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THE

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RELIGION, THEOLOGY, AND
PHILOSOPHY

EDITED BY

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AND

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THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

THE MISCARRIAGE OF LIFE IN THE WEST.

P. RĀMANĀTHAN, C.M.G., K.C.,

H.M. Solicitor-General, Ceylon.

How interesting to every thoughtful person is the problem whether his life is carrying him to the proper goal or not! The mind that runs indiscreetly with the senses, as they go a-hunting for sights, sound, smells, touches, and tastes, is much too occupied with external things to grasp the importance of this issue. When the senses get wearied of their respective works, they fall asleep and rise freshened for the hunt again. At a later stage of existence, when the evils of self-indulgence have been repeatedly felt and much pain caused thereby to the mind, it refuses to run promiscuously with the senses; and the senses, deprived of the willing support of the mind, remain proportionately undrawn by sense-objects. It is at this period of comparative peace that the mind comes to know its separateness from the senses and its capacity for righteous work by control of the senses, formation of sound thoughts, and correlation of them in the way that leads to the discovery of what lies under the surface of things. What is the first deep truth learnt in this manner, as the result or fruit of worldly experience, by the analytic mind which refuses to be in bondage to

the senses? It is this—the beauty of things perceived by the senses turns into ugliness, and the joys arising from them change into sorrows. The more clearly one sees that the attractions of nature, including the human body, and the pleasures which spring from a contemplation of them, are as perishable as quicksand heaps in a flowing river, the more urgent to him becomes the solution of the problem whether his life is carrying him to the proper destination or not. For if the mind is convinced that it is folly to be wedded too deeply to things perceivable by the senses, owing to the certainty of their decay and disappearance, it will assuredly turn from such passing shows and look eagerly for something more real in the world to occupy itself with, and delight in, without the interruptions of sorrow, anger, and hate. Such is the experience of men and women on whom the truth has dawned that beautiful forms and sensuous pleasures wither like the grass of the field. It is to this class of persons that the question of the miscarriage of life will be of interest.

We have next to consider what life means in such expressions as “the miscarriage of life,” “the right use of life,” and “is life worth caring for?” In regard to these phrases, which, be it noted, rise instinctively to the lips of those who are not too fond of sensuous enjoyments, it will not do to think of life as a round of pleasures, or as joys mixed with sorrows, or as animate existence with its phases of growth and decay. None of these meanings will help us to answer rightly the question raised, for in it is involved the profound truth, little known to the sensuous-minded, but universally attested by sanctified sages as an incontrovertible fact, that souls have been endowed with instruments of breath, knowledge, and action, as well as different spheres of training (such as home, school and profession, married life and society, government and politics, industry and amusement), for the beneficent purpose of emancipating themselves from corruption; and therefore, unless “life” is taken to mean the aggregate of those ministers of the soul who labour for it, the question whether one’s “life”

is "carrying" one to his destination or not, cannot be answered properly.

The truth that "life," in one of its deeper senses, means the ministers of the soul, has been recognised by thoughtful men in the West. About thirty years ago, when the views of Schopenhauer and Hartmann began to prevail and the question "Is life worth living?" became the topic of the day, it was conceded that "life" was a mystery in all its forms, vegetable, animal, and human, and various were the solutions offered in the monthly magazines of the period. Speaking of human life, St George Mivart said: "An inevitable instinct impels us all to seek our own happiness and to gratify our passions and desires, though we are by no means compelled always in all cases to choose whatever we most like. Yet, however we may suffer ourselves to be borne passively along the pleasure-seeking current, our reason can, even while we are so borne along, ask the question: Are we rational if we acquiesce in happiness as the supreme and deliberate aim of our life? The answer of reason to itself must surely be that the rational end of life is that which *should* be its end, *i.e.* which ought to be its end; and 'ought' is meaningless without the conception 'duty.'" He came to the conclusion that "life" meant fulfilment of duty; for such fulfilment the will should be exercised in accordance with reason and apart from the pleasures of the moment; and that the exercise of the will in this manner was the highest act of which we are capable, and that to which all our lower passions and faculties minister (art. on "The Meaning of Life," in the *Nineteenth Century*, March 1879).

Reason and will are, indeed, most important parts of life. But life is more than reason and will, for the "life" of a man is said to be extinct when his "breath" ceases to function in the body. What is this "breath"? It is not a passing breeze chased away by another which follows it. The breath of life, that is, the "breath" *called* "life" (as in the expression "the continent of Europe," which means the continent *called*

Europe) is not a passing gust, but an aerially-constituted power which expires and inspires in a settled rhythmic manner, while located in the body, and which in the act of inspiring draws the atmospheric air into the channels of the body, and in the act of expiring expels it in regular succession, and which further makes many other delicate adjustments conducive to the safety and proper working of the mind and body. It is called *prāna* in Sanskrit, or life, or the principle of breath, or the breather, because, say the sages, it is not only powerful but also intelligent in its own way, and accommodates itself to every conceivable position, and keeps order among other aerially-constituted powers within us, when disarrangement takes place. Sages skilled in *prānāyāma yoga*, or the art of breath-control, and their apt pupils, are equally certain that the *prāna* (or the breath named life) in the body permeates every other instrument of the soul, and imparts to them both initiatory movement and endurance in their respective works. Hence the word *prāna*, or life, is often used to include all its colleagues.

The greatest of these colleagues is the mind (*manas*), the thinker, or the intelligent and powerful entity which makes thought out of sense-percepts, and correlates them in the most wonderful manner. In the *Bhagavad Gītā* is declared the truth that the mind is the instrument by which the resurrection of the soul or spirit is effected. "The uplifting of the soul (*ātma uddhāranam*) from corruption has to be done by the mind. Since mind only is the ally of the soul, and mind only the enemy of the soul, the mind should not be made impure by letting it run on sensuous things" (vi. 5). A mind that capers about indiscreetly with the senses becomes quite useless for the edification of the soul. It cannot build it up in love and light. If the ministers of the soul do not assiduously keep themselves clear of the pollutions of worldliness, which is another name for that element of corruption in man which impels him to be selfish and to indulge freely in the grosser forms of sensuous enjoyment, they will not be able to guide or carry the soul to its proper haven of Light and

Love. Overcome by the wild fancies of ignorance and hate, they will drift further and further away from that glorious port with their precious charge. This drifting away of the mind into sensuous planes, and its inability to serve the spirit as it should, is the meaning of "life miscarrying." It must be carefully remembered that we are now concerned with inner, not outward things; that the Light and Love to be reached, as well as the soul and its guides or carriers, are housed in the body; that the journey of life does not mean the movement of the body from one place to another in the objective world, but the turning of the mind from things worldly to things godly, and the awakening of the soul to a knowledge of God; and that unless the mind and the other ministers of the soul are cultured and strengthened, under the direction of apt teachers, for lawful and loveful works, they cannot quicken the soul, *i.e.* make the soul to recognise its fallen condition and rise to its own spiritual state, so as to know (as only it can know) and be at one with God, the Eternal Being, who is in all, through all, and above all, who is imperceptible to the senses and unthinkable by the mind, but who is knowable by the purified soul. It is positively true that the awakening of the soul to God does not take place till the interest of its ministers turns from the things of the flesh to the things of the spirit (soul). The moment the mind's attention or gaze is fixed steadily inwards, the soul awakens, like the lotus-bud in the morning sun, and gives all its energy to the study of itself and its relationship with God and the subjective and objective worlds.

The solution of the problem of the miscarriage of life thus necessitates a careful examination and ascertainment of

- (1) The being and properties of the soul;
- (2) The nature of the corrupt power which holds the soul in bondage;
- (3) The being and ways of God, who mercifully emancipates the soul and takes it back, when purified, to be in constant fellowship with Him;

- (4) The nature and functions of the different instruments with which the soul is endowed for the attainment of spiritual freedom ;
- (5) The spheres of training ordained for the culture and purification of the instruments of the soul ; and
- (6) The special methods by which the soul may be sanctified, that is, isolated from all the entanglements of corruption.

This is a severe course of study and training which will tax one's powers to the utmost, but it is fully worth the trouble, because it is the very kind of education which, when combined with exercises in godliness, leads to actual knowledge of God, and to a complete emancipation from sorrow, anger, fear, and hate.

Supposing we have students qualified in mind and body to hear and understand the truths relating to spiritual life, our first duty to them is to free them from the vain convictions to which they have been bred from their infancy—to disentangle them from the bonds of common mistake as well as of learned ignorance. Every land and age has its own obstructions to the comprehension and practice of the principles of true life. The difficulties which beset the seeker in India at the present day, for instance, are different from those of the seeker in Europe. A consideration of the main causes of the miscarriage of life in India—such as, firstly, the corporeal caste system which has all but strangled the intellectual caste system taught by sages under the name of *Varnāśrama Dharma*, for the practical advancement of all who would be spiritual in every part of the globe ; and, secondly, the utter forgetfulness of the truth that the works section of the Vedas and Agamas was designed only for awakening the spirit to a knowledge of itself and of God—is not called for in this paper. For the present we must concern ourselves with the obstacles in Christendom to spiritual progress.

In Western lands there is little effort made to distinguish between the kernel and the shell—the essence and the excres-

cences—of religion. Notwithstanding the assurance of Christ Jesus that His doctrines existed from the foundation of the world, those who call themselves Christians attach the greatest importance to the history of verbal controversies in the different centuries following His era. More than thirty years ago, Mr Gladstone bewailed “the singularly multiform and confused aspect of religious thought in Christendom,” and said : “At every point there start into action multitudes of aimless or erratic forces, crossing and jostling one another, and refusing not only to be governed, but even to be classified. Any attempt to group them, however slightly and however roughly, if not hopeless, is daring” (art. on “The Courses of Religious Thought,” in the *Contemp. Rev.*, June 1876). The numerous controversies which have arisen in and out of Christian councils are due to the literary ability as well as the spiritual ignorance of those learned in the words of the Bible. Not being delivered from “the oldness of the letter,” as observed by St Paul, which corresponds to the *purva paksham* of Indian epistemology, they have been too prone to differentiate and too contentious, and this attitude of the mind is fatal to the religious life itself. Such persons know not what religion truly is, and are therefore addicted to the habit of attaching needless importance to unessential growths in Christian belief. Narrow in mind, they seek to monopolise God, though He is everywhere, and has manifested Himself from the remotest times, æons before Jesus was sanctified and sent into Judæa, up to the present day, to everyone who has renounced at heart the deceptive attractions of the world and longed for grace. How few in Christendom know that religion does not consist in words, professions, and ceremonies, but in heartfelt longing for the Imperishable Substrate of all things ! The names and forms, ideals and practices of every creed, are intended only to create a love for God, a bond of union between God and man. Religion, from *religare*, to bind, is the love-bond which unites man to God. This love of God is the essence of religion. When it has arisen in the heart, it is destined to grow fuller

and fuller by association with godly men and by frequent meditation on things spiritual, and to enter into union with Love Infinite, even as a river fed by perennial streams is bound to join the ocean, howsoever distant. Articles of faith and dogmatic teachings, being only methods for causing the love of God to spring in the heart, are not religion in the highest sense of the term, for the religious man is he who lives for God through love of God. He is not controversial, defiant, or monopolising. He is not jealous that God has manifested Himself beyond the bounds of his own sect. He welcomes with joy the tidings of divine grace wheresoever shown, for he knows that his God lives and reigns far beyond his own little neighbourhood.

Another grand difficulty in the West is the triumvirate of theology, philosophy, and science, which have made sceptics and agnostics of seekers by thousands. For fifteen centuries after the days of Jesus, the people implicitly believed the bishops and clergy of the Church. But when the fierce controversies of the Reformation arose, and the current of thought initiated by Bacon, Descartes, Locke and others began to flow steadily, widened by the discoveries of physical science and astronomy, the intelligent among the faithful were dismayed to find that the authorities of the Church were not, in the words of St Paul, "apt to teach or convince the gain-sayers." Their faith was shaken when the increasing sense of law produced by the study of physical sciences forced them "more and more to attribute all the phenomena that meet them in actual life or history to normal, rather than to abnormal, agencies" (Lecky's *History of Rationalism in Europe*, ch. iii.). They could not believe in abnormal revelations and miracles, nor accept the usual interpretations of the hard sayings of the Bible. The ancient claim of theology to speak with authority on all subjects of inquiry was rejected, and indeed relinquished: "It restricts itself to the region of faith, and leaves to philosophy and science the region of inquiry" (Lewes' *History of Philosophy*, Prolog. 1). In this

field of free investigation, science deals with demonstrable or verifiable facts only, and philosophy consists of the interpretations of such facts and their possible causes, as also of purely speculative thought respecting things that transcend the senses. The West is ruled by this strange coalition. But there is no cohesion or consistency in it. The standpoints of view of the theologian, the philosopher, and the scientist are different from each other. The theologian proclaims God as the goal of life, believing the testimony of the Biblical sages. The philosopher and the scientist have no such belief or goal, being prepared to go wherever the imaginative or hypothetical reasoning of the one, or the matter-of-fact experiment (on bodies perceivable by the senses) of the other, takes them. "We have scanned the heavens and the earth, but we have no evidence of God's existence; we do not know Him," say they. It is thus not difficult to see that the so-called triumvirate is a house divided against itself. The three powers confound and unsettle each other, and everyone else, by their discordant notes. Hence, it is usual in the West to say: "Science declares so and so, philosophy so and so, and theology so and so; and now what do *you* say?" And the reply is: "I don't *know*, I am sure, but I *think* it is so and so." What progress is possible in this unsettled state of knowledge, in this reign of controversy?

Nevertheless, the West is firmly persuaded that it is progressing satisfactorily. It is proud of its "success" in industry, science, and politics, and claims to have created, and to live in, an age of progress. "Fifty years of ever-broadening commerce, fifty years of ever-brightening science, and fifty years of ever-widening empire," represent the cry of those who are satisfied with material prosperity, even though its silver lines are set on a background of squalid poverty and lawless schemes of revolution. Are we really living in an age of progress, or is it only a flattering fancy which obstructs a true perspective of life and lulls people to slumber in error, in imminent peril of losing a life's opportunity? The subject is worthy of careful analysis.

What is the true position of Western nations in regard to what is called industrial progress?

Industry is the diligent employment of the mind, hand, and eye (or any other sense) on the production of something that is useful or ornamental; and industrial progress is the constant exercise of the creative talent upon the production of things for sensuous enjoyment. To the producer his occupation brings some money by the sale of his work, so that he is able to supply himself and those whom he loves with the needs and comforts of the body. A more enduring return to the steadfast worker is the improvement of his mind. When it is set upon industrial work regularly, it becomes steady, sharp, and discriminating, and therefore thinks straight and sees clear, especially if it is literate and law-abiding. It then becomes reflective. During this stage of introspection it discovers signs of the spirit within, and its interest in matters concerning the spirit grows to be keen. Even as in days gone by the mind stood united to the things of the flesh, it now prefers union with the spirit. Once carnally-minded and therefore disturbed easily, given to hate, wanting in restfulness and crass in understanding, it is now spiritually-minded, and therefore forgiving, charitable, peaceful, and enlightened. This is the history of the mind set on industrial work. That work, done ably and with a law-abiding heart, is indeed the way to the goal called spiritual-mindedness, or that state of the mind wherein it does not allow itself to be drawn this way or that way by the likes and dislikes of the body, but remains true to the spirit, which is love and light.

Two classes of benefits flow from industrial work, one external and the other internal. The external benefits are the supplying of increased comforts and conveniences to the body and the embellishing of houses and cities. But these are all perishable. Taught to make bubbles out of soap and water, a boy gave his mind to that work, blew the bubbles through his tube, and contemplated them as they floated gaily in the air. The hand that worked to produce the

glittering effect rested, as the mind and eye watched the vainglorious thing fading in the distance. The boy felt happy, but that happiness was as fleeting as the bubble itself. In a similar way did Alexander the Great and Napoleon the First project empires, which rose and burst even as they were looking on. The external benefits of work, industrial or political, are comparatively of little value to the worker himself. To him, far more important is the internal benefit accruing to the mind which has done its work ably and justly. Such a mind, being cleansed and strengthened, becomes qualified for the higher work of calm reflection and meditation, by which alone the spirit within may be found. If men, individually or collectively, rest content with the external benefits of industrial work, without striving hard for the internal benefits also, the chief end of industrial work will be missed.

The expansion of the industrial arts at home and the attainment of commercial supremacy abroad are not commendable if they stand divorced from spirituality. The spread of perishable wares for the convenience and adornment of perishable bodies is vain if the producers and carriers of them do not know how to save their souls from wreck and ruin in the wide seas of sensuousness and mean competition, and if the consumers of the goods do not take care to buy only what they really need and so prevent the pampering of the senses, which promotes the growth of emotion, irreverence, and frivolity. The industry and commerce of England, which are said to be the "foundations of her pride," are, in the absence of love for the welfare of the spirit, like fuel to the fire of sensuousness, which, alas! has been burning in the people for some centuries, and slowly withering what is holy and beautiful in them. If the artisans and traders of the country live for the spirit, while working hard for the maintenance of the body and the improvement of the cities, they will be a shining light and perpetual source of joy to their brethren at home and to everyone else abroad.

Next comes this question—How does the West stand in truth in regard to what is called scientific progress?

With the microscope, telescope, and the chemical-tube the man of Western science assays all things perceivable by the senses, turns into horse-power the manifestations of nature, called of old “flesh,” and utilises its brute forces either for the more rapid production and transport of commodities, or for the destruction of enemies by novel implements of warfare. The scope of Western science is thus limited, as in the case of the industrial arts, to that which relates to the body. Its methods of inquiry prevent it from the study of the invisible spirit. Though it recognises the fact that the visible came from the invisible, it declines to predicate anything of the invisible. It says nothing of the spirit, or of the bondage of the spirit to darkness, or of the extrication of the spirit therefrom. It has no spiritual discernment. Indeed, it does not know what that expression means. It has not heard of, much less experienced, the fact that there are three kinds of knowledge available: firstly, what the spirit knows through the senses; secondly, what it knows through the deductions and inductions of the mind; and thirdly, what it knows directly, without the intervention of the senses or the mind. Western science is ignorant of the distinction between worldly knowledge and godly knowledge. Worldly knowledge consists of the reports of the senses and the inferences of the mind; and godly knowledge consists of what the soul only can know *when it stands isolate*—as most assuredly it can by due culture—*from the senses and the mind*. Western science is wholly ignorant of this isolation or alone-becoming of the soul, so well known to sanctified sages, and called by them in Sanscrit *Kaivalyam*, *Sānti*, *Ekatvam*, and in Greek *Mono-geneia*. Ignorant of the absolute existence of the invisible spirit and of its capacity to know God during isolation, and to know the world in combination with the senses and the mind, and obliged by the particular methods of inquiry

which Western science has imposed upon itself, it disowns the spirit, the most real thing in the universe. There is no justification in truth for remaining in this state of agnosticism and continuing to be an ally of atheism. If it would only step out of its narrow sense-plane and study under proper guidance the deep-lying truths of the larger soul-plane, called the kingdom of the spirit, as assiduously as it has studied the secrets of the kingdom of nature, what a change would there be in the heart of all Europe! It would pass from carnal-mindedness, and that bondage of the intellect to the senses which is complacently called rationalism, to spiritual-mindedness, poise, and love of God. Its cities would be abodes of righteousness and peace, and not of selfishness, strife, and gnawing desire. Then, indeed, should we speak of the glories of scientific progress.

And now of political progress.

In the East the populace admit that, owing to want of means and leisure, they are obliged to forego the advantages of learning and culture save in exceptional cases. Respecting the law as the doctrine of neighbourly love enforced by the government of the country, they mind their own business, and rely patiently and trustfully on the guidance of their spiritual teachers and the consideration of the wealthy and the learned, who are themselves not unmindful of the spirit. This ideal of living in the world, not for the pampering of the senses but for the purification of the spirit and for its development in love and true knowledge, necessarily involves not only a genuine obedience to the law and to every constituted authority, such as parent, teacher, employer, magistrate, and other rulers of the people, but also a constant desire to practise forbearance on the part of both the rulers and the ruled. In these circumstances the word "government" does not mean one body of people domineering over another body, but all classes of minds governing themselves by the dictates of neighbourly love as interpreted by time-honoured customs.

The early history of man proves that social relationships

originally rested on consanguinity, common language, and common worship, and that any new question which did not come within the purview of an existing custom had to be decided by the unanimous consent of all the heads of families which formed the brotherhood. In the West also this rule of unanimity prevailed in ancient times in the settlement of public questions, and a survival of it in the present day may be seen in trial by jury. But the ties of blood, language, and worship, which conduce to unity of sentiment and action, become ineffective for that end when foreign ideals have been allowed to take root in the minds of the people. The introduction of strange principles in a homogeneous community leads to the suppression or modification of established modes of thought and the espousal of new opinions. In this conflict of thought it is impossible to determine questions affecting the welfare of the mixed people by the rule of unanimity, which is founded on love. A new rule was necessary for the adjustment of differences arising in a polity composed of heterogeneous masses and interests, and the rough and ready rule of majority, based on the force of numbers, was chosen. The two rules are different in kind. Unanimity involves mutual concession, but the majority in agreement means the rejection of the wishes of the minority. The former rule gives satisfaction all round and broadens love in the heart; but the latter quenches love and breeds resentment in the party defeated. To persons who prize the spiritual qualities of self-effacement, patience, and forbearance, the rule of majority is positively unholy, desecrating; but it looks natural to those who are not spiritual-minded, and to those who have backslidden from spirituality to secularity. And what is meant by the secularisation of politics? A polity which lives for this world only, and is ever in a hurry to wield power and secure for itself the perishable things of sensuous life by short cuts, esteeming it a virtue to be self-assertive, and to bawl, hustle, and smash in order to have its own way against the cherished desires and needs of others, is said to be "secularised."

Political progress in the West means nothing more than the victories of majorities over minorities in parliament, diet, or senate. It does not mean a series of well-chosen measures for the development of righteousness and the expansion of love in the individual. Many of the triumphs of majorities have indeed abated or suppressed tyranny and other forms of abuse of political power, but who can tell how many blessings have been lost to the world by the defeat of minorities? It is usual to speak highly of the Reform Act of 1832, but for some years past it has been seen to be the means by which the government of the empire is passing into the hands of common labourers, and the cause of many a coming storm in the sea of socialism. Some fifty years earlier than the Reform Act happened the French Revolution, which secured for the masses what it called "political equality." The true meaning of this expression is little known. It denotes the idea that one human body is as good as another, that the body of a prime minister is no better than that of his coachman or footman. It ignores the deeper truth that minds in human bodies are really of different orders of intelligence and ability, and that therefore it is wrong, in the nature of things, to invest one order of minds with the work which is suitable only to another order. In a family it is the parents who must rule, because their minds see further and are less influenced by currents of selfishness or other disturbing factors than the minds of their children. Even so, in the government of a polity, it is the most enlightened and capable minds that should be entrusted with the power of directing its affairs. It is ruinous in the highest degree to invite the unlearned, the fickle, the impatient, and the irascible, who form the majority of the world, either to rule the country or to elect representatives for that purpose. Only those who are behind the scenes know the ingenious, costly, and difficult contrivances by which the evils and dangers of popular government are sought to be minimised or averted, —by which the enfranchised populace are attempted to be "snared and taken" by a comparatively small body of men

who are actuated by public spirit, or who believe themselves to be fit to guide the people and represent their interests in parliament. The work of teaching the people the nature of the public questions as they rise from time to time, and the work of carrying them safely to the poll, involve most anxious thought, strenuous labour, and heavy expenditure of money on the part of this small body of men, who employ thousands of agents to go among, and convert, the people. Thus arises the enthralling game of politics in the West. The aim of each player is to make his party take up his cry, and the aim of each party is to make the majority of the people take up that cry. When that is achieved, the ruling ministers who form the government are expected to give effect to the wishes of the majority by legislative enactment or executive order; and if they do not, they should resign office and make room for another ministry. In this wise is maintained the never-ending political drama. It is exciting, and often amusing, and is commonly believed to be a struggle for the liberty of the people.

“The great characteristic of modern politics,” said Mr W. E. H. Lecky, “is the struggle for political liberty in its widest sense—the desire to make the will of the people the basis of the government—the conviction that a nation has a right to alter a government that opposes its sentiment.” But surely the will of the people is not the will of a little more than half its number; nor can the liberty of the majority, which involves the slavery of the minority, be justly called political liberty. It is this strange medley of freedom and bondage which stands proudly in the West for political progress. One of its worst features is that the middle and the cultured classes, who form the most sensible part of the nation, are without political power owing to their smallness in number. “They have as little power now,” said Mr Walter Bagehot, “as they had before 1832; and the only difference is that before 1832 they were ruled by those richer than themselves, and now they are ruled by those poorer.” If they

desire for legislative or municipal power, they must woo and win the populace in the way the latter like, and that way is the profane way that sickens the gentle and the righteous.

It is not difficult now to see the true meaning of the saying that we are living in an age of progress. It simply means we are living in an age which, for want of proper judgment and poise, believes in change of any kind as a sure remedy for the tedium of work and idleness, and whose appetite is therefore keenly set on all those mechanical improvements which have been invented from day to day for facilitating business or amusement. Such an age, having no adequate conception of the evils of luxury or of the greatness of work for its own sake, takes no pains to restrain the senses when they distract the mind, or to abate the play of the imagination as a means of conserving one's energy. It does not know the truth that sensuousness unfits the mind for its proper work of uplifting the soul. It claims to make us better to-day than we were yesterday, and to make us better to-morrow than we are to-day ; but that is only better in food, raiment, wealth, household furniture, equipage, social position, and rank,—to be better in all that relates to the glorification of the perishable body, but not in anything that conduces to the purity of the eternal spirit. In this betterment of the body, the poor are striving hard to keep pace with the middle classes, the middle classes with the richer classes, the rich man with the millionaire, and the millionaire with the multimillionaire. This feverish desire to earn more and spend more on the feeding and dressing of the body, and supplying it and the senses with every object of gratification, is robbing all classes of the people, from the highest to the lowest, of that peace of mind and poise which are essential to the safety of the body, as well as of the spirit. The nervous restlessness which characterises life in Western cities is not the mark of true progress or sound civilisation. This is felt to be so by the cultured few in those very cities, who are puzzled and amazed at the “ up-to-date ” craze, which is slowly but surely quench-

ing the spirit, and so ruining the most valuable asset alike of the individual and the nation.

It is folly to call this wide expansion of sensuousness and worldliness an Age of Progress. Sages declare that cities get filled with the rural population when love of finery and amusement dominate the minds of the people. The flight of the peasantry from agricultural holdings into towns, known already to be too full of the unemployed and unemployable, is like the rush of insects into a bonfire lit in a tropical night, and affords positive proof that the spread of sensuous ideals is breaking up the very foundations of society. The steady backsliding of every class into deeper depths of worldliness, irreligion, and frivolity, is utterly inconsistent with true progress or true civilisation, by which is meant the ideas and practices which consciously uplift a nation from the corruptions of sensuousness and unrighteousness to a higher plane of life, where reverence for the spirit and its careful extrication from the mazes of worldliness are the chief aims of human endeavour.

P. RÁMANÁTHAN.

COLOMBO, CEYLON.

A CHINESE STATESMAN'S VIEW OF RELIGION.

CHARLES JOHNSTON,

Late Bengal Civil Service.

By a piece of good fortune I was able, not long ago, to discuss many aspects of life and religion with his Excellency Kang Yu Wei. Let me try to indicate the position of this distinguished man, who is one of the foremost living Orientals.

Those who followed events in China during the critical period just before the "Boxer" outbreak of 1900 will remember that the young Emperor Kuang-su had adopted a very liberal programme, and had announced his wish to do for China what the Emperor Mutsuhito and the Elder Statesmen had done for Japan. The age-old system of Civil Service Examinations based on the Confucian Classics was to be abolished, to make way for modern methods. The countless loopholes for corruption, which made the Chinese government a system of bribery, were to be closed. Modern science was to take root at the very doors of the Forbidden City. A new Medical College was to oust the ancient Chinese quackery, with its charms and simples. And the Six Boards, the very stronghold of Chinese conservatism, were to be done away with, a modern Cabinet being created in their stead. Warm admiration for Japan was expressed, and it was even rumoured that the Emperor Kuang-su wished to invite Marquis Ito to Peking, to advise him in the renovation of China.

Then came a spectacular transformation. A new edict

announced that the Emperor Kuang-su, conscious of his youth and inexperience, had begged his titular mother, the Empress Dowager, to aid him with her wise counsel and long experience. It was added, very significantly, that the recent decrees abolishing the Six Boards, the old Civil Service, and the traditional system of quackery, and establishing fiscal reforms and a new Medical College, were withdrawn, and that China would henceforth continue in the ancient ways wherein she had walked so long, as the most civilised nation in the world. Immediately after this new edict, the power of the reactionaries, with Prince Tuan at their head, began to be felt increasingly; the attitude towards "foreign devils" became more and more menacing, till the final explosion at Taku and Peking, in the early summer of 1900.

So much was visible from the front. Had we been able to go behind the scenes, to watch the secret springs of action in the Forbidden City, we should have seen the genius of the first transformation at work: a Cantonese by birth, a man of genius, who had rapidly attained the highest official positions in the state, and had finally gained the fullest confidence of the youthful Emperor Kuang-su. This Mentor, taking Japan as his text, convinced Kuang-su that there was no salvation for China in the old ostrich-like methods of obscurantism and seclusion; that the Manchu bowmen could not withstand Maxim guns. He helped Kuang-su to see that only on modern principles of effectiveness, of real education and real work, could China hope to hold her own in the commonwealth of nations; and that, if she really espoused these principles, and heartily applied them, she might one day become one of the greatest of nations.

Under the wise guidance of this Cantonese Mentor, one reform after another was conceived and outlined, and the weak places in China's armour were laid bare. But such reforms as these had hosts of violent enemies, and the storm of opposition grew steadily blacker, until the Empress Dowager, Tszu-Hszi, the splendid and savage old woman who was well

nicknamed "the only man in China," came like the blind fury with the abhorred shears to slit the thin-spun life of the too venturesome Cantonese reformer. A sudden flight, an almost miraculous escape on a British warship, and Kang Yu Wei fled from China, with a price on his head. This is what might have been seen behind the scenes during that sudden and spectacular transformation.

From the day of his flight, Kang Yu Wei has toiled unceasingly for the redemption of his motherland, travelling through many countries, building up reform organisations among the most influential Chinamen throughout the world; instructing young men in his ideals; everywhere the idol of young China; dauntless, cheerful-hearted, indefatigable, toiling day and night, yet maintaining always the detachment and aloofness of the true philosopher. Through all his wanderings, Kang Yu Wei has always kept in touch with the young Emperor Kuang-su; and now that the long life of the Dowager Empress is visibly drawing to a close, the chance of his return, once more to direct the policy of his vast motherland, grows daily greater. Kang Yu Wei may be lifted in a day to the most influential position in the largest and oldest of the family of nations. His ideals, his beliefs, his prejudices even, may become determining factors in world politics.

This is hardly the place to speak of the details of his policy, which Kang Yu Wei was good enough to explain at some length; but perhaps I may be pardoned if I add a personal touch, as it well illustrates this gifted man's mood and temper. Kang Yu Wei is no wild-eyed revolutionary. On the contrary, he is moderate, urbane, gentle, full of humour, and deeply religious in inspiration. When so many Orientals have adopted Western dress, Kang Yu Wei is still a typical Chinaman. He wears the gold-laced jacket, and the high mandarin's cap with coral button; a blue silk skirt and embroidered Chinese slippers complete the portrait. There is something even more Oriental, in the best sense, in the

mobility and refinement of his face, in the delicate vivacity of his hands, and in his courtly and sympathetic manners.

After we had spoken of the regeneration of China, her need of an enlightened industrialism, of a modern fleet and army, the conversation turned to religion. Kang Yu Wei declared that he had the spiritual revival of China even more at heart than her political regeneration. He declared that he had always been a close student of religions; that he had studied and translated the two thousand texts of Buddhism; and that he found the great humane principles of religion in Buddhism and Christianity alike. He further told me that he always visited in the spirit of a pilgrim the centres or shrines of religious tradition; that he had sought relics of Martin Luther at Eisenach; and that, on a recent visit to Spain, he found in a monastery near Toledo much the same spirit of devout silence that had struck him in the lamaseries of Tibet.

This brief talk suggested so many interesting problems, that I gladly took advantage of another opportunity to talk of religion with this Chinese man of genius, and some of the things which he said on that occasion I shall now try to record.

I asked Kang Yu Wei, who has studied the Gospels profoundly, what seems to him the most striking quality in the character of Jesus. He answered, somewhat to my surprise, as we generally lay the emphasis elsewhere, that what appealed to him most, in the personality of Jesus, was his courage—the manliness which could so quietly and dauntlessly face the hatred of so many of his fellow-countrymen, the fierce enmity of the powerful Pharisees, and, above all, the certainty of death, and of the outward failure of his mission; the courage which undertook a work so constructive, the valour which could make, and could ask from others, such large sacrifices. The positive attitude of authority and power, maintained by one who was, outwardly, a homeless wanderer, seemed to Kang Yu Wei the dominant note in the character of Jesus. His courage stood first; next to courage came his love. And

Kang Yu Wei had been deeply impressed by the fact that the love of Jesus, profound, abundant, and all-embracing as it was, was yet wholly free from weakness and sentimentalism ; could, indeed, be terribly stern on occasion, as when he scourged the money-changers from the Temple.

The question of the miracles naturally came up. Kang Yu Wei declared that he believed that the accounts of them were true, and added that the East had always had the tradition of miraculous power associated with great holiness. In his view, Jesus had used his spiritual powers to work what we call miracles, in order to fix the attention of his disciples and the multitudes on his spiritual message : " Believe me that I am in the Father, and the Father in me : or else believe me for the very works' sake." Kang Yu Wei made a comparison with the miracles attributed to Buddha, who, at the beginning of his mission, while talking to his disciples in a cave, produced the form of a serpent, which he then took in his hands, and caused to vanish. Miracles of healing, such as restoring sight to the blind, are also attributed to the Buddha.

Further, Kang Yu Wei laid special stress on the way in which the teaching and personality of Jesus have woven themselves into the fabric of Western history, as the most potent factor in the development of Christendom. He spoke especially of the work of Clovis, and of the dramatic scene in the cathedral of Rheims, which in a certain sense was the birthday of modern Europe. He was also profoundly conscious of the part played by the Church in the culture of the Latin nations ; and we have already seen that he was an interested student of the life-work of Martin Luther. So that we may say that Kang Yu Wei recognised that a large part in the development of Western history, of the modern state with its ideas of civil rights, of individual liberty, of humanity, is to be attributed to the personality and teaching of Jesus, and this quite independently of our view of his spiritual standing. Jesus is the greatest single factor in the development of the Western world.

At this point in our talk, a situation arose which had a strong element of humour. As we had just discussed the historical and even the political aspects of the work of Jesus, it was natural that I should seek to learn Kang Yu Wei's views of its more spiritual sides. Therefore I asked him what he thought of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. He looked at me rather keenly before replying; and I think that, behind the urbane and courteous countenance of the statesman, there was something of the reticence of the Oriental, when confronted by the pushing, inquiring, and very often sneering "foreign devil." The good gentleman did not wish to have his shrines rashly invaded.

My impression that his thought was running in some such channel was strengthened by his question: "What do you yourself think about the soul's immortality?"

I was able to reply that I held immortality to be the great and illuminating central truth in life; that which gave meaning and power to all the rest. And one detected something like a delicate expression of relief and satisfaction pass over the mobile, gifted, strong face of the Chinese statesman.

Thereupon he began to unfold to me his own view, putting his conclusions rather in the form of question and speculation; yet one could see that he held quite clearly and firmly to these lightly indicated ideas. If I mistake not, Kang Yu Wei, while believing firmly in the immortality of the soul, does not believe that all men are equally immortal; that all men have only to pass through physical death, in order to enter the ranks of the immortals. He believes rather, I convinced myself, that immortality is something to be attained, something to be won, and something which, in the full sense, all men cannot be said to win. He spoke of strong souls and weak souls; of souls made strong by courage and sacrifice, by daring and unselfish work for others; souls that soar on wings of high attainment into the clearer air of spiritual being; of such souls as these, he believes that conscious immortal life after death is the reward. On the other hand,

there are weak, cowardly, indifferent souls, who are to be thought of as rather prone upon the earth; and the full measure of immortality is not for these.

I was struck by the curious resemblance of this belief to that expressed by Goethe, who also held that not all souls are equally immortal; that full immortality is the prize and crown of heroic endeavour, of noble virtue, of undaunted self-sacrifice; that the spiritual body must grow, so to speak, to the full immortal stature. After all, does not St Paul suggest the same idea, in the famous fifteenth chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians? "It is sown in weakness, it is raised in strength; it is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption; it is sown a physical body, it is raised a spiritual body."

This resemblance to the view of Goethe suggested another question. Goethe believed in immortality, not only in the future, but in the past, and declared that not only did he hope to live again, and live many times, but that he believed he had lived many times in the past; and that his strong sympathy for certain periods of imperial Rome was a half-conscious reminiscence carried over from a former life. In the same way, Goethe suggested that intuitive sympathy and love for certain people may be carried over from another life, may be the picking up of threads spun long before.

Therefore I asked Kang Yu Wei whether he also believed in previous existence, and in the possibility of a memory of former times, so that we come "not in entire forgetfulness." Once more there was the quick glance of inquiry, lest the foreigner might heedlessly step on consecrated ground. But this time the reassurance was instant. Yes, Kang Yu Wei did believe that the soul must in some sense be immortal in the past as in the future; that we must struggle toward the goal of fully conscious immortality through a long series of experiences, in which battle after battle must be waged, victory after victory painfully won. As to memory of past experiences and former lives, Kang Yu Wei seemed to associate it with the growth of the soul. Strong, valiant souls, which have grown

to full stature and "attained," may, in his view, gain also a full memory of the past; and there must be all degrees, through partial and shadowy reminiscence, down to complete forgetfulness and mere oblivion.

So much as to the chief matters of speculation. We spoke also more particularly of China and her religious life. As a high official who had gained the Chinese degrees, it need not be said that Kang Yu Wei was thoroughly familiar with the texts of Confucianism. His knowledge, indeed, has grown to warm enthusiasm, and he insists that the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are cardinal doctrines of the Confucian system. I was greatly surprised to find that his dislike for Lao-Tze and the Tao Teh King seems as marked as his love and admiration for Confucius. He insists that the Taoist texts are either mistranslated or not yet translated at all, and that the Western view of this teacher is quite erroneous. Lao-Tze, he said, was an obscurantist, who taught that the people should be kept in ignorance, in order that they might be the more easily governed. I fancied that he almost identified Lao-Tze with certain reactionary forces at Peking in our own day.

These, in brief, are the views which I was so fortunate as to be able to glean from the Chinese statesman who may yet be destined to play a leading part on the world's stage. I think they are as reassuring as is his personality; and I can well believe him when he says that he would willingly renounce the stormy and perilous life of a reformer for the quiet paths of religion and philosophy, were it not that he feels drawn to the more arduous task by a strong sense of duty and moral obligation. There is much of sacrifice in his life. Let us hope that the future may bring him the reward he covets, of successful achievement for others.

CHARLES JOHNSTON.

NEW YORK.

THE MOSLEM TRADITION OF JESUS' SECOND VISIT ON EARTH.

CAPTAIN F. W. VON HERBERT.

WHEN, as a youngster of seventeen, I was in the Turkish service, I loved to have theological discussions with brother-officers of my age, like me fresh from school. In the course of these the remark was often hurled at me: "When your Jesus comes again"—such and such a thing will happen; so often, by such widely different men, with such assertiveness and force of conviction, as gave me seriously to think thus: These fellows are not drawing on their imagination, are not quoting arguments of their own, but are referring to something that exists already in their creed, or their literature, or their text-books, or their traditions. Later in the campaign (1877) I heard, round the camp-fire, the habitual story-teller of a company of infantry relate his version of the Second Coming of Issa, and I then learnt that many versions of the same story were afloat amongst Moslems of all countries. This version, by the way, was grotesque and obscene, and is unfit for publication in Christian countries. Its Issa was a feeble-minded fool, who, after having tried all other lands, returns to Turkey as the only soil congenial to him, the only place where idiots are still held in superstitious veneration, instead of being locked up in asylums.

Since then I have travelled repeatedly and extensively in Turkey, both European and Asiatic. Speaking Turkish, I have made it my business to make friends of Turks of all classes. I have paid special attention to public story-tellers, a

class fast dying out. In particular, I have inquired carefully into the Issa legends. This is the result of my inquiries:—

The Turks owe the legend to the Seljuks, as they owe to them many other things—for instance, names, nursery-rhymes, fables, bogeys and other superstitions, lullabies and cradle-songs, fairy tales, not to mention matters pertaining to architecture, public worship, ceremonial, and government. The idea that Jesus will at some future time revisit this earth, and will select Turkey as the place of His abode, after having tried in vain all those countries whose inhabitants profess His name, dates thus from the thirteenth century. But up to the middle of the nineteenth century this was only an idea, at the most a short fable; it became a tale or legend when railways were first built in Western countries. Presumably the notion of Jesus encountering one of those rushing monsters, unknown to Him, gave professional story-tellers, up to two decades ago the only carriers of Turkish folklore, a splendid *motif* for a new and striking tale, and they hung it on to the peg of the already existing Issa fable. This was the birth of the modern legend of the Second Coming of Issa. Be it specially noted that the legend was in existence some forty years before European and American writers used an imaginary revisit of Jesus as a theme for sensational books. As I said before, I heard a complete and lengthy version in 1877. Thus the Turks have not been influenced in the general idea of the legend by Christian writers.

There are many versions of this legend—probably some hundreds. They have the idea in common that Jesus chooses Turkey, as the only country which He recognises, after having turned in horror or disgust from every Christian country. Naturally, they vary much in detail, for the details are left to the knowledge of Western countries and customs possessed by the narrator, be he story-teller, priest, teacher, or ordinary village-gossip. Thus, in 1907, I heard of a version in which European ladies still wore crinolines, and the time of action was supposed to be that same year! The reason of this

anachronism was simply that the narrator, unable to read Latin characters and figures, had come across a French illustrated book of the year 1860. Again, in another, also recent, version Occidentals are presumed to be unacquainted with tobacco, simply because they are unacquainted with the *narghilé*!

But the most vital difference is exhibited in the character of Issa. Sometimes, as in the version here given, Issa is the Jesus of the Bible—simple, trusting, childlike, loving all men, ever ready to forgive, yet stern and uncompromising at rare moments, when faith or principle is involved; above all, He is the friend of the poor and oppressed. In parenthesis: in the version here given, an absurd, though not irreverent, love-episode is omitted. In other versions Issa is militant, aggressive, always making enemies. In yet others He is, as already mentioned, a good-natured imbecile. In yet others He is a supernatural Being pure and simple, without human attributes, a glorified “Jin” of old. In yet others He is simply the saint and minor prophet of Moslem theology.

I acquired the version here given in the following wise: A public story-teller told it in a small café on the outskirts of Smyrna during Ramazan (October) 1906, I being present. Present was also a priest, whose acquaintance I subsequently made, a week or two later. He was a well-informed man, had once travelled in Roumania and Austria, had read European history, and was a voracious reader of Greek and Turkish newspapers. He repeated the story to me, and, so far as I could remember, it differed from that of the public reciter only in unimportant details. He knew the story well, had heard it many times, and I begged him to reproduce the reciter's own words as much as possible. This he promised to do, but I cannot help thinking that he introduced a few details of his own knowledge of Western life and manners, of which knowledge he was very proud. A fortnight later I made, from memory, a rough translation, which I revised and copied six months afterwards.

With one exception, I have never seen any version of the Issa legend in print or manuscript, nor have I heard of any. The exception is this : During my last visit to Turkey I bought a large number (eighty or more) of Turkish school-books, first readers and the like. In one of them appeared a brief version, less than a small page in length, of Issa's second coming and choice of Turkey. It was very bald and rather childish. Unfortunately, I did not keep a list of the titles, etc., of those books. On my journey home my steamer ran on the rocks, during a fog, on the coast of Asia Minor, and in the turmoil of salvage part of my luggage, including my box of books, was lost or stolen. I have since re-bought a large number of Turkish school-books ; but this particular book I have not yet found again.

To conclude : The Takhtajis, a tribe which inhabits the peninsula which forms the northern horn of the Bay of Smyrna, are generally held to be descendants of the Seljuks. They have a curious annual festival, from which strangers (even Moslems) are jealously excluded. I have never met anyone who had succeeded in being present, though many, including myself, have tried ; but it is a common belief among Moslems that an allegorical representation of Issa's Second Coming forms part of the ceremonial. This is too striking to be a mere coincidence. In parenthesis : so secretive is this tribe that my patient inquiries have not even elicited their true name, for the appellation Takhtajis, meaning Woodcutters, is that given to them by the Turks, by reason of their occupation. It is probably here that some future inquirer will find reliable data as to the origin of the Turkish Issa legend.

THE LEGEND.

Nearly two thousand years have passed since Issa—on whom be peace !—wandered in the richest province of our mighty empire and preached peace on earth, goodwill to men, concord among nations, practising all that he taught in his own person and his own life, and thus preparing the way for a

greater who came, six centuries after him, to finish and to crown the sublime edifice of a universal faith: when he be-thought himself to visit once again this fair earth, for whose inhabitants he had laid down his life and sealed his life's work with his blood.

I.

Issa, in the garb of a labouring man, walked along a main road which led into a flourishing city of the German empire. The road was deserted; there were no wayfarers in sight. And at this Issa was much astonished; for in his time roads leading into cities were crowded on sunny mornings with men whom their vocations took to town from the villages, and with those who, having already terminated their business in the markets, returned to their peaceful homesteads. Mules, asses, horses, camels, carrying burdens to and fro, carts, poor men with loads on their backs, used to throng the roads which Cæsar's soldiers and hirelings had made. But here was solitude, though over the horizon hung a heavy black cloud, betokening many houses in which, no doubt, countless women prepared the midday meal against their masters' return from field or workshop.

Issa walked on towards the city, not comprehending. For he was mortal man again for a little while, with man's limited understanding.

He that had come after Issa, God's own Prophet, had counselled him to walk on earth in the shape and the garb of a rich and mighty person, for the Prophet knew that a portion of humanity had declined to receive his teaching, and was in the coils of unbelief and cruelty and spiritual darkness, and in the habit of worshipping those who owned many lands and worldly goods. But Issa, simple and childlike as of yore, with his sublime belief in the inherent goodness of the human race, had made reply and said: "I was despised and rejected, sorrowful and acquainted with grief; I was a homeless wanderer; the poor were my friends and little children my comfort; and my message was for the humble and the heavy-

laden. I shall not give the lie to my teaching and my life ; I shall not turn my back on the equals and successors of those who once befriended me." And thus Issa was again an out-cast among men, lonely as that awful forsakenness in which he had prayed in the garden of El Kuds for deliverance from the coming hour of terror and torment and infamous death.

Suddenly Issa heard behind him a great noise, a noise of horror and devilry, as of thunder and metal, and rushing whirlwind, and a thousand clanking chains, with the voice of a shrieking fiend above the infernal din.

He turned round and beheld, on a raised path running parallel to the road—a hideous path of geometrical exactness, curiously beset with tall, cord-connected poles—a succession of iron chariots of ugly shape and colour ; in front of the long clanging line, a shrieking, fire-spitting, smoke-vomiting black monster. And this devilish procession was rushing towards the city with a speed compared to which the speed of the swiftest Roman war-chariot was but as a snail's pace. The earth shook, the sweet morning air was poisoned, the sun was obscured by the black monster's infamous exhalations, and flocks of birds were startled from the meadows and flew away in dismay. The cars had regular openings in their sides, and through these Issa beheld in a lightning glance, as this devil's contrivance thundered by, crowds of human beings in hideous attire.

The thing was gone in the twinkling of an eye, contracting its shape until it became a mere black speck in the fair landscape. The birds returned to their worms, and God's wind dispersed the smoke and the stench. But earth was not the same to Issa ; it seemed to him that a foul disease had left on it a vile and poisonous sore. And then Issa, looking round to refresh himself by the sights and sounds and scents of nature, noticed that the fields were uncultivated and produced apparently nothing but rank grass, to consume which there seemed to be no cattle or beasts of burden—only three or four miscoloured sheep.

But God, taking compassion upon His beloved saint's perplexity, sent him one of the angels whose painful duty it is to record the doings of unbelievers. And the angel whispered into Issa's ear:

"This is the manner in which these men convey themselves from place to place—an invention of the devil. This is why the highroads are deserted. This is why men congregate in huge, ugly cities. This is why fruitful fields are uncultivated, fair gardens unweeded, pretty villages forsaken. This is why unbelievers have to obtain their daily sustenance from far countries, over seas which in thy time were deemed endless—countries where there are still men, simple and grateful, who gather the kindly fruits of the earth."

Sadly Issa walked on and came to the city. He was hungry and thirsty and tired, and he bethought himself to enter a labourer's cottage and salute the master and claim the wanderer's privilege—a morsel of bread, a drink of spring-water, a basin wherein to wash his aching feet. But in vain was he looking for a humble house in the door of which should stand a man with a kindly countenance. For all the buildings were tall and big and grim, like prisons, and all the people seemed to be in a hurry and had anxious faces, many cruel and sinister, many callous, many careworn and sad. Not one happy countenance was to be seen—even the children sped along the streets as if driven with whips, carrying heavy satchels, and appearing to be intent on some pressing and serious business.

Issa walked on, and presently he came to a vast space, surrounded by gorgeous edifices. A multitude had assembled therein, mostly men in garments like his own, and they appeared to be listening to an orator who stood on the steps leading to the statue of some ill-shapen god or hero.

The orator thundered forth with a great voice and waved his arms, and sweat was on his brow; and the multitude swayed to and fro, and presently it shouted frantically. And then, lo! many men with swords, some afoot, some on prancing

horses, all garbed alike in sombre blue and wearing ugly hats with spikes, appeared from the neighbouring streets, where they had lain in ambush, drew their swords and made a fierce attack upon the multitude, which seemed to carry no arms. And in the unequal combat the multitude was beaten back and left many behind prostrate, over whose bodies the horsemen rode with joyful faces and shouts of glee and triumph; and the armed men afoot pursued the vanquished ones, even up the stairs leading to houses, and into the doors, and down the steps into dark cellars, and they hacked at them with their swords, and gloried when they had cut down a woman or a child, or some aged and defenceless person.

Issa fled from the terrible sight, and when he came to a quieter street he lifted up his countenance and prayed for enlightenment. And immediately the angel was by his side and said :

“The men who listened to the orator are workmen toiling in hellish dens full of inventions of the devil for wages which will not buy a sufficiency of bread for their children, so that a few rich might become yet richer. The orator is one of the leaders of the labouring men, and he exhorted them to be brave and strong and united. The soldiers are the guardians of the city, who are bribed by the rich ones to cut down and mutilate and imprison all such as desire to ameliorate their sad existence. And, most wonderful thing of all, the teaching of that orator is thine when thou didst walk the earth: the equality of all before God, community of goods, mutual help, charity, and the claim of everyone that worketh to daily bread, shelter, and a peaceful life for himself and his children.”

Issa covered his face with his hands and prayed. And when light and comfort had come to him from on high he spoke :

“This is not the country which I would fain choose for my second Advent. Here I know scarce the earth and the human race again.”

And while he yet spoke soldiers with swords appeared at the end of the street and rushed towards him to seize and slay

him, for to them he was but one of a multitude to be beaten and tormented and cast into prison.

But the angel took Issa's hand, and when the men with swords came to the spot where he had stood they found nobody. And after they had marvelled greatly, they proceeded to seek other unarmed victims; for they were mighty heroes, and greatly daring whenever they encountered those who could not defend themselves.

II.

Issa stood in a dirty, poverty-stricken village of the empire of the Russians. In the open doors of the hovels crouched shapes which he failed to recognise at first as human beings: grimy skeletons, ragged and half naked, their faces pain-drawn, their eyes lustreless, their long hair unkempt. The bony hands were folded, and the thin lips muttered prayers to an idolatrous god who did not and could not hear.

There was a famine in the land—there is nearly always a famine in that land—and Issa, with his infinite compassion for human suffering, was anxious to help those who could not help themselves, in whose torture and starvation the rich and mighty ones of the country gloried.

Issa assumed the garb of a man from the neighbouring market-town, and when the people beheld him they crawled towards him—they were too weak to walk upright—and knelt before him and cried for bread. So Issa lifted his eyes to heaven and prayed for power to help the starving ones, and God and His Prophet heard him. And when full assurance had come to him he said:

“Go ye to yonder barn and ye will find wherewith to feed yourselves and your little ones.”

So the people went, as best they could, and found loaves and wheaten cakes, fruit and flour, eggs and meat, jars of milk and skins of clear water, enough for the whole village and to spare for the morrow and the day after, and they ate and were filled.

But when they had rested and regained strength a little, they came back to Issa, angry and menacing, and with one accord they demanded that he should give them firewater.

Issa comprehended not ; but the angel was at his side and whispered :

“ Firewater is an invention of the devil, which these people drink, which benumbeth their senses, maketh them mad, and causeth them to do vile deeds.”

So Issa made answer to them and said :

“ What would ye do with this firewater ? For if ye drink it, the devil will enter into your bodies.”

The people cried :

“ We want to have courage to burn the palace in which liveth the lord of this land, and to slay him, his wife and his children, his guests and his servants.”

Issa answered :

“ Taught I not your fathers that ye should forgive your enemies, pray for them who trespass against you, and do good to those who have done you evil ? Why, therefore, do ye desire this wicked thing ? ”

The people answered him not, but shouted with a great voice :

“ Slay him ! Slay him ! ”

The angel seized Issa's hand, and when the people found him not they were sore afraid.

So Issa came to the town, and in the main street, which was forsaken by all but vile-looking men on horseback, ape-like in appearance, clad in garments of dark green, with swords and lances, he found many bodies of slain—men, women, and children. Some were still moving, groaning or crying feebly for help which came not ; the most part were dead, and terror-stricken eyes, from which light had departed, gazed up to a pitiless heaven. Some were horribly mangled, and not a few of the dead women clasped dead babies in their arms. Old men there were among the slain and youths in the vigour of years ; aged hags and handsome girls ; blood was every-

where—pools on the pavement, splashes on the walls, and the gutters were pink. The horsemen chattered like monkeys to each other, and gnashed their teeth and rejoiced greatly at the sight of so many victims. The windows of the houses were closed with boards and the doors were tightly shut, and, but for the horsemen, this was truly a city of the dead.

The angel spoke :

“The slain are Jews, thy countrymen, and the slayers are those who profess to have adopted thy teaching and call themselves by thy name. I say no more.”

Issa made answer and said :

“It is written : ‘My thoughts are not thy thoughts and My ways are not thy ways.’ Woe unto this country which hath profaned my name, and hath made of it an instrument of hatred and murder towards my brethren ! But there must be fair realms still on this once so fair earth. Let me seek them, so that I may hasten my Advent.”

III.

So Issa came to France. He stood in a beautiful old town, before a glorious edifice, the like of which there are but few in the world. Many centuries ago men had worked at it from youth to old age, and their children and children's children had laboured to complete it, spending their lives, their money, their knowledge, and their craft to make it a house worthy of the Lord of Hosts who was to dwell therein. But the door was closed, and soldiers guarded it with deadly weapons.

A white-haired man in a long black robe and some young women who carried flowers approached the building, intent on entering and worshipping God in His own house ; but the soldiers pushed them back with rude words, and they went away weeping.

The angel said to Issa :

“The governors of this country and the priests have quarrelled ; it would seem that each desireth the money of

the others. So the governors have sent for the soldiers, who prevent the people from entering into the temples and worshipping God therein."

Sadly Issa walked away and came to a great space where many men and women were assembled buying and selling; for it was a market-town, and this was the weekly market-day. Oxen and cows were there to be sold, fowl and fish, fruit and vegetables; and in many other commodities much barter was done. There were also tents in which buffoons amused the people, making them to laugh and to spend much money; and in other tents wild beasts, starved and sick, were kept, so that people might tease them with sticks, and cause them to roar with rage and pain.

Issa entered one of these tents and beheld a multitude listening to a loud and raucous and nasal voice, which was singing a song full of mirth-provoking indecencies, whereat the people were greatly edified. Issa marvelled, for he could not perceive the singer, until at length it became clear to him that the voice proceeded from an instrument shaped like a great clarion, which stood on a raised platform at the end of the tent.

"Behold yet another invention of the devil!" said the angel. "The voice of a man, singing coarse, obscene, and hideous songs, is condensed and preserved in this infernal contrivance, and can be let loose at will."

"I recall full well," replied Issa, sadly, "the stern and virile ballads of the Arab wanderers in the desert, when they crouched around the camp fire, after the day's hunting and travelling and fighting were done. And I remember the joyous songs of Syrian maidens at vintage or harvest, gay as the pæan of the skylark, and melodious as the rustling of God's wind in the forest trees or the surging of the waves on the borders of the tideless sea, and their plaintive ditties when they sat spinning in the long dark winter evenings. So this is what men call song nowadays? Let us leave them. I would fain rest among people who can still speak of their

joys, hopes, and sorrows in the language of song, and who can listen spellbound when one, a master of the craft, poureth out his very heart before them, and attuneth them to his innermost thoughts and feelings, so that they rejoice with him at his gladness, and weep with him at his grief, and are better men and women for having so listened and so felt."

And Issa departed thence.

IV.

Issa came to the beautiful realm of England, and stood on a road which led, through many lovely scenes, to the mightiest town of that empire—the mightiest town, too, of the whole world.

A fairer earthly spot had he not beheld since the days of his toilsome pilgrimage in our beloved Syria. Here were wooded hills and fertile valleys, silvery streams in which fishes leapt with joy, mysterious thickets in which the nightingale sang divinely, rich meadows studded with sturdy cattle and fat sheep, and—O marvel!—not a few golden cornfields. And cottages were there, quaint, thatched, half-hidden in luxurious foliage, wherein dwelt men and women, poor, content, and no doubt kindly and hospitable. It was evening; the west was lighted up in crimson and orange, and pale, pellucid green clouds had a margin of fire, and a russet light fell over hill and dale like molten gold, the last rich gift of the dying day.

A stranger in a strange land, having not a place where to lay his head, and possessing none of that accursed thing called money with which—as he had learnt by now—you can buy anything among unbelievers, from a loaf to a man's honesty, from a shoe to a woman's virtue, from a house to a human soul, Issa proposed to knock at the door of a cottage and crave for a humble evening meal and a bundle of straw, to start with the rising sun on his search, leaving the sweet fragrance of his blessing behind in the house which had given him shelter.

So he walked on for a little space until he came to a tiny

cottage abutting on the road, the walls of which were almost covered with roses and creeping plants. Adjoining the cottage were great iron gates, craftily wrought, swinging between stone pillars crowned with images of winged monsters. Through the bars of the gates Issa beheld a straight broad road covered with yellow gravel and bordered with gorgeous flower-beds, and in the distance, at the end of the yellow road, a castle with towers.

So Issa, who wore the garments of a wayfarer, knocked at the door of the cottage. A burly man opened, and Issa, having saluted the house and its master, humbly preferred his request, and proceeded to take off his dusty shoes before entering. But the man spoke roughly, and called Issa a thief, and a liar, and a vagabond, and, having sent for a soldier-man with a stick, had him cast into prison.

Issa knew not what crime he had committed; for in his time every wanderer, be he never so lonely and humble, was entitled to expect at any house that he might encounter on his weary journey a kindly greeting, a meal, the wherewithal to wash his feet, a night's shelter, and a cup of milk and a cheerful godspeed on starting. But in the night, when Issa was praying in his darksome dungeon, the angel came to him and explained that among unbelievers, more particularly in this country, England, the asking for bread or shelter without tendering money was considered a dreadful crime, deserving of long and severe punishment.

"But the strangest thing of all," said the angel, "is that it is equally considered a crime, meriting cruel punishment, for a man possessing no money to sleep among the hedges, or under trees, or at the roadside, or on doorsteps."

Issa spoke :

"It is written : 'He giveth His beloved sleep.' It is God's will that men should sleep. What is a man to do, who, having no money and being tired and worn, desireth to forget his sorrows in the slumber which God ordained to be the home of the homeless and the solace of the afflicted ?"

“He must wander on until he drops down dead, or he must sleep in prison, among thieves and murderers,” replied the angel, grimly. “But let us depart hence, for if thou stayest, thou wilt be brought on the morrow before the judge who liveth in the castle. And the man of whom thou askedst bread is the servant of the judge, and the judge will surely punish thee threefold, because thou hast committed a crime against his hireling, whose duty it is to guard the iron gates.”

So Issa and the angel departed, and on the morrow they came to the great and rich city.

Never had Issa beheld such splendour. The booths of the craftsmen, the silk-mercens, the purple-dyers, the fruit-vendors, the sellers of gold and silver ware, the money-changers, the slave-traders, were more splendid than the palaces of the mightiest in his time. Chariots with prancing horses, rolling on to a fair garden; warriors in garb of crimson and gold; beautiful women, bestowing kindly smiles even on wayfarers unknown to them, passed him in a whirling procession of such magnificence as might have entered the boldest dreams of King Solomon, on whom be peace! But the fair scene was contaminated by an evil screeching iron monster which rushed through the streets at lightning speed, at whose approach people fled in dismay, taking shelter in doorways, and covering their faces terror-stricken. Seated on this monster were two demons with vile faces, who grinned at the multitude whom their approach had affrighted, and who ever and anon made a hideous noise, like the howl of anguish of some animal in pain.

Issa said to the faithful angel who stood beside him :

“I would fain see other parts of this city, the quarter of the poor and humble; for here I see but the rich.”

The angel seized his hand, and together they came to a vast hall, and with many others entered a chamber therein. And the chamber moved down, down into the bowels of the earth. When it had stopped they were in a long, ugly passage, and rushing into this passage came just such a procession of cars, drawn by a vile monster, as Issa had beheld in Germany. The

cars were crowded with men and women, and scarce Issa found a place therein. Then the hellish procession rushed on into the darkness of earth's interior, with the speed of the lightning and the noise of a thousand demons let loose. It stopped many times, and men came and went; and when at last it had arrived at its destination, Issa and the angel entered another chamber, which moved upwards till they came to daylight again.

Issa said :

"I know not this earth, into the bowels of which you must descend if you desire to go from place to place. I know not this race, which despiseth the limbs given to it by God, and hath to employ devilish contrivances for the simple act of proceeding on a brief journey."

And he shook the dust of that country from off his feet.

V.

Issa came to America, and stood in a great city thereof. Never had he beheld or imagined anything so hideous. The houses—huge, square, forbidding, and indescribably ugly—reached into the heavens; they were higher than the highest towers of castles and palaces in his time. They shut out the sunlight and the fresh air eternally; the street was damp and chilly and gloomy, as if at the bottom of a well. Overhead were meshes and networks of cords, so that the birds could not descend to be fed. Through the street rushed great cars in an endless procession, propelled by an unseen power. The people hurried along in a never-ending stream, each man and woman alone, never two or three in cheerful conversation, each face anxious and flurried and sinister, as if bent on some sinful errand. The ceaseless din of the rushing cars, and the pattering of countless feet on the hard, cruel stone pavement, the coarse shouting of vile-looking urchins, who appeared to hawk rags on which were inscribed black characters—all these seemed to Issa as the tumult and the devilry of a great battle.

The angel pointed to a vast edifice, even uglier and higher than its neighbours.

"Here dwelleth a company of men," said he, "each richer by far than Solomon (on whom be peace!), whose vocation it is to render the commodities which men require for bare life, such as corn for bread, or oil for lamps, so dear that the people must die or become beggars or outcasts."

"And why do not the governors cast such evildoers into the innermost prison?" asked Issa.

The angel made answer and said :

"Because people have set up to themselves a god whose name is money, whom they worship in abject fear, against whose high-priests they dare not lift a finger."

"Let us depart," said Issa. "Show thou to me one other spot in this country before I leave a nation whom God hath forsaken, because it hath forsaken God and made to itself a molten and graven image to worship."

So Issa came to an open place in that country, with corn-fields and meadows and cattle, and a soft, warm air. A great multitude was assembled on a spot beyond a fair town, and in their midst was an Ethiopian, bound to a stake. Around the stake were piled up faggots of dry wood. And the people set fire to the faggots, and the Ethiopian was burned alive for their edification, dying amidst frightful agonies, whereat the people made a cheerful noise. And soldiers came from the town, carrying curious weapons. But the people had similar weapons, which, before the soldiers had come near enough for battle, they used against them. These weapons spit fire amid much deafening noise, and some soldiers fell down dead or wounded, whereupon the people fled.

"The Ethiopian was suspected of having committed a crime," explained the angel. "But being black of skin, the people (who call themselves by thy name, O Issa!) took him away from prison, where the judge was to judge him according to law, and burnt him before his guilt had been proved, and before an opportunity had been given to him to make a defence.

The soldiers were sent to rescue the poor captive and take him back to prison, so that justice might be done in due order and with impartiality; but they came too late, and the people, incensed at being disturbed in their amusement, used their firearms—another invention of the devil—which, enabling a man to slay his adversary without being near him, has stifled courage and prowess and manly intrepidity, the virtues of the race in thy time. Some of the soldiers fell down grievously hurt. But the multitude, being cowards, ran away.”

Issa said: “This is not the mankind whom I came to save. They know me not, although they—hypocrites, vipers, and blasphemers!—call upon my name; and I shall know them not on the last day, but shall pray God to cast them into outer darkness.”

And he departed thence.

VI.

Many other countries did Issa visit. In South Africa he found the English nation exterminating with hellish contrivances a tribe of kindly husbandmen who had been living contentedly and peacefully on the soil which they had conquered from the heathen, so that the English might dig into the ground and carry away gold and precious stones therefrom. In Asia he found the Russian nation making dreadful war upon a strange people that had desired to ameliorate its lot and to extend its commerce. And many more devil's inventions did he see: instruments by which the human voice was carried from house to house and from town to town, so that a man, desiring to offend his neighbour, could speak to him at a distance, lest the neighbour should rise up in his wrath and smite him on the cheekbone; another instrument, in which the lightning became man's slave and carried messages over incredible spaces in less time than it takes to utter that message with the lips; ships that sailed without sails, being propelled by hell-fires burning in their bowels; frightful implements of destruction swimming under the sea,

by means of which, vessels could be broken and sunk in a second ; ships that dived into the water and came up again at a distant part of the ocean ; boats that floated in the air and defied the winds ; long tubes which revealed the forbidden mysteries, hidden to man since the beginning of time, of the moon and the stars and all the heavens ; huge, ugly edifices, in which contrivances of glimmering, crashing steel, revolving eternally and working of their own accord, made the necessities of life which in his time were fashioned by craftsmen and labourers, who thereby bought bread for their children. And many other awe-inspiring things did he see ; and he marvelled greatly at the stupidity of men, who called these "labour-saving appliances," and perceived not that thereby labour and sorrow and poverty had greatly increased, so that innocent enjoyment, the love of nature, the study of God's Law, serene contemplation, prayer, the assembling of congregations for worship and praise, devotion to home and family, the searching of old records, and all else that had made life pleasant in the olden time, had become all but impossible.

And he found that the rich had grown wicked beyond even the devil's wildest hopes. They lent money on usury ; they adulterated the food of the people ; they caused women and young girls and tender children to work in dreadful prisons, and even in the bowels of the earth ; they had seized the land, and extorted vast sums from those who had to live thereon. Everywhere the poor were oppressed, and the rich sinned with impunity and amassed more wealth thereby.

And wherever the nations called on his name he found men without honour, women without virtue, children without innocence, merchants without honesty, priests without faith, soldiers without courage, judges without justice, lawyers without law, teachers without wisdom, kings without clemency ; and he discovered not one country in which, despite temples and priests, his message was not utterly ignored, as if he had never lived and taught, suffered and died.

Heartsick and despairing, Issa came at last to the land in

which his earthly life had been passed—Syria, the cradle of his race, the promised land, the country blessed of God.

VII.

And so Issa stood on the shores of the Lake of 'Tubariyeh, at the foot of that hill from the slope of which he had, nineteen centuries before, preached his message of faith and love and hope to a wondering multitude. He knew every inch of that ground, and little was changed. Here no thundering, stinking, demoniacal horseless carriages sped on their lightning-errand, to the destruction of peace, comfort, and beauty. Here no ugly prisons full of clanging machinery, emitting foul smoke from their tall, hideous chimneys, disfigured the fair landscape. Here were no telegraphs, and they were not needed; for men, wishing to send messages to absent friends, wrote kindly epistles, or dictated such to the grave, learned letter-writers. Here were no telephones, and they were not needed; for a man, being at strife with his neighbour, had the courage to go to his house and say to him face to face that with which he had to reproach him. Here were no telescopes, and they were not needed; for men and women were grateful for the life-giving warmth of the sun, for the gentle light of the moon, for the glorious sparkling of the starry heavens, without foolishly inquiring into distance and composition and movement, and receiving lying replies thereto from conceited men as insignificant and pitiable and ignorant as themselves. Here were no railways, and they were not needed; for men had sturdy legs, patient asses, strong camels, docile horses.

It was the early spring, and in the soft wind blowing from the tideless sea the fields were like waving oceans of millions upon millions of gorgeously hued anemones. Lilies fairer than Solomon in all his glory (on whom be peace!) blossomed in the cottage gardens; the scent of roses came like the breath of some beautiful houri; the slopes of the hills had patches of burning gold, where daffodils grew in their legions;

and the lake sparkled in the sun as if God had poured over it all the diamonds and sapphires of Thousand and One Nights.

On this spot Issa had taught that which, if it had been followed, would have had in its wake peace, love, and happiness for the whole human race. And something akin to the agony in the garden beyond the city gates of El Kuds came back to him when he reflected on what had actually occurred since he had proved his own sincerity, and the truth and beauty of his message, by his death. The present generation not only ignored every one of his precepts, but acted habitually in direct contradiction to it, and persecuted those who maintained that he had been right after all. Among all the nations who called themselves by his name, he had not found one tribe, one town, one hamlet in which he could have exclaimed: "Here I will abide, for here I am loved and honoured and obeyed." And so he was come back to that nation which did him no lip-service, but which lived in accordance with his principles of love and piety, and which obeyed the Law of the Greater One, whose path he had prepared.

He descended towards the water's edge as a fisherman's boat was landing its plentiful cargo. He saluted the master thereof and his brothers, and, stating that he was a wayfarer, weary and footsore, humble and penniless, prayed that a mite out of the wealth from the depths of the sea might be given to him, to the glory of the Lord of Hosts. And the master, having filled a basket, seized Issa's hand and gently led him, whom he supposed to be a tired and halting wanderer, to his house. And he placed a basin of water and a clean napkin before him, so that he might wash his feet. And when he had thus refreshed himself, the master gave him to eat and to drink. And Issa rested in that house for a little while and blessed it. And he took the master's child upon his knee and told the little one a wondrous story of far lands and gracious spirits. And when he left the house the master thereof gave him a loaf and a cup of milk and wished him

good luck. And when Issa was alone again, he fell on his knees by the roadside and lifted his face to God and gave thanks ; and he wept with joy that at last he had found again love and pity and hospitality, as he had found them on that very spot in the years long, long past.

And Issa blessed that land and gave it peace and increase.

Issa stood before the throne of the Lord of Hosts to render an account of his earthly pilgrimage. And he said :

“My Lord and my Father, I have wandered over the world, and found everywhere wickedness and oppression, and greed and sin. But in one country, and in one only, have men received me and broken bread with me and given me a cup in Thy name. And to that country would I return when the time cometh, when Thou shalt send me with glory to judge the living and the dead.”

And the Prophet, who stood at the right hand of the Throne, said :

“The people of which the saint speaketh is that people into which I was born, with which I lived, which I taught, for which I fought, among which I died. To this people give Thou, O Lord, Thy blessing.”

And the Lord of Hosts made answer and said :

“So be it.

F. W. VON HERBERT.

SHANKLIN.

A GREAT SOCIAL EXPERIMENT.

REV. CHARLES PLATER, S.J.

THE average Englishman has a certain pathetic faith in the efficacy of committees as instruments of social regeneration. When once he has grasped the purpose for which his committee exists, he is apt to resent any further inquiries as to how far this purpose is related to actual social needs. Give him a report which records a lavish distribution of blankets, or an unparalleled activity in the giving of lantern-lectures, or the capture of a football trophy by repentant hooligans, and he asks no more. Possibly the results thus secured may indicate some constructive work, and mark an advance towards the realisation of a carefully considered scheme. Possibly they may not. Where the vision is limited to a narrow field of practical work, it is easy to mistake the means for the end, and to develop a cheery optimism based on fallacious statistics.

Such philanthropic short-sightedness is not without its advantages. The sight of realities which lie deeper, of social conditions which threaten to nullify their work as inexorably as the incoming tide washes away the children's sand-castles, would probably discourage many workers from efforts which, however inadequate, are not without their value. Yet, on the other hand, some reflection upon the more fundamental needs of our time would give our departmental workers an increased solidarity and a more assured direction. Their efforts would lose none of their value for being seen in

perspective. In fact, one of the most serious weaknesses of much of our social work lies in its exclusive attention to the improvement of material surroundings. It is tacitly assumed that a corresponding improvement in character will be the necessary result—a result which may be left to take care of itself.

In this matter we may quote the opinion of Mr C. F. G. Masterman, who, while admitting the value of the efforts which are being made to meet specific social evils, has pleaded eloquently for a recognition of what is, after all, the deepest social need of our time :—

“A background to life—some common bond uniting, despite the discordance of the competitive struggle—some worthy object of enthusiasm or devotion behind the aimless passage of the years—some spiritual force or ideal elevated over the shabby scene of temporary failure—this is the deep, imperative need of the masses in our great cities to-day. With this the mere discomforts incidental to changing conditions of life and the specific remediable social evils can be contemplated with equanimity; without it the drifting through time of the interminable multitude of the unimportant becomes a mere nightmare vision of a striving signifying nothing, ‘doing and undoing without end.’ No material comfort, increased intellectual alertness, or wider capacity of attainment, will occupy the place of this one fundamental need. The only test of progress which is to be anything but a mere animal rejoicing over mere animal pleasure is the development and spread of some spiritual ideal which will raise into an atmosphere of effort and distinction the life of the ordinary man.”—*The Heart of the Empire*, p. 30.

The inadequacy of so much of our social work lies in this, that not only does it touch merely the fringe of the classes in which it is interested, but it makes no deep impression upon the individual most accessible to its treatment. It tends to raise the standard of comfort rather than of character. It does not fortify men: it merely alters their surroundings. The change is applied from without, not educed from within. It reminds us of the gardeners in *Alice in Wonderland* who painted the white roses red. This was, no doubt, only a temporary expedient, resorted to under stress of panic. It could hardly have been based upon any deliberate horticultural theory. Even in *Wonderland* red roses must be grown and not painted.

This want of an ideal indicated by Mr Masterman is perhaps more sadly apparent among the workmen of this country than among those of the Continent. Our fiercer individualism makes little response, for instance, to the enthusiasms of a socialism which, however crude, does at least substitute class selfishness for individual self-seeking. It is clear that an ideal which is to win popular acceptance amongst us and lift us out of the rut of materialism must be something very potent, very rousing, and very simple. No æsthetic propagandism, no prospect of remote benefits to posterity will suffice. Our appeal must be to the whole man. It must be practical without being sordid, reasonable yet not academic, and emotional without hysterics. Our ideal must be high enough to co-ordinate all the activities of life and to satisfy the spiritual nature, yet so practical that it can maintain itself in an environment to which every other ideal would succumb—and not only maintain itself, but serve as a stimulus and a guide to constructive social work. We have in fact to discover an ideal which will illuminate the mind and strengthen the will of the ordinary man in the ordinary street, and we have to do this at a time when the national character is showing deplorable signs of deterioration. We are, it has been said, a nation at play. Work is a nuisance, and the real business of life is amusement. The warning has been raised of late in many quarters, and the point need not be emphasised further. But an appreciation of the danger should lead us to seek primarily for some method of developing virility and strength of character, steadiness of purpose and consciousness of individual responsibility. Until we have secured this, our material will crumble to pieces at our touch. To raise the standard of comfort is only to precipitate the collapse. Legislation can do little in the absence of moral stamina among a people. Thus the drink evil, to take but one instance, cannot be remedied merely by restrictive measures, though these undoubtedly have their value. We must give men an effective motive for not evading the law. This is obviously no easy task.

And having found our ideal we must devise some method of making it dominate the lives of prosaic people. When it is a question of penetrating the working classes, the ordinary channels of social and religious activity will not suffice. Modern industrial conditions have isolated the workers, so that they now live and think apart from the rest of the community. Their relation to their employers rests on a cash basis, not, as formerly, on the brotherhood of man and the fatherhood of God. They have their own standards and their own ways of looking at things. The bulk of them will not avail themselves of the best-intentioned efforts to reach them. They regard the Churches as institutions intended for the Sunday recreation of a certain section of the well-dressed. Religion does not claim their attention, or present itself as "good tidings." They will not accept the spiritual ministrations of those who, they feel, are out of sympathy with them. Of course there are exceptions. They will listen to men like Father Dolling, and they may respond, to some extent, to the work of a Settlement. But is there any likelihood that the Settlement movement will develop on a scale sufficient to affect more than an infinitesimal proportion of the working classes? And even here the want of a definite ideal sometimes leads to that worship of visible results of which we have spoken. As for institutions embodying purely secular ideals—ethical societies, courses of lectures on art, and the like—it will be clear to those who know the deepest needs of our working classes that these can never serve as an ultimate goal of human endeavour, or produce, by themselves, any degree of virility.

Hence direct action upon working men as a body is difficult. The only possible method is to reach them through members of their own class. If we can form a nucleus of working men who feel that they have a message for their brethren, and will spare no pains and shirk no obloquy in delivering it, our problem will be solved. If only a small body of influential working men could be selected, brought

away from their normal surroundings, and invited to meet together for a few days in a comfortable country house, then, provided they could be won to enthusiasm for a great ideal, they would form an *élite* which would diffuse that ideal among others. Repeat the performance every week near several of the great centres of industry, and the whole tone of the working classes in the country will be raised.

The suggestion may sound quixotic. But it has actually been tried on a very large scale within the last few years, and has succeeded beyond the expectations of its most sanguine promoters. To give some account of this work is the purpose of the present article. The method employed is that of the *Spiritual Exercises of St Ignatius*, and the process of going through these exercises is popularly known as "making a retreat."

Such retreats are, of course, no new institution, but it is only within recent years that they have been brought to bear in a systematic way upon the working classes. As so directed they have been worked with phenomenal success in many countries, and are indeed of universal application—a point which must invest them with an additional interest for ourselves. But it is in Belgium that they have reached their most complete development, and to their results in that country we may restrict our attention. Although the work in question is primarily a religious one, its social effects have been so satisfactory that it is now supported by many publicists and social workers who have but little sympathy with the religious system upon which the work is based. It will be seen in what practical ways these supporters have given expression to their belief in its efficacy.

The story of the recent development of the retreats in Belgium may be briefly told. In 1890 forty-two workmen were invited to spend a few days at a Catholic College in Charleroi for the purpose of "making a retreat"—an operation the nature of which may perhaps become clearer as we proceed. They came every morning, and dispersed at night to their own

homes. It was soon seen that this arrangement was unsatisfactory. If a retreat is to succeed, the men must be withdrawn entirely from their normal surroundings. A retreat is an orderly process, an "exercise," which must be made without interruption. It is this that marks it off from "missions" and similar intermittent appeals to the conscience.

A house, then, had to be procured in which workmen might spend at least three full days in uninterrupted retreat. This was effected in 1891 at Fayt-lez-Manage, and the first "enclosed" retreat (*retraite fermée*) was given to twenty-six workmen. Before long all Belgium became aware that a new social force of extraordinary significance was at work in the country.

Three years later a second house was built at Ghent. Since then four more houses have sprung up, at Arlon, Lierre, Liège, and Alken. Their popularity is sufficiently attested by the following figures. At the first house (Fayt), during the sixteen years of its existence, retreats have been given to more than 22,000 men. Ghent in fourteen years has received over 18,000 men; Lierre in eight years, about the same number. About 10,000 men made retreats in the various houses during the year 1907. New houses are called for, and the possibilities of the work are almost endless. It should be said that the number of men who make a retreat together in a single house is about forty.

The six houses now in existence are all managed on the same general lines, and a description of one of them will suffice to give some idea of the rest. We may select for our purpose the establishment at Lierre, founded in 1899. The house, which, though in the town, stands in extensive grounds, is a cheerful building of red brick and stone, built, as the Father Superior or Warden maintains, in the very purest Flemish style. Next to the house is a chapel, for the exclusive use of those who make the retreats. The garden is well planted with trees, and the men may walk about in it at their pleasure. A garden, it may be remarked, is indispens-

able for a retreat. The men are not accustomed to dwell with their own thoughts, and to box them up in a small room for three days would conduce to a state of nervous tension quite fatal to success. In the present case, besides the garden, we find a large winter-garden or glass-enclosed court, where the men can take exercise in wet weather. The ground floor of the house is occupied by the kitchen, the dining-hall, the common room, billiard-room, and library. The upper stories contain some fifty bedrooms, plainly furnished. Every part of the house is beautifully light, and there seems to be white paint everywhere.

Each week a batch of men comes to the house for a three days' retreat. Most of these are workmen, but not unfrequently a special retreat will be given to a group of students or employers or soldiers or professional men or priests. The various social classes are generally kept distinct in order that the instructions may have special reference to the needs of one particular class. But sometimes exceptions are asked for, and the present writer has seen distinguished senators, financiers, and lawyers going through a retreat side by side with a band of workmen. At Lierre we chiefly see agricultural labourers, masons, navvies, carpenters, railway employees, and the like. They come in from the neighbouring districts, from the surrounding villages, and even from the more distant towns like Antwerp and Louvain.

How, it may be asked, is it possible to get ordinary workmen to immerse themselves in solitude for three days in order to give themselves to serious reflection upon the gravest problems? The answer is that, once the retreats have been started, the men themselves do the recruiting, and a steady stream of visitors is kept up. The workman is reached by the workman. In the beginning, of course, only picked men are invited—men of a serious turn of mind, who have already something like an ideal. The purpose of a retreat is carefully explained to them, and they are urged to try the experiment. When they have done so they may be depended upon to

persuade a number of their fellow-workmen to follow their example. The good effects are seen at once in the strengthening and tranquillising of character. The retreat gives the men something to live for. It supplies what, as we have said, is the fundamental social need—a background to life. Some are led to make it by curiosity; others, strange as it may seem, by bravado. None are refused if they will but undertake to keep the rules of the house, and avoid disturbing the others. In almost every case the result is the same. Bitterness of spirit and hardness of heart give way, almost under our eyes, to a genial kindliness and a hopefulness which is based on a new appreciation of the meaning of life. The men lose none of their desire to combat social evils. On the contrary, their zeal is increased. But they come to see that all successful effort in this direction must be based upon a reformation of character; and their chief desire, on leaving, is to win their fellows to a recognition of the value of these retreats as a foundation for social reform. One man out of the hundreds working in a big industrial establishment will present himself at one of the houses. After a few weeks three or four more are sure to arrive. These form a committee which, the following year, will perhaps send a dozen. And so the work grows. When employers become aware of the increased conscientiousness and reliability which these retreats foster, they almost invariably (whatever their own religious convictions may be) do all in their power to foster the work by facilitating the men's absence from work, paying their wages during the interval, supplying their travelling fare, and even making donations to the houses. And many employers make retreats, sometimes by themselves, and sometimes with the workmen. A better understanding between the two classes is thus effected, and something of the old guild spirit is the result.

Returning to the house at Lierre, we may imagine ourselves present at the arrival of a batch of workmen, some of whom, probably, have never made a retreat before. The

house wears a somewhat depressed air during the first evening. Many of the men look intensely bored ; some are shy and awkward, others assume an air of suspicious defiance, as if to intimate that *they* at least are not going to be imposed upon. Attempts to engage in conversation with them are not particularly encouraging. They stray about the galleries, staring at the religious pictures and statues, or exchanging whispered comments. The supper-bell comes as a relief, and the crowd drifts off to the dining-hall. After supper the men amuse themselves as they will with cards and billiards, pipes and beer. Then follows Benediction and a short explanation of the retreat, its objects, the rules of the house, and so forth.

The following is the "order of the day" for the next three days:—The men rise at 6 and, after morning prayers in common, hear Mass. During breakfast a spiritual book is read for a few minutes. After breakfast the men smoke, walk about the grounds, or play at such games as bowls, billiards, and draughts. At 8.15 they go to the chapel, where the priest who is conducting the retreat sets before them for the space of about half an hour some elementary thoughts or "points." They then go to their rooms in silence and think over what they have just heard. Then they read a religious book (the Gospels, the *Imitation of Christ*, the life of some saint, and so forth) in the grounds or reading-room, or in their own rooms. Later on they say the rosary together, walking in the grounds or in the covered court. At 10.30 there are "points" in the chapel as before, followed again by "meditation" in private. After the midday dinner the men amuse themselves as after breakfast. At 2 p.m. come "Stations of the Cross," spiritual reading, rosary in the grounds, and a hymn in the chapel ; then the afternoon "points and meditation." At 4.30, coffee and conversation. Strict silence is maintained excepting during these fixed periods after meals. Then more spiritual reading, rosary in the garden, hymn in the chapel, evening "points and meditation." Supper at 7 is

followed by recreation as before. Finally Benediction at 9.30 and night prayers. Confessions are heard on the second day, and Holy Communion is administered on the third. On the morning of the fourth the men take their departure.

This programme does not sound exciting. To those who have never had practical experience of a retreat, it might appear wearisome in the extreme. Such, indeed, is the view generally taken of it on their arrival in the house by the workmen who make it for the first time. Yet the fact remains that the very men who, it may be, showed every signs of boredom at the beginning, and during the first and even the second day, are obviously sorry to leave the house on the morning of the fourth, and declare their intention of coming the following year. Indeed, it is sometimes no easy matter to get rid of them. They frequently leave behind them in their rooms letters expressing their gratitude; these notes are often extremely touching in their simple sincerity.

It may be said at once that the whole force of the retreat lies in the "points" and "meditations" made four times a day. The hymns, rosary, and the like are intended to relax the tension without dissipating the mind. The men must be kept moving or singing or praying or reading; otherwise their minds will revert to their normal surroundings and familiar associations, or else, it may be, become a prey to melancholy and morbid introspection. But such is the bent given to them by the four periods of meditation, that the pious exercises are not felt as a constraint.

The matter proposed for consideration in these "points" is not chosen at haphazard, but follows the orderly course of the *Spiritual Exercises of St Ignatius*—a book, by the way, which yields little of its secret to the casual reader, but has to be "worked through" in the literal sense of the term, and this under the guidance of those who are qualified to present it. Hence it is not a question, in these retreats, of preaching detached sermons at the men four times a day. This would indeed be more than flesh and blood could stand. It is a ques-

tion rather of leading the men on, step by step, to serious reflection upon the deepest truths of life. *They* do the real work, and the expression "preaching a retreat" gives a totally wrong impression of the office of the director.

The appeal is to the whole man. Vague sentimentalism—a mere emotional "revival" with its inevitable reaction—forms no part of the process. Neither, on the other hand, are the "points" abstract or academic. In orderly course the men are led onward, not by hysterical rhetoric but by calm and earnest statement of fact, to see the meaning of their lives. Man, they are led to reflect, has been created by God to render praise, reverence, and service to his Maker. All other things exist in order to help him to fulfil that purpose aright. Here at once is a standard by which he may judge everything he employs—money, opportunities, friends, health, life itself. Here is a basis for (among other things) his social duties. All his aspirations after material well-being fall into their place; all that is good in them is developed and justified, all that is crude or exaggerated is refined away. The malice of sin and the necessity for its punishment are explained. Each one makes a careful survey of his past life in the light of the great principle just obtained. And, lest the soul should lose courage, it is told of the fatherly mercy of God, as displayed, perhaps, in the parable of the prodigal son, or the story of the woman who was a sinner. Then the meaning of the Redemption is explained. Appeal is made to the generosity of each. He is Christ's soldier, and a great battle is raging, though he guessed it not, between the powers of light and those of darkness. The scene of it is his own factory, his own club, his own home. On which side will he range himself? Before God he makes his choice. The life of Christ is passed in review and made the pattern on which each is to mould his own life in future. The story of the Passion leaves its mark. Then, strengthened and tranquillised, the men come to see how the love of God is the force which raises man above himself, ennobles his life, and gives him eternal happiness. To all this an assent is given

which is real, and not, as Cardinal Newman puts it, "notional." It forms the starting-point of a new life.

That the men do undergo a deep spiritual experience will be evident to anyone who has stayed in one of these houses of retreat, seen them at their prayers, listened to their conversation, and watched their after lives. A kind of astonished gratitude is seen in their faces. They go forth with a work to do, and they set about doing it in a practical and resolute fashion. When once back at their daily work they stand out boldly against the degrading influences which surround them, and endeavour, often with very great success, to form a healthy public opinion. The subsequent organisation of those who have made a retreat is, of course, a matter of great importance. Where possible they spend a day of quiet recollection and helpful converse every month or so in one of the retreat houses, thereby reinforcing the impressions first made there. On the religious side the effects are seen in every direction. Churches, once almost deserted, are filled with workmen to whom religion has become the central reality of their lives. They will march to Mass and the Sacraments in processions which number hundreds of men, with bands and banners, and this in centres where a few years ago materialism was threatening to eat out every trace of the supernatural.

But it is rather with the social effects of these retreats that the present paper is concerned, and here the results gained have won the admiration of all who are interested in social welfare. The employer and the workman have been brought together and have gained a new conception of their respective duties. The former has come to look upon the latter not as a tool but as a fellow-man, whose moral and material well-being must not be prejudiced by any contract made between them. The latter has found something which gives to every detail of his life a meaning and a value. "The dignity of labour" is henceforth no empty phrase. Work is not something to be reduced to a minimum, and abandoned

as soon as possible. The dignity of work is seen to arise not from its compulsion, but from the spirit in which it is done. Improved workmanship and increased conscientiousness at once result. All that hinders ennobling work is resolutely resisted. The drink evil is combated with a success almost incredible to those who pin their faith to "cures" or legislation. Organisations to improve the social condition of the destitute or the working classes arise on every side. Co-operative institutions and mutual societies are multiplied, sound social legislation is promoted, the weak are helped, and the helpless are supported without being pauperised. Family life is held in honour, and the household becomes the school of civic virtues. The men work for their children, and no longer regard offspring as obstacles to enjoyment. The gospel of selfishness and self-indulgence becomes discredited. The idea of fraternity supplies at last not a mere parrot-cry of class selfishness, but an illuminating guide in practical life, and a force which makes for social solidarity.

It may be added that retreats of the same sort have been provided for working women in Belgium, and this on an even more astonishing scale. Fourteen houses exist in which retreats are given to between thirty and fifty women almost every week. The results are seen in a widespread improvement of family life, due to increased thrift, sobriety, devotion to duty, and a strengthening of family ties.

After all, these retreats appeal to human nature, and not to mere national peculiarities or accidental qualities in those to whom they are addressed. Hence they are of universal application, as, indeed, the facts have shown. They do not depend for their efficacy on the more or less emotional temperament of particular nations, nor even on the prevailing religious tone of a district. They have of late been introduced with excellent results into the most industrial and least religious centres of Germany. They have, as it would be interesting to show, been addressed with success to the non-European mind.

Regular houses of retreats for girls and women of all classes of society are now established in London, Manchester, and Liverpool. Occasional retreats are given to working men in London and the north. And finally, a special house of retreats for men (Compstall Hall) was opened last March near Marple. It is an attractive country mansion, standing in ten acres of ground. To this house different batches of about twenty men, mainly working men, come every week to spend three full days in retreat. It is hoped to enlarge the house so as to accommodate fifty visitors at a time. There is no difficulty in getting the men: the work is its own best advertisement. Those who have already made retreats at Compstall Hall announce their intention of returning next year and bringing their friends. There can be no doubt about the deep impression which these retreats are making.

To sum up. In the regeneration of family life, and the providing of the working classes with a background to life, lies the chief hope of the nation's welfare. To this end, as experience has shown, the institution of spiritual retreats is a singularly valuable means. For the effects of these retreats are as wide as life itself; and one of these effects, which, though secondary, is not unimportant, has been an improvement in the material conditions of the working classes.

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HEGEL AND HIS METHOD.

PROFESSOR WILLIAM JAMES.

DIRECTLY or indirectly, that strange and powerful genius Hegel has done more to strengthen idealistic pantheism in thoughtful circles than all other influences put together. In no philosophy is the fact that a philosopher's vision and the technique he uses in proof of it are two different things more palpably evident than in him. The vision in his case was that of a world in which reason holds all things in solution and accounts for all the irrationality that superficially appears by taking it up as a "moment" into itself. This vision was so intense in Hegel and the tone of authority with which he spoke from out of the midst of it was so weighty that the impression he made has never been effaced. Once dilated to the scale of the master's eye, the disciples' sight could not contract to any lesser prospect. The technique which Hegel used to prove his vision was the so-called dialectic method, but here his fortune has been quite contrary. Hardly a recent disciple has felt his particular applications of the method to be entirely satisfactory. Many of them have let them drop entirely, treating them rather as a sort of provisional stopgap, symbolic of what might some day prove possible of execution, but having no literal cogency or value now. Yet these very same disciples hold to the vision as a revelation that can never pass away. The case is curious and worthy of our study.

It is still more curious in that these same disciples, although willing to abandon any particular instance of the dialectic

method to its critics, are unshakably sure that in some shape the said dialectic method is the key to truth. What is this dialectic method? It is itself a part of the Hegelian vision or intuition, and a part that finds the strongest echo in empiricism and common sense. Great injustice is done to Hegel by treating him as primarily a reasoner. He is in reality a naïvely observant man, only beset with a perverse preference for the use of technical and logical jargon. He plants himself in the empirical flux of things and gets the impression of what happens. His mind is in very truth *impressionistic*; and his thought, when once you put yourself at the animating centre of it, is the easiest thing in the world to catch the pulse of and to follow.

Any author is easy if you can catch the centre of his vision. From the centre in Hegel come those towering sentences of his that are comparable only to Luther's, as where, speaking of the ontological proof of God's existence from the concept of Him as the *ens perfectissimum* to which no attribute can be lacking, he says: "It would be strange if the Notion, the very heart of the mind, or in a word the concrete totality we call God, were not rich enough to embrace so poor a category as Being, the very poorest and most abstract of all—for nothing can be more insignificant than Being." But if Hegel's central thought is easy to catch, his habits of speech make his application of it to details exceedingly difficult to follow. His passion for the slipshod in the way of sentences; his unprincipled playing fast and loose with terms; his abominable vocabulary, calling what completes a thing its "negation," for example; his systematic refusal to let you know whether he is talking logic or physics or psychology, his deliberately adopted ambiguity and vagueness, in short: all these things make his present-day readers wish to tear their hair—or his—out in desperation. Like Byron's corsair, he leaves "a name to other times, linked with one virtue and a thousand crimes."

The virtue was the vision, which was really in two parts. The first part was that reason is all-inclusive; the second was

that things are "dialectic." Let me say a word about this second part of Hegel's vision.

The impression that any *naïf* person gets who plants himself innocently in the flux of things is that things are off their balance. Whatever equilibriums our finite experiences attain to are but provisional. Martinique volcanoes shatter our Wordsworthian equilibrium with Nature. Pathological accidents, mental or physical, break up the slowly built-up equilibriums men reach in family life and in their civic and professional relations. Intellectual enigmas frustrate our scientific systems, and the ultimate cruelty of the universe upsets our religious attitudes and outlooks. Of no special system of good attained does the universe recognise the value as sacred. Down it tumbles, over it goes, to feed the ravenous appetite for destruction of the larger system of history in which it stood for a moment as a landing-place and stepping-stone. This dogging of everything by its negative, its fate, its undoing, this perpetual moving on to something future which shall supersede the present, this is the Hegelian intuition of the essential provisionality, and consequent unreality, of everything empirical and finite. Take any concrete finite thing and try to hold it fast. You cannot, for so held, it proves not to be concrete at all, but an arbitrary extract or abstract which you have made from the remainder of empirical reality. The rest of things invade and overflow both it and you together, and defeat your rash attempt. Any partial view of the world tears the part out of its relations, leaves out some truth concerning it, is untrue of it, falsifies it. The full truth about anything involves more than that thing. Nothing less than the whole of everything can be the truth of anything at all. Taken so far, Hegel is not only harmless, but accurate. There *is* a dialectic movement in things, if such it please you to call it, one that the whole institution of concrete life establishes; but it is one that can be described and accounted for in terms of the pluralistic vision of things far more naturally than in the terms to which Hegel reduced it. Empiricism knows

that everything is in a surrounding world of other things, and that if you leave it to work there it will inevitably meet with friction and opposition. Its rivals and enemies will destroy it unless it can buy them off by compromising some part of its original pretensions.

But Hegel saw this undeniable characteristic of the world we live in in a non-empirical light. Let the *idea* of the thing work in your thought all alone, he fancied, and the same consequences will follow. It will be negated by the opposite ideas that dog it, and can only survive by entering, along with them, into some kind of treaty. This treaty will be an instance of the so-called "higher synthesis" of everything with its negative; and Hegel's originality lay in transporting the process from the sphere of percepts to that of concepts and treating it as the universal method by which every kind of life, logical, physical, or psychological, is mediated. Not to the sensible facts as such, then, did Hegel turn for the secret of what keeps existence going, but rather to the conceptual way of treating them. Concepts were not in his eyes the static self-contained things that previous logicians had supposed, but were germinative and passed beyond themselves into each other by what he called their immanent dialectic. In ignoring each other as they do, they virtually exclude and deny each other, he thought, and thus in a manner introduce each other. So the dialectic logic according to him had to supersede the "logic of identity" in which since Aristotle all Europe had been brought up.

This view of concepts is Hegel's revolutionary performance; but so studiously vague and ambiguous are all his expressions of it that one can hardly tell whether it is the concepts as such or the sensible experiences and elements conceived that Hegel really means to work with. The only thing that is certain is that whatever you may say of his procedure some one will accuse you of misunderstanding it. I make no claim to understanding it; I treat it merely impressionistically.

So treating it, I regret that he should have called it by

the name of logic. Clinging as he did to the vision of a really living world, and refusing to be content with a chopped-up intellectualist picture of it, it is a pity that he should have adopted the very word that intellectualism had already pre-empted. But he clung fast to the old rationalist contempt for the immediately given world of sense and all its squalid particulars, and never tolerated the notion that the form of philosophy might be hypothetical only. His own system had to be a product of eternal reason, so the word logic, with its suggestions of coercive necessity, was the only word he could find natural. He pretended therefore to be using the *a priori* method, and to be working by a scanty equipment of ancient logical terms—position, negation, reflection, universal, particular, individual, and the like. But what he really worked by was his own empirical perceptions, which exceeded and overflowed his miserably insufficient logical categories in every instance of their use.

What he did with the category of negation was his most original stroke. The orthodox view was that you can advance logically through the field of concepts only by going from the same to the same. Hegel felt deeply the sterility of this law of conceptual thought; he saw that in a fashion negation also relates things; and he had the brilliant idea of transcending the ordinary logic by treating advance from the different to the different as if it were also a necessity of thought. "The so-called maxim of identity," he wrote, "is supposed to be accepted by the consciousness of everyone. But the language which such a law demands, 'a planet is a planet, magnetism is magnetism, mind is mind,' deserves to be called silliness. No mind either speaks or thinks or forms conceptions in accordance with this law, and no existence of any kind whatever conforms to it. We must never view identity as abstract identity, to the exclusion of all difference. That is the touchstone for distinguishing all bad philosophy from what alone deserves the name of philosophy. If thinking were no more than registering abstract identities, it would be a most superfluous performance.

Things and concepts are identical with themselves only in so far as at the same time they involve distinction.”¹

The distinction that Hegel has in mind here is naturally in the first instance distinction from all other things or concepts. But in his hands this quickly develops into contradiction of them, and finally, reflected back upon itself, into self-contradiction; and the immanent self-contradictoriness of all finite concepts thenceforth becomes the propulsive logical force that moves the world.² “Isolate a thing from all its relations,” says Dr Edward Caird,³ expounding Hegel, “and try to assert it by itself; you find that it has negated itself as well as its relations. The thing in itself is nothing.” Or, to quote Hegel’s own words: “When we suppose an existent A, and another B, B is at first defined as the other. But A is just as much the other of B. Both are others in the same fashion. . . . ‘Other’ is the other by itself, therefore the other of every other, consequently the other of itself, the simply unlike itself, the self-negator, the self-alterer,” etc.⁴ Hegel writes elsewhere: “The finite, as implicitly other than what it is, is forced to surrender its own immediate or natural being, and to turn suddenly into its opposite. . . . Dialectic is the universal and irresistible power before which nothing can stay. . . . *Summum jus, summa injuria* — to drive an abstract right to excess is to commit injustice. . . . Extreme anarchy and extreme despotism lead to one another. Pride comes before a fall. Too much wit outwits itself. Joy brings tears, melancholy a sardonic smile.”⁵ To which may well be added that most human institutions, by the purely technical and professional manner in which they come to be administered, end by becoming obstacles to the very purposes which their founders had in view.

¹ Hegel, *Smaller Logic*, tr. Wallace, pp. 184, 185.

² Cf. Hegel’s fine vindication of this function of contradiction in his *Wissenschaft der Logik*, Bk. ii. sec. 1, chap. ii. C, Anmerkung 3.

³ *Hegel* (in Blackwood’s Philosophical Classics), p. 162.

⁴ *Wissenschaft der Logik*, Bk. i. sec. 1, chap. ii. B, a.

⁵ Wallace’s translation of the *Smaller Logic*, p. 128.

Once catch well the knack of this scheme of thought and you are lucky if you ever get away from it. It is all you can see. Let anyone pronounce anything, and your feeling of a contradiction being implied becomes a habit, almost a motor habit in some persons who symbolise by a stereotyped gesture the position, sublation, and final reinstatement involved. If you say "two" or "many," your speech bewrayeth you, for the very name collects them into one. If you express doubt, your expression contradicts its content, for the doubt itself is not doubted but affirmed. If you say "disorder," what is that but a certain bad kind of order? If you say "indetermination," you are determining just *that*. If you say "Nothing but the unexpected happens," the unexpected becomes what you expect. If you say "All things are relative," to what is the all of them itself relative? If you say "no more," there is already more, namely, the region in which more is sought, but no more is found—to know a limit as such is consequently already to have got beyond it—and so forth, throughout as many examples as one cares to cite.

Whatever you posit appears thus as one-sided and negates its other, which, being equally one-sided, negates *it*; and, since this situation is instable, the two contradictory terms have together to engender a higher truth of which they both appear as indispensable members, mutually mediating aspects of that higher concept or situation in thought.

Every higher total, however provisional and relative, thus reconciles the contradictions which the parts abstracted from it prove implicitly to contain. Rationalism is the way of thinking that methodically subordinates parts to wholes, so Hegel here is rationalistic through and through. The only whole by which *all* contradictions are reconciled is for him the absolute whole of wholes, the all-inclusive reason to which Hegel himself gave the name of the absolute Idea.

Empirical instances of the way in which higher unities reconcile contradictions are innumerable, so here again Hegel's vision, taken merely impressionistically, agrees with countless

facts. Somehow life does, out of its total resources, find ways of satisfying opposites at once. This is precisely the paradoxical aspect which much of our civilisation presents. Peace we secure by armaments, liberty by laws and constitutions, simplicity and naturalness are the consummate result of artificial breeding and training, health, strength, and wealth are increased only by lavish use, expense, and wear. Our mistrust of mistrust engenders our commercial system of credit; our tolerance of revolutionary utterances is the only way of lessening their danger; our charity has to say no to beggars in order not to defeat its own desires; the true epicurean has to observe great sobriety; the way to certainty lies through radical doubt; virtue signifies not innocence but the knowledge of sin and its overcoming.

The ethical and religious life are full of contradictions held in solution. You hate your enemy?—well, forgive him, and thereby heap coals of fire on his head; to realise yourself, renounce yourself; to save your soul, first lose it; in short, die to live.

From such massive examples one easily generalises Hegel's vision. Roughly, his "dialectic" picture is a fair account of a good deal of the world. It sounds paradoxical, but whenever you once place yourself at the point of view of any higher synthesis you see exactly how the thing comes about. Take, for example, the conflict between our carnivorous appetites and hunting instincts and the sympathy with animals which our refinement is bringing in its train. We have found how to reconcile the opposites most effectively by establishing game laws and close seasons and by keeping domestic herds. The creatures preserved thus are preserved for the sake of slaughter, truly, but if not preserved for that reason, not one of them would be alive at all. Their will to live and our will to kill them thus harmoniously combine.

Merely as a reporter of certain aspects of the actual, Hegel then is great and true. But he aimed at being something far greater than an empirical reporter, so I must say something

about that essential aspect of his thought. Hegel was dominated by the notion of a truth that should prove incontrovertible, binding on everyone, and certain, which should be *the* truth, one, indivisible, eternal, objective, and necessary, to which all our particular thinking must lead as to its consummation. This is the dogmatic ideal, the postulate uncriticised, undoubted, and unchallenged, of all rationalisers in philosophy. "*I have never doubted,*" a recent writer says, that truth is universal and single and timeless, a single content or significance, one and whole and complete.¹ Advance in thinking, in the Hegelian universe, has in short to proceed by the words *must be* rather than by the weaker words *may be*, which are all that empiricists can use.

Now Hegel found that his idea of an immanent movement through the field of concepts by way of "dialectic" negation played most beautifully into the hands of this rationalistic demand for something absolute and *inconcussum* in the way of truth. It is easy to see how. If you affirm anything, for example that A is, and simply leave the matter thus, you leave it at the mercy of anyone who may supervene and say, "Not A, but B is." If he does say so, your statement does not refute him: it simply contradicts him, just as his contradicts you. The only way of *securing* your affirmation about A is by getting it into a form which will by implication negate its negation in advance. The mere absence of negation is not enough; it must be present, but present with its fangs drawn: your A must not only be an A, it must be a non-not-A as well; it must already have cancelled all the B's or made them innocuous by having negated them already. Double negation is thus the only form of affirmation that fully plays into the hands of the dogmatic ideal. Simply and innocently affirmative statements are good enough for empiricists, but unfit for rationalist use, lying open as they do to every accidental contradictor, and exposed to every puff of doubt. The final truth must be something to which there is no imaginable

¹ Joachim, *The Nature of Truth*, Oxford, 1906, pp. 22, 178.

alternative, because it contains all its alternatives inside of itself as moments already taken account of and overcome. It involves its own alternatives as elements of itself, is, in the phrase so often repeated, its own other, made so by the *methode der absoluten negativität*.

Formally, this scheme of an organism of truth that has already fed as it were on its own liability to death, so that, death once dead for it, there is no more dying then, is the very fulfilment of the rationalistic aspiration. That one and only one whole, with all its parts involved in it, negating and making one another impossible if abstracted and taken singly, but necessitating and holding one another in place if the whole of them be taken integrally, is the literal ideal sought after, it is the very diagram and picture of that notion of *the* truth with no outlying alternative, which so dominates the dogmatic imagination. Once we have taken in the features of the diagram that so successfully solves the world-old problem, the older ways of proving the necessity of judgments cease to give us satisfaction. Hegel's way we think must be the right one. The true must be essentially the self-reflecting self-contained recurrent, that which secures itself by including its own other and negating it, that makes a spherical system with no loose ends hanging out for foreignness to get a hold upon, that is for ever rounded in and closed, not strung along rectilinearly and open at its ends like that universe of simply collective or additive form that Hegel calls the world of the bad infinite, and that is all that empiricism, starting with simply posited single parts and elements, is ever able to attain to.

No one can possibly deny the sublimity of this Hegelian conception. It is surely in the grand style, if there be such a thing as a grand style in philosophy. For us, however, it is so far a merely formal and diagrammatic conception, for with the actual content of absolute truth, as Hegel tries to set it forth, few disciples have been satisfied, and I do not propose to refer at all to the concreter parts of his philosophy.

The main thing now is to grasp the vision, and feel the attractiveness of the abstract scheme of a statement self-secured by involving double negation. Absolutists who make no use of Hegel's own technique are really working by his method. Reality, according to them, is that which you implicitly affirm in the very attempt to deny it; truth is that from which every variation proves self-contradictory: this is the supreme insight of rationalism, and to-day the best must-be's of rationalist argumentation are but so many attempts to communicate it to the hearer. Thus we can consider Hegel and the other absolutists to be supporting the same system. The next point I wish to dwell on is the part played by vicious intellectualism in the system's structure.

Rationalism in general thinks it gets the fulness of truth by turning away from sensation to conception, conception obviously giving the more universal and immutable picture. What I have just called vicious intellectualism is the habit of assuming that a concept *excludes* from any reality conceived by its means everything not included in the concept's definition.

Now Hegel himself in building up his method of double negation offers the vividest possible example of this vicious intellectualism. Every idea of a finite thing is of course a concept of that thing and not a concept of anything else. But Hegel treats this not being a concept of anything else as if it were *equivalent to the concept of anything else not being*, or, in other words, as if it were a denial or negation of everything else. Then, as the other things thus implicitly contradicted by the thing first conceived also by the same law contradict *it*, the pulse of dialectic begins to beat and the famous triads to grind out the cosmos. If anyone finds the process here to be a luminous one he must be left to the illumination, he must remain an undisturbed Hegelian. What others feel as the intolerable ambiguity, verbosity, and unscrupulousness of the master's way of deducing things, he will probably ascribe—since divine oracles are notoriously hard to interpret—to the “difficulty” that habitually accompanies profundity. For my

own part, there seems something grotesque and *saugrenu* in the pretension of a style so disobedient to the first rules of sound communication between minds, to be the authentic mother-tongue of reason, and to keep step more accurately than any other style does with the Absolute's own ways of thinking. I do not therefore take Hegel's technical apparatus seriously at all. I regard him rather as one of those numerous original seers who can never learn how to articulate. His would-be coercive logic counts for nothing in my eyes; but that does not in the least impugn the philosophic importance of his conception of the Absolute if we take it merely hypothetically as one of the great types of cosmic vision.

Taken thus hypothetically, it must be seriously discussed. But before doing so I must call attention to an odd peculiarity in the Hegelian procedure. Hegel considers that the immediate finite data of experience are "untrue," because they are not "their own others." They are negated by what is external to them. The Absolute is true because it and it only has attained to being its own other. (These words sound queer enough, but readers who know a little of Hegel will follow them.) Everything hinges here on whether the several pieces of finite experience may not be truly described when they are also said to be in any wise their own others. When conceptually or intellectualistically treated, they, of course, cannot be their own others. Every abstract concept excludes what it does not include; and if such concepts are adequate substitutes for reality's concrete pulses, the latter must square themselves with intellectualistic logic, and no one of them in any sense can claim to be its own other. If, however, the conceptual treatment of the flow of reality should prove for any good reason to be inadequate, and to have a practical rather than a theoretical or speculative value, then an independent empirical look into the constitution of reality's pulses might possibly show that some of them *are* their own others, in the self-same sense in which the Absolute is maintained to be so by Hegel.

May not the remedy lie, then, rather in revising the intellectualist criticism than in first adopting it and then trying to undo its consequences by an arbitrary hypothesis? May not the flux of our finite sensible experience itself contain a rationality that has been overlooked, so that the real remedy would consist in harking back to that rationality more intelligently, and not in advancing in the opposite direction away from it, and even away beyond the intellectualist criticism that disintegrates it, to the pseudo-rationality of the supposed absolute point of view?

I myself believe that this is the real way to keep rationality in the world, and that the traditional rationalism has been facing in the wrong direction.

In a later article on Professor Bergson, I shall summarise his criticism of the intellectualist type of rationalism. Meanwhile, let me say that any unprejudiced look at our finite experiences reveals their continuity. The sense-world is not disintegrate, as Hegel and ordinary rationalism accuse it of being. Its parts, run into one another, are thus "their own others" in the only sense that that preposterously paradoxical expression can be made to bear. The cuts we think of as separating them are cuts made by ourselves. In short, if we only make our empiricism radical enough, it triumphs over all its foes.

WILLIAM JAMES.

INFALLIBILITY AND TOLERATION.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

A DETACHED spectator of the follies of mankind could not but be profoundly impressed by the widespread interest which has been aroused throughout the world by the Pope's Encyclical against what is called Modernism. In many quarters the Papal condemnation is regarded as a sort of Congo atrocity in the spiritual world. But no reason is given why Protestants and Agnostics, Jews and Infidels, should interfere, even in thought, with the way in which internal discipline is administered in a Church which has always proclaimed its resolution to prescribe with authority and to enforce unquestioning obedience. Why should sympathy be lavished on persons who are oppressed because they refuse to liberate themselves by leaving an institution which excommunicates them? In these days when no Church is strong enough to persecute effectively, and it has become quite an arguable position that the best way of furthering the spiritual development of mankind would be to break up all ecclesiastical institutions, why should Roman ways of enforcing discipline be denounced with indignation? Why should not those who do not relish them be left to make their choice between submission and departure? They have been surreptitiously trying to combine the advantages of an ancient and highly picturesque community with those of an unrestricted freedom of individual thought; they have been detected and sharply called to order. Why then should they be pitied and paradoxically helped from outside to stay inside by people who would gladly welcome them if they would come out?

In other quarters the Pope's procedure meets with strong approval, and rationalist philosophers may be heard condemning Modernism as fervently as Pragmatism. The perplexities of the controversy, moreover, are only deepened when one observes how curiously vague and general are the Modernist's replies to the Papal accusations. It is all very well to denounce the obscurantism of the Vatican and to prophesy the disastrous failure of the Papal policy; but it would have been more to the purpose to show how any other course would have been consistent with Papal authority.

Thus the whole situation forcibly suggests a suspicion that the facts are not fully put before the public. Modernism is clearly suspected of being something far more dangerous and subversive than the Pope's examples prove; and both its allies and its enemies appear to think that there is more at issue than merely the domestic question of what latitude of thought the Roman Church can tolerate.

A belief that this is truly so, that this suspicion is amply justified, that the issue is really one of vital importance to the whole human race, and that this can be, and ought to be, made clear, is the *raison d'être* of this article.

What is really at stake and what really arouses so much interest is the claim to infallibility and the right to persecute on the one side, and the freedom of thought and the duty of toleration on the other. This it is that evokes so much feeling on both sides, when it is (more or less clearly) perceived; and rightly, for the question is plainly one of universal import. It has not yet, however, been explained that the decision of this question does not rest with popes and theologians, but with philosophers and scientists; for it depends ultimately on the view that is taken of Truth.

Very few men understand the nature of infallibility. Nearly all, for example, would scout the idea that we may all be infallible, even the silliest of us, if we will only equip ourselves with a suitable view of Truth. In non-Catholic countries it is commonly supposed that the infallibility of the

Pope is the acme of theological extravagance, and that the Vatican Council of 1870 irretrievably stultified Romanism for ever in the eyes of reason by its enunciation of this monstrous dogma. In point of fact, infallibility is an essential postulate implicit in all rationalistic philosophy, and the dogma of the Roman Church is merely the religious formulation of a belief which it shares with nearly all its critics. The infallibility of the Pope differs from that of the philosopher and the common man only in being relatively reasonable and couched in singularly guarded and moderate terms. For the Pope, when he claims to be infallible, does not believe himself to be infallible on all and sundry subjects, but only when speaking on matters of religious faith, and that solemnly and in his capacity as head of an infallible Church. Whereas the common man claims infallibility for every thought that may chance to come into his head at any time, whether or not it agrees with what he said a moment ago. He attributes, moreover, to every one else a similar endowment with infallibility, regardless of the consequences.

It is true, no doubt, that the man in the street is unaware of the monstrous claim he makes. But this does not alter the facts that both he and the Pope believe themselves to hold the same theory of Truth, and that this theory implies a claim to infallibility. The sole difference is that whereas the Pope draws its consequences consistently, cautiously, and with moderation, the man in the street does so inconsistently, wildly, and extravagantly. And then the latter turns upon the former and roundly accuses him of demanding what is repugnant to reason !

Yet the Pope and the man in the street both believe in the existence of absolute truth. Both also believe in their own capacity to enunciate it. But an absolute truth is one which could not under any circumstances become false. Whoever enunciates it, therefore, could not (so far) possibly be wrong. But what is this but to claim infallibility ?

As ordinarily assumed, however, this claim is wildly absurd.

For when men fail to agree in enunciating absolute truths, each has as good a right to think himself infallible as the other. Every man, therefore, who in good faith makes a statement he believes to be true, and believes that truth is absolute, must claim infallible truth for his statement, and infallibility *pro tanto* for himself its maker. He becomes a little pope *in posse* in his own eyes. And he must insist on enforcing his rights. All must agree with him. The facts that his pronouncements do not meet with universal acceptance, and indeed that no two men ever quite agree, cannot affect the theoretic validity of his claim. Nor can it be impugned by the fact that others put forward conflicting claims with equal assurance. Each must abide by his own vision of absolute truth. Whoever does not see the same as he does must be either a fool or a knave: a fool if he cannot see it, a knave if he will not admit that he sees it. He must be made to see it, therefore, by fair means or foul. The social consequences may be imagined. There must be war unceasing and unsparing upon earth, until one and the same Truth, immutable, infallible, and absolute, is established upon it, and is seen and accepted by all without exception. Thus persecution becomes a duty and tolerance a crime.

Common Sense, of course, would be the first to shrink with horror from the consequences of its own doctrine. For, unlike philosophy, it will never press logic to absurdity. It will decline, therefore, to take the claim to infallibility with such tragic earnestness in practice. It will much prefer to point out that while no doubt it is imperative to believe that absolute truth exists, it would be decidedly presumptuous to suppose that any one had got it. In fact there is no very urgent necessity to regard absolute truth as anything but an ideal. In practice no one can really work with it. Not only does it lead to endless quarrels when different men all claim to be absolutely right, but even the same man entangles himself by enunciating incompatible truths with equal absoluteness at different times. And so it will finally suggest that perhaps

this inconvenient infallibility had better be dropped, and even smile approval on a paradoxical philosopher who, perceiving the awkwardness of the situation, comes forward with proposals to attenuate its virulence by contending that though every judgment any one makes is necessarily infallible for the time being, yet there is nothing in this to prevent any one from superseding and annulling his infallible judgment by another equally infallible, and as shortlived, the moment after.¹

It is clear, however, that reluctance to follow out the logical consequences of an unpalatable doctrine is not strictly the right way to atone for its initial ferocity. It is far more consistent to interpret absolute truth absolutistically than to draw its fangs in such a lax and easy-going democratic way. If, we should argue, absolute truth exists, it is clear that the common man has not got it. But some one must have it, else it would not exist, and then there would be no truth at all. Even if it is among the prerogatives of deity, it is reasonable to suppose that it has been deposited with some human representative. Let us search the world, therefore, for one whom we can regard as such a depositary of absolute truth, and submit to his authority. And whom shall we find to satisfy these conditions better than the Pope? His infallibility is infinitely more credible than that of the man in the street.

Such a train of thought must surely appeal very powerfully to all who feel a spiritual craving to submit themselves to authority, who long to shuffle off the responsibility for their acts, and to find some one who will guide and direct them. And their name is legion. If, therefore, there were no Pope, he would have to be invented for such souls. His Holiness need not fear that his faithful will desert him. There is no reason to think that the *anima naturaliter Vaticana* is becoming extinct. He must, however, eschew the restriction of his claim to faith and morals. The absolutistic view of truth logically demands that truth be fully unified. A

¹ Such is actually the purport of Mr F. H. Bradley's doctrine of the infallibility of the last judgment (cf. *Mind*, N.S., No. 66).

plurality of authority implies a plurality of truth; and this is inadmissible. The Pope, therefore, must be the infallible authority in art, politics, and science, as well as in religion. There is, moreover, a practical reason for this arrangement. If there is no single infallibility to cover the whole realm of thought, if there are a number of authorities all claiming to speak infallibly in the name of their respective sciences, it is impossible to avoid conflicts and collisions between them; and this must discredit, weaken, and perhaps destroy, the whole principle of authority as such.

Before, however, this unification of authorities is finally established, it is easy to predict that a prolonged period of painful contention must ensue. The world at present contains a great number of conflicting authorities, of which it is by no means clear that the Roman Church is the strongest and best fitted to survive; it contains also many recalcitrants against all authority, and an appreciable number of philosophers who, though they insist on the absolute authority of reason, will admit no reason but their own. It seems improbable, therefore, that this doctrine of the infallibility of those who speak in the name of absolute truth will make for social peace and quiet. For all parties are in duty bound by their allegiance to absolute truth to wage war unflinchingly upon all views but their own, and wherever they can to oppress, suppress, and persecute by all means in their power. History, therefore, will repeat itself. Its blood-stained pages tell too eloquently how thoroughly man has tried to live up to his obligations, and the psychological intolerance which has become so natural in man shows how deeply the corollaries of his belief in the absoluteness of truth have sunk into his soul.

Is it not possible, therefore, to pay too high a price even for absolute truth? In modern times there is probably a growing number of men to whom the price to be paid will seem excessive and such consequences seem repulsive. It is time, therefore, that for their benefit we considered the alternative which, apprehended with various degrees of clear-

ness, underlies the modern revolt against mere authority, the Modernist attitude towards religion, and the extensive sympathy therewith.

Let us return to the practical but illogical compromise whereby Common Sense robbed the intolerant belief in the absoluteness of Truth of all its terrors. A single step beyond it in the same direction will take us into a new world, a very paradise of freedom. Common Sense was willing to admit that in point of fact absolute truth was not in any man's possession, and that, however confident men might feel about the truth they had, they were often, if not always, victims of an illusion, and might as well allow for this possibility in their behaviour towards their fellows. For its immediate purpose of mitigating the acerbity of absolutist theory and securing social intercourse this compromise is plainly sufficient. It works well enough in practice. Theoretically, however, it is more than dubious. It is most unpleasantly and directly suggestive of sceptical inferences. If it is held that most men most of the time are deluded when they suppose themselves to be enunciating absolute truth, if it is impossible to show that any one ever succeeds in enunciating such a thing, what does the doctrine of absolute truth become but a subtle and insidious means of discrediting all human truths? Is not this the explanation of that paradox of philosophic history, viz. that consistent rationalism always in the end collapses into scepticism?

It is clear then that absolute truth is not really an operative idea. It is an ideal that ever recedes into the distance when we try to grasp it. Men are not really infallible, and cannot treat each other as such. The truths they actually deal in are not absolute. The common sense belief that they are is really an ill-considered prejudice.

Let us candidly confess, therefore, that not only do we not have absolute truth, but that what we have is enough to content us. Let us boldly say that we do not need absolute truth, that it is a superfluity and an encumbrance, and get rid

of it in theory as well as in practice. Let us frame a new conception of Truth. Let us strip her ægis of the rigours and terrors that compelled reluctant assent but rendered her unapproachable in her warlike armour, and teach her to dwell peaceably in our midst, to speak our language, and to interest herself in our life. Let us, in a word, *humanise* Truth, instead of idolising her as a goddess who is more than half a demon. Let us define the true no longer as what is cogent and compulsory and irresistible, but as what is attractive and valuable and satisfying. Let Truth mean whatever can satisfy our cognitive cravings, whatever can answer a logical problem. And let it mean our *best* answer for the time being. Let it be conceived, that is, as essentially progressive and *improvable*, and therefore as superseded by new truth and turning into error so soon as something superior to the old dawns upon any human soul.

Thus Truth will no longer shine upon us from afar with the dim glimmer of an infinitely distant nebula. It will no longer dazzle us with the delusive flashes of a will-o'-the-wisp that is really "error." It will be a torch kindled by human will and wielded by human hands (or rather a succession of such torches), always lighting the way for man as he passes onwards. The objects it illumines will come into its sphere as man's life requires them; they will drop back into the limbo of the useless, out of which they were drawn, as they are used up or improved upon.

From such a reconstitution of the idea of Truth it is clear that man must gain immensely. And, apart from the glamour of words, even Truth will lose nothing. Even its absoluteness is not lost. It is only avowed to be what it is—an ideal, the culmination of Truth's working value, the perfect satisfaction of every cognitive ambition. As such it may still yield the remote and emotional consolation which was all it could afford before, when the illusions of verbiage were purged away. The human truth which alone we have and alone we need, on the other hand, will be a very real and potent

influence. It must enormously enlarge the liberty of thought. It must enormously enhance humaneness of discussion. It must utterly explode the foundations of dogmatism and intolerance.

For nothing at first can be "true" but what can commend itself to some one and satisfy some spiritual need. Conversely, whatever can do this can claim "truth"; it has a claim to be heard and tested, even though it be merely the fleeting inspiration of a moment. Every man has a vote in the making of truth; any man's truth may be elected, any man's vote may decide the election. But no man has a right to use force; no man has a right to impose his convictions on any other: superior attractiveness alone effects conversions in the conflict of opinions. Nor has any one a right to argue that because he is right every one else must be wrong: Truth is plural, and can adjust herself to every man's sight and point of view. Hence an indefinite variety of truths may be valid relatively to a variety of differently constituted and situated persons. Toleration mounts the throne left vacant by Infallibility.

But what a blasphemous travesty of Truth, what a hideous anarchy it all must seem to absolutists, dogmatists, pedants, authoritarians of all sorts! How it must seem to them to shiver into atoms the whole edifice of Truth and the foundations of all intellectual order! No wonder they must support Rome against the inroads of such modernity! No wonder they are almost speechless with horror and incoherent with indignation! For the *mirage* of an absolute Truth in the skies is dissolved beyond recall, and its worshippers are left desolate. To them it seemed the real thing. It never was the real thing, and they have lost nothing but an illusion. But they do not, and perhaps will not, see this. All that was of real value remains. The terrestrial realities remain of which the celestial phantasmagoria was the reflexion. There remains the practical necessity of living together and agreeing upon the conditions of a common life. Man remains with his

gregarious nature, his lack of originality, his respect for tradition, his easy acquiescence in the habitual, his dislike of innovation, his preference for order and system, his eagerness to think the world a cosmos—in short, with all the forces that weld society together.

More than enough remains, therefore, for the compacting of our intellectual order. The “real” and “objective” becomes that which it is socially convenient to recognise, in a rich variety of senses. “Objective truth” will be that which all or most can agree on. It articulates itself into systems of truths which are more substantial, more useful, and probably more durable, than the transcendent vision which was sacrificed. Certainly these systems are at present plural, not because Truth cannot be conceived as one—for the plural truths can easily be conceived as converging towards a single consummation—but because men do not agree. Whether they can agree remains to be seen; they have every motive to agree, and have lost the strong stimulus they had to insist obstinately on their individual infallibility. But, on the other hand, the notion of agreement has itself become easier: men can agree to differ; they can maintain all individual views which do not clash with those of others or lead to social discord. In short, the existing situation will be altered only by the infusion of a more tolerant temper into all opinions.

But has not all this carried us far away from the Modernist movement in the Church of Rome? Not at all; it has brought us to its core. Modernism is essentially the recognition by certain more enlightened or sensitive clerics of the intellectual forces which are drawing men in religion, as in science and philosophy, towards the humanistic conception of Truth which we have sketched. They have perceived at last what the lives of laymen have always dumbly attested, that religion is not primarily a matter of theology but of religious experience, and nowhere reducible to a rigid chain of incontrovertible syllogisms. They have therefore abandoned the intellectualistic travesties of religion, which kill its spirit to

embalm its letter, and offer long strings of pseudo-rational propositions as a satisfaction to a reason which easily detects their imposture and is itself seeking for something more nutritious than pure intellect. But such dogmas, as M. Leroy has shown,¹ are utter failures as purely intellectual propositions: they neither can nor do *compel* assent; as such, they can neither be defended nor even made to mean anything that matters. So to understand the meaning of dogmas and the nature of religious beliefs is a fatal mistake. They are not really intellectual products at all, and therefore cannot be attacked (or defended) as such. No religion really rests on the impersonal support of pure reason; nor can it be kept from moving with the times by chains of rusty syllogisms. For the truth is that dogmas are essentially secondary expressions of the vital value of a religion, the by-products of a spiritual life that was never nourished on pure intellect. They are, as it were, the lifeless fossils of a living faith, and remain unmeaning marvels unless they are re-enveloped in the life which grew them. That life, moreover, is primarily an individual attitude of soul: however closely it is wrapped in a spiritual environment, each soul must nourish itself and grow in its own congenial fashion.

The chief paradox of the situation is that these facts of the spiritual life should have been so intensely perceived in the Roman Church. For at first sight they look such a supreme vindication of Protestantism, such a sanctioning by psychologic science of the evangelical or mystic. But it must never be forgotten that, like all science, psychology is catholic and impartial. Every religion may be vindicated by the psychologic tests in so far as it is genuine, *i.e.* really nourishes the spiritual life. It speaks well for the intelligence of the Catholic Modernists that they should have discovered this. But they discovered also that the idea of a Church, of an historical association with a corporate confidence in the truth of its position, has very great religious value. There

¹ *Dogme et Critique.*

is little doubt that the Roman Church could flourish exceedingly on Modernist lines.

But will it prefer to do so? It is very hard to say. It must be a very hard question to decide for the astute directors of Papal policy. Superficially, no doubt, the present indications are that this bold and novel policy will not be adopted, that Modernism will be crushed, that Medievalism will prevail, and that a mechanical uniformity will be enforced, even at the cost of schism. But appearances are nowhere more deceptive than in matters ecclesiastical, and history does not confirm the view that the Pope always knows his own business best. It is quite conceivable that in due course, when the more cautious sympathisers with modern thought have risen by dint of years to the higher posts in the hierarchy, and the pressure of circumstances has convinced the less fanatical conservatives that something must be done, some successor of Pius X. will be moved to issue another Encyclical which, after splitting a vast number of hairs to prove that what is now sanctioned is not identical with what was condemned before, will define the sense in which a Modernist attitude may be permitted, and concede the substance of what has lately been denied.

There would be both psychological and historical warrant for this prophecy. The opposition to any novelty of thought is always largely a matter of individual psychology. The human mind becomes less open to new impressions as it grows older, and in all institutions the high authorities are always old, and often stupidly conservative. Progressiveness and open-mindedness are tender plants which must be carefully cultivated, and often forced. Historical analogy points to the same conclusion. The making of dogmas usually ends by making orthodoxy a razor-edge between two opposite heresies which have been successively condemned. It is formulated so as to conceal the facts that when new ideas arose the old men in authority conservatively condemned them, and that when, nevertheless, they triumphed, words

had to be found that would not break too abruptly with the old traditions.

Such, however, are what may be regarded as the normal psychological and political obstacles to the progress of human thought, and they are in no wise peculiar to the Roman Church. What complicates the situation in her case is that there are other serious objections to innovation which render her the least likely of the Churches to modernise her basis. By so doing she could probably purchase an ignoble peace and enduring prosperity, but only at the cost of two things which have hitherto been very dear to her. In the first place, she would have to renounce the right to persecute. Truly a trivial matter this, it may be thought, seeing that it cannot nowadays be exercised. But it is one thing to suspend it in practice and for prudential reasons, and quite another to give it up in theory and on principle. Principles which cannot be carried into practice often grow all the dearer for their pathetic impotence, as is proved by intellectualist philosophies. Moreover, to renounce this right would not only break with much historical tradition, but would also sacrifice the ambition of recovering the lost power of the Church.

Secondly, the right of making dogmas (of the old quasi-rational sort) would have to be abandoned. The Church would have to follow the example set by science and, more recently, by philosophy. Science for some time past has been too busy and too rapidly progressive to find it worth while to formulate into fixed dogmas her working theories, which, in the words of Professor J. J. Thomson, form "a policy and not a creed." It has grown accustomed to use them merely for what they are worth, and so long as they are worth it. In philosophy the discovery of the proper attitude towards dogmas has been of slower growth, though philosophic Humanism is quite clear as to their value.

But religion hitherto has always stood for the eternal fixity of dogma, once it has been defined. In most Churches, indeed, this power of making dogma has long been in abeyance. They

have been too tightly wedged into an antiquated creed which none of its members could construe literally, or tied to some paralysing political *concordat*, or too loosely organised to act corporately. But this inability has usually been construed as a disability, and the power of making dogma has seemed a mark of the superior progressiveness and unity of Rome. Acceptance of Modernism, however, would mean the sacrifice of this flattering prerogative.

Here again, however, it might be argued that the apparent loss would be a real gain. For the making of dogma is always a perilous business. In making dogmas it is hard to avoid making heretics. And the more heretics a Church makes the less "catholic" does it become. It is extraordinary what losses the Roman Church has incurred by her indulgence in the dogma-making instinct. Was a disagreement about the calculating of that most inconveniently migratory festival, Easter, worth the bisection and permanent weakening of Christendom? Was the defining of the Trinity and the Incarnation worth the loss of Africa and Asia to Moham-medanism, and the destruction of the best of the Northerners, the Arian Goths? The world in all probability would long ago have been Christian, the Roman Church would have been truly "catholic," but for the disastrous practice of defining dogmas, and the intolerance of which this was the cause and the effect. Will history repeat itself? Will dogma be made though the angels weep? Will Rome decide in accordance with her past traditions, *fiat dogma, ruat cœlum*? It will be immensely hard to break with them, and the traditional policy will necessarily have immense strength. But who can say? Not even Pius X. But the situation is very interesting, though decidedly more comfortable for those who can watch from without the distractions of an embarrassed Church.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

A NEGLECTED ARGUMENT FOR THE REALITY OF GOD.

C. S. PEIRCE.

I.

THE word "God," so "capitalised" (as we Americans say), is *the* definable proper name, signifying *Ens necessarium*; in my belief Really creator of all three Universes of Experience.

Some words shall herein be capitalised when used, not as vernacular, but as terms defined. Thus an "idea" is the substance of an actual unitary thought or fancy; but "Idea," nearer Plato's idea of *ιδέα*, denotes anything whose Being consists in its mere capacity for getting fully represented, regardless of any person's faculty or impotence to represent it.

"Real" is a word invented in the thirteenth century to signify having Properties, *i.e.* characters sufficing to identify their subject, and possessing these whether they be anywise attributed to it by any single man or group of men, or not. Thus, the substance of a dream is not Real, since it was such as it was, merely in that a dreamer so dreamed it; but the fact of the dream is Real, if it was dreamed; since if so, its date, the name of the dreamer, etc., make up a set of circumstances sufficient to distinguish it from all other events; and these belong to it, *i.e.* would be true if predicated of it, whether A, B, or C Actually ascertains them or not. The "Actual" is that which is met with in the past, present, or future.

An "Experience" is a brutally produced conscious effect that contributes to a habit, self-controlled, yet so satisfying, on

deliberation, as to be destructible by no positive exercise of internal vigour. I use the word "self-controlled" for "controlled by the thinker's self," and not for "uncontrolled" except in its own spontaneous, *i.e.* automatic, self-development, as Professor J. M. Baldwin uses the word. Take for illustration the sensation undergone by a child that puts its forefinger into a flame with the acquisition of a habit of keeping all its members out of all flames. A compulsion is "Brute," whose immediate efficacy nowise consists in conformity to rule or reason.

Of the three Universes of Experience familiar to us all, the first comprises all mere Ideas, those airy nothings to which the mind of poet, pure mathematician, or another *might* give local habitation and a name within that mind. Their very airy-nothingness, the fact that their Being consists in mere capability of getting thought, not in anybody's Actually thinking them, saves their Reality. The second Universe is that of the Brute Actuality of things and facts. I am confident that their Being consists in reactions against Brute forces, notwithstanding objections redoubtable until they are closely and fairly examined. The third Universe comprises everything whose being consists in active power to establish connections between different objects, especially between objects in different Universes. Such is everything which is essentially a Sign—not the mere body of the Sign, which is not essentially such, but, so to speak, the Sign's Soul, which has its Being in its power of serving as intermediary between its Object and a Mind. Such, too, is a living consciousness, and such the life, the power of growth, of a plant. Such is a living constitution—a daily newspaper, a great fortune, a social "movement."

An "Argument" is any process of thought reasonably tending to produce a definite belief. An "Argumentation" is an Argument proceeding upon definitely formulated premisses.

If God Really be, and be benign, then, in view of the generally conceded truth that religion, were it but proved, would be a good outweighing all others, we should naturally

expect that there would be some Argument for His Reality that should be obvious to all minds, high and low alike, that should earnestly strive to find the truth of the matter ; and further, that this Argument should present its conclusion, not as a proposition of metaphysical theology, but in a form directly applicable to the conduct of life, and full of nutrition for man's highest growth. What I shall refer to as the N.A.—the Neglected Argument—seems to me best to fulfil this condition, and I should not wonder if the majority of those whose own reflections have harvested belief in God must bless the radiance of the N.A. for that wealth. Its persuasiveness is no less than extraordinary ; while it is not unknown to anybody. Nevertheless, of all those theologians (within my little range of reading) who, with commendable assiduity, scrape together all the sound reasons they can find or concoct to prove the first proposition of theology, few mention this one, and they most briefly. They probably share those current notions of logic which recognise no other Arguments than Argumentations.

There is a certain agreeable occupation of mind which, from its having no distinctive name, I infer is not as commonly practised as it deserves to be ; for indulged in moderately—say through some five to six per cent. of one's waking time, perhaps during a stroll—it is refreshing enough more than to repay the expenditure. Because it involves no purpose save that of casting aside all serious purpose, I have sometimes been half-inclined to call it reverie, with some qualification ; but for a frame of mind so antipodal to vacancy and dreaminess such a designation would be too excruciating a misfit. In fact, it is Pure Play. Now, Play, we all know, is a lively exercise of one's powers. Pure Play has no rules, except this very law of liberty. It bloweth where it listeth. It has no purpose, unless recreation. The particular occupation I mean—a *petite bouchée* with the Universes—may take either the form of esthetic contemplation, or that of distant castle-building (whether in Spain or within one's own moral training), or

that of considering some wonder in one of the Universes, or some connection between two of the three, with speculation concerning its cause. It is this last kind—I will call it “Musement” on the whole—that I particularly recommend, because it will in time flower into the N.A. One who sits down with the purpose of becoming convinced of the truth of religion is plainly not inquiring in scientific singleness of heart, and must always suspect himself of reasoning unfairly. So he can never attain the entirety even of a physicist’s belief in electrons, although this is avowedly but provisional. But let religious meditation be allowed to grow up spontaneously out of Pure Play without any breach of continuity, and the Muser will retain the perfect candour proper to Musement.

If one who had determined to make trial of Musement as a favourite recreation were to ask me for advice, I should reply as follows: The dawn and the gloaming most invite one to Musement; but I have found no watch of the nychthemeron that has not its own advantages for the pursuit. It begins passively enough with drinking in the impression of some nook in one of the three Universes. But impression soon passes into attentive observation, observation into musing, musing into a lively give-and-take of communion between self and self. If one’s observations and reflections are allowed to specialise themselves too much, the Play will be converted into scientific study; and that cannot be pursued in odd half-hours.

I should add: adhere to the one ordinance of Play, the law of liberty. I can testify that the last half century, at least, has never lacked tribes of Sir Oracles, colporting brocards to bar off one or another roadway of inquiry; and a Rabelais would be needed to bring out all the fun that has been packed in their airs of infallibility. Auguste Comte, notwithstanding his having apparently produced some unquestionably genuine thinking, was long the chief of such a band. The vogue of each particular maxim of theirs was necessarily brief. For what distinction can be gained by repeating saws

heard from all mouths? No bygone fashion seems more grotesque than a *panache* of obsolete wisdom. I remember the days when a pronouncement all the rage was that no science must borrow the methods of another; the geologist must not use a microscope, nor the astronomer a spectroscope. Optics must not meddle with electricity, nor logic with algebra. But twenty years later, if you aspired to pass for a commanding intellect, you would have to pull a long face and declare that "It is not the business of science to search for origins." This maxim was a masterpiece, since no timid soul, in dread of being thought naïve, would dare inquire what "origins" were, albeit the secret confessor within his breast compelled the awful self-acknowledgment of his having no idea into what else than "origins" of phenomena (in some sense of that indefinite word) man can inquire. That human reason can comprehend some causes is past denial, and once we are forced to recognise a given element in experience, it is reasonable to await positive evidence before we complicate our acknowledgment with qualifications. Otherwise, why venture beyond direct observation? Illustrations of this principle abound in physical science. Since, then, it is certain that man is able to understand the laws and the causes of some phenomena, it is reasonable to assume, in regard to any given problem, that it would get rightly solved by man, if a sufficiency of time and attention were devoted to it. Moreover, those problems that at first blush appear utterly insoluble receive, in that very circumstance, as Edgar Poe remarked in his *The Murders in the Rue Morgue*, their smoothly-fitting keys. This particularly adapts them to the Play of Musement.

Forty or fifty minutes of vigorous and unslackened analytic thought bestowed upon one of them usually suffices to educe from it all there is to educe, its general solution. There is no kind of reasoning that I should wish to discourage in Musement; and I should lament to find anybody confining it to a method of such moderate fertility as logical analysis.

Only, the Player should bear in mind that the higher weapons in the arsenal of thought are not play-things but edge-tools. In any mere Play they can be used by way of exercise alone ; while logical analysis can be put to its full efficiency in Musement. So, continuing the counsels that had been asked of me, I should say, "Enter your skiff of Musement, push off into the lake of thought, and leave the breath of heaven to swell your sail. With your eyes open, awake to what is about or within you, and open conversation with yourself ; for such is all meditation." It is, however, not a conversation in words alone, but is illustrated, like a lecture, with diagrams and with experiments.

Different people have such wonderfully different ways of thinking, that it would be far beyond my competence to say what courses Musements might not take ; but a brain endowed with automatic control, as man's indirectly is, is so naturally and rightly interested in its own faculties that some psychological and semi-psychological questions would doubtless get touched ; such, in the latter class, as this : Darwinians, with truly surprising ingenuity, have concocted, and with still more astonishing confidence have accepted as proved, one explanation for the diverse and delicate beauties of flowers, another for those of butterflies, and so on ; but why is all nature—the forms of trees, the compositions of sunsets—suffused with such beauties throughout, and not nature only, but the other two Universes as well ? Among more purely psychological questions, the nature of pleasure and pain will be likely to attract attention. Are they mere qualities of feeling, or are they rather motor instincts attracting us to some feelings and repelling others ? Have pleasure and pain the same sort of constitution, or are they contrasted in this respect, pleasure arising upon the formation or strengthening of an association by resemblance, and pain upon the weakening or disruption of such a habit or conception ?

Psychological speculations will naturally lead on to musings upon metaphysical problems proper, good exercise for a mind

with a turn for exact thought. It is here that one finds those questions that at first seem to offer no handle for reason's clutch, but which readily yield to logical analysis. But problems of metaphysics will inevitably present themselves that logical analysis will not suffice to solve. Some of the best will be motivated by a desire to comprehend universe-wide aggregates of unformulated but partly experienced phenomena. I would suggest that the Muser be not too impatient to analyse these, lest some significant ingredient be lost in the process; but that he begin by pondering them from every point of view, until he seems to read some truth beneath the phenomena.

At this point a trained mind will demand that an examination be made of the truth of the interpretation; and the first step in such examination must be a logical analysis of the theory. But strict examination would be a task a little too serious for the Musement of hour-fractions, and if it is postponed there will be ample remuneration even in the suggestions that there is not time to examine; especially since a few of them will appeal to reason as all but certain.

Let the Muser, for example, after well appreciating, in its breadth and depth, the unspeakable variety of each Universe, turn to those phenomena that are of the nature of homogeneities of connectedness in each; and what a spectacle will unroll itself! As a mere hint of them I may point out that every small part of space, however remote, is bounded by just such neighbouring parts as every other, without a single exception throughout immensity. The matter of Nature is in every star of the same elementary kinds, and (except for variations of circumstance) what is more wonderful still, throughout the whole visible universe, about the same proportions of the different chemical elements prevail. Though the mere catalogue of known carbon-compounds alone would fill an unwieldy volume, and perhaps, if the truth were known, the number of amido-acids alone is greater, yet it is unlikely that there are in all more than about 600 elements, of which 500

dart through space too swiftly to be held down by the earth's gravitation, coronium being the slowest-moving of these. This small number bespeaks comparative simplicity of structure. Yet no mathematician but will confess the present hopelessness of attempting to comprehend the constitution of the hydrogen-atom, the simplest of the elements that can be held to earth.

From speculations on the homogeneities of each Universe, the Muser will naturally pass to the consideration of homogeneities and connections between two different Universes, or all three. Especially in them all we find one type of occurrence, that of growth, itself consisting in the homogeneities of small parts. This is evident in the growth of motion into displacement, and the growth of force into motion. In growth, too, we find that the three Universes conspire; and a universal feature of it is provision for later stages in earlier ones. This is a specimen of certain lines of reflection which will inevitably suggest the hypothesis of God's Reality. It is not that such phenomena might not be capable of being accounted for, in one sense, by the action of chance with the smallest conceivable dose of a higher element; for if by God be meant the *Ens necessarium*, that very hypothesis requires that such should be the case. But the point is that that sort of explanation leaves a mental explanation just as needful as before. Tell me, upon sufficient authority, that all cerebration depends upon movements of neurites that strictly obey certain physical laws, and that thus all expressions of thought, both external and internal, receive a physical explanation, and I shall be ready to believe you. But if you go on to say that this explodes the theory that my neighbour and myself are governed by reason, and are thinking beings, I must frankly say that it will not give me a high opinion of your intelligence. But however that may be, in the Pure Play of Musement the idea of God's Reality will be sure sooner or later to be found an attractive fancy, which the Muser will develop in various ways. The more he ponders it, the more it will find response in every part of his mind, for

its beauty, for its supplying an ideal of life, and for its thoroughly satisfactory explanation of his whole threefold environment.

II.

The hypothesis of God is a peculiar one, in that it supposes an infinitely incomprehensible object, although every hypothesis, as such, supposes its object to be truly conceived in the hypothesis. This leaves the hypothesis but one way of understanding itself; namely, as vague yet as true so far as it is definite, and as continually tending to define itself more and more, and without limit. The hypothesis, being thus itself inevitably subject to the law of growth, appears in its vagueness to represent God as so, albeit this is directly contradicted in the hypothesis from its very first phase. But this apparent attribution of growth to God, since it is ineradicable from the hypothesis, cannot, according to the hypothesis, be flatly false. Its implications concerning the Universes will be maintained in the hypothesis, while its implications concerning God will be partly disavowed, and yet held to be less false than their denial would be. Thus the hypothesis will lead to our thinking of features of each Universe as purposed; and this will stand or fall with the hypothesis. Yet a purpose essentially involves growth, and so cannot be attributed to God. Still it will, according to the hypothesis, be less false to speak so than to represent God as purposeless.

Assured as I am from my own personal experience that every man capable of so controlling his attention as to perform a little exact thinking will, if he examines Zeno's argument about Achilles and the tortoise, come to think, as I do, that it is nothing but a contemptible catch, I do not think that I either am or ought to be less assured, from what I know of the effects of Musement on myself and others, that any normal man who considers the three Universes in the light of the hypothesis of God's Reality, and pursues that line of reflection in scientific singleness of heart, will come to be stirred to the depths of his nature by the beauty of the idea and by its

august practicality, even to the point of earnestly loving and adoring his strictly hypothetical God, and to that of desiring above all things to shape the whole conduct of life and all the springs of action into conformity with that hypothesis. Now to be deliberately and thoroughly prepared to shape one's conduct into conformity with a proposition is neither more nor less than the state of mind called Believing that proposition, however long the conscious classification of it under that head be postponed.

III.

There is my poor sketch of the Neglected Argument, greatly cut down to bring it within the limits assigned to this article. Next should come the discussion of its logicity; but nothing readable at a sitting could possibly bring home to readers my full proof of the principal points of such an examination. I can only hope to make the residue of this paper a sort of table of contents, from which some may possibly guess what I have to say; or to lay down a series of plausible points through which the reader will have to construct the continuous line of reasoning for himself. In my own mind the proof is elaborated, and I am exerting my energies to getting it submitted to public censure. My present abstract will divide itself into three unequal parts. The first shall give the headings of the different steps of every well-conducted and complete inquiry, without noticing possible divergencies from the norm. I shall have to mention some steps which have nothing to do with the Neglected Argument in order to show that they add no jot nor tittle to the truth which is invariably brought just as the Neglected Argument brings it. The second part shall very briefly state, without argument (for which there is no room), just wherein lies the logical validity of the reasoning characteristic of each of the main stages of inquiry. The third part shall indicate the place of the Neglected Argument in a complete inquiry into the Reality of God, and shall show how well it would fill that place, and what its logical value is supposing the

inquiry to be limited to this; and I shall add a few words to show how it might be supplemented.

Every inquiry whatsoever takes its rise in the observation, in one or another of the three Universes, of some surprising phenomenon, some experience which either disappoints an expectation, or breaks in upon some habit of expectation of the *inquisiturus*; and each apparent exception to this rule only confirms it. There are obvious distinctions between the objects of surprise in different cases; but throughout this slight sketch of inquiry such details will be unnoticed, especially since it is upon such that the logic-books descant. The inquiry begins with pondering these phenomena in all their aspects, in the search of some point of view whence the wonder shall be resolved. At length a conjecture arises that furnishes a possible Explanation, by which I mean a syllogism exhibiting the surprising fact as necessarily consequent upon the circumstances of its occurrence together with the truth of the credible conjecture, as premisses. On account of this Explanation, the inquirer is led to regard his conjecture, or hypothesis, with favour. As I phrase it, he provisionally holds it to be "Plausible"; this acceptance ranges in different cases—and reasonably so—from a mere expression of it in the interrogative mood, as a question meriting attention and reply, up through all appraisals of Plausibility, to uncontrollable inclination to believe. The whole series of mental performances between the notice of the wonderful phenomenon and the acceptance of the hypothesis, during which the usually docile understanding seems to hold the bit between its teeth and to have us at its mercy—the search for pertinent circumstances and the laying hold of them, sometimes without our cognisance, the scrutiny of them, the dark labouring, the bursting out of the startling conjecture, the remarking of its smooth fitting to the anomaly, as it is turned back and forth like a key in a lock, and the final estimation of its Plausibility, I reckon as composing the First Stage of Inquiry. Its characteristic formula of reasoning I term Retroduction, *i.e.*

reasoning from consequent to antecedent. In one respect the designation seems inappropriate; for in most instances where conjecture mounts the high peaks of Plausibility—and is *really* most worthy of confidence—the inquirer is unable definitely to formulate just what the explained wonder is; or can only do so in the light of the hypothesis. In short, it is a form of Argument rather than of Argumentation.

Retroduction does not afford security. The hypothesis must be tested.

This testing, to be logically valid, must honestly start, not as Retroduction starts, with scrutiny of the phenomena, but with examination of the hypothesis, and a muster of all sorts of conditional experiential consequences which would follow from its truth. This constitutes the Second Stage of Inquiry. For its characteristic form of reasoning our language has, for two centuries, been happily provided with the name Deduction.

Deduction has two parts. For its first step must be by logical analysis to Explicate the hypothesis, *i.e.* to render it as perfectly distinct as possible. This process, like Retroduction, is Argument that is not Argumentation. But unlike Retroduction, it cannot go wrong from lack of experience, but so long as it proceeds rightly must reach a true conclusion. Explication is followed by Demonstration, or Deductive Argumentation. Its procedure is best learned from Book I. of Euclid's *Elements*, a masterpiece which in real insight is far superior to Aristotle's *Analytics*; and its numerous fallacies render it all the more instructive to a close student. It invariably requires something of the nature of a diagram; that is, an "Icon," or Sign that represents its Object in resembling it. It usually, too, needs "Indices," or Signs that represent their Objects by being actually connected with them. But it is mainly composed of "Symbols," or Signs that represent their Objects essentially because they will be so interpreted. Demonstration should be *Corollarial* when it can. An accurate definition of Corollarial Demonstration would require a long

explanation ; but it will suffice to say that it limits itself to considerations already introduced or else involved in the Explication of its conclusion ; while *Theorematic* Demonstration resorts to a more complicated process of thought.

The purpose of Deduction, that of collecting consequents of the hypothesis, having been sufficiently carried out, the inquiry enters upon its Third Stage, that of ascertaining how far those consequents accord with Experience, and of judging accordingly whether the hypothesis is sensibly correct, or requires some inessential modification, or must be entirely rejected. Its characteristic way of reasoning is Induction. This stage has three parts. For it must begin with Classification, which is an Inductive Non-argumentational kind of Argument, by which general Ideas are attached to objects of Experience ; or rather by which the latter are subordinated to the former. Following this will come the testing-argumentations, the Probations ; and the whole inquiry will be wound up with the Sentential part of the Third Stage, which, by Inductive reasonings, appraises the different Probations singly, then their combinations, then makes self-appraisal of these very appraisals themselves, and passes final judgment on the whole result.

The Probations, or direct Inductive Argumentations, are of two kinds. The first is that which Bacon ill described as "*inductio illa quæ procedit per enumerationem simplicem.*" So at least he has been understood. For an enumeration of instances is not essential to the argument that, for example, there are no such beings as fairies, or no such events as miracles. The point is that there is no well-established instance of such a thing. I call this Crude Induction. It is the only Induction which concludes a logically Universal Proposition. It is the weakest of arguments, being liable to be demolished in a moment, as happened toward the end of the eighteenth century to the opinion of the scientific world that no stones fall from the sky. The other kind is Gradual Induction, which makes a new estimate of the proportion of

truth in the hypothesis with every new instance ; and given any degree of error there will *sometime* be an estimate (or would be, if the probation were persisted in) which will be absolutely the last to be infected with so much falsity. Gradual Induction is either Qualitative or Quantitative, and the latter either depends on measurements, or on statistics, or on countings.

IV.

Concerning the question of the nature of the logical validity possessed by Deduction, Induction, and Retroduction, which is still an arena of controversy, I shall confine myself to stating the opinions which I am prepared to defend by positive proofs. The validity of Deduction was correctly, if not very clearly, analysed by Kant. This kind of reasoning deals exclusively with Pure Ideas attaching primarily to Symbols and derivatively to other Signs of our own creation ; and the fact that man has a power of Explicating his own meaning renders Deduction valid. Induction is a kind of reasoning that may lead us into error ; but that it follows a method which, sufficiently persisted in, will be Inductively Certain (the sort of certainty we have that a perfect coin, pitched up often enough, will *sometime* turn up heads) to diminish the error below any predesignate degree, is assured by man's power of perceiving Inductive Certainty. In all this I am inviting the reader to peep through the big end of the telescope ; there is a wealth of pertinent detail that must here be passed over.

Finally comes the bottom question of logical Critic, What sort of validity can be attributed to the First Stage of inquiry ? Observe that neither Deduction nor Induction contributes the smallest positive item to the final conclusion of the inquiry. They render the indefinite definite ; Deduction Explicates ; Induction evaluates : that is all. Over the chasm that yawns between the ultimate goal of science and such ideas of Man's environment as, coming over him during his primeval wanderings in the forest, while yet his very notion of error was of the vaguest, he managed to communicate to some fellow, we are

building a cantilever bridge of induction, held together by scientific struts and ties. Yet every plank of its advance is first laid by Retroduction alone, that is to say, by the spontaneous conjectures of instinctive reason ; and neither Deduction nor Induction contributes a single new concept to the structure. Nor is this less true or less important for those inquiries that self-interest prompts.

The first answer we naturally give to this question is that we cannot help accepting the conjecture at such a valuation as that at which we do accept it ; whether as a simple interrogation, or as more or less Plausible, or, occasionally, as an irresistible belief. But far from constituting, by itself, a logical justification such as it becomes a rational being to put forth, this pleading, that we *cannot help* yielding to the suggestion, amounts to nothing more than a confession of having failed to train ourselves to control our thoughts. It is more to the purpose, however, to urge that the strength of the impulse is a symptom of its being instinctive. Animals of all races rise far above the general level of their intelligence in those performances that are their proper function, such as flying and nest-building for ordinary birds ; and what is man's proper function if it be not to embody general ideas in art-creations, in utilities, and above all in theoretical cognition ? To give the lie to his own consciousness of divining the reasons of phenomena would be as silly in a man as it would be in a fledgling bird to refuse to trust to its wings and leave the nest, because the poor little thing had read Babinet, and judged aerostation to be impossible on hydrodynamical grounds. Yes ; it must be confessed that *if we knew* that the impulse to prefer one hypothesis to another really were analogous to the instincts of birds and wasps, it would be foolish not to give it play, within the bounds of reason ; especially since we must entertain some hypothesis, or else forego all further knowledge than that which we have already gained by that very means. But is it a fact that man possesses this magical faculty ? Not, I reply, to the extent of guessing right the first time, nor

perhaps the second; but that the well-prepared mind has wonderfully soon guessed each secret of nature, is historical truth. All the theories of science have been so obtained. But may they not have come fortuitously, or by some such modification of chance as the Darwinian supposes? I answer that three or four independent methods of computation show that it would be ridiculous to suppose our science to have so come to pass. Nevertheless, suppose that it can be so "explained," just as that any purposed act of mine is supposed by materialistic necessitarians to have come about. Still, what of it? Does that materialistic explanation, supposing it granted, show that reason has nothing to do with my actions? Even the parallelists will admit that the one explanation leaves the same need of the other that there was before it was given; and this is certainly sound logic. There is a reason, an interpretation, a logic, in the course of scientific advance, and this indisputably proves to him who has perceptions of rational or significant relations, that man's mind must have been attuned to the truth of things in order to discover what he has discovered. It is the very bed-rock of logical truth.

Modern science has been builded after the model of Galileo, who founded it on *il lume naturale*. That truly inspired prophet had said that, of two hypotheses, the *simpler* is to be preferred; but I was formerly one of those who, in our dull self-conceit fancying ourselves more sly than he, twisted the maxim to mean the *logically* simpler, the one that adds the least to what has been observed, in spite of three obvious objections: first, that so there was no support for any hypothesis; secondly, that by the same token we ought to content ourselves with simply formulating the special observations actually made; and thirdly, that every advance of science that further opens the truth to our view discloses a world of unexpected complications. It was not until long experience forced me to realise that subsequent discoveries were every time showing I had been wrong, while those who understood the maxim as Galileo had done, early unlocked the

secret, that the scales fell from my eyes and my mind awoke to the broad and flaming daylight that it is the simpler Hypothesis in the sense of the more facile and natural, the one that instinct suggests, that must be preferred; for the reason that unless man have a natural bent in accordance with nature's, he has no chance of understanding nature at all. Many tests of this principal and positive fact, relating as well to my own studies as to the researches of others, have confirmed me in this opinion; and when I shall come to set them forth in a book, their array will convince everybody. Oh no! I am forgetting that armour, impenetrable by accurate thought, in which the rank and file of minds are clad! They may, for example, get the notion that my proposition involves a denial of the rigidity of the laws of association: it would be quite on a par with much that is current. I do not mean that logical simplicity is a consideration of no value at all, but only that its value is badly secondary to that of simplicity in the other sense.

If, however, the maxim is correct in Galileo's sense, whence it follows that man has, in some degree, a divinitory power, primary or derived, like that of a wasp or a bird, then instances swarm to show that a certain altogether peculiar confidence in a hypothesis, not to be confounded with rash cocksureness, has a very appreciable value as a sign of the truth of the hypothesis. I regret I cannot give an account of certain interesting and almost convincing cases. The N.A. excites this peculiar confidence in the very highest degree.

V.

We have now to apply these principles to the evaluation of the N.A. Had I space I would put this into the shape of imagining how it is likely to be esteemed by three types of men: the first of small instruction with corresponding natural breadth, intimately acquainted with the N.A., but to whom logic is all Greek; the second, inflated with current notions of logic, but prodigiously informed about the N.A.; the

third, a trained man of science who, in the modern spirit, has added to his specialty an exact theoretical and practical study of reasoning and the elements of thought, so that psychologists account him a sort of psychologist, and mathematicians a sort of mathematician.

I should, then, show how the first would have learned that nothing has any kind of value in itself—whether esthetic, moral, or scientific—but only in its place in the whole production to which it appertains; and that an individual soul with its petty agitations and calamities is a zero except as filling its infinitesimal place, and accepting his little futility as his entire treasure. He will see that though his God would not *really* (in a certain sense) adapt means to ends, it is nevertheless quite true that there are relations among phenomena which finite intelligence must interpret, and truly interpret, as such adaptations; and he will macarise himself for his own bitterest griefs, and bless God for the law of growth with all the fighting it imposes upon him—Evil, *i.e.* what it is man's duty to fight, being one of the major perfections of the Universe. In that fight he will endeavour to perform just the duty laid upon him and no more. Though his desperate struggles should issue in the horrors of his rout, and he should see the innocents who are dearest to his heart exposed to torments, frenzy and despair, destined to be smirched with filth, and stunted in their intelligence, still he may hope that it be best *for them*, and will tell himself that in any case the secret design of God will be perfected through their agency; and even while still hot from the battle, will submit with adoration to His Holy will. He will not worry because the Universes were not constructed to suit the scheme of some silly scold.

The context of this I must leave the reader to imagine. I will only add that the third man, considering the complex process of self-control, will see that the hypothesis, irresistible though it be to first intention, yet needs Probation; and that though an infinite being is not tied down to any consistency, yet man, like any other animal, is gifted with power of

understanding sufficient for the conduct of life. This brings him, for testing the hypothesis, to taking his stand upon Pragmaticism, which implies faith in common sense and in instinct, though only as they issue from the cupel-furnace of measured criticism. In short, he will say that the N.A. is the First Stage of a scientific inquiry, resulting in a hypothesis of the very highest Plausibility, whose ultimate test must lie in its value in the self-controlled growth of man's conduct of life.

Since I have employed the word *Pragmaticism*, and shall have occasion to use it once more, it may perhaps be well to explain it. About forty years ago, my studies of Berkeley, Kant, and others led me, after convincing myself that all thinking is performed in Signs, and that meditation takes the form of a dialogue, so that it is proper to speak of the "meaning" of a concept, to conclude that to acquire full mastery of that meaning it is requisite, in the first place, to learn to recognise the concept under every disguise, through extensive familiarity with instances of it. But this, after all, does not imply any true understanding of it; so that it is further requisite that we should make an abstract logical analysis of it into its ultimate elements, or as complete an analysis as we can compass. But, even so, we may still be without any living comprehension of it; and the only way to complete our knowledge of its nature is to discover and recognise just what general habits of conduct a belief in the truth of the concept (of any conceivable subject, and under any conceivable circumstances) would reasonably develop; that is to say, what habits would ultimately result from a sufficient consideration of such truth. It is necessary to understand the word "conduct," here, in the broadest sense. If, for example, the predication of a given concept were to lead to our admitting that a given form of reasoning concerning the subject of which it was affirmed was valid, when it would not otherwise be valid, the recognition of that effect in our reasoning would decidedly be a habit of conduct.

In 1871, in a Metaphysical Club in Cambridge, Mass., I used to preach this principle as a sort of logical gospel, representing the unformulated method followed by Berkeley, and in conversation about it I called it "Pragmatism." In December 1877 and January 1878 I set forth the doctrine in the *Popular Science Monthly*; and the two parts of my essay were printed in French in the *Revue Philosophique*, volumes vi. and vii. Of course, the doctrine attracted no particular attention, for, as I had remarked in my opening sentence, very few people care for logic. But in 1897 Professor James remodelled the matter, and transmogrified it into a doctrine of philosophy, some parts of which I highly approved, while other and more prominent parts I regarded, and still regard, as opposed to sound logic. About the time Professor Papirie discovered, to the delight of the Pragmatist school, that this doctrine was incapable of definition, which would certainly seem to distinguish it from every other doctrine in whatever branch of science, I was coming to the conclusion that my poor little maxim should be called by another name; and accordingly, in April 1905, I renamed it *Pragmaticism*. I had never before dignified it by any name in print, except that, at Professor Baldwin's request, I wrote a definition of it for his *Dictionary of Psychology and Philosophy*. I did not insert the word in the *Century Dictionary*, though I had charge of the philosophical definitions of that work; for I have a perhaps exaggerated dislike of *réclame*.

It is that course of meditation upon the three Universes which gives birth to the hypothesis and ultimately to the belief that they, or at any rate two of the three, have a Creator independent of them, that I have throughout this article called the N.A., because I think the theologians ought to have recognised it as a line of thought reasonably productive of belief. This is the "humble" argument, the innermost of the nest. In the mind of a metaphysician it will have a metaphysical tinge; but that seems to me rather to detract from its force than to add anything to it. It is just as good

an argument, if not better, in the form it takes in the mind of the clodhopper.

The theologians could not have *presented* the N.A.; because that is a living course of thought of very various forms. But they might and ought to have *described* it, and should have defended it, too, as far as they could, without going into original logical researches, which could not be justly expected of them. They are accustomed to make use of the principle that that which convinces a normal man must be presumed to be sound reasoning; and therefore they ought to say whatever can truly be advanced to show that the N.A., if sufficiently developed, will convince any normal man. Unfortunately, it happens that there is very little established fact to show that this is the case. I have not pretended to have any other ground for my belief that it is so than my assumption, which each one of us makes, that my own intellectual disposition is normal. I am forced to confess that no pessimist will agree with me. I do not admit that pessimists are, at the same time, thoroughly sane, and in addition are endowed in normal measure with intellectual vigour; and my reasons for thinking so are two. The first is, that the difference between a pessimistic and an optimistic mind is of such controlling importance in regard to every intellectual function, and especially for the conduct of life, that it is out of the question to admit that both are normal, and the great majority of mankind are naturally optimistic. Now, the majority of every race depart but little from the norm of that race. In order to present my other reason, I am obliged to recognise three types of pessimists. The first type is often found in exquisite and noble natures of great force of original intellect whose own lives are dreadful histories of torment due to some physical malady. Leopardi is a famous example. We cannot but believe, against their earnest protests, that if such men had had ordinary health, life would have worn for them the same colour as for the rest of us. Meantime, one meets too few pessimists of this type to affect the present question.

The second is the misanthropical type, the type that makes itself heard. It suffices to call to mind the conduct of the famous pessimists of this kind, Diogenes the Cynic, Schopenhauer, Carlyle, and their kin with Shakespeare's Timon of Athens, to recognise them as diseased minds. The third is the philanthropical type, people whose lively sympathies, easily excited, become roused to anger at what they consider the stupid injustices of life. Being easily interested in everything, without being overloaded with exact thought of any kind, they are excellent raw material for *littérateurs*: witness Voltaire. No individual remotely approaching the calibre of a Leibniz is to be found among them.

The third argument, enclosing and defending the other two, consists in the development of those principles of logic according to which the humble argument is the first stage of a scientific inquiry into the origin of the three Universes, but of an inquiry which produces, not merely scientific belief, which is always provisional, but also a living, practical belief, logically justified in crossing the Rubicon with all the freightage of eternity. The presentation of this argument would require the establishment of several principles of logic that the logicians have hardly dreamed of, and particularly a strict proof of the correctness of the maxim of Pragmaticism. My original essay, having been written for a popular monthly, assumes, for no better reason than that real inquiry cannot begin until a state of real doubt arises and ends as soon as Belief is attained, that "a settlement of Belief," or, in other words, a state of *satisfaction*, is all that Truth, or the aim of inquiry, consists in. The reason I gave for this was so flimsy, while the inference was so nearly the gist of Pragmaticism, that I must confess the argument of that essay might with some justice be said to beg the question. The first part of the essay, however, is occupied with showing that, if Truth consists in satisfaction, it cannot be any *actual* satisfaction, but must be the satisfaction which *would* ultimately be found if the inquiry were pushed to its ultimate and indefeasible

issue. This, I beg to point out, is a very different position from that of Mr Schiller and the pragmatists of to-day. I trust I shall be believed when I say that it is only a desire to avoid being misunderstood in consequence of my relations with pragmatism, and by no means as arrogating any superior immunity from error which I have too good reason to know that I do not enjoy, that leads me to express my personal sentiments about their tenets. Their avowedly undefinable position, if it be not capable of logical characterisation, seems to me to be characterised by an angry hatred of strict logic, and even some disposition to rate any exact thought which interferes with their doctrines as all humbug. At the same time, it seems to me clear that their approximate acceptance of the Pragmaticist principle, and even that very casting aside of difficult distinctions (although I cannot approve of it), has helped them to a mightily clear discernment of some fundamental truths that other philosophers have seen but through a mist, and most of them not at all. Among such truths—all of them old, of course, yet acknowledged by few—I reckon their denial of necessitarianism; their rejection of any “consciousness” different from a visceral or other external sensation; their acknowledgment that there are, in a Pragmatistical sense, Real habits (which Really *would* produce effects, under circumstances that may not happen to get actualised, and are thus Real generals); and their insistence upon interpreting all hypostatic abstractions in terms of what they *would* or *might* (not actually *will*) come to in the concrete. It seems to me a pity they should allow a philosophy so instinct with life to become infected with seeds of death in such notions as that of the unreality of all ideas of infinity and that of the mutability of truth, and in such confusions of thought as that of active willing (willing to control thought, to doubt, and to weigh reasons) with willing not to exert the will (willing to believe).

C. S. PEIRCE.

DETERMINISM AND MORALS.

THE HON. BERTRAND RUSSELL.

THE importance to ethics of the free-will question is a subject upon which there has existed almost as much diversity of opinion as on the free-will question itself. It has been urged by advocates of free-will that its denial involves the denial of merit and demerit, and that, with the denial of these, ethics collapses. It has been urged on the other side that, unless we can foresee, at least partially, the consequences of our actions, it is impossible to know what course we ought to take under any given circumstances; and that if other people's actions cannot be in any degree predicted, the foresight required for rational action becomes impossible. I do not propose, in the following discussion, to go into the free-will controversy itself. The grounds in favour of determinism appear to me overwhelming, and I shall content myself with a brief indication of these grounds. The question I am concerned with is not the free-will question itself, but the question how, if at all, morals are affected by assuming determinism.

In considering this question, as in most of the other problems of ethics, the moralist who has not had a philosophical training appears to me to go astray, and become involved in needless complications, through supposing that right and wrong in conduct are the ultimate conceptions of ethics, rather than good and bad, in the *effects* of conduct and in other things. The words *good* and *bad* are used both for the sort of conduct which is *right* or *wrong*, and for the sort

of effects to be expected from right and wrong conduct, respectively. We speak of a *good* picture, a *good* dinner, and so on, as well as of a *good* action. But there is a great difference between these two meanings of *good*. Roughly speaking, a *good* action is one of which the probable effects are *good* in the other sense. It is confusing to have two meanings for one word, and I shall therefore speak of a *right* action rather than a *good* action. In order to decide whether an action is *right*, it is necessary to consider its probable effects. If the probable effects are, on the whole, better than those of any other action which is possible under the circumstances, then the action is *right*. The things that are good are things which, on their own account, and apart from any consideration of their effects, we ought to wish to see in existence: they are such things as, we may suppose, might make the world appear to the Creator worth creating. I do not wish to deny that right conduct is among the things that are good on their own account; but if it is so, it depends for its intrinsic goodness upon the goodness of those other things which it aims at producing, such as love or happiness. Thus the rightness of conduct is not the fundamental conception upon which ethics is built up. This fundamental conception is intrinsic goodness or badness, desirability or undesirability.

In order to be able to pass quickly to the consideration of our main theme, I shall assume the following definitions. The *objectively right* action, in any circumstances, is that action which, of all that are possible, gives us, when account is taken of all available data, the greatest expectation of probable good effects, or the least expectation of probable bad effects. The *subjectively right* or *moral* action is that one which will be judged by the agent to be objectively right if he devotes to the question an appropriate amount of candid thought, or, in the case of actions that ought to be impulsive, a small amount. The appropriate amount of thought depends upon the importance of the action and the difficulty of the decision. An act is neither moral nor immoral when it is unimportant, and a

small amount of reflection would not suffice to show whether it was right or wrong. After these preliminaries, we can pass to the consideration of our main topic.

The principle of causality—that every event is determined by previous events, and can (theoretically) be predicted when enough previous events are known—appears to apply just as much to human actions as to other events. It cannot be said that its application to human actions, or to any other phenomena, is wholly beyond doubt; but a doubt extending to the principle of causality must be so fundamental as to involve all science, all everyday knowledge, and everything, or almost everything, that we believe about the actual world. If causality is doubted, morals collapse, since a right action is one of which the probable effects are the best possible, so that estimates of right and wrong necessarily presuppose that our actions can have effects, and therefore that the law of causality holds. For the view that human actions alone are not the effects of causes, there appears to be no ground whatever except the sense of spontaneity. But the sense of spontaneity only affirms that we can do as we choose, and choose as we please, which no determinist denies; it cannot affirm that our choice is independent of all motives,¹ and indeed introspection tends rather to show the opposite. It is said by the advocates of free-will² that determinism destroys morals, since it shows that all our actions are inevitable, and that therefore they deserve neither praise nor blame. Let us consider how far, if at all, this is the case.

The part of ethics which is concerned, not with conduct, but with the meaning of good and bad, and the things that are intrinsically good and bad, is plainly quite independent of free-will. Causality belongs to the description of the existing world, and no inference can be drawn from what exists to

¹ A *motive* means merely a *cause of volition*.

² I use *free-will* to mean the doctrine that not all volitions are determined by causes, which is the denial of determinism. Free-will is often used in senses compatible with determinism, but I am not concerned to affirm or deny it in such senses.

what is good. Whether, then, causality holds always, sometimes or never, is a question wholly irrelevant in the consideration of intrinsic goods and evils. But when we come to conduct and the notion of *ought*, we cannot be sure that determinism makes no difference. For the materially right action may be defined as that one which, of all that are *possible* under the circumstances, will probably on the whole have the best consequences. The action which is materially right must therefore be in some sense *possible*. But if determinism is true, there is a sense in which no action is possible except the one actually performed. Hence, if the two senses of possibility are the same, the action actually performed is always materially right; for it is the only possible action, and therefore there is no other possible action which would have had better results. There is here, I think, a real difficulty. But let us consider the various kinds of possibility which may be meant.

In order that an act may be a *possible* act, it must be physically possible to perform, it must be possible to think of, and it must be possible to choose if we think of it. Physical possibility, to begin with, is obviously necessary. There are circumstances under which I might do a great deal of good by running from Oxford to London in five minutes. But I should not be called unwise, or guilty of an objectively wrong act, for omitting to do so. We may define an act as physically possible when it will occur if I will it. Acts for which this condition fails are not to be taken account of in estimating rightness or wrongness.

To judge whether an act is possible to think of is more difficult, but we certainly take account of it in judging what a man ought to do. There is no *physical* impossibility about employing one's spare moments in writing lyric poems better than any yet written, and this would certainly be a more useful employment than most people find for their spare moments. But we do not blame people for not writing lyric poems unless, like Fitzgerald, they are people that we feel could have written them. And not only we do not blame them, but we feel that their

action may be objectively as well as subjectively right if it is the wisest that *they* could have thought of. But what they *could* have thought of is not the same as what they *did* think of. Suppose a man in a fire or a shipwreck becomes so panic-stricken that he never for a moment thinks of the help that is due to other people, we do not on that account hold that he does right in only thinking of himself. Hence in some sense (though it is not quite clear what this sense is) some of the courses of action which a man does not think of are regarded as possible for him to think of, though others are admittedly impossible.

There is thus a sense in which it must be possible to think of an action, if we are to hold that it is objectively wrong not to perform the action. There is also, if determinism is true, a sense in which it is not possible to think of any action except those which we do think of. But it is questionable whether these two senses of possibility are the same. A man who finds that his house is on fire may run out of it in a panic without thinking of warning the other inmates; but we *feel*, rightly or wrongly, that it was possible for him to think of warning them in a sense in which it was not possible for a prosaic person to think of a lyric poem. It may be that we are wrong in feeling this difference, and that what really distinguishes the two cases is dependence upon past decisions. That is to say, we may recognise that no different choice among alternatives thought of at any time would have turned an ordinary man into a good lyric poet; but that most men, by suitably choosing among alternatives actually thought of, can acquire the sort of character which will lead them to remember their neighbours in a fire. And if a man engages in some useful occupation of which a natural effect is to destroy his nerve, we may conceivably hold that this excuses his panic in an emergency. In such a point, it would seem that our judgment may really be dependent on the view we take as to the existence of free-will; for the believer in free-will cannot allow any such excuse.

If we try to state the difference we feel between the case of the lyric poems and the case of the fire, it seems to come to this: that we do not hold an act materially wrong when it would have required what we recognise as a special aptitude in order to think of a better act, and when we believe that the agent did not possess this aptitude. But this distinction seems to imply that there is not such a thing as a special aptitude for this or that virtue; a view which cannot, I think, be maintained. An aptitude for generosity or for kindness may be as much a natural gift as an aptitude for poetry; and an aptitude for poetry may be as much improved by practice as an aptitude for kindness or generosity. Thus it would seem that there is no sense in which it is possible to think of some actions which in fact we do not think of, but impossible to think of others, except the sense that the ones we regard as possible would have been thought of if a different choice among alternatives actually thought of had been made on some previous occasion.

We shall then modify our previous definition of the objectively right action by saying that it is the probably most beneficial among those that occur to the agent at the moment of choice. But we shall hold that, in certain cases, the fact that a more beneficial alternative does not occur to him is evidence of a wrong choice on some previous occasion. But since occasions of choice do often arise, and since there certainly is a sense in which it is possible to choose any one of a number of different actions which we think of, we can still distinguish some actions as right and some as wrong.

Our previous definitions of objectively right actions and of moral actions still hold, with the modification that, among physically possible actions, only those *which we actually think of* are to be regarded as possible. When several alternative actions present themselves, it is certain that we can both do which we choose, and choose which we will. In this sense all the alternatives are possible. What determinism maintains is, that our will to choose this or that alternative is the effect of antecedents; but this does not prevent our will from being

itself a cause of other effects. And the sense in which other decisions are possible seems sufficient to distinguish some actions as right and some as wrong, some as moral and some as immoral.

Connected with this is another sense in which, when we deliberate, either decision is possible. The fact that we judge one course objectively right may be the cause of our choosing this course : thus, before we have decided as to which course we think right, either is possible in the sense that either will result from our decision as to which we think right. This sense of possibility is important to the moralist, and illustrates the fact that determinism does not make moral deliberation futile.

Determinism does not, therefore, destroy the distinction of right and wrong ; and we saw before that it does not destroy the distinction of good and bad : we shall still be able to regard some people as better than others, and some actions as more right than others. But it is said that praise, and blame, and responsibility are destroyed by determinism. When a madman commits what in a sane man we should call a crime, we do not blame him, partly because he probably cannot judge rightly as to consequences, but partly also because we feel that he could not have done otherwise : if all men are really in the position of the madman, it would seem that all ought to escape blame. But I think the question of choice really decides as to praise and blame. The madman, we believe (excluding the case of wrong judgment as to consequences), did not choose between different courses, but was impelled by a blind impulse. The sane man who (say) commits a murder has, on the contrary, either at the time of the murder or at some earlier time, chosen the worst of two or more alternatives that occurred to him ; and it is for this we blame him. It is true that the two cases merge into each other, and the madman may be blamed if he has become mad in consequence of vicious self-indulgence. But it is right that the two cases should not be too sharply

distinguished, for we know how hard it often is in practice to decide whether people are what is called "responsible for their actions." It is sufficient that there is a distinction, and that it can be applied easily in most cases, though there are marginal cases which present difficulties. We apply praise or blame, then, and we attribute responsibility, where a man, having to exercise choice, has chosen wrongly; and this sense of praise or blame is not destroyed by determinism.

Determinism, then, does not in any way interfere with morals. It is worth noticing that free-will, on the contrary, would interfere most seriously, if anybody really believed in it. People never do, as a matter of fact, believe that anyone else's actions are not determined by motives, however much they may think *themselves* free. Bradshaw consists entirely of predictions as to the actions of engine-drivers; but no one doubts Bradshaw on the ground that the volitions of engine-drivers are not governed by motives. If we really believed that other people's actions did not have causes, we could never try to influence other people's actions; for such influence can only result if we know, more or less, what causes will produce the actions we desire. If we could never try to influence other people's actions, no man could try to get elected to Parliament, or ask a woman to marry him: argument, exhortation, and command would become mere idle breath. Thus almost all the actions with which morality is concerned would become irrational, rational action would be wholly precluded from trying to influence people's volitions, and right and wrong would be interfered with in a way in which determinism certainly does not interfere with them. Most morality absolutely depends upon the assumption that volitions have causes, and nothing in morals is destroyed by this assumption.

Most people, it is true, do not hold the free-will doctrine in so extreme a form as that against which we have been arguing. They would hold that most of a man's actions have causes, but that some few, say one per cent., are uncaused spontaneous assertions of will. If this view is taken, unless

we can mark off the one per cent. of volitions which are uncaused, every inference as to human actions is infected with what we may call one per cent. of doubt. This, it must be admitted, would not matter much in practice, because, on other grounds, there will usually be at least one per cent. of doubt in predictions as to human actions. But from the standpoint of theory there is a wide difference: the sort of doubt that must be admitted in any case is a sort which is capable of indefinite diminution, while the sort derived from the possible intervention of free-will is absolute and ultimate. In so far, therefore, as the possibility of uncaused volitions comes in, all the consequences above pointed out follow; and in so far as it does not come in, determinism holds. Thus one per cent. of free-will has one per cent. of the objectionableness of absolute free-will, and has also only one per cent. of the ethical consequences.

In fact, however, no one really holds that right acts are uncaused. It would be a monstrous paradox to say that a man's decision ought not to be influenced by his belief as to what is his duty; yet, if he allows himself to decide on an act because he believes it to be his duty, his decision has a motive, *i.e.* a cause, and is not free in the only sense in which the determinist must deny freedom. It would seem, therefore, that the objections to determinism are mainly attributable to misunderstanding of its purport. Hence, finally, it is not determinism but free-will that has subversive consequences. There is therefore no reason to regret that the grounds in favour of determinism are overwhelmingly strong.

B. RUSSELL.

OXFORD.

PAIN.

MISS CAROLINE STEPHEN.

THE rapid diffusion in recent years of a familiar and detailed acquaintance with pain and evil in all their forms has been accompanied by a growth of sensitiveness to suffering, whether our own or other people's, almost amounting to panic, and has produced two opposite reactions, both of which appear to those belonging to an older and sterner generation to be full of danger. They spring from one root: the assumption that pain ought not to exist—that it is of necessity an evil.

The teaching of which "Christian Science" is the most familiar type, taking its stand on belief in God as a Being at once all-loving and all-powerful, declares that pain cannot really exist. Modern rebels, on the other hand, declare that since the existence of pain is undeniable, the God of Christian faith cannot exist. Both hold that there is no room in one universe for pain and for a God who is Love. Both apparently feel themselves competent to sit in judgment on the whole course of Nature and to condemn it—the one as a vast lie, the other as a huge system of cruelty.

To the ordinary mind both these attitudes appear so presumptuous as almost to refute themselves. They both imply a claim to have mastered the problem of evil and to have ascertained its origin with such completeness as to warrant the assertion of its needlessness.

I need hardly say that nothing is further from my intention than to offer any alternative solution of that awful problem.

My object is only to consider what, for ordinary people, is the right way of meeting suffering. There are multitudes who are staggered and perplexed by the daily tragedies and the heart-sickening conditions of life surrounding us on all sides, who yet desire to find and to keep hold of a courageous and dutiful way of meeting the facts of experience; who can find no satisfaction either in denying the reality of pain, or in blaspheming against the Author of Life and Order. These ask not what God ought to allow, but how we ought to meet that which *is* allowed; not whether the infliction of pain can be morally justifiable, but whether the endurance of it can be made morally profitable. They ask not for consolation but for strength. Possibly there may be no consolation to be had, but there is always the need to endure. If we can but find firm ground on which to stand upright and to meet our lot without loss of self-respect or lowering of aim, it will be time enough after the battle has been fought and won to ask how the conflict arose. Meanwhile, it is in fighting the battle that we shall answer such questions as it behoves us to ask.

This is not to say that if Philosophy could solve for us the ever-recurring problem of how to reconcile in thought the existence of evil with that of a supreme and everlasting Order—nay, with the existence of any order at all—it would not make our task infinitely easier. Possibly, indeed, it might make all life “a task so light, that Virtue never could grow strong.” But Philosophy has not yet solved this problem; and we cannot wait for such a solution before living our lives, and encountering the inevitable trials of our mortal state. Are we at liberty—can it be right, wise, or helpful—either to kick against the pricks or to deny their power to wound?

The whole question for practical purposes turns on that of the moral and spiritual effects of pain when rightly met. Before asking what results have in fact been known to flow from it, and what is meant by rightness of attitude towards it, there are two points which need to be made clear.

In the first place, we are met at the very outset of such an

inquiry as this by the question of our own competence to deal with it. Few of us can ever be sure that we have had experience enough of the power of pain to warrant us in generalising about it. In reply especially to any hopeful view of the matter, those who are unconvinced can always reply: "That is all very well, but you would not say so if you knew as much about suffering as I do"; and there is no common measure for such experience. Yet though no one dare boast that he has exhausted the possibilities of suffering in his own personal experience, and though some degree of exemption from it (for the moment, at any rate) may be implied in the very power to speculate on its meaning and tendencies, yet no one can live long in this world without tasting enough of it to afford some test of the bearing, and even of the cogency, of the various theories in the strength of which it may be encountered, or under cover of which it may be flinched from. For it must be remembered that it is not the degree, but the fact of suffering which raises the difficulty as to its compatibility with Divine Love.

From a merely logical point of view, one pang suffered by the humblest creature is as clearly if not as strikingly incompatible with the idea of omnipotent benevolence as the utmost intensity of accumulated torture; and in like manner the experience of blessing springing out of the familiar sorrows of ordinary people loses nothing of its weight because there are depths of suffering which these have not yet fathomed. It is the common lot with which we are chiefly concerned when our object is not the solution of a theoretical puzzle, but the justification of a definite mental attitude. Whether our own experience be in any respect exceptional or not, we can all recognise the place which suffering holds in the lives of others, and the degree in which our estimate of their character is affected by their manner of encountering it. We have all suffered enough to know how much it costs—and how much it avails—to meet trial in a brave spirit, as discipline, not as mere hindrance. We can in some degree guess what has gone

to the making of such qualities as we see shining in the lives of the heroes and martyrs by whose deeds our lower levels of life are lighted up, and our deepest veneration called out. At any rate, whether competent or not to preach patience, we must all be ready to practise it ; and we have all both the right and the duty to consider in what light it should be regarded.

The other point which must be emphasised as a preliminary is the distinction between pain and evil. To use the words indiscriminately is of course to beg the whole question at issue, which is precisely whether pain is or is not of necessity evil. All who have seriously considered the matter know how difficult it is to frame any definition of good and evil which shall not turn in some degree upon the tendency of actions to produce or to hinder happiness. But this is not to say that good has no other meaning than happiness, or evil than pain. At every turn we have to recognise that the things are different, though mysteriously related.

The question of the precise meaning of good and evil, of course, lies at the very root of the science of ethics, and I am not dreaming of grappling with it ; but it is clear that in their practical application to everyday life the words pain and evil express two very different thoughts ; and that while evil obviously cannot be innocent, pain often is so. Of course it will be replied that though the suffering of pain may be innocent, its infliction cannot be so. But this is just the question at issue. Does the infliction of pain always mean an actual injury done to the sufferer ? If not—if, on the other hand, it means a moral and spiritual, or even a physical benefit, which the sufferer, having the choice, would gladly purchase at that cost—then there can be no room for calling it evil, short of the assertion that the whole constitution of Nature ought to have been different, so as to allow of the same results being produced by quite other means—an assertion which, in the mouth of a mere human being, is as idle as it is rebellious.

We shall, of course, all agree in considering the infliction of needless and unprofitable suffering as mere cruelty. But

who shall dare to say under what fundamental necessity joy and sorrow, pain and pleasure, light and darkness are in this world as inseparably connected as are the concave and convex sides of the line of any curve? The rashness with which it is often assumed that the omnipotence which we attribute to God means—and that we are therefore justified in asserting—that He could just as easily have created us and brought us to a state of moral perfection without suffering as with it, seems incredible when one reflects upon it. Yet this assumption is the very root of the difficulty. Our own utter inability to conceive of any such process or its result might at least keep us silent, if we cannot rise to the height of being ready to “rejoice in tribulation.”

But not to dwell further on the surprising liberty claimed by some to sit in judgment on that whole of which our very existence, let alone our moral sense, is but an infinitesimal fragment, let us consider what is involved for our daily life in the habit of allowing ourselves to regard all suffering as evil.

It would seem to be too obvious a truism to be worth recalling (could we ever count upon truisms being kept in mind), that courage and patience depend for their very existence upon the need and the practice of endurance. It is perhaps more to the purpose to ask wherein lie the peculiar preciousness and beauty of these two qualities, and how the universal reverence for them is justified. The essence of both seems to consist in self-mastery; and self-mastery appears to have an intrinsic rightness and beauty in whatever form it may be manifested. The exercise of courage and patience involves, of course, the dominion of the spirit over the flesh, as we refuse to be deterred by the fear, or disturbed by the actual experience, of suffering. Deterred from what? Disturbed out of what? Does not our instinctive as well as reasoned admiration of courage recognise, whether consciously or not, the existence of an order, a plan, a design (call it duty or truth or beauty, or what you will) which is rightfully

supreme, and the pursuance of which in the teeth of all hindrances constitutes our essential idea of virtue? And in like manner, does not our admiration of patience imply that equanimity is the ideal state of the human spirit?

So by the mere fact of our admiration and reverence for courage and patience in others we acknowledge that there is something better than mere freedom from pain, a better sway than that of the emotions. The homage we yield to the brave testifies to our sense of the value of the higher law in obedience to which they risk, or actually encounter, every kind of hardship or suffering. And when from admiration we rise to the practice of courage and patience, we do in very deed recognise and consent and say Amen to an Order, the Author of which is the Object of our inmost adoration. By such effectual consent and actual working out in deed of loyalty to the higher law we are, I believe, actually, though of course gradually, lifted above mere sensation or mere emotion—raised to a higher plane. And the power to endure, like all our active powers, grows through exercise.

If this be true—and I believe that every one of us may prove its truth by actual personal experience, for it applies to the endurance of all pain, however slight or however intense, whether bodily or mental—if this be true, we have the key to all the religious value for suffering which, though liable to such deplorable exaggerations and perversions, is yet so incalculable a force. If it be true, the modern revolt against all suffering is obviously suicidal. To extinguish all suffering, were that possible, would be to deprive the world of a leverage as all-pervading and effectual towards spiritual elevation and purification as is gravitation towards stability.

It is not, of course, mere pain in itself that lifts or cleanses. It is pain rightly endured which acts as a spiritual lever. By pain rightly endured, I mean whatever is courageously and patiently borne, from whatever motive. I believe that the blindest, the most purely instinctive effort of mere “pluck” has a lifting power, and deserves our thankful admiration; and

that every degree and every form of courage tends to raise the whole tone of life within the range of its influence, in proportion to the amount and the quality of the endurance exercised.

The lifting power of endurance must probably be measured by its motive. The mere instinctive pluck which makes a schoolboy ashamed to wince or cry out may have no conscious motive at all, and may in fact be inspired by nothing more exalted than a general sense of *esprit de corps* and respect for tradition or public opinion. Yet even these things are higher than the dominion of mere sensation from which the boy is lifted away by them. And when once we arrive at the recognition of fortitude as an ideal, the conscious and resolute practice of it becomes a radiating power of incalculable value, the condition of the highest achievements which ennoble life. And again, there is a devotion in the strength of which courage is kindled into the joyous rapture of martyrdom.

The higher degrees of courage—perhaps all conscious devotion to it as an ideal—imply of course the distinct recognition of that, be it what it may, for the sake of which we make the effort to rise above our pain. This object, recognised as something higher than ease, may be only an ideal. Some of us have seen, and wondered at, the sustaining power of that devotion to moral beauty and excellence (considered in a purely impersonal and abstract fashion as the one supremely desirable thing in a life unlighted by any revelation, and not necessarily regarded as extending beyond the grave) which in these troubled times ennobles and beautifies the lives of so many professed Agnostics. We have seen such lives gradually being lifted and purified by a power to which they give no name, and which seems not to inspire them with any tender or personal sense of devotion, but to which they render an austere and disinterested obedience. Such as these do not ask for consolation; but neither do they struggle or cry out against the Order under which they live, and by which they have been wrought into so fine a temper of unworldly and unwavering

integrity. Dumbly they do homage to the nature of the lessons taught by the discipline of life, though they may refrain from any spring of confidence towards the Teacher.

Others there are for whom the Light of Revelation has shone in the darkness ; for whom the central source of all joy and strength is the life of the Crucified One—Son of God and Son of Man—by whom the very gates of heaven are opened to all believers. By these, however poor and feeble their own presentation of the Christian life, it is yet felt to be essentially and of necessity a life of victory. They have recognised once for all “the glory of the Cross,” and all suffering is for them a means whereby the Father’s name may be glorified. These “count it all joy” when they are called on to endure anything for His sake who loved us and gave Himself for us. They are ready with all their hearts to follow His call to rise higher through suffering, to take up their cross and follow the Captain of their salvation in the narrow upward path that leadeth unto life. To them the discipline of life is not merely a steady obedience to principle, but a blessed and tender instruction administered by the Father of their spirits, and prized above all mere happiness for its power to draw them nearer to Himself. Such willing scholars in the school of Divine discipline have experiences more or less incommunicable, and not to be freely spoken of, in the light of which all pain is seen as containing the possibility of infinite blessing.

For indeed the experience of the saints that it is good for them to have been in trouble is too familiar, too freely shared by those who, while never dreaming that they deserve the name of saints, are yet one with them in hope and faith, to need reassertion. It seems to be in the nature of happiness to lessen the forward impulse of the soul. “Stay, thou art fair,” is the language of the happy, while those who endure cheer themselves with the thought, “This too will pass.” And not only does happiness tend rather to rest than to effort, but in proportion as it satisfies it isolates ; whereas pain breaks down the barriers between spirit and spirit as nothing else can do.

When we are in trouble we call upon God, and are brought into sympathy with man. Nothing unites hearts like a sorrow shared.

But though the contrast between these familiar effects of joy and sorrow explains the sense of the value of pain which makes so many of us feel that our times of trouble are those which we could least afford to have blotted out from our lives, it does not follow that we feel suffering to be a better thing than enjoyment, or indeed to be in itself a good thing at all. Its whole value is in the effect of its right endurance—in the lifting and purifying and stimulating action on the mind for which to the brave and patient it becomes a means. It is one of the instruments, but is very far from being the only instrument, in the hand of the Divine Husbandman, by which the fruit harvest is brought to maturity. Just because joy and sorrow are so powerful and so various in their power, we need both, and both need to be administered by more than human wisdom and knowledge. The office of brave and patient endurance being not only to lift us above the dominion of mere emotion, but to reveal to us the presence of the Teacher from whom this instruction comes, it is, I believe, our wisdom, while accepting willingly from His hand the needful severity of discipline, to abstain altogether from intermeddling in the administration of it by self-inflicted austerities. A dutiful spirit of confidence in Divine Wisdom is the mainspring of patience. I do not see how any such confidence can be rightly felt in one's own devices for subduing the flesh.

Indeed, the apportionment of joy and sorrow, pain and pleasure, in any lot is a matter with which it does not seem conceivable that human wisdom should be competent to deal, even were the control of events in its hands. Joy and sorrow have their different and perhaps equally important parts to play in every life. While sorrow rightly met lifts and awakens and braces, joy rightly met rests and melts and ripens—and perhaps raises also. Surely our wisdom is to open our hearts to both, and to take no thought for either, while cleaving to

the guidance of that "stern daughter of the voice of God" which sets us free from the sway of our own desires.

There is one plain duty for us all in the presence of an ever-growing acquaintance with the sorrows of the world—the duty of self-control. Whatever our inmost thought with regard to the "Awful Power" by which the conditions of our life are ordained, whether we have even a grain of religious faith or must content ourselves with ethical principle, let us for any sake keep our balance, and not exaggerate, or indulge in rhetorical violence of denunciation against that which we can neither prevent nor fathom. It is certainly a duty to resist the temptation to an excessive value for ease which is at any rate akin to cowardice.

I have not touched on the haunting horrors by which so many minds are overshadowed through dwelling on the worst evils of our overcrowded and in many respects corrupt city populations. It may be necessary that these things should be published, and it may be right that we should all in our measure feel their weight and urgency; but of one thing I am sure—that they cannot be truly measured from outside, still less from afar off. It is not those who are actually engaged in a hand-to-hand struggle with evil and degradation who take the gloomiest view of things. No others can give due weight to the elements of hope and of goodness which are mixed up everywhere with human vice and misery. This, I believe, is a part of the reward reserved for those who are honestly and heartily spending themselves in the service of the poor and wretched. They learn to hope against hope, and to see encouragement everywhere. Their sympathy takes that deepest and best form which is not a mere reflection of pain, but a community of resolve. At any rate we shall do no good to ourselves or to others, and we may but too easily harden our hearts, by dwelling on pictures of misery and wretchedness without attempting any active endeavours to remove or lessen them. And if we are to give heart and hope to others, it must be by having our own heart and hope fixed on that which cannot fail.

CAROLINE STEPHEN.

THE "JERAHMEEL THEORY":

A MISTAKEN NAME FOR A GENUINE THING.

THE REV. T. K. CHEYNE, D.Litt., D.D., F.B.A.

IN the present article the writer, with much reluctance, deserts the paths of simple inquiry and exposition. He will not, however, try the reader's patience by condescending to the procedure of ordinary controversialists. The attacks directed against him may often have been of a singular vehemence, but the only mode of self-defence that he will adopt is the removal of misapprehensions. Possibly the most violent of his assailants will pass over these pages, but there must still be some unspoiled Bible students who prize the jewel of an open mind, and who would say to the writer as the Roman Jews said to St Paul, "We desire to hear of thee what thou thinkest." What is it, then, that requires to be freed from misapprehension? It is the North Arabian theory in its fullest form. It is here contended that Arabia, and more distinctly North Arabia, exercised no slight political and religious influence upon Israel, especially upon the region commonly known as Judah. And now, as always, the writer will combine this with a Babylonian theory, viz. that subsequently to a great migration of Jerahmeelites and kindred Arabian peoples in a remote century (2500 B.C.?), and again later, Babylonian culture exercised a wide influence on Syria and Palestine, and that South Arabia too, which was within the Babylonian sphere of influence, profoundly

affected North Arabia, and through North Arabia South Palestine. Both directly and indirectly, therefore, Palestine received a powerful and permanent stimulus from Babylonian culture.

The portion of this complex theory which is most sharply attacked is one which claims to be based not only on inscriptional evidence but also on passages of the Old Testament. The question whether it really has an Old Testament basis has not yet received half enough attention. This is unfortunate. South Arabian evidence may be only probable; the Assyrian and the Hebrew may, in my opinion, be called decisive. Open-minded students may well be surprised that there should be scholars of the first and second rank who fail to see this, and who, strong in their presumed security, not only attack the North Arabian theory themselves, but warn their pupils or readers against it as a phantasy.

It may perhaps be objected that the keenest adversaries are but a small number of persons, who, being at least on this question orthodox, may be expected to show the qualities characteristic of too many orthodoxies. In reply, lapsing into the first person, I admit that the most hostile writers may be comparatively few; but when a member of the larger and less bitter class, in paraphrasing a simple narrative of the origin of a book, succeeds in transforming an act of generosity into an act of calculating prudence,¹ even a saint might feel justified in breaking silence. Is this, then, the right way for a young convert to the historical spirit (for such Professor Witton-Davies is) to treat a work of some originality? I know that it is hard to enter into a new point of view, but those who cannot yet do this are scarcely trustworthy reviewers. It is disappointing, but I must confess that hitherto only "one man among a thousand have I found" (Eccles. vii. 28), and he is an American.

¹ I am sorry to have to point this out, for Professor Davies is zealous for the higher education in Wales. But truth requires it. See *Review of Theology and Philosophy*, edited by Professor Menzies, May 1908, p. 689; and *cp. Traditions and Beliefs of Ancient Israel*, p. v, "To the Reader."

Professor Davies says that he is also an ex-Baptist, and has "defended some points of Jerahmeelism." Apparently the two things go together.

The views of this scholar (Professor Nathaniel Schmidt of Cornell University) are summed up in an article in this Journal (January 1908), entitled, "The 'Jerahmeel' Theory and the Historic Importance of the Negeb." The opening words of this remind me too much of the misleading title of another American article, "Israel or Jerahmeel?"¹ The truth surely is that there are other ethnic or regional names of North Arabia—Mizrim, Asshur, Cush—which would have as much right to form part of the title of the theory as Jerahmeel. I dissuade, however, from parading any of these names in a title. There are too many who are glad to scoff at unfamiliar names, not being aware that the questions, "Which were the powers in closest contact with Israel?" and "Where did the ancestors of Israel sojourn before entering Canaan?" are symbolised by these names. And not only this, but the due comprehension of the Hebrew traditions is bound up with the investigation of this subject.

To prove this, let me select a few passages out of many, which contain the name of Asshūr (or Shūr) or Ashhūr as a regional name of North Arabia, and which, with one exception, have been misunderstood. And first, Gen. xxv. 3 and Ezek. xxvii. 23. In the former Asshur[im] is connected most closely with Dedan, and only less closely with Sheba, which are admittedly North Arabian. In the latter, Asshur stands between Sheba and Kilmad, both which ought to be Arabian, only the commentators cannot adopt the only natural view. "Kilmad" is admittedly corrupt. Next, Gen. xxv. 18. Here, beyond doubt, Asshur is most easily explained as a North Arabian regional name. The true rendering is, "And they dwelt from Havilah unto Shur, which is in front (*i.e.* eastward) of Mizrim." To this an ancient gloss is added, "in the direction of Asshur." Shur is the short for Asshur. Another

¹ See *American Journal of Theology*, October 1907.

passage is Gen. xxiv. 63. Here no doubt the text is corrupt, but the right correction, from the point of view of the theory, is evident. The common text may be represented thus: "And Isaac went out to x in the field at eventide": x stands for a word which is untranslatable, and manifestly corrupt; in short, an unknown quantity. And until we try some new method, x is likely to remain x . My own experience enables me to assert that the new method has been found, and that the true reading is, "to Ashhur," which should probably be restored to verse 62, where a regional name is really wanted. Thus we get for verses 62, 63, "Now Isaac had come to Ashhur from the road (*i.e.* the caravan road) to the Well of Jerahmeel, for he was a dweller in the Negeb. And Isaac went out into the field at eventide," etc. Ashhur was probably not the region so called, but the city of Ephron, where Isaac's father dwelt for a time before his death.¹ The Well of Jerahmeel, miscalled Beer-lahai-roi, was the great central well of the north Jerahmeelite country. For a definite view of the situation of this country we may turn to Gen. xxv. 18, already explained.

Another interesting passage is 1 Sam. xxiv. 14 (*cp.* the parallel, xxvi. 20). Can our Bible really give us the original writer's meaning? With tasteless servility the chivalrous David is here made to say—what everyone remembers and wonders at. The true reading, however, of the closing words is, "a wild ass of Ashhur." A good part of the wide region called Ashhur (or Asshur) was no doubt steppe-country, where wild asses delighted to roam (Job xxxix. 5–8). That surely is a figure both fine in itself and specially appropriate for David, who roamed at large in the south country like a wild ass.

We have seen where an early narrator placed the North Arabian Asshur. It is quite another thing to be able to locate it on the map. It is also troublesome that we have two Asshurs to provide for, there being apparently two uses

¹ See my *Traditions and Beliefs*, pp. 337 f., 349 f.

of the name, a narrower and a wider.¹ There was probably an Asshur which adjoined and may once have included the Negeb, and another which was remote from Southern Palestine and whose king at some period claimed suzerainty over the smaller kingdoms to the north, including especially Mizrim. Its capital was probably called Bābel.²

I have mentioned these things partly to justify my objection to the phrases "the Jerahmeel theory" and "Jerahmeelism," partly because of the intrinsic importance of the result to which the facts appear to point, viz. that the rulers of a distant Arabian land, called *conventionally* by the Israelites Asshur or Ashhur, were strong enough to invade the Negeb and the land of Judah, and were confounded by later scribes with kings of Assyria. The cause of the confusion is obvious; it is that the tradition of Assyrian invasions was still in circulation. Parallels for the confusion will be given in my forthcoming book; I may therefore proceed to explain another regional name, Mizrim, or, in Assyrian, Muzri or Muzur, which I have already had occasion to use. Whether it means "border-region" seems to me doubtful; the true meaning of regional names is not always the most plausible one. There is, however, one result of criticism which seems to me to have not been overthrown either by Eduard Meyer or by Flinders Petrie or by the latest writer, A. T. Olmstead.³ It is that there was a second land of Mizrim or Muzri, not indeed in the Negeb (as the latest writer strangely supposes Winckler to think), but in a tract of North Arabia extending perhaps as far south as Medina, and in the north probably not far removed from the better-known Mizrim, *i.e.* the Nile Valley. Many equally strange doublings of regional names will at once occur

¹ Hommel, however, who knows only of one Asshur, thinks it to have extended from the Wady-el-Arish (the miscalled "brook of Egypt") to Beersheba and Hebron, and that it is the A'shur mentioned together with Muzr in an ancient Minæan inscription.

² In the article by Professor Witton-Davies (*Rev. of Theol.*, 1908, p. 692), we find a "man of straw," a "Babel in the Negeb." What accuracy!

³ *Sargon of Assyria* (1908), pp. 56-71.

to the student. For instance, it is an assured historical fact, not dependent on 1 Kings x. 18, 2 Kings vii. 6, that there was a third Muzri in North Syria.

About the second Muzri there is, I admit, still much dispute. Winckler's opinion, however, so cogently maintained by him against Professor Eduard Meyer, has notable defenders. To say the least, it must be, and is, admitted that there are some inscriptional references to Muzri which cannot possibly mean either a North Syrian state or the land which we know as Egypt.

Things being so, we must give our best attention to any evidence adduced from Assyrian or Egyptian sources, and the newest writer on Biblical archæology¹ refers me, in correction of my own views, to Professor Flinders Petrie. Be it so. Eager and impetuous alike as an explorer and as a writer, Professor Petrie must produce some effect, even though it may not be what he desires. So I turn to his latest utterance of opinion, and what do I find? He tells us that the theory of a second Muzri is a fantastic result of unchecked literary criticism.² Are we really expected to believe this? I know that any unchecked criticism would be a dangerous thing; but how can the Muzri theory, based as it is on inscriptional as well as literary evidence, be an example of this? Or will it be asserted that unchecked inferences from inscriptions are less dangerous? Can one, for instance, infer from the fact that "Sinai" contains Egyptian monuments down to the twentieth dynasty (Petrie, 1202-1102 B.C.), and from that other fact (if it be such) that the Egyptian frontier stretched across into South Palestine at *many* periods, that a Hebrew writer would call the added region Mizraim? Yet Professor Petrie draws this inference, while frankly admitting (*Researches*, p. viii.) that "there is no trace (in Sinai) of any permanent garrison." Elsewhere³ this scholar speaks of the

¹ See *Prehistoric Archaeology and the Old Testament*, by H. J. Dukinfield Astley, M.A., Litt.D.

² *Researches in Sinai*, p. 195.

³ *History of Egypt*, iii. 283.

supposed Muzri as situated in "the almost uninhabited desert." Such an assertion, however, is arbitrary. As Winckler remarks, "If Roman civilisation penetrated into this region under Roman rule, Oriental civilisation penetrated before under Oriental rule"; nor can we doubt that stimulating influences came from the more developed culture of South Arabia, especially if Winckler is right in supposing that the king of Meluḥa (West Arabia), who was probably the suzerain of Muzri, was the head of the Minæan empire, *i.e.* that the archaising phrase "king of Meluḥa" should rather be "king of Ma'in."¹ At any rate, North Arabia cannot fail to have been affected in many ways by the more civilised south. The tillage of any productive parts of the land would certainly not have been exempt from this influence, especially the important oases as far south as the neighbourhood of Medina.

I have now to speak of passages respecting Muzri in the Assyrian inscriptions. And first of all, of the passage in which Tiglath-Pileser III. states that he appointed Idi-bi'lu (evidently an Arabian, not [as Olmstead] a tribe) to be *kêpu* (strictly *kêputu*), or, as we, thinking of Indian native states, might say, a "resident," over Muzri. Where was this Muzri situated? In 1889 Winckler supposed the reference to be to the North Syrian Muzri, but in 1893, with more Tiglath-Pileser texts before him, he was able (in my opinion) to show that a North Arabian Muzri would alone satisfy the conditions of the case. Professor Petrie, however, whom our latest Biblical archaeologist brings up against me, interprets this Muzri as, not indeed the Nile Valley, but either what he calls Sinai or the Isthmus of Suez. One or two chiefs on the eastern side of the Egyptian empire, who had achieved their independence, may have made their submission and received an Assyrian resident. The theory takes no account of the other facts adduced by Winckler, and implies that the Assyrian king had an ill-served intelligence department.

Next I will refer to an inscription of Sargon. It tells how

¹ See my forthcoming work (*Decline and Fall of Kingdom of Judah*).

Jamani (probably a Jamanite or Javanite of North Arabia),¹ an adventurer put up by the anti-Assyrian party in Ashdod, fled before Sargon "to the region of Muzur, which is at the entrance to Meluha." This at least is Winckler's present translation. The passage is by no means without difficulty. It would be possible to render, "to the border of Muzur, which (*i.e.* Muzur) is beside Meluha," which Professor Petrie paraphrases, "to the frontier of the Egyptian power in Sinai which joins on to Arabia." This, he says, is "a perfectly sound expression." It is at any rate sound English, but in what sense can it have been said that the region which Professor Petrie designates Sinai was distinct from Meluha? And can Meluha be rightly paraphrased "Arabia"? The inference which Professor Petrie—and now (June 1908) Dr Olmstead²—have not drawn from the Assyrian phraseology, but surely ought to have drawn, is that the Muzur referred to by Sargon needed to be distinguished from some other Muzur, *i.e.* from Egypt.

I have no inclination to prolong this debate. Dr Astley has accused me (not discourteously) of rashness on the ground of historical statements by Professor Petrie; and these statements, upon examination, prove to be doubtful. Perhaps, however, some other writer may compel my assent. Let us search the magazines. Professor Eerdmans, in his notice of my Psalter, seems to me to have failed through misapprehensions and unbending textual conservatism. I turn therefore from Leyden to St Andrews, where Professor Menzies edits an excellent Review. Here I find an article as unprogressive in spirit and as liable to strange inaccuracies. The writer (Professor Witton-Davies) holds that every form of the North Arabian theory is "impossible." How can two peoples, both called Mizrites, "have existed side by side without

¹ Less probably a Phœnician or a Greek from Cyprus. Omri, Zimri, and Tibi were all probably adventurers from North Arabia: this is inferred from the names. Winckler, however, suggests that Jamani (Yamani) may mean a man of Jemen (Yemen). What is the history of the name Jemen? Did the name Jaman (Jerahmeel) extend to South Arabia?

² *Sargon of Assyria*, p. 79, note 68.

some notice of the fact"? And must not an exodus from a North Arabian land of Mizrim "have been known to at least the oldest writers (Amos, etc.) of the Bible, who connect it with the well-known Egypt?" To these brief criticisms I will reply. As to the first, it is by no means certain that "no notice of the fact" was ever given. One notice we have found already in Sargon's inscription, and in such Old Testament passages as Deut. iv. 20, Ps. lxxviii. 51, cv. 27, cvi. 21, 22 a reference to North Arabia (rather than to Egypt) is guaranteed by the rule of synonymous parallelism. Professor Witton-Davies may, indeed, question this in Deut. iv. 20, but the phrase "the furnace of iron" has no meaning, and only prejudice can oppose the methodical textual correction, "the furnace of Arabia of Ishmael" (*T. and B.*, p. 109). Still less can it be denied that "Mizrim" in the passages from Psalms is synonymously parallel to "Ham." What then does this strangely short name signify? I have answered the question elsewhere (*T. and B.*, p. 32, n. ²). It is an abridgment of the form "Jarham," and therefore equivalent to the racial as well as tribal name "Jerahmeel." Passing on to the second point, how can any critic possibly prove that references in Amos and Hosea to the "land of Mizrim" in connection with the Exodus mean "the land of Egypt"? A thorough study of Amos and Hosea seems to point rather to the land of Mizrim, in North Arabia.

I turn much more hopefully to Professor Nathaniel Schmidt, because he has attracted the censure of an opponent of my own, and because I know that, like Chaucer's priest, "gladly would he learn, and gladly teach." Indeed, his previous changes of opinion conclusively prove this. He is aware of the complexity of the problems before us, and fair enough to hold that neither Winckler's theories nor my own can possibly be as absurd as Professor Eduard Meyer and his younger allies suppose. At present he inclines to think that the kings of Muzri spoken of in certain Assyrian inscriptions were not kings or viceroys of a somewhat extensive North

Arabian region, but dynasts residing either in Egypt or in districts adjoining it on the east, and also that the region called in these inscriptions Meluḥa was not Western Arabia but Ethiopia. I am sorry that Professor Schmidt should defend this, and against it would refer to Professor Winckler's able answer to Eduard Meyer.¹ I do not think that Meyer has made out his case, and Schmidt will certainly agree with me in objecting to his tone. Acute as he is, it is dangerous to take him for a master.

Still, I do not myself belong to the irreconcilables, and, agreeing on this point with Winckler, am willing to make an admission in the interests alike of peace and of truth. It may be true that Meyer's view of Muzri and Meluḥa has fewer elements of truth than Winckler's in the inscriptional passages to which a Muzri and Meluḥa theory is applied. But it may be that Egypt and Muzri alike, Magan and Meluḥa, meant to the Babylonians the southern part of the earth.² The door is thus opened for different geographical uses of these names. Magan, for instance, may mean the east and south of Arabia, but also conceivably India; and Meluḥa sometimes the north and west of Arabia, but also Nubia. At the same time, how can we believe that any Hebrew writer can have regarded Hagar as an Egyptian? The connotation of Mizrim must by a certain time have shrunk, leaving room for a twofold interpretation, Egypt and North Arabia. Similarly, Meluḥa may perhaps have come to mean either Ethiopia or West Arabia.

Professor Witton-Davies in the same article speaks of "the confusion which, according to Winckler, abounds in our Bible," and (referring to myself) finds it "impossible that all our notions of ancient geography should be so muddled and muddling."³ But can my critic assert that our "notions" of ancient Arabian geography were ever precise? This was

¹ *Die jüngsten Kämpfer wider den Panbabylonismus*, Leipzig, 1907.

² See Winckler, *Enc. Biblica*, "Sinai," sects. 4, 7.

³ *Review of Theology and Philosophy*, May 1908, p. 697.

Professor Schmidt's great difficulty. For a long time he hesitated as a student of the new theories because of his "ignorance of a region of which we had no good maps and no accurate descriptions." Hence, when Winckler gave up the identification of the *nahal Mizrim* with the *Wady-el-Arish*, and maintained that it was "the stream that rushes into the sea at Raphia," he withheld his own decision till he could examine the locality. Winckler's difficulty, of course, was that he was loth to accuse a capable Assyrian scribe of topographical vagueness. Nor does Winckler speak of a "rushing stream." He is much too careful for that, and expressly remarks that even an insignificant watercourse might have political and legendary importance. Whether this is a conclusive argument may be doubted. A watercourse like the *Wady-el-Arish* must, one would think, have been specially distinguished in phraseology. I have not myself seen the *Wady*, but the description of it given by the late lamented Lieutenant Haynes seems to me ground sufficient for adhering to the usual view.

But the Cornell professor's interest centres in the Negeb, that region at the extreme south of Palestine which forms the transition to North Arabia.

The cause of his interest is manifest—it is the close association of spots in the Negeb with the history of religion. Some of the eloquent sentences in which he sums up his views sound almost like passages from the article on Prophecy in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*. Nor can I avoid mentioning that he still adheres to an opinion expressed by him in the same work, that "the Jerahmeelite theory unquestionably promises to throw much light on the obscure history of the Negeb."¹ Among the points of detail referred to is the question of the origin of the Cherethites, who, in David's early time, occupied a section of the Negeb. Were they really Philistines who had come over from Crete? Professor Schmidt thinks so, and the view is widely held; it is indeed as old as the Septua-

¹ *Enc. Biblica*, "Scythians," sect. 8.

gint. We know, however, that Cherethites and Pelethites formed the bodyguard of King David, and it cannot, I think, be called likely that this force was composed partly of Semitised descendants of a Cretan race (Cherethites), partly of fully Semitic Arabian tribesmen, akin to David (Pelethites). The prevalent theory is based on 1 Sam. xxx. 16 (*cp.* ver. 14). But is it certain that "the land of the Philistines" is not equivalent to "the land of the Pelethites"? Is it certain, too, that David's suzerain, the king of Gath, was a Philistine?¹ If Achish were a Philistine, is it likely that he would have accepted David as a vassal, or that David would have wished to become one? And is it not plain that Gath and Ziklag² were further south than is consistent with their being in the ordinary sense Philistian localities?

Who the Cherethites were, we shall, I hope, see presently. At present I devote myself to the very difficult name "Philistine" (פלשתי). Most recent critics identify it with "Purusati," the first on the list of the "sea-peoples" which, perhaps about 1230 B.C., invaded Syria from the north, and were opposed on land and sea by Rameses III. I myself still accept this identification, but do not feel able to infer from it that Saul and David had to deal with Semitised descendants of the Purusati. With Hommel, I am of opinion that those of the Purusati who remained in Palestine found it convenient to settle in the north. Professor Schmidt will admit that this opinion is perfectly tenable, and that my own view, that the seemingly express references to Philistines in the Old Testament are due to a confusion between Pelishtim and Pelethim, is at any rate plausible. For my own part, I cannot recall any other critical theory which is at all plausible. The confusion referred to must have spread widely in Palestine, and have

¹ A king of Ekron is called I-ka-u-su in an inscription of Esar-haddon. But (1) the reading is somewhat uncertain, and (2) in any case a Pelethite might have borne the names.

² זִקְלָג, probably from אֲשְׁחֻר־גִּלְעָד=שֶׁקֶל, "Ashhur-Gilead." Gilead, originally a North Arabian name (*Traditions and Beliefs*, p. 389).

been current even among the most highly educated class, from whom, in the eighth century, the Assyrian scribes derived it. We need not therefore emend "Philistines" into "Pelethites," provided that we attach a marginal gloss, "that is, Pelethites." There is evidence enough that the Old Testament writers really meant, not what the ordinary student means by "Philistines," but some population in Southern Palestine or North Arabia, which inhabited the Negeb (1 Sam. xxx. 16), and Gerar (Gen. xx., xxvi.), as well as the so-called five Philistine cities (Josh. xiii. 3).

And who were those "Pelethites"¹ whom I am virtually substituting for the familiar Philistines? Let us look at the evidence. (a) In three of the so-called Philistine cities Joshua is said to have found Anakites (Josh. xi. 22): now ענק is to be grouped with ענק, עקן, יעקן, כנען, עמלק, all of which (even כנען) are in their origin North Arabian names,² and very possibly arose out of popular corruptions of ירחמאל. (b) In 1 Sam. vii. 14, after a statement that Israel recovered its lost territory out of the hands of the Philistines, we read that "there was peace between Israel and the Amorites." Now, the probability is that אמרי, like the class-name אמר from ארם, has come by a popular transposition of letters from ארמי (one belonging to the southern Aram). (c) In Judges xiv. 3, xv. 18; 1 Sam. xiv. 6, xvii. 26, 36, xxxi. 4; 2 Sam. i. 20, we find ערל (Arel[ite]), פלשתי (Arelites), either in the text or as a gloss, where פלשתי (Philistine), פלשתיים (Philistines), or rather פלתי (Pelethite), פלתיים (Pelethites) are meant. Now Arel[i] is only a popular corruption of Jerahmeel[i], unless indeed anyone deliberately prefers the tasteless and misleading traditional rendering.³ (d) In 1 Chron. ii. 25-33, which is based on old traditions, we have a record in genealogical form of a number of Jerahmeelite peoples or clans. If we look closely at the names we shall see

¹ See *Enc. Biblica*, "Pelethites"; *Traditions and Beliefs*, p. 312.

² *Traditions and Beliefs*, pp. 121, 175.

³ If the reader will hunt up the references to "uncircumcision" in the Old Testament, and avail himself of the help I have offered, he will receive an agreeable shock of surprise.

that some of them at least are corruptions either of Jerahmeel or of some equivalent name, such as Ishmael, Asshur, Ashkar, or Ashtar. Thus Ram is the same name as Aram (see p. 140); Jether comes from Ashtar, and Atarah also from Ashtar, but with the feminine ending; Jamin is a modification of Jaman (see p. 139), and Eker of Ashkar; while Peleth, like Tubal (Gen. x. 2) and Tophel (Deut. i. 1), comes from an ancient corruption of Ishmael, viz. Ethbal. In short, the phrase Peleth ben Jerahme'el indicates that the Pelethites were one of the many peoples into which the ancient Jerahmeelite or Ishmaelite race broke up. According to Am. ix. 7 the Philistines, *i.e.* the Pelethites, came from Caphtor, and the original reading of Gen. x. 14 probably agreed with this; Caphtor is obviously an Arabian region, and by a permutation of letters כפתור has not improbably come from רחבותר (Rehoboth). And now at length we see what the Cherethites were, viz. certainly North Arabians and probably Rehobothites; and since Cherethites (like Cherith) is almost certainly Caphtor, and the Pelethites are distinctly said to have migrated from Caphtor, we may reasonably hold that tradition admitted no difference between Cherethites and Pelethites.

So much for the names, which, here as elsewhere, are symbols of historical facts. But was David really a kinsman of the Pelethites? Most probably. How else could he so easily have obtained a hold on the Negeb, and become, as Professor Schmidt puts it, "the creator of the Judean state"? Did not one of his sisters marry an Ishmaelite¹ (2 Sam. xvii. 25), and he himself take one of his two first wives from (the southern) Jezreel (1 Sam. xxv. 43)? It is true, he is said to have been born at Beth-lehem of Judah (1 Sam. xvii. 12). But there were presumably several places called Beth-lehem; the second part of the name is a popular variation of some shortened form of Jerahmeel, like *melah* in *gē melah* (Eng. vers. "valley of salt"), so that we can well believe that there were several Bethlehems, and that one was in Zebulun, another

¹ "Israel" and "Ishmael" are confounded, *cf.* 1 Chron. ii. 16.

in the later Judah (the modern *Beit Lahm*), and another in the Negeb of Judah. It is also true that David's father is called an Ephrathite (1 Sam. xvii. 12). But the same appellation is given to Samuel's father, though he was doubtless of southern origin; indeed, the Septuagint expressly calls him a "son of Jerahmeel" (the Hebrew text has, "son of Jarham," which means the same thing). Hence, unless we assume two inconsistent traditions and neglect 1 Chron. ii. 19, 24, we must obviously hold that there was a Calebite, or, as we might also say, a Jerahmeelite, district called Ephrath.

On the Philistine question, therefore, I agree more nearly with Mr Stanley A. Cook (*Critical Notes*, 1907) than with Professor Schmidt. But I have still quite sufficient points of contact with the latter respecting the Jerahmeelites and the Negeb. Not that even here we are completely agreed. I think that Israelites and Jerahmeelites began to mingle as early as the Exodus.¹ It also seems to me to stand to reason that the Jerahmeelites called Cherethites and Pelethites not merely served David in his bodyguard but intermarried with Israel, and settled in the enlarged territory of Judah. I should not say without qualification that it was David who made Yahweh the God of Israel, for I think that long before David's time the priesthood represented by Jethro incorporated a number of Israelite clans into the people (federation) of the Jerahmeelite God Yahweh, an event which marks the entrance of the original Israel upon a more settled stage of life. But we must, of course, acknowledge that David did much to heighten the *prestige* of the cult of Yahweh, as practised at Jerusalem.

With regard to Moses, Professor Schmidt held at one time that he was the historical creator of Israel, who gave to his people a new divinity, Yahweh. Now, however, he sees that Moses is a "mythical figure," whose home was first in Midian and then in Kadesh-Barnea, agreeing in essentials with the article "Moses" (sects. 14, 17) in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*.

¹ *Traditions and Beliefs*, p. 546, and *cp.* p. 382.

In details the writer of that article might not always agree with the American professor. But on this important point he has the support both of Professor Schmidt and of Professor Eduard Meyer, viz. that "modern historical research, when it seeks for the earliest history of the Hebrew tribes, must travel away from Egypt into North-west Arabia." Whether these two scholars agree in inferring from the supposed Egyptian names Moses and Phinehas that the priestly families of Kadesh must have had some connection with Egypt, I do not know. It is at any rate Professor Meyer's view, but I trust that no one will be so rash as to adopt it. I observe that Professor Schmidt congratulates himself (p. 338) that his own and Professor Meyer's main conclusion "does not in the least depend upon the acceptance of the Muzri theory." The statement is literally correct. I venture, however, to think that the conclusion referred to would be stronger if the two scholars did accept that theory, and if one of them at least did not support a disproved explanation of Mosheh (Moses) and the less probable of the two possible explanations of Pinehas (Phinehas).¹ It may be added that even if the tradition of the sojourn of the Hebrew clans in Muzri be rejected, it supplies valuable evidence of the North Arabian connection of the Israelites and of Moses. But I for my part question whether that tradition ought altogether to be abandoned.

On another question this fair-minded critic proclaims his agreement with me (p. 333). He thinks that I have "rightly divined" Jerahmeelite influence upon Judah in post-exilic times. It is indeed certain that Jerahmeelite tribes, under whatever names, were driven north in the Persian period by the advancing Edomites (themselves pressed by the Nabateans), and so infused a North Arabian element into the weakened population of Judah. There is evidence for this in Ezra and Nehemiah, and to some uncertain extent in Chronicles. Thus in the post-exilic catalogue of "the men of the people of Israel" (Ezr. ii., Neh. vii.) we find among the names, as given

in the Hebrew text, the benê Par'osh (the Flea-clan!) and the benê Pashhur (unexplained), designations which (like most others) have had a strange history, and ultimately come, each by its own road, from benê 'Arab-Asshur and its equivalent benê 'Arab-Ashhur respectively; also the benê 'Elam Aher, *i.e.* benê 'Elam Ashhur; the benê Ater, *i.e.* benê Ashtar; the benê Salmai, *i.e.* the benê Salmah; the benê 'abdê Shelomoh, *i.e.* benê 'Arab-Salmah. We find, too, the place-names Tel-Melah, *i.e.* Tubal-Jerahmeel, and Tel-Harsha, *i.e.* Tubal-Ashhur. These names prove that many families from the region still conventionally called Asshur (= Ashhur, Ashtar) or Jerahmeel were admitted into the renovated Israelite community. Presumably they were proselytes or the children of proselytes. We also hear much in Ezra and Nehemiah of the abundance of mixed marriages, which, however, were not recognised by the religious authorities. In Neh. xiii. 23, 24 wives of Ashdodite origin are specially mentioned; Ashdod (from Asshur-Dod) is a regional name of North Arabia. Another witness for an Asshurite or Jerahmeelite immigration. Let us turn next to the list of builders of the wall (Neh. iii.). The goldsmith and the spice-merchant in verse 8 were, surely, a Zarephathite and a Korahite respectively. The "ben Hur" in verse 9 was of an Ashhurite family. In verse 14 we meet with a Rechabite, *i.e.* a Kenite, and at the end of the list with a number of Zarephathites and Jerahmeelites (surely not goldsmiths and merchants). Two of these, it will be noticed, are heads of political districts.

It would be unwise to reject this criticism as speculative. Evidence from names, critically treated, is almost irresistible. I will not, however, deny that its value would be increased by monumental evidence. It is, of course, too soon to say that no monuments exist, for we have not yet looked for them.¹ Professor Schmidt's recent expeditions into the Negeb, when Director of the American School of Archæology, were rather preliminary surveys than explorations, and the North

¹ Cp. Winckler, in Helmolt's *Weltgeschichte*, iii. 230.

Arabian Muzri, supposed by Winckler and myself, was out of his range. He informs us that he found but few *tells* in the Negeb, a circumstance which may surprise us, considering the long list of "cities" in Josh. xv. 21-32 (*cp.* Neh. xi. 25-30). We need not, indeed, suppose that that list accurately represents the Negeb of early times; still the early cities (partly disclosed to us by textual criticism) cannot have been much fewer. Let us remember, however, that "city" in the Old Testament may mean very little. Many so-called "cities" were of highly perishable materials, and would be easily effaced by the destroyer's hand.

One criticism I cannot help making, that Professor Schmidt, like Professor Meyer before him, confines the Jerahmeelites within too narrow an area. It is true that in 1 Sam. xxvii. 10, xxx. 14 the Negeb appears to be divided into sections, one belonging to Judah, and others to the Jerahmeelites. But, properly speaking, Jerahmeel was not a tribe but a race, and is to be distinguished from the tribes which broke off from the parent stock, and sometimes even developed into peoples. But to prove that the name Jerahmeel or Ishmael has much more than a tribal reference would require a far-reaching investigation which I am on the point of giving elsewhere.

There is also another American professor (Dr H. P. Smith of Meadville) whom I cannot presume to ignore, but to whom I am unable to express gratitude for his treatment of my recent researches. Listen to this sentence from the article already referred to:

"We are at a loss to discover why Jabal, Jubal, Mahalaleel, Lamech, . . . should not have been allowed to appear in their original form as Jerahmeel, or why Joktheel should supplant Jerahmeel as the name of a city, or why Beer-lahai-roi should be forced into the place of en-Jerahmeel" (p. 566).

Allowed! Supplant! Be forced! Could there be any greater proof of unwillingness to enter into a new point of view than this? Surely the first duty of the critic is not to tell the

world whether he agrees with, *i.e.* is prejudiced in favour of, some other scholar, but to show that he comprehends the other's point of view. And the second duty is "like unto it." It is to study the new tracks which the new point of view has suggested to that other, and state where he understands and where he requires further help, and also, no doubt, where he can himself offer help to that other. And the whole investigation should be permeated by the spirit of fairness and accuracy.

But no, the critic is not to be the fellow-student and in some sense the disciple of that other, but his judge. As if any critic could venture either to praise or to blame a book of extensive range and originality, except with modesty and as the result of sympathetic study! A judge, indeed, is not called upon to be modest, but how can any critic pass sentence upon a book of this character? If he assumes the *rôle* of judge, is he not in imminent danger of hindering the progress of his study, and discouraging that originality which is the salt of learning, and the prize of long years of critical research?

Professor Smith does not seem to have realised that the stories which underlie the Israelite legends were, many of them, brought from a distance, and that with the stories came the names of the legendary places and the legendary heroes. These stories, if I see aright, were derived from different tribes, all Jerahmeelite, and it is probable that almost in each the name Jerahmeel took a different form or different forms. That ethnic names like Jerahmeel, Ishmael, Asshur, Israel, should be worn down by use, was inevitable, and the attrition would have different results among different groups of people. When, therefore, it is said that Jabal and Jubal are forms of Jerahmeel, and that Jubal is a form of Ishmael, it is not meant that they have come directly from Jerahmeel or Ishmael, but from some popular or tribal corruptions of these names.

There is much more that ought to be said if space allowed, but for this I must refer to the introduction to my forth-

coming work, *The Decline and Fall of the Kingdom of Judah*. One point of much importance may, however, be indicated. When Samaria was taken, the catastrophe which ensued was not only political but literary. What was saved of the North Israelitish records must have been scanty in extent, and the South Israelites or Judaites did not care to preserve it except in a mutilated, confused, and altered form. Hence by far the greater part of the extant literary monuments of ancient Israel are precisely those monuments whose producers were most preoccupied by North Arabia. This is why the history both of Israel and of Judah has found such a one-sided representation in the Old Testament. This, too, is why the North Arabian key has plausibly solved so many problems, that critics who have perhaps not gone deeply enough into the matter are repelled. Had a different class of documents been transmitted, the North Arabian key might not have equally fitted the new problems. I trust that this consideration may tend to conciliate opponents, and induce them to assume the rôle, not of judges, but of fellow-students. As Professor William James well says, "When larger ranges of truth open, it is surely best to be able to open ourselves to their reception, unfettered by our previous pretensions."

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HOW MAY CHRISTIANITY BE DEFENDED TO-DAY ?

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THE changes in religious ideals and in theological beliefs witnessed in recent years have resulted in widespread confusion touching the aim and method of Christian Apologetic. What is it the Christian Apologist has to prove, and how is he to do it? In discussing this question, I wish to avow at the start my sympathy with the modern social emphasis, and to declare my belief that Christianity stands primarily for the promotion of the Kingdom of God in this earth,—that is, the reign of sympathy and service among men. The number of Christians holding this belief is very large and constantly increasing. It is in their emphasis upon it that the principal characteristic of modern Christianity is to be found. It differs from traditional Christianity not chiefly because modern Christians disbelieve many of the things the fathers believed, but because, in their interest in this one great end, many of the things the fathers believed seem unimportant to them. It is not doubt of the truth of traditional doctrines, but doubt of their value, that is always most ominous. The former may testify only to a scepticism which exists in every period; the latter foretells the coming of a new age. When many men are interested enough in a particular system to attack it, it still has a hold upon the world; when they are too absorbed in other matters to trouble themselves about it, its day is over. And so it is evident that

a new age has dawned in the history of Christianity and the old apologetic is out-of-date, not because it attempts to prove so many unbelievable things, but because it attempts to prove so many things in which men have no interest. Much mattered in other days which does not matter now. An apologetic which is to be of any value to-day must defend the things that matter to-day, and only those. The question, then, for the modern apologist is not merely what is true, but what is important. What is the one thing, if there be one thing, that really counts—the one thing whose acceptance or rejection means the acceptance or rejection of Christianity? For this it is the business of the Christian apologist to secure approval and support. Failing this, his apologetic is a failure, whatever else he may successfully defend.

I. The apologist who believes that Christianity stands primarily for the promotion of the Kingdom of God in this earth, that is, the reign of sympathy and service among men—and it is only for those who believe this that I propose to speak in this paper—must labour to secure the recognition and adoption of this ideal; to convince men that it is not only worthful but supreme. And, fortunately, it is easier now than formerly to convince men of this. Without as well as within the church there are multitudes to whom it is already a commonplace, and who recognise the service of their fellows as their highest duty. In other days chief emphasis has often been laid upon a man's duty to God or to himself, but now his duty to his neighbour overshadows all else. The widespread recognition of this duty and the widespread interpretation of Christianity in these terms have gone hand in hand and are the fruit of similar influences. Those who read the Gospel thus are children of their age, and have a message which appeals to it with peculiar force.

But though the spirit of the present day is widely in sympathy with this ideal, the apologist's task is not as simple as it seems. It is not that there is difficulty in securing the

practical realisation of the ideal, and inducing men actually to live in accordance with such a principle, for with this apologetic has nothing to do. It deals with theory only, not with practice. But to secure even in theory the general recognition of the supremacy of the principle of service is not easy. The more clearly the principle is apprehended and its consequences understood, the sharper often becomes the antagonism to it. A prominent judge of sterling integrity and of the highest moral character, after listening recently to a clear and forceful presentation of the social message of Christianity, remarked that he believed the speaker had stated accurately the real teaching of Jesus and the real meaning of Christianity, and just because of this he was not a Christian, for to him the only possible state of human society seemed a state of competition, not co-operation, where every man looks out primarily for his own interest, and only secondarily for that of others. To maintain anything else and to labour for anything else seemed to him only fanaticism or folly, and argued small acquaintance with the real world of men. And this spirit is no exception even in these days of new social interest and enthusiasm. Few may be willing to avow themselves so frankly, but that present conditions are essentially unalterable and bound to persist, and that anybody who attempts to meddle with them is a dangerous character, and that any interpretation of Christianity which threatens their stability is mischievous—this is a widespread belief, and it is with men thinking thus that our apologetic has first to deal. Is the highest thing in the world the promotion of the reign of sympathy and service among men, or is it not? Is a state of society in which the spirit of brotherhood, voicing itself in mutual sympathy and service, is in complete control supremely desirable, or is it not? And if it is, is it an end worthy the effort of rational men, or is it so impracticable as not to be entitled to serious consideration—a mere Utopia, no better than an idle dream? This is a fundamental question. Rational men must be convinced of the practicability as well as the desirability of

the ideal or they will not accept it. Not that we must show that perfection is attainable, or that we are to expect this or any other ideal to be fully realised. With such perfection, as with the Absolute in general, the modern apologist has nothing to do. But that it is a distinctly practicable ideal, whose realisation can be promoted by honest and united effort; that the reign of sympathy and service can be progressively substituted for selfish rivalry and cut-throat competition—this the apologist must maintain, and his success in winning support for his ideal will be largely in proportion to his success in convincing men of this possibility. The apologist must show first that the highest thing a man can do is to put himself and his talents at the service of the community, to help those who need help, and to enrich the common life of man by all that he can give it, whether of art, or science, or learning, or wealth, or physical strength, or moral goodness, or ethical ideals; and secondly, that, doing this, he is not merely wasting his energies, but is contributing to the progressive realisation of the highest social ideal, the Kingdom of God on earth. If the apologist cannot show this, his apologetic is a failure.

II. The one fundamental thing is to win support for this ideal. If all good men can be enlisted in the promotion of this end it matters little by what name they call themselves, Christians, Jews, Ethical Culturists, Humanitarians, Free-thinkers, Agnostics, or Atheists. This the broad-minded man of to-day, to whom the ideal of service is supreme, freely recognises, whether he be a Christian or not; and so we have the many co-operative efforts of modern times, in which men of the most various faiths unite for the promotion of a common end.

But for the Christian apologist it is not enough to stop with the defence of this common ideal of service. Men may be led to recognise it and to make it their own, but they may remain entirely out of sympathy with Christianity as they

understand it, and the Christian apologist cannot be content to leave them thus. His principal interest should be to effect the adoption of the ideal of service; but he is interested also, if he be a Christian apologist, to secure recognition for Christianity, and this not as an independent and unrelated thing, but as itself the chief embodiment of men's purpose to promote the ideal. This may seem to many of little importance. If the ideal be adopted and in the way of realisation, all else is of minor consequence. But the matter cannot be so easily dismissed. To leave men of good-will divorced from Christianity and out of sympathy with Christ is to divide the forces that make for the promotion of the Kingdom, and to fail to recognise this ideal as the Christian ideal is to leave the great Christian movement uncommitted to the purpose which should be its supreme concern. Even Christian men may recognise so clearly the supremacy of the ideal that they would stand for it though it should prove not to be Christian; but if it be Christian so much the better for Christianity, and so much the better for the ideal. Standing for the highest purpose we know, Christianity rallies increasingly to its standard men to whom that purpose is supreme, and in support of that purpose is enlisted all the faith, the love, the loyalty, the devotion, the sacrifice which the name of Jesus inspires in the breasts of multitudes who rejoice to call themselves His disciples. And so a second step in Christian apologetic should be to show that the ideal for which we stand is truly Christian; that to promote the reign of sympathy and service among men was the controlling purpose of Christ Himself, and must be the controlling purpose of Christianity if it would be true to Him. Fortunately, modern study of Jesus has made this very clear, and we are recognising with a unanimity never reached in other days that it was for this Jesus laboured, and for this He summoned men to follow Him, and so inaugurated the great movement which bears His name, all unconscious though He may have been of what it was to lead to. But it is not enough to show this simply; it is necessary to make clear that this is the one essential

thing in Christianity in such a sense that the man who stands for this principle is truly Christian even though he reject all else that commonly goes by the name of Christian, and that the man who avows himself a Christian thereby commits himself at least to this one great purpose, whatever else he may support or repudiate. If we succeed in showing this both to men without and men within the church, we shall commend Christianity to those who share the one supreme ideal, and we shall rally to the support of that ideal those to whom Christianity is dear. We shall thus at the same time promote the credit of Christianity and multiply the forces making for the realisation of the ideal we have most at heart.

III. Undoubtedly a man may make this ideal his own, and may consciously follow Christ in a life of sympathy and service, and yet be quite without religious faith and devotion. To such a man no one may rightfully deny the name of Christian. To live Christianly is to give oneself to the promotion of the end for which Christ lived, whatever one's religious faith or lack of faith. But Christ gave His message a religious basis, whose significance and value the modern apologist clearly recognises, and so a third step in his apologetic is to commend that religious basis to men of good-will; is to show that the purpose which Jesus made His own, and which we recognise as supreme, is the purpose of God Himself, the Christian God.

The traditional belief in the pre-existence and deity of Christ represents a sound instinct. It voices the conviction that the Christian ideal, if it is to have supreme worth and permanent validity, and if its ultimate realisation is to be guaranteed, must come from God and have His support. Christians to-day may recognise that the traditional doctrine is defective, and may see that there are other and perhaps better ways of conserving the interest which it has conserved. But Christian instinct demands that in some way the connection shall be made and the divine basis found, and so Christian

apologetic maintains that the idea which it has shown to be supreme and Christian is divine, that it represents the will and the purpose of God. Maintaining this, there is added to the conviction of its worth faith in its realisation. To effort is joined confidence, to devotion assurance. This is the essential nature of Christian faith. Not that God is the Creator of the world, the absolute substance, the unifying principle of existence, the *summum bonum*, the all-pervading Spirit, but that He is will and power for the promotion of the Christian purpose. Other kinds of faith in God may be good, and may bring comfort, inspiration, and joy; but this is the one specifically Christian faith. And upon it the Christian apologist lays stress, not because a man cannot live Christianly without it—as a matter of fact, multitudes of devout Christians have known nothing of it—but because it supplies power for the promotion of the one great end, which is to be had in no other way.

The modern apologist, therefore, cannot escape the traditional theistic obligation. To promote belief in God is an important part of his task, not, to be sure, as an end in itself, but as a means to another end. But the theism in which he is interested is of a different type from that upon which traditional apologetic has laid stress. Modern disbelief in God (whether disbelief is more or less common than in other days) is due in large measure to the persuasion of the self-sufficiency of the phenomenal universe, to the feeling that God is needed to account neither for its origin nor for its continuance. With this disbelief Christian apologetic has nothing to do, and its wide prevalence is no ground for alarm. If Christian faith were dependent upon the overcoming of this unbelief we might well be discouraged. But Christian faith moves wholly in another realm, the realm of ethical values. For the Christian imbued with the modern spirit God exists for the sake of the ideals which are precious to him. If they are realisable, it is because they are rational, because they are in line with, and not opposed to, the universe in which they must

be realised ; in other words, because divinity is at the heart of things, and they themselves are divine. It is just this faith which the Christian message brings, and just this faith which the life of Jesus, a life of victory in seeming defeat, guarantees. That the world recognises His victory means, if the world but knew it, that it recognises not simply the beauty but the validity of His ideals, or, in other words, it means that the world recognises their divinity. Thus the modern apologist gives to the supreme ideal which he is chiefly interested to promote the support of religious faith. The ideal once recognised as God's commends itself to multitudes of believers in God to whom it meant nothing before, and to those to whom it was already dear the faith that it is God's gives a new enthusiasm and courage. The wise apologist deals in affirmations, not negations. He does not make the mistake of denying the Christian character of the ideal divorced from its religious basis, and so alienate from its support those to whom the religious message does not appeal ; but he recognises the immense power of the latter where it is a reality, and he labours to make it increasingly and ever more widely real.

IV. Finally, it is quite possible that a man may accept Christianity both as an ethic and as a religion, and yet remain out of sympathy with the Christian church and apart from its communion. His love of personal independence, which he fears may be imperilled if he becomes a member of such an institution, his dislike of engaging in public religious exercises, his distaste for established rites and ceremonies, his recognition of the faults of the church, and his lack of sympathy with much for which it stands—all this and much else may lead him to hold himself aloof. But Christian apologetic has not accomplished its full work until it has shown the importance of the Christian church, and commended it to all those who are devoted to the promotion of the Kingdom of God on earth. It is the business of the Christian apologist to prove that, in spite of all its failures and mistakes, in spite

of its frequent distortion of values, and its all too common emphasis upon the wrong things, the Christian church has an indispensable place in the promotion of the great cause, and so to rally around it all to whom that cause is dear. For this purpose it is not necessary to defend any existing church or all existing churches, but to show that Christian church there must be if the Christian purpose is to be progressively realised in this our world. And that can be shown chiefly in two ways.

In the first place, the Christian purpose is a social purpose. It has to do with the reign of sympathy and service among men, and so eventuates not in the perfection of the individual character, conceived as an isolated unit, but in the perfecting of men's relations with one another. To accomplish this social end it is imperative that there be conscious community of purpose and conscious combination of effort. For men interested in the common end to work in complete isolation is not only to sacrifice the strength which union of forces gives, but to make the realisation of the end itself impossible. The end is co-operation as broad as the brotherhood of man, and this can be promoted only by similar co-operation on a smaller scale and in a more limited circle. If those interested in the great end cannot work with others similarly interested, the hope of a universal co-operation is certainly small. The principal reason why so many who are devoted to the promotion of the one great purpose find themselves out of sympathy with the church, and hold themselves aloof from it, is that the church has so widely concerned itself with other irrelevant or inconsistent ends, and so seems to have no significance for the promotion of the Kingdom, which must come rather in spite of it than because of it. If this were the case—if the church were really an obstacle rather than a help to the promotion of the Kingdom of God on earth—no other benefits that might accrue from it, however valuable in themselves, would justify the Christian apologist in coming to its defence. But the failure of any or all existing churches to fulfil their true mission

would be no sufficient ground for the assumption that we could do without a church altogether. If those we now have do not stand for the right purpose they should be reformed or others put in their place, but church there must be if the purpose is to be accomplished; that is, there must be co-operation instead of individualistic, isolated labour. Any institution in which such co-operation exists is a Christian church whatever its relation to the historic institutions that bear that name. To the degree in which the various agencies making towards the one Christian end co-operate consciously and sympathetically is the one church of Christ realised. Not sacraments, or doctrines, or historic descent, or ministerial succession, makes the Christian church in which the modern apologist is interested, but an organised body of men enlisted for the promotion of the one great end, wide enough to embrace them all, and of such a character as to call out their best effort and enthusiasm. In such community of purpose and of effort are found all the blessings of Christian communion that the church has promised to its members. Communion with Christ and with the saints means, above all else, community of effort for the one great Christian end.

In the second place, the church is indispensable because no ideal can establish itself permanently unless it be made a part of the heritage of each rising generation; unless it be knit into their fibre by early training, and grow with them to maturity. For such implanting of the ideal, not simply in an individual here and there, but in an entire community, and even in an entire civilisation, institutions are needed which embody that ideal, and visibly symbolise it to generation after generation. If the ideal of sympathy and service be not inculcated diligently, persuasively, unremittingly; if it be not kept alive by constant emphasis, by common effort, and by visible symbol, it will soon be lost altogether. And here lies the great significance of the church as an historic, world-wide institution, tracing its lineage back to Jesus Christ, in whom the Christian purpose found its supreme embodiment, and

consecrated by the lives and deaths of multitudes of those who have humbly and faithfully followed Him. The Christian church, within which, in spite of all its errors, is kept alive the memory of Jesus and devotion to Him, and within which has been cultivated during all the centuries faith in His Father God, and confidence in His purpose to establish the Kingdom—such an institution has untold value for the accomplishment of the Christian purpose. No society which we could form to-day could begin to do what it may do if it be committed to the one great end. All the loyalty of its members to Jesus Christ and to His Father God, and all their loyalty to the church itself, the church of their fathers and their church, though it may often have led them astray, is capable of being enlisted for the promotion of the Kingdom. Not to condemn and repudiate the church, and not to hold oneself aloof from it in contempt or indifference, but to reinterpret to itself its own ideal, in order that its heritage of power may be employed for the realisation of that ideal—that is the wise method for all to whom the ideal is dear. And no Christian apologetic has fulfilled its task until it has made this clear to all men of good-will.

An apologetic which should succeed in showing these four things: first, that the ideal of human sympathy and service is the highest of all ideals; secondly, that this is the Christian ideal in such a sense that the man who shares it may properly call himself a Christian, and that the man who would be truly a Christian must make it his own; thirdly, that this Christian ideal is a divine ideal, supported and promoted by God; and fourthly, that the Christian church is an institution in the long run indispensable for the promotion and realisation of this ideal—an apologetic which should succeed in showing all this would seem a sufficient and indeed complete Christian apologetic, leaving out nothing essential and including nothing unimportant.

A. C. M'GIFFERT.

BOOKLESS RELIGION.¹

JAMES MOFFATT, D.D.

BY bookless religion I do not mean brainless religion. At the outset I would disclaim emphatically the slightest desire to undervalue either theology or literature as factors in the discipline of the Christian ministry. Theology is like guide-books; both are commonly depreciated by the very class of people who stand in sorest need of them. Within certain obvious limits, the more books a minister can manage to read, the better for himself and for his people. The theological college is at any rate one place where a man should learn to sink intellectual mines which will repay working in the after-days. If he learns there how to read hard and wisely, how economical it is to study large books by experts, and how fruitful is all work done at first-hand upon the sources, he will probably have done much by anticipation to preserve his ministry not only from the unbalanced vagaries of the amateur in theology, but from that error which, I imagine, our best people resent—or at least ought to resent—the error of supposing that to preach adequately means the public reading of a literary essay touched more or less delicately with religion.

What is before my mind is rather an attitude of life which we find among men; it is a way of looking at religious truth which may be that of Renan's Gavroche or of a higher type, often characterised by considerable penetration and common sense, by such qualities as honesty, shrewdness, and moral interest, yet to a very minor degree nourished by

¹ An address to students for the Christian ministry.

reading. It appears to me that this temper or attitude is more influential than some of us are at first disposed to admit. Our academic training tends to exaggerate the importance which attaches to the printed page. Books form so large and central a factor in our early world of educational discipline that we are apt to assign quite an undeserved circumference to what is known as the reading public. It is assumed, too lightly, that the majority of people, with whom most of us have to deal, are familiar, or desire to be familiar, with serious literature. As a matter of fact, they are not. I deplore this, but I cannot deny it. "The public which reads in any sense of the word worth considering is very small," as Mr George Gissing bluntly put it. Mr Gissing was a pessimist, but his views on the popular vogue of literature are not the froth of deliberate despair. "The public which would feel no lack if book-printing ceased to-morrow, is enormous. Gather from all ends of the British Empire the men and women who purchase grave literature as a matter of course, who habitually seek it in public libraries, in short, who regard it as a necessity of life, and I am much mistaken if they could not comfortably assemble in the Albert Hall." Such was the mature verdict of a man who loved books and wrote books.

Now, this may be regrettable, and it is doubtless one function of the Church to foster education and culture: we in Scotland, at any rate, can pride ourselves on the fact that the connection between the Church and education is honourable and historic. But the immediate point is that, as things are, we have to reckon with a public, three-fifths of whom, within most of our congregations, are inaccessible to religious appeals or instructions which are either couched in bookish form or put in such a way as to involve literary allusions. Such people, on whatever social level they move, are generally far from unintelligent. Just as a love for literature is not necessarily equivalent to sympathy with the finer ideals of humanity, so this cheerful apathy towards books by no means disqualifies men and women for an appreciation of solid

ideas or an understanding of human nature in its deeper interests and issues. Observation and experience are the university of the common man. He graduates there with degrees which entitle him to speak with considerable authority upon the laws and practice of life. And one task of the ordinary preacher or teacher in the Christian Church is simply the translation of ideas from his own semi-professional dialect into that of the semi-educated, or, if you choose to call them so, the illiterate. They will often be found surprisingly receptive if the translation is properly done. They will not object to definite doctrine, provided that it is not flung at them from a desk. For here also is that old philosophy of Plato true, the philosophy that bubbles up, for example, in the *Phædrus*—that light, the light of genuine knowledge, breaks commonly from co-operation and friendly intercourse between man and man, rather than from books which cannot be cross-questioned. Such people can be reached. But we have no right to assume that our bookish categories and methods will give them the sound thought which they desire or need.

In this preliminary sense of the term, bookless religion represents one phase or temper in our civilisation which will instantly be recognised by all who have to work, either in politics or in education, among the masses and the classes of this country. If it seems to be less carefully recognised by the Church, the fault is due, fundamentally, to the fact that her relation to the written Scriptures offers a special temptation to the exaggeration which is known as bookishness or intellectualism. Christianity has never been the religion of a book precisely as Judaism and Islam have been. At certain periods in her history the Church has indeed magnified the functions of Scripture to the pitch almost of an untruth, and there will always be sections, especially in the reformed Churches, which are disposed to regard the written Word with a slavish homage which is as unhistorical as it is illegitimate. Against such extremes the general sense of the Church, however, has maintained a sound position on the whole. Even the preference

for oral tradition which characterised Papias may be taken as a first phase of that healthy bookless religion which has ever accompanied the use of the Scriptures in the Church. The historical reasons which justified the Bishop of Hierapolis in his well-known practice I shall not discuss in this address. He has been often censured by his critics, from Eusebius downwards; indeed, to judge from the casual extant fragments of his expositions, we are inclined if not entitled almost to reckon him as the first, though not the last, bishop who would have done better to talk less and read more. The living oral tradition on which he prided himself was far from being central or reliable at all points. It was a stream which carried many thin straws and dead leaves. Besides, his attitude towards it was hopelessly uncritical. His method was spoiled by his credulity. But he did feel, with many Christians, nearer to the current of faith in listening to reminiscences of the original disciples than in reading; and this was due, partly to a distrust of the legal associations gathering round the *litera scripta*, and partly owing to the fact that it seemed safer and more appropriate to propagate the worship and faith of Jesus in the communities of the Church than by recourse to written records of One who Himself wrote nothing. In any case, preaching existed and flourished before the New Testament arose or was crystallised into the canon. As Dr C. R. Gregory eloquently puts it, in his recent volume on *The Canon and Text of the New Testament* (pp. 44-45), "The Christian Church is more than a book. Jesus was more than a word. Jesus, the Logos, the Word, was the Life, and the Church is a living society, a living fellowship. Our connection with Jesus, which reaches now over more than eighteen hundred years, does not rest upon the fact that He wrote something down, which one man and another, one after another, has read and believed until this very day. . . . Christianity began with the joining of heart to heart. Eye looked into eye. The living voice struck upon the living ear. And it is precisely such a uniting of personalities, such an action of man on man, that

ever since Jesus spoke has effected the unceasing renewal of Christianity. Christianity has not grown to be what it is, has not maintained itself and enlarged itself, by reason of books being read—no, not even by reason of the Bible's being read from generation to generation. The Christian, whether a clergyman or a layman, has sought with his heart after the hearts of his fellow-men. A mother has whispered the word to her child, a friend has spoken it in the ear of his friend, a preacher has proclaimed it to his hearers, and the child, the friend, the hearers have believed and become Christians. Christianity is an uninterrupted life."

This is a vital conception which must be held tenaciously by all who realise the supreme religious value of Scripture for the work and worship of the Church. They, more than others, need this reminder of what the Scripture presupposes. Their temptation is to identify what is Biblical with what is Christian, and, by a recoil from the subordination of Scripture to the normal interests of the Church, to revert to a more or less doctrinaire view of the Bible and its contents. Against this tendency to stereotype revelation upon bookish lines there has been no lack of just protests from the ranks of the faithful. Many of these will occur at once to your minds. Their common standpoint has been the conviction that the Bible is always thrown out of focus when it is detached, by radical or by conservative, from the living fellowship of the Church, and that faith cannot be inspired or shaped wisely by Biblical appeals which fit texts together in a verbal mosaic. Jesus was not a scribe, and He has not chosen scribes to carry forward His faith. The Church did not make the New Testament, any more than the New Testament made the Church. Behind both lay the great redeeming facts and forces. These still operate, partly no doubt through the incomparable and searching witness of Scripture, but never aside from that wider human experience, in relation to God's Spirit, which may be termed the bookless religion of the average individual. Faith, as the Ritschlians are never tired of

teaching us, is reached and held, not by trying to throw ourselves back into the intellectual world of the apostles, but by yielding in our own lives, as they yielded in theirs, to the overpowering reality of God's revelation to man in Jesus Christ. The New Testament is the classical record of this divine revelation in history and experience, and of the human response to it from many sides. Hence the sound preaching of the New Testament must take into account this timeless and continuous soil of human life, into which the divine seed has to be dropped, studying its particular qualities and alive to the variety of its characteristic features.

This aspect of "bookless religion," as the spontaneous, unformulated element in the Christian experience, may be corroborated by another definition which regards it as a sort of extra-mural preparation or predisposition for Christianity itself. Max Müller, I recollect, employed the term in this connection, when he delivered the first series of the Gifford Lectures to us in the University of Glasgow. He laid great stress upon the struggle for eternal life through which the world and the individual pass, meaning apparently the aspirations and yearnings which are commonly classed under the title of Natural Religion. Without that struggle, he used to protest, "no religion, whatever its sacred books may be, will find in any human heart that soil in which alone it can strike root and on which alone it can grow and bear fruit. We must all have our bookless religion, if the sacred books, whatever these may be, are to find a safe and solid foundation within ourselves. No temple can stand without that foundation, and it is because that foundation is so often neglected that the walls of the temple become unsafe, and threaten to fall." This is, of course, an old idea—as old as Paul's address to the Athenians: "What ye worship in ignorance, this set I forth to you." The varied moral instincts which grow up in the social context of our day, the special traditions and psychological climates, have all to be estimated carefully, if faith's appeal is to succeed. This "bookless religion," more or less unconscious of its needs,

predisposes some to receive the fuller truth of Christ, and to root that truth in the soil of their own experience. Deep calls to deep. The depth of the Biblical witness answers to the depth of these private feelings in the extra-mural life.

Now, all this bears upon our preaching and teaching with a force that is not always valued at its due. For no religious propaganda which is mainly made up out of the letter of the Bible and of books about the Bible will be effective in the best sense of the term. That rollicking and saintly Irishman, Father Dolling, once remarked that the Oxford Movement, for all its excellence, suffered from being "made up out of books." Dolling was no theologian; but he was deeply read in certain volumes of human nature which were sealed books to men like Newman and Keble, and his apparently superficial criticism carries a truth whose significance applies widely to religious efforts. What Dolling felt was the "academic" taint. All great religious movements have been accompanied by a serious zest for sound learning and instruction; but to propagate religion among the extra-mural classes, a much more efficient vehicle must be found than any recourse, merely or mainly, to Biblical investigations, valuable as these are in their place. One condition of progress in such matters must be the power of speaking in the dialect of the marketplace, as well as of the study, the frank recognition of "bookless religion," *i.e.* of the unformulated, undogmatic, untechnical religious feeling—or, if you will, religious capacity—which lies latent in human nature, and which demands more than severely intellectual methods if it is to be reached and won for the definite, saving gospel of the Spirit in Jesus Christ. The average religious consciousness is far more elusive and versatile and human than is dreamt of in the philosophy of the academic or doctrinaire spirit. Abstract discussions leave it only puzzled, and that sense of bewilderment condemns the preacher. The bookless man of religion occupies *the seat of the unlearned*. If he does not understand what the preacher is saying, it will not do

for the latter to shift all the blame from his own shoulders. What Paul told the enthusiast at Corinth applies equally to the modern pulpit devotee of the academic spirit. He, after all, is responsible for the failure to understand the message.

While it is one duty of the Christian minister to realise this principle by safeguarding himself against any intrusion of the academic spirit into the ordinary statement of the Church's faith, yet, in two other ways, the just needs of this "bookless religion" have to be satisfied, especially by ourselves in Scotland. One is a wise and reverent enrichment of our worship, which refuses to believe that simplicity is equivalent to bareness. I merely note this and pass on to the other, which is a habit of developing the conception and practice of fellowship in the church. A congregation is not an audience. It is not a fortuitous concourse of human atoms drawn together weekly by curiosity or admiration. Worship must not be degraded to the level of attendance at a lecture or a concert. The common activities and interests of the Church as a brotherhood must be promoted, if the full requirements of human nature are to be satisfied in the religious sphere, for it is there, as nowhere else, by co-operation for common ends, that Christianity can be learnt in its due range. "If we wish to become exact and fully furnished in any subject of teaching which is diversified and complicated, we must consult the living man and listen to his living voice. The general principles of any study you may learn at home by books: but the detail, the colour, the tone, the air, the life which makes it live in us, you must catch all these from those in whom it lives already." These words of Newman were meant for university life, but they can be applied directly to our present subject. They illustrate the cardinal principle for which I am contending here, that the Christian religion in practice is not a Levitical reproduction of first or second century ideas, but a spontaneous growth, which, however nourished and guided by the classical traditions and scriptures of the past, catches its full life from the common fellowship, the social responsibilities, the

mutual enterprise and self-sacrifice, which throb within the vital intercourse of contemporary faith.

The fact is, once this principle of "bookless religion" is recognised, its ramifications disclose themselves in all directions. It is a factor which we find operating in many spheres. One of the really hopeful signs in recent Biblical criticism has been a truer appreciation of it in dealing with the early Christian documents. Here, as in the newer movements of research into Greek and Roman religion, the ultra-literary bias is being corrected, and more allowance made for the existence of a normal, popular, voiceless religion within the early Churches than was common in the criticism of last century, when, for example, a dogmatic system of so-called "Paulinism" was tacitly assumed by many to sum up the central current of the primitive faith. On this aspect of the problem I have not time to dwell at present. But I should like to add one word upon a cognate subject in which the recognition of "bookless religion" has a real significance; and that is the modern passion for generalising, from statistics and schedules, upon the quality or the spread of personal religion. Evidence of this kind, we ought to bear in mind, is extremely difficult to secure. It is not often gained by dredging even the literature of religious autobiography, for the perennial question of the historian arises, How far is any writer a true exponent of his age or even of his circle? We can get literature for our own age, or for a past age. But is it representative, and, if so, to what extent? As a rule, one will do well to entertain a wholesome scepticism of conclusions based upon induction from purely literary sources. The eccentric or the exceptional finds voice more readily than the normal. The latter does not pass into utterance so directly. The divorce court and the novel afford no clue to the number of happy marriages in a country! Besides, in literature, as in life, the most vocal is not always the most dominant; it is one thing to be visible, another thing to be vital. There is a bookless religion whose presence in the genuine, general life of the age vitiates many neat and

sure estimates of the period which are drawn mainly if not entirely from the delusive evidence of contemporary writings—delusive because it is partial or fragmentary.

Finally, such facts and factors as we have been reviewing converge upon our conception of what the Christian ministry is designed to be and to do. A trained ministry has usually been at least the ideal of the Scottish Churches, on the excellent principle that vital Christianity suffers whenever the religious consciousness is allowed to fall apart from the general intellectual advance of the age. Against such an ideal there is no law. We assume it as an axiom of our discipline. But the very glory of our training brings its own temptations. That training for about eight years tends to pre-occupy our mind with books. Biblical learning is, during our college course, the be-all and end-all. And its danger is intellectualism or bookishness. Some students, unfortunately, need no inoculation against the malady. Others have the sense to protect themselves, by clinical work in missions, against this pestilence of the academic spirit. But even the most wary may be none the worse of a gentle reminder that the people for whom he is responsible do not live in a world of documents alone, even of Biblical documents, that neat arrangements of texts will not fathom the depths of human need, and that, if the Church is to discharge her full debt to the barbarian as well as to the Greek, to the unlettered and unliterary class as well as to the reading public, she must present her faith in ways free from needlessly technical phraseology and preach the saving word without suggesting the bondage of an unelastic text. Men are not "dumb, driven cattle." They will not be driven, by the strong rods of argument or of mere authority, into any pen of conviction. Even when they may be thus forced to yield some intellectual assent, or at any rate to silence any outward protest, they remain "of the same opinion still." Neither the theologian nor the evangelist wins a success worth mentioning by such argumentative processes of appeal. And, as a matter of fact, in

this age of journalism, when the practical principles of any subject are scattered far and wide, the professional theologian no longer possesses an unchallenged monopoly. Sooner or later, no doubt, the deciding factors will be those of sure, first-hand experts, who have made it their business to know the subject in its ultimate principles. But the trend of modern religious thought is controlled by considerations which too often escape the abstruse thinker in theology, considerations which appeal powerfully to ordinary people because their practical experience affords a ready verification of such prejudices or instincts. In a word, the bookless religion of our day furnishes one of the conditions under which our work has to be done. Failure to allow for it adequately is responsible, I am afraid, for much of the inefficiency of our work as theologians and preachers. We take more trouble to know the Word than to master the conditions under which alone we can make it audible. The minds we address are pre-occupied. We ought to know what they are thinking and how they are thinking. This does not imply that their methods and aims of thought in religion are invariably accurate. Far from it. But we cannot hope to awaken a true conception of faith, or to direct the conscience aright, unless we are prepared, first of all, to get access to the life as it lies before us. "It would be almost incredible," says Frank Osbaldistone in *Rob Roy*, "to tell the rapidity of Miss Vernon's progress in knowledge; and it was still more extraordinary, when her stock of mental acquisitions from books was compared with her total ignorance of actual life. It seemed as if she saw and knew everything except what passed in the world around her." This combination probably made Di Vernon irresistibly fascinating as a talker. But while knowledge of books and ignorance of the bookless world are accomplishments which together may produce a charming angel in the house, I am perfectly certain that they will turn out an extremely ineffective angel of the Lord.

JAMES MOFFATT.

EVANGELICAL BARGAINING.

JOHN PAGE HOPPS.

THE modern movement in favour of a frank dealing with the Bible and Evangelical Theology has reached the National Council of Evangelical Free Churches, which, we are glad to hear, has decided to enter the arena with a series of books on "Christian Faith and Doctrine." The series is to be edited by the Rev. F. B. Meyer, and the writers include Dr R. F. Horton, Professor Peake, Principal Adeney, the Rev. J. Scott Lidgett and others. The first of the series, just out, is by Dr J. Monro Gibson, and is on the crucial subject of *The Inspiration and Authority of Holy Scripture*.

It is pretty evident that the book has been forced into existence by the pressure of a certain "distress" which is very widespread, and which is confessed here by such ominous phrases as "Multitudes of our teachers and preachers, truly religious men, are crying out, 'Would God I had a definite creed for my mind, and a positive gospel to preach!'" "There were never so many, in all the history of the Church, crying out, 'Where am I?' as there are to-day." "There are multitudes of good, earnest souls who do love the light, but have been forced into unbelief by the cruel demand that they must accept every word of the Bible as coming direct from God, or reject the whole."

Hence this book, for which Dr Forsyth writes a piquant introduction, in which he strives to call off the men of the "Higher Criticism," and pleads for the calling in of critics whom he quaintly names "the capable middle-men," who are

to act as mediators "between the learned and the public." It is a curious revelation as to the present position. "The army of research," he says, "is sufficiently well recruited. Its van has been going faster than the main body can follow, and becoming detached from its evangelical base": so he proposes a quickened pace from the rear, and a halting or harking back of the van, in order to link up the old evangelical position with the new scholarly one, and thus secure rest for perturbed spirits; and this book of Dr Gibson's is one of the links, and its writer is certified, by Dr Forsyth, as a "capable middle-man"—a man who has to stand between the world of modern knowledge, on the one hand, and the world of traditional religion on the other, and mediate between them. "The premises are being rebuilt," he says, "but the business must be carried on." Was there ever such a naïve and illuminating confession?

That is the position, then, to-day—the middle-man carries on the business, pending entire reconstruction; and he does it for the Bible in this book. One therefore expects a good deal of bargaining and contriving; a good deal, too, of accommodation and management; and this is what we get, with only a show of finality, but a show of finality which is made the most of. In fact, it is the part of "the capable middle-man" to persuade the customers that there is a great change, and yet that it all comes to the same thing.

In a book of compromise, involving movement in a once tabooed direction, we might have expected a suitable modesty and a genial reference to the old advance guard; but Dr Gibson fails us here. Curiously enough, though himself only coming in with the tide, he blames those who floated in long ago and are moored. One might have thought that he would have a good word, perhaps even a word of gratitude, for those who, under great difficulties, long ago showed the way into the harbour; but there is, instead, a good deal of open or implied rebuke.

Thus, Dr Martineau, who, as Dr Gibson says, in his *Seat*

of *Authority*, "finds the ultimate seat of authority in the voice of God as responded to by the human heart and conscience," is said to "assume a position which practically sets aside as worthless the witness of prophets and apostles, and the accumulated experience and witness of the Church." Does Dr Gibson deliberately regard that as fair?

But, as to Bible critics generally, he is unfair if they go an inch farther than himself. Of these he says: "They have their difficulties about miracles, about the future life, about the course of nature and the providence of God; and, because their Christian friends cannot clear these all up to them in the space of ten minutes or half an hour, they will not listen to anything our Lord and Master may say." That may be excused as pulpit emotion or pulpit rhetoric (and there is a good deal of both in this book), but it will not bear reflection. Of another, who finds that he has been deceived about the infallibility of the Bible, he says: "So he gives up the Bible because it is not what he thought it to be, and then, having given up the Bible, he concludes as a matter of course that he must give up Christ." What nonsense! Might it not more naturally occur to this honest and enlightened person to rally to Christ more resolutely, and to let the Old Testament atrocities go?

But Dr Gibson now and then plays the part of the "capable middle-man" excellently well, by pointing out to the hesitator that, after all, dark purple is very much like light brown. Thus, towards the end of his bargaining, he says: "How is it that the Bible of the simplest saints will be well worn and thumbed, perhaps actually torn, at the Psalms and in Gospels, and the page quite clean in Leviticus and Esther? It is because they are higher critics. And their criticism is perfectly just"; and he adds: "Whatever does not stand in times like these is better gone"; and he also adds, almost as his last words, as though to clinch a bargain: "Though the old theory was that the Bible was all equally inspired 'from cover to cover,' as the phrase is, it was only

a theoretical, not a practical, belief. Even the most stalwart defenders of the theory have not acted on it; or, if the attempt was made, as in the writer's case, it was soon given over as impracticable. For, however resolutely one may set himself to go through the whole Bible chapter by chapter, there are considerable portions of it which to the ordinary reader are a hopeless puzzle."

But, true to his rôle as "middle-man," he turns to the advanced critic and says: "In regard to the divine revelation, there can surely be no place for the fault-finding critic. Shall anyone find fault with 'the light of the knowledge of the glory of God'?"—an almost comical begging of the question which no experienced commercial "middle-man" would think plausible.

Dr Gibson's method is a very simple one. He deals with the Bible very much as a bold salesman might deal with a roll of cloth, moth-eaten here and there. He proposes to take what he calls "the telescopic," not "the microscopic" view. His argument is, "It is all right on the whole." He treats the book as one might treat Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*, concentrating attention upon its general unity, its underlying history, and its philosophy of life, with an expert's hiding of its gross animalism, its wicked stories, and its occasional blasphemy. He may not know it, but he does it; and this refuge, of the view on the whole, with a large placing of unpleasant things in the background, is practically Dr Gibson's case. By means of it he contrives, with a good deal of pulpit rhetoric, to find a certain "progressive revelation" in the Bible. Of course, he quotes the Epistle to the Hebrews: "God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these days spoken unto us by his Son." What, then, are we to understand by God speaking to the prophets? The answer is that God called "an elect nation" "to receive and convey to the world His message of salvation," and then "individual men selected and empowered by the agency of His Spirit to make

the message articulate—the witness of all converging on Him who is the Word of God, and by whose sacrifice alone the world can be redeemed.”

This is Dr Gibson's case. The Gospel message, “dimly foreshadowed, perhaps, in the story of the Fall,” grew “clearer and clearer as we come down the ages, till it blazes out in Christ.” “See there, first,” he cries, with another flash of pulpit fervour—“see there, first, the long line of prophets, everyone of them with a light in his eye and a fire in his soul, as, with a forward pointing, he says: ‘The Christ is coming, the Christ of God is coming.’” And yet, after all, there is not one of these prophets who is concerned with anything but the social, political, and ethical problems and events of his own day! But, if all this is so, if all who went before Christ were God-guided witnesses to Him, how came it to pass that Christ Himself said, “All that came before me were thieves and robbers”? The prophets were not, perhaps, distinctly in His mind, but the assertion is a very sweeping one: if, indeed, He ever said it at all.

But now, as to this claim that God chose the Jewish people “to receive and convey to the world His message of salvation,” we must pause and think before we again admit this venerable theory. Again and again Dr Gibson hammers at it. He says, “The first fact we have to deal with is that of an elect and inspired people—a nation singled out from other nations to receive God's special redemptive revelation and to give it to the world”; and this nation, he does not hesitate to say, was specially distinguished for its “abiding consciousness of the immanence and transcendence of God,” its “quenchless passion for righteousness,” and its growth of “a lofty spirituality.” It takes a good deal of emotion mixed with management to say this, and prove it in face of the history of this idolatrous and God-forsaking people, though much of what he attributes to the nation was true of some of its habitually rejected ethical and religious reformers whom we call “prophets.”

Dr Gibson contrasts the religion of the Hebrews with that of Greece and Rome, which, he says, was “‘of the earth, earthy,’ sadly stained all through by the evil imaginations of the heart of man.” But is this less true of the Hebrews? “God spoke to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,” says Dr Gibson; “and think,” he cries, “what He did for the heroes of the Old Testament! Think what He did for Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Think what He did for Joseph and through Joseph. Think what he did for Moses and through Moses. Think what He did through Joshua and the Judges and the Kings.” Is it all really good history, then? But what of the heroic characters of even our own little island? Has not God “done great things for us, whereof we are glad”? and, if the story of our heroes and of our heroic days is less blended with assertions of God’s championship, that may only show a more modest and more elevated thought of God; for truly, the heroic characters of the Old Testament, or their chroniclers, imputed things to God which we have to contradict on His behalf. Dr Gibson says: “By a mighty hand and an outstretched arm God did bring His people out of Egypt.” And did not the men of Holland say that God with His mighty hand delivered them from the grasp of Spain? And Englishmen have said it of England too. But even one of the old Hebrew prophets rose above this provincialism when he said: “The God of the whole earth shall He be called.” And Dr Gibson occasionally rises above it, as, for instance, when of the Scripture record he says quite frankly: “God was in it, of course, as He is in everything.” This is an immense admission, and is an excellent example of the function of the “middle-man.” After all, inspiration, and the guidance of God, and the leading of the Holy Spirit, are only matters of degree.

It therefore follows, and Dr Gibson quite frankly admits it, that the various parts of the Bible are not at all on “the same level.” Within his limits, he is as outspoken as any Unitarian in his repudiation of the old “evangelical” view that it

is all alike infallible and literally true. The Bible, he says, is not one book, but sixty-six, and many things are doubtful—as to their authors, for instance, and as to whether all of them ought to be included in the Canon of inspired books. There is the Book of Esther, for example; and Dr Gibson often glances at Esther and shakes his head. It is true that Christ quotes the Old Testament, but “we have no means of knowing the mind of Christ or of His apostles as to the exact number of books to be included in the Bible.” The Apocrypha is a part of the old Septuagint version, and Jesus “generally used” it, but “left no warning against treating the whole of it as authoritative”; and yet “those who are acquainted with the Apocrypha will recognise what a relief it is to be free from the necessity of claiming special inspiration for all the books which it contains”; and this is accompanied by many hints as to the relief now being felt when it is no longer necessary to claim equal inspiration for all parts of the Canon.

The Bible, we are told, was not given to teach us history or science. We have “given that up” and are “willing to have the scope of Scripture teaching limited to the spiritual and the practical.” “The entire history (of the Jews) from the entrance into Canaan down to the Captivity, a space of seven hundred years at least, comes to us, not only without any sign of a call or commission (to write the history), but without any means of finding out who the author was”; and then we have the further suggestive remark that the literature of the world began with myth and legend. But a passage in Dr Gibson’s naive little autobiography, with which he begins his book, throws the clearest light on his position, and, by implication, on the present position of the National Council of Evangelical Free Churches. He says: “I was brought up to believe that the whole fabric of our faith rested ultimately on the foundation of a book which, though written by many different authors, was yet from beginning to end not their work at all, but that of God. They were simply God’s penmen, and what they wrote was at His dictation.” Later on, he became perplexed,

and found some help "in Kitto's books," but he had "an uncomfortable feeling that too much ingenuity had been needed, and that simple truth should scarcely require so very much special pleading." Then came what he calls the "sad experience" of finding that "it was not all on the same level." Then he found relief in the notion that "the Bible was not itself the divine revelation, but the record of it," and in the further discovery of "the progressive nature of divine revelation." He confesses to having been at first strong in opposition to modern criticism, but he has come "out of the comparative darkness into better light."

Thinking of men like Theodore Parker and Colenso, who went through the jungle before him, we cannot help being reminded of the story of a penitent old lady who, on her death-bed, said to her faithful old servant, "Ah, Sarah, I see I've been a wicked woman for many years," to which Sarah pathetically replied, "Lor, missus, we've known it all the while."

So then, Dr Gibson, it will be perceived, has exceedingly interesting and elastic ideas about inspirations, and, if we venture to give a brief summary of his grading of them, we do so only as helping to carry on the business during the rebuilding of the premises, to use Dr Forsyth's remarkable phrase. Dr Gibson's grading of inspirations, then, comes out something like this: There is a broad sense in which we are all inspired. Then there are artists, poets, and musicians who are inspired in a higher or finer degree. Still higher, there is "spiritual inspiration," and this "again admits of degrees." Then, at last, we come to the inspiration of "those who were chosen of God to be the vehicles of that redemptive revelation which was to be the basis of fellowship with God through all succeeding ages." All this would be acceptable enough if we turned the particular into a universal; for the vital question is whether the revelation of God is one small chapter in the world's history or the whole of it.

Amid all these difficulties, we are pathetically asked for

“faith”; but Dr Gibson has a beautifully childlike way of taking “faith” as meaning faith in his own particular explanations. He assures us that it is the inner vision which sees, and that it is this inner vision which is faith. In a sense that is quite true, but it was true for Luther and Newman, Channing and Spurgeon, just as it is true for R. J. Campbell and Munro Gibson, Wilberforce and Father Vaughan. Faith must be free, as Dr Gibson himself tells us, allowing a large margin for the personal equation, and going so far as to tell us that inspiration was purposely largely diluted with the human. If it had come upon us “with the impact of super-human power, would not human freedom be abolished?” And yet he says: “Why should it be thought a thing incredible that God should lay upon us the responsibility of recognising His Gospel as it shines forth in the pages of the Bible?” Well, but is it not quite as fully open to us to ask: “Why should it be thought a thing incredible that God should endow us with the sacred right to find an unholy spirit in certain pages of the Bible?”

Dr Gibson’s answer to all this seems to be that we ought to accept the whole Bible as specially inspired, “because Christ is in it”; and he certainly says, plainly enough, that “we may rest assured that if a man truly believes in Christ, he will not fail to rise to a worthy faith in the inspiration of the Scriptures.” That is a very vague and elastic remark. “A worthy faith in the inspiration of the Scriptures” may mean such a faith in the Scriptures as they deserve; and the sense of the whole might, to some honest readers, actually mean this: We may rest assured that in proportion as a man truly believes in Christ, he will be less inclined to believe in the special inspiration of many portions of the Old Testament. Dr Gibson himself gives us specimens of these unacceptable portions of “the Holy Scriptures” (though still, in some way, holding by their inspiration); but there are hundreds of them. They are well known, and we need not recite them; but there is one which we cannot pass, because

it illustrates how familiarity can breed devotion, and because it gives us a typical specimen of Dr Gibson's notion of a "contrast."

"We may compare the Song of Moses with the almost contemporary hymn of the poet Pentaur, who is sometimes spoken of as the Homer of Egypt. . . . The one is full of man and his praises, while the other makes nothing of man and everything of God. The first three verses sufficiently indicate the tenor of the whole: 'I will sing unto the Lord, for He has triumphed gloriously: the horse and his rider hath he thrown into the sea. The Lord is my strength and song, and He is become my salvation. This is my God, and I will praise Him; my father's God, and I will exalt Him. The Lord is a man of war: the Lord is His name.'

"Such is the strain of the Hebrew epic; whereas, in the Egyptian one, the praises of Pharaoh are sung throughout, and when any god of Egypt is referred to, it is in some such fashion as this: 'I (Pharaoh) have built for thee Propylæa, wonderful works of stone; I have raised to thee masts for all time; I have conveyed the obelisks for thee from the island of Elephantine. It was I who had brought for thee the everlasting stone, who caused the ships to go for thee on the sea, to bring thee the products of foreign nations. Where has it been told that such a thing was done at any other time?' Comment," says Dr Gibson, "is needless on the contrast." Quite needless, but, if we made any comment, it would be strongly in favour of the Egyptian record over the Hebrew one. Both are largely inspired by boasting, but Pharaoh boasts of good things done in building and commerce, whereas the Hebrew boasts in a God who threw people into the sea, and who is "a man of war": better is it to praise a useful man than a merciless God. It is curious to note that, all through, Dr Gibson's case seems to be that a record is inspired if it refers to God, no matter what it says of Him. It is an old superstition, and anything but a lovely one.

Impelled by this superstition, Dr Gibson might be com-

pelled to include the Koran as a part of "The Holy Scriptures," but, being an Englishman, he is restrained by a patriotic claiming for his book the guarantee of the Holy Spirit, and he appears to claim the Holy Spirit for his interpretation of it. Of course he is aware that this is rather thin ice, but he does not falter. Of course, also, he is aware that there is a great and venerable claimant who holds that to him has been entrusted the revelation, as custodian and interpreter; but he mentions that only to repudiate it; and yet, in the absence of such a divinely appointed custodian and interpreter, there is nothing left but private judgment, with a resolute ruling out of all condemnation on account of adverse opinion. But Dr Gibson is very "capable," and confidently claims the Holy Spirit's guidance for his particular view; and virtually denies the guidance of the Holy Spirit to all who do not accept that view. That is a bold stroke, in view of the fact that he has only just come within sight of it, that he is but coming in with the tide, and has by no means reached the pier.

Is this reliance upon the Holy Spirit anything more than reliance upon the God-given sense of what is true and good—a sense which has always varied, and must always vary, in its behests, in harmony with the stage of spiritual sensitiveness attained? Dr Gibson mentions Newman's *Apologia*. May we commend to him a curious parallel to his own following of the Holy Spirit's guidance. That following has led him to the occupation of a "capable middle-man," in order to reconcile the stolid Nonconformist to the conclusion that the Bible is not all equally inspired; but it led Newman into the Roman Catholic Church for the saving of his soul; and, so far as we can see, Newman agonised more than he in his anxiety to be guided aright. Here are a few expressions taken from that wonderful and touching story of Newman's laborious pilgrimage: "Pray believe that I am encompassed with responsibilities so great and so various as utterly to overcome me, unless I have mercy from Him who, all through my life,

has sustained and guided me, and to whom I can now submit myself."

"It suggests to me the traces of a Providential Hand."

"I am a Catholic by virtue of my believing in God."

"The question simply turns on the nature of the promise of the Spirit made to the Church."

It is certainly interesting to turn from these ardent assurances within the pale, to Dr Gibson's equally ardent assurances in the open (unless, indeed, the "National Council of Evangelical Free Churches" is also a pale). "Verily," he says, "we cannot do without something above the written word, without the presence and guidance of the Spirit of Him who spake to the fathers by the prophets. There must be present inspiration to verify for us, and to enable us to make use of, the inspiration that is past. Do we not believe in the Holy Ghost?" "There is the final verification. There is the ultimate authority—the Holy Spirit of God and of His Son Jesus Christ speaking, in the sacred Scriptures especially, to the consciences and hearts of those who are of the truth." But who are "of the truth"? Are they only "of the truth" who agree with Dr Gibson? It looks like it.

Belief in endorsement by the "Holy Ghost" is an old source of trouble, and has always been the cause of much over-belief and excessive assertion. And yet there is a truth in it; but it is a truth which puts Newman and Gibson side by side, and condemns neither; and this truth will be found in a more modern, a more reasonable, and a more reverent conception of God than that which presents Him as a sort of exaggerated human being, selecting this man and that; doing this and that, as He chooses, and usually as the champion of one side; inspiring David and ignoring Socrates; guiding Monro Gibson aright to Farringdon Street, and letting your anxious, trusting Newman grope his way to Rome alone. The truth is, that there is a God-side to every one of us, and that it is on this side of the spirit-self that conscience and the sense of duty operate; so that a man is led by God when

he is seeking the light, longing for truth, and hungering and thirsting for righteousness, though these may lead two men to opposite conclusions.

In the light of this view of divine guidance, we can grant to Dr Gibson that every part of the Bible may be inspired in its degree. It is quite possible that the writers of the psalms which treat God as a fighting champion of the Jews, and a ruthless fighter too, were moved by zeal for God, and even by a rough kind of zeal for righteousness, as they understood it, and were to that extent inspired by the God in them: though it would often be difficult to call it inspiration by the "Holy" Spirit.

This view of inspiration may appear to be paradoxical, but it does not seem possible to escape from it except by postulating a humanly arbitrary God, and attributing to some men the power to discover that they are His chosen ones—and not much good has come of that! Newman's *Apologia* gives many a curious glimpse of this. In one place he suggests that it is one's duty "to throw oneself generously into that form of religion which is providentially put before one," and says boldly, "I have always contended that it mattered not where a man began, so that he began on what came to hand and in faith; and that anything might become a divine method of truth." The rest is "divine guidance."

But beneath this fencing with the notion of guidance by the Holy Spirit there is a serious fact which admits of no evading—that we are all engaged in a great act of separation, and oscillating between Freedom and Authority, Fact and Assertion, Reason and Rome; and Newman's struggle was precisely what Gibson's is, but in different directions. Newman said, "The spirit of lawlessness came in with the Reformation, and Liberalism is its offspring"; and by "Liberalism" he meant pretty much what Dr Gibson has to bargain with as "The Higher Criticism." "There are but two alternatives," said Newman, "the way to Rome, and the way to Atheism: Anglicanism is the halfway house on the one side, and Liberal-

ism is the halfway house on the other"; and he ought to have known, for he was sure that all his life he had been "divinely guided." He predicted that "the stern encounter" would come, "when the two real and living principles, simple, entire, and consistent . . . rush upon each other, contending, not for names and words, or half-views, but for elementary notions and distinctive moral characters": and he adds a passage which, though a trifle scornful, amusingly illustrates the present balancing attitude of the men whom Dr Gibson represents: "In the present day, mistiness is the mother of wisdom. A man who can set down half a dozen general propositions, which escape from destroying one another only by being diluted into truisms; who can hold the balance between opposites so skilfully as to do without fulcrum or beam; who never enunciates a truth without guarding himself against being supposed to exclude the contradictory . . . this is what the Church is said to want, not party men, but sensible, temperate, sober, well-judging persons, to guide it through the channel of No-meaning, between the Scylla and Charybdis of Aye and No!"

Dr Gibson concludes with a pretty little story which will serve our purpose just as well as his: "I think of my little grandchild of eighteen months, who, having been taught by her father to blow out first a match and then a candle, made her next attempt on the orb of day, on an afternoon with just enough fog to make it possible for her to look straight at its great red ball. The dear child tried it again and again and again. And the sun is shining yet."

Yes, "God's in the heavens," and He lights us all. But the trouble is that we are always being tempted to mistake our poor little candles for His "marvellous light."

JOHN PAGE HOPPS.

DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "*Hibbert Journal*." Reviews of books are not open to discussion. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the *Journal*. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

IS CIVILISATION IN DANGER?

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1908, p. 729.)

THE somewhat startling title of the second article in the July issue of the *Hibbert Journal* could not fail to draw attention to it. The article itself, readable as it is, proves in effect disappointing. So much is assumed, so little proved.

To take a few points briefly. It is assumed that there is a rapid decay of that liberal thought and finer feeling which constitute what is called "Culture," and that such decay is due partly to increasing specialisation in work, which cramps the intellect and quenches all aspiration, and partly to the passion for uniformity which "is assailing not only superiority of fortune and position, but every kind of superiority whatsoever." For both these tendencies, which ought to be much more carefully distinguished than is here the case, M. Gérard makes the Democracy responsible. He fears that "with the disappearance of social inequalities individual initiative will come to an end." For, in his judgment, Democracy is the enemy of Genius, which is "essentially anti-democratic." Education itself, he thinks, is becoming part of the machinery by which wealth is to be brought within the reach of all alike, and for all alike that is becoming the one goal of effort. In a word, he dreads that for the leisured thought by which life is enlarged and enriched, for the arts by which it is ennobled and refined, there will presently be no demand and no scope. And, since the foe is Democracy, and since the failure of the aristocracy of wealth and privilege is conspicuous, appeal is made to such "men of letters, artists, and women" as may have within them the spirit of genuine Culture, to band themselves together "in opposition to that universal mediocrity by which our civilisation is threatened": to form themselves, in fact, into an aristocracy "of intellect, of feeling, and of manners."

Surely there is much here open to question.

That there is a note of vulgarity, a lack of distinction, in the general

demeanour of the average citizen—Frenchman, Englishman, or German—is only too true. Our ideals for work, for recreation, and even for study are not very lofty, and many seem to have no ideals at all. But were things any better a generation ago? I trow not; unless, indeed, we compare the cultivated few of a previous age with the general mass of the population to-day, which is apparently the method of this article. What is indisputable is, that the general mixing of classes, which is the outcome of democratic progress, has made sensitive people feel more keenly than before how low is the standard of our attainment as a people. But the Democracy, only now beginning to assert itself, must not be made wholly responsible for deficiencies which are, partly at least, the outcome of aristocratic rule; and the remedy will hardly be found by deliberately instituting a new aristocracy of superior persons. Indeed, it strikes one as rather odd, that a gentleman whose ideal of culture is expressed in the motto "*nil humanum a me alienum puto*," and who finds the chief obstacle to the realisation of his ideal in the specialising tendencies of modern work, should take alarm at the progress of Democracy. For, in the first place, it is by no means certain that the real trend of practical life is towards the emphasising of such injurious specialising: Mr H. G. Wells gives some good reasons for thinking otherwise. And, in the next place, if specialisation be a danger for the future, as it undoubtedly is in some respects a present evil, is not the Democracy, or at all events the Socialists, who are the advanced wing, up in arms against it? The clamour of the labouring man for shorter hours, if not consciously a demand for nobler training, is at all events a plea for larger opportunity, for the *possibility* of doing or hearing or seeing something outside the routine of his monotonous day's work.

Monotony, let us note, is what M. Gérard especially dreads—"the monotony of a universal mediocrity," which is to result from "democratic pressure on the one hand and material progress on the other." He laments that machinery is turning out, for the use of poor people, houses, clothing, furniture, amusements, and even education, after the very same patterns in vogue among the wealthy, observing with dismay that the middle and lower classes show no more taste or originality than their social superiors. He draws in grey tints a depressing picture of a London suburb, and finds in the dulness of the streets sad evidence that the occupants of these dwellings "are absolutely impervious to every idea and to the highest type of culture." Let us pity these people indeed, if, as is so naïvely assumed, none of them ever rise in spirit above their surroundings. But what about Grosvenor Square or Grosvenor Place, or the uninspiring exterior of Buckingham Palace? Must the levelling Democrats take the blame for the lack of initiative there?

But below these secondary causes of decay, the writer discerns a deeper cause, which is moral—the love of money. "Utilitarian interests are on the eve of causing all that lies beyond them to be forgotten." And here comes in the gist of his argument. While, "in material respects, the

levelling of society is especially evident in the slow ascent of the masses to better conditions" (which, as it would appear, he grudgingly allows), "in moral and intellectual respects, on the contrary, it is being realised by the lowering of the *élite* to a uniform level with the rest." But who are the *élite* thus degraded? Either they must be individuals highly placed who never utilised their wealth and leisure to cultivate higher interests, or else we must infer that men of high birth and breeding succumb as easily to vulgar influences as baser folk. What, then, comes of his appeal to the better sort to form themselves into a brotherhood, an aristocracy of all the virtues, to rescue a perishing civilisation? Does not the very suggestion imply a misapprehension of the way in which intellect and merit exalt and purify the life of Man? Good men and wise hitherto have uplifted and ennobled their fellows, not by electing themselves to high office as the legitimate leaders of the nation, but by giving freely of the spiritual treasures they possessed without respect to persons or classes. When they are concerned to assume a privileged position and to exercise authority, they begin to lose something of their spiritual power. That is the history of churches and schools of art the world over. Yet something of this sort is implied in M. Gérard's appeal, since his call to the men of mind and character to champion "the prerogatives of talent and merit" is bound up with, nay, made subordinate to, his contention that social inequalities are a necessary condition of civilisation, that *we must have an aristocracy*. I would submit, on the contrary, that, attractive as the idea is, presented in abstract terms, an aristocracy of the most excellent persons, deliberately established and formed into a privileged class, would prove in practice a fiasco. They would inevitably degenerate into a selfish *clique*. Such, indeed, has been the actual experience of mankind. Pharisaism is a typical instance, beginning, as it did, in an honest and whole-hearted zeal for righteousness. But every aristocracy, however established, has claimed to be in some sense the exponent of virtue and refinement. Its members must always be "gentlemen"; and the tradition of gentility, where preserved in its purity, is no ignoble thing. But (*teste* M. Gérard) it is fast disappearing. And the reason is not far to seek. It has been a selfish tradition. These worthy and refined gentlefolk have not shared their treasure with their fellow-citizens of a lower social grade, but have kept them at arm's-length as "common people." And now the nemesis has come upon the gentlemen, in that those whom they despised are pushing forward, and that their lack of good breeding is felt as painful.

I submit, then, that it is futile to deplore the passing away of social distinctions. The levelling process will go farther, whether we will or no. The masses will not ask the best people always to take the first place, and will probably, following the example of the higher classes, put some of them down at the bottom. But if, indeed, as the Scriptures suggest to us, spiritual excellence works as a leaven, permeating the social body, they will be able to work even there quite effectively, as, in fact, some of them are working now. The motto of true genius in art and literature, as well

as in morals and religion, has ever been: "I am among you as he that serveth."

Two very important considerations which, if duly weighed, must have greatly modified his judgments, are by the writer of this paper most strangely ignored. The one is the fact that, quite apart from the not too generous help given by those in high place, there has always been a leaven of righteousness, and even of refinement, working among the masses, unobserved because unpretentious, but none the less effective for good. The other (the outcome of this) is the fact that the aristocracy of enlightened and right-minded persons, to whom as a body actually existing M. Gérard appeals, is itself constantly recruited from below.

WILLIAM C. STEWART.

KENSINGTON.

SCIENCE AND THE PURPOSE OF LIFE.

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1908, p. 743.)

DR NANSSEN writes: "We see now that really nothing we behold has a beginning or an end, and that therefore the only logical view of the Universe, based upon our own experience, is that it is infinite in time and space. It always has existed, and will go on for ever. It has no limits, but extends infinitely in all directions." But can that view of the Universe be "logical" which is inconceivable and self-contradictory. That the Universe has never had a beginning and will never have an end is as inconceivable and self-contradictory, as it is inconceivable and self-contradictory that it had a beginning and will have an end, as Kant showed long ago in his first Antinomy. "Illimitable space" and the "star-spangled heavens" are known to us only as phenomena. What they are apart from ourselves, or if they exist apart from ourselves, we do not know. If, however, "science" be right, the question is not merely, What is the purpose of life? but, What is the purpose of the Universe? Apparently it exists only that at stated intervals there should be "glorious collisions"—collisions which, however "glorious," there will be no one to observe in the case of our solar system, as, long ere it takes part in a "collision," all sentient life will have disappeared, and have been "wiped out as a dream of the past." To hold that the Universe has slowly evolved, that man after ages of struggle and suffering should have reached his present condition, and then after some millions of years which yet are as nothing in comparison with infinite time, should slowly devolve until he ceases to exist, merely in order that it and he should form part of a "glorious collision," is to deny that the Universe and human life have any purpose whatever. Still, if this be our destiny, we must face it. The only question is, What manner of men should we be, and what should we do? Dr

Nansen replies, "Be as happy as possible, and develop yourselves to the utmost." "Be as happy as possible" is good advice. *Carpe diem* is the highest wisdom, if the conclusions of science are true. Though whether happiness be possible when we know that every tick of the clock is carrying us towards blank negation is another question. It will probably depend on temperament. But why should we develop ourselves? Is it worth while to do so when in a few short years, in comparison with infinite time, we ourselves and finally all of us and all our achievements will be "wiped out as a dream of the past."

"What the philosophies, all the sciences, poesy, varying voices of prayer,
All that is noblest, all that is basest, all that is filthy, all that is fair,
What is it all, if all of us end but in being our own corpse coffins at last,
Swallowed in vastness, lost in silence, drowned in the deeps of a meaning-
less past."

If it be replied, Develop yourself, because by so doing you will increase your own happiness and that of others, the answer is—Why should I think of others, and why should I develop myself if I am already as happy as I can conceive myself to be, undeveloped? It is useless to tell me that I should be happier if I was unselfish, and should develop myself. I can reply that others may take that view of happiness if they will, but I am quite content to remain as I am. As I am already as happy as I can imagine possible, I have fulfilled my "one duty" of making the most of this life and of being "as happy as possible."

If the naturalist view of the world be true, to make the most of this life is wise and prudent: to talk of it being a duty is absurd. And everyone has a perfect right to make the most of this life in his own way. If A thinks he can make the most of this life in drunkenness and B in self-sacrifice, the naturalist view must regard both as equally good. B has no right to claim that his manner of life is higher and better than that of A. It is higher and better for B. But he has no right to say that it would be the same for A; and if he try to convince A that self-sacrifice and unselfishness are better than drunkenness, A can reply, We are both agreed that we should make the most of this life and be as happy as possible—you find your happiness in self-sacrifice, while I find it in drunkenness. Both of us are thus making the most of life and fulfilling our "one duty," and what right have you to say that your mode of making the most of this life is better than mine? If B should reply that A ought to think of others, and that his drunkenness lessens their happiness—on the naturalist view, A can reply, Why should he think of others? Is it worth while for him to sacrifice his own happiness for beings so ephemeral as they? Why should he detract from his own happiness to add to theirs, whose loss of happiness or even whose misery are but "passing trifles," and therefore "not so very important after all"? How, indeed, can he be certain that by giving up his own happiness for the sake of others, he is not lessening instead of increasing the sum of happiness in the world? How can he be

certain that the loss of happiness on his part is not greater than the happiness his unselfishness may confer on others? He cannot be certain, and therefore, if his "one duty" is "to be as happy as possible" and to make the most of this life, his wisest plan is to look after himself, and to think of others only so far as they are a means to his happiness. On the naturalist view all moral distinctions and all appeals on moral grounds disappear.

Dr Nansen seems to think that the one test of greatness is mere size. If we want to learn to be modest, to be convinced of our own insignificance, and to find comfort for all the ills of life, we need only contemplate the "star-spangled heavens" and reflect upon the infinity of space. Whether a patient suffering from the agony of a cancer, for example, will find much consolation in "listening to the silence of illimitable space" or in contemplating the "star-spangled heavens," or be convinced thereby that his suffering is but a "passing trifle," and "is not so very important after all," even if he has been trained in that modesty which Dr Nansen desiderates, is more than doubtful. If his suffering allowed him to think, he would surely find more consolation in the thought that there was something greater than "illimitable space" and the "star-spangled heavens," viz. his own mind, which was able to observe and reflect upon them.

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THE RIGHT TO CONSTRAIN MEN FOR THEIR OWN GOOD.

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1908, p. 782.)

IN an article under the above heading in the July *Hibbert Journal*, Professor W. M. Flinders Petrie, although touching on many important subjects in this connection, yet has omitted one which at the present time, however great indifference may be shown towards it by the majority, is nevertheless a topic of the day: I mean the right of constraint over the opium habit, which Professor Flinders Petrie merely mentions as "other drug habits," saying at the same time, that "the same principles" which he has been enunciating "must apply." It seems to me that this is a question eminently suited to discussion on the same lines as the other subjects mentioned in the article, and that it is a pity that the writer did not apply his principles to it in so many words. The opium question and the drink question have many points in common, but there are also two great differences between the two. There is no doubt that the opium question comes under heading B of Professor Flinders Petrie's "three degrees," for "we can already perceive some countervailing forces." It is unnecessary to enumerate these countervailing forces, or alternative evils, for they are, in the main, the same as those already mentioned in the

article in connection with the possible suppression of alcohol, and agree with the eight points to be considered as set forth on pp. 788 and 789. The same arguments, for and against, apply equally to the forcible suppression of the opium and the alcohol habits; except that it may possibly be said that over-indulgence in the former tends to less evils than does excessive alcohol drinking, for a man under the influence of opium does not go home and beat his wife with a poker. Also it may be added that the abuse of opium does not tend to set up a "craving" for the stimulant in the offspring; and therefore opium is not as dangerous *per se* to third parties as is alcohol.

The first point of disagreement between the two is that the opium habit is not one of the "faults and follies of our own people at home." The question has arisen almost solely in its bearings on the Chinese. And it is at least open to question whether we, as a nation, have the right to injure those to whom we *are* bound by legal ties, for the benefit (granting, for the moment, that benefit will accrue) of those to whom we are not. And this brings us to the second point of divergence. Everyone is agreed that it would be a good thing to do away with the evils of drink, if it were possible to do so on a strictly ethical basis: many have tried, and are trying, but, so far, no one has succeeded. But means have been found, and are being put into execution, for restricting the growth of opium in India, whereby it is hoped (falsely, as I believe), by limiting the output, to limit its use and abuse by the Chinese and others. The output of opium can be limited, or even totally suppressed, in India as in no other opium-growing country in the world, to the great detriment of India and its revenue. But have we the right to do it?

The mistake made by those ardent pseudo-moralists who desire the total suppression of the sale of opium (except for medicinal purposes) is the tacit assumption on their part that its use, as that of alcohol, is *wrong in itself*, and that therefore its suppression, regardless of the right of the millions who use it in moderation, is necessarily right.

I am aware that I have not even touched the fringe of the opium question as such. But my sole object was to examine it in the light of the ethical principles so ably argued by Professor Flinders Petrie. All those who, with me, cordially subscribe to those principles (without, however, necessarily agreeing with all the proposed measures for lessening the drink evil) must, in answer to the question, Have we the right forcibly to restrain the Chinese from using opium? give a decided negative, and condemn as unmoral any action tending in that direction. And, in view of the fact that in China itself immense quantities of opium are produced over which there cannot be, as in India, any efficient control, it is no answer to say that the Chinese themselves desire the restriction of the opium traffic.

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SAUGOR, C.P.

THE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND AND ITS FORMULA.

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1908, p. 869.)

IF the views of my friend Mr Campbell as set forth in his article on "The Church of Scotland and its Formula" in the July number of the *Hibbert* are representative of any considerable party in the Established Church, then we are within sight of a movement towards disestablishment arising within the Church itself. Mr Campbell, it is true, does not even mention disestablishment as a thing to be desired. He shrinks from it. But the inevitable logic of his position will drive him to it all the same. It is impossible to see in what other way the Church of Scotland can be honourably extricated out of the *impasse* in which it finds itself.

Such a movement would be welcomed by many friends of the Church of Scotland outside its borders. This would be a legitimate form of disestablishment—a church freeing itself from alien bonds which it finds intolerable. It would be, besides, a necessary and indispensable step towards the union of the two great Presbyterian Churches in Scotland.

By Clause 5 of the Act of Parliament which settled the affairs of the churches in Scotland, arising from the notorious decision of the House of Lords, liberty was given to the Church of Scotland to alter its formula of subscription to the Confession of Faith. It was desired by those who prepared this Act to give to the Church of Scotland what may be called "the most favoured nation treatment," and Clause 5 was hailed as a new charter of liberty. It turns out, however, that the "new charter" is a delusion. "In 1905," says Mr Campbell, "liberty was obtained to alter the part of the formula quoted, which remains henceforth under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Church. As, however, the Act of 1690 is unaffected, the Church still remains bound to the Confession and has liberty of movement only within its limits." So it turns out that the only liberty which the Church has got is liberty "to turn on its bed of pain." The liberty to alter the formula, without power to alter the Confession, will issue in a new formula which in the circumstances can only be an ignoble equivocation. Mr Campbell sees this, and rightly protests. He sees the logical issue of the situation also, but shrinks from it. "To stifle the cry for freedom, to bind the conscience by inelastic formulas, can have only one result in the Scottish Church. It will hasten a movement, not for an amended formula, but for the rejection of the Confession of Faith. This has to come some day, we have no doubt. But if it were demanded at present it could be granted only by the repeal of the Act of 1690, and what that means in the present state of Scotland it is not necessary to set forth here." It means of course, disestablishment—the one logical and honourable way out of the difficulty.

Mr Campbell's alternative (stated with a cynical frankness and bluntness positively refreshing in a writer on ecclesiastical matters, but likely to make his more cautious brethren gasp with horror) is this: "Would

it not be better to hold by the Confession, that if we have not uniformity of belief we may at least have uniformity of make-believe?" We admire the candour of the question, but what are we to say to what it suggests? As a jest, it is untimely; if seriously meant, it is more in keeping with the expedients of those ecclesiastical Gallios whose souls have become asphyxiated by the poisonous atmosphere of blue-books than with the open mind of our parish minister.

Mr Campbell's instinct for freedom is right, but it is new-born. His eyes are as yet but half opened. That he should "see men as trees walking" and some other things a little in confusion is therefore not so much to be wondered at. He will pardon me reminding him of the lesson which our race has learned at a great price. It is this. Freedom is won: it is not gifted. It can never, never be won by uniformitarians in "make-believe."

With his discussion of the "formula" Mr Campbell has incorporated some remarks on the progress of the Scottish Church. The classical age of that Church is assigned (to our surprise) to the Moderates of the eighteenth century. Among these David Hume is accorded a place of honour! Here again we have difficulty in believing that Mr Campbell is serious. His apotheosis of Hume and the Moderates has the effect of an elaborate jest, though possibly it is not so intended. We know what Hume thought of his ironical canonisation by the wag who chalked "St David's Street" on the corner of his house, then newly built, and forming the beginning of a street then unnamed. One wonders what he would say to Mr Campbell ranking him with the prophets!

Hume, it is true, consorted with the Moderates, and they with him. It would, however, be surprising to learn that they all did so. It is an open question whether this fraternisation of Hume and the ministers was really creditable to either side. Could Hume really respect men who meekly swallowed his covert insults against their religion? It may be doubted. Wellington, we know, had to consort with the Spaniards. We have no reasons for believing that he respected his Spanish "friends" more highly than his French enemies.

This is not the occasion to offer a critique on Hume; but the cry "Back to Hume and the Moderates" sounds queer as the rallying cry of any party in a church of the twentieth century. The Moderates, if they stood for anything in particular, stood for "culture"—a somewhat thin and insipid variety of it. Their sympathies, if they had any, leaned towards the French Encyclopædia. As a party, they contributed nothing to religion in the usual sense of the term. Mr Campbell wishes to utter a chivalrous word for them, and we have no quarrel with him for doing so. We only protest when he praises them at the expense of the "other side." Mr Campbell's references to the revival at Cambuslang and other movements of the kind as "orgies of fanaticism" and "fantastic devil-worship" must be admitted by himself, on reflection, to be an offence to good taste. They show also (and this is even more serious) a misapprehension of what

religion is in its true inwardness, in its real essence. It is surely unnecessary to point out that the subject-matter of religion is not the same as the subject-matter of philosophy or literature. However eminent Hume may be as a thinker or Robertson or Blair as literary men (and no one denies them their claim), yet such eminence does not constitute them religious forces. This confusion runs through the whole of the article dealing with the wider aspect of religion in Scotland, and makes any helpful conclusions impossible. Looked at from the point of view of Dr James in his article on a cognate theme in the same number of the *Hibbert*, Mr Campbell's strictures seem hopelessly out of focus and out of date.

In a short discussion it is impossible to supply a full corrective to Mr Campbell's one-sided and antiquated views; but he may be reminded that "revivals" have a rational justification in so far as they supply the raw material for the sculpturing forces of God to act upon. They have their analogy in the physical world in the volcanic action that throws up new material to replace that which has been worn down. So regarded, the "work at Cambuslang" has the same justification as the "work at Pentecost," and answers to the same end. "The gold-dust comes to birth with the quartz sand all around it, and this is as much a condition of religion as of any other excellent possession." I commend this quotation from the article by Dr James to Mr Campbell's consideration. When he appreciates the bearings of it, one has the hope that his scorn of "revivals" will be considerably mitigated.

It cannot be expected that we of the United Free Church who represent the evangelical tradition in Scotland, and are the heirs of the Secession and the Disruption, are able to accept Mr Campbell's article as a satisfactory contribution to a difficult subject, but we can welcome it as a candid indication of the position of himself and his party in the Church of Scotland. It is evident that much rubbish must be cleared away before we get a satisfactory and stable "site" for the comprehensive union which many of us desire to see consummated.

DAVID HOUSTON.

ST OLAF'S UNITED FREE MANSE,
LERWICK.

REVIEWS

The Religious Teachers of Greece. Being Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion delivered at Aberdeen.—By James Adam, Litt.D., LL.D., Fellow and Senior Tutor of Emmanuel College, Cambridge. Edited, with a Memoir, by his Wife.—Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1908.—Pp. xx+LVI+468.

THE area covered by the Gifford Lectureships in the Scottish Universities tends constantly to widen, and in these lectures the late Dr Adam entered on a comparatively new and very fruitful field of inquiry. It is true that four or five years previously Dr Edward Caird devoted his second series of Gifford Lectures to a study of the development of theological ideas in Greek philosophy; but while three-fourths of his book is occupied with Aristotle and those who came after him, Dr Adam does not follow his subject beyond Plato, and a great part of his volume is devoted to the poets, who, even more than the philosophers, were “the religious teachers” of classical Greece. Thus the two books are admirably adapted to supplement one another, and together they give a far more complete account of the development of Greek religious thought than has hitherto existed in this country.

The value of this volume of Dr Adam's lectures is greatly increased by the memoir with which it opens. Like another great scholar, Robertson Smith, he was born under the shadow of that Aberdeenshire mountain, Benachie, from whose slopes so many distinguished men have come. Like Robertson Smith, he spent a strenuous and brilliant life at Aberdeen and Cambridge; and both men passed away at the early age of forty-seven. The story of Adam's earlier years is one that has often found a place in the annals of Scottish scholarship; but it is here told in a way that brings vividly before the reader the difficulties against which the young scholar had to contend, his early love for Greek, which he went off to study on the moors in summer after a breakfast of porridge taken at 5.30 a.m., his years of intense application at that rigorous home of learning, Aberdeen University, and the encouragement which he gained from the teaching and friendship of Sir William Geddes. Both at this time and in his years at Cambridge, Adam appears as much more than a mere scholar: as a man of wide humanity and many enthusiasms, loved by children, and admired by those whom he taught. He speaks himself (p. 365) of the “*præfervidum ingenium*” characteristic of the idealist; and it was because he added this

power of quick intuition and poetic insight, derived perhaps from some Celtic ancestor, to an Aberdonian persistence and acuteness of mind that he was so well fitted to act as an interpreter of the many-sided genius of Plato. To the same ardent and intense temperament was probably due that alternation of periods of mental exhilaration and intense depression of which we are here told. Perhaps the highest praise that can be given to this memoir is to say that it is written with a truly Hellenic directness and restraint, and that its fifty-five pages give so complete and living a picture of its subject that even those who did not know Adam feel themselves in actual contact with the personality of the author in reading the lectures that follow.

Mention should also be made of the number and accuracy of the references, which show both the industry with which Dr Adam collected the materials for his work and the care spent on its revision. The only omission which we have detected in the editorial part of the work is that several important headings (*e.g.*, *Apollo* and *Delphi*) fail to appear in the index.

In his first lecture Dr Adam treats of the "feud between philosophy and poetry" in respect to their theological ideas; and he proceeds to trace the development of religious thought, first in the poets from Homer to Sophocles, next in the philosophers from Thales to the Sophists, and then in Euripides, who was at once philosopher—his enemies said "sophist"—and poet; while the whole work culminates appropriately in an account of the religious ideas of Socrates and Plato. This independent treatment of the two contrasted lines of development gives clearness to Dr Adam's exposition; and the only possible criticisms of the arrangement of the work are that the lecture on Orphism comes in somewhat awkwardly between the sections on Bacchylides and Pindar, and that the book concludes abruptly with a short account of Plato's doctrine of Immortality, the reader being left to gather up for himself the different threads which have been unrolled in the lectures.

Of these threads, perhaps the most important is that by which we follow the gradual development of Greek thought from the early polytheism to a monotheistic form of belief. In tracing this development in Greek poetry the author shows a keen eye for those elements in the earlier poets which pointed to the thought of unity in the Divine nature; and yet he is careful not to attribute monotheism to the poets down to the time of Sophocles. But even the polytheism of Homer represents an advance on the "chaos of pre-existing legends and belief"; for "we may well suppose that it is the universalising instinct of poetry which has apprehended and transfigured the universal element in the particular cults, creating out of local and provincial deities the awe-inspiring figures of a single Zeus, a single Apollo, a single Poseidon, and so on" (p. 8). Dr Gilbert Murray has reached the same conclusion, and holds that the Homeric poets not only unified but purified the religious beliefs of the Hellenic race (*Rise of the Greek Epic*, pp. 134-5). But while Dr Murray lays the chief emphasis

on the positive achievement of Homeric poetry in purifying belief and doing away with the "baleful confusion between man and God," Dr Adam freely acknowledges the darker side of Homeric religion, and points out that, though there were elements of idealism in the Homeric theology which raise it above the theology of Hesiod (pp. 29, 81), yet there is hardly a trace in Homer of the feeling that the gods ought to be regarded as moral examples to man (p. 65). Thus, although he finds the leading characteristic of the Homeric faith to be the sense of dependence upon the Divine power (pp. 21 ff.)—a feeling which a great modern thinker considered the essence of religion—he yet shows how long a path had to be traversed before this feeling was transformed into an ethical monotheism.

To this end both the lyric and the tragic poets contributed. Pindar protested against the attribution of evil to the gods in words which anticipate Plato; and in his odes, as in Hesiod and the Homeric hymns, Dr Adam traces the tendency to exalt Zeus above the other Olympians (pp. 71-2, 83, 117-8). This tendency becomes clearer in Æschylus and Sophocles. Except in the *Prometheus*, which depicts a transitory phase in the Divine government of the world, the tendency of the Æschylean drama as a whole "is undoubtedly to exalt the authority of Zeus, and to make Destiny either his coadjutor or simply that which he decrees" (p. 142). The idea that any less power than Destiny could thwart the will of Zeus has been left far behind; and in Sophocles the supremacy of Zeus is no longer questioned. But Dr Adam does not on that account define the religion of either poet as monotheistic. He describes the position of both in almost identical words: "The one essential difference between the polytheism of Homer and the polytheism of Sophocles is that in Sophocles there is no longer any conflict of wills in the celestial hierarchy: the authority of Zeus is not only supreme but unquestioned" (p. 177; cf. p. 144).

But along with the development of belief regarding the gods in Greek poetry there went a widening current of human sympathy which had a genuinely religious aspect; and to this also Dr Adam's book does justice. In Homer the sanction of right and noble conduct is not the example of the gods so much as the feeling of *αἰδώς* (p. 65). Probably no lines in Homer dealing directly with the gods have sunk more deeply into the hearts of succeeding generations of men, or have more genuinely religious a ring, than those in which Hector refuses to leave the battle, though he realises to the full the fate which awaits his wife and child as well as himself if he goes forward—

οὐδέ με θυμὸς ἄνωγεν, ἐπεὶ μάθον ἔμμεναι ἐσθλὸς
αἰεὶ καὶ πρῶτοισι μετὰ Τρῳέεσσι μάχεσθαι.

Here is "morality touched with emotion"; and in course of time the moral and religious elements which in Homer were partially separated were bound to draw together. This ideal treatment of human nature

was reinforced by Hesiod's teaching of the dignity of labour (pp. 80-1), and still more by the wide sympathy of Sophocles with suffering and his perception of its purifying influence (pp. 178 ff.). It is, however, in Euripides that it reaches its full force; and Dr Adam rightly points out that it is this positive idea which underlies all the poet's destructive criticism (pp. 297, 305). In spite of Euripides' violent revolt from the Homeric theology, yet in his poetry as in that of Homer the "moral grandeur of man" stands out against the frequent baseness of the gods. Thus Dr Adam's conclusion seems well within the mark when he says, "Perhaps the poet rendered some service to religion by his new and deeper interpretation of humanity" (p. 306; cf. pp. 66-7).

These two topics by no means exhaust Dr Adam's treatment of this division of his subject. Other points on which light is thrown by his book are the doctrine of "the envy of the gods" and its moralisation by Æschylus (pp. 37, 123-5, 157), and the teaching of the poets in regard to responsibility for sin. He also gives a very full and adequate account of the development of the idea of immortality. His pages on the Homeric conception of a future life follow the familiar lines, but he brings out with especial clearness the fact that, with the exception of a few "half-heroic figures" and favourites of the gods, future happiness or woe is not affected by the good or evil done on earth (p. 60). But in Pindar the influence of Orphic ideas begins to operate, although in general he holds to the Homeric theology. In decided contrast to Æschylus, he "contemplates with more satisfaction the rewards of virtue than the punishments of vice" (pp. 128, 145). It is in this connection that Dr Adam's account of Orphism is introduced; and some readers may feel that he lays a rather disproportionate emphasis on the lower aspects of that obscure but intensely interesting movement, and that his description of Orphic "other-worldliness" needs some modification in view of Miss Harrison's conclusion, which he accepts on p. 101, that "consecration . . . is the keynote of Orphic faith," rather than immortality as a separate end. Dr Adam concludes his chapter by remarking that Orphism had to be intellectualised, and that "the intellectualisation of this belief was effected by Plato" (p. 114). But this was only one aspect of Plato's achievement. It was at least as great a thing to bring these new religious ideas into relation to the ethical and political ideals of Greece. And in both these directions, as Dr Adam subsequently points out, Plato was completing the work begun by the Pythagoreans, who sought moral emancipation not merely by ritual, but also by the pursuit of knowledge and by political action (pp. 193-7).

In his account of Pre-Socratic Philosophy Dr Adam traces from the first a monistic element which was "bound to bring it into conflict with Greek polytheism" (p. 190), and which did something to prepare the way for monotheism. In this part of the volume there is a much greater tendency to interpret early thinkers by the help of later ideas than in that which deals with the poets. In the case of Xenophanes this comes out strongly; while in discovering the beginnings of the "Logos-doctrine" in

Heraclitus and in arguing that Anaxagoras thought of *Nous* as incorporeal, Dr Adam takes a widely different view from that of Professor Burnet. The difference of attitude between the two writers is illustrated by their remarks on Anaxagoras. Professor Burnet says: "Zeller holds indeed that Anaxagoras meant to speak of something incorporeal; but he fully admits that he did not succeed in doing so, and this is historically the important point" (*Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 293). But Dr Adam holds that "the historically important point is not whether Anaxagoras called *Nous* God or not; it is rather to what extent he ascribed to *Nous* those attributes and functions which, according to the theology of later times, belong to the Deity" (p. 264). If it is objected that this method of interpretation introduces a subjective element, one might reply with Dr Adam that there is a suspicion of *petitio principii* in (e.g.) refusing to admit that so original a thinker as Heraclitus might have used the term *Logos* in a sense for which there is no other authority in his time (p. 221). In curious contrast to Dr Adam's generous treatment of the other Pre-Socratics is his abrupt dismissal of Parmenides and the Eleatic School after two pages as "of little or no importance to the student of theological ideas" (p. 244).

In his treatment of the Sophists and Socrates Dr Adam takes up a conservative position, laying greater emphasis than many recent writers on the destructive side of the Sophistic teaching and on the positive religious teaching of Socrates. He argues for the subjective and individualistic interpretation of the *Homo Mensura*, relying largely on the testimony of the *Thesetetus* (p. 274), and apparently setting aside the more favourable view of the teaching of the great sophist suggested by Plato in the *Protagoras*. But at the same time he acknowledges the influence of the Sophists, along with Euripides and in a deeper sense Socrates himself, in preparing the way for the Stoic and Christian ideal of human brotherhood (pp. 283, 325).

The closing sections of the book are perhaps the best of all. In dealing with Socrates and Plato Dr Adam was on familiar ground, and he was able to bring, even to those parts of his subject which have been most frequently discussed, a rare freshness and clearness of vision, as well as a wealth of detailed knowledge. He finds the keynote of Socrates' character in his union of rationalism and transcendentalism. "The union of prophet and rationalist is so rare in our experience, that writers on Socrates have often unduly emphasised one of the two sides of his character at the expense of the other" (p. 321). Dr Adam avoids this mistake, and shows how a recognition of both the critical and, to use his own word, the "prophetic" aspects is necessary to a true understanding of Socrates. In so doing he makes a larger use of Xenophon's evidence than most recent writers.

In his treatment of Plato Dr Adam shows the same gift of recovering evidence from sources which have often been comparatively overlooked. In his lecture on the "Cosmological Doctrine" he draws from the *Timæus*

a number of telling illustrations of the metaphysics of the *Republic*. The following lectures are entitled: "Elements of Asceticism and Mysticism," "The Theory of Education," and "The Theory of Ideas"; and each is a valuable contribution to the interpretation of an essential part of the Platonic thought. One of the most interesting, but, at the same time, debatable passages, is that in which the author argues that the Idea of the Good in the *Republic* should be interpreted in the light of the statements regarding the Divine Mind in the *Philebus* and *Sophist* (pp. 446-7). Here, again, we notice the "teleological" as opposed to the literal method of interpretation.

But perhaps the most original parts of Dr Adam's treatment of Plato are the parallels which he points out between Platonic and Christian thought. Especially suggestive are his comparisons of the Platonic and Pauline conceptions of the temporal and the eternal worlds, of the natural and the spiritual life, and of death to sin and resurrection to a new life (pp. 359 f., 381-6). And that the parallels which he here traces were present to his mind throughout is shown by his words in his opening lecture: "The particular suggestion which I desire to make is, that the religious ideas of Greek philosophy are of peculiar importance for the student of early Christian literature in general, and more especially for the student of St Paul's Epistles and the Fourth Gospel. 'Neque sine Græcis Christianæ, neque sine Christianis Græcæ litteræ recte aut intelligi aut æstimari possunt'" (p. 2). It is a great gain that by studies such as this of the religious thought of Greece, as well as by studies of Hebrew thought which show its essentially human side, we should be enabled to appreciate the points of contact of Greek and Hebrew thought as well as their points of difference. The old hard and fast antithesis of Hebraism and Hellenism, which placed them in unmediated opposition, is gradually giving place to a truer distinction which recognises these two great factors in the life and thought of the race as complementary rather than as wholly antagonistic.

Dr Adam's book is likely to hold its place for long, not only because of its learning and philosophic insight, but as a complete and worthy memorial—*consummatio totius vitæ*—of a life of constant and conspicuous devotion to the study of Greek literature and thought.

G. F. BARBOUR.

PITLOCHRY, N.B.

Essays, Philosophical and Psychological, in honor of William James, Professor in Harvard University.—By his Colleagues at Columbia University.—Longmans, Green & Co., 1908. Pp. viii+610.

It is a fitting and graceful act on the part of the Philosophical Faculty of Columbia University to do honour to a great teacher by a collection of essays dealing with the various subjects on which he has taught. "This

volume is intended," as is stated in the prefatory note, "to mark in some degree its authors' sense of Professor James's memorable services in philosophy and psychology, the vitality he has added to those studies, and the encouragement that has flowed from him to colleagues without number." The authors have rightly judged that their purpose did not demand a slavish adherence to Professor James's own doctrines. Some of them are pragmatists, some, apparently, are not; but since, in philosophy, unanimity is only found where thought has ceased, this is a state of things which not even the most ardent pragmatist need regret.

The essays deal with a great multiplicity of subjects: metaphysics, theory of knowledge, history of philosophy, ethics, and psychology. It is impossible in the space of a review to do justice to all the contributions; but there are two essays which deserve special attention, as being concerned with the advocacy of some of the most fundamental of William James's philosophical opinions. These are the essays by Professor Dewey and Professor C. A. Strong, which are both really on the nature of knowledge.

Professor Dewey's essay: "Does Reality possess Practical Character?" is the only one which definitely undertakes the defence of the pragmatic position. Professor Dewey has a great contempt for theory of knowledge, which he alludes to as "that species of confirmed intellectual lock-jaw called epistemology." Nevertheless his essay is a contribution to that subject, being an attempt to explain how knowledge can be accurate and can yet change the object known, as pragmatism avers that it must do. His position is that, although knowledge changes the object from what it was before we knew it, it may succeed in changing it into precisely what we know it to be, so that after the knowing has produced its effect on the object, it becomes accurate. Pragmatism holds, he says, that knowledge makes a difference to the object, but not to the object-*to-be-known*. A reality which is the appropriate object of knowledge may be one in which knowledge has succeeded in making the needed difference. And again: "knowing fails in its business if it makes a change in its *own* object—that is a mistake; but its own object is none the less a prior existence changed in a certain way." This view, on the face of it, is much more Kantian than, one would gather, its defenders consider it to be. There is an unknowable thing in itself, which is altered by contact with the knower in such a way as to become knowable. Where, I suppose, it chiefly differs from Kant is in the element of experiment. That is, there is an object, X , which will be changed by any belief we may entertain about it. Hence if we could believe it to be X , we should be wrong, because our belief would have made it cease to be X . Thus X itself is essentially unknowable. Suppose that if we believe it to be X_1 , it becomes Y_1 ; if we believe it to be X_2 , it becomes Y_2 , and so on. Then the problem is to find an X_n which is identical with Y_n . *A priori*, one would say there might be many such X_n 's, or there might be none. If there were many, the reality would be ambiguous for knowledge; if none, it would be unknowable.

It would be interesting to know how Professor Dewey deals with these

possibilities. Professor Dewey urges that the reason why objection is taken to the view that knowledge alters things is that the theory of knowledge is built on the assumption of a static universe. But this surely rests upon a misunderstanding. The truth about what changes does not itself change. Professor Dewey seems to hold some principle of the same type as

“Who drives fat oxen should himself be fat,”

namely, “Truths about change must themselves be changeable.” Thus such a proposition as “the date of the Conquest is 1066” must be supposed to have been true in 1066, but to be true no longer. To suppose it always true does not, on any other hypothesis, involve denial of the reality of that change which we call the Conquest. It is to be hoped that pragmatists will some day show us how it is that this confusion is not really involved in their theory of knowledge.

Professor C. A. Strong's article on “Substitutionalism” is very interesting, but far too brief for its theme. His essential thesis, he tells us, is a proposition in regard to the mechanism of cognition, namely, “that it happens by the projection of a sentient experience into the place of the object cognized, and is not a species of intuition. . . . By projection [he continues] I mean that the experience evokes actions (and thoughts, which are a sort of actions) appropriate to the object, and not to itself as an experience.” Thus in memory, for example, we have a more or less perfect reproduction of the past, which provokes us to act as if what we had to do with were not the present state, but the past object. The difficulty which naturally occurs to the reader, that on this theory there seems no reason to suppose that experience has to do with objects at all, is very candidly stated, but is not dealt with, on the plea that it is too large for a short essay. We are therefore, for the present, left to conjecture how it would be solved.

There are two interesting essays on Realism, one by Professor Fullerton, called “The New Realism,” and one by Professor Miller, called “Naïve Realism: What is It?” Professor Fullerton considers the question as to the concessions which realism must make in order to meet idealist criticisms, and concludes that idealism has not succeeded in making every kind of realism untenable. “He who declares all phenomena to be mental,” he says, “repudiates the actual knowledge of the world which both the unlearned and the learned seem to have. He repudiates a distinction which is embedded in the very structure of human experience.” It is therefore worth while to make an effort to preserve this distinction. “What right,” he asks, “has the philosopher to rub out this distinction? He has no right. The idealistic philosopher who maintains that the objective order which we are all forced to accept, and of which science attempts to give us an exact account, is an Absolute Mind, has simply recognised the external world, and has given it the wrong name.” But “the realist should frankly admit that the only external world about

which it can be profitable to talk at all is an external world revealed in *experience*"; the mistake of the idealist consists in supposing that this obliges us to identify an object with our experiences of it.

Professor Dickinson S. Miller, in his essay on Naïve Realism, endeavours to prove that "naïve realism," if this means the realism of the philosophically unsophisticated, cannot be regarded as a "theory" at all. "It is," he says, "more naïve than we thought. All there is of it is acceptable." There is no such thing, he says, as a "conscious transubjective reference." It is true that in perception we recognise an object as "external to ourselves," but this does not mean "external to our consciousness": it means "external to our bodies, primarily; and secondarily, distinct from our feelings and ideas." The essay is ingenious and careful, but it seems legitimate to doubt whether naïve realism is as little of a theory concerning objects as Professor Miller believes it to be.

There is a good essay by Professor Brown on "The Problem of Method in Mathematics and Philosophy," in which it is pointed out that mathematics, for all its apparatus of deduction, is really an inductive science, and that its method is (or should be?) also that of philosophy. There are, according to Professor Brown, three stages of science, namely, (1) the pure empirical, which merely collects facts; (2) the merely hypothetical, which proposes hypotheses to connect the facts; (3) the hypothetico-deductive, "in which the hypotheses have been sufficiently verified so that they may be taken together as premises, and new conclusions deduced which are found to be also verified." Mathematics and philosophy alone, he says, have reached the third stage. It would seem possible to maintain, as against this view of the actual stage reached by philosophy, that there is an earlier stage than any of Professor Brown's three, namely, the purely deductive, in which unverified hypotheses are used to supply what are regarded as proofs of untested conclusions. This stage, which *looks* very like the hypothetico-deductive, was, roughly, the stage in which mechanics was before Galileo, and might be regarded by the sceptic as the stage in which philosophy still is. Otherwise, it seems hard to account for the immense difference in certainty between the conclusions of philosophy and those of mathematics.

The last essay in the book, "A Pragmatic Substitute for Free Will," by Professor Thorndike, rouses hopes by its title which are hardly fulfilled by the subsequent argument. In the first place, we are told (on the authority of William James) that the only reason why free will has pragmatic value is in order to assure us that the world may grow better. Now what in fact makes most people desire free will is that they wish to think themselves meritorious and their enemies wicked. But if we let this pass, we still find that the essay does not fulfil its promise. "I shall try to prove," says Professor Thorndike, "that the behavior of human beings changes the world for the better for them, and for future human beings." The proof proceeds by means of five hypotheses as to the physiological behaviour of neurones. As a cure for pessimism, it suffers

from the defect of not disproving the accepted theory that the earth must some day become uninhabitable; and in other respects it fails to be convincing to those who are more alive to the facts of human existence than to the theories of psychophysics.

The book, as a whole, is easy and pleasant reading, and shows serious attempts to grapple with some of the most important problems of philosophy. The method of short essays has the drawback that no really difficult subject can be treated as fully as would be necessary for an adequate discussion; but, within the inevitable limitation, many of the essays will be found stimulating and highly suggestive.

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The Philosophy of Loyalty.—By Josiah Royce, Professor of the History of Philosophy in Harvard University.—New York: The Macmillan Company, 1908.—Pp. xiii + 409.

THIS book consists of eight lectures delivered before the Lowell Institute in Boston in 1907. The rather curious title was suggested by Steinmetz's book on the Philosophy of War; and it has been part of the author's task to break the "ancient and disastrous association" that makes loyalty subservient to the war-spirit. The warrior is not the only or the best representative of the spirit of rational loyalty: loyalty is of much wider significance; and the author attempts to show that "in loyalty, when loyalty is properly defined, is the fulfilment of the whole moral law." It is therefore with a philosophy of morals that we are here presented; and, although the title of the book may have been suggested by Steinmetz, a more important motive may perhaps be traced in the choice. Philosophers of Professor Royce's way of thinking have commonly expressed the moral ideal by some such conception as self-realisation, or the development or perfection of personal qualities; and this conception has often produced the impression of being only a form—though an idealist form—of egoism or individualism. The criticism does less than justice to the conception of personality as it is found either in Hegel or in T. H. Green. But it is obvious enough to affect the popular mind, and to make it worth while for an author who lays such stress as Professor Royce does on the social factor in life to avoid the suggestion from the outset, and to make it clear that morality does not lie in the self or its development as a mere individual, but in something that lifts it out of this mere individuality and unites it with the universe in which all selves are included. For this reason he seems to have chosen the conception of loyalty to describe his moral principle. For the loyal man devotes himself to a cause in which his mere individuality is lost; and he devotes himself to it willingly as finding in its success the fulfilment of his own life.

Loyalty is defined—at least preliminarily—as "the willing and practical and thoroughgoing devotion of a person to a cause." And a cause

means "something that is conceived by its loyal servant as unifying the lives of various human beings into one life." And the whole law and the prophets can be summed up in the command "be loyal." There is a good deal of value in this way of putting the matter; and Professor Royce is no doubt right in pointing to many of the unhealthy conditions of modern, especially American, life as due to lack of loyalty to any worthy cause. For this reason the author's homiletics are to be welcomed. Loyalty is at least a primary and important factor in the moral life, if it is not the whole of it. From this point of view also the diffuseness of the author's style and his habit of constant repetition of the same idea in similar or identical phrase may be explained. Popular audiences can only be convinced by repetition. And the author unites all the accomplishments of the orator with the insight of the metaphysician. But it would be too much to assert that he has been able altogether to overcome the traditional opposition between the rhetorician and the philosopher. From the latter's point of view the book might have been better if it had been shorter. The reader is apt to be carried over the difficult places of the argument by the flow of the author's eloquence rather than by the force of his logical reasoning.

The fundamental difficulty of the whole position is that loyalty to a cause is, after all, a merely formal conception. Professor Royce is thus in the same difficulty as Kant was when he attempted to deduce a moral code from a formal principle. His method of solution is indeed different from Kant's, and consists in a certain modification, perhaps deepening, of the initial conception of loyalty. But the questions which arise are much the same. How are we to distinguish the good from the bad among the causes to which men may be loyal? And what canon of preference is there for choosing between competing causes, each of which by itself might be regarded as good?

For solving these and similar questions Professor Royce makes use of that modified or deepened conception which I have referred to, and which he expresses by the phrase "loyalty to loyalty." I am not sure that this phrase is always used with exactly the same meaning. In some cases it seems to mean much the same as what is commonly described by the term conscientiousness as applied to the man who is scrupulous in always observing and following the dictates of his conscience. The example given on pp. 135-7 seems to be a case of this sort, for in it the obvious loyalty of the official to his chief was superseded by the higher loyalty which the official's conscience told him he owed to truth. But the example is too long to quote or to discuss, and the explicit meaning given to the phrase "loyalty to loyalty" is simply the promotion of loyalty in self and others. "Be loyal to loyalty" means "do what you can to produce a maximum of the devoted service of causes, a maximum of fidelity, and of selves that choose and serve fitting objects of loyalty." The word "fitting" here might seem to beg the whole question of the distinction of good from bad causes. But this can hardly be intended,

and "fitting" must be interpreted to mean simply fit to encourage or produce more loyalty. Maximum of loyalty, therefore, may be said to be the end for Professor Royce, just as maximum of pleasure is for the Hedonists. It is easy to show that the ordinary virtues of social life exhibit and encourage loyalty. In the same way the Hedonists had no difficulty in pointing out their felicitic consequences. But can we use maximum of loyalty as a criterion for distinguishing between good causes and bad? The difficulties here are similar to those in the way of the Hedonist. If the example may be pardoned, we may say that loyalty to Tammany and organisations like to it is a prominent feature in American political life. This feature is not all bad. Yet this very spirit of loyalty so directed is a more serious danger to good government than would be the total selfishnesses of all Tammany's constituent members. Now, have we any calculus of loyalties capable of assuring us that if purity in politics were to triumph by the dissolution of Tammany and its fellows, there would be compensation in kind for the loyalties destroyed, and the maximum of loyalty throughout the American continent would be increased? I am far from saying that even in this way compensation would not be granted; but I do not know how the sum is to be worked, and I should not like to stake the cause of good government on the hazard of the calculation. And the author offers no suggestion of any such calculus of loyalties. The misfortune is that, apart from such a calculus or some substitute for it, his distinction of good from evil becomes a matter simply of common sense, not recognised as such.

The lack of any criterion—of any working principle—is most plainly disclosed when Professor Royce goes on to discuss the second question which I have put—a question which he states in the form, "How shall we decide, as between two apparently conflicting loyalties, which one to follow?" Let it be granted that each loyalty contains promise of good—in his example, good to the community from trained fitness for a professional career in competition with good to a family which disaster had bereft of its head. In such a case the principle of loyalty "commands simply but imperatively that, since I must serve, and since, at this critical moment, my only service must take the form of a choice between loyalties, I shall choose, even in my ignorance, what form my service is henceforth to take." In other words, the principle of choice is—choose. Having chosen, I must of course be faithful to my cause. This is no caricature. What the principle "clearly says" is formulated with all the emphasis that italics can give in the words, "Decide, knowingly if you can, ignorantly if you must, but in any case decide, and have no fear." Nothing can better illustrate the bare formality of the principle than this statement. It is true that other ethical theories than Professor Royce's must allow that "my special choice of my personal cause is always fallible." But they usually point to some more or less definable end for their criterion: to happiness, or to well-being, or to the perfection of personal qualities—ends the way to which may be difficult or dubious, but which at least offer a

concrete ideal for action. They do not rest content with the ineffectual advice that the principle of choice is to choose.

The two last lectures of the volume enter upon the metaphysics of the subject, and in them appears the author's final definition: "Loyalty is the will to manifest, so far as is possible, the Eternal, that is, the conscious and superhuman unity of life, in the form of the acts of an individual Self." There is value in this conception. But it adds nothing to the solution of those practical questions which occupy the greater portion of the volume. On the contrary, it increases the difficulties already pointed out. For the definition is so interpreted as to include all purposive activity of whatever kind. Evil, like good, becomes a will to manifest the Eternal, a "fragmentary form of the service of the cause of universal loyalty." Whatever be the truth of this view, it should be unnecessary to repeat that we are not helped to distinguish the evil cause from the good by being told that the distinction is merely a relative one.

The metaphysics of loyalty stated by the author is at the same time a theory of truth and of reality. And here he expounds his own views in connection and contrast with those of Professor James. His criticism of his Harvard colleague is so appreciative, and his references to their points of disagreement are so intimate and personal, that the reader feels as if he were the unwilling witness of a domestic dispute in which it would be indecent for an outsider to interfere. Such interference need not be required of the present reviewer, as he has already had an opportunity of commenting on Professor Royce's metaphysical theory in the pages of this journal. That theory remains substantially the same as it was. Only it seems to me as if his attitude were modified by an approach to the pragmatic method, as if he, too, chose his philosophic road by a voluntary preference—"knowingly if you can, ignorantly if you must"—and then found reasons to justify his course. There is another way of philosophising—a strait and narrow way; and one would be glad to think that the author had not deserted it—in which logic leads instead of being made to follow, and in which no step is taken but under the direction of reason.

W. R. SORLEY.

CAMBRIDGE.

Identité et Réalité.—Par Émile Meyerson.—Paris: Félix Alcan, 1908.
Pp. vii + 431.

THE variety of theories of the constitution of matter, the rapidity with which these and other comprehensive theories follow each other, have led scientists to formulate views on the nature of scientific aims and theories which some people find rather disconcerting. If the physics of philosophers has not proved satisfactory, the philosophy of physicists seems scarcely more so. An exhaustive examination of the subject would certainly appear desirable, and the book before us is an interesting contribution in this

direction. Somewhat after the manner of Whewell, M. Meyerson tries to get at the philosophy of science by means of the historical evolution of the leading conceptions of modern science. The title of the book indicates the goal rather than the aim of our author's investigations.

The book opens with an attempt to show the futility of trying to confine science to description and the discovery of uniformities, and to restrain it from causal hypotheses, or to explain these away as mere aids to the imagination and memory. Notwithstanding the protests of Comte, Mach, and others, the history of science teems with causal explanations, and at the present as much as in the past. Causality is no mere Eldorado enticing scientists away from their proper business. The tendency to causal explanation has its roots deep in human nature, and is essential to human thought. It is the Principle of Identity applied to time; and the Principle of Identity constitutes the very basis of thought. This gives the keynote of the whole book. Scientific principles are examined, with almost a superabundance of historical detail, in order to bring to light the subtle rôle which the Principle of Identity plays in each of them. Their evolution is presented in the light of a conflict of two opposing tendencies—the tendency of Thought to find identity and unity in all things, and the tendency of Sense to accept the reality of infinite variety and incessant change. In so far as phenomena are amenable to the Principle of Identity they are intelligible or “rational”; in so far as they are not so amenable they are unintelligible or “irrational.”

In the mechanical interpretation of nature, the Principle of Identity prompts the reduction of all phenomena of change to movements of atoms which persist unchanged. The fact that there are so many views of the nature of these ultimate particles, and that they are all so readily accepted, suggests that the main feature in all these theories is *that* something persists in the flux, while *what* it is that persists is only of secondary interest. Apparently any X will do, provided it can be regarded as permanently self-identical. As guiding ideas, mechanism and atomism have been, and still are, of great service to science. But they only indicate the direction, not the goal, of science; if, *per impossibile*, they could be erected into a complete system, they would be quite unsatisfactory. The reason is explained partly in the course of an examination of the Principles of Inertia, of the Conservation of Matter, and of Energy, to which the author then turns his attention.

The communication of motion by impact, simple as it appears through familiarity, is really unintelligible; and action at a distance is as mysterious as self-movement. The Principle of Inertia cannot, therefore, be altogether *a priori*. Nor is it altogether *a posteriori*. It has something of the nature of both. The *a priori* Principle of Identity predisposes us to find something persisting; and any suggestion of experience as to what persists, at once appears plausible. Similarly with the Principle of the Conservation of Matter. Experiment can verify it only roughly. It rests, according to Maxwell, on foundations deeper than experience. Yet it is not *a priori*,

but "plausible," that is, intermediate between *a priori* and *a posteriori*, as just explained. Lastly, the Principle of the Conservation of Energy is not proved experimentally. The constant dissipation of energy renders such proof impossible; and we do not even know all the forms of energy. M. Poincaré has remarked on the tendency to reduce the Principle of the Conservation of Energy to "a kind of tautology," formulating that "there is something which remains constant." The spirit of the Principle of Identity is manifest. Descartes based the conservation of energy directly on the immutability of God. So did Joule, who argued that the power with which God had endowed matter could not be added to or diminished. Remembering that to Descartes and Joule "God" was the symbol of the general order of nature, of the essential immutability of things, these views confirm the rôle which the Principle of Identity plays in that of the Conservation of Energy, which is thus made "plausible."

One striking result of the influence of the Principle of Identity is the tendency to eliminate time. In Chemistry, for instance, it is assumed, to start with, that there are so many essentially different and unalterable elements. Strictly speaking, the sign $=$, in chemical equations, does not imply equivalence. Its legitimate meaning would be expressed more accurately by \rightarrow , because a chemical equation only represents the transition from the term on the left to that on the right side of the equation, the process being irreversible. "Le chimiste qui, dans un laboratoire, tente de refaire une opération de chimie organique un peu compliquée sait quelle ironie cache bien souvent ce signe d'égalité." Unconsciously, however, the sign $=$ does express the belief or hope that the related terms are at bottom identical. And when this process of equating is carried to its logical conclusion we arrive at the conception of a Totality which persists unchanged throughout time, and to which time is, consequently, of no account. At this stage Causality itself disappears, and we have a kind of Sphere of Parmenides, to which, in fact, the Nebular Hypothesis bears some resemblance.

Just as the Principle of Identity tends towards the elimination of Time, so the conception of the Unity of Matter tends towards the elimination of Space, which is supplanted by, or identified with, Matter. Although no experiments necessitate the abandonment of the fixity of the several chemical elements, and although it is actually easier to explain chemical phenomena by reference to a multiplicity of ultimately heterogeneous elements than by reference to one kind of element only, yet there is a decided tendency in the latter direction. The air is full of "transmutations" of elements. The unity of matter is, in fact, the secret postulate of all atomism. Matter is by degrees refined away into an ether whose properties are those of vacuum. The position that confronts us then is this: Causality explains away all "becoming" or change, by finding the persistence of the cause in the effect. The Unity of Matter explains away "being" by reducing even ultimate, immutable reality to space. The world seems emptied of its content! But reality resists this strange

culmination of Mechanism, and the Principle of Identity which prompts it. And this revolt of nature is embodied in the Principle of Carnot.

This principle voices the claims of change, of evolution in one irreversible direction. Its very form is significant. Most physical laws are in the form of an equation; they express equality, for they express the tendency towards identity. The Principle of Carnot is expressed in the form of an inequality, because it proclaims the reality of change. And this self-assertion of Change seems such a stumbling-block to scientific explanation that attempts have been made to explain it away by means of the conception of periodicity, which would bring change itself within reach of the principle of Identity. And here we may note the paradox of explanation. Phenomena changing with time, and in one irreversible direction, are explained causally, that is, as identical in time, although the flux seems more obvious and more important for us to know. By accepting the principle of Carnot, however, science comes under the direction of both principles—Identity and Change. The principle of Change controls the purely “legal” part of science, the discovery of uniformities; the principle of Identity is at the basis of all causal explanations.

Sensations are considered next. According to Mechanism these are subjective and epiphenomenal. After depriving reality of all equalities, no room is left for sensations. But then Mechanism is left in this extraordinary plight: the phenomena of change, of which it purports to be the ultimate explanation, are in the first instance our sensations; if, then, our sensations are nothing, Mechanism itself is an explanation of nothing! The fact is that sensations defy mechanical explanation. The relation between sensations and their physical stimuli is unintelligible, “irrational.” Sensations are outside the mechanical system. But even within the system there are “irrational” factors. The action of one body on another is ultimately as unintelligible as is its action on the senses. This fact received due recognition in Occasionalism. Mechanism thus involves two “irrationals,” one subjective, the other objective. In reality nothing is gained by reducing the “theological” causality of the free-will to the scientific causality of one material body acting on another.

Turning to non-mechanical theories of nature, that is, theories which posit the ultimate reality of certain qualities, without attempting to explain the “being” of these qualities, M. Meyerson shows the part played by the principle of Identity in these also, and then passes on to examine the unconscious logic of common sense. The naïve realism of common sense is prompted by the same motives which guide scientific theory. We experience sensations which do not altogether depend on our volition, and they recur in the same combinations after the lapse of an interval. Prompted by the tendency towards causal explanation, we hypostatise these sensations as qualities and things supposed to persist in time, and to stimulate these sensations of ours. The scientist, it has been said, *makes scientific facts out of brute facts*. This is true, but the scientist is only carrying further the same process whereby common sense makes its brute

facts. At bottom, brute facts, like scientific facts and theories, are only causal hypotheses.

Limits of space do not permit us to follow M. Meyerson any further. Already one may see more difficulties raised than solved. And his treatment of sensation and common sense is provoking. It would surely be far more accurate to treat sensations as the subjectification of qualities than to treat qualities as the hypostases of sensations. In any case no such process is carried out consciously. To say that this hypostasis takes place unconsciously can only mean that it is logically involved in our apprehension of reality. But is it? Is it not simpler, and no less justifiable, to assume that somehow we do apprehend reality directly, and just as it is?

However, although there are various points on which one may not agree with M. Meyerson, the book will be found none the less interesting and suggestive. Nor is M. Meyerson unprepared for differences of opinion.

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Father and Son.—London: Heinemann, 1907.

THE author of this book, a well-known literary man whose name is no secret, has imposed upon himself a most difficult and delicate task. He has told us the story of his relations as an only child to a father who was entirely devoted to his son's eternal interests. The story is a very tragic one, for by the time or before the time when the son reached manhood, father and son had drifted hopelessly apart in those matters on which the father's interest was concentrated. The plot works itself out by an inexorable fate, and neither is at all to blame. Almost the last words of the book, the very last words recorded of the father, are terrible in their intensity of pain: "If this grace were granted to you"—the grace, that is, of return to the religion of his early days—"oh! how joyfully should I bury all the past, and again have sweet and tender fellowship with my beloved son, as of old." Now, most people will feel at once that relationships of this sort, complete and enthusiastic communion in the highest things, ending in no less complete estrangement, are too sacred and intimate to be spoken of, far too sacred and intimate to be set in print and revealed to the public. This objection is strengthened by the fact that the account of the society in which the writer was bred contains many incidents, many even of the father's sayings and doings, which are ludicrous in the highest degree. Moreover, they lose nothing in the telling, for the book is pervaded with the keenest sense of humour and the narrative never fails in picturesqueness and dramatic power. Yet after all we are convinced that Dr Gosse, for we need no longer scruple to give the author his real name, has been well advised to write the book. We believe that it will hold an abiding place in literature as an honest, faithful,

powerful record of spiritual life. It was not right that such classic and typical portraiture should be withheld from the world at large. Nor are the evils of publication such as might have been feared. They have been avoided by the exquisite tact and the fine feeling of the narrator. If we laugh sometimes at the father's simplicity, we never lose our respect, we may add, our love, for him. From first to last he is exhibited in his genuine character, as a noble and high-minded gentleman, one of whom a son may well be proud. Whatever the defects of his religion may have been, he at least held it with profound sincerity and moulded into strict accordance with it the minutest details of his daily life.

The author's father and mother married late in life, some sixty years ago. He was a distinguished naturalist, though his numerous books, despite their high repute, brought him little money. She had written a volume of religious verse, which had enjoyed some slight success in its day, and has long since been forgotten. Both had joined a hyper-Calvinistic sect, calling itself the "Brethren," and known to the outer world as the "Plymouth Brethren." They had no paid ministry, but met every Sunday morning for prayer and exhortation, and for the "breaking of bread." Meetings of an evangelistic kind were held in the evening, and the elder Mr Gosse preached twice every week in a hired hall at Hackney. From the time of his birth their only child was dedicated to God. "We have given him," so the mother wrote in her diary, "to the Lord; and we trust that He will really manifest him to be His own, if he grows up; and if the Lord take him early, we will not doubt that He has taken him to Himself." She goes on to express a natural and touching hope that if their child be called away early, "we may be spared seeing him suffering in lingering illness and much pain." She adds, however, "In this as in all things His will is better than what we can choose." She herself was to die after lingering agony of cancer, a fate which she bore with heroic fortitude.

The boy was chiefly educated by his parents. All works of fiction, nay, even the improvised stories in which children delight, were rigidly prohibited. To a large extent the imagination was left uncultivated, with the natural result that their child tended to become "positive and sceptical." Most of the day the father was hard at work, earning a scanty maintenance by his books and essays on natural history. Still the father found time for much converse with his son. Indeed, the religious instruction which he gave was "incessant," and was "founded on the close inspection of the Bible, particularly of the epistles of the New Testament." It is interesting to learn that the "Epistle to the Hebrews," which the father read and expounded to his little pupil, verse by verse, were "his earliest initiation into the magic of literature." He never forgot "the extraordinary beauty of the language, the matchless cadences and images of the first chapter." Side by side with this literary attraction, there occurred a curious instance of the sceptical spirit to which we have just referred. Assured by his father that God "would signify His anger if anyone in a Christian land bowed down to wood and stone," he deliberately put this

assertion to the test by offering solemn and explicit worship to a wooden chair. He did so with a "trembling heart," but nothing happened, and he came to the conclusion that his father "was not really acquainted with the divine practice in cases of idolatry." Here we may add that the son was isolated, not only from converse with persons who were indifferent to religion, but also from almost all religious people outside of that small and fanatical community known as "the Brethren." Roman Catholics, as a matter of course, were looked upon as blind idolaters, and the Pope was that man of sin whom the Lord would shortly "destroy with the brightness of His coming." Socinians at the other pole of religious thought were, if possible, in still more helpless plight. Nay, the Church of England was but "a so-called Church," and there was scant reason to believe that many of its clergy or laity were "saved." Even Dissenters, as a rule, were dangerously lax. This last point is illustrated by an amusing incident. The Browns, a family of Baptist drapers, invited young Gosse to "tea and games." The father, dreading this allurements of secular dissipation, invited his son to lay the matter "before the Lord" in his study. After vocal prayer in which the parent called the attention of the Deity "to the snakes that lay hid in evening parties," and a pause of silent expectation, the father said: "Well, and what is the answer which the Lord vouchsafes?" "The Lord says, I may go to the Browns." "My father gazed at me in speechless horror: he was caught in his own trap: yet surely it was an error in tactics to slam the door."

Here, however, we have been anticipating. Before the incident just related, the mother had died; the little family, now in easier circumstances, had gone to a new and very pleasant home in Devonshire, and just when he was ten years old, the boy testified by receiving baptism, and was admitted to the "breaking of bread." Such young discipleship was quite unprecedented, and created immense excitement among "the Brethren." But the father, with almost incredible imprudence, declared in his son's presence and before the whole congregation that his son "was an adult in the knowledge of the Lord," and "possessed an insight into the plan of salvation which many a hoary head might envy for its fulness, its clearness, its conformity with Scripture doctrine." There was at first no small opposition—but it was borne down when two elders had testified, after separate and united conference and examination, to the precocity of the young disciple. He was the hero of the hour. "When I am admitted to fellowship, papa, shall I be allowed to call you beloved brother?" "That, my love, though strictly correct, would hardly, I fear, be thought judicious." When the immersion took place, there were indeed other candidates, but the boy attracted all the attention to himself. The blaze of lights, the pressure of hands, the ejaculations and tears with which he was led to the front row of the congregation, made the scene a dazzling one for him, and nobody will be surprised by his confession that "he was puffed up by a sense of his own holiness," "haughty with the servants," "insufferably patronising" with his companions. On one occasion at least his demeanour was

worse than "patronising," for, alas! during a service in the public room he put out his tongue in mockery, to remind the other boys that "he now broke bread as one of the Saints, and that they did not." His father himself had to suffer from the airs which his son now assumed. He married a second time, choosing as his partner an excellent and kindly lady to whom both he and his son were deeply indebted. When he announced this intention the son, by a curious reversal of the natural order, proceeded to cross-examine his father with uplifted finger. "But, papa, is she one of the Lord's children?" "Has she taken up her cross in baptism?" "Papa, don't tell me that she's a pedobaptist." He had but lately found out the meaning of that learned term, and was charmed to use it in this remarkable way. His father seems to have satisfied him on the whole, though allowance had to be made for a lady whose sad misfortune it was to have been educated in the national Church, and whose views were not yet quite as clear and scriptural as her stepson might have desired. After all, she had left the Church for the meeting, and did, after some hesitation, "see the Lord's will in the matter of baptism."

We are not told much of the process by which the son, after settling in London at the age of seventeen, cast off the shackles by which he had been bound from his earliest childhood. Apparently the change came gradually and almost imperceptibly. His old beliefs crumbled and fell without apparently any open and direct attack. It became impossible for him any longer to dismiss the beauty of art and the ennobling influences of literature as secular and profane. A God whose love was limited to a small portion of mankind, united by common theory and common discipline, was plainly no God at all. It might be urged, and with justice, that Evangelical religion, especially as it has been held within the Church of England, is not responsible for the narrow prejudices and fanaticism of the "Plymouth Brethren." Still it is true that Evangelical religion in all its forms has been too intellectual. It has insisted on the acceptance of theories with respect to the Fall, the Atonement, conversion, etc., which, whether they be true or no, are matters of intellectual apprehension, and depend on acuteness of mind rather than on spiritual experience. Religion nowadays tends more and more to revert to the Christianity of St John: "God is love." "Love is of God: and every one that loveth is born of God and knoweth God." No doubt it also is a very grave defect in the religion of the Plymouth sect, as described in this book, that it laid so little stress on the duty of promoting the moral and physical improvement of mankind. Surely, however, it is a most gross exaggeration to bring this charge against Evangelical religion as a whole, or to say that, when Bossuet insisted that we must listen "to the cry of misery around which should melt our heart," he "started a new thing in the world of theology." What of St Francis, or of St Vincent of Paul, or of St Camillus of Lellis? Was it from Bossuet that the English Evangelicals learned to do that noble work for the slave and the prisoner, for the ignorant and depraved, to which Mr Lecky has borne such eloquent and weighty witness? Even in its dreariest days the

Church, whether Roman or High Church or Evangelical, has never quite forgotten the saying of the Son of Man: "Forasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me."

W. E. ADDIS.

OXFORD.

Le Pragmatisme, Étude de ses diverses formes, anglo-américaines, françaises et italiennes et de sa valeur religieuse.—Par Marcel Hébert, Professeur à l'Université Nouvelle de Bruxelles.—Paris: Émile Nourry, 1908.

PRAGMATISM neglects or obscures a fundamental element in human consciousness, the sense of subjective and objective reality, which is at the root of all philosophies, Idealist and Realist, and which is postulated by that common-sense outlook upon the world which Pragmatism professes to include in its system. It must be admitted that the mind can only know its own sensations, and these only through its categories. In this sense it makes its own truth, but in so doing it is bound to posit an external reality to which in some sense its categories conform. Mr Schiller says we can know nothing certain about this ultimate reality, and that therefore this question may be left to Metaphysics, which Pragmatism does not profess to meddle with. From the Humanist standpoint we can only make our own truth and our own reality, and this we effect by categories which we choose because it is found in practice that they "work."

Pragmatism, however, has not left the metaphysical question alone. It has already prejudged the question by denying to external reality anything but a purely passive existence. It is a "chaos" until ordered by mind, not an activity producing certain effects which mind reacts upon and interprets. Nor does Mr Schiller thus escape the metaphysical difficulty, for if the mind is incapable of judging as to the nature of external reality, on what grounds can even such a "chaos" be posited? It is true that Mr Schiller seems to realise the unsatisfactory state in which he leaves the question. But then, if he must theorise about it at all (and it is certainly difficult to avoid doing so), why not at least choose a theory which accords better with the elementary facts of consciousness?

In the cognate question, as to the nature of truth, he is not more successful. The correspondence-theory need not go beyond phenomena, and to these it is strictly applicable. Even if it be granted that we can know nothing as to the ultimate nature of things, yet the objectivity of truth is implied in the necessary postulate that there is a certain sequence and co-existence in phenomena which is independent of the individual mind. It is true that there is no absolute standard by which the correctness of such correspondence can be judged. "Doubtless," says M. Hébert, "the thing in itself cannot be compared with the knowledge of it as the model with its portrait, but what I do not allow is that there can be no

likeness between two of our representations ; for example, between that of the cathedral at Paris, of which I have the photograph before me, and the impression of it which I shall receive when I go to visit it. Similarly, the picture, which I have formed in my mind's eye, of primitive man and the way he used the flint, either resembles or not the impression I should have received if I could have been an eye-witness of this phase of the evolution of our race. There is, then, in such a case, resemblance, if not 'adequatio.'"

Individual impressions and theories must be corrected or confirmed by the combined critical action of many minds before they can be accepted as objective and universal truth. So far the Pragmatist contention holds good that truth is made by man, but not that it is merely determined by utility. As M. Hébert says, there is this aspect of knowledge, but it is not the only aspect. Pragmatism, in limiting knowledge to this aspect, ignores a fundamental "working" postulate not only of Metaphysics but of Science, and by so doing stultifies itself. This postulate, moreover, inevitably leads us back to the question as to the ultimate nature of reality on which this assumed correspondence is based.

Critical philosophy and modern psychology have done much to reduce the extent of the *a priori* element in thought, but this element cannot be banished altogether, or ignored, as Pragmatism apparently seeks to do. Even if it has been evolved in the whole course of the development of mind from its lower forms, the explanations which Pragmatism offers of this development seem very inadequate, and, in any case, its origin does not destroy its significance. M. Hébert is wrong, however, in denying the supreme importance of Will as the fundamental directing agency of intellect and feeling, a truth admitted by St Thomas Aquinas in a quotation given by himself. Yet Pragmatism has exaggerated the principle of Voluntarism, at least as a positive principle of action. Its negative value is not even considered, and yet this is at least equally important in Science and Philosophy. It is the Will which first directs the mind to its objective, yet every critic or scientist worthy of the name knows well enough that one of the chief functions of the Will, acting with the Reason, is to control the feelings and check the desire to obtain results in accordance with theory. Now, Pragmatism, as expounded by Messrs William James and Schiller, makes such purposeful seeking for results the chief, if not the only, principle of scientific action ; whereas it needs to be strictly subordinated to the desire for truth for its own sake. Instead of recognising that the personal equation must be kept as far as possible in the background, Pragmatism elevates it into a kind of first principle of research.

In its affirmations, as M. Hébert truly observes, Pragmatism is right ; in its denials it is wrong. For, in spite of the disclaimers of its chief exponents, it tends to turn what is legitimate and even necessary as a method into an exclusive system of philosophy ; and, considered from this point of view, its claim to kinship with antiquity, with Kant, and with modern French philosophy, is, as he shows, unfounded.

In his chapter on religious Pragmatism M. Hébert falls into the common error of identifying the truths of history with those of faith. It is a theory which, in the past, has had lamentable consequences for both, and in the present has become quite unworkable.

H. C. CORRANCE.

HOVE.

The Apocalypse of St John. The Greek Text, with Introduction, Notes, and Indices.—By Henry Barclay Swete, D.D.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1906.

OF the learning, scholarship, and pains which have been lavished upon this volume there can be no doubt. Whether it also displays the qualities which are requisite for success in the Higher Criticism is a different question. The general attitude assumed by Dr Swete is that of an enthusiastic apologist. For this we can no more quarrel with him than with an advocate for making the best of his case, especially as we can well believe that Dr Swete is himself genuinely convinced of the high character of his client.

The criticism of the Apocalypse presents this singular phenomenon, that the orthodox and traditional date assigned to the book, namely, at the close of the reign of Domitian, is the later one, whereas the innovating view puts it back before the destruction of Jerusalem into the reign of Vespasian or Nero. Dr Swete is—rightly, I think—in favour of the traditional view. But the other possessed great attraction for those who were anxious to refer to the son of Zebedee everything which went under the name of John. For while it was manifestly impossible to regard both the Gospel and the Revelation as the work of the same author at the same time of life, it seemed more feasible to suppose that the Son of Thunder had fulminated his truculent Revelation at an earlier stage of his career, and had afterwards mellowed with age into the benign Apostle of Love, when his Greek also had been improved by a long residence at Ephesus. Dr Swete, indeed, warns us (p. clxxx) that “the question of the authorship of the Apocalypse must not be complicated by considerations connected with the still more vexed question of the authorship of the Fourth Gospel.” It is not easy to follow this admonition, seeing that from the earliest times the two books have been ascribed to one man. Still let us do our best to isolate the question of the authorship of the Apocalypse.

The book declares itself to be the work of one John, who nowhere claims to be an Apostle in the way that is done by Peter and by Paul. He speaks in one passage (xxi. 14) of the holy city Jerusalem, that came down from heaven, having twelve foundations, and on them the twelve names of the twelve Apostles of the Lamb. But there is no suggestion that one of those names is his own. Who then is this John who wrote

the Apocalypse? He tells the Seven Churches of Asia (xix.) that he is their "brother and partaker with" them "in the tribulation and kingdom and patience which are in Jesus"; also that he was then in the island of Patmos, "for the Word of God and the testimony of Jesus," and that, being "in the Spirit on the Lord's Day," he heard and saw the things which he wrote to the Churches. It is evident from this that the writer was, above all things, a prophet. This point is well brought out by Dr Swete (p. xvi): "Both in the prologue and in the epilogue, the work of John lays claim to a prophetic character; and in the heart of the book the writer represents himself as hearing a voice which warns him, *Thou must prophesy again*. Moreover, it is clear that he is not a solitary prophet, but a member of an order which occupies a recognised and important position in the Christian societies of Asia. His 'brother prophets' are mentioned, and they appear to form the most conspicuous circle in the local Churches." Thus the Pauline constitution of the Asiatic Churches was in abeyance, and the monarchical episcopate of the time of the Ignatian letters had not yet been introduced. Meantime, the prophets were in Jewish fashion the leaders. Just as Hermas was the prophet of the Roman Church, so John was the prophet of the Churches of Asia. This is all that we know of the author, except that he was a bigoted Jew, while, at the same time, he was a fervent follower of Christ. He is just such a leader as we might expect would arise long after all Asia had turned away from Paul.

This brings us to a point on which I venture to think that Dr Swete has gone wholly astray. He everywhere speaks as though Jews were regarded as enemies by the author of the Apocalypse (*e.g.* pp. lxx, lxxxix, xci, cxxiii). Is this likely in a book in which the world to come is constructed specially for the benefit of Jews? Now this is a point of primary importance. If Dr Swete has gone wrong here, then, however much we may respect his learning, we must beg leave to doubt his judgment. Let the reader consider the question for himself. It turns upon what we understand by "the blasphemy of them which say they are Jews, and they are not, but are a synagogue of Satan" (ii. 9; *cp.* iii. 9). Are these the words of one who is denying Jews to be Jews? Or of one who is rejecting a claim to the honourable name of "Jew" on the part of some whom he deems unworthy of it?

Let us turn now to the linguistic aspect of the problem, on which Dr Swete has bestowed much care. "The Apocalypse," he tells us (p. cxv), "contains 913 distinct words, or, excluding the names of persons and places, 871. Of these 871 words, 108 are not used elsewhere in the New Testament, and 98 are used elsewhere in the New Testament but once, or by but one other writer." Dr Swete then appends a list of 108 words in the Apocalypse which occur in no other New Testament writing. But from this list must be excluded *κέρας*, which is to be found in Luke i. 69, and to it there should be added *ἄρκος*, *ἐγχεῖν*, *ἐλεφάντινος*, *σμαράγδινος*, *σπρηγιάν*, *χάλκεος*, all of which will be found in the Index

of Greek words at the end, duly marked with the star which shows that they occur nowhere else in the New Testament. But the list of 108 words, according to Dr Swete's statement, ought not to include proper names, and it does include 5 (if, for the present purpose, we define a proper name as a word beginning with a capital), namely, Ἀβαδδὼν, Ἀπολλών, Ἄρ, Μαγεδών (the last two being entered separately in the Index), Νικολαΐτης. For these and κέρας let us substitute the 6 words supplied above, and we shall still have the 108 words other than proper names, which Dr Swete has told us we ought to have.

In discussing the question whether there is any literary affinity between the Fourth Gospel and the Apocalypse, Dr Swete states the facts with perfect candour. He points out, to begin with, that there are only 8 words, common to these two books, which occur nowhere else in the New Testament. But the only remark he makes is that "they do not supply a sufficient basis for induction," as if the inference to be drawn did not rest upon their fewness. The 8 words in question are ἀρνίον, Ἑβραϊστί, κυκλεύειν, ὄψις, πορφύρεος, σκηνοῦν, φοῖνιξ. Of these, κυκλεύειν must be excluded, if we go by the Revisers' text (John x. 24); but, on the other hand, the same text omits δέκατος in Acts xix. 9, so that that word (John i. 39; Rev. xi. 13, xxi. 20) may take the place of κυκλεύειν. Now, with this list of 8 words compare the 57 which occur in the New Testament only in the Third Gospel and Acts. Yet Dr Swete actually speaks of the evidence being divided. "If," he says (pp. cxxii, cxxiii), "we extend our examination to words which, though not exclusively used in these books, are prominent in them or in one of them, the evidence is similarly divided. On the one hand, there are not a few points in which the diction of the Apocalypse differs notably from that of the Gospel; the conjunctions ἀλλά, γάρ, οὖν, which continually meet the reader of the Gospel, are comparatively rare in the Apocalypse; ἐνώπιον, a characteristic preposition in the Apocalypse, occurs but once in the Gospel; the Evangelist invariably writes Ἱεροσόλυμα, the Apocalypticist Ἱερουσαλήμ; the one chooses ἀμνός when he is speaking of the Lamb of God, the other ἀρνίον; to the one the Eternal Son is simply ὁ λόγος, to the other the glorified Christ is ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ. The Apocalypticist uses the Synoptic and Pauline terms εὐαγγελίον, εὐαγγελίζειν, κηρύσσειν, κληρονομεῖν, μετανοεῖν, μυρτήριον, ἡ οἰκουμένη, συνκοινωνεῖν, from which the Evangelist seems to refrain; while on the other hand, as Dionysius long ago pointed out, of many of the key-words of the Gospel he shows no knowledge. On the other hand, the two books have in common a fair number of characteristic words and phrases, such as ἀληθινός, ἐξουσία, μαρτυρεῖν, νικᾶν, ὁδηγεῖν, οἶδα, σημαίνειν, τηρεῖν (λόγον, ἐντολήν), ὑπαγεῖν. It is still more significant that both attach a special meaning to certain words; both use Ἰουδαῖος of the Jew considered as hostile to Christ or the Church, and in both such words as ζωή, θάνατος, διψᾶν, πεινᾶν, νύμφη, δόξα, bear more or less exclusively a spiritual sense—a remark which applies also to several of the words mentioned above (e.g. νικᾶν, ὁδηγεῖν)."

On all questions of fact this presentation of the evidence is beyond reproach. But listen to the remarkable summing up which follows! "Thus on the question of the literary affinity of the Fourth Gospel and the Apocalypse, the vocabulary speaks with an uncertain sound, though the balance of the evidence is perhaps in favour of some such relationship between the two writings." "Some such relationship" must mean that there is a literary affinity between the two writings; whereas, if anything in literary criticism is certain, it is certain that there is not. In saying this, I mean that on grounds of literary criticism it is impossible to ascribe the Fourth Gospel and the Apocalypse to one and the same author. What Dr Swete means by "a literary affinity" it would be difficult to say precisely. But he is all the time of the same opinion which I have just expressed. "It is incredible," he says later, "that the writer of the Gospel could have written the Apocalypse without a conscious effort savouring of literary artifice" (p. clxxviii). And then he intimates that it is to him equally incredible that the writer of the Apocalypse should ever have come to write the Gospel. That the two books are not by the same author was clearly shown in the third century by Dionysius of Alexandria, and might by this time be taken for granted.

What then is Dr Swete's opinion as to the authorship of the Apocalypse? Here are his own words (p. clxxxi): "While inclining to the traditional view which holds that the author of the Apocalypse was the Apostle John, the present writer desires to keep an open mind upon the question. Fresh evidence may at any time be produced which will turn the scale in favour of the Elder." But why should the authorship be assumed to lie between the Apostle and the Elder? Were there no Johns but these two at the close of the reign of Domitian? Dr Swete himself points out that some twenty-five persons of this name are mentioned in the Greek Bible, and seventeen in Josephus.

Dr Swete has shown in a convincing way the literary unity of the Apocalypse (pp. xlii-xliv), and is perfectly justified in saying (p. xlvii) that "No theory with regard to the sources of the Apocalypse can be satisfactory which overlooks the internal evidence of its essential unity." But unity of authorship is quite compatible with inconsequence of thought, a fact which the seekers after "sources" seem to overlook. Dr Swete does his best to minimise the inconsequence, but his attempt to read "something like cosmic order and progress" into the chaos of the Apocalypse is at best an ingenious failure. He would have done better to accept the analysis of Andreas, which is just such as any reader without a theory would be likely to make. In what intelligible sense can the Measuring of the Temple and the Two Witnesses be called a "preparation" for the Seventh Trumpet?

Space and time forbid the discussion of a number of interesting points. But we cannot close without some reference to Dr Swete's general view of the Apocalypse. He regards the book as being "in some respects the crown of the New Testament canon" (p. x). He tells us also that it is

"a treasure of which the full value is even now scarcely realised" (p. cxiv). Even the obscurity of the work he regards as "not the least valuable of its characteristics, for it affords scope for the exercise of the Christian judgement" (p. cxxix). What kind of judgement is this? Evidently not a frankly human judgement. Perhaps, then, a judgement which is free, except in so far as some supposed necessities of Christianity are involved. Or is Dr Swete here speaking as in his note on p. 216, where he says:—"As Arethas points out, the wisdom which is demanded is a higher gift than ordinary intelligence." If this be so, one had better hold one's peace. For ordinary intelligence would lead one to suppose that the "solemn claim to veracity" conveyed by the assertion, "These are God's words, and they are true," did "require belief in the literal fulfilment of the details"; but Dr Swete assures us that "of course" it does not (p. 244). He holds up to our admiration the example of the great Dionysius of Alexandria, who "with the modesty of the true scholar" was "ready to attribute the difficulties presented by the Apocalypse to the limitations of his own understanding." It is seductive to think that, if one is modest in this matter, one may be pronounced a true scholar by so good a judge as Dr Swete, but it is well to remember that we might on the same principle be called upon to abase our intelligence before the Book of Mormon or Zadkiel's Almanac.

ST GEORGE STOCK.

OXFORD.

The Terms Life and Death in the Old and New Testaments, and other Papers.—By Lewis A. Muirhead, D.D.—London: Andrew Melrose, 1908.

THE opening paper, which gives its title to this volume, was originally delivered before the Oxford Society of Historical Theology. The second and third, upon "Eschatology in the Consciousness of our Lord," were delivered as lectures at Durham, the second also appearing as an article in the recent *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*. The fourth is a survey, reprinted from the *Review of Theology and Philosophy*, of "Recent Literature on Jewish Eschatology, with special reference to the consciousness of Jesus." The eschatology of the primitive Church is perplexing enough, partly owing to the scantiness of the records, and partly owing to the heterogeneous character of the Jewish tradition. But the difficulties are heightened when the consciousness of Jesus is investigated in this province; any student of this problem has become sadly accustomed to treatises which either develop bright speculative reconstructions of Christ's mind, or else fail to disentangle the ideas of Christ from the apostolic strata of the gospels. The modernisers evaporate, the verbalists petrify, the mind of Jesus on the future. Dr Muirhead has managed to avoid both extremes in his rôle of interpreter. He writes as a Christian scholar, and his Christian faith is as unobtrusive and genuine as his critical sagacity.

This book is not to be taken as a complete solution of the vital problem to which its three later sections are addressed. Its construction, for one thing, tends to suggestiveness rather than completeness of argument; the good things in it are scattered instead of being drawn together. But the patient, wise spirit which its pages breathe is a real contribution to the question, and there are bits of criticism and reflection to which one finds oneself turning back for further study.

Dr Muirhead now accepts the "small apocalypse" theory of Mark xiii. (and parallels), on which formerly he hesitated (pp. 124 f.). "We think it unnatural to suppose that a person of such holy originality as Jesus spoke, when he dealt with the future—especially with the future in which he had a unique personal interest—in the style of a *book* of apocalypse." But that Jesus used the apocalyptic style at certain seasons or in certain moods of his life, Dr Muirhead has no doubt. Jesus believed in his Messianic calling. He predicted the near downfall of the Jewish nation. But "through the telescope of Jewish particularity he was looking out upon the whole human world" (p. 70). The elusive element in all such sayings on the future is attributed in part to their aphoristic, pictorial character, in part to the fact that he was always laying a spiritual emphasis upon the religious certainty which these predictions expressed in the form of definite, temporal statements. This line of explanation is worked out tentatively but persuasively, upon the whole. We only wish that the author had taken space to apply it in detail to the gospel records. As it is, however, the mental poise of the discussion, with its combination of frankness and faith, is an admirable illustration of how an open-eyed Christian criticism of the gospels can do justice alike to the divine consciousness of Jesus and also to the limitations of his teaching in the evangelic records.

There are many happy sayings thrown out in the course of these papers. Here are three, culled at random:—"The correspondences of fulfilment to prophecy are largely contrasts, and the impressiveness of history is perhaps mainly due to these contrasts." "The hope of God's people is doubtless a new world, but the heart of the new world is new men and women." "The New Testament writings offer singularly convincing witness to the fact that the moral foundations, on which all that is best in our modern civilisation has been built, were in the first generation of Christians linked to a form of eschatological doctrine which, in one feature of it, had no relevance except to that generation." The attentive reader will find, before he reads this volume very far, that such sentences are more than the work of a phrase-maker.

The book is designed, we are told in the preface, "mainly for young theological students, yet it will, perhaps, not be found on the whole too technical for laymen who are interested in theology." One would feel more comfortable about its prospects of success, in the former quarter at least, were it less modest! The candid, unpretentious, and even naïve character of some of its pages may hide from the aforesaid student the genuine ability of the writer to instruct even the youngest of his readers. But perhaps this is the vain fear of a reviewer who is ignorant that

theological students have added humility to their other virtues during the past fifteen years. Laymen, at any rate, need not be afraid that any undue "technicalities" will trip them up in the study of the volume.

Bousset's name is misprinted on p. 129, and "fallen" (on p. 93) seems an awkward word, if it is not a misprint for "taken."

JAMES MOFFATT.

BROUGHTY FERRY, N.B.

The Book of Exodus, with Introduction and Notes.—By A. H. M'Neile, B.D.—Methuen & Co. (Westminster Commentaries.)

THE Hexateuch was lately called, to my knowledge, "a not very interesting part of the Bible." The author of this statement would probably agree with the opinion which Mr M'Neile has "heard seriously expressed," that Exodus is "one of the duller books" of the sacred library. But he would be of a singularly stubborn and unreceptive mind if, after perusing the present work, he did not see well, as far as Exodus is concerned, to withdraw his remark and change his mind unreservedly.

A good English commentary on Exodus, with up-to-date critical and archæological matter, was needed, and Mr M'Neile has given us a good one. He attacks the problems of Exodus with critical boldness, but at the same time the spirit of religious earnestness is manifest throughout. In his remarks about the "miracles" of Exodus (pp. xcvi, cx-cxii, 43-46) the writer adopts the view that they "had a basis in 'natural' facts," and that the "wonderful element" consisted in the *opportuneness* with which they occurred. But this, after all, is merely to move the difficulty a step or two further back, and one cannot but ask why "natural" events should be invested with a miraculous character at all? That the Hebrew writers chose to do so, that they loved to believe that the very elements had to render their ancestors service at God's command, that "the stars in their courses fought against Sisera," is one thing, but that *we* should accept this belief and persuade ourselves that God worked wholesale damage and loss of life in order to free His people, is quite another. The imaginative element which the writers introduced into their stories reaches its climax in the death of "all the first-born in the land of Egypt, from the first-born of Pharaoh that sat on his throne, unto the first-born of the captive that was in the dungeon; and all the first-born of cattle" (xii. 29), and Mr M'Neile admits (p. 46) that any thought of a "natural" event is here out of place. We are in the presence of miracle!

In the Introduction, which consists of one hundred and thirty-six pages, the writer treats of the analysis of the book, the laws, the geography, the historical and religious value, and other subjects, while there are several "Additional and Longer Notes" imbedded in the Text and Commentary. In our search for information Mr M'Neile does not often disappoint us, and he has given us so abundantly of his treasures

that one feels rather greedy in asking for more. But surely the phrases "of uncircumcised lips" (p. 36), and "move his tongue" (p. 61), require some explanation; and we are not told much about the "ban" (p. 135), and "the Hittites" are quite unnoticed (pp. 12, 13, 17). Attention should have been drawn, too, to the archaisms of the Revised Version, more especially as Dr Driver's *Genesis* gave such a good lead in this respect. A very short note suffices for the word "Hebrew" (p. 4), and does not contain any mention of the Habiri. The article by Spiegelberg in *O.L.Z.*, Dec. 1907, might be read in this connection, and his reference to Knudtzon consulted. The statement on p. 76, "It is impossible, therefore, to uphold both the Biblical chronology and the identity of Amraphel and Hammurabi," must be modified by a reference to King, *Studies in Eastern History*, ii. p. 22 (1907), "Our new information enables us to accept unconditionally the identification of Amraphel with Hammurabi, and at the same time it shows that the chronological system of the Priestly Writer, however artificial, was calculated from data more accurate than has hitherto been supposed." In the note on "Cherubim" (p. 160) some reference to their supposed representation on the Altar of Incense discovered by Dr Sellin at Taanach is expected. As, moreover, Josephus (*Ant.* III. vi. 5) describes them as "winged creatures," it is hardly accurate to say that "as early as Josephus all knowledge of their appearance had been lost."

The Bibliography (pp. XVII.-XX.), which, as the author remarks, "might be greatly enlarged," should have included Spiegelberg's interesting pamphlet *Der Aufenthalt Israels in Aegypten* (4. Auflage, 1904); Cheyne, *Traditions and Beliefs of Ancient Israel* (1907); Stade, *Biblische Theologie des Alten Testaments* (1905); and Dibelius, *Die Lade Jahves* (1906).

A few typographical slips have been noted. Paul Haupt (not Harper, as stated in the footnotes, pp. 89, 90) annotated the Song of Moses in the *American Journal of Semitic Languages*, and the correct title of Reichel's book (p. 163) is *Über die vorhellenischen Götterkulte*.

The volume includes a sketch of the tabernacle and a map of the country of the Exodus.

P. J. BOYER.

NORTHAMPTON.

Ecclesiae Occidentalis Monumenta Iuris Antiquissima, Canonum et Conciliorum Graecorum Interpretationes Latinae . . . edidit C. H. Turner
Tomi Secundi Pars Prior.—Oxonii: e Typographeo Clarendoniano,
1907.

OF the first volume of Mr Turner's definitive edition of the Canons of the earliest Councils in Latin two portions of the first volume have appeared, containing the Apostolic Canons and the Canons of the Council of Nicaea. The remainder of volume one is still unpublished, and it is only because the now published part of the second volume has been in type for some con-

siderable time that it has appeared before the concluding part of the first volume. It contains the Canons of the Councils of Ancyra and Neocaesarea, which are of great interest to the historian of morals. The title of the work as a whole is not sufficiently comprehensive, because it will include the Canons of Sardica, the original language of which is Latin, and it is a critical rather than a historical work. The editor justly considers that exact critical work must precede that of the historian: we may hope that he will undertake the latter office later, as no one is better fitted for it.

Of the Canons of Ancyra and Neocaesarea six Latin translations in all are presented, with a double critical apparatus, one containing real manuscript variants, the other orthographical. Mr Turner has gone to the very oldest manuscripts, one being as old as the sixth century. Their excellence is not always in proportion to their age—seventh and eighth century manuscripts are generally inferior in character to those of the fifth, sixth, and ninth centuries—and there has therefore been considerable scope for emendation. Mr Turner, well acquainted with palæographical possibilities as well as the Greek original of these versions, has proved himself always a skilful, sometimes a certain, emender. It is not, however, always possible to agree with his proposals: for example, on p. 22*b*, vii., I should read *multotiens* as the rarer word (*cf.* p. 24*b*, xiv., l. 7), probably a colloquial formation on the analogy of *aliquotiens*; again, on p. 23*b*, x. title, *destupratae* would be nearer the corrupt *distipulatae* than is the simple *stupratae*; it is true that the word is unexampled, but so are others in these translations (compare too *constupro*, *obstupro*); p. 30, ix., l. 1, the reading of the manuscripts is best explained by the supposition that the orthography *peccauitse* for *peccauisse* intervened between the original *peccauisse* and *peccauit*. The notes elucidating the language are always useful, but the Latin *Thesaurus* should sometimes have been cited instead of Neue-Wagener's *Formenlehre*; and Rönisch's references might have been supplemented occasionally from later works—for instance, on *prode non fecerit* (p. 91). The passage from Paulinus of Nola which he could not find (p. 31) is given by Georges as "epist. xi., 10." Mr Turner's own Latin is so good that we resent *inceperat* for *coeperat* (p. 53); correct also *Monaci* to *Monachii* (p. 135).

These old translations are a valuable, and I think unworked, mine of vulgar Latin, and are of the greatest importance to Latin and Romance philologists. They add to the Latin vocabulary and to the known meanings of words, and illustrate besides the history of Latin orthography, in a way which will yet prove useful to editors of texts, both classical and Christian. It is to be hoped that at the end of the work Mr Turner will provide full vocabularies to increase its value. Reference must meantime be made to the valuable excursuses on the vulgar forms "grados," "partos," and "domos," as well as to the history of the forms "digamus" and "bigamus."

ALEX. SOUTER.

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[See p. 224.]

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Baylac (J.) Le Modernisme et ses origines philosophiques.
R. prat. d'Apologét., July 1, 1908.
Journet (Albert) Le Modernisme et l'Infaillibilité. 40p.
Nourry, 1908.
[Attempts to find a *via media*.]
Author of "The Policy of the Pope."
The Abbé Loisy and Modernism.
Cont. R., Aug. 1908.
[What Loisy has done is to bring home to the mind of every Catholic, not that the title-deeds of his Church are defective or doubtful, but that they have mouldered away, and if brought into contact with the upper air will crumble and vanish as dust.]
Tyrrell (George) Mediævalism: A Reply to Cardinal Mercier. 210p.
Longmans, 1908.
[Review will follow.]
- 17 Soter. Fede e Miracolo.
Cenobium, May 1908.
[Miracle in the sense of divine intervention is absurd; but "the human brain is an inexhaustible generator of cosmic force," and is to be the source of new power.]
- 22 Crespi (A.) Il Cristo di Alfredo Loisy.
Cenobium, May 1908.
- 27 Le Bréton (Paul) La Résurrection du Christ. (Bibliothèque de Critique religieuse.) 100p.
Nourry, 1908.
[A critical examination of the evidence. Concludes that the resurrection of Christ is a fact which has never been historically proved, and never can be.]
- 33 Harbin (Robert Maxwell) Health and Happiness; or, An Analogical Study of Disease and Sin. 184p.
Griffith & Rowland Press, 1908.
- 47 Cos (G. A.) What does Modern Psychology permit us to believe in respect to Regeneration? Amer. J. Th., July 1908.
- 65 Tolstoi (L.) Lettre sur la vie future.
R. du Christianisme social, July 1908.
- 80 Barnes (W. Emery) The Lambeth Conference and the "Athanasian Creed."
19th Cent., July 1908.
- 90 Egerton (Hakluyt) Liberal Theology and the Ground of Faith: Essays towards a Conservative Re-statement of Apologetic. 248p.
Pitman, 1908.
[Two essays. The first attempts to describe and estimate the ideas which characterise Liberal Theology, and to criticise the conceptions of

uniformity which tend to predispose the modern mind against a miraculous religion. The second finds the ground of faith in the living Christian society and our experience of that society.]

Lacger (L. de) De la modernité des apologies chrétiennes au 2^e siècle.

R. prat. d'Apologét., June 1, 1908.

E ETHICS. 1-9 *Practical Theology, Christian Ethics, Transition to General Ethics*, 10 *Theories*, 20 *Applied Ethics, Sociology*, 28 *Economics*, 27 *Education*.

10 Mead (George H.) The Philosophical Basis of Ethics. Phil. R., Apr. 1908.

[Proceeds on the conception of an evolution within which the environment—that which our science has presented as a fixed datum in its physical nature—has been evolved, as well as the form which has adapted itself to that environment.]

M'Taggart (J. Ellis) The Individualism of Value. Inter. J. Eth., July 1908.

[Goodness and badness are individualistic in a way in which the existent reality which is good or bad need not be individualistic. If all existent reality forms a single unity, in which the unity is as real as the differentiations—even in that case the goodness or badness to be found in that whole would not be a unity. It would be a multiplicity of separate values. The universe as a whole is neither good nor bad.]

Lloyd (Alfred H.) The Relation of Righteousness to Brute Facts.

Inter. J. Eth., July 1908.

[The relation of righteousness to the brute facts of life should be one of faith; of the faith that realises itself in broad sympathy, in positive activity, and in deep humour.]

Fouillée (A.) La volonté de Conscience comme Base Philosophique de la Morale.

Rev. Phil., Aug. 1908.

[Author used the term *Volonté de conscience* in his recent work on the *Morale des idées-forces* as the formula of the immanent basis of his theoretical and practical philosophy. He here replies to various objections and criticisms.]

Millioud (M.) La formation de l'Idéal.

Rev. Phil., Aug. 1908.

Sharp (F. Chapman) A Study of the Influence of Custom on the Moral Judgment. (Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin, No. 236.) 144p.
Madison, 1908.

Wright (H. W.) Evolution and the Self-Realisation Theory.

Inter. J. Eth., April 1908.

[The idea of evolution incorporated in the self-realisation theory furnishes just the aid needed to prevent its degenerating into a mere prudential calculus.]

Laurys (Dr) Responsabilité ou Réactivité? Rev. Phil., June 1908.

[Contends that the principle of social reaction, analogous to that of organic reaction, should replace the metaphysical notion of free-will in the legal treatment of crime.]

Libby (Walter) Two Fictitious Ethical Types. Inter. J. Eth., July 1908.

[Compares with the vehemently antichristian ethical ideal of Nietzsche the moral ideal of "The Two Noble Kinsmen."]

Pigou (A. C.) The Ethics of Nietzsche.

Inter. J. Eth., April 1908.

[Strength and energy is for Nietzsche the primary quality of super-man. It is an essential ingredient in all real goodness. But it is not the only ingredient. It is also necessary that there be no oneness.]

- 20 *Oppenheimer (Franz)* *Moderne Geschichtsphilosophie.*
Vierteljahrssch. f. w. Phil., xxxii. 2, 1908.
 [Discusses Lamprecht, Breysig, and Brooks-Adams.]
- Muirhead (J. H.)* *The Service of the State.*
 Four Lectures on the Political Teaching of
 T. H. Green. 134p. Murray, 1908.
 [Aim of these lectures is to show more fully
 what the union of the theoretical and practical
 reason meant to Green himself, and by what
 potency in his ideas they have entered into the
 spirit of our own time, directing forces in thought
 and action.]
- Hobhouse (L. T.)* *The Law of the Three
 Stages.* Sociological R., July 1908.
 [Finds that Comte's law expresses certain
 aspects of the movement of thought. Author
 suggests, however, considerable modifications.
 The first stage is not purely theological, and the
 second can hardly retain the name metaphysical.]
- Tupper (Sir C. L.)* *Sociology and Compara-
 tive Politics.* Sociological R., Jul. 1908.
 [The scientific examination of political evolu-
 tion on the basis of ascertained facts ought to be
 one of the objects of Sociology.]
- Dickinson (G. Loves)* *Machiavellianism.*
 Albany R., Aug. 1908.
 [Every idealist, before he can get to work, must
 meet and wrestle with Machiavelli on the way.
 When he has broken the staff of that god, he
 may be fit to pass through the fire.]
- Herbert (Auberon)* *The Voluntarist
 Creed* (Herbert Spencer Lecture, 1906), and
A Plea for Voluntarism. 107p.
 Frowde, 1908.
- Kidd (Benjamin)* *Individualism and
 After.* (Herbert Spencer Lecture, 1908.)
 36p. Clarendon Press, 1908.
 [Endeavours to exhibit the leading feature of
 our times as a movement of the world under
 many forms towards a more organic conception
 of society.]
- Stanton (Rossington)* *An Essay on the
 Distribution of Livelihood.* 125p.
 Farwell, 1908.
 [This essay purports to set forward new prin-
 ciples of production and distribution, and to
 mathematically adjust population to the produc-
 tive organism.]
- Bureau (M.)* *La crise morale dans les
 sociétés contemporaines.*
 Bull. de la Soc. franç. de Phil., April 1908.
- McConnell (R. M.)* *The Ethics of State
 Interference in the Domestic Relations.*
 Inter. J. Eth., April 1908.
- Webb (Sidney)* *The Necessary Basis of
 Society.* Cont. R., June 1908.
 [The necessary basis of society is the formula-
 tion and rigid enforcement in all spheres of
 social activity of a National Minimum below
 which the individual, whether he likes it or not,
 cannot, in the interests of the well-being of the
 whole, ever be allowed to fall. The policy of
 the National Minimum translates itself into four
 main branches—(a) of wages, (b) of leisure, (c) of
 sanitation, (d) of education.]
- Macdonald (J. Ramsay)* *Socialism and
 Politics.* Fort. R., June 1908.
- Hunter (R.)* *Socialists at Work.* 374p.
 Macmillan, 1908.
 [An American work closely studying the facts of
 the Socialistic movement, with special treatment
 of Germany, Italy, France, England, and Belgium.]
- Jenks (Edward)* *Mr Mallock on Socialism.*
 Albany R., June 1908.
- Crozier (J. Beattie)* *A Challenge to
 Socialism.* IV. A Dialogue with Marx.
 Fort. R., July 1908.

- Basé (E. Belfort)* *Socialism, Real and So-
 called.* Fort. R., Aug. 1908.
- Egerton (H.)* *Socialism and an Alterna-
 tive.* Church Q. R., July 1908.
 ["Ethical Individualism" is the alternative.]
- Wells (H. G.)* *My Socialism.*
 Cont. R., Aug. 1908.
 [Defends the *Samurai* idea as sketched in the
Modern Utopia.]
- Marriott (J. A. R.)* *The "Right to
 Work."* 19th Cent., June 1908.
- Goddard (J.)* *The Church and the Social
 Question.* New Church Rev., July 1908.
 [Chiefly an exposition of two American books
 on the subject—Shaler Matthews and Rauschen-
 busch.]
- Grossman (Mrs)* *Poverty in London and
 in New Zealand: A Study in Contrasts.*
 19th Cent., July 1908.
- Hutchinson (J. G.)* *A Workman's View
 of the Remedy for Unemployment.*
 19th Cent., Aug. 1908.
- Barry (W.)* *Forecasts of To-morrow.*
 Quar. R., July 1908.
 [Discussion of works by Professor Petrie, Mr
 H. G. Wells, and W. Hentschel. All three hold
 civilisation to be in danger, and they fix on the
 same enemy—the "wholesale" leveller who calls
 himself a democrat. It is urged that the
 Christian State, which would lay on property
 duties commensurate with opulence, and on
 anarchic freedom the yoke of the Gospel, is a
 way of salvation.]
- Askwith (G. R.)* *Sweated Industries.*
 Fort R., Aug. 1908.
- Crackanthorpe (Montague)* *Eugenics as a
 Social Force.* 19th Cent., June 1908.
- Jones (Russell Lowell)* *International
 Arbitration as a Substitute for War between
 Nations.* 269p. Simpkin, Marshall, 1908.
 [Rector's Prize Essay at St Andrews, 1907.
 Professor Bosanquet writes a preface with a high
 commendation of the author's work.]
- Unwin (George)* *A Note on English
 Character.* Inter. J. Eth., July 1908.
- Anon.* *Catholic Social Work in Germany.*
 II. The "Autumn Maneuvres."
 Dub. R., July 1908.
- Iqbal (S. M.)* *Political Thought in Islam.*
 Sociological R., July 1908.
- Carlton (Frank T.)* *Is America morally
 decadent?* Inter. J. Eth., July 1908.
 [It is not proven that the American people are
 entering upon a period of moral decadence.]
- Macnicol (N.)* *The Future of India.*
 Cont. R., July 1908.
- 21 *Heath (Carl)* *The Treatment of Homicidal
 Criminals.* Inter. J. Eth., July 1908.
- 23 *Gide (C.)* *Le pouvoir de l'argent.*
 R. du Christianisme social, May 15, 1908.
- 27 *Dürr (E.)* *Einführung in die Pädagogik.*
 288p. Quelle & Meyer, 1908.
- Johnston (Sir H. H.)* *The Empire and
 Anthropology.* 19th Cent., July 1908.
- Gibon (F.)* *Les instituteurs sans foi,
 sans famille et sans patrie.*
 R. prat. d'Apologét., Aug. 1, 1908.
 [Charging the secular schools of France with
 deliberate and aggressive anti-religious, anti-
 moral, and anti-social teaching. Remarkable
 cases are cited and names of teachers given.]
- Lathbury (D. C.)* *Equality and Element-
 ary Schools.* 19th Cent., June 1908.
- A Catholic Outcast.* Free Trade in
 Education. Fort. R., June 1908.

- Grove (Lady Agnes)* The Meaning of the International Moral Education Congress. Fort. R., July 1908.
- Mackenzie (J. S.)* The Problem of Moral Instruction. Inter. J. Eth., Apr. 1908.
[Deals with the questions: (a) whether the principles of morality are sufficiently definite to admit of being taught to all children in a generally acceptable form; (b) admitting that they can be so taught, whether a sufficient number of suitable teachers can be provided.]
- Ramsay (Sir W. M.)* The Carnegie Trust and the Scottish Universities. Cont. R., June 1908.
- Platt (H. E. P.)* Oxford in the Sixties. Cont. R., June 1908.
- 28 *Karnel (Aly Bey Fahmy)* Discours Patriotique: Réponse au Rapport de Sir E. Gorst en 1907. 43p.
"L'Etendard Égyptien," 1908.
- Richet (Ch.)* La Guerre et la Paix au point de vue philosophique. Rev. Phil., Aug. 1908.
[The effort of philosophers ought to be directed to creating in the public mind the conviction that the enemy of man is not man, but ignorance of the forces of nature.]
- Cook (Waldo L.)* Wars and Labour Wars. Inter. J. Eth., April 1908.
- Roberts (W. J.)* The Racial Interpretation of History and Politics. Inter. J. Eth., July 1908.
- 29 *Russell (Hon. Bertrand)* Liberalism and Women's Suffrage. Cont. R., July 1908.
- Billington-Greig (Teresa)* The Rebellion of Woman. Cont. R., July 1908.
- Billington-Greig (T.)* The Sex-Disability and Adult Suffrage. Fort. R., Aug. 1908.
- Anon.* Women and the Franchise. Edin. R., July 1908.
[The "movement" has to be defeated; and it will greatly tend to that defeat if the majority of wives and mothers can succeed in making their wishes known and their influence felt.]
- Harrison (Ethel B.)* The Freedom of Women. 55p. Watts, 1908.
[An argument against the extension of the suffrage to women, by Mrs Frederic Harrison.]
- Spender (Harold)* The Revolt of Woman. Albany R., Aug. 1908.
[A strain of inconsistency runs through the whole of our English treatment of women, both social and economic.]
- Ward (Mrs Humphry)* The Women's Anti-Suffrage Movement. 19th Cent., Aug. 1908.
- Lovat (Lady)* Women and the Suffrage. 19th Cent., July 1908.
- 50 *A Spectator.* The Stage and the Puritan. Fort. R., June 1908.
- 98 *Snowden (Philip)* Socialism and the Drink Question. (The Socialist Lib.) 205p. Indep. Lab. Party, 1908.
[In favour of the municipalisation of the Drink Traffic.]
- Traherne (Thomas)* Centuries of Meditations. Now first printed from the Author's Manuscript. Edited by Bertram Dobell. 372p. Dobell, 1908.
[This work seems to have been intended as a manual of devotion for members of the Church of England.]
- 2 *Collyer (Robert)* Where the Light Dwelleth. Sermons. With a Memoir by C. Hargrove. 353p. P. Green, 1908.
- Fillingham (R. C.)* Sermons by a Suspended Vicar. 106p. Griffiths, 1908.
["A modest attempt to popularise Modernism."]
- Campbell (R. J.)* Thursday Mornings at the City Temple. 319p. Unwin, 1908.
- Ingram (A. F. Winnington)* The Love of the Trinity. 328p. Gardner, 1908.
[Addresses and answers to questions given at the Central London Mission.]
- Butcher (Dean)* The Sound of a Voice that is Still: A Selection of Sermons preached in Cairo. Introduction by Mrs Butcher. 216p. Dent, 1908.
- Bannister (A. T.)* Christianity and Social Problems. 60p. Hereford: Jakeman & Carver, 1908.
[Six Lenten Sermon-Lectures on Christianity in its Practical Application, Christianity and Poverty, Christianity and Commerce, Christianity and Labour, Christianity and the Child, Applied Christianity at Work. In an Introduction, the Bishop of Hereford warmly commends the book, which deserves to be widely read.]

G BIOGRAPHY. 2 English.

- 1 *Gerard (J.)* Giordano Bruno. The Month, June 1908.
[Intended to correct an undiscriminating admiration.]
- Holman (H.)* Pestalozzi: An Account of his Life and Work. 322p. Longmans, 1908.
- Witt-Guizot (F. de)* Montalembert. R. chrét., June, July, 1908.
- Dartigue (H.)* Auguste Sabatier à Strasbourg. R. chrét., June, July, 1908.
- Dartigue (H.)* Auguste Sabatier à Strasbourg (1869-73). R. chrét., Aug. 1908.
- 2 *Minchin (Harry Christopher)* Glimpses of Dr Thomas Fuller. (Born in June, 1608.) Fort. R., July 1908.
- Mackie (Alexander), ed.* James Beattie, "The Minstrel." Some Unpublished Letters. Aberdeen: "Daily Journal" Office, 1908.
- C. R. L. F.* Mr Gladstone at Oxford, 1890. 103p. Smith, Elder, 1908.
- Rait (Robert S.)* David Masson. Fort. R., Aug. 1908.
- Raikes (Elizabeth)* Dorothea Beale of Cheltenham. 432p. Constable, 1908.

F PASTORALIA. 2 Sermons.

- Cunningham (W.)* The Cure of Souls. 236p. Clay, 1908.
[Lectures on Pastoral Theology—largely historical—delivered in the Divinity School, Cambridge, Lent, 1908, and other addresses on missionary work, etc.]

H HISTORY. x Persecutions C Christian M Mediæval R Modern 2 English.

- C *Lawlor (H. J.)* The Heresy of the Phrygians. J. Th. St., July 1908.
[Their Montanism was of a different type (much less ascetic) from that of the West—which was in fact Tertullianism.]

Bethune-Baker (J. F.) The Date of the Death of Nestorius: Schenute, Zacharias, Evagrius. J. Th. St., July 1908.

Cumont (F.) Le tombeau de S. Dasius de Durostorum.

Anal. Boll., fasc. iii. and iv., tom. xxvii. [A tomb recently discovered at Ancona as the place where the translated remains of the saint rest.]

Delehaye (H.) Une version nouvelle de la Passion de S. Georges.

Anal. Boll., fasc. iii. and iv., tom. xxvii. [Contained in MS. 3789 of the Bib. Nat. of Paris. Text is given. The author concludes that it is a narrative (legendary) of the passion of St Gregory of Spoleto.]

Delehaye (H.) Les femmes stylites.

Anal. Boll., fasc. iii. and iv., tom. xxvii. [From the Life of "S. Lazare le Galésiole," the author discovers that there were communities of Stylite women.]

Goregaud (L.) Some Liturgical and Ascetic Traditions of the Celtic Church.

J. Th. St., July 1908.

[L. on Genuflexion.]

Moretus (H.) De magno legendario Bodecensi.

Anal. Boll., fasc. iii. and iv., tom. xxvii. [Index and catalogue of MSS.]

Peeters (P.) Le sanctuaire de la lapidation de S. Étienne. A propos d'une controverse.

Anal. Boll., fasc. iii. and iv., tom. xxvii. [Referring to the controversy in the *Revue de l'Orient* as to an alleged identification.]

Poncelet (A.) Une lettre de S. Jean, Evêque de Cambrai, à Hinemar de Laon.

Anal. Boll., fasc. iii. and iv., tom. xxvii. [Examined and found not authentic.]

MacCaffrey (J.) The Origin and Development of Cathedral and Collegiate Chapters in the Irish Church.

Irish Th. Q., July 1908.

[The present article deals with the organisation of the Church of St Patrick's period.]

Görres (F.) Papst Gregor I. der Grosse (590-604) und das Judentum.

Ztschr. f. wiss. Theol., Heft 4, 1908.

Robinson (Dean J. A.) Simon Langham, Abbot of Westminster.

Church Q.R., July 1908.

Souter (A.) Contributions to the Criticism of Zmaragdus's *Expositio Libri Comitis*.

J. Th. St., July 1908.

Berbig (A.) Fünfundzwanzig Briefe des Kurfürsten Johann Friedrich, des Grossmütigen, aus der Zeit von 1545 bis 1547. Ztschr. f. wiss. Theol., Heft 4, 1908.

Kawerau (G.) Fünfundzwanzig Jahre Lutherforschung, 1883-1908.

Theol. St. u. Krit., Heft 4, 1908.

[Second and concluding article.]

Harrison (Mrs Frederic) The Bastille. 19th Cent., Aug. 1908.

Maitland (F. W.) A Constitutional History of England. 573p. Clay, 1908.

[Professor Maitland delivered these lectures in 1887-1888, as Reader in English Law at Cambridge. They are edited by Mr H. A. L. Fisher.]

Benn (A. W.) Modern England: A Record of Opinion and Action from the time of the French Revolution to the present day. 535p. Watts, 1908.

[Emphasises the influence on thought and politics of rationalistic opinion.]

Green (Alice Stopford) The Making of Ireland and its Undoing, 1200-1600. 527p. Macmillan, 1908.

Swinny (S. H.) A Sociological View of the History of Ireland.

Sociological R., July 1908.

Cooper (Charles Henry) Annals of Cambridge. Vol. v., 1850-6. With Additions and Corrections to vols. i.-iv. and Index (113p.). 656p. Clay, 1908.

1 INDIVIDUAL CHURCHES AND WRITERS. C *Fathers* 2 *R.C. Church* 3 *Anglican*.

Connolly (R. H.) On Aphraates Hom. 1, § 19. J. Th. St., July 1908.

Klein (G.) Die Gebete in der Didache.

Ztschr. f. neuest. Wiss., Heft 2, 1908.

[The Giving-of-Thanks or Eucharistic prayer of the Didache is nothing else than an equivalent of Jewish rites; ix. 2 answers to the Kiddush ushering in the sabbath or feast day; ix. 3 and 4, to the Blessing of the Bread; x. 2-5, to the three Blessings which compose the "Table-Prayer."]

Chapman (Dom) On the Date of the Clementines, II.

Ztschr. f. neuest. Wiss., Heft 2, 1908.

Lupton (J. M.), ed. Q. Septimi Florentini Tertulliani de Baptismo. With Intro. and Notes. (Cambridge Patristic Texts.) 119p. Clay, 1908.

Souter (Alexander), ed. Pseudo-Augustini Questiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti cxxvii. Accedit Appendix continens alterius editionis questiones selectas. 614p.

Tempsky, 1908.

[Vol. L. of the *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*.]

Petschenig (M.), ed. Sancti Aureli Augustini Scripta contra Donatistas Pars I: Psalmus contra Partem Donati, contra Epistolam Parmeniani Libri Tres, De Baptismo Libri Septem. 410p.

Tempsky, 1908.

[Vol. LI. of *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*.]

Muzzey (D. S.) Were the Spiritual Franciscans Montanist Heretics?

Amer. J. Th., July 1908.

[No, in spite of some similarities.]

Pisani (P.) La constitution civile du Clergé. R. du Clergé franç., June 1, 1908.

[An account of the anti-Ultramontane law of 1790 and its application.]

Hitchcock (G. S.) The Last Things.

Irish Th. Q., July 1908.

[Depicts phases of thought leading a man, represented as a Unitarian, to become a Catholic.]

Keating (J.) A Study in Bigotry.

The Month, July 1908.

[As exhibited, according to the writer, in the references to Catholicism in E. F. Horton's *What I Believe*.]

Van Ortruy (F.) Manrèse et les origines de la Compagnie de Jésus.

Anal. Boll., fasc. iii. and iv., tom. xxvii. [Seeks to correct some current views.]

Anon. Fénelon at Cambrai.

Edin. R., July 1908.

Anon. Port Royal. Edin. R., July 1908. [Port Royal was an attempt—unhappily an unsuccessful attempt—to arrest the process of interior decay in religious and national life; to make out of the France of the old régime, feudal,

Catholic and monarchical, "une nation instruite, honnête, ayant souci du vrai."]

Sarolea (Charles) Cardinal Newman and his Influence on Religious Life and Thought. (The World's Epoch-Makers.) 174p.

Clark, 1908.

[Author is more concerned in this essay with the theologian and the thinker than with the man and the artist. He tries to clear up some aspects of the problem and to get at the fundamental ideas and main conclusions of Newman.]

Rule (M.) The Leonian Sacramentary: An Analytical Study. J. Th. St., July 1908.

[To be continued. The writer seeks to prove that it was first composed under Leo the Great, an amplified redaction published under Hilarus, and a third and much augmented one under Simplicius.]

Martindale (C. C.) Catholics and Athelicism in Italy. The Month, July 1908.

Smith (S. F.) Indulgences.

The Month, June and July 1908.

[Their rationale. A paper read before a Church guild.]

3 *Anon.* The Lambeth Conference and the Union of the Churches.

Church Q. R., July 1908.

[Discussion in a liberal spirit of possibilities of reunion on the basis of Lambeth Quadrilateral. To further the proposed union with the Presbyterians in Australia, it is suggested that ministers of both communions should receive, not a new ordination, but a fresh commission with laying on of hands.]

Cerisier (J. E.) Le Congrès universel de l'Eglise anglicane. Rev. chrét., Aug. 1908.

Burns (Cecil Delisle) The Pan-Anglican Congress. Albany R., July 1908.

[The papers of the Congress mark a stage in the growth of the religious consciousness. Whatever the religion of the future may be, it will certainly contain more intellectual elements than any form of religion does now.]

Welldon (Bishop) An "Imperial Conference" of the Church and its Significance. 19th Cent., June 1908.

Montgomery (Bishop H. H.) The Pan-Anglican Congress. Cont. R., Aug. 1908.

Hodges (George) The American Episcopal Church. Cont. R., July 1908.

4 *Albrecht (O.)* Neue Katechismusstudien. Theol. St. u. Krit., Heft 4, 1908.

[Dealing with "What did Luther understand by Catechism?" and "MSS. Material for the so-called Greater Catechism of Luther."]

Mulot (R.) Wilhelm Farel der Reformator der französischen Schweiz: Ein Lebensbild. Theol. St. u. Krit., Heft 4, 1908.

[Concluding article.]

Vaucher (E.) La réforme des Facultés de théologie. Rev. chrét., June 1908.

[Criticism of the method and of the proposed reforms in the training of French Protestant pastors.]

5 *Warfield (B. B.)* The Westminster Assembly and its Work.

Princeton Th. R., July 1908.

[I.e. in framing Directory, Confession, and Catechisms.]

Beveridge (W.) Makers of the Scottish Church. (Handbooks for Bible Classes and Private Students.) 212p. Clark, 1908.

[A useful little work tracing the history of the Scottish Church from Columba down to the present time.]

7 *Evans (R. C.)* Calvinism: A Treatise on the Confession of Faith of the Calvinistic Methodists in Wales. 79p. Williams, 1908.

L LITERATURE. 2 English 3 German 5 Italian 9 Classical.

2 *Collins (Churton)* The Literary Indebtedness of England to France.

Fort. R., Aug. 1908.

Guyot (Yves) The Influence of English Thought on the French Mind.

Fort. R., July 1908.

Ingram (J. H.) Verse ascribed to Shakespeare. Albany R., June 1908.

Sullivan (Sir Edward) Shakespeare and the Waterways of North Italy.

19th Cent., Aug. 1908.

Hadow (W. H.) Iago.

Albany R., July 1908.

[That Iago is driven at last into the extreme of wickedness is admitted without reserve; but the contention of the writer is that Shakespeare has made him, not a mere personification of evil, but a possible human being with human qualities.]

Paul (Herbert) The Permanence of Wordsworth. 19th Cent., June 1908.

Eagleton (A. J.) Wordsworth, Coleridge, and the Spy. 19th Cent., Aug. 1908.

Stavell (F. Melian) The Poems of Mary Coleridge. Albany R., Aug. 1908.

Thompson (the late Francis) Shelley.

Dub. R., July 1908.

[An eulogistic estimate.]

Salt (Henry S.) Thoreau in Twenty Volumes. Cont. R., June 1908.

Goddard (Harold Clarke) Studies in New England Transcendentalism. 227p.

Columbia University Press, 1908.

V *Ward (Wilfred)* Three Notable Editors: Delane, Hutton, Knowles.

Dub. R., July 1908.

W *Morley (John)* Miscellanies. Fourth series. 331p. Macmillan, 1908.

[Essays on Machiavelli, Guicciardini, A New Calendar of Great Men, J. S. Mill, Locky on Democracy, A Historical Romance, Democracy and Reaction. All have appeared before in the Times and Nineteenth Century.]

Hamon (Augustin) Un nouveau Molière: A French View of Bernard Shaw.

19th Cent., July 1908.

Salter (W. Mackintire) Mr Bernard Shaw as a Social Critic. Inter. J. Eth., July 1908.

[Art has an end beyond itself; and the object of Shaw's art in particular is to make men think, to make them uncomfortable, to convict them of sin.]

Guidi (A. F.) Rudyard Kipling. Intimo.

Cœnobium, May 1908.

[With more personal than literary detail.]

3 *Engel (B. C.)* Schiller als Denker. 188p. Weidmann, 1908.

Dowden (Edward) Goethe's West-Eastern Divan. Cont. R., July 1908.

[A delightful article upon Goethe's last important body of lyrical poetry, the "West-Eastern Divan," which even in Germany is, as a whole, much less known than it deserves to be.]

4 *Gribble (Francis)* Rousseau in Venice. Fort. R., Aug. 1908.

Wyndham (Francis M.) M. Anatole France on Joan of Arc.

Dub. R., July 1908.

5 *Ferrall (A. W.)* Dante on the Baptism of Statius. Albany R., Aug. 1908.

Austin (Alfred) Dante's Poetic Conception of Woman. Fort. R., June 1908.

- 8 *Rose (Henry)* Ibsen as a Religious Teacher. Cont. R., June 1908.
[A very appreciative treatment of "Peer Gynt" and "Brand"—the "two greatest of the dramatic poems of Ibsen."]
- 9 *Corsen (P.)* Über Begriff und Wesen des Hellenismus.
Ztschr. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 2, 1908.
Verrall (A. W.) The First Homer.
Quar. R., July 1908.
[Critiques Andrew Lang's *Homer and His Age*.]
Ashby (Thomas) The Rediscovery of Rome.
Quar. R., July 1908.
[An interesting paper on recent excavations by the Director of the British School at Rome.]

M RELIGIONS. MYTHOLOGY. 4 Hinduism. 7 Judaism. 9 Demonology. 12 Occultism.

- Best (E.)* Maori Personifications of Nature. Amer. Antiquarian, May 1908.
Amélineau (E.) La religion égyptienne d'après M. Ad. Erman.
R. de l'Hist. des Rel., Mar. 1908.
- 1 *Radaru (Hugo)* Bel, the Christ of Ancient Times. 55p. Kegan Paul, 1908.
[The "Light that lightens the world" said of himself, "Before Abraham was I was." He was and existed and was worshipped as "Son of the God of Heaven and Earth" under various names as early as 7000 B.C., when the monotheistic trinitarian religion of Babylonia was systematised.]
- 4 *Macdonald (W. A.)* The Oldest Story: Doings of our Ancestors in India 10,000 years ago. Trans. from pre-Vedic Sanskrit. 170p. Questall Press, 1908.
Segerstedt (T.) Les Asuras dans la religion védique (first article).
R. de l'Hist. des Rel., Mar. 1908.
- 5 *Anesaki (M.)* Il Buddhismo e i suoi critici. Cenobium, May 1908.
[An answer to what the author considers one-sided criticism.]
Copleston (R. S.) Buddhism Primitive and Present in Magadha and in Ceylon. 2nd ed. 301p. Longmans, 1908.
[The book has been entirely re-written. Notice has been taken of such recent discoveries as have become known to the author. Much important matter added in the form of notes.]
Davidson (T. D. Rhys) Early Buddhism. (Religions, Ancient and Modern.) 92p. Constable, 1908.
[An extremely valuable little book, giving a most interesting account of the life and teaching of the Buddha.]
Lloyd (A.) The Wheat among the Tares: Studies of Buddhism in Japan. 146p. Macmillan, 1908.
[A collection of Essays and Lectures, giving an unsystematic exposition of certain missionary problems of the Far East, with a plea for more systematic research. The author is Lecturer in the Imperial University, Tokyo, and was formerly Fellow of Peterhouse, Cambridge.]
- 7 *Franklin (Cecil A.), ed.* The Jewish Literary Annual 1906. Routledge, 1908.
[This sixth *Jewish Literary Annual* is of exceptional interest, since it contains the five successful essays in the competition instituted in June 1907 by Mr Claude G. Montefiore.]
Büchler (A.) The Blessing ברכה ירושלים in the Liturgy. Jewish Q. R., July 1908.

Cohen (H.) Some Notes on Resemblances of Hebrew and English Law.

- Jewish Q. R., July 1908.
[I.e. Pentateuchal enactments.]
Conybeare (F. C.) An Old Armenian Version of Josephus. J. Th. St., July 1908.
Levine (E.) A Genizah Fragment of Genesis Rabba. Jewish Q. R., July 1908.
[Text and notes.]
Margoliouth (G.) The Doctrine of the Ether in the Kabbalah.

Jewish Q. R., July 1908.
[A title in some respects better, as the writer says, would be the "שקל וקורש" of Moses de Leon," of which much of the text is quoted and translated.]

- Robertson (E.)* Notes on Javan, II.
Jewish Q. R., July 1908.
[Discusses Jemen and early Aegean civilisation.]
Segal (M. H.) Mišnaic Hebrew and its Relation to Biblical Hebrew and to Aramaic.
Jewish Q. R., July 1908.
[Investigates the grammatical and lexical phenomena, and concludes that M. H. is absolutely independent in grammar of Aramaic. In the main it is identical with Bibl. Heb., and the differences are popular developments of older stages of the language, by natural living process.]
Skipwith (G. H.) The Origins of the Religion of Israel. Jewish Q. R., July 1908.
[Concluding articles, collecting mythical data from wide sources and relating them to O.T. indications.]

- 12 *Mills (James Porter)* Health: Omnipresence, Omniscience, Infinite, Abstract and Concrete. 319p.

3 Cornwall Gardens, 1908.
[Sets forth "the Principle and Practice of Mental and Spiritual Healing."]

Goddard (H. G.) Mental Healing: Its Practical Side. New Church R., July 1908.
[Believes in a limited influence of mind upon mind—not at all in Christian Science. Writer appears to be a physician.]

Benson (Robert Hugh) Christian Science. Dub. R., July 1908.
[Before Christian Science can be adequately met upon its own ground, it will be necessary that we know a great deal more about the department of sub-conscious life which certainly underlies the conscious than we do at present.]

P PHILOSOPHY. 10 • Metaphysics, 21 Epistemology, 33 • Psychological Research, 40 • Psychology, 60 • Logic, 70 • Systems, 90 • Philosophers.

Dobson (G. R.) The Function of Philosophy as an Academic Discipline.

J. of Phil., Aug. 13, 1908.
[It is the specific and primary business of the philosophic department to assist the student to that unification of his mental life, to that organisation, which is the condition of growth.]

Benrubi (J.) and others. Études sur le mouvement philosophique contemporain à l'étranger.

Rev. de Méta. et de Morale, Sept. 1908.
[A series of articles on Philosophy in Germany, by Benrubi; in England, by J. S. Mackenzie; in United States, by F. Thilly; in Italy, by G. Amendola; in Scandinavia, by H. Höfding; and in South America, by F. G. Calderon.]

Ewald (Oscar) German Philosophy in 1907. Phil. R., July 1908.

- [The revival of the idealistic speculation from Kant to Hegel is still going on; the neo-romantic movement has lost little intensity. There is at present also high appreciation of, and attention accorded to, Leibniz.]
- Ewald (Oskar)* Die deutsche Philosophie im Jahre 1907. Kantstudien, xiii. 3, 1908. [The preceding article in German.]
- 2 *Palmer (William Scott)* Presence and Omnipresence. Cont. R., June 1908. [A Christian study aided by the philosophy of Bergson. The interpretation of Spirit by Spirit is a vital process; and the ways of our thought in relation to what we call substance and mechanism are not even analogous to it.]
- 10 *Aimel (Georges)* Individualisme et philosophie bergsonienne. Rev. de Phil., June 1908. [Considers the philosophy of Bergson as a thorough-going system; of individualism.]
- Boune (Borden Parker)* Personalism: Common Sense and Philosophy. 336p. Constable, 1908. [The aim of these lectures is to show that critical reflection brings us back again to the personal metaphysics which Comte rejected. Causal explanation must always be in terms of personality, or it must vanish altogether. Thus we return to the theological stage, but we do so with a difference. We now see that law and will must be united in our thought of the world. Man's earliest metaphysics re-emerges in his latest; but enlarged, enriched, and purified by the ages of thought and experience.]
- Cuche (P. J.)* Le procès de l'Absolu. Rev. de Phil., June, July 1908. [Examines various views, chiefly that of Herbert Spencer.]
- Parsons (J. D.)* Realtà et Oggettività. Conobium, May 1908.
- Trendelenburg (Adolf)* Zur Geschichte des Wortes Person. Nachgelassene Abhandlung eingeführt von Rudolf Eucken. Kantstudien, xiii. 1 and 2, 1908.
- Meyerson (Émile)* Identité et Réalité. 438p. Alcan, 1908. [See p. 210.]
- 12 *Messer (August)* Heinrich Gomperz' Weltanschauungslehre. Kantstudien, xiii. 3, 1908. [A criticism of the first volume of Gomperz's work.]
- 13 *Anon.* The Question of Life in Mars. Edin. R., July 1908. [Neither Lowell nor A. R. Wallace has succeeded in the task which he undertook.]
- Wallace (Alfred Russel)* The Present Position of Darwinism. Cont. R., Aug. 1908. [Examines the theories which are claimed to be, in whole or part, a substitute for Darwin's explanation of organic evolution by means of Natural Selection—viz. the theories of the Neo-Lamarckists, the Mutationists, and the Mendelians.]
- Atkinson (Mabel)* The Struggle for Existence in Relation to Morals and Religion. Phil. R., April 1908. [The conception of the underlying similarity of the progress of life through natural selection, and through conscious community of existence, explains and enlarges Huxley's views. It turns out that man is not a fragile reed, a delicate plant in an artificial garden, but that he embodies in himself, in a better and higher form, the same forces that urge on the cosmic process of life.]
- Vieilleton (L.)* La loi biogénétique fondamentale de Haeckel. Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., July 1908.
- Poulton (E. B.)* Essays on Evolution, 1889-1907. 527p. Clarendon Press, 1908.
- Berthelot (Rend)* Évolutionisme et Platonisme: Mélanges d'histoire de la Philosophie et d'histoire des Sciences. Alcan, 1908. [Author deals with "l'évolutionisme mécaniste" of Darwin and Spencer, with "l'évolutionisme romantique et vitaliste" of Guyau, Nietzsche, and Bergson, and aims at showing that evolutionism can also be a "philosophie idéaliste."] 14
- Russell (Leonard J.)* Space and Mathematical Reasoning. Mind, July 1908. [An able article, developing a view of space on lines suggested by Kant's work. The author criticises Mr Bertrand Russell's theory of space. If we are to hold seriously to absolute space, and if it is to be of any value to us, we must consider it as in some way interacting with the matter in it.]
- 21 *Leighton (Joseph A.)* The Final Ground of Knowledge. Phil. R., July 1908. [There can be no truth or knowledge which does not obtain in and for some minds. And, since there can be no world of existents unqualified by truth, there can be no world of existents without a world-mind. In a final analysis the objectivity of truth, the valid reference of knowledge to reality, depends on the reality of a single, systematic intelligence.]
- Boodin (John E.)* Energy and Reality. I. Is Experience Self-Supporting? II. The Definition of Energy. J. of Phil., July 2 and 16, 1908. [Experience in many ways seems to depend upon an extra-experiential constitution. The concept of energy is a dual concept involving process or stuff, on the one hand, and constancy or uniformity of processes, on the other.]
- Moore (A. W.)* Truth Value. J. of Phil., July 30, 1908. [Truth-value is the value of the entire experience of readjusting conflicting values through the process of redistribution of values effected by interaction with a wider and relatively more permanent range of relevant values.]
- Bouyssonie (A.)* De la réduction à l'unité des principes de la raison. Rev. de Phil., Aug. 1908.
- Schmitt (Eugen H.)* Kritik der Philosophie vom Standpunkt der intuitiven Erkenntnis. 515p. Eckhardt, 1908.
- Rey (Abel)* L'énergétique et le mécanisme au point de vue des conditions de la connaissance. 186p. Alcan, 1908.
- Spir (A.)* Denken und Wirklichkeit. Versuch einer Erneuerung der kritischen Philosophie. 4te Aufl. mit Titelbild nebst eine Skizze über des Autors Leben und Lehre von Helene Claparède-Spir. 577p. Barth, 1908. [This new edition is edited by the author's daughter, who writes an interesting account of her father's life and teaching.]
- 25 *Baensch (Otto)* Ueber historische Kausalität. Kantstudien, xiii., 1 and 2, 1908.
- 27 *Weber (L.)* La finalité en biologie et son fondement mécanique. Rev. Phil., July 1908. [Maintains that causation is final causation, that is to say, the causality of creative and directive ideas. The domain of life is *par excellence* the domain of finality, and biological facts can only be interpreted by means of teleological ideas.]
- 33 *Johnson (Alice)* On the Automatic Writing of Mrs Holland. Proc. S.P.R., lv., June 1908. [A careful and thorough piece of investigation.]
- Barrett (W. F.)* On the Threshold of a New World of Thought: An Examination of the Phenomena of Spiritualism. 127p. Kegan Paul, 1908.

- Bennett (Edward T.)* The Direct Phenomena of Spiritualism: Speaking, Writing, Drawing, Music, Painting. 64p.
Rider, 1908.
- 40 *Gemelli (A.)* Le fondement biologique de la Psychologie. Rev. Néo-Scol., May 1908.
Witasek (Stephan) Grundlinien der Psychologie. 400p.
Dürr, 1908.
[This little volume is of extreme interest, written, as it is, from the point of view of Meinong and the Graz psychologists. The treatment of thought, and the higher mental processes, is especially noteworthy.]
- Seashore (Carl E.)* Elementary Experiments in Psychology. 227p. Holt, 1908.
- Tawney (G. A.)* Ultimate Hypotheses in Psychology. J. of Phil., Aug. 13, 1908. [Discusses Professor Calkin's recent papers.]
- Ross (E. Alsworth)* Social Psychology: An Outline and Source Book. 388p.
Macmillan, 1908.
[A pioneer treatise in what is, as yet, an infant science. Social psychology treats of the psychic planes and currents that arise in consequence of human association. Its phenomena may be considered under the heads of Social Ascendancy and Individual Ascendancy. Author acknowledges indebtedness to Gabriel Tarde.]
- Mauss (M.)* L'Art et le Mythe d'après Wundt. Rev. Phil., July 1908.
[A critical account of Wundt's *Völkerpsychologie*.]
- Trotter (W.)* Herd Instinct and its Bearing on the Psychology of Civilised Man. Sociological R., July 1908.
- Lindsay (J.)* Psychology of the Soul. Princeton Th. R., July 1908.
- 41 *Kirkpatrick (E. A.)* The Part Played by Consciousness in Mental Operations. J. of Phil., July 30, 1908.
[The subconscious explanation is readily used and difficult to test in any reliable way. Hence it seems safer for the scientist to attempt to use the physiological explanation until more is known.]
- 43 *Hamon (A.)* Mysticism et subconscience. R. prat. d'Apologét., July 1, 1908.
[Against Delacroix (*Études d'histoire et de psychologie*), who would regard mysticism as an expression of the subconscious.]
- 47 *Beers (Clifford W.)* A Mind that Found Itself: An Autobiography. 371p.
Longmans, 1908.
[An account of the coming to itself of a mind that was deranged.]
- 48 *Sollier (P.) et Danville (G.)* Passion du jeu et manie du jeu. Rev. Phil., June 1908.
[Beside normal passion, play appears pathologically as the equivalent of certain hysterical manifestations, of constitutional morbidness, and of moral depression.]
- 49 *Rageot (G.)* Le problème expérimental du temps. Rev. Phil., July 1908.
- Turro (R.)* Psychologie de l'équilibre du corps humain. Rev. de Phil., June, July 1908.
- Dagnan-Bouveret (J.)* L'aphasie et les localisations cérébrales. Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., July 1908.
- 52 *Bailey (Thomas P.)* Organic Sensation and Organismic Feeling. J. of Phil., July 16, 1908.
- 53 *Wodehouse (Helen)* Judgment and Apprehension. Mind, July 1908.
[Supports the thesis that judgment and apprehension are identical, and examines Stout's arguments on the other side. The division between judgment and apprehension disappears so soon as we remove from judgment the shadow of a mysteriousness and complication which it really does not possess.]
- 54 *Ziehen (Th.)* Das Gedächtnis. 50p.
Hirschwald, 1908.
- 55 *Lucka (E.)* Die Phantasie. 197p.
Braumüller, 1908.
Winch (W. H.) The Function of Images. J. of Phil., June 18, 1908.
[Tries to distinguish "image" from "sensation" and from "thought." Argues that the function of "images" has been much over-estimated.]
- 59 *Wodehouse (Helen)* The Logic of Will: A Study in Analogy. 176p.
Macmillan, 1908.
[Attempts to give some elaboration to the general analogy between cognition and conation. The analogy is of considerable value psychologically, but it is of less value in speculative metaphysics and the investigation of the relation between truth and goodness.]
- 60 *Vailati (Giovanni)* On Material Representations of Deductive Processes. J. of Phil., June 4, 1908.
- 61 *Sageret (J.)* La Curiosité Scientifique. Rev. Phil., June 1908.
[All human actions arise from curiosity, interested or disinterested, and division as to scientific problems can only cease when curiosity concerning them shall cease.]
- 72 *Valensin (A.)* La théorie de l'expérience d'après Kant. Rev. de Phil., July 1908.
Stadler (August) Die Frage als Prinzip des Erkennens und die Einleitung der Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Kantstudien, xiii. 3, 1908.
[By the will the sensory impression becomes an end, through questioning or inquiry an object of knowledge, a problem.]
- Schubert-Soldern (Richard v.)* Die Grundfragen der Aesthetik unter kritischer Zugrundelegung von Kants Kritik der Urteilsth. Kantstudien, xiii. 3, 1908.
[Not a discussion of the fundamental notions of Aesthetics according to Kant, but a further working out of these ideas apart from Metaphysics.]
- Bauch (Bruno)* Kant in neuer ultramontan- und liberal-katholischer Beleuchtung. Kantstudien, xiii. 1 and 2, 1908.
- Spranger (Eduard)* W. v. Humboldt und Kant. Kantstudien, xiii. 1 and 2, 1908.
- Ewald (Oscar)* Kants kritischer Idealismus als Grundlage von Erkenntnistheorie und Ethik. 323p. Hofmann, 1908.
- 73 *Braun (O.)* Die Entwicklung des Gottesbegriffes bei Schelling. Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxxi. 2, 1908.
[An appreciative account of Schelling's doctrine at different stages of its development.]
- Kinkel (W.)* Schelling's Rede: Ueber das Verhältnis der bildenden Künste zur Natur. Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxxi. 2, 1908.
- Korwan (Anton)* Schelling und die Philosophie der Gegenwart. Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxxi. 2, 1908.
[Lays emphasis upon Schelling's *Naturphilosophie* as being in many features reproduced in modern thinking. Also Schelling's Aesthetic is still deserving of study.]
- Schmidt (Ferdinand Jakob)* Zur Wiedergeburt des Idealismus. Philosophische Studien. 243p. Dürr, 1908.
[This collection of essays is of interest as indicating in Germany a tendency of return to

Hegel. The author writes from the point of view of Hegelian idealism, and deals in a very suggestive way with present-day problems.]

Schwarz (H.) Ein markantes Buch in der neo-idealistischen Bewegung.

Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxxi. 2, 1908.

[Deals with Schmidt's *Zur Wiedergeburt des Idealismus*. Author maintains that German thought has recently been untrue to the natural course of its development, and under foreign influence has followed the unfruitful path of Empiricism.]

Münsterberg (Hugo) Philosophie der Werte. Grundzüge einer Weltanschauung. 489p. Barth, 1908.

[In this important work the author attempts to show in the light of modern thought the truth of what Fichte announced a hundred years ago, that philosophy reveals a Life which is eternal and which remains the same in all change. There is developed in the first part a theory of values, and in the second a system of values. The book is dedicated to Royce. Review will follow.]

74 *Hibben (John Grier)* The Test of Pragmatism. Phil. R., July 1908.

[1. Pragmatism is inadequate as a working hypothesis. 2. It is inadequate, because in its application we subordinate it to other considerations. 3. It is inadequate, because of the limitation of its alleged creative function.]

Devey (John) The Logical Character of Ideas. J. of Phil., July 2, 1908.

[Reply to Pratt.]

Walker (Leslie J.) Martineau and the Humanists. Mind, July 1908.

[Intellectualism exaggerates the functions of thought; Martineau and the Humanists unduly curtail them, and confuse them with the functions of sense. Martineau is as much the enemy of intellectualism in Ethics as the Humanist is its enemy in Epistemology, and the fact is due to a similar cause, partly to his Voluntarism and partly to his rejection of the objective point of view.]

Berthelot (R.) Sur le Pragmatisme de Nietzsche. Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., July 1908.

[Nietzsche did not know the name, but he was the first clearly to apprehend what is now described as "pragmatism." Author gives a detailed exposition of the pragmatism of Nietzsche, and deals with its origin (i.) in romanticism, and (ii.) in utilitarianism.]

Stettheimer (Ethie) The Will to Believe as a Basis for the Defence of Religious Faith: A Critical Study. (Archives of Philosophy.) 103p. Science Press, 1907.

[Critiques James's theory (i.) by comparing it with related doctrines for the purpose of bringing into relief its individual character, and (ii.) by examining into its coherence for the purpose of exhibiting its inherent inconsistency.]

Hébert (Marcel) Le Pragmatisme: Étude de ses diverses formes, anglo-américaines, françaises et italiennes et de sa valeur religieuse. Nourry, 1908. [See p. 218.]

77 *Salvadori (Guglielmo)* Positivism in Italy. J. of Phil., Aug. 13, 1908. [Discussion of philosophies of Ardigò and Varisco.]

Crespi (Angelo) The Principle of Causality in Italian Scientific Philosophy.

Mind, July 1908.

[An account of the philosophy of Professor Robert Ardigò, of Padua.]

80 *Burnet (J.)* Early Greek Philosophy, 2nd ed. 433p. Black, 1908.

[Largely re-written in the light of discoveries made since the publication of the first edition in 1892, "above all that of the extracts from Menon's *l'apocryphe*," which have furnished, so the author thinks, a clue to the history of Pythagoreanism.]

89 *Rousselot (Pierre)* L'Intellectualisme de Saint Thomas. 256p. Alcan, 1908.

[A very careful and thorough account of the teaching of Aquinas. Part I. deals with intellect as such; Part II. with human speculation and its value; Part III. with intelligence and human action; whilst in a concluding section intellectualism as religious philosophy is considered.]

Rousselot (Pierre) Pour l'histoire du problème de l'amour au moyen âge. (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters.) 104p.

Aschendorffsche Buchhandlung, 1908.

90 *Piat (Clodius)* De l'intuition en Théodicée. Rev. Néo-Scol., May 1908. [Largely a discussion of Malebranche's theory of the idea of infinite being.]

92 *Bloch (Léon)* La philosophie de Newton. 643p. Alcan, 1908.

Milhaud (G.) La philosophie de Newton, par M. L. Bloch.

Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., July 1908.

[A very appreciative review.]

94V *Anon.* Herbert Spencer. Edin. R., July 1908.

[Along with a wonderful excess of originality there went in Spencer a great deficiency of receptivity. The details of his character gain their chief interest from the fact that a knowledge of them greatly aids the comprehension of his works.]

Patton (G. S.) Beyond Good and Evil. Princeton Th. R., July 1908.

[A presentation of Nietzsche's teaching.]

V ART. 83 *Sacred Music.*

Müller-Freienfels (R.) Zur Theorie der ästhetischen Elementarerscheinungen, II. Vierteljahrssch. f. w. Phil. xxxii. 2, 1908. [ii. Konsonanzerscheinungen. iii. Die Elementarformen der bildenden Kunst.]

Lalo (Ch.) Les sens esthétiques, II. Rev. Phil., June 1908.

[Forms and sounds are the only things for which we have both receptive and producing organs. Accordingly, æsthetic sensations, being both active and passive, can only be given by sight and hearing.]

Sentrout (C.) La Vérité dans l'Art. III. L'œuvre d'art, expression d'une conception esthétique inspirée par le réel.

Rev. Néo-Scol., May 1908.

Bryan (J. Ingram) The Secret of Japanese Art. Albany R., June 1908.

83 *Anon.* Hymnology, Classic and Romantic. Edin. R., July 1908.

Gasquet (Abbot) and *Bishop (Edmund)*, eds. The Bosworth Psalter: An Account of a Manuscript formerly belonging to O. Turville-Petrie, Esq., now Addit., MS. 37,517 at British Museum. 189p. Bell, 1908.

[Editors think that the Psalter dates from the earlier years of St Dunstan's archbishopric, and was probably written for him.]

[NOTE.—For an explanation of the system of classification adopted in the Bibliography, readers are referred to HIBBERT JOURNAL, vol. i. p. 630 *sqq.*]

G. D. H. and J. H. W.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

SOME RECENT INVESTIGATIONS BY THE
SOCIETY FOR PSYCHICAL RESEARCH.

THE RIGHT HON. GERALD W. BALFOUR.

MUCH attention has been given during the last few years by the Society for Psychical Research to the subject of automatic writing, and especially to the phenomena now known as "cross-correspondences" exhibited by the scripts of a particular group of automatic writers. Apart from their intrinsic interest, some have seen in these phenomena the promise of a new and powerful instrument of investigation which might even make it possible to apply an effective test to the authenticity of communications purporting to come from disembodied spirits. One object of the present paper will be to inquire how far such an expectation appears to be well founded.

In the first place, what precisely is meant by a cross-correspondence?

The term has hardly yet been submitted to strict definition. Let us suppose A and B to be writers of automatic script sitting at the same hour on the same day in London and Edinburgh respectively. If, under such conditions, A's script describes correctly facts relating to the surroundings of B, of which A could have no normal knowledge, this would

certainly seem to point to some kind of telepathic *rapport* between the two automatists, but would it constitute a cross-correspondence? As employed by Mrs Verrall,¹ the term would apparently include such cases. On the other hand, Miss Johnson, in her valuable chapter² on the "Theory of Cross-Correspondences," prefers to restrict it to cases "in which independent references to the same topic occur at about the same time in the scripts of both writers." Mr Piddington, to whose labours—and very arduous labours they must have been—we owe the latest and by far the most important collection of correspondences yet published, is very sparing of discussion on the general aspects of the question, being for the most part content to refer the reader to Miss Johnson's essay.

If the wide extension implied in Mrs Verrall's application of the term is legitimate, it is not easy to see how a simple correspondence is to be distinguished from a cross-correspondence. In the natural signification of the word, a cross-correspondence between two automatic writers A and B would appear to imply a cross-reference, *i.e.* a reference of A to B and of B to A. It was probably this consideration which led Miss Johnson to restrict the term to cases "where references to the same topic occur independently in the two scripts," and refuse it to cases "where one automatist describes correctly some fact about the other." Yet even thus some difficulties remain. From one point of view, the meaning given to the word by Miss Johnson may be thought too narrow. Let us suppose a case in which the script of A correctly describes B's surroundings, while that of B correctly describes A's surroundings. There would certainly seem to be a reciprocity of reference here, yet the case would not rank as a cross-correspondence in Miss Johnson's sense,

¹ In her Report on her own Automatic Writings, *Proceedings of the S.P.R.*, vol. xx.

² *Proceedings of the S.P.R.*, vol. xxi. "On the Automatic Writing of Mrs Holland," chapter vii.

inasmuch as the two scripts could not be said to refer to the same topic. Passing by this objection, however, it may possibly be argued from another point of view that Miss Johnson's application of the term is too wide. Is it certain that every case in which references to the same topic occur independently in two scripts is necessarily a case of *reciprocal* reference? If other personal happenings in connection with A may be apprehended telepathically by B and appear in B's script without being held to constitute a cross-correspondence, why not A's automatic writing also? For that too is a personal happening in connection with A, and it is at least doubtful whether, regarded as an object of telepathic apprehension by B, it is properly distinguishable from A's other personal happenings.

In whatever way this doubt may be resolved—and perhaps no satisfactory solution is possible without a clearer insight into the nature of telepathy than we at present possess—it suggests a question of great importance in relation to the investigations with which we are here concerned. Can correspondences between the scripts (or trance-utterances) of different automatists take such a form that, *from the peculiarities of that form alone*, we are entitled to infer something beyond a simple telepathic perception by one automatist of what is consciously or subconsciously present to the mind of another?

It is to Miss Johnson that belongs the merit of having been the first to raise this question, though not exactly in the shape here given to it. When studying the proofs of Mrs Verrall's Report early in 1906, Miss Johnson was "struck by the fact that in some of the most remarkable instances [of cross-correspondences contained in the Report] the statements in the script of one writer were by no means a simple reproduction of statements in the script of the other, but seemed to represent different aspects of the same idea, one supplementing or complementing the other." Furthermore, this peculiarity appeared to be emphasised by passages in Mrs Verrall's own script, indicating that it was not accidental but deliberate. A

considerable number of such passages have been collected by Miss Johnson, and included in her chapter on the Theory of Cross-Correspondences. A few of these may be quoted here :—

27th Oct. 1902.—Mrs [Forbes] has the other words—piece together. Add hers to yours.

31st Oct. 1902.—You have not understood all—try further. She has some words incomplete to be added to and pieced and make the clue.

3rd Nov. 1902.—I will give the words between you neither alone can read, but together they will give the clue he wants.

10th Aug. 1904.—Sit regularly and wait. I want something quite different tried—you are not to guess, and you will probably not understand what you write. But keep it all, and say nothing about it yet. Then at Christmas, or perhaps before, you can compare your own words with another's, and the truth will be manifest.

That the above passages are apposite to the new type of cross-correspondences which Miss Johnson believed herself to have discovered will not be disputed. “The characteristic of these cases,” she goes on to say, “is that we do not get in the writing of one automatist anything like a mechanical verbatim reproduction of the phrases in the other; we do not even get the same idea expressed in different ways—as might well result from direct telepathy between them. What we get is a fragmentary utterance in one script, which seems to have no particular point or meaning, and another fragmentary utterance in the other, of an equally pointless character; but when we put the two together, we see that they supplement one another, and that there is apparently one coherent idea underlying both, but only partially expressed in each.”

It is evident that the type of cross-correspondence here described might be realised in very different degrees of perfection in different cases. Its possible significance may perhaps be most conveniently illustrated by an imaginary example intended to represent it at its best.

When the Shakespear-Bacon controversy was at its height and the discovery of recondite cryptograms was the order of the day, some ingenious person happened to find out that in the 46th Psalm, as printed in the Authorised Version of the Bible, the forty-sixth word from the beginning is “shake,” and the

forty-sixth word from the end is "spear." Now suppose that three automatic writers sit simultaneously in three different places, and produce script independently of each other—that is to say, without collusion and without normally acquired knowledge on the part of any of the three of what the others are writing. On comparison it is found that A's script refers to the Bible version of the 46th Psalm, B's to Shakespear, while that of C contains an injunction to count forty-six from the beginning and forty-six from the end, without specifying what it is that has to be counted.

With this imaginary example before us, let us return to the question which we left unanswered a while since: Is it possible for a cross-correspondence to take such a form as to entitle us, from the mere peculiarities of that form, to infer something beyond a simple telepathic perception by one automatist of what is consciously or subconsciously present to the mind of another? A brief consideration of our imaginary case shows, I think, that this question must be answered in the affirmative. Even if one or all of the automatists knew of the cryptogram, the fact that the three scripts so dove-tailed into each other that their real significance became apparent only on comparison would be insufficiently accounted for by a mere quasi-passive psychical *rapport* between the writers. It would be at once felt that we had here evidence of the active intervention of purpose and design. If many such cases occurred, the evidence for purposive action would be irresistible. Understanding, then, by "simple telepathy" a telepathic community of mental content into which the element of deliberate intention and design does not enter, it will be admitted, I think, that the peculiar type of cross-correspondence we are now considering is capable of carrying us beyond simple telepathy.

But how far will it carry us? Let me quote Miss Johnson once more. "It occurred to me then," she writes, "that by this method [*i.e.* by means of cross-correspondences in which one script provides a complement to the other], if by any, it might be possible to obtain evidence more [conclusive than any

obtained hitherto of the action of a third intelligence external to the minds of both automatists. If we simply find the same idea expressed—even though in different forms—by both of them, it may, as I have just said, most easily be explained by telepathy between them; but it is much more difficult to suppose that the telepathic perception of *one* fragment could lead to the production of *another* fragment which can only after careful comparison be seen to be related to the first.”

Similarly, Mr Piddington, after remarking that the simple type of coincidence which consists in the production of the same word or phrase through two automatists is easy enough to explain as the result of telepathic interchange between them, but that “this theory seemed inadequate to cover some of the more complex forms of cross-correspondence inherent in Mrs Verrall’s and Mrs Holland’s scripts, which appeared to point to the action of some third mind,” adds that as he and his co-workers reflected on the problem they “came to realise how cross-correspondences might be so elaborated as to afford almost conclusive proof of the intervention of a third mind, and strong evidence of the identity of this third mind.”

These are high hopes; but if they are to prove well grounded, it is clear, I think, that they must be based on something besides the merely formal or structural peculiarities of a special type of cross-correspondence. Those peculiarities may indeed justify us in inferring intelligent action directed to the attainment of an end; but there remains the possibility that the intelligent action has its source within one of the automatists themselves. And to determine this question—if indeed it can be determined—we must take account not merely of the form of the cross-correspondence, but also every other circumstance that can throw light upon it.

The term “cross-correspondence” has probably become too deeply engrained in the technical language of *Psychical Research* to be easily got rid of; otherwise it might be better to discard it, and divide correspondences between automatic scripts into two classes, which I should propose to call *simple*

and *complementary* correspondences respectively. No doubt the two classes pass by insensible gradations into each other: also, it must be admitted that any correspondence, to which ever class assigned, *may* be the result of purposive activity. But, speaking generally, in simple correspondences the form gives no indication of purpose; in complementary correspondences there is ground for suspecting purpose, though the ground may be far from amounting to a proof; a repetition of extreme cases of "dove-tailing," as exhibited in our imaginary example, would convert suspicion into practical certainty.

The voluminous automatic script of Mrs Verrall, Miss Verrall, Mrs Holland, Mrs Forbes, Mrs Piper, and others, from 1901 onwards, published by the Society for Psychical Research, contains a very considerable number of correspondences both of the simple and of the complementary type. These deserve the most careful study by all who are interested in the subject. In particular, the paper by Mr J. G. Piddington, entitled "A Series of Concordant Automatisms," which fills the best part of a bulky number of the Society's *Proceedings* issued in October last, forms in some respects the most important contribution to Psychical Research that has been made within recent years.

In saying this I am far from wishing to disparage the value of the earlier Reports which we owe to Mrs Verrall and Miss Johnson. But the correspondences to be found in those reports cannot compare either in number or in complexity with the later series. Perhaps this was to be expected, whatever explanation we incline to give of the results obtained. By the time the later series began, the importance of cross-correspondences and the evidential possibilities which they seemed to hold out had been fully realised by members of the Society, largely owing to the labours of Mrs Verrall and Miss Johnson themselves. The conduct of a series of cross-correspondence experiments was, indeed, one main reason why the Society invited Mrs Piper to come over. This was of course known to those who had the management of Mrs Piper's

sittings (described by Mr Piddington as the "experimenters in charge"), and to Mrs Verrall, who frequently sat to obtain automatic writing at hours adjusted to those of Mrs Piper's trance. It was also known to Miss Verrall, and, during the latter half of the period over which the sittings extended, to Mrs Holland as well. Though withheld from Mrs Piper in her normal state, it was freely mentioned in her presence when in the trance condition. Her trance-personalities were constantly encouraged to produce cross-correspondences through the various automatists, and a message was conveyed to them (veiled, it is true, in Latin, a language not understood by Mrs Piper) laying special stress on the importance of correspondences of the complementary type.

In these conditions 71 sittings, extending from 15th November 1906 to 2nd June 1907, in the course of which some 120 "experiments" were tried, resulted in a number of more or less successful cases of cross-correspondence sufficient to occupy several hundred pages of print and as many as twenty-three subject-headings in Mr Piddington's Report.

The Platonic Socrates remarks somewhere concerning the writings of Heraclitus the Obscure, that it needed a stout swimmer to win through them. It is to be feared that many, even of those who have had the courage to take the first plunge, will feel something of the same kind about Mr Piddington's paper. But the author himself is hardly to blame for this. It is inherent in the material with which he has to work. The tedious and bewildering incoherence of the automatic writings, the curiously intricate and allusive character of many of the cross-correspondences, which often require real ingenuity and some literary knowledge to detect and unravel, the number of sittings over which a single experiment may extend, and the number of different scripts which have to be compared at every turn—these and other difficulties make brevity and lucidity practically impossible. It may be added that they are difficulties for a reviewer as well as for the author. How is he to deal with such a mass of material,

the evidential value of which can only be estimated by careful attention to minute detail? The task might well seem almost a hopeless one within the limits of a magazine article; and yet I feel that an attempt must be made to describe a few at least of the incidents recorded with such fulness in Mr Piddington's Report, if only to enable the reader unacquainted with the original to form, by the help of actual examples, some more concrete idea of the phenomena obtained.

It should be clearly understood, however, that these examples can only serve as illustrations, and that even as illustrations they are not to be regarded as samples from which the character and quality of the entire series can fairly be judged.

The six weeks from the middle of March to the end of April were peculiarly prolific of triple correspondences between the scripts of Mrs Piper, Mrs Verrall, and Mrs Holland; Mrs Holland writing throughout the period in India, Mrs Piper in London, and Mrs Verrall either in Cambridge or at Matlock Bath.

Two of these cases are described in the report under the headings "Cup" and "Thanatos." They are both of them interesting and instructive examples, though in the former the part played by Mrs Holland might fairly be set down to chance coincidence; but I pass them over in order to select for more detailed treatment three other cases which, taken together, afford perhaps the best specimen of complementary correspondence to be found in the whole volume. I propose to consider them separately in the first instance, and afterwards in relation to each other.

1. It is worthy of remark that Mrs Piper's share in this series of triple correspondences is a comparatively subordinate one. In the case I shall give first it is confined to the words "Light in West" uttered during the "waking stage"¹ on the 8th of April. The piecemeal ejaculations which invariably

¹ Mrs Piper passes into a deep self-induced trance before she begins to write. The "waking stage," or process of "coming to," lasts several minutes.

proceed from Mrs Piper during the "waking stage" are often quite as significant as the script itself. They frequently serve to indicate particular words or phrases as subjects of a cross-correspondence; and it is probable that such an indication was meant to be given in the present instance.

Be that as it may, Mrs Holland's script, written a few hours earlier on the same day in India, contained the following passage:—

The Constellation of Orion.

The tall spire shows above the mellow redness of the wall. Do you remember that exquisite sky when the afterglow made the East as beautiful and as richly coloured as the West—Martha became as Mary, and Leah as Rachel.

Also on the same day, but a few hours later, at Cambridge, Mrs Verrall wrote:—

The words were from *Maud*, but you did not understand.

"Rosy is the East," and so on.

You will find that you have written a message for Mr Piddington which you did not understand but he did. Tell him that.

The words "You will find that you have written a message," etc., almost certainly indicate that a cross-correspondence is to be looked for. That a cross-correspondence does exist is evident; and that it is closer than might appear at first glance a brief consideration will show.

The words "Rosy is the East" in Mrs Verrall's script are a misquotation from Tennyson's *Maud*, and were at once seen to be so by Mrs Verrall herself. They should be "Rosy is the West." The substitution of *East* for *West* may be a mere error, but it may also be deliberate; and there is at least one other instance in Mrs Verrall's script of a misquotation which would be fully explained by supposing it to be employed for the express purpose of emphasising the word that has replaced the correct one. On this interpretation, Mrs Verrall's *Rosy is the East* will stand in marked contrast with Mrs Piper's *Light in West*.

Next, let us turn to Mrs Holland's script: "Do you remember that exquisite sky when the afterglow made the East as beautiful and as richly coloured as the West—Martha

became as Mary, and Leah as Rachel." Here the contrast is transcended. East and West become as one. The two opposites are united and identified, even as though Dante's types of the Active and the Contemplative life had passed one into the other—Martha had become as Mary, Leah as Rachel.¹

Two further points remain to be noticed. First, Mr Piddington has given some plausible reasons for thinking that the mention in Mrs Holland's script of "the Constellation of Orion" is a reference to *Maud*. If this surmise is right, it provides another point of connection between Mrs Holland's script of the 8th of April and Mrs Verrall's of the same date. Secondly, the unification of East and West, explicit in Mrs Holland's script, is suggested in Mrs Verrall's also. For immediately preceding the line out of *Maud* misquoted in Mrs Verrall's script comes this verse :

Blush from West to East,
Blush from East to West ;
Till the West is East,
Blush it thro' the West.

These various coincidences, and especially the way in which the different scripts fit into each other, seem to rank this case as a good example of a complementary correspondence, even when taken by itself.

2. The next case, inferior to the preceding in respect of simultaneity in the production of the concordant scripts, is in other ways not less remarkable. It begins with two scripts written by Mrs Verrall : the second and most important of the two on the 25th of March, the earlier on the 4th of the same month. For reasons which will appear later, it is desirable to quote both of these scripts in full, or nearly so.

Mrs Verrall's Script of 4th March.

μαινόμενος ὁ Ἡρακλῆς.

Hercules Furens. Tell your husband from me, there is a passage in the Heracles not understood, about the pillar and the tying to it. An old story lies behind that but it means something in Euripides that

¹ See Dante, *Convito*, iv. 17 ; *Purgatorio*, xxvii. 97-108.

A W V [*i.e.* Dr A. W. Verrall] has not yet seen. Tell him to look at it again—it is the passage about the pillar and the thong—the pillar at the foot of wh. lay the dead children. Tell your husband to read that again—not to mind the mythology but to see another point wh. will please him.

I have long wanted to say this but the words were never there—now all the words are there and I think I have made the meaning clear ask elsewhere for the **BOUND HERCULES**.

Ἡρακλῆς λυόμενος is the sequel.

Binding and loosing δεσμοῖσι λυοῖσι

not adamantine fetters but fetters that link and loose. Something about snapping his bonds in sunder. Tell AWV he will understand.

Mrs Verrall's Script of 25th March.

Claviger the bearer of the Key and Club
clavem gerens trans Pontem



trans Hellespontem et insuper mare

ad urbem antea Byzantineam postea de ipsius nomine nominatam.

The Club and Key—East and West. look for the Eastern sign of the Club ex pede Herculem.

The Hercules story comes in there and the clue is in the Euripides play if you could only see it.

Bound to the pillar—I told you before of Sebastian, it is the same story of the archer and the binding to the pillar.

I want a special message to get to you. I have tried several times, but you have not understood. I dont know where it went wrong. But let Piddington know when you get a message about shadow,—remember the Virgilian line indignantis [*sic*] sub umbras. To you they are shadows—like the shadows in Plato's cave but they are shadows of the real.

quae cum vides bene comprehendere possis quae tibi nunc fusco colore obdita paene obscurata videntur, et tamen in somniis aliquando UMBRARUM volitantia corpora percipis—immo pro corporibus animas dicere melius—quae tibi per somnum mentem immortalia tangunt

The shadow of a shade.

That is better umbrarum umbras. σκιᾶς εἶδωλον was what I wanted to get written. Good-bye.

A partial explanation of these curious rigmaroles will be offered presently. For the moment, attention should be concentrated on two points about which there can be no mistake: (1) the mention of Euripides; (2) the association of Euripides with one of his plays, the *Hercules Furens*. It is these which form Mrs Verrall's contribution to the cross-correspondence we are now engaged upon; and here again the words "ask elsewhere for the Bound Hercules" seem to indicate that a cross-correspondence was to be expected.

Mrs Piper's contribution was not made until the 8th of April. On that day, when Myers_P¹ was in the midst of an enumeration of words corresponding, as he claimed, to messages which he had given or was trying to give to Mrs Verrall, the following conversation took place with Mrs Sidgwick, who was in charge of the sitting:—

Myers_P. Do you remember Euripides?

Mrs S. What is that? "Euripides"?

Myers_P. I meant to say Harold.

Mrs S. "Harold"?

Myers_P. Yes, well.

Mrs S. To whom did you say "Harold"?

Myers_P. To Mrs V.

There is some doubt as to what is intended by "Euripides . . . I meant to say Harold." The last words may mean that "Euripides" had been written in error for "Harold." But the error would be a strange one; and it seems to me at least equally probable that what Myers_P intended to say was that in addition to "Euripides" he had tried to give Mrs Verrall "Harold"

¹ The formula Myers_P requires explanation. Most automatic writing takes the form of a communication *ab extra*; but the scripts of the automatists who took part in the experiments described by Mr Piddington have the further peculiarity that they purport to be inspired by an identical group of spirit personalities. The protagonist among these claims to be F. W. H. Myers. Mr Piddington uses the symbols Myers_P, Myers_V, and Myers_H to designate the Myers's influence as it is manifested in the script of Mrs Piper, Mrs Verrall, and Mrs Holland respectively. It is made quite clear, however, that this usage is only for convenience of description, and is not intended in any way to prejudge the answer that may eventually be given to questions concerning the real source and nature of the influence.

also. In any case, it remains the fact that Mrs Piper's script of the 8th of April mentions "Euripides," and immediately afterwards "Harold."

Mrs Holland's script of the 16th of April contains a passage which corresponds both to Mrs Verrall's of the 4th and of the 25th of March, and to Mrs Piper's of the 8th of April.

Leopold.

Lucus.
Margaret.

To fly to find Euripides. Philemon—

I want you to understand me, but I have so few chances to speak—it's like waiting to take a ticket and I am always pushed away from the pigeon-hole before I can influence *her* mind—No, the scribe's—A peck of pickled pepper.

Students of Browning will at once see in "Lucus [Lukos]—to fly to find Euripides—Philemon" allusions to *Aristophanes' Apology*, in which a translation of the *Hercules Furens* is incorporated. The mention of "Margaret" (Mrs Verrall's Christian name) in the middle of these allusions still further serves as a connecting link with Mrs Verrall's script, just as that of "Leopold" serves as a connecting link with Mrs Piper's script. For "Leopold" and "Harold" are the names of Frederic Myers's two sons. Miss Johnson (so Mr Piddington informs us) has no doubt that "a peck of pickled pepper" is a punning allusion to Mrs Piper. It is difficult to express any opinion on this without having more of Mrs Holland's script before us. Whether Miss Johnson's interpretation be well founded or not, the cross-correspondence is sufficiently striking without it. All three automatists mention Euripides by name. All three indicate more or less clearly that "Euripides" is the subject of a cross-correspondence. Two out of the three connect Euripides with the *Hercules Furens*, though the connection is differently brought out by each. Two out of the three couple the mention of Euripides with the name of one of Frederic Myers's two sons, Harold and Leopold.

3. In both the cases already described it is Mrs Holland's script which forms a kind of middle term between Mrs Verrall's and Mrs Piper's. In the third, the middle term is provided by

Mrs Verrall. It must be added that the third case is more disputable, because more fanciful, than either of the other two. Nevertheless I am inclined to think that Mr Piddington's interpretation of it as a triple cross-correspondence is probably, though not certainly, correct.

The relevant passage in Mrs Verrall's script has been already quoted. It forms the second part of the "Euripides" script of the 25th of March, beginning with the words, "I want a special message to get to you." Reiteration of words or ideas intended to be significant is a very common feature of Mrs Verrall's automatic writing. The significant idea in this particular passage is evidently that conveyed by "shadow" (repeated no less than five times), "shade," "shadow of a shade," "umbræ," "umbrarum umbræ," σκιᾶς εἶδωλον. All these words and phrases are capable of bearing both a literal and a metaphorical meaning: indeed, there seems to be a transition in the script from one to the other—from the "shadow" which is darkness to the "shade" which is the ghost or phantasm of the dead. The insistence with which the idea is repeated is sufficient of itself to suggest that a cross-correspondence may be intended; but the words "Let Piddington know when you get a message about shadow" seem to leave no doubt upon the point.

Only two days later (*i.e.* on 27th March) Mrs Holland produced a script beginning "Birds in the high Hall Garden—not Maud Sylvia," in which the words, "tenebræ," "darkness," "light and shadow—shadow and light" occur within the space of a few lines. It will be observed that in Mrs Verrall's script "shadow" appears (1) in its literal sense as implying darkness, (2) in its metaphorical sense as equivalent to "phantom." Mrs Holland's script gives it in its literal sense only. To complete the cross-correspondence artistically, "phantom" or some analogous word should appear in Mrs Piper's script. It is interesting therefore to find that on the 8th of April, at the very same sitting which produced both "Light in West" and "Euripides—Harold," Myers_p does actually claim to have given "spirit" to Mrs Verrall.

As I have already said, the cross-correspondence thus arrived at is very distinctly weaker and less convincing than the two former ones. On the whole, however, I believe it to be genuine (*i.e.* not accidental); and an examination, which we have still to undertake, into the relation of the three cross-correspondences to one another will be found, I think, to support the belief.

At first sight there might seem to be nothing to connect any of the three with any other, unless the opening passage of Mrs Holland's script of 27th March, "Birds in the high Hall Garden—not Maud Sylvia," be held to provide such a connection. For the reference to *Maud* gives a point of contact between "East and West" and "shadow"; and the mention of "Sylvia" (Silvia is the name of Frederic Myers's only daughter) gives a point of contact with "Euripides."

A much more intimate connection, however, is revealed by a careful study of Mrs Verrall's two "Euripides" scripts of the 4th and the 25th of March, especially the latter.

The first part of the script of the 25th of March seems to identify Hercules with Janus through their common epithet *claviger*, which means "key-bearer" as well as "club-bearer." In the bearer of the club and key the union of the East and West is typified. And as Hercules, the world-wide wanderer, may be said, like Xerxes, to have bridged the Hellespont, which divides East from West, so also he may be compared to the God of the twin countenance, who embraces in one single gaze *Eoas partes Hesperiasque simul*.¹

Again, when the second half of the script of the 25th of March is read in the light of the script of the 4th of March, there emerges a direct association between the *σκιάς εἶδωλον* in which the former culminates and the individual "shade" of Heracles himself. For Mrs Verrall, whose contemporaneous notes are often the best interpreters of her own script, records at the time that the reference in the script of 4th March to the Hercules Unbound (*Ἡρακλῆς λυόμενος*) reminded her of a

¹ Ovid, *Fasti*, i. 140.

passage in Plotinus of which a translation is given in Myers's *Human Personality*: "“As the soul hasteneth,”” says Plotinus, ““to the things that are above, she will ever forget the more; unless all her life on earth leave a memory of things done well. For even here may man do well if he stand clear of the cares of earth. And he must stand clear of their memories too; so that one may rightly speak of a noble soul forgetting those things that are behind. And the shade of Heracles,¹ indeed, may talk of his own valour to the shades, but the true Heracles in the true world will deem all that of little worth; being transported into a more sacred place, and strenuously engaging, even above his strength, in those battles in which the wise engage.’”

If this interpretation be accepted and we are to see in the “Unbound” Heracles of the script the “true” Heracles of Plotinus, the cross-correspondences summed up in the words *East and West*, *Euripides*, and *shadow*, must themselves be regarded as parts of a still more elaborate cross-correspondence, in which the first and third are brought into direct relation with the second, and so into indirect relation with each other. Mr Piddington believes them to be the starting-points of yet wider ramifications, and in supporting his argument shows much subtlety and acumen, though perhaps also a tendency to over-refining. Into this field, however, I will not attempt to follow him: what has already been given should suffice to serve its immediate purpose, which is that of illustration merely.

I will now state very shortly the provisional conclusions—I cannot yet call them fully considered opinions—which a first study of Mr Piddington's report has led me to form.

1. The cross-correspondences presented by the different scripts are too numerous and too close to be the result of mere chance.

2. They could, of course, be explained on the hypothesis of

¹ The allusion to the shade of Heracles in this passage is itself a reminiscence of *Odyssey*, xi. 601-3.

collusion. Nor do I think that this hypothesis can be absolutely disproved. By many it will no doubt be accepted with all its difficulties in preference to conclusions repugnant to their settled preconceptions. But if it cannot be disproved, it may be disbelieved; and personally I disbelieve it. I do so partly on grounds of internal evidence, partly because my knowledge of several of the individuals concerned forbids me to think them capable of engaging in a carefully prepared and long-sustained conspiracy to deceive. This, and nothing short of this, is involved if the phenomena are to be accounted for by collusion. The trickeries and frauds only too often practised by paid mediums at séances seem to me to stand on quite a different footing.

3. If we exclude accidental coincidence and reject collusion, no explanation seems possible which does not in some shape or other presuppose telepathy.

4. In some of the cross-correspondences, though not in all, the "complementary" character is sufficiently developed to make design and purposive action a probable inference, even if that inference had no foundation other than peculiarities of form alone.

5. The argument in favour of design is, however, immensely strengthened by the circumstance that in many, perhaps in most, of the successful cases an intimation is given in one script that the subject of the cross-correspondence will be found in another. In Mrs Piper's script the intimation usually takes the form of a distinct claim that such and such a word or combination of words has actually been given, or a statement that an attempt is being or will be made to give it, to Mrs Verrall.¹ In the case of Mrs Verrall and Mrs Holland the intimation is in general much less explicit, and often absent altogether.

6. If the exhibition of purpose and design be an admitted feature in the phenomena, a mere blind and haphazard telepathic *rapport* between the persons concerned in the experi-

¹ I do not recall at the moment any claim on the part of Mrs Piper's trance-personalities to have successfully conveyed a message to Mrs Holland. There is one rather doubtful case of such a claim with reference to Miss Verrall.

ments is not sufficient to account for them. Directing intelligence must come in somewhere, whether it be manifested in conveying appropriate ideas to other minds, or in extracting appropriate ideas from other minds, or in turning ideas acquired, whether actively or passively, from other minds to appropriate use.

7. The above considerations, if sound, do a good deal to narrow the area of the problem. The question now takes this form: To what mind is the directing influence to be traced? Two alternative answers suggest themselves: It may proceed from the mind of one or more of the persons concerned in the experiment; or, it may have its origin in some source wholly external to any of them.

8. If we could eliminate the first alternative, and thereby establish the second, something approaching a *prima facie* case would have been made out for accepting the account which the directing influence gives of itself, namely, that it proceeds from the surviving spirits of certain individuals who "have passed through the body and gone"—always provided this explanation is not ruled out *ab initio*. So long as the bare possibility of communications from the dead is treated as an open question, it would savour of paradox, in the case of a cross-correspondence admitted to be due to the purposive action of some intelligence external to the living persons immediately concerned in it, to attribute that action to an absolutely unknown *x* rather than to the source from which it actually purports to come.

9. Unfortunately, evidence that would exclude directive agency on the part of the automatists is very difficult to get.¹

¹ The difficulty, great in any case, is further increased by the conversational method characteristic of the Piper script. The advantages which this method offers in the devising and carrying out of experiments are obvious; the drawback is that the experimenter in charge, and the sitter, if any, may easily become important factors in the result. This is, perhaps, less felt in the case of cross-correspondences than in that of other "psychical" phenomena. Some of Mrs Piper's most successful "hits" outside of cross-correspondences are strongly suggestive of ordinary thought-transference from those present. I should be inclined to put the *Plotinus* and *Abt Vogler* incidents both in this class. See Mr Piddington's report, pp. 59 and 107.

It may, indeed, be conceded that intelligent action directed towards an end must be conscious action ; and further, that we may have good ground for believing (as I think we have in the present instance) that the automatists are genuinely unconscious of any action taken by them of a nature to produce a given cross-correspondence. But this is not sufficient. The phenomena of automatic writing, like those of hypnotism, seem to point to what is sometimes described as "dissociation of the personality," whereby an element of the normal self may be supposed to become in a lesser or greater degree divided off from that self and to acquire for the time being a certain measure of independence. It would appear to be with this secondary self (or selves, if there be more than one of them) that we have to reckon in dealing with the facts of automatism, rather than with the normal self ; and deductions drawn from the consciousness or unconsciousness of the latter may be altogether inapplicable to the former. How ready these secondary selves are to act a part, and how cleverly they often do so, the experience of hypnotism is there to show.

10. I have now indicated the two rival hypotheses that seem to me on the whole to afford the most probable explanations of the phenomena of cross-correspondences. One of these attributes the production of the cross-correspondences to the directive agency of the secondary self of one of the automatists (or it may be the secondary selves of more than one co-operating together). According to the other, these secondary selves are passive instruments played upon by intelligences external to them, which there is some *prima facie* ground for accepting as what they represent themselves to be, namely, spirits yet living that once were human beings in the flesh. I am well aware that to many people both these hypotheses will appear utterly fantastic and impossible. To me, both seem possible, and neither proved. But I do not see how any number of cross-correspondences, as such, will help us to decide between them.

G. W. BALFOUR.

NEW FACTS ON OUR SURVIVAL OF DEATH.

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IT is generally known that thirty years ago Frederic W. H. Myers, one of the greatest men of our generation, combining as he did extraordinary faculty as a man of letters and a man of science with high academic standing and strong spiritual intuition, determined to devote the rest of his life to the investigation of a group of phenomena of which no scientific explanation had yet been found. He found in Edmund Gurney a colleague of singular like-mindedness, extensive leisure, and good literary and scientific powers, and on the initiative of Professor Barrett of Dublin, the Society for Psychical Research was launched in 1881. Dr Richard Hodgson, an acute and sceptical thinker, who was at that time an expert in Herbert Spencer's philosophy and a man of much practical wit, shortly joined the band, and it has worked on under the constant play of showers of sceptical criticism from Mrs Sidgwick and Mr F. Podmore. It has issued twenty-two volumes of Proceedings and thirteen volumes of Journal, and there have been produced the great work *Phantasms of the Living* and the still greater work of F. W. H. Myers, published after his death under the title of *Human Personality*. Other subsidiary literature has flowed from other pens. Then in succession came the deaths of Gurney, Sidgwick, Myers, and Hodgson. But this is a work

which, if there is anything in it, may perhaps be carried on from both sides of the chasm of death ; and for the past five years, amid many bogus imitations, there appears to have come a stream of communication from the departed leaders, which I venture to claim has now reached evidential force and volume.

Communications have to pass through a medium's hand or voice ; she has to write or to speak ; how are we to know that the communication does not come from some subliminal part of herself, or by thought transference from someone else on earth ? If it be accepted, as it is accepted, that the subliminal self of each of us may carry on communication with the subliminal self of another without our knowledge or the other's knowledge, and that anything that is in anyone else's mind may conceivably, by stretching improbabilities, be thus transferred to the medium's mind, it will be seen how difficult it is to choose material which will be evidence of a communication from the departed. Myers and his friends recommended when they were here that we should all write in a sealed envelope some word, or fact, or allusion, which we should leave behind us in the hands of a trusted friend, hoping that if we were able to tell the contents of the envelope from the other side before the envelope itself was opened, that would constitute a proof of our survival. But it appears as though accidental, merely superficial knowledge of that kind rarely survives into the memory of the next life, and no such experiment has yet been successful except a remote one in America many years ago. Myers, therefore, the initiator as ever of new work, conceived the idea about two years after his death—that is at least what purports to have happened—that he would try to give through two or more different mediums communications which make no sense in isolation, but which dovetail into one another and show an independent mind behind them both ; the communications to the two or more mediums being so different that it would be plain that telepathy had not taken place between them. The mediums used have been Mrs Piper, the experienced lady who has worked so long with Dr Hodgson at Boston, and

whose communications have already given such strong evidence of survival as to convince most of those who have studied them; Mrs Verrall, the wife of Dr Verrall of Cambridge, her daughter Miss Verrall, Mrs Thompson, and the Anglo-Indian lady who goes under the name of Mrs Holland. Three Parts of the Proceedings, dealing chiefly with the script of Mrs Verrall, Mrs Holland, and Mrs Piper respectively, have been published (Parts liii., lv., and lvii.). It is almost impossible to give in a brief form an intelligible account of experiments which are so complicated and which depend upon detail for their value, but I will here attempt a summary of one from Part lvii. edited by Mr Piddington which I will call

CALM IN TENNYSON AND PLOTINUS.

On the 29th of January 1907, Mrs Verrall propounded to the Myers of the Piper trance a test question, which had been carefully selected so as to be wholly meaningless to Mrs Piper herself, and to suggest matter which was so familiar to Frederic Myers in his life, and had entered so fully into his habitual thoughts, that there was good hope of his recollecting it. On account of the difficulty of getting questions through the well-intentioned but rather ill-educated amanuensis called "Rector," who appears to work Mrs Piper's hand, the question had to be very short; and in order to avoid the chance of lucky guesses, and to make the result comfortably certain, this short question was to be such as would have large allusiveness, and might open up many recollections in the mind of Myers. It was thought also that if the question bore some kind of affinity to a subject already touched by Myers, though an affinity unrecognisable by the medium, there would be still more hope that his mind would again travel on that path. It was also necessary that the result should be verifiable, and not dependent upon Mrs Verrall's or upon anyone else's impressions. These conditions appeared to be all fulfilled by the three Greek words *αὐτὸς οὐρανὸς ἀκύμων* ("the very heavens without a wave"), which were painfully spelt out, frequently repeated so as to be

transmitted correctly, and plainly caught by Myers on the above date.

These words are from the *Enneades* of Plotinus, and are part of a description of the circumstances which accompany and condition ecstasy ; that is, the condition in which the soul is sufficiently separated from the body, or from the bodily interests, to be in such close communion with the divine as to receive visions in rapt contemplation. The last of the three words is a rare one, not known even to Mr Piddington, still less, of course, to the absolutely Greekless minds of Mrs Piper and of " Rector."

Now for the connection of the words with F. W. H. Myers. In his treatment of Ecstasy in *Human Personality* (Epilogue, vol. ii. p. 291), he quotes the paragraph in which they occur, not in Greek but in English. He translates the sentence containing them—"Calm be the earth, the sea, the air, and let Heaven itself be still." Moreover, the actual Greek words are used by Myers as the motto to his poem on Tennyson, which is printed in *Fragments of Prose and Poetry* (p. 117). These words, which state that clear outward calm in nature is propitious to the trance condition of ecstasy, were pretty sure to have been often pondered by Myers in writing his careful inquiry into the experience of ecstasy—an inquiry, it is safe to say, more scientific, more wide in its outlook, alike more penetrating and more comprehensive, than any preceding treatment of the phenomenon. It was therefore reasonable to expect that Myers would still be able to translate the words and to quote illustrative allusions to its subject matter from Tennyson and from Plotinus, and possibly from his own works. It was not yet seen by any of the experimenters how closely connected were Tennyson and Plotinus in the mind of Myers, and probably also in the mind of Tennyson himself; and how deeply appropriate it was that that motto from Plotinus should be placed at the head of a poem on Tennyson. The words out of that poem to which the motto is appropriate are these :—

Once more he rises ; lulled and still,
 Hushed to his tune the tideways roll ;
 These waveless heights of evening thrill
 With voyage of the summoned Soul.

The allusion is, of course, to Tennyson's *Crossing the Bar* ; they are indeed little but a paraphrase of that lovely lyric :—

And may there be no moaning of the bar,
 When I put out to sea,
 But such a tide as moving seems asleep,
 Too full for sound and foam,
 When that which drew from out the boundless deep
 Turns again home.

We have therefore to do with the idea of calm, particularly as a preliminary to spiritual exaltation ; calm of nature as conducive to calm of spirit ; and we shall expect, if the experiment be successful, allusions to that idea in Tennyson, and reference to Plotinus.

It was carefully discovered that Mrs Piper had never seen the volume, *Fragments of Prose and Poetry*, and even if she had read the English rendering of the words in *Human Personality*, it would not convey the Greek.

A previous connection with the words "halcyon days" in Mrs Verrall's script was, as was intended, remote and unrecognisable. Let it be remembered that we have to do in this investigation with the operation of a mind which appears to dream, and to bring out of its treasures unexpected allusions, glimmering attempts at a central idea, which it apparently takes time and effort for the speaker to make clear, and then to pass through an ill-made machine. It is something like writing a letter in the dark, which you hand to a sleepy postman, who will carry it through an unknown land, past ancient block-houses of prohibitive tariffs and along unscaled passes, to a temporary and movable address ; and the responses are brought by dictation to an illiterate scribe, who does not always know the meaning of what he writes.

We shall not, therefore, be surprised that the first answers to the test question were glimmering approaches to it only.

The day that the question was propounded, Myers, through Mrs Piper, alluded to a "haven of rest," which he connected with a low armchair in Mrs Verrall's house, and to "celestial halcyon days," both of which he claimed to have referred to in her earlier script since he left this life. This was, on the whole, a well-founded claim, and it was doubtless made because Mrs Verrall had told him that the answer to her question would have some slight connection with something previously given. We thus see him on the right track, having apparently caught the idea of calm. He went on to speak of "larches" and "laburnum." A dreamer who was dreaming of Tennyson in connection with the word "halcyon" might easily pass on to the verse :—

When rosy plumelets tuft the larch,
And rarely pipes the mounted thrush ;
Or underneath the barren bush
Flits by the sea-blue bird of March.

For the "sea-blue bird of March" is the kingfisher or halcyon. Just at the end of the sitting, however, all that could be expressed was the word "larches," and that led on to another nature reminiscence from *In Memoriam* : "laburnums dropping wells of fire." All this would deserve the name of fanciful if it stood alone ; but we will proceed.

We now turn to Mrs Verrall's script, which on the 12th of February ran thus :—

The voyage of Maeldune faery lands forlorn and noises of the western sea—
thundering noises of the western sea.

It is about Merlin and Arthur's realm—Merlin's prophetic vision—"all
night long mid thundering noises of the western sea" and how he
would not go—the passing of Arthur.

And then the island valley of Avilion where blows not any wind nor ever
falls the least light—no not that but you have the sense—there falls
no rain nor snow nor any breath of wind shakes the least leaf.

I will try to get the idea elsewhere conveyed—but it is hard and I know
I have failed before. Why will you not put the signature? Surely
you know now that it is not you. FWHM.

Here we have more Tennysonian calm with the island valley of Avilion, which he could not manage to quote quite

correctly. The words near the end, "Why will you not put the signature? Surely you know now that it is not you. FWHM," appear to be remarks which have leaked through, addressed by Myers to Mrs Verrall as medium.

The Keats quotation "faery lands forlorn," is also used as title of a poem by Myers published in his *Fragments*, and in that poem are references to "that heaven-high vault serene," and "unearthly calms." He is thus giving a clear allusion from his own words to the idea required of him. Myers's poem speaks of a voyage north from Aalesund to "Isles unnamed in gulfs unvoyaged," just as does the Voyage of Maeldune.

We have, therefore, here an allusion than which few could have been more characteristic of Myers and more appropriate to the idea he was desired to convey.

On the 25th of February Mrs Verrall's hand wrote :—

I stretch my hand across the vapourous space, the interlunar space—twixt moon and earth—where the gods of Lucretius quaff their nectar.
Do you not understand?

The lucid interspace of world and world—Well, that is bridged by the thought of a friend, bridged before for your passage, but to-day for the passage of any that will walk it, not in hope but in faith.

Here is an allusion to the *Lucretius* of Tennyson, to a passage descriptive altogether of calm contemplation and such communion as is possible to men :—

The Gods, who haunt
The lucid interspace of world and world,
Where never creeps a cloud, or moves a wind,
Nor ever falls the least white star of snow,
Nor ever lowest roll of thunder moans,
Nor sound of human sorrow mounts to mar
Their sacred everlasting calm! And such,
Not all so fine, nor so divine a calm,
Not such nor all unlike it, man may gain
Letting his own life go.

On the next day we have, through Mrs Verrall's hand, the first reference to the three Greek words connected with *Crossing the Bar* :—

I think I have made him [probably "Rector"] understand, but the best reference to it will be made elsewhere, not Mrs Piper at all.

I think I have got some words from the poem written down—if not stars and satellites, another phrase will do as well. And may there be no moaning at the bar—my Pilot face to face.

The last poems of Tennyson and Browning should be compared. There are references in her writing to both—Helen's, I mean.

The fighter fights one last fight, but there is peace for him too in the end—and peace for the seer who knew that after—after the earthquake, and the fire and the wind, after, after, in the stillness comes the voice that can be heard.

Here we have the first clear allusion to the connection between the motto from Plotinus and the poem *Crossing the Bar*, to which it alluded in Myers' poem on Tennyson. He evidently feels the difficulty of communication, and adds that though he cannot get the allusion "sunset and evening star," he does get part of the lines about "the pilot" and the "moaning at the bar." He then alludes to the well-worn comparison of this last poem of Tennyson's with Browning's valediction to life:—

"Strive and thrive!" cry "Speed, fight on, face ever
There as here."

The appropriateness of the comparison of Tennyson the seer, to Browning the fighter, is plain; and finally, we have the allusion to the "still small voice" heard by Elijah on Mount Horeb.

On the 6th of March Mrs Verrall's hand wrote:—

I have tried to tell him of the calm, the heavenly and earthly calm, but I do not think it is clear. I think you would understand if you could see the record. Tell me when you have understood.

Calm is the sea—and in my heart, if calm at all, if any calm, a calm despair.

That is only part of the answer—just as it is not the final thought. The symphony does not close upon despair—but on harmony. So does the poem. Wait for the last word.

Here we have more allusions to the same thought, though Myers expresses doubt as to whether he has made "Rector" understand; but he thinks that the record of the Piper trances will be plain to Mrs Verrall. He then runs in another quotation from *In Memoriam*, but corrects its final word, inas-

much as the conclusion of that poem is hope and not despair. He put his special signature to this bit of script.

Then on the 11th of March we have a beautiful passage written by Mrs Verrall's hand, dwelling on the fact that both Plato and Tennyson had communion with the unseen :—

Violet and olive leaf purple and hoary.

The city of the violet and olive crown.

News will come of her. Of Athens

The shadow of the Parthenon. It is a message from Plato that I want to send. It has been given elsewhere, but should be completed here.

It is about dim, seen forms, half seen in the evenings grey by a boy and afterwards woven into words that last—I want to say it again.

I think there is a verse in Tennyson about it.

Plato and the shadow and the unseen or half-seen companionship—shapes seen in the glimpses of the moonlit heights.

To walk with Plato (or some phrase like that), with voiceless communing, and unseen Presence felt. (No, you don't get it right.) Presences on the eternal hills (that is better). The Presence that is on the lonely hills. (That is all for now. Wait.)

This script is an allusion to Frederic Myers's poem on *The Collected Works of G. F. Watts* :—

Then as he walked, like one who dreamed,

Through silent highways silver-hoar,

More wonderful that city seemed,

And he diviner than before :

A voice was calling, " All is well " ;

Clear in the vault Selene shone,

And over Plato's homestead fell

The shadow of the Parthenon.

For purposes of mere evidence it is enough to say that Tennyson and Plotinus, who were plainly connected in the mind of Frederic Myers, were also connected in the script ; and any reader who feels that he would like to keep his mind closely bent upon the thread of evidence, will do well to skip the following paragraphs. It is in itself, however, a deeply interesting quest to point out how the great mystics in all ages speak the same tongue.

It is well known that Tennyson was all his life subject to periods of trance, which he could sometimes produce by the device of repeating his own name over and over ; he was

"wound into the great Soul," had the sensation of leaving his body and living in a larger air, a consciousness of exalted happiness and communion, at once broken by any interruption, or even by his own hand suddenly touching the table. He gives an account of this experience in *In Memoriam*, stanza xcv., in *The Ancient Sage*, and in Arthur's speech at the conclusion of the *Holy Grail*, and it is referred to pretty fully in his son's Memoir.

With regard to the particular point of the desirability of external calm to induce ecstasy, Mrs Verrall has noted that before the trance described in *In Memoriam*, xcv., there was—

Calm that let the tapers burn
Unwavering : not a cricket chirred ;
The brook alone far off was heard,
And on the board the fluttering urn,

and that the vision "was stricken through with doubt" in the sudden breeze of dawn. Mrs Verrall also points out that there are some interesting verbal parallels between *In Memoriam* and Plotinus, who speaks of the "illuminating entry of the soul bringing a golden vision." Tennyson speaks of "the spirits' golden day." "Æonian" occurs in both writers, and both speak of "That which is" as compared with the present, past, and future ideas appropriate to time, which is a mere image of eternity. It is known also that Arthur Hallam, the subject of *In Memoriam*, was a student of Plotinus.

We will now turn to Mrs Piper's trance, which we left on the 30th of January, giving then its first hints of a solution to the question which had been propounded to those who write through her hand the day before.

On the 6th of March there were written by her hand the three words, "Cloudless Sky Horizon. Don't you understand?" and immediately afterwards the sentence : "A cloudless sky beyond the horizon." This is a paraphrase of the three Greek test-words. Mrs Piper's trance concludes with a waking stage, in which, after the writing has ceased, she utters all kinds of disconnected sentences, during the time when her personality

is resuming control, or, as Myers put it, through her hand, "When the spirit is returning to this light." The things said at this time are probably partly Mrs Piper's own and partly from the same source as her script; they are often faint, and can only be caught by putting the ear close to her mouth.

When she was thus recovering after this sitting, she said, "Moaning at the bar when I put out to sea." Shortly after she uttered "Arthur Hallam" twice, and "Good-bye, Margaret" (the Christian name of Mrs Verrall, who, however, was not present). She then said for the third time, "Arthur Hallam. Myers said it was he. He says that he will give evidence, and he is glad to know that he had a good definite idea in his innermost soul. He said it affected his innermost soul to talk to you, and he was so glad."

Then, a week later, at the next sitting, Myers, through Mrs Piper, attempted to draw roughly what was said to represent a bar—in fact, three attempts at drawing it were made altogether. He claimed that he had spoken of "crossing the bar" to Mrs Verrall also, which was quite true, though at that time unknown to Mr Piddington, the experimenter. Myers also declared that he had tried to draw a bar with Mrs Verrall, adding, "I thought she might get a glimpse of my understanding of her Greek." Then Hodgson appeared and asked whether Mrs Verrall had drawn a bar. Myers also came and asked the same question. As a fact, this drawing had not succeeded, though Mrs Verrall had written, "May there be no moaning at the bar." Myers replied that he was not sure that he had succeeded in giving her the full impression, but that he had quoted the words to her as well as to Mrs Piper. He added that he had given to Mrs Piper both the words "Arthur Hallam" and the drawing of the bar—"so as to get the words with the author's individuality."

These references to Hallam and *Crossing the Bar* occurred in Mrs Piper's trance before Mrs Verrall had grasped the significance of the appearances in her script of the Tennysonian quotations. She did not see the point till six days later;

and the paraphrase, "cloudless sky beyond the horizon," does not appear with Mrs Verrall at all, and could not have come from her.

To sum up in the words of Mr Piddington: "It appears that in the absence of all intercourse between Mrs Piper and Mrs Verrall after 30th January, on the one hand, the 'Myers' of Mrs Verrall's script on 26th February and 6th March respectively, connected *Crossing the Bar* and *In Memoriam* with αἰὲρὸς οὐρανὸς ἀκύμων; while, on the other hand, the 'Myers' of Mrs Piper's trance on 6th March alluded to *Crossing the Bar* and mentioned the name 'Arthur Hallam' in close conjunction with Mrs Verrall's Christian name; claimed on 13th March to have given to Mrs Verrall a quotation from *Crossing the Bar*, and further explained that he thought this reference would make Mrs Verrall understand in part what significance the Greek words had for him."

The situation then was that, whilst abundant allusion to the Tennysonian connection with the three Greek words had been made, the passage in *Human Personality* where they are translated, and the name of their author Plotinus, had not yet appeared. It was therefore thought better to see whether this field also would yield a harvest, and for that purpose Mrs Verrall sat with Mrs Piper on the 29th of April, and asked Myers if he could make allusion to some other group of associations, and also give the author's name. No clue was given to Myers to guide him as to which of his communications had been found to be answers to the question.

This was a very confused sitting, possibly due to the newness of the experimenters and their difficulty in deciphering the script; and to everyone's surprise allusions, evidently made with great difficulty, occurred to Swedenborg, to Dante, to St Paul, and to Francis of Assisi. References also occurred to "Azure a blue sky," and to "Halcyon days," both concordant with the central idea. Still this was not what was wanted.

The next sitting produced even more unexpected results, inasmuch as Myers stated that the three Greek words reminded

him of "Homer's Illiard." This piece of illiteracy only shows how great are the mechanical difficulties in passing a word through. Without definitely giving the author's name, we have first an attempt to begin the word Plato, and then we have the word "Socratese."

This was very confusing to all the experimenters, and seemed as though it might be nothing better than bad guessing; the riddle was hard to read; it was all the better riddle for that, nevertheless. Afterwards Mrs Verrall remembered that in *Human Personality*, near the Plotinus passage wherein the three Greek words are translated, occurs an account of the famous vision of Socrates, described in the *Crito* of Plato, in which a fair and white-robed woman appeared to him in his prison, and quoted to him, as he waited for death, a line from the *Iliad* (ix. 363)—"On the third day hence thou comest to Phthia's fertile shore." Socrates took this as a promise of immortality, whence came its fitting place in *Human Personality*. Further, the original Greek of this passage from the *Crito* is given as the motto to the Epilogue of *Human Personality*, in which the passage from Plotinus occurs. The experimenters now felt that they understood the allusion to the *Iliad*, though neither the word "Iliad" nor the word "Homer" occurs in the text of *Human Personality* at that place. Surely no one but Myers could have made that allusion. As Mr Piddington says: "It would not, therefore, have been possible for anyone but a Greek scholar, familiar with Greek literature, to discover from these pages of *Human Personality* any connection between the vision of Socrates and Homer's *Iliad*, even if he had sufficient familiarity with these pages to be reminded of the vision of Socrates by an allusion to the vision of Plotinus."

In this chapter on Ecstasy in *Human Personality* we have the passage: "We need not deny the transcendental ecstasy to any of the strong souls who have claimed to feel it;—to Elijah or to Isaiah, to Plato or to Plotinus, to St John or to St Paul, to Buddha or Mahomet, to Virgil or Dante, to

St Theresa or to Joan of Arc, to Kant or to Swedenborg, to Wordsworth or to Tennyson."

On the same page we find the passage: "Our daily bread is as symbolical as the furniture of Swedenborg's heavens and hells. . . . Plotinus, 'the eagle soaring above the tomb of Plato,' is lost to sight in the heavens. . . . But the prosaic Swede—his stiff mind prickly with dogma, the opaque cell walls of his intelligence flooded cloudily by the irradiant day—this man, by the very limitations of his faculty, by the practical humility of a spirit trained to inquiry but not to generate truth, has awkwardly laid the corner stone, grotesquely sketched the elevation of a temple which our remotest posterity will be upbuilding and adorning still."

In the Epilogue of *Human Personality* we find this significant passage:—"I believe that some of those who once were near to us are already mounting swiftly upon this heavenly way. And when from that cloud encompassing of unforgetful souls some voice is heard,—as long ago,—there needs no heroism, no sanctity, to inspire the apostle's ἐπιθυμία εἰς τὸ ἀναλῦσαι, the desire to lift our anchor, and to sail out beyond the bar. What fitter summons for man than the wish to live in the memory of the highest soul that he has known, now risen higher—to lift into an immortal security the yearning passion of his love? 'As the soul hasteneth,' says Plotinus, 'to the things that are above, she will ever forget the more; unless all her life on earth leave a memory of things done well.'"

Here in one paragraph we have Myers's deepest and most original thought, beginning with a quotation from the Apostle on whose inward experience he had based in earlier life his well-known mystical poem *St Paul*. Next comes an allusion to *Crossing the Bar*, and finally a passage from Plotinus; all within a few lines.

Without actually giving as yet the name of the author of the three Greek words, it may surely be said that the communications are full of Myers's rich and radiating person-

ality, not easy to mistake for anyone else's by any who knew him.

But we now come to the final achievement. On the 6th of May, Mrs Sidgwick, before she had asked a single question in the Piper trance, was met by the word "Plotinus," to be transmitted with every sign of triumphant emphasis to Mrs Verrall. The atmosphere of the interview was like that after an athletic contest in which victory had been won; Myers congratulated himself on having fully answered the Greek as he had previously answered a certain important Latin question. He said that he had "caught" Rector at their last meeting, and had spelled it out to him clearly.

That there are great difficulties to overcome in these transmissions is what we should expect; and that it actually is so is plain from the gradual process by which success arrives. As Mr Piddington acutely remarks, the first shots at the Tennysonian allusions in the words "larches" and "laburnum"—indirect, only partial answers as they were—were given on the day after the test question was put; and when a new set of associations was demanded we had Homer's *Iliad*, Socrates, Swedenborg, St Paul, and Dante—the dramatis personæ, in fact, of the concluding chapters of *Human Personality*, before the awakening strands of earth memory gave forth the name Plotinus.

By way of guarding against a telepathic origin for the messages from a mind still on earth, it may be noted that the whole range of thought and knowledge is alien from the circle of Mrs Piper's mind; that Mr Piddington declares himself to have been wholly unaware of all the literary connections and allusions brought out, and wholly unable to assist the medium unconsciously in any way, and that Mrs Verrall—the only other person concerned—did not know or think of a large part of this complex of allusions, and did not even recognise them in the script until the 12th of March, which is after the Piper answers of 6th March had come. It is also hard to understand, if her subliminal mind is to be credited with both her own and

Mrs Piper's script, why the name Plotinus, which must have been on the tip of her tongue of expectation all the time, was the last to be unearthed. The telepathic hypothesis will, I think, be found insufficient by anyone who reads the scripts. Mrs Verrall's mind is the only one on earth which needs consideration as a possible source of the knowledge displayed ; but it is not only knowledge that is displayed, but every token of a particular personality. There are conversations overheard between the communicators, their amanuensis, and their medium, either spoken during the waking stage of trance, or written by the hand. Moreover, we must remember that we can only properly regard the subliminal self, enlightening generalisation as it is of many phenomena, telepathic, hypnotic, and so forth, as an entity provisionally covering a good many facts, not as an actually defined organism, the bounds of whose faculties are even beginning to be known. There may be several subliminal selves, or it may be rather a link of connection with other potencies behind it than a great organ in itself. In any case, if all this is due to the operation of Mrs Verrall's underlying mind, it is entirely unique among our records.

The narrative which I have attempted here to summarise, and which covers 65 pages of Proceedings, Part lvii., is only one — though one of the best — of twenty-three cross-correspondences described in this volume, in addition to the eight which were described in Miss Johnson's paper on Mrs Holland in Part lv. The care shown over minutiae by Mr Piddington, and the perfect candour of his exposition, win the reader's confidence ; his ingenuity in the tracking of allusions, and insight into the working of the fragmentary mental operations of the trance personalities, is nothing less than delightful to those who care for intellectual athletics and like to see a mark neatly hit.

If the curious reader wants to know what news of our life hereafter is vouchsafed by this revelation, the best answer is to exhort to patience and to be cautious in statement.

“Myers” and “Hodgson” declare that they are very much more alive than they were on earth, that they are not really dreaming, that they would not desire to come back again, and that they are still, nevertheless, in possession of much at any rate of the memories and attachments of earth; they say that they are still almost as far as we are from the innermost Presence and Counsel of God, but they confirm the claims and sanctions of the religious life. They state that a period of unconsciousness, varying in length, supervenes upon death—a period unusually prolonged in Myers’s case; and that after a few years—say half a dozen—the spirit moves in its development too far from earth life to have any further communication with it. Doubtless there are numerous exceptions to this; and we gather that Myers himself is voluntarily staying near us for the sake of the service of our faith.

JOHN W. GRAHAM.

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THE DOCTRINE OF THE EARTH-SOUL AND OF BEINGS INTERMEDIATE BETWEEN MAN AND GOD.

AN ACCOUNT OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF
G. T. FECHNER.

PROFESSOR WILLIAM JAMES.

FECHNER and Hegel are both pantheists, and in a sense Fechner writes himself down as an absolutist. But the methods and intellectual atmospheres of the two men are so different that it seems to mock every real ground of relationship to refer them to the same type. Hegel is the very paragon of a rationalist, Fechner the very paragon of an empiricist. If thinkers who go from parts towards wholes are ever to be convinced of an absolute spirit's existence, it can never be by the style of reasoning of Hegel or his disciples. It *may* be by Fechner's way of reasoning. Before giving my sketch of it, let me rehearse a few of the facts of Fechner's life.

Born in 1801, son of a poor country pastor in Saxony, he lived from 1817 to 1887, when he died—seventy years, therefore—at Leipzig, a typical *gelehrter* of the old-fashioned German stripe. His means were always scanty, and his only extravagances could be in the way of thought, but they were gorgeous. He passed medical examinations at Leipzig University at the age of twenty-one, but decided, instead of becoming a doctor, to devote himself to physical science. It was ten years before he was made professor of physics, although he soon was authorised

to lecture. Meanwhile, he had to make both ends meet, and this he did by voluminous literary labours. He translated, for example, Biot's treatise on *Physics* and Thenard's on *Chemistry*, four and six volumes respectively, with enlarged editions later. He edited repertories of chemistry and physics, a pharmaceutical journal, and an encyclopædia in eight volumes, of which he wrote about one-third. He published physical treatises and experimental investigations of his own, especially in electricity. Electrical measurements are the basis of the science, and Fechner's measurements in galvanism, performed with the simplest self-made apparatus, are classic to this day. During this time he also published a number of half-philosophical, half-humorous writings, which have gone through several editions, under the name of Dr Mises, as well as poems, literary and artistic essays, and other occasional articles.

But overwork, poverty, and an eye trouble produced by his observations on after-images in the retina (also a classic piece of investigation) produced in Fechner, then about thirty-eight years old, a terrific attack of nervous prostration with painful hyperæsthesia of all the functions, from which he suffered three years, cut off entirely from active life. Present-day medicine would have classed poor Fechner's malady quickly enough as partly a habit-neurosis; but its severity was such that in his day it was treated as a visitation incomprehensible in its malignity; and when he suddenly began to get well, both Fechner and others treated the recovery as a sort of divine miracle. This illness, bringing Fechner face to face with inner desperation, made a great crisis in his life. "Had I not then clung to the faith," he writes, "that clinging to faith would somehow or other work its reward, *so hatte ich jene zeit nicht ausgehalten.*" His religious and cosmological faiths saved him—thenceforward one great aim with him was to work out and communicate these faiths to the world. He did so on the largest scale; but he did many other things too ere he died.

A book on the atomic theory, classic also; four elaborate mathematical and experimental volumes on what he called psychophysics—many persons consider Fechner to have practically founded scientific psychology in the first of these books; a book on organic evolution; two works on experimental æsthetics, in which again Fechner is considered by some judges to have laid the foundations of a new science, must be included among these other performances. Of the more religious and philosophical works I shall immediately give a further account.

All Leipzig mourned him when he died, for he was the pattern of the ideal German scholar, as daringly original in his thought as he was homely in his life, a modest, genial, laborious slave to truth and learning, and withal the owner of an admirable literary style of the vernacular sort. The materialistic generation, that in the fifties and sixties called his speculations fantastic, had been replaced by one with greater liberty of imagination, and a Preyer, a Wundt, a Paulsen, and a Lasswitz could now speak of Fechner as their master.

His mind was indeed one of those multitudinously organised cross-roads of truth, which are occupied only at rare intervals by children of men, and from which nothing is either too far or too near to be seen in due perspective. Patientest observation, exactest mathematics, shrewdest discrimination, humanest feeling flourished in him on the largest scale, with no apparent detriment to one another. He was, in fact, a philosopher in the "great" sense, although he cared so much less than most philosophers care for abstractions of the "thin" order. For him the abstract lived in the concrete, and the hidden motive of all he did was to bring what he called the daylight view of this world into even greater evidence, that daylight view being this, that the whole universe in its different spans and wave-lengths, exclusions and envelopments, is everywhere alive and conscious. It has taken fifty years for his greatest book, *Zend-Avesta*, to pass into a second edition (1901). "One swallow," he cheer-

fully writes, "does not make a summer. But the first swallow would not come unless the summer were coming; and for me that summer means my daylight view some time prevailing."

The original sin, according to Fechner, of both our popular and our scientific thinking, is our inveterate habit of regarding the spiritual, not as the rule, but as an exception in the midst of Nature. Instead of believing our life to be fed at the breasts of the greater life, our individuality to be sustained by the greater individuality, which must necessarily have more consciousness and more independence than all that it brings forth, we treat whatever lies outside of our life as so much slag and ashes of life only; or, if we believe in a Divine Spirit, we fancy him on the one side as bodiless and Nature as soulless on the other. What comfort, or peace, he asks, can come from such a doctrine? The flowers wither at its breath, the stars turn into stone; our own body grows unworthy of our spirit and sinks to a tenement for carnal senses only. The book of nature turns into a volume on mechanics, in which whatever lives is treated as a sort of anomaly; a great chasm of separation yawns between us and whatever is higher than ourselves; and God becomes a thin nest of abstractions.

Fechner's great instrument for vivifying the daylight view is analogy; not a rationalistic argument is to be found in all his many pages—only reasonings like those which men continually use in practical life. For example: My house is built by someone; the world too is built by someone. The world is greater than my house; it must be a greater someone who built the world. My body moves by the influence of my feeling and will; the sun, moon, sea and wind, being themselves more powerful, move by the influence of some more powerful feeling and will. I live now, and change from one day to another; I shall live hereafter and change still more; etc.

Bain defines genius as the power of seeing analogies. The number that Fechner could perceive was prodigious; but he insisted on the differences as well. Neglect to make allowance for these, he said, is the common fallacy in analogical reasoning.

Most of us, for example, reasoning justly that since all the minds we know are connected with bodies, therefore God's mind should be connected with a body, proceed to suppose that that body must be an animal body over again, and so paint an altogether human picture of God. But all that the analogy comports is *a* body—the particular features of our body are adaptations to a habitat so different from God's that, if God have a physical body at all, it must be utterly different from ours in structure. Throughout his writings Fechner makes difference and analogy walk abreast, and by his extraordinary sense for both things converts what would ordinarily pass for objections to his conclusions into factors of their support.

The vaster orders of mind go with the vaster orders of body. The entire earth on which we live must have, according to Fechner, its own collective consciousness. So must each sun, moon, and planet; so must our solar system have its own wider consciousness, in which the consciousness of our earth plays one part. So has the entire starry system as such its consciousness; and if that starry system be not the sum of all that *is*, materially considered, then that whole system, along with whatever else may *be*, is the body of that absolutely totalised consciousness of the universe to which men give the name of God.

Speculatively, Fechner is thus a monist in his theology; but there is room in his universe for every grade of spiritual being between man and the final all-inclusive God. In suggesting the positive content of all this super-humanity, however, he hardly lets his imagination fly beyond simple spirits of the planetary order. The earth-soul he passionately believes in; he treats the earth as our special human guardian angel; we can pray to the earth as men pray to their saints; and I think that in his system, as in so many of the actual historic theologies, the supreme God only marks a sort of limit of enclosure of the world of the divine. He is left thin and abstract in his majesty, men preferring to carry on their

personal transactions with the many less remote and abstract messengers and mediators whom the divine order provides.

I shall ask later whether the abstractly monistic turn which Fechner's speculations took was necessitated by logic. I believe it was not required. Meanwhile, let me proceed a little farther into the detail of his thought. Inevitably one does him miserable injustice by summarising and abridging him. For although the type of reasoning he employs is almost childlike for simplicity, and his bare conclusions can be written on a single page, the *power* of the man is due altogether to the profuseness of his concrete imagination; to the multitude of the points which he considers successively; to the cumulative effect of his learning, of his ingenuity in detail, and of his thoroughness; to his admirably homely style; to the sincerity with which his pages glow; and, finally, to the impression he gives of a man who doesn't live at second-hand, but who *sees*, who in fact speaks, as a prophet, and is wholly unlike one of the common herd of scientific and philosophic scribes.

Abstractly set down, his most important conclusion for my purpose in the present article is that the constitution of the world is the same throughout. In ourselves, visual consciousness goes with our eyes, tactile consciousness with our skin. But although neither skin nor eye knows aught of the sensations of the other, they come together and figure in some sort of relation and combination in the more inclusive consciousness which each of us names his *self*. Quite similarly, then, says Fechner, we must suppose that my consciousness of myself and yours of yourself, although in their immediacy they keep entirely separate and know nothing of each other, are yet known and used together in a higher consciousness, that of the human race, say, into which they enter as constituent parts. Similarly the human and the animal kingdom at large are members of a collective consciousness of still higher grade. This combines with the consciousness of the vegetable kingdom, in the Soul of the Earth, which in turn contributes its share of experience to that of the whole solar system; and so

on from synthesis to synthesis, and from height to height, till an absolutely universal consciousness is reached.

A vast analogical series, of which the basis consists of facts directly observable in ourselves.

The supposition of an earth-consciousness meets a strong instinctive prejudice which Fechner ingeniously tries to overcome. Man is the highest consciousness upon the earth, we think—the earth itself being in all ways his inferior. How should its consciousness, if it have one, be superior to his?

What are the marks of superiority which we are tempted to use here? If we look more carefully into them, Fechner points out that the earth possesses each and all of them more perfectly than we. He considers in detail the points of difference between us, and shows them all to make for the earth's higher rank. I will touch on only a few of these points.

One of them, of course, is independence of other external beings. External to the earth are only the other heavenly bodies. All the things on which we externally depend for life—air, water, plant- and animal-food, fellow-men, etc.—are included in her as constituent parts. She is self-sufficing in a million respects in which we are not so. We depend on her for almost everything, she on us for but a small portion of her history. She swings us in her orbit from winter to summer, and revolves us from day into night and from night into day.

Complexity in unity is another sign of superiority. The total earth's complexity far exceeds that of any organism, for she includes all our organisms in herself, along with an infinite number of things that our organisms fail to include. Yet how simple and massive are the phases of her own proper life! As the total bearing of any animal is sedate and tranquil compared with the agitation of its blood corpuscles, so is the earth a sedate and tranquil being compared with the animals whom she supports.

To develop from within, instead of being fashioned from

without, is also counted as superior in men's eyes. An egg is a higher style of being than a piece of clay which an external modeller makes into the image of a bird. Well, the earth's history develops from within. It is like that of a wonderful egg which the sun's heat, like that of a mother hen, has stimulated to its cycles of evolutionary change.

Individuality of type, and difference from other beings of its type, is another mark of rank. The earth differs from every other planet, and the class of planetary beings is extraordinarily distinct.

Long ago the earth was called an animal, but a planet is a higher class of being than either man or animal; not only quantitatively greater, like a vaster and more awkward whale or elephant, but a being whose enormous size requires an altogether different plan of life. Our animal organisation comes from our inferiority. Our need of moving to and fro, of stretching our limbs and bending our bodies, shows only our defect. What are our legs but crutches, by means of which, with restless efforts, we go hunting after the things we have not inside of ourselves? But the earth is no such cripple; why should she, who already possesses within herself the things we so painfully pursue, have limbs analogous to ours? Shall she mimic a small part of herself? What need has she of arms, with nothing to reach for; of a neck, with no head to carry; of eyes or nose, when she finds her way through space without either, and has the millions of eyes of all her animals to guide their movements on her surface, and all their noses to smell the flowers that grow? For, as we are ourselves a part of the earth, so our organs are her organs. She is, as it were, eye and ear over her whole extent, seeing and hearing at once all that we see and hear in separation. She brings forth living beings of countless kinds upon her surface, and their multitudinous conscious relations with each other she takes up into her higher and more general conscious life.

Most of us, considering the theory that the whole terres-

trial mass is animated as our bodies are, make the mistake of working the analogy too literally, and allowing for no differences. If the earth be a sentient organism, we say, where are its brain and nerves? What corresponds to its heart and lungs? In other words, we expect functions which she already performs through us, to be performed outside of us again, and in just the same way. But we see perfectly well how the earth performs some of these functions in a way unlike our way. If you speak of circulation, what need has she of a heart, when the sun keeps all the showers that fall upon her, and all the springs and brooks and rivers that irrigate her, going? What need has she of internal lungs, when her whole sensitive surface is in living commerce with the atmosphere that clings to it?

The organ that gives us most trouble is the brain. All the consciousness we directly know seems tied to brains. Can there be consciousness, we ask, where there is no brain? But our brain, which primarily serves to correlate our muscular reactions with the external objects on which we depend, performs a function which the earth performs in an entirely different way. She has no proper muscles or limbs of her own, and the only objects external to her are the other stars. To these her whole mass reacts by most exquisite alterations in its total gait, and by still more exquisite vibratory responses in its substance. Her ocean reflects the lights of heaven as in a mighty mirror, her atmosphere refracts them like a monstrous lens, the clouds and snowfields combine them into white, the woods and flowers disperse them into colours. Polarisation, interference, absorption, awaken sensibilities in matter of which our senses are too coarse to take any note.

For these cosmic relations of hers, then, she no more needs a special brain than she needs eyes or ears. *Our* brains do indeed unify and correlate innumerable functions. Our eyes know nothing of sound, our ears nothing of light; but, having brains, we can feel sound and light together, and compare them. We account for this by the fibres which in the brain

connect the optical with the acoustic centre; but just how such fibres bring the sensations as well as the centres together we fail to see. But if fibres are what is needed to do that trick, has not the earth pathways enough by which you and I are physically continuous, to do for our two minds what the brain fibres do for the sounds and sights in a single mind? Cannot the earth-mind know the contents of our two minds together? Must every higher means of unification between things be also a brain-fibre, and go by that name?

Fechner's imagination, insisting on the differences as well as on the resemblances, thus tries to make our picture of the whole earth's life more concrete. He revels in the thought of its perfections. To carry her precious freight through the hours and seasons, what form could be more excellent than hers—being as it is horse, wheels, and wagon all in one? Think of her beauty—a shining ball, sky-blue and sunlit over one half, the other bathed in starry night, reflecting the heavens from all her waters, myriads of lights and shadows in her mountains' folds and valleys' windings, she would be a spectacle of rainbow glory could one only see her from afar as we see parts of her from her own mountain-tops. Every quality of landscape that has a name would then be visible at once in her—all that is delicate or graceful, all that is quiet or wild, or romantic, or desolate, or cheerful, or luxuriant, or fresh. That landscape is her face—a peopled landscape, too, for men's eyes would appear in it like diamonds among the dewdrops. Green would be the dominant colour, but the blue atmosphere and the clouds would enshroud her as a veil enshrouds a bride—a veil the vapoury transparent folds of which the earth, through her ministers the winds, never tires of laying and folding about herself anew.

Every element has its own living denizens; can the celestial ocean of æther whose waves are light, in which the earth herself floats, not have hers, higher by as much as their element is higher, swimming without fins, flying without wings, moving, immense and tranquil, as by a half-spiritual force

through the half-spiritual sea which they inhabit, rejoicing in the exchange of luminous influence with one another, following the slightest pull of one another's attraction, and harbouring, each of them, an inexhaustible inward wealth?

Men have always made fables about angels, dwelling in the light, needing no earthly food or drink, messengers between ourselves and God. Here are actually existent beings, dwelling in the light and moving through the sky, needing neither food nor drink, intermediaries between God and us, obeying his commands. So, if the heavens really are the home of angels, the heavenly bodies must be those very angels, for other creatures *there* are none. Yes! the earth is our great common guardian angel, who watches over all our interests combined.

In a striking page Fechner relates one of his moments of direct vision of this truth.

"On a certain spring morning I went out to walk. The fields were green, the birds sang, the dew glistened, the smoke was rising, here and there a man appeared; a light as of transfiguration lay on all things. It was only a little bit of the earth; it was only one moment of her existence; and yet, as my look embraced her more and more, it seemed to me not only so beautiful an idea, but so true and clear a fact, that she is an angel, an angel so rich and fresh and flower-like, and yet going her round in the skies so firmly and so at one with herself, turning her whole living face to heaven, and carrying me along with her into that heaven, that I asked myself how the opinions of men could ever have so spun themselves away from life so far as to deem the earth only a dry clod, and to seek for angels above it or about it in the emptiness of the sky, only to find them nowhere. But such an experience as this passes for fantastic. The earth is a sphere, and what more she may be one can find in mineralogical cabinets."¹

Where there is no vision the people perish. Few pro-

¹ Fechner, *Üb. d. Seelenfrage*, 1861, p. 170.

fessorial philosophers have any vision. Fechner had vision, and that is why one can read him over and over again, and each time bring away a fresh sense of reality.

His earliest book was a vision of what the inner life of plants may be like. He called it *Nanna*. In the development of animals the nervous system is the central fact. Plants develop centrifugally, spread their organs abroad. For that reason people suppose that they can have no consciousness, for they lack the unity which the central nervous system provides. But the plant's consciousness may be of another type, connected with other structures. Violins and pianos give out sounds because they have strings. Does it follow that nothing but strings can give out sounds? How, then, about flutes and organ-pipes? Of course their sounds are of a different quality, and so may the consciousness of plants be of a quality correlated exclusively with the kind of organisation that they possess. Nutrition, respiration, propagation take place in them without nerves. In us these functions are conscious only in unusual states; normally their consciousness is eclipsed by that which goes with the brain. No such eclipse occurs in plants, and their lower consciousness may therefore be all the more lively. With nothing to do but to drink the light and air with their leaves, to let their cells proliferate, to feel their rootlets draw the sap, is it conceivable that they should not consciously suffer if water, light, and air were suddenly withdrawn; or that when the flowering and fertilisation which are the culmination of their life take place, they should not feel their own existence more intensely and enjoy something like what we call pleasure in ourselves? Does the water-lily, rocking in her triple bath of water, air, and light, relish in no wise her own beauty? When the plant in our own room turns to the light, closes her blossoms in the dark, responds to our watering or pruning by increase of size or change of shape and bloom, who has the right to say she does not feel, or that she plays a purely passive part? Truly plants can

foresee nothing, neither the scythe of the mower nor the hand extended to pluck their flowers. They can neither run away nor cry out. But this only proves how different their modes of feeling life must be from those of animals that live by eyes and ears and locomotive organs; it does not prove that they have no mode of feeling life at all.

How scanty and scattered would sensation be on our globe, if the conscious life of plants were blotted from existence! Solitary would consciousness move through the woods in the shape of some deer or other quadruped, or fly about the flowers in that of some insect. But can we really suppose that the nature through which God's breath blows is such a barren wilderness as this?

I have probably by this time said enough to acquaint those readers who have never seen these metaphysical writings of Fechner, with their more general characteristics, and I hope that many may now feel like reading them in the original. The special thought of Fechner's with which in this place I have most practical concern is his belief that the more inclusive forms of consciousness are in part *constituted* by the more limited forms. Not that they are the mere sum of the more limited forms. As our mind is not the bare sum of our sights plus our sounds plus our pains, but in adding these terms together also finds relations among them and weaves them into schemes and forms and objects, of which no one in its separate estate knows anything, so the earth-soul traces relations between the contents of my mind and the contents of yours of which neither of our separate minds is conscious. It has schemes, forms, and objects proportionate to its wider field, which our mental fields are far too narrow to cognise. By ourselves we are simply out of relation with each other; in it we are both of us there, and "different" from each other, which is a positive relation. What we are without knowing, it knows that we are. We are closed against the world, but that world is not closed against us. It is as if the total universe of inner life had

a sort of grain or direction, a sort of valvular structure permitting knowledge to flow in one way only, so that the wider might always have the narrower under observation, but never the narrower the wider.

Fechner's great analogy here is the relation of the senses to our individual minds. When our eyes are open their sensations enter into our general mental life, which grows incessantly by the addition of what they see. Close the eyes, however, and the visual additions stop; nothing but thoughts and memories of the past visual experiences remain—in combination, of course, with the enormous stock of other thoughts and memories, and with the data of the remaining senses not yet closed. Our eye-sensations of themselves know nothing of this enormous life into which they fall. Fechner thinks, as any common man would think, that they are taken into it directly when they occur, and form part of it just as they are. They don't stay outside and get represented inside by their copies. It is only the memories and concepts of them that are copies; the sensations and percepts are just taken in or walled out in their own proper persons according as the eyes are open or shut.

Fechner likens our individual persons on the earth unto so many sense-organs of the earth's soul. We add to its perceptive life so long as our own life lasts. It absorbs our perceptions, just as they occur, into its larger sphere of knowledge, and combines them with the other data there. When one of us dies, it is as if an eye of the world were closed, for all perceptive contributions from that particular quarter cease. But the memories and conceptual relations that have spun themselves round the perceptions of that person remain in the larger earth-life as distinct as ever, and form new relations and grow and develop throughout all the future, in the same way in which our own distinct objects of thought, once stored in memory, form new relations and develop throughout our whole finite life. This is Fechner's theory of immortality, first published in the little *Büchlein des Lebens nach dem Tode*

in 1836, and re-edited in greatly improved shape in the last volume of his *Zend-Avesta*.

We rise upon the earth as wavelets rise upon the sea. We grow from her soil as leaves grow from a tree. The wavelets catch the sunbeams separately, the leaves stir when the branches do not move. They realise their own events apart, just as in our own consciousness of anything emphatic the background fades from observation. Yet the event works back upon the background, as the waves work upon other waves, or as the leaf's movements work upon the sap inside the branch. The whole sea and the whole tree are registers of what has happened, and are different from the wave's and leaf's action having occurred. A grafted twig may modify its scion to the roots: so our outlived private experiences, impressed on the whole earth-mind as memories, lead the immortal life of ideas there, form parts of the great system, as distinguished as we by ourselves were distinct, realising themselves no longer isolatedly, but along with one another, entering then into new combinations, and being affected by the perceptive experiences of the living who survive us, and affecting the living in their turn, although they are so seldom recognised by living men as doing so.

If you imagine that this entrance into a common future life of higher type means merging and loss of distinct personality, Fechner asks you whether a visual sensation of our own exists in any sense *less for itself* or *less distinctly*, when it enters into our higher relational consciousness and is there distinguished and defined?

Thus is the universe alive, according to this philosopher! I think you will admit that he makes it more *thickly* alive than do the other philosophers who, following rationalistic methods solely, gain the same results, but only in the thinnest outlines. Both Fechner and Professor Royce, for example, believe ultimately in one all-inclusive mind. Both believe that we, just as we stand here, are constituent parts of that mind. No other *content* has it than us, with all the other creatures

like or unlike us. Our eaches, collected into one, are substantively identical with that all, though the all is perfect while no each is perfect, so that we have to admit that new qualities accrue from the collective form, which is thus superior to the distributive. Having reached this result, Royce (though his treatment of the subject on its moral side seems to me infinitely richer and thicker than that of any other contemporary idealistic philosopher) leaves us very much to our own devices. Fechner, on the contrary, tries to trace the superiorities due to the more collective form in as much detail as he can. He marks the various intermediary stages and halting-places of collectivity—as we are to our separate senses, so is the earth to us, so is the solar system to the earth, etc.; and if, in order to escape an infinitely long summation, he posits an absolute God as the all-container and leaves him about as indefinite in feature as the idealists leave their absolute, he yet provides us with a very definite gate of approach to him in the shape of the earth-soul, through which in the nature of things we must first make connection with all the more enveloping superhuman realms, and with which our more immediate religious commerce has at any rate to be carried on.

Ordinary transcendentalism leaves everything intermediary out. It recognises only the extremes, as if after the first rude face of the phenomenal world in all its particularity nothing but the supreme in all its perfection could be found. First, you and I, just as we are in our places; and the moment we get below that surface, the unutterable Absolute itself! Doesn't this show a singularly indigent imagination? Isn't this brave universe made on a richer pattern, with room in it for a long hierarchy of beings? Materialistic science makes it infinitely richer in terms, with its molecules and æther, and electrons, and what not. Absolute idealism, thinking of reality only under intellectual forms, knows not what to do with bodies of any grade, and can make no use of any psychophysical analogy or correspondence. The resultant thinness

is startling when compared with the thickness and articulation of such a universe as Fechner paints. May not satisfaction with the rationalistic absolute as the Alpha and Omega, and treatment of it in all its abstraction as an adequate religious object, argue a certain native indigence of mind? Things reveal themselves soonest to those who passionately want them. Need sharpens wit. To a mind content with little, the much in the universe may always remain hid.

To be candid, one of my reasons for printing this article about Fechner has been to make the thinness of our current transcendentalism appear more evident by an effect of contrast. Scholasticism ran thick; Hegel himself ran thick; but English and American transcendentalism run thin. If philosophy is more a matter of passionate vision than of logic—and I believe it is, logic only finding reasons for the vision afterwards—must not such thinness come, either from the vision being defective in the disciples, or from their passion, matched with Fechner's or with Hegel's own passion, being as moonlight unto sunlight or as water unto wine?

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PSYCHOTHERAPEUTICS AND RELIGION.

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I. WERE the complete history of medical science written, it would without doubt appear that the treatment of disease through what seem to be mental influences has prevailed in one form or another ever since man began to realise that certain illnesses are curable. Yet psychotherapeutics as a science may be said to have had its origin in the famous investigations as to the nature of hypnotism undertaken at Nancy under the leadership of Bernheim, and coincidently by Charcot in Paris, only some twenty-five years ago. These investigations began with the careful observation of certain modes of therapeutic practice which were being used in an unscientific manner at that time under such names as animal magnetism, mesmerism, etc., and which we now see had been thus employed from time immemorial by those who practised the so-called occult arts, magic and necromancy.

But attention to these phenomena has also brought into existence a small host of cults, *e.g.* Mental Healing, Mind Cure, Faith Cure, Metaphysical Healing, Christian Science, etc., whose leaders make use in a more or less bungling way of the methods of the more scientific psychotherapeutics, but explain the resultant cures in terms of doctrines of very dubious nature.

In a large proportion of cases at least, the first crude therapeutics of the uncivilised man probably had its origin among those of the priestly class, which, in the nature of the

case, included all men of special wisdom ; and so far as crude psychotherapeutics was employed in the earlier days, it must almost certainly have been practised under the same auspices, and in connection with religious doctrinal teaching. This being the case, it is not at all surprising to find a tendency to couple religious or semi-religious teaching with our newer psychotherapeutic practice. All the cults above referred to claim to teach what may be broadly described as religious doctrines in conjunction with their mental healing ; and as the forms of doctrine preached have proved acceptable, these cults have gained strength apart from, and even in the antagonism to, the established Churches, and notwithstanding opposition from the scientifically trained men in the medical profession.

The growth of these cults, however, has in general been very limited, Christian Science having alone been markedly successful ; and this evidently because in Mrs Eddy it has a prophetess who has delivered a message, and who has written what is to her followers a sacred book.

Christian Science deals with psychotherapeutics, and it is also announced as a new religion, or a new interpretation of the religious movement instituted by Christ. Its therapeutics is opposed by men of training because of the absurdity of its modes of explanation of the facts with which it deals ; because of its unscientific methods of procedure ; and because of the unfounded claims it makes as to the cure of radical organic diseases, which claims, indeed, it is bound in consistency to make if the doctrines it teaches are well based. Its religious teachings might naturally be expected to arouse some hostile feeling among the established Churches in the fact that it claims to present a new and truer interpretation of the Scriptures, and this hostility has not been reduced by the recognition that Christian Science is gaining not a few converts from the members of the long-established Churches, and that it seems to be moving to new triumphs where these latter have failed to advance.

But what we may perhaps call the worldly success of

Christian Science has led the churchman to note the fact that its advance seems bound up with the cure of disease, with which his church concerns itself only very indirectly. He has seen for years the growth among the people of a habit of turning to their medical advisers for counsel which but a generation ago would have been asked from the priest: he now sees the sudden growth of a new church, the leaders of which claim to take the place of both medical adviser and priest. Naturally, then, he asks whether his church's hold upon the people cannot be retained if he add to his priestly function that of the medical adviser, and naturally we find suddenly appearing within certain of the churches a new school which holds that, if a church is to fulfil its function completely, it must add to its establishment a psychotherapeutic clinic such as is called for by Dr Worcester and Dr MacComb of Emmanuel Church in Boston, where this movement is at present most thoroughly organised. If we may judge from the interest the work of this Boston church has aroused, it seems likely that pressure will be brought to bear upon a large body of the clergy to establish similar clinics in connection with their churches. It may be well worth while, therefore, to make a comparison between the characteristics of Christian Science and those of the Emmanuel Movement as it has been lately described in the "official" volume called *Religion and Medicine*.

II. (1) The Christian Scientist maintains that religion and therapeutics are inseparably connected; and (2) in defence of this position points to the cures resulting from treatment by their leaders, claiming that they can do all that the trained physician can do, and are able to effect cures which the physician cannot accomplish; beyond this, (3) its founder, Mrs Eddy, attempts to establish these claims by a special interpretation of the Scriptures, building upon that as a foundation a metaphysical structure which her disciples present as a warrant for their practice. Let us consider these points in reverse order.

Mrs Eddy's interpretation of the Scriptures is largely based upon the assumption of the verbal inspiration of the original texts and the accuracy of our English translation, and it is true, as the Emmanuel workers say, that "she interprets Scripture in a way that excites the scholar's disgust." For this, however, she should not be too sharply criticised; for her outlook upon life has been exceedingly limited, and in this procedure she has merely followed in the footsteps of the worthies of the Church, with whose methods she must have been more or less familiar.

The metaphysical doctrines promulgated by her, and treated as inspired by her followers, surely cannot be treated seriously when one of her most reverent disciples, who writes a learned apologetic of over 700 pages,¹ acknowledges that "the first reading of her chief work, *Science and Health, with a Key to the Scriptures*, leaves the impression, in spite of much that is strikingly beautiful and true, that there is a prevailing tone of incoherence, contradiction, illogicality and arbitrary, dictatorial assertion, with no regard for evident fact either in the realm of objective nature or history."

One cannot but note how definitely her poorly systematised metaphysical doctrine leads in the direction of mysticism, which indeed seems to have a fascination for the leaders of the Emmanuel Movement themselves, if we may judge by their assumptions as to the nature and function of the "unconscious mind," of which we speak below. In fact, it appears that Christian Science and all kindred cults attract many to their shrines just because they there gain the satisfactions which mysticism in all its forms brings: the relief from effort to think clearly; the delight yielded by the removal of all of the strain attending the appreciation of foresight and responsibility, which must accompany any belief in the individual's absorption within the being of the universal.

It is all too easy, however, to consider this general move-

¹ *The Interpretation of Life*, in which is shown the relation of Modern Culture and Christian Science: by C. C. Mars.

ment from a coldly critical standpoint; we are likely to gain a more satisfactory insight if we take a more sympathetic view. We must face the fact that great numbers of men and women, whose intelligence we do not think of questioning when we meet them in the ordinary walks of life, nevertheless follow the teachings of Christian Science and allied cults which seem to demand logical blindness and hopeless unintelligence. There must be some latent reason why they are willing to lay aside the safeguards of rational life in favour of the non-rational or even the irrational, and I take it that the mystic attraction just referred to would in most cases fail of efficacy were it not that those who thus slip from the firm ground of reason believe that physical sufferings of their own, or of their close friends, have been relieved in connection with the acceptance of these unreasoned doctrines, as they could not have been in any other manner; and this brings us to the consideration of the second point referred to above.

III. All physicians of broad practice and keen observation realise that certain pains may be alleviated or cured, and that certain morbid conditions may be made to disappear, provided a change in the mental state of the patient can be brought about. To what processes this is due they do not often stop to inquire; their business is to cure, and when they find an effective instrument at hand they are likely to use it without etiological inquiry.

The studies of hypnotism above referred to, and kindred inquiries, especially in relation to hysteria, have shown that if we can persuade a person that a pain of which he complains has disappeared, a change for the better in his physical condition will often follow. It does not require special learning to build up a psychotherapeutic practice based upon the observation of such cases; and the Christian Science healers, narrowly educated and of narrow experience, have done just this thing, resting upon the theory that the mental influence of the healer is the effective curative agent. It is easy to see

how a development of this theory would lead to the assumption that all kinds of diseases may be curable by mental influences emanating from a healer, this leading to the practice of the so-called "absent-treatment," with all its follies and dangers.

To the claims thus made the educated and experienced physician naturally enters a vigorous demurrer; he knows all too well the processes of physical decay, which no human skill can do more than delay. And the leaders of the Emmanuel Movement here take issue with Christian Science; for they hold that psychotherapeutics can only be effective in the treatment of functional nervous diseases; and they argue that specially trained physicians should be called into consultation to determine whether cases of nervous trouble presented to them for treatment are functional and not organic. We may overlook the question whether the distinction between functional and organic disease is one that is sufficiently fundamental to warrant the adoption of a mode of therapeutic treatment which may apply to the functional class while not applying to the organic; but we cannot overlook the fact that the leaders of the Emmanuel Movement, whose special training has been to prepare them for other work, are willing and anxious to undertake the cure of disease, for which the skilled physician has specially prepared himself, and to which he has perhaps devoted a lifetime of serious effort. The effective physician must be a man of keen insight, sound judgment, unwarping by emotionalism, and wise; yes, at times even "worldly wise." It cannot be maintained that the clergy as a rule are recruited from those in whom these characteristics are markedly displayed, nor that their training and occupation tend to emphasise these qualities. We cannot but group together the Christian Science healer and the Emmanuel Movement leader as men who lightly take upon themselves work which the most serious experts in medicine study with the deepest care and handle with the greatest caution.

Such an attitude can only be condoned if we grant that these functional nervous diseases can be treated more success-

fully under religious influences than in the non-religious atmosphere of the scientific study of disease; and this claim is quite clearly made by the advocates of the methods here described. This brings us to the question whether it is true that religion and therapeutics are inseparably connected.

IV. It would probably be conceded that religion and therapeutics are necessarily related if it were generally believed that certain diseases can be cured under religious influences that cannot be cured in any other way. But evidence favourable to this belief is difficult to reach. The sceptical physician could probably present cases of the type usually treated by psychotherapeutic methods which he has cured, although the religious healer has failed to do so; but it would evidently be absurd to argue from this that *irreligion* and therapeutics are necessarily connected. So without doubt cases may be cited where disease has been alleviated by the Christian Science and kindred treatments which had not been benefited by many doctors; but this of course does not prove that the same results might not have been gained without religious influences had the proper physicians been consulted. It is easy to create an impression favourable to a given view by persistent reiteration of claims such as is made by the religious healers; but we are learning that if such claims are to be accepted they must be substantiated by scientifically presented evidence, and this we here find to be lacking. The religious healers as a class are unfamiliar with and averse to the labour of collecting accurate statistics: we have therefore no proper means of comparison between the results obtained by the skilled physician who guards his statements by careful calculations, and the religious healer who takes no such precaution. There is thus a presumption against the claim of the latter, which becomes stronger when we consider that he habitually makes use of the very modes of suggestive treatment that are employed by the skilled neurologist. The religious healer will claim that he uses the "power of prayer" as the neurologist

does not ; but if, as we shall presently show, the efficacy of prayer in this connection is due to its power of suggestion, the most the religious healer can claim is that he employs a more powerful suggestive method than that used by physicians : a claim which it would be difficult to substantiate.

Suggestion is ineffective unless the patient is in a receptive attitude of mind, and therefore trust in the one who suggests—a willingness and anxiety to receive command—is essential to the efficacy of the psychotherapeutic treatment. It is probably true that some patients are less ready to put their trust in a physician, who is to them merely a man who claims wisdom, than in a religious teacher, who appears as the representative of a loving and powerful God. Where, then, we find trust more readily yielded to the religious teacher than to the doctor, we should be led to urge the importance of the function of the religious leader as an interpreter to the physician, but should surely not find in it an indication that the religious leader may take the physician's rôle.

It is not at all unlikely that the religious healer at times brings about in his patient something closely allied to a real religious conversion. In religious conversions of a profound type we see the replacement of one morbid individuality by a new and more moral one, and the shifting of point of view so that ideas and aims which were formerly persistent give place to others. Now the very ideas and aims that are thus displaced may have been correlated with morbid physical conditions, and in that case their displacement means the appearance of new physical conditions which may effect the disappearance of what is morbid. In cases where the medical doctor notes that his patient has not felt the influence of religion, and surmises that religious conversion may bring relief, it may appear wise for him to call the clergyman to his aid. We are thus led to hold that collaboration between the medical doctor and the religious leader is greatly to be desired, but are surely not warranted in suggesting the assumption by either of the rôle of the other in addition to his own.

Religion has to do with ethics, with conduct and motive, with the emphasis of the best impulses that are within us ; and with these things therapeutics cannot pretend to deal.

Nor can it for a moment be conceded that religion is dependent for its persistence upon any physical benefit to be gained by the religious devotee. It is very doubtful whether many thoughtful Christians will accept the teaching of the Emmanuel Church leaders, when they perceive that it implies that Christ's healing of the sick was of the very essence of his message to humanity.

V. Christian Scientists make little pretence of explaining their methods or practice in rational terms ; nor is it of importance to them to do so. Based as their system is upon a misconceived idealism, it merely proclaims the unreality of pain, disease, and error, and naturally demands no explanations of what it treats as non-existents.¹

The intellectual follies to which these ill-digested metaphysical theories lead naturally produce a revolt in men of more logical bent ; and we find the Emmanuel leaders, who really care to explain their methods in rational terms, replacing

¹ The psychological basis of this crude metaphysical thesis seems to be found in the relative instability of pain, with which disease and error are correlated. Pleasant experiences tend to persist, and this because they are the correlates of efficient neural activities. Painful experiences, on the other hand, tend to disappear from attention, and this because they are the correlates of inefficient neural activities which tend to cease : they may be persistent enough, as we all too well know ; that is, however, not because of their inner nature, but because of the persistence of external or internal stimuli, which force the activity which, but for the stimulation, would quickly disappear. It is without doubt the vague recognition of this instability of pain itself, as compared with the stability of pleasure itself, that leads to the assertion of the unrealness of pain. This psychological fact is then quite illogically transmuted into an unwarranted metaphysical principle which maintains the unreality of,—the non-existence of,—pains as such. If there is a sense in which this is true, it is also necessary to maintain in the same sense the unreality of pleasure as such ; but it never occurs to the defenders of these vague theories to maintain the unreality of pleasure as such ; rather do they treat pleasure as a reality to which we have a right in the nature of the constitution of the universe.

them by conceptions that on their face seem much more reasonable. Their argument may be summarised as follows:—¹

1. The mind has power over the body (p. 2).

2. (a) There exists in each of us (p. 42) a "sub-conscious mind" which is "a normal part of our spiritual nature." (b) This sub-conscious mind is "purer, more sensitive to good and evil, than our conscious mind," and (c) "has more direct control of our physical processes than the conscious." (d) This powerful sub-conscious mind acts favourably upon the nerves as the result of suggestion and auto-suggestion.

3. (a) "Faith simply as a psychical process or mental attitude . . . has healing virtue" (p. 293). (b) The more deeply personality is involved in any given ailment, the more necessary is it that faith should have an object worthy of men's ethical dignity (p. 294), *i.e.* this faith should be directed toward God. (c) "The prayer of faith has an immense influence over the functions of organic life" (p. 312), and "when we pray earnestly and long for the moral and physical welfare of another, our soul not only acts on that one, but our prayer, rising in the mind of God, directs his will more powerfully and constantly to the soul for which we pray" (p. 316). Hence the value of the association of religion with psychotherapy.

Let us consider these main conceptions in reverse order.

VI. Faith "as a psychical process or mental attitude" implies a listening for and a willingness to obey a command or suggestion: and evidently prayer as a psychical process is closely allied with the mental attitude of faith. When one prays for a second person in that person's presence, the one who prays is clearly suggesting to the other, and enforcing in the other's mind the ideas suggested. When one prays for oneself he is doing the very same thing, but by what is called auto-suggestion.

If one then says that "faith has healing virtue," and that

¹ Page numbers in brackets refer to *Religion and Medicine* as above mentioned.

prayer "has an immense influence over the functions of organic life," we may say that no more is claimed than that the attitude in which suggestion is effective, and the actual process of suggestion, are often followed by improvement in physical condition: a proposition which will be granted, and which evidently may be granted without any acceptance of the doubtful hypothesis above referred to, as to the manner in which the prayer of a human being affects the mind of God, and renders God's mind more effective in relation to the human soul prayed for.

VII. We are thus carried forward to the second point made by the Emmanuel leaders, viz. that suggestion is effective especially, if not almost wholly, through what is called the sub-conscious mind. In this connection we may study briefly, (1) the nature of suggestion as a psychic process; and (2) the hypothesis as to the existence and the nature of the "sub-conscious mind."

1. Altogether too much mystery is attached by the psychotherapists to the process of suggestion, which as a matter of fact we employ, and are subject to, in every moment of our active lives. One uses suggestion whenever he forces an idea into prominence in the mind of another; and what is recognised by the psychotherapist and his patient as suggestion differs from this everyday performance only in the clear intention of the one suggesting, and the recognition by the patient that the healer is attempting to dominate his thought.

When we make our suggestions to a hypnotised patient we are bringing about changes in the patient's mental realm of the abnormal moment, which produce results in the mental situation of the non-hypnotic condition.

In auto-suggestion the patient, having gained the conception of a set of ideas which it is desirable to emphasise, uses every effort to make the appearance of these ideas persistent; and, as we have already seen, this auto-suggestion may be gained through the reiteration of an idea through

prayer. It is to be noted also that the process of auto-suggestion from the psychological point of view is identical with the process of voluntary action or "willing." For it will probably be granted that the Emmanuel Church workers are warranted in describing auto-suggestion as a "self-imposed narrowing of the field of consciousness to one idea, by holding a given thought in the mental focus to the exclusion of all other thoughts" (p. 93). Nor will any psychologist deny that in this they give us a fairly accurate description of the voluntary act; for, as Professor Royce¹ puts it, "to will a given act is to think attentively of that act to the exclusion of the representation or imagining of any and all other acts." This being the case, it is easy to comprehend the close alliance between those who claim to cure by power of will and those who claim to cure by auto-suggestion.

Now it is evident that this process of suggestion is not confined to the emphasis of any one type of ideas. The new ideas may be more or less normal than those replaced, or they may be more or less moral. There is no fundamental difference between these forms of suggestion which lead to evil and the normal types of suggestion in use in everyday life.

Nor is there any fundamental difference between these latter and the forms of suggestion employed by the mental healer, who, however, usually deals with markedly persistent morbid ideas which he wishes to displace. These persistent morbid ideas are of course correlated with morbid nerve situations. If we replace these ideas with others, we reduce the emphasis of the morbid ideas, and at the same time alter the correlated morbid nerve situation. If, then, by exaggeration of the everyday process of suggestion we bring into existence a new set of persistent ideas, we have at the same time eliminated the old and morbid persistent ideas, and coincidentally have changed the nerve situation, and may even have brought about the disappearance of the morbid nerve conditions with which the morbid ideas were correlated.

¹ *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 369.

It seems clear from these considerations that suggestion is not a process which is employed alone in psychotherapeutic practice. Nor can it be said to be a process which is essentially correlated with the religious attitude of mind.

2. Turning to the consideration of the hypothesis as to the existence and nature of the "sub-conscious mind," we note, what will be generally conceded, that when we experience a sharp sensation, a clear thought, a well-defined emotion, a voluntary choice, *i.e.* any clearly defined mental element (A) which is held in attention, there exists at the same moment a specially marked activity in some part (*a*) of the nerve system, usually assumed to be within the brain; but it would never occur to anyone to hold that at the moment considered that nerve part (*a*) is the only part of the nerve system that is active; what we really have in (*a*) is an emphasis of activity in a special part of the all-active nerve system, which is a highly complex system of minor systems of nerve parts. It is most natural, therefore, to assume that the mental element in attention (A) also does not stand alone, but that it is what it is because it is contrasted with a highly complex mental system which is really a broad system of minor systems of psychic elements, which taken in its totality and as inclusive of (A) we call consciousness. The parts of this psychic system which are apart from A and the rest of the field of attention, while not sufficiently emphatic to form part of this field of attention, are effective in forming a background against which the psychic elements within attention appear; this background may therefore be well described as *sub-attentive consciousness*, and that there exists in each moment of an individual's waking life not only a field of attention but also a field of sub-attentive consciousness few psychologists of importance nowadays would question. It is this sub-attentive consciousness that is referred to by those who speak of "sub-consciousness."

Much of the mystery usually felt in relation to this sub-attentive consciousness ("sub-consciousness") results from our

overlooking the fact that it is most intricately systematised, just as the parts of the nerve system whose activities correspond with it are intricately systematised. It is fundamentally of the same nature as attentive consciousness, and we should therefore not be surprised to discover that it is affected by elements which appear in the field of attention, nor surprised to find the field of attention affected by influences initiated within it. The suggestions made to patients in sleep and in trances; the auto-suggestions made as one is falling asleep or just awaking, as recommended by our Emmanuel healers (p. 106), and by the psychotheraputists in general, are cases where mental elements within the field of attention affect the sub-attentive consciousness ("sub-consciousness"). The cases where suggestions thus made change the tone of the mental life of which a man is aware, are cases where a changed sub-attentive consciousness ("sub-conscious mind") affects the man's field of attention.

The mystery as to the nature of the sub-conscious mind being thus dispelled, we are prepared to ask certain questions in relation to the tenets of the Emmanuel workers. They tell us that this "sub-conscious mind" is a normal part of our spiritual nature. Here the word spiritual is doubtless intended to refer to something diverse from the field of attention in consciousness, but this involves an unwarranted assumption. What we mean by our spiritual life is that part of our experience of impulse and motive, realised or imagined, which yields to us the greatest satisfaction in retrospect, and which we, in these moments of reflection, wish might persist and recur in our future experience. But we have in this no warrant for the description of our spiritual being in animistic terms as existing within the body apart from both it and mind (p. 390), or even distinct from both body and soul (p. 379).

The statement that the "sub-conscious mind" is "purer, more sensitive to good and evil, than the conscious" is equally unwarranted, although it seems to have the support of so

eminent a psychologist as William James, who tells us: ¹ "Starbuck seems to put his finger on the root of the matter when he says that to exercise the personal will is still to live in the region where the imperfect self is the most emphasised. Where, on the contrary, the sub-conscious forces take the lead, it is more probably the 'better self' *in posse* which directs the operation."

But how can this be true if, as we have seen above, clearly recognised suggestions are not limited to any special type of ideas? for this implies that suggestions to the sub-attentive consciousness are in like manner not limited to any special type of ideas; that is, that they may as well be immoral as moral. And, whatever these suggestions to the sub-attentive consciousness are, if they are effective it must be because they are welcomed by this sub-attentive consciousness; and this means that the sub-attentive consciousness is in harmony with the ideas welcomed; so that if immoral suggestions are ever effective, it must be because the sub-attentive consciousness is *less* pure, *less* "sensative to good and evil," than the attentive consciousness.

Now, just this happens in cases of temptation. The tempter's suggestions are usually repudiated by the attentive consciousness of the tempted man, because he looks upon them as immoral; nevertheless, they so influence the sub-attentive consciousness of the tempted man that presently he sins without compunction when opportunity offers.

A similar statement may be made in relation to the process of self-sophistication through auto-suggestion.

We are also compelled to question the statement that the sub-attentive consciousness (sub-conscious mind) "has more direct control of physical processes than the conscious" (p. 42). The sub-attentive consciousness is broader than the narrow field of attention; and its nerve activity correlates are doubtless more numerous, and more thoroughly integrated, than those corresponding to the mental elements in attention;

¹ *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 209.

but it is difficult to see how what we call mental control of physical processes can be more efficient in the one case than in the other.

A dim appreciation of the sub-attentive consciousness is involved with all "feeling" and all emotion. We are not surprised, therefore, to find the evidences of the activity of this so-called "sub-conscious mind" in connection with our religious emotions; but it is certainly clear that this relation is one that holds for all "feeling," and for all emotions, and which therefore cannot be claimed to relate especially to our religious life.

It may be well here also to call attention to the fact that attentive consciousness merges into sub-attentive consciousness: out of the latter, as it were, appears the flitting field of the former. This would lead us to hold that as no sharp line can be drawn between the two, so no fundamental distinction can be made between the therapeutic value of suggestions made to the sub-attentive consciousness and to the attentive consciousness of the clear-headed rational man. The field of attention is the active field, the variable field, the field subject to many environmental influences which may prevent the influence of suggestions, but which, on the other hand, may make these suggestions especially effective if they happen to be co-ordinated with those elements of attention which make the substance of what we call our convictions. The field of sub-attentive consciousness, on the contrary, is the less active, the less variable field, the field little subject to environmental disturbance, *i.e.* the conservative field, which often will sustain persistently and without impediment some suggestion given to it, but which can be influenced by a suggestion only provided this latter accords with its own essential nature, which is relatively unvarying.

It would thus appear that in a certain sense the efficiency of suggestion is in general likely to be less marked in relation to the sub-attentive than in relation to the attentive consciousness; and is only likely to be more marked in relation to the

former if we happen to be dealing with what relates to that normal existence which is unconcerned to meet new conditions.

VIII. We may now turn, within such limits as are here appropriate, to the consideration of the nature of that relation of our mental and physical states which leads us to say that the mind has power over the body.

The Christian Scientists are more consistent than the Emmanuel workers and the average educated man, in that the former hold that the mind has power over the whole realm of our bodily activities. It is easy for the opponents of this cult to offer disproof of any such wide extension of the mind's power, but in doing so they present the view that the mind has control over the body in certain directions only and not in others, and leave us with the highly unsatisfactory notion of the common man that the relation of the mind to the body is an entirely haphazard and lawless one.

The category of causality is one upon which we rest, forgetful of its mysteries. Its value is due to the fact that the recognition of concrete causal relations enables us to predict with certainty events in the future from data found in the present. As the result of many experiences we then find ourselves gaining satisfaction from the mere statement of the existence of a causal relation even where little evidence is at hand to warrant such a statement; we rest content as though we had once for all solved all the mysteries involved in the relations within the sequence of events we have under consideration. Thus it is that we satisfy ourselves with the assertion that the action of the body causes mental changes, and conversely that the mind acts causally upon the body, although the greatest uncertainty prevails in prediction as to the bodily states that will follow certain mental conditions, and as to the mental states that will follow certain bodily conditions.

It is worth our while, therefore, to note that we are aided greatly in our comprehension of the relation between our

mental states and therapeutics by waiving entirely the question as to the causal relation between mind and body, turning our attention to the hypothesis of "parallelism" which is held by a large body of psychologists in our day, according to which each change in the psychic system which we call consciousness is accompanied by a coincident change in the activities within the nervous system.

We note in a patient a certain morbid state of mind A, which under our hypothesis is necessarily accompanied by a morbid nerve condition α . When we make a suggestion to the patient the state of mind A is replaced by the state of mind B, and coincidently of necessity the nerve condition α gives place to a certain new nerve condition β , a fact which is usually overlooked. This new nerve condition β may be one that tends to yield a less morbid nerve condition than α , and may thus bring into existence a normal nerve condition γ , which is evidenced by the appearance of a corresponding happier mental condition C.

Turning to auto-suggestion, which we have seen to be identical with voluntary action, we note that if a person "wills" the disappearance of a pain, he "wills" the replacement of a painful mental state by some other that is not painful. To his mental "act of will" there corresponds a nerve change; and if therefore the pain disappears, it is because the alterations of nerve activity accompanying the act of will are followed by new physical conditions to which correspond the new and non-painful mental state. Now we have much reason to believe that painful mental states correspond with inefficient nerve activities, and the displacement of pain therefore means that inefficient nerve activities cease more or less completely. The physical parts whose activities were inefficient (to which pain corresponded) are thus brought to a condition of quiescence which is a condition favourable to recuperation. If, then, there be no serious lesion, the replacement of the pain may well be followed by repair of the nerve parts affected, and a return to normal conditions.

IX. We are thus again led to the conclusion that there is no such essential connection between religion and psychotherapeutics as is assumed by those whose work is here considered. The facts we have presented might lead us to urge the physician to encourage the growth of closer and more sympathetic relations with the clergy, and to urge the religious teacher to trust more implicitly than he does to the trained expert; but if we may judge from the general movement in the direction of specialisation, and from a comparison of conditions in the past and in the present, the functions of the priest and of the physician are likely to become more and more distinct in the future.

It is, of course, a matter of question whether a large proportion of the cases treated successfully by the Emmanuel Church or Christian Science methods could be benefited if the patients were no longer allowed to believe that their cures are due to some mysterious or miraculous agency. And this raises the broader question whether it is folly to teach wisdom where ignorance is bliss. Those who believe that relief from pain is of the highest significance in this world would urge us to avoid the awakening of the intellect if this awakening means the continuance of human suffering. There are those, however, with whom the author of this paper allies himself, who feel that other ends are more important than the hedonistic, and that the greatest nobility of character cannot be gained until men are willing calmly to face the facts of life as they comprehend them; that in the long-run it will be better for the race to risk the continuance of some suffering among weaklings whom the arts of magic can alone relieve, rather than to curtail the development of clear thinking among the common people.

HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL.

NEW YORK.

THE SOCIAL CONSCIENCE OF THE FUTURE.

I.

MISS VIDA SCUDDER.

I.

THAT the socialist state is surely on the way, few even within the movement would dare confidently to assert; that many tendencies point to it, few even without the movement would dare deny. With the socialist party in Germany gaining a million votes in five years; with a socialist labour-party represented in the British Parliament; with the Pan-Anglican Congress drawing its largest and most eager audiences to hear socialism discussed and in the main endorsed by the clergy—indications thicken. In Latin Europe the socialists are a force to be increasingly reckoned with: if the movement in America is less concentrated than in smaller or more autocratic countries, the sentiment is perhaps more widely diffused. *Shooting Niagara—and After*, was the title of one of Carlyle's alarmist pamphlets over half a century ago. The stream is broad, and we have not shot Niagara yet; but the sound we hear may be the roar of the approaching falls.

It is, of course, still possible to stop one's ears; it is also feasible to try to work upstream; and a large number of thinkers, and some statesmen, are to-day engaged in this pursuit. Meantime, everybody is talking. A great dis-

cussion is "on," which bids fair to throw all other intellectual interests temporarily into the shade. While it rages, the socialist vote continues to increase; and the idea occurs to the impartial observer that an activity apart from defence or attack might profitably occupy the sober-minded public: getting ready for the possible plunge.

Moral preparation for the New Order! It might well be the watchword of the hour; it is the last thing of which one hears. The militant socialists are too busily engaged in aggressive propaganda: so preoccupied with their vision of healing and liberation for the body, that they lay themselves open to the charge of feeling slight interest in the soul. The conservatives are absorbed in defence. Yet in the confusion one fact is clear: should socialism come otherwise than as the result of an inward transformation, affecting the deep springs of will and love, it would prove the worst disaster of any experiment in collective living that the world has seen. Matthew Arnold, wisest of Victorian critics, pointed out years ago the perils with which the advance of democracy is fraught, unless it be achieved through a common enlightenment and a pervading social passion. Socialism is democracy pushed to an extreme. It would involve immensely elaborated machinery. Unless the spirit of the living creature be in the wheels, one foresees them grinding destruction. Should socialism be other than the expression of a general will very different from that of to-day, it would be an unbearable tyranny. The only comfort is that it could not endure. The socialist state might quite conceivably be ushered in suddenly, forced by revolution or by the proletariat vote on an unprepared world which had undergone no inner change: it could never be so maintained. For no social order can be even relatively stable if it is mechanically introduced. It must be a growth, and growth has to root deeply underground before it shows much in the light of day. No one could enforce laws against stealing in a community in which two-thirds of the

citizens had kleptomania. Picturing a social democraey introduced by violence, with its ranks of reluctant citizens undergoing the industrial conscription, and of autocratic officials running a state enemy to all free self-expression, one perceives the very "coming slavery" of standard dread. The critics who echo Spencer down the decades are right enough from their point of view: far more right, in any case, than the old-fashioned doubters who saw in socialism a future riot of licence.

The truth is, that we are forced to agree with our tedious friends who insist that we "must alter human nature" if socialism is to be a success.

But is the prospect so staggering? Call History to the witness-stand! Human nature alters perpetually before our eyes. The stuff is malleable, nay, fluid, and its changes are the soul of progress. A moral transformation has accompanied every new social order evolved since the story of the race began. Each vanishing civilisation has been at once cause and product of distinct ethical types. Nomadic life yields to agricultural; states rise and fall; a great imperialism gathers the nations into its folds, disintegrates, disappears; a feudal system rises, thrives, decays. Industrialism follows, a society founded on commercial ability succeeding one founded on physical force. The imagination, brooding on these various social orders, recognises them, not by their outward traits but by the personal types which they produced. The consciousness of those delightful young Athenians, disciples of Socrates, friends of Plato, created Greece as much as Greece created them. It differed from the mind of the Puritan as much as that differs from the mind of the man in the street to-day, and both from the mind of the Napoleonic general. Emphases change as the ages pass; ideals shape themselves like clouds, and like clouds depart. Now these virtues, now those, are fostered; now these sins, now those, run rank. The pioneer in that almost untried study, evolutionary psychology, has a fascinating field before him.

So dramatic is this moral shifting, that the virtues of one age sometimes become the vices of another. In the days of chivalry, the most popular virtue was to run at your neighbour, spear in hand, when you met him on the road, and cheerfully to knock him off his horse, in accordance with a courteous code of etiquette. We do not approve of this practice to-day, and chivalry is gone. A new ethics has replaced it. The most popular virtue now is to accumulate money enough to educate one's family decorously, with a surplus on which to be generous—though by so doing one push one's neighbour's family to the wall. Further contemplating modern ideals, we note that this central virtue of Acquisitiveness is surrounded by attendant nymphs: Thrift, Energy, and Foresight. Certain old-fashioned traits once considered to be virtues are now commonly counted to men for vices. Non-resistance, for example, now considered cowardice in men or states; meekness, to-day usually spelled weakness; taking no thought for the morrow, now known as improvidence; unworldliness, now generally viewed as a phase of sentimentality. A perfunctory verbal admiration is accorded these qualities in some quarters, but no one looking straight at life can fail to see that the person who allowed them to rule his conduct consistently and exclusively, would not only be likely to ruin the lives of those dear to him, but would in the long run become a public charge.

In all seriousness, the virtues fostered and applauded by our present commercial civilisation are the self-regarding ones. Many subtle causes have conspired during the last hundred and twenty-five years to produce an ideal in which militant violence is at a discount and force is replaced by greed, but in which the individual is the centre more exclusively than in any preceding phase of history, and the defence of personal rights in an indifferent or hostile world is the first canon of duty. Till this canon is satisfied, all else must be deferred. The moral type which emerges, approved and enticing, is one in which integrity is at least nominally honoured, and justice is not nominally ignored, but in which alertness and prudence,

energy and practical judgment, point the way to victory, while mercy, humility, indifference to personal gain, exercised otherwise than as an indulgence supplementary to the serious business of life, spell social failure and breed contempt.

Is this instinct of defiant self-protection destined always to remain the master-passion in the social structure? Surely not in its present form. We can be sure of only one thing concerning the industrial and competitive civilisation which has so stressed this instinct, and that is, that its hour will strike. As the Age of Violence was succeeded by the Age of Greed, so the Age of Greed will be succeeded by some other age, in which neither physical force nor commercial cleverness will be the key-note of the personal ideal. What this new age will be like, we do not know. It is always the unexpected that happens, and the great forces that control history work out into surprising relations and results. We use the term socialism as a sort of algebraic expression, ignorant what truth may lie behind the symbol. Algebraic formulæ, however, truly express laws of relation; and if we wish to infer from future probabilities some guidance to present duty, the moral correlate to the socialist state is a fruitful topic to consider.

We might as well use what light we have. So far as we can see, what is on the way is a great equalisation of wealth, such as Arnold long ago asserted to be necessary to social advance. It will be achieved by many restrictions and readjustments. The functions and privileges of the common life will assume an importance that we can hardly imagine; many enterprises now run for private profit will be run for public good; many incentives to productive energy now operative will be limited or withdrawn. The individual will find his outward life more prepared in advance for him, so to speak, than is likely to be the case to-day, unless he is either a proletarian or an hereditary legislator. One hardly needs to enumerate the incoherent forces which are pointing in this direction. The slow but sure growth of the working people

in class-consciousness, and their entrance on political power, the consolidation of industry, the spread of social compunction—all point the same way. Apparently the great changes that are coming will divide the future order from the present as widely as we are divided from the feudal system.

It would certainly do no harm to prepare ourselves, and yet more our children, for these probably imminent and drastic changes. We might well resume a somewhat discredited pursuit—the culture and training of the interior life—from a new point of view. “I wish you to open the New Year with a sacrifice to the Graces: to put off the old and on the new man,” wrote that amazing old worldling, Lord Chesterfield, to his much-exhorted son. Crises recur when society as a whole puts off the old Adam and puts on the new. Seeing the great New Year that perhaps trembles at the point of dawn, it certainly behoves us to follow Chesterfield’s good counsel: to endue ourselves, so far as in us lies, with the new Adam who can thrive in the socialist state to be.

II.

It is not difficult to gain at once a general and superficial idea of the work that lies before us. Socialism is going to demand a great development of the other-regarding virtues. Unless the instincts of fair play and of service, and the habit of scrutinising the reactions of one’s deeds on the general life, become more common than now, the members of the new society will have a restive and miserable time of it. Nothing is simpler than to begin to train oneself at once in these instincts. One can put a little catechism to himself every night: Should I have been a good citizen of the socialist state to-day? Have I cultivated in myself the impulses that will be abiding incentives to life and labour when incentives born of self-interest are limited or removed? Have I desired honour, achievement, serviceableness, rather than mere profit? Have I loved my work (if it be in any wise lovable) for work’s sake, not for gain’s sake? Have I been as sorry over the

sufferings of my neighbour as over my own sufferings, as watchful of his interests as of my own? Has my spirit been free from evil suspicion, or from pleasure in getting ahead of others, and full of brotherly trust in men? Have I found my joys less in what I call "mine" than in the great beauties and blessings we call "ours"?

It is all extremely simple. But if we can say "Yes," then in our hearts at least the new order has been born.

But it is worth while to look more deeply into the probable reactions of the socialist state upon the interior life. And the first patent fact is that socialism is going to bring with it a penetrating discipline, perhaps the most universal in pressure of any that history has evolved. "Doing as one likes," that distinctively British ideal flouted of Arnold, will be at a discount. In important and new respects, we shall all have to do what the state likes. We shall have to acquiesce in laws of life and labour that may inhibit impulse and check achievement at a thousand unsuspected points. We shall want to go a-fishing: the stern necessities of the industrial conscription will stand in the way. Our tastes may lie in farming, and an over-supply of farmers reported from Government may send us behind the counter. We may feel within us the capacity to accumulate millions and bounteously to scatter them abroad: matters will be so managed that neither our generosity nor our acquisitiveness can have free scope. All this, of course, on the assumption that we now belong to those privileged classes, the members of which have such really choice tastes to indulge, and who do so very much like to suit themselves. The chaotic independence that we now enjoy will vanish like a mist, replaced by an orderly social organisation in which individuality, trammelled in various ways where it is now free, will have to express itself, if at all, through new channels.

And in all probability we shall not enjoy this condition of things at all. Distaste for discipline is innate in the human breast. We all wail in unison with the little boy in *Peter*

Pan, who cries, "I don't *want* to take my bath!" as good Nana trots him sternly to the tub. Certainly, the present world affords an especially bad introduction to that future state. For never was there a period which so shrank from disciplines and restrictions of every kind, and so far succeeded in throwing them off, as the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. See where we stand to-day! The Churches have candidly abandoned all disciplinary functions: a religion of good-humour has taken the place of the old religion of fear: nay, the horror of discipline has led to the foundation of a new popular faith, which regards pain, not as a task-master, but as an illusion. Ethical restraints, especially in the matter of marriage, are weakening with the religious. The substitution of indulgence for discipline in the education of children, and the triumphant march of the free elective system, point the same way; while until very lately restraints on "individual enterprise" in the industrial sphere were viewed with keen suspicion. This relaxation of discipline, in the name of freedom and of natural good, which has been going on ever since the Revolutionary upheaval, has resulted in a curious state of things. Many a critic, from Carlyle down, has not hesitated to describe modern life as an organised anarchy. To-day, the outcry against social restraint in any form still rises vigorously, from dramatists and philosophers as well as from the man in the street, and Spencer's lugubrious prophecy of the bureaucratic tyranny threatened by socialism still finds many an echo: at the same time, he who listens can hear an increasing volume of voices in a different song. For Carlyle, with his bewildered cry, "Wanted an autocrat," was only the first prophet of a strong reaction. A line of thinkers down the decades has protested against the riot of individualism, and demanded a principle of effective authority for the salvation of the modern world. Here comes one of the latest, Mr Irving Babbitt, ably pointing out the intellectual laxity that has resulted from the sway of humanitarianism in its two phases—inaugurated, so he says, by Bacon and Rousseau—the

extension of knowledge and the extension of sympathy. He shows with convincing logic how humanitarianism slips either into sentimentality or into scientific accumulation, in neither of which is found that power to train in selection and judgment which is the basis of sound education. Mr Babbitt would propose to restore this decaying power by a revival of humanistic and classical training in schools and colleges. One endorses and applauds, perceiving at the same time that there is small chance of effectively restoring the intellectual disciplines in a society where the moral disciplines are undermined. The educational world does but reflect in its tendencies the larger world without. Contemplating the relaxation of all effectual restraints that has gone on for over a hundred years, one is assured that a change more profound than a revival of classical studies will be needed, if the world is to become in the good old sense a school for character.

Nor can this needed discipline ever be regained by mere revivals of any kind. History does not repeat itself. Carlyle's hero-autocrat will never bless our eyes again. He has gone with the feudal system, and it is to be feared that the classical curriculum has disappeared with him, to be "happy in the past."

What then if we looked forward? What if the prophesied tyranny of the socialist state, being fulfilled, should prove itself to be not curse but blessing? It is possible, at least. The humanitarian movement, which is surely one of the main currents sweeping us toward socialism, may in time become humane. Through all vapours of sentimentality and materialism, it may flow on and out into a clearer air. Out of its own necessities it may generate that power to restrain, select, subdue, in which modern civilisation most clearly fails. The discipline supplied by socialism may conceivably prove to be that very discipline, competent to shape human life to nobler likeness, for which our wisest clamour; and when the "coming slavery" is here, we may find in it that service which is perfect freedom.

But only on one condition: that this authority, with the discipline it entails, be the result of the general will of the whole enlightened community. Autocracy is one thing; voluntary self-control is another. Better our present chaos than a state without poverty or disease, established against the free will of its members! A "benevolent despotism" imposed from outside, no matter how excellent its results, is repudiated by the spirit of democracy. But discipline self-imposed is the first requisite of noble manhood. Limit personal independence through external tyranny of mob or Czar, you produce the slave; limit it by the choice of the common will, you gain the only citizen who is truly free. The advance of civilisation is measured by its self-imposed restrictions. Already to-day, such restrictions for the sake of the social welfare are thickening on every hand. We may no longer spit in the street cars,¹ nor take more than a given number of lodgers to the cubic feet of air that we control. In countless matters the enlightened conscience is limiting its prerogatives, in that spirit of joy which transforms sacrifice from mutilation to redemption.

The one chance for the well-being of the great coming experiment to which, apparently, we are all but committed, is that it shall express a general aspiration and a common choice. We may as well be frank. Socialism is going to mean a new degree of authority, not over this class or that class but over every last man. And the one thing that can, if we wish to, make this authority not only enduring but salutary and life-giving, will be that it is bestowed by the communal will, to the end of the welfare of the whole. In how many ways has humanity sought to achieve this welfare! It has tried despotisms; they ended in disaster: it has tried anarchies; they have left us in our chains. What if the times were ripe to try a new way—the way of illumined and reasonable sacrifice of individual rights to a wider good? Neither the Russian autocracy nor the riot of individualistic *laissez-faire*

¹ This is written of the United States.—EDITOR.

has conquered conditions under which the majority of men are able to attain the full stature of their manhood. But now democracy is for the first time coming to its own. Does it not whisper in our ear a new possibility—a social organisation in which equality of opportunity shall be created by the deliberate surrender of private privilege, and each child born into the world shall grow up under such discipline in moderation and selflessness as will prohibit his personal powers from impeding the full welfare of his fellow-men? Surely, socialism so conceived may be our moral salvation. It may afford the God-appointed means to check the self-indulgence that enervates the modern world, and the egotism that blasts us like a disease. Neither reform in education nor indefinite preaching in the air is likely to produce this result or to afford the needed corrective. But a reorganisation of the whole basis of society can do it. Nor is it Utopian to believe that such reorganisation can be achieved, not by the self-assertion of the poor, but by the self-knowledge of all working together. To say that it is impossible for the race at large to gain sufficient self-control to adopt an order planned at the expense of “those spend-thrift liberties that waste liberty,” to attain the most general diffusion of well-being and opportunity, is to despair of human nature. Let the Potter’s Wheel, as the ages pass, twirl faster; let it mould the clay into forms increasingly complex, by pressure increasingly heavy, involved, and severe. If the vessel emerge in greater and more serviceable beauty, the gain is clear; and the clay will sing to the pressure of the wheel.

III.

We cannot expect, of course, that the will which creates the socialist order should be universal. It will suffice if it be as common as the will that to-day keeps honesty and decency as the general and outward rule in social life. One sees immediately that there will always be some types of people miserable in the socialist state. Chief among them are a

number of those who are to-day agitating most loudly for socialism. Your born malcontent will be extremely ill at ease in the social order for which he clamours, and it is amusing to contemplate him there! One foresees him kicking angrily against the pricks, and organising reactionary movements in the sacred name of personal independence. The windy demagogue, the man of words, the restless rebel—it is by a curious history that he is in the socialist ranks at all. For socialism, as we all begin to see, really means an unparalleled degree of law and order. Those who promote it are, though against their wills, the friends of law; and Mr Chesterton's "Man who was Thursday" is entirely correct in suggesting that the Central Council of Rebels is in reality composed of members of the secret police. The revolt against civilisation during the last hundred years has had two impelling forces: self-assertion and self-effacement, individualism and chivalry. Despite the Marxian with his scorn for the second, and the Churchman with his distrust of the first, both are potent, positive, and essential. From Leopardi to Heine, to Tolstoi, to Ibsen, to Nietzsche; from Mazzini to Ruskin, to Morris, to Jaurés—the two forces pull side by side, yoke-fellows looking askance each on each, but ploughing the furrow together. Philanthropists and revolutionists, idealists and materialists, socialists and anarchists, confusedly work together toward an unseen end. To trace the action and reaction of the two forces is a study in distinctions awaiting the social psychologist aforesaid. They are still united for attack. When this work is done, and the "forts of folly fall," the testing of the ranks will be swift and sure. Then it will be seen who is the true socialist, for we shall learn which man is really at home in the world he has evoked. Who can doubt that it will be he who has trained himself spiritually for the new order—who by watchful self-control has developed the new social intuitions, the swift perception of that delicate point where the pressure of his own claims and powers might inflict injury rather than help on others? This is the man

who will make the inner strength of the new state; and it is he who will rejoice in the new order, not the impatient man intent on self-development who is the chosen hero of certain schools in letters and philosophy. We shall know then that the real socialist is he who has been actuated all along, not by egotism or the instinct of revolt, but by the resolute longing for a state in which each individual shall be competent to attain the highest point of development consistent with the general welfare. The barren self-assertion, the helpless and violent temper of rebellion, the outcry against all that checks private self-gratification, which for over a hundred years have been mistaking themselves for a passion for freedom, will find their logical executioner where they think to find their patron. Byronism and Nietzscheism will languish miserably—or else, and quite conceivably, will form in the new socialism a dangerous element that will be allowed just enough freedom to act as safety-valve.

But there are others besides the malcontents who are likely to feel painfully the gentle discipline of the socialist state. At a word, the pressure will probably be most severe on originality and self-indulgence: on the brilliant and the weak. Consider for a moment the probable fate of genius under socialism. Genius! that erratic gift so notoriously reluctant to submit itself to any disciplines whatever, so confident that the needs of its own soul—sometimes, alas! confounded with its senses—are the one light by which it must walk! Well, one does foresee a hard time for the artists—in particular for the minor men, artists by temperament rather than by power. Many a man convinced that he is born to be a poet may die with all his music in him, having served the community in bitterness of soul as cook and bottle-washer to the end. As one contemplates this elimination of minor poets, one congratulates the community while commiserating the singers. But what about the really great men? There will be pensions, of course, and exemptions. The new order will be very eager to discover genius: as soon as a man has justified himself in its eyes it

will free him from other pursuits, bidding him paint and write for the rejoicing world. But will the world make its selection wisely? Ah, there's the rub. It never did yet. One pictures Martin Tupper contentedly pouring forth platitudes on a pension, while John Milton writes the *Paradise Lost* of the future in odd moments, when his quota of work is done.

Well, perhaps the epic will be none the worse for it. Eating one's bread with tears, and learning in suffering to teach in song, may help in the future as in the past to deepen the music. Injustice and neglect have been foster-parents of the muse. But of course one does believe that a mighty saving of creative power will be effected by the new order. A Thomas Chatterton will not commit suicide when that good day has dawned.

For we have to remember the immense amount of social waste involved in the present system. When we imagine a time in which the majority of children will not be assigned before birth to an industrial slavery in which all artistic instincts are stifled, we see the unpredictable gain that may result. When we contemplate the life of the average man to-day, we are to think, not of the university student or the successful merchant but of the factory hand, or, if you will, of that every tenth man who, unless the social revolution hastens its pace, will fill a pauper's grave. Our despotisms and our anarchies have alike failed miserably to give this man a chance. After a century and a quarter of the industrial individualism plus political equality inaugurated with such glowing hopes, we face, broadly speaking, a world in bondage. And if social reorganisation on broad lines is called for more and more loudly, even at the evident cost of some surrender of private independence, it is from the growing conviction that such surrender is the price to be paid for a rich and full life for the majority.

Our new hope of social welfare was not possible before the advent of democracy; nor was it possible until democracy had had time to work for several generations as a leaven within the

souls of men. For the self-control and sacrifice for which it calls, on the part of the strong, can find motive only in that intuition of the Whole which democracy brings, and which we feel to-day tingling in every nerve of the social body. Freedom ! It is indeed a holy name, in which more crimes are committed than those known to Madame Roland. Only to-day are we beginning to realise that it is a term of social rather than of individual import, never to be realised by the one while the many are still bound. True liberty is positive, not negative, dealing less with the removal of restriction than with the imparting of power. It consists, not in the licence of each person to indulge desire, but in the power bestowed by the community upon its every member to rise to the level of his richest capacity by living in harmony with the Whole. Of this freedom, Dante knew more than the schools of the Revolution ; for he placed it at the end, not the beginning of humanity's journey, and showed it to be a gift awaiting the climber at the summit of the mount of discipline rather than a companion of the pilgrim way.

Social welfare is a wider term than personal liberty ; but it includes that liberty, even in the narrower sense, just as soon as the restrictions through which alone, apparently, it can be attained become the result, not of a law imposed from without, but of a choice from within the social structure. The joyous surrender of personal rights which the socialist state, in accordance with the common will, must demand from its citizens will be in itself the evidence of a high degree of private freedom. For the crowning glory and the only thorough proof of freedom has always been a willing submission ; and the "richest capacity for living in harmony with the Whole" may again and again prove a kenosis or self-emptying. "I will run the way of Thy commandments when Thou hast set my heart at liberty," said the psalmist. The fruit of inner liberty is ever obedience to law. Only he possesses who refrains, and the way of renunciation is always the way of freedom.

IV.

And here at last we reach the heart of our subject. The Way of Renunciation the Way of Freedom! How long religion has known this truth! With what desperation, and against what heavy odds, at least in the Western world, has she clung to it! Who can fail to recognise the profound paradox and puzzle which from the dawn of Christianity has weakened the religious sense of Europe, and tended to make the precepts of our religion food for the hypocrite or the cynic? To a large extent, all that makes for the permanence and energy of the social structure has seemed to be the exact denial of all that makes for sanctity. It was not in jest but in earnest that we pointed out at the beginning the stress laid by our modern social system on the virtues that constitute practical efficiency and lead to self-regarding success. This emphasis is clearer and more single in an industrial democracy like ours than under any previous conditions; but it has been prominent in the whole course of Western civilisation. It differentiates our ethical and social conditions from those of the East, where these virtues have always been more or less at a discount. Not that the East has lacked its conquerors or its tyrants; but that, in a social order at once less exacting and more stable, the individual, if he felt the craving for the religious life, could at least gratify it, torn by no agonising conflict between his duty to the state and his duty to his own soul. But how have "the pride of life, the tireless powers" in which the West has gloried been sustained? Through the pushing eagerness of every individual to distance his fellows in the race and to achieve for himself the dominance of assured ownership, were it over a large kingdom or a small. Self-assertion has been with us more than the condition of personal success; it has been the oil on the wheels—nay, we may go farther, the motive power in the whole social machine. The passivity of the non-resistant has been recognised by the thinker as a peril to social advance, or at

best as innocuous only because so safely rare. A man who carried to their logical extreme the precepts of the Sermon on the Mount would, as it has frequently been pointed out, bear no vital relation whatever to the social Whole, or at least have no productive function in regard to it.

Mercy, humility, poverty of spirit, are indeed endearing traits for the parasite and weakling; they may also be permitted to the strong man as a decorative adjunct when the serious business of life has been attended to. But that serious business means the watchful nurture of one's own interests, since by the sum total of such devotions equilibrium and progress are alike secured.

During the Middle Ages this emphasis on the self-regarding virtues was somewhat checked by an authoritative hierarchy, both religious and secular, which limited the ambition of the individual, no less than by the prominence of the monastic ideal as a counsel of perfection. In the modern world it has come to prevail all but alone. Yet, while this emphasis is clearer and more single to-day than ever before, it is worth noting that it is left far more than in the past without philosophical foundation. During the Middle Ages the world was popularly viewed as a creation of the devil and an enemy of the soul; it was then natural that religious virtues should contribute to the destruction rather than to the health and permanence of the worldly order. The Christian, so far as practicable, withdrew from action; the law of renunciation and sacrifice led too often, though with glorious exceptions, to social inefficiency; and we face, looking back, the curious phenomenon of two orders confronting each other, in opposition not logically sustained yet always latent: the World, going on its ancient way of lust and chaffering, and Christianity, drawing its most ardent adherents away from Vanity Fair into the hush of an existence in which action was suspended and self was lost that it might find itself in God.

There were perplexity and inconsistency enough in that

situation. There is a new perplexity, a new inconsistency, for us to face to-day. Paradox, in the relation of the Christian to the world, has become more and more cruel to thinking minds; and the conflict between the ideals of personal holiness and of social efficiency has driven many to despair, more to denial. For the Manichæan ideal has increasingly lost hold. We no longer view the material universe and the structure of social life as a lure of the devil, but rather as a sacrament revealing the Divine. The true meaning of those great dogmas, the Incarnation and the Indwelling of the Spirit, begins to be perceived. They unite with the growth of the Higher Pantheism to destroy the mediæval conception that living as a productive unit in the social whole is a necessary negation of the claims of God. On the contrary, we are learning that social well-being is a holy thing, and that so to shape our activities that they may minister to it is a primary religious duty. To restore to all men their earth-heritage has become a sacred aim—an aim not to be attained by sporadic philanthropies, but by such a shaping of the social order that this well-being may be the product of the sum total of the normal activities of men. Thus the old conflict between the ideals that make for social permanence and those that make for individual salvation loses all justification; and the paradox by which the virtues recognised by all Christians to be the highest are nevertheless seen to be so impracticable that they would, if universal, destroy society, appears in all its naked cruelty.

But what if we were moving toward a state of things in which the law of individual selflessness and sacrifice were to become the fundamental law of social health? This, and nothing less, is essentially the moral transformation demanded by socialism. It proposes to translate into terms of social efficiency the deepest and most mystical law of spiritual being, and to achieve a true harmony between two spheres of life which have always appeared hopelessly incompatible. Renunciation! Sacrifice! They are a necessity of true

selfhood so deep, so inward, that it can never be exhausted. They will find further reaches, deeper scope, when they shall have overcome the initial obstacle presented to their realisation by the present social order. But at least it will be a gain when we are summoned to practise them by the state, not as a private luxury, not as self-immolation to a Setebos, but in the name of the larger social self, of which the functions can only be performed as the individual joyously surrenders all claim to special privilege, and finds in self-subjection his true liberty. He who loses his life shall find it! Even in nature we begin to perceive this hidden law. We shall probably see it more and more clearly there as science advances. But it is in the life of humanity that we may look for its perfect triumph—humanity, that has clung to it with passion even when it most seemed to contradict all social progress, and to lead to a self-centred and cloistered virtue that dwelt afar from the habitations of men and from all productive power. This law, gradually accomplishing its work in the hearts of men, must in due time reshape the social structure so that individual sin need no longer be social virtue, nor individual holiness, socially speaking, a negative and unfruitful source. That this due time is at least conceivably our own time is not for people to deny who have for ever on their lips the prayer, Thy Kingdom come on Earth.

VIDA D. SCUDDER.

IS THE OLD TESTAMENT A SUITABLE BASIS FOR MORAL INSTRUCTION?

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IN the January number of the HIBBERT JOURNAL (1908) it was ably argued that religion is a necessary constituent in all education, and that educated Christendom will be satisfied with nothing less, as a basis for religious education, than the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, with or without the Church's interpretation of them. It is also argued that these Scriptures present the necessary material in a condensed form, that they remain as the one clear record of the Soul of a People, and that modern criticism, so far from destroying their value, shows us that we are not at the end, but at the beginning of their usefulness.

With the general tenor of the propositions thus laid down most serious educationalists will be in sufficient accord. Nevertheless, the practical difficulties they involve are both numerous and formidable. I propose in this article to limit myself to a discussion of those connected with the use of the Old Testament as a text-book for moral instruction.

There are many who still refuse to allow the existence of moral difficulties in the Old Testament. They bathe them in the glow of religious fervour, or dissolve them in the *aqua fortis* of an unquestioning faith. There are others who, if pressed, acknowledge the difficulties, but think it wiser to let sleeping dogs lie. And there are others who, clearly seeing

the difficulties, cannot bring themselves to shut their eyes to what are palpable breaches of the civilised moral code, not to speak of offences against the Christian law of love. It is, of course, with the doubts and perplexities of this last class that I propose to deal; for I have intense sympathy with them. And I am bold to maintain that we assume all too easily the fitness of the Hebrew Scriptures to serve as a basis for moral instruction.

It cannot be denied that most people have but the vaguest ideas of the ethical principles underlying the early stages of Hebrew history, and still vaguer ideas of the ethical evolution therein manifested. Even when we turn to the writings of those who should be experts in this subject, we are most frequently sorely disappointed. There is a painful absence of any broad grasp of the problems to be faced, and in its stead a timid and uncritical treatment of detached details. As a consequence, while here and there a ray of light may be thrown on a dark place, a rough place smoothed, or a harsh feature softened, the larger masses are left in the gloom of a Rembrandtesque background, suggestive but illusive. I speak of the writings of those whose aim is constructive. As for the merely destructive critic, he fails to perceive, if he does not frankly deny, the existence of the soul of the Hebrew race, and he does not concern us here.

The cause of this failure is quite plain. Those who value the contents of those Scriptures are afraid lest, in applying critical canons, they should damage the feeling of reverence for inspiration, or should seem to impugn the righteousness of God. And the unwholesome products of this timidity are no less self-evident. The intermittent and helpless waverings as to the absolute or relative value of the earlier moral codes have often strained the moral sense to breaking point, have laid the Church open to the powerful artillery of the moral critic, and have fostered, if they have not occasioned, periodical recrudescences of that fierce spirit and intolerant zeal so opposed to the express teaching of Christ. Witness the unconscious,

but radical, contradiction between the Crusader's cross on his breast and the sword in his hand: the tortures of the Inquisition and the fires of Smithfield: the burning of Servetus by Calvin: the less lovely traits in the character and conduct of the early Puritans and the Pilgrim Fathers: the prolonged and wholesale murdering of innocent women under the laws dealing with witchcraft: and a sad host of similar moral and religious tragedies which are blots on the fair escutcheon of Christendom.

To urge caution in the use of the Old Testament as a moral text-book is not to lose sight of its unique revelation of the power that makes for righteousness, actually and continuously moulding the ideas and ideals of a race specially endowed with a genius for spiritual things; nor is it to deny the moral leadership of the Hebrews among the peoples of the ancient world. It is rather to draw attention to the fact that the various stages of ethical development therein delineated are marked by immaturities and crudities which, while of wonderful significance for a comparative study of ethics, can only confuse and weaken such impressions as direct instruction seeks to convey. And this fact assumes all the greater importance when we reflect that the moral difficulties of the Old Testament are by no means limited to certain episodes and passages which we may call classical, such as the destruction of the Canaanites, Deborah's praise of the treachery of Jael, the sacrifice of Isaac, the deception of Jacob, and Jephthah's vow. Ethical problems manifest themselves on almost every page, and are woven into the very texture of the whole. The narratives of ancient Israel depict the play of those natural impulses which predominate in the initial stages of civilisation, and illustrate the sway of custom, simply as custom, in scanty dependence on moral feeling. There followed the era of law, the peculiar characteristic of which, waiving critical niceties, may be said to be its externality; God's commands were to be obeyed, not for their moral content, but because of the danger involved in disobedience. The people were in the iron grasp of legalised custom and tradition. A pictorial ritual enhanced

the authority of what might otherwise have been abstractions, beyond the reach of immature spiritual apprehension. Even the "collective" punishments, which seem to us so wasteful and so sweeping, had their due part to play. However arbitrary the rules, however unintentional the violation of them, the one thing necessary was to inculcate respect for a settled constitution. For in the lack of such respect the nation could not survive in the struggle for existence.

The Law was thus a schoolmaster to bring into subjection undisciplined desires and passions; but its rigid externality made its yoke intolerable. The nobler spirits were bound to rebel. On one hand emerged the notable school of thinkers whose ethical conceptions were embodied in the "Wisdom" literature. The will of God was no longer regarded as simply and purely arbitrary. The fear of the Lord was no longer mere fear of a Being able to reward and punish. A higher moral elevation was attained. The divine laws were recognised as general principles on which the creation was governed, and obedience to them was seen to bring men into harmony with the supreme wisdom. But in spite of this distinct advance, the general spirit of the time was cold and calculating; the fire of inspiration burnt low. Even pessimism reared its fearsome head.

More significant than these, emerged the finer spirits who opened a way to true moral freedom. The prophets, urged by a growing sense of the worth of the individual, and a correlative sense of moral responsibility, burst through the bonds of legalism and ceremonialism. And thus it came to pass that Isaiah declared his scorn for externalism, and Ezekiel proclaimed, with the zeal begotten of new insight, how that "the soul that sinneth, it shall die." But the bonds were not altogether broken. The blade and ear were there, but not the full corn in the ear. The spirit of the prophets had to find its highest realisation in the spirit of Christ.

The relapse into legalism, and its crystallisation in the later Pharisaism, take us somewhat beyond the bounds of the

Old Testament problems, and do not, therefore, require more than mere mention. But enough has been said to prove that the ethical facts of ancient Hebrew history afford striking illustrations of the nature and trend of what is known as Progressive Morality. We can see that the earlier stages are preparatory for the later; and these later, again, preparatory for the spiritualised ethics of the New Testament; and that each is immature in comparison with its successor. These things being so, does it not follow that those who would use the older Scriptures as a basis for moral education have before them a task as delicate as it is complicated? Doubtless the possibilities of the case for moral science are great—all the greater because of the thoroughness demanded by the complexity. But must not careful reservations be made before we explicitly maintain that this heterogeneous material, containing elements so crude and contradictory, is fitted for laying the foundations of Christian character? Granted that in proportion as the material is digested and systematised the greater will be the sphere of its usefulness and influence, we have to take things as they are. And can we expect that the developing moral faculties will be best nourished on precepts, ideals, and histories, which are still so perplexing to the most advanced students, which risk a confusion of moral issues, and which may even prepare the way for moral reactions?

Let us go into further detail. And be it noted, first of all, that to deprecate the use of the Old Testament as a basis for direct moral teaching is not to deprecate the use of an anthology from that marvellously varied collection of writings. To assert that these scriptures do not contain passages almost perfect in matter, form, and tone, would be a gratuitous absurdity. A selection of gems could be made which would be worthy in every way to stand alongside of the material furnished by the New Testament. But I do not think that the majority of those who uphold the use of the Old Testament as a text-book of morals would be content with a selec-

tion. No doubt they do, in actual practice, select ; but they would justify themselves, not on any general principle affecting their choice, but on the necessities of time and opportunity. They would insist that the Jewish Canon must be treated as a whole ; and this is what I venture to dispute. Again, many passages are quietly passed over even by those who most keenly champion the use of the whole. But tacit negation, with no recognised principle behind it, save a general observance of decency, is totally distinct from positive selection, such as I here advocate, based on a broad survey of the moral principles involved, and with a definite aim before it. We have plain proof of lack of principle in the fact that the Church of England, impelled by tradition, still orders the reading of passages which in any other connection would be sternly repressed.

Let us note, in the second place, that Jesus Christ Himself dealt very freely with the Old Testament. He referred to it as bearing testimony to His work and His Person. Moreover, He often counselled His disciples to study it closely. But He was speaking, we must remember, to those who had no other scriptures, and whose minds were steeped in its language and leading conceptions ; whereas we have the Christian Canon, with its more perfect moralising of all motives and ideals. They were just emerging from legalism ; whereas we have had nineteen centuries in which to imbibe and expand the new law of love. And even at the beginning of those nineteen centuries, a disciple, quoting from the Old Testament, could incur the rebuke, " Ye know not what spirit ye are of." We find, also, that in numerous and vital cases Jesus Christ made it clear that He regarded much of the Old Testament as being quite out of harmony with His own ideas of justice and goodness. He not merely abrogated the sayings of the men of old time, He condemned them. He proclaimed a kingdom which should grow by love, not by force. He broke down barriers of exclusiveness which even the prophets had left standing, and gave His life to establish a universal Brotherhood. And even

when not condemning, He often referred to the Old Testament to show its incompleteness, to contrast it with His own teaching. The Sermon on the Mount takes the place of the Old Law, not as ignoring it, but as superseding it. It gives us the supreme sanction for holding to the doctrines of progressive morality. And it justifies us in relegating the Old Testament, as a whole, to the secondary position of a manual of comparative ethics—essential, indeed, for the full understanding of that which succeeded it, but not essential as a basis for the direct and positive teaching of the Christian code. This is said, of course, with the reservation contained in the preceding paragraph.

But some may object that I have conjured up imaginary difficulties, and that we may trust to the moral forces now at work to interpret and correct the imperfections of the earlier codes. And to some extent this is undoubtedly the case. But making full allowance on this score, I can see dangers ahead similar to those experienced in the past. Let us remember, for example, how mightily Luther strove to resuscitate the spirit of primitive Christianity, and yet how the Old Testament blazed out in his denunciations of those poor misguided and misgoverned peasants, whom he had at first encouraged, but whom he unsparingly denounced when they went further than he intended. He tells the princes that they are commanded by the Gospel (*sic!*), so long as the blood flows in their veins, to slay such folk. "A rebel is outlawed by God and Kaiser. Therefore who can, and will, first slaughter such a man does right well; since upon such a common rebel, every man alike is judge and executioner. Therefore, who can, shall here openly or secretly, smite, slaughter, and stab." "O Lord God," he cries, "when such spirit is in the peasants, it is high time that they were slaughtered like mad dogs." Do we condemn Luther for these denunciations? In a degree, most decidedly. For although his environment was exceptional, and explains much, we cannot help feeling that his anger would have

taken a worthier form had he worked his way to sounder and more consistent views on the moral problems of the Old Testament. And Luther's days are ominously near, in sentiment as in date, to our own! The fierce spirit still lingers as an element in our composite nature, ready to show itself on strangely small provocation. Moreover, a dangerous alliance is springing into existence between this age-old fierceness and the cold, inhuman teachings of the materialistic evolutionist. The chosen people becomes the selected people. Hence much of the apathy with which we regard the drastic treatment of uncivilised tribes by Christian nations. Hence much of the half-sympathetic acquiescence in the sight of Christendom increasingly arming itself to the teeth for aggression as well as for defence. It is not long since the pulpits of England resounded with defences of the slave trade.

But the tendency to relapse into the lower morality of the older codes, and to confuse the moral issues, is seen in less salient forms than those just mentioned. We need not go into the question how far certain modern Puritan ideals are tinged with Old Testament fierceness. There is simpler and clearer evidence at hand. Take the fact that the imprecatory psalms still form a recognised and recurrent part of public worship. There are some who are beginning to be restive under the infliction; but the multitude are apathetic, and no inconsiderable number are eager advocates for the continuance of the present system. Or consider a special instance from these psalms. One of the sweetest and most pathetic elegies in any language concludes with the strange beatitude—"Blessed shall he be that taketh thy children, and dasheth them against the stones." Evidently the psalmist had not brought the law forbidding murder into any vital connection with his desire for revenge. We can understand him—even sympathise with him—in his glowing zeal for his people and his royal city. But when our own great-grandparents wanted a metrical version of the psalms, we should have anticipated a desire to throw a veil over the terrible intensity of the stern

patriot. Instead of this we find their chosen poet exulting in the chance of lurid colouring, and turning the *Beatus* into a *Ter beatus*.

“Thrice blest, who, with just rage possest,
Shall snatch thy children from the breast,
And, deaf to all the parents’ moans,
Shall dash their heads against the stones.”

Such lucubrations were fairly harmless, and the singers of them lived in a very different world from that which they imagined they thus perpetuated. Still, there is food for reflection in the fact that they sang them at all. And this is all the more significant when we realise that so few of the modern popular exegetes and commentators make any pretence of coming to grips with the live issues. Even the gentle, loving soul of a Keble could find nothing more to say of such passages than that “the Holy Ghost puts words into our mouth which we should have been afraid to have spoken of ourselves.” No, the dangers are not past, while the true position and function of the Old Testament are still so widely misunderstood.

The momentum of old dogmas and traditions carries us on in spite of ourselves. The true character of the situation will emerge more clearly if we consider its parallel in a sphere which sufficiently excludes theological prejudice. I suppose there are few Christian educationalists who do not sympathise with Plato in his emphatic repudiation of certain elements in Greek myth and poetry regarded as material for the education of the good citizen. He condemned, from this standpoint, all stories which tended to lower the more spiritual standard to which his race had attained in their conceptions of what was highest and best in gods and men. God must always be presented as good, and the author of good. The heroes must be types of obedience to moral principle. In brief, the moral influences brought to bear in education must be as pure and elevated as the conditions will allow. Now I venture to hold that all this applies much more directly to the Old Testament

than many would imagine. Take, as an obvious example, the conception of God which prevails in large sections of its varied contents. God is continuously represented as speaking and acting in ways which offend our moral sense. He issues commands to slaughter even the babes unborn. Many of His punishments are wholesale and capricious. He gives His formal approval of slavery, allowing little children to be bought and sold as well as adults. He provides that Jewish slaves shall be more kindly treated than other slaves. He gives the strange law that a man shall not be punished for beating his slave to death, if the poor assaulted wretch does not die out of hand, but lingers for a day or two; and adds the still stranger reason, that the slave is his owner's money. Such are some of the more striking instances from what constitutes a fairly homogeneous whole.

How shall we explain such views of God as were held by the Israelite of old? The question is not an easy one. Recall Hobbes' teaching, "That which God does is made just by His doing it; just, I say, in Him, though not always in us. . . . Power irresistible justifies all actions, really and properly, in whomsoever it is found. . . . God cannot sin, because His doing a thing makes it just . . . to say that God can so order the world, as a sin may be necessarily caused thereby in a man, I do not see how it is any dishonour to Him." Will it be held that such a line of defence is impossible for a Christian? I most emphatically concur. But I cannot forget Dean Mansel and Sir William Hamilton. If I turn to so sound and approved a moralist as Bishop Butler, I find that though he does not explicitly allow that the Hebrew ethical standard was inferior to ours (*Analogy*, pt. ii. ch. iii.), he nevertheless elects to defend the position entirely from the side of the divine will, arguing that God has the right to destroy life, and to use man as an instrument to effect His purposes. And I find a similar line of defence adopted by an apologist in a book authorised and issued by a Society which is thoroughly representative of the Church of England.

The line of defence taken is that the Hebrews, in their destruction of the Canaanites, acted simply as destroying or punitive agencies in God's hand, like the storm, the pestilence, or the earthquake.

The objections to such a view are surely overwhelming, and justify the famous outburst of John Stuart Mill when asked to attribute to God acts which our highest human morality does not sanction. "Whatever power such a being may have over me, there is one thing which he shall not do: he shall not compel me to worship him." How can we worship such a God? For, guided by the best we know, we simply refuse to believe that the moral Governor of the universe could issue such commands now, in the present day. Further, were such commands issued, we should disregard them, denying them to be divine. And the moral ground for such refusal is plain for all to see. When man acts as an agent, he acts as a conscious agent. He is a moral being. And thus he differs by a whole heaven of difference from the unconscious storm or pestilence. God would not be Himself, we feel, were He to coerce or trample on the freedom of a moral agent, even though that agent be one so feeble and erring as mortal man.

If it is contended that a higher form of exegesis, founded on a more enlightened criticism, will remove these difficulties, I cannot altogether agree. For the whole drama of human history has unrolled itself under the supreme guidance of the moral Governor of the universe; and we are thus driven to ask why morality should have passed through these lower stages on the road to the higher. No doubt we here touch a problem of cosmic significance—but we touch it in a form, it seems to me, quite unnecessarily acute when we use the Old Testament as a text-book of ethics. At a later period the student of ethics may grapple with these great difficulties, and may reach some theory of progressive morality which shall enable him to vindicate the divine righteousness without stifling the promptings of a healthy moral judgment. I believe that such a

vindication is possible, proceeding on lines suggested by St Augustine. The start would be from an explicit recognition of the fact that the moral standard of the Hebrews had not risen to the level at which they would rebel against such sentiments and conceptions. The strict intuitionist doctrine concerning conscience would have to be frankly abandoned. But why bring such advanced reasonings into an elementary text-book? And even granting the soundness of the reasonings, have we yet applied them with sufficient lucidity and thoroughness to the Hebrew scriptures to warrant our general use of these for instruction in fundamentals?

Guiding ourselves yet once again by Plato's doctrines, let us glance at the Greek drama, that mirror held to nature which reflects, in all their essential features, the same problems as the Old Testament—the clashing of varying and discordant ethical codes, and the unravelling of moral perplexities. Let us take a typical example. The *Electra* of Euripides was performed recently in London on a splendid scale, and Canon Scott Holland has given a vivid account which I most gladly quote. “Tremendous!” he writes; “yet what is it which holds us back in the play, and forbids us to yield ourselves to its appeal? The truth is that the collision between the exquisite modernity of the spirit in the play and the brutal savagery of the story is too violent. The story belongs to the heroics of barbaric passion. We are face to face with the simplicities of elemental man, as we encounter them, say, in the Jewish psalms of retaliation and denunciation. Man is stripped bare; his naked being exhibits the play of every instinct, unqualified and untempered. . . . But, then, here is Euripides, flinging into the savage and heroic setting all that comes from delicate and subtle thought, playing hither and thither round spiritual problems, the touch of fine emotion; the thrill of sensitive souls; the movement of quivering wonder and pity and tenderness; the lissome interchange of antithetical sympathies, the quick questioning of a conscience that is alive to the conflicts of varying motives and appeals.

How can all this consort with the scene on which it is to play its part? If we yield to the spell, then the play becomes horrible, bloody, gross, improbable."

Does not this powerfully drawn contrast suggest parallels only too obvious in the results of our attempts to weld together the Old Testament and the New to form a basis for direct teaching of the fundamentals of morality? Many of the passages in the "First Lessons" clash well-nigh insupportably with those in the "Second Lessons." We are still slaves to imperfect theories and worn-out preconceptions. It is bad enough to raise such moral discords in acts of public worship. It is still worse to set vibrating such moral discords in what Plato calls "the tender souls of children," which, "like blocks of wax," are ready to take any impression, and which are so quickly deformed and distorted. Nay, we would, by thus acting, come perilously near to incurring the censure of Him who sternly warned against harming those "tender souls," of whom He declared that of such is, not the gloomy wrath and fierceness of the old order, but the joy, and brightness, and love of the Kingdom of Heaven.

J. E. TASMANIA.

THE CENTRAL PROBLEM OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON MORAL EDUCATION.

PROFESSOR J. H. MUIRHEAD.

THE significance of the International Congress on Moral Education held at the University of London at the end of September is sufficiently indicated by the fact that delegates had been sent to it by no fewer than fifteen Governments, some of them thinkers and writers of world-wide reputation in their own fields. During the four days of the Congress it is not too much to say that every aspect of education was touched upon. The committee had the happy idea of inviting a number of papers on the different subjects put down for discussion, causing them to be printed both *in extenso* and in condensed form, circulated among the members of the Congress, and taken as read. The result was that the speeches which were delivered had been prepared in full view of all the contributions before the meeting, or were the result of the actual collision of opinion in the heat of discussion. The proceedings thus acquired a life and the convictions that were expressed an impressiveness that are rare in such conferences. It is hardly conceivable that an attentive listener should have been present at any of the sessions without having his views enlarged and modified on the subject under discussion. Few, probably, returned from the Congress to their work, whether as teachers, educational writers, or administrators, without feeling how much was to be said for views and

methods not their own, and on the other hand how little they had understood of the real inwardness of those they had themselves accepted.

Even with much larger space than I have at my disposal I should find it difficult to give any idea of the issues that were raised and the conclusions that were sometimes pointed to and sometimes were not. I do not propose to try, but to assume that the readers of the HIBBERT JOURNAL will be chiefly interested in the discussion which occupied the central place in the programme—the Relation of Religious to Moral Education. Even here I wish to confine myself to one point, to me the central one. No less than thirteen papers had been written for the session. The best-known among the writers—the Rev. Hon. Edward Lyttelton, Dr Gow, Fathers Maher and Sydney F. Smith, the Rev. Morris Joseph, and Mrs Bryant—together with the presence on the platform of two Bishops, seemed sufficient guarantee that the discussion would move within the limits of orthodoxy and be confined to practical questions. As it happened, the Chairman was misled by this array and by the superficial trend of the majority of the papers, and sought to confine the discussion within these limits. It was like Mrs Partington's well-meant endeavour. Men had not come from the Lycées of France, from the Universities and Government Departments of Germany and Japan, to discuss the moral efficacy of the reading of the Greek Testament as a substitute for systematic religious and moral instruction.

It was clear that the real issue before the Congress was not as to the desirability and practicality of religious teaching, but as to the possibility of finding any meaning or relevance in the ordinary religious ideas that could be acknowledged by teachers and educationists who were in touch with the modern spirit. When an hour later they left the hall, there were few, whatever their sympathies, who did not feel that, had this ruling held, a unique opportunity would have been missed of having the two great ideals of education, which, for the

last century, have slowly been recognising each other as mortal foes, clearly set forth by some of the ablest of their respective supporters. There was a dramatic element in the session which sharpened the antithesis. For the first half of the time it seemed as though the issue would be confined to differences in doctrinal emphasis and in pedagogical methods. The wider question was first broached by M. Ferdinand Buisson of Paris, who in a short, courageous paper made it clear that the leading French educationists had long ceased to regard religion as any part of the content of moral education or as having any vital relation to it. Religion is to receive a formal acknowledgment. Children must be taught "the respect due to the idea of religion and the tolerance due to all its forms without exception. But for the rest they are to be taught that the chief mode of honouring God consists in each doing his duty according to his conscience and his reason." After his speech, everyone present seemed to feel that in the conflict of ideals he had succeeded in indicating, the whole problem of modern education was contained as in a nutshell: all other conflicts were trivial in comparison. It was not that the supporters of each of these ideals had not known of the existence of the other, but that the authority and sincerity with which the speeches were delivered on both sides, the touch of personal conviction in men of international reputation, arrested attention and seemed to give a depth and a meaning to the several contentions which they had not before possessed.

On the one side, which, for want of a better name, may be called the Positivist, there was the emphasis on the concrete, the connection of conduct with social, industrial, civic, and political well-being. In character lie the issues of life for individual communities and humanity at large. There was, further, the uncompromising claim for freedom of conscience, the insistence on intellectual sincerity as the very fountain-head of moral rectitude. No individual or nation can undervalue veracity and continue to count as a member of a spiritual

community. As compared with the interests here involved, theologies and doctrinal differences, if advocated in themselves, are as unsubstantial shadows; while if they are turned, as too commonly they are, into a ground of intolerance and superstition, or, worse still, of acquiescence in existing social conditions, they are the most serious obstacle against which progressive forces have to contend.

Just here the other side made itself heard. All this is an accident of particular forms of religion. What religion stands for is not any particular system of dogma or discipline, but the indefeasible claim for the inwardness of morality, for the recognition of the eternal distinction between the natural and the spiritual, and, going along with this, of the reality of sin and the necessity of rising, through a grace which is not our own, from mere natural goodness of heart to a vivid sense of the demand that our souls' deeper attachments make upon us. True, this implies the belief in the reality of these attachments, but this itself is part of the witness of consciousness. It is popularly called faith in God, but its essence is not the belief in anything supernatural and transcendental, but the sense of a wider fellowship than that represented by any individual society or even group or succession of societies upon this planet—the conviction that, in ways we are far from completely understanding, the real underlying forces of the world are on the side of our best aspirations, that the ideal *is* the real, and is most real where it is most true to itself as an ideal. Nor is this faith mere matter of speculation, without effect on moral conduct. It is put on a false footing, compromised and forfeited rather than fortified by the advocacy of those who seek in it a supernatural sanction for moral conduct. But this ought not to create prejudice or blind us to its real influence in purifying and refining character and in furnishing the natural breath of spiritual graces—humility, fortitude, resignation, hope, trust, joy—which live with difficulty in the more rarefied atmosphere of Positivist belief.

Are these two ideals really incompatible? Or rather,

since neither of them can really afford to ignore or repudiate the other, is it impossible to find a background of reasoned belief that will make it possible to unite them in a new and satisfying synthesis? This was the question that was inevitably suggested by this remarkable debate, which in a moment was seen to have grown from parochial to universal interest.

The aim of this short article, written at the request of the Editor, has been to try to fix the main issue that was presented to the Congress, the point at which its discussions touched the fundamental problems of our time. Having done this, I might close. Perhaps it would be wiser to do so. But as I ventured at the time to point the contrast and indicate what I believed to be the line of reconciliation, I may perhaps be permitted to add one or two sentences, chiefly of quotation, from what I then said.

1. Positivism in all its forms rests ultimately on the antithesis between man and nature and the limitation of our insight to the "human synthesis." In view of our widening knowledge of the nature and meaning of the world in which we live, it is not likely long to remain possible to maintain the rigidity of this distinction. More and more we are coming to realise—here, through the study of the forces operative in civilisation; there, through the study of the relation between mind and body, the organic and the inorganic; here, again, through the study of the human mind itself in its operations as will and intelligence—the essential relativity of man and nature, the underlying unity of the material and the spiritual.

2. Going along with this, and indeed a corollary from it, is the growing recognition of the priority of spirit—a priority which, to be realised, has to assert itself through the control and the transformation of the natural into the form of the spiritual. Human life at its best consists in no easy-going acceptance of natural law, or acquiescence in forms of life and conduct, social or individual, that are fixed for us by inheritance or external circumstances. It consists rather in

the continuous effort to realise, under the forms of time, aspirations that carry us beyond time.

3. Such a view, when we come to realise what is involved in it, is likely to carry us equally beyond anything which has hitherto been regarded as adequate religious teaching, and beyond the current ideal of secular education. So far from being a support to morality, much that goes by the name of religious instruction will be seen to cut at the roots of what is best in it. On the other hand, it will be seen that current Positivism requires to be freed from what is merely local and temporary in it and supplemented in the light of a larger philosophy.

The new religious thought will appropriate with gratitude what Positivism has so nobly taught, but will seek in addition to raise this teaching to a higher power by its faith in the ideals of humanity as something to which the universe itself is pledged. If it comes with no addition to the content of morality, no "duties to God" which are not also duties to ourselves and our fellow-men, religion as above defined has the power of giving a deeper significance to conduct by connecting its laws with the general purposes of the universe so far as we can understand them. Following on this, religion brings a new form of emotion in the confidence it inspires in the ultimate triumph of the good. "A man's confidence in himself," said Hegel, "is much the same as his confidence in the universe and in God," and what is true of the individual is true of humanity. Without such confidence, it is difficult to see with what ultimate convincingness appeal can be made to the ideals of humanity; with it, we are beginning to see how a new inspiration can be brought to the work of moral education as the development in souls, prepared by their own deepest instincts to respond, of an attitude of mind which shall be true not only to their own manhood and womanhood in what is seen and temporal, but to that which is unseen and eternal in the world at large.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

JESUS OR CHRIST ?

AN APPEAL FOR CONSISTENCY.

THE REV. R. ROBERTS,

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RECENT criticism of the New Testament has gathered around Jesus Christ and the testimony of its various documents to His person and work. This has characterised not merely the technically called Evangelical churches, but has also marked large sections of the Roman obedience on the extreme right and influential scholars in the Unitarian church on the extreme left. For the scholarly divines and the devotional lay minds who have felt the force of this great current of Western thought in the sphere of religion, it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that Jesus Christ is Christianity. The several parts of the New Testament are in the main narratives of His supposed life and teaching, or theories of various kinds built upon them. But neither the narratives nor the theories are Jesus Christ.

With certain reservations, it may be said that the group of doctrines known as "Evangelicalism" is the common property of Western Christendom. In developing its thought "back to Christ," Evangelicalism has found itself driven to make stupendous claims on behalf of Jesus. It is not possible, within the compass of this article, to set forth those claims with any approach to fulness, nor to state fully the numerous and grave misgivings which they create for the modern mind. But on the threshold of even such treatment as is here possible

one finds himself beset by an initial difficulty. Perhaps I can best express that difficulty in the form of the following questions:—Are the claims to be presently set forth made on behalf of a spiritual “Ideal” to which we may provisionally apply the word “Christ,” or are they predicated of Jesus? The apologists do not frankly face these questions. The reluctance to do so renders it difficult to make any pertinent criticism of the claims. For it may easily turn out that insistence on limitations of knowledge, restrictions of outlook, evasions of issues, and disillusionments of experience true enough of an historic Jesus may not be wholly relevant to a spiritual “Christ Ideal” expanding and enriching through the ages into “the Christ that is to be.” To one who was the “fulness of Godhead” bodily expressed, “Very God of Very God,” they could not be attributed at all, without such a strain as would crack the sinews of language, reducing the sequences of speech to incoherences of thought.

The vast sweep of these claims becomes apparent in the following citations from writers who have laid the Christian world under a heavy obligation by their elevation of thought and spirit, the chastened scholarship, the fine yet reasoned reverence of their work. I select first a somewhat abstract statement of the “Modernist” position in the Roman communion:—

“The whole doctrine of Christ’s *κενῶσις*, or self-emptying, can be explained in a minimising way almost fatal to devotion, and calculated to rob the Incarnation of all its helpfulness by leaving the ordinary mind with something perilously near the phantasmal Christ of the Docetans. Christ, we are truly taught to believe, laid aside by a free act all those prerogatives which were His birthright as the God-man, that He might not be better off than we who have to win our share in that glory through humiliation and suffering, that He might be a High Priest touched with a feeling for our infirmities, tempted as we in all points, sin only excepted” (*Through Scylla and Charybdis*, p. 98, the Rev. George Tyrrell).

The learned Catholic scholar above cited has his own quarrel with the terms of this statement. But his uneasiness as to its phrasing does not touch the purpose for which it is here quoted, the point of which is to show that Jesus and

Christ are terms used interchangeably ; that the "self-emptying" of the God-man has no meaning apart from a historic life conditioned by the limitations of ordinary humanity ; and that He, in His humiliation, felt the poignancy of all such temptations as assault our frail nature, sin only excepted.

Coming now to the Anglican church, the opinion of the late revered Bishop Westcott will be accepted as representative of a large school of thought within and without his own communion. On the significance of Jesus for the Christian life and doctrine he says :—

"We look back indeed for a moment upon the long line of witnesses whose works, on which we have entered, attest the efficacy of His unfailing Presence, but then we look away from all else (*ἀπορῶντες*) to Jesus the leader and perfecter of faith, who in His humanity met every temptation which can assail us and crowned with sovereign victory the force which He offers for our support" (*Christus Consummator*, p. 156).

And still more pointedly in the same volume :—

"The Gospel of Christ Incarnate, the Gospel of the Holy Trinity in the terms of human life, which we have to announce covers every imaginable fact of life to the end of time, and is new now as it has been new in all the past, new in its power and new in its meaning, while the world lasts" (*Christus Consummator*, p. 171).

Passing now to those churches known as Nonconformist, Principal Fairbairn, writing of the "historical Christ," says :—

"The Person that literature felt to be its loftiest ideal, philosophy conceived as its highest personality, criticism as its supreme problem, theology as its fundamental datum, religion as its cardinal necessity" (*Christ in Modern Theology*, p. 294).

Twelve years of building construction separate the work containing this sentence from the next quotation to be cited. I select a somewhat more detailed paragraph from *The Ascent through Christ*, by the Rev. Principal E. Griffith Jones. On the last page of this very interesting volume we find the following passage :—

"We do our Master little honour when we place Him among a group of teachers competing for the acceptance of men. He is not one of many founders of religions. He is the source and fountain of all, in so far as they have caught a prophetic glimpse of His truth, and anticipated something of His spirit, and given a scattered hint here and there of His secret. He is the truth, the type, the saving grace, of which they faintly and vaguely dreamed ;

the Desire of all Nations, the Crown and Essence of Humanity, the Saviour of the World, who by the loftiness of His teaching, the beauty of His character, the sufficiency of His atoning sacrifice, is able to save to the uttermost all who will come to Him and trust in Him" (*The Ascent through Christ*).

The final quotation to be made will represent a scholarly and conservative school of Unitarian thought. The Rev. Dr James Drummond was selected to deliver the last of the well-known series of Hibbert Lectures, and from it I take the following passage:—

"The Word made flesh discloses to us, not some particular truth or requirement, but the very spirit and character of God, so far as we are able to apprehend it; for the Divine Thought is God Himself passing into self-manifestation, just as our speech is our own personality entering into communication with others" (Hibbert Lecture, *Via, Veritas, Vita*, p. 312).

"Word" and "Thought" are both implied in the Greek "Logos." On the Evangelical theory, the "flesh" was Jesus, not Christ. If I understand Dr Drummond's position aright, whether it was as "Divine Word" or as "Divine Thought" it was still "God Himself" who dwelt in the fleshly tabernacle known as Jesus. But on both theories there is a localisation of the Infinite, a differentiated moment in eternity, a limitation within the conditions of a fleeting human organism of the Omnipotent, Omniscient, and Perfect God. If Jesus was the "Word made Flesh," and if this same "Word"—or, to meet Dr Drummond's position, "Thought"—was "God Himself," then it would seem difficult to resist the inference that Jesus was God. Such a position involves all the claims which the quotations now cited have made on behalf of Jesus. Dr Drummond does not indeed draw out the implications of the position with the startling vividness which we find in Principals Fairbairn and Jones. The great Unitarian scholar is mainly concerned with the ethical and spiritual content. It is within the sphere of morals he is anxious to affirm the peerless position of the "Word made flesh," and it is notable that nearly throughout the lecture the position thus claimed is associated with Christ. Jesus, as distinct from Christ, makes but an occasional appearance in the lecture-room of this

"Hibbert" lecturer. Yet it cannot but be that His presence is felt in every phase of the lecture, for it is only in and through "the flesh" that the Word becomes the subject of history and enters into relationship with men. When we remember the very rich content of the Greek "Logos," and that "the Divine Thought is God Himself," it seems impossible to limit His presence and potency within the sphere with which the lecturer is dealing. God is not to be so confined. No part of the universe is without Him, and thus it appears to me that the two distinguished Congregational scholars have but drawn out to their logical conclusions ideas implicit in Dr Drummond's Unitarian position. The claims thus made on behalf of Jesus are what I have ventured to describe them, "stupendous." When their character, scope, and magnitude are considered in the light of New Testament documents and in that of the secular literature nearest to New Testament times, a disturbing sense of disproportion between the claims made and the historical evidence legitimately producible in support of them grows upon the mind.

In dealing with the evidence which is submitted, it cannot be overlooked that statements made as to Jesus cannot properly be admitted as evidence for Christ. Dr Percy Gardner, as will be presently shown, has observed the distinction here made. But in the current literature, in the hymnology, and in almost all sermons the rule is to take statements as to Jesus and apply them to Christ. A remarkable example of this is found in Dr Fairbairn's *Christ in Modern Theology*, where (p. 353) passages relating to Jesus in the footnote are adduced in the text as evidence for Christ. The illegitimacy of this process becomes apparent when the differing character of the two words is borne in mind, and when the historic process of the passage of Jesus into Christ becomes more clearly understood. This is one of the many reasons why increasing numbers of people find their confidence in the very bases of the Evangelical faith most seriously disturbed.

The silence of non-Christian literature as to Jesus has more significance than is usually assigned to it. The point, however, cannot be developed here.

When we turn to the New Testament, we have a body of literature whose evidential value has been, and still is, the riddle of Christendom. Close and careful reading of its documents reduces our knowledge of the actual facts of the life of Jesus to a small, and, it must be added, a narrowing compass. Beyond the narrative of birth and infancy and one incident in the boyhood, the Synoptists give us only detached fragments of events in one year of His life. The Johannine narrative extends the chronology so as to cover portions of perhaps the last three years. Criticism, of course, greatly reduces the value of this face view of the story. Following it, we pass through narrowing areas of admissible statement, and, guided by Dr Schmiedel's "pillar," pass ages, till we reach the position of Professor Khaltoff, from which the figure of the historic Jesus has completely vanished.

So far, I have dealt only with the alleged events of the life. With the exceptions named, they seem to have disappeared from Apostolic literature. To Apostolic literature the Jesus of the Gospels, apart from the incidents mentioned, is unknown. But the case as to the alleged teaching is still more disturbing. On the modern Evangelical theory, this teaching is the whole groundwork of Christian theology and institutions. Moreover, in the contentions¹ which, it is said, distressed the early churches, the teaching, if it then existed as we have it, would have been the first thing to be produced, and in nearly the whole of the Pauline disputations its production would have been decisive. Yet the fact is that, with one exception, we have no single statement of the teaching produced in Jesus' own words. That alleged

¹ Paul contended for the freedom of the spirit against the bondage of the letter. The teaching on the Sabbath attributed to Jesus, especially the text, "The Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath," would have been decisive.

exception is the Eucharistic formula in Corinthians. Considering the immense stress laid by modern theological criticism on the authority of Jesus in the sphere of morals and religion, the fact that the Christian documents chronologically nearest to His times do not consider it worth while to quote His words is not a little disconcerting. I do not wish to forget the limitations attaching to arguments from silence. But I may remark that they are more strictly applicable to ordinary literature, written under the normal conditions of humanity and for the common purposes of literature and life. This, however, is not the case with New Testament literature. It purports, so it is affirmed, to be an exposition of the life, work, and teaching of One who came to reveal the Father, to give the world assurance of new truth, and to lay upon mankind the authority of a new, universal, and eternally binding moral code. These claims may or may not have lain latent in the "sayings" on which they are said to be based, and it may be also that the historic Christology of Christendom is but their formal expression. Be that as it may, they are part of the literary output of the times and countries which produced them, and alike in their noblest passages and in their legendary parts they carry the impress of their "place of origin."

They are in harmony with the intellectual climate of that part and age of the world. An instructed Jew would be familiar with the thought in almost every passage attributed to Jesus. A cultivated Roman versed in the literature of the Græco-Roman world would find no difficulty in narratives of blind men restored to sight, of lame men regaining the use of their limbs, of divine heroes born of a virgin mother, and of dead men restored to life. These were some of the normal products of that mental climate. But the New Testament marvels have outlived that climate, and, like an Alpine plant occasionally found on Yorkshire moors, they live on in new and strange surroundings. But they did not and they could not awaken the many-sided reflections in

apostolic, patristic, or scholastic times they inevitably do to-day; and statements which passed comparatively unchallenged in pre-evolution days find themselves now in an atmosphere quick with eager questionings. In the larger, wider intellectual world of to-day these mementoes of man's mental past startle the reader. If he is presented with a narrative of the life and teaching of One "in whom all the fulness of the Godhead dwelt bodily," he rightly asks for credentials which would never have occurred to a Paul or a Plutarch. And yet of that One who came to be the inexhaustible and final revelation of the infinite God—nay, who was Himself "Very God of Very God"—we have only these meagre, these elusive and tantalising reports. This is enough, I submit, to justify the serious disquietude of the modern mind on this part of the New Testament problem.

There are, however, other aspects of the same problem which the widened horizons of the modern world compel us to recognise. Possession by evil spirits was a form of belief natural to the culture-level at which the Jews of Jesus' day stood. They believed that these evil spirits entered into the human organism, and that their presence was the cause of physical and mental derangements. Jesus seems to have shared these opinions. Even more embarrassing to the modern mind is His apparent acquiescence in the popular belief that they could be expelled by exorcism, and that He Himself practised the art so effectually that it has maintained its place in the Christian Church to this day. Then again, the world has outlasted the anticipations of its duration which coloured at least the later phases of the Galilean idyll, and which impart a sombre tinge to the whole circle of Apostolic and Apocalyptic thought. Every day on the brink of opened graves we still repeat stately and solemn words which were written when the world was supposed to be hurrying to its catastrophic close. But the prophets of dissolution are dead, and still the old world spins its way "down the ringing grooves of change." And even as it has belied New Testa-

ment beliefs as to its speedy end, so also it has belied the beliefs of the same volume as to its beginning. Mankind did not begin with a perfect Adam. Womankind did not emerge from the extracted rib of the first man. Suffering did not enter into the world, nor did the tragedy of death cast its dark shadow on humanity as the result of "man's first disobedience and the fruit of that forbidden tree," partaken in an idyllic Eden in the morning of time. These are fairy tales, and they have "faded into the light of common day." But they have left their mark on, even if they have not largely shaped, gospel and epistle. In a society which has done with fairy tales as to its own origin we have to ask: What are we to make of a New Testament which is said to be the last word of knowledge on the tremendous questions of life and destiny, and which yet lends its sanction to these fables of the morning? The writer of the great "Quadrilateral" epistles shared these views. If the narrative is to be trusted, Jesus himself accepted many of them. And the stupendous claims made on His behalf by modern Evangelicals compel me to put the question: Are these fables things which we should expect from One represented to be "the Desire of all Nations, the Crown and Essence of Humanity, the Saviour of the World"?

Man, however, has other interests than those of religion. From the dawn of intelligence he has observed the world in which he finds himself, and gradually he has come to realise that some reasoned theory of it and its forces is a necessity of his nature. Science is the outcome of this craving for knowledge. Through the æons of his evolving history he has been haunted by an ideal, other and fairer than the actual around him. He has felt an imperious necessity to express these haunting visions, and Art has grown out of his efforts. He early found himself one of a group. Father and mother, sister, brother, wife, and children were around him. Outside his own group were other groups similarly related, and to these he had to adjust himself in some rude order. Here was

the beginning of political institutions, and advancing civilisation has meant the slow adaptation of these institutions to a gradually expanding consciousness of social needs and order. I cannot further develop these points. But, in view of the claims with which I am dealing, I must ask: Can we conceive of Jesus believing in and understanding the Copernican system or following the reasonings of Newton? Is it possible to think of Him following the dialectic of Aristotle or entering into the enjoyment of the art of Pheidias? Political science is a necessity of civilisation. But what proof is there in the evidence before us that Jesus had any conception of society as the product of human reason dealing with the facts of associated experience? If Jesus was man only, these questions are irrelevant. But if He was God, they raise, for me, an insoluble difficulty.

Jesus Christ, we are told, is the Universal King. In this phrase, Jesus and Christ have become identified. Jesus imparts to the Christ His own historicity and character; Christ assimilates Jesus. The two make one Person. The worlds of science and of art wait on His inspiration. Principal Fairbairn informs us, in words already quoted, that all the highest activities of the race receive their inspiration from Him: He is the origin and fount of all our thinking and doing; His Person co-ordinates the otherwise aimless impulses of humanity; He alone gives meaning to philosophy, direction and purpose to history. This is the "discovery" which, Principal Fairbairn says, has been made in these recent years, and that not by any designed and meditated counsel on the part of representative spirits in these departments of human activity. Rather it is, that these have become conscious of what was the result of their unpremeditated and manifold labours, and through that awakened consciousness the "historical Christ" has come to His own. The throne of the universe is no longer vacant. On it sits the crowned King of men, "Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever"; and all the saints, sages, poets, and artists of all the

earth and all the ages are bidden "to lay their trophies at His feet and crown Him Lord of all."

Yet when we look carefully at the achievements of the human mind we speedily become aware that without the aid of a continuous miracle the suppositions of this theory could not be complied with. Humanity had achieved much before Jesus was born. If He alone is the inspiration and energising life of humanity, it is pertinent to ask how came we to have religions, literatures, art, sciences, philosophies, politics, and industries, all the contents of many-sided civilisations, thousands of years before He was born?

We know too that claims similar to these have been put forward on behalf of other Saviour-Gods among all the great races of the past. Every type of civilisation has had its Saviour-God. The believers in these knew no world outside their own, and they fondly yet sincerely and earnestly believed that the Saviour-God who had done so much for them was able to save to the uttermost. And, truth to say, when Dr Fairbairn and his disciples come to scrutinise the claims and characters of the Saviour-Gods of other religions they make very short work of the evidence of miracle and history with which such claims are associated. They apply to them the canons by which the children of this scientific age of the West judge of evidence, and the claims vanish at the touch of that Ithuriel spear. Jesus knew nothing of the world of Greek thought. There is no proof that He was aware of that great and real religious reconstruction which found expression in the drama of *Æschylus*, or of those reachings after a deeper spiritual realism breathing through the "Mysteries" of later Greek and Roman thought. Had He been acquainted with the writings of Plato, what marvellous confirmations of His own highest teachings would He not have found in them? Is it conceivable that if he had known of Socrates and Pericles He would have dismissed them to outer darkness as mere heathens? The vast and hoary religious systems of the Farther East lay outside His range of vision; their great saints

were wholly unknown to Him. His world, on the evidence before us, was that of Palestine, its problems those of Galilee and Jerusalem, and its literature that of his own nation.

If from the realm of knowledge we pass to that of morals, we meet with sayings attributed to Jesus which raise disturbing reflections. Matthew's version of the Sermon on the Mount is regarded as the high-water mark of Christian ethics. Yet if we are to regard these "sayings" as regulative words for the guidance of personal character or social order we cannot help being embarrassed. Almsgiving implies a failure of social justice. But the "sayings" contain no recognition of that now widely accepted fact; while the prohibition to have any regard to rewards from men does not apply to the "Father which seeth in secret," whose reward will be given "openly" and may be, apparently, expected. No condemnation is passed on the harsh and cruel law of debtor and creditor, nor would efforts for legal reform find any encouragement from the words attributed to the Master here. On non-resistance and oath-taking the rule attributed to Jesus is absolute. Yet, as a whole, Christendom has openly violated it throughout its history. His most distinguished followers, popes and bishops, have waged wars and consecrated battleships; and the existence of Christian armies proves that Jesus has been unable to get His own followers to obey His rule. His teaching on divorce¹ recognises the husband's right to accuse, judge, condemn, and dismiss the wife; while the wife, having no such rights as against her husband or even over her own children, is left the helpless victim of the husband's caprice. There is no recognition of adultery on the part of the husband as a ground for divorce which the wife might urge, while the right of the husband to decide these matters himself without reference to any constituted law courts strikes the modern

¹ Matt., c. xix., vv. 3-9; Mark, c. x., vv. 11-12; Luke, c. xv., v. 18. Early Hebrew practice as to marriage and divorce was probably shaped by Arab custom. Deuteronomy introduced a milder practice, and in Malachi fairer treatment to the wife is urged. But throughout Biblical times the right of the wife to sue for divorce was not recognised.

mind as callous and iniquitous to the last degree. The teaching is governed throughout by an admission of the iniquitous principle of sex-inferiority as against woman, and let it be remembered this principle has inflicted infinite suffering on half of the human race. Yet Jesus sanctions this sex-subordination, and His ideas rule Christendom to this day. English law has now decreed that divorced persons may legitimately re-marry, and in this particular it has presumed to improve on the ethics of Jesus as to the marriage relationship. We are awaking, somewhat slowly it is true, but still awaking, to the enormous iniquity involved in this sex-inferiority; and the measure of our awaking is the measure of our departure from this part of the Sermon on the Mount.

Provident regard for the future is utterly condemned. "Take no thought for the morrow" is an absolute injunction. But all our Insurance Societies are avowedly founded on the opposite of this. Friendly, Co-operative, and Trade Union Societies are organised on the principle condemned in this sermon, and Christian governments prepare their national budgets at least twelve months in advance. The principle of some of these instructions may have its value as an ideal. But as regulative ideas for the government of personal conduct and associated life they have been useless and they have been mischievous.

Even more mischievous has been the sanction which persecution has drawn from Jesus' reported attitude to possession by evil spirits. As I am here dealing with ethical limitations, I must return to this subject and must press the question: Why did Jesus permit people to believe that evil spirits were the cause of disease, and that He could and did exorcise them?

It is certain that He was mistaken alike in His diagnosis and in His remedy, and the mistake becomes tragical when we remember that His example has been made to justify some of the most atrocious cruelties in history. If He did not know

that possession by evil spirits as understood by His countrymen was an error, then His knowledge was at fault. If He did know, and also knew the use that would be made of His example for more than a thousand years after His death, then His acquiescence shows a moral limitation more embarrassing than the intellectual one. Dr Fairbairn, in a perfect *tour de force* of intellectual subtlety, argues that Christ had limitations of knowledge. Writing of this in *Christ in Modern Theology* (p. 353), he says:—

“If He knows as God while He speaks as man, then His speech is not true to His knowledge, and within Him a bewildering struggle must ever proceed to speak as He seems and not as He is.”

“If He had such knowledge, how could He remain silent as He faced human ignorance and saw reason wearied with the burden of all its unintelligible mysteries? If men could believe that once there lived on this earth One who had all the knowledge of God yet declined to turn any part of it into science for man, would they not feel their faith in His goodness taxed beyond endurance?”

Let us apply these thoughts to the case of possession by evil spirits. It will be noticed that Dr Fairbairn speaks of Christ, but I may take it that Jesus is meant. Mark reports (i. 23-26):—

“And there was in their synagogue a man with an unclean spirit; and he cried out, saying, Let us alone; what have we to do with thee, thou Jesus of Nazareth? Art thou come to destroy us? I know thee who thou art, the Holy One of God. And Jesus rebuked him, saying, Hold thy peace, and come out of him. And when the unclean spirit had torn him, and cried with a loud voice, he came out of him.”

Here is acquiescence in the animistic theory of disease, and an exercise of exorcism in which the people apparently thoroughly believed. Now I ask, Did Jesus “know as God” and “speak as man” in this instance? If He was God, He must have known the people’s opinion was an error, and an error too the theory that He had cast an evil spirit out of this man. What are we to think of God, who permits such things and becomes a party to this exorcism? If He did not know that this was an error, then His knowledge was at fault, and what are we to think of a God with limited knowledge? Dr Fairbairn and his followers admit these limitations of

knowledge while yet claiming that this admittedly limited Personality was at the same time "Very God of Very God." These, however, are not merely intellectual limitations. There are also ethical limitations involved, and they touch on the theory of sinlessness. In the case before us Jesus permitted the people to believe that which was not true.

If He was God, He knew that their belief in obsession was an error; He must have known that after ages would quote His example as sanction for superstition and cruelty. We are therefore driven to the conclusion that "One who had all the knowledge of God declined to turn any part of it into science for man" in this instance, and thus allowed humanity to drift for more than a thousand years through the night of ignorance and cruelty. In a mere man this ethical limitation would be a sin. Is it otherwise in One who is said to be God?

These considerations seem to prove that modern Evangelicals, many of the "New Theologians," and not a few conservative Unitarians are in difficulties with their idea of Jesus Christ. Jesus limits and localises Christ; Christ extinguishes Jesus. Dr Fairbairn tells us (*Christ in Modern Theology*, p. 352) that "the terms under which Christ lived His life were those of our common non-miraculous humanity. We know no other. To be perfect and whole man must mean that as regards whatever is proper to manhood He is man and not something else." But it presently appears that He is something else, for though (*Christ in Modern Theology*, p. 355) "the normal manhood has its home in Judæa and its history written by the Evangelists," "the supernatural Person has no home, lives through all time, acts on and in all mankind." To me this seems "to say and straight unsay" in the same breath, and makes me feel that in theology English words do not convey their common meaning. Principal Griffith Jones, too, writes of Jesus Christ: "He Himself was the subject of a spiritual evolution" (*The Ascent through Christ*, p. 332). I am not sure that I know what a spiritual evolution is, but perhaps I put no strain on

the word when I say that it implies the passage from a less developed to a more developed state. If so, there was a moment when Jesus Christ was less than God, and a subsequent moment when he was more of God. But this implies imperfection and limitation, with a gradual emergence from their shadows, and I must admit that I can attach no meaning to a limited God emerging slowly from imperfection and limitation. Nor is that all. Does "spiritual evolution" imply that the full and perfect type lies at the beginning of the process? As usually understood, an evolutionary process starts from an undeveloped cell, and by the pressure of environing forces reaches the more fully developed stage. "Spiritual evolution" reverses this process. It places the developed stage—the "Christ"—at the beginning, and two thousand years of evolution have only secured us partial realisations of what the Christ was at the start. And yet it is this same Christ who is continually growing.

Dr Percy Gardner, in *A Historic View of the New Testament*, Lecture III., writes quite frankly:—

"The more closely we examine the documents of early Christianity, the more fully do we acquiesce in the dictum of Dr Edersheim that the materials for a life of Jesus in any objective sense do not exist. It will probably always remain an impossibility to set forth even a brief narrative of the Founder's life which history can accept as demonstrated fact. Even the chronological skeleton of such a life cannot be sketched with certainty."

"I endeavour in these lectures to observe a distinction very conducive to clearness of thought. In speaking of the earthly life of the Master, I call Him, with the Evangelists, Jesus; in speaking of the exalted Head of the Christian Society, I use with Paul the term Christ. In cases where the meaning is between these two, the phrase Jesus Christ is applicable."

But the eminent scholars with whom I am dealing habitually quote words and actions attributed to Jesus and apply them to Christ. They thus gain for the mystical and spiritual Christ that objectivity which, assuming His historicity, belongs properly only to Jesus. This process seems to me wholly illegitimate. I want to put this matter quite as clearly and yet as reverently as I can, for it is the very heart of the disturbance which the modern mind feels in presence of the

enormous claims made on behalf of Jesus. If Jesus was one of, or if He even was Himself, the highest and best in "the goodly fellowship of the prophets," then that He should be found subject to the intellectual, ethical, and emotional limitations of an Isaiah or an Amos would not diminish our obligations to Him or abate by one iota our reverence for His character and work. But when we are told He is the universal King, the full and final perfection of humanity's reach, the Divine Exemplar, towards whose far off, infinitely distant perfection humanity must aspire and toil through the illimitable ages of the future, then the limitations of outlook, evasions of issues, disillusionments of experience shown in the Gospels assume an altogether different aspect.

I will take the risk of much ridicule by saying frankly that the "historical Christ," as used by the apologists, is a phrase which embarrasses me. If it means an enriching and expanding "Ideal" to which history bears its witness, and from the hope inspired by which humanity may draw encouragement and strength in its conflict with ignorance and wrong, I, for one, will subscribe myself a believer. I admit the "Ideal" has had a history, and that in this sense it may well be described as historical. But I do not think this is at all what the eminent scholars I have been dealing with mean. They habitually quote as divinely decisive, words and actions attributed to Jesus of Nazareth. This conveys to me the impression that they believe Jesus was God. Yet almost every chapter of the Gospels bears testimony to the limitations within which Jesus lived and wrought. And though the physical limitations are by now freely admitted even by conservative scholars, the political, economic, social, intellectual, and ethical limitations are no less apparent. Dr Drummond tells us that the Divine Thought was "God Himself passing into self-manifestation." But when the position is even thus stated it compels us to ask, Did the "Divine Thought" give us the passages about woman and her treatment reported in that "Sermon" which is the admitted bed-rock of Christian ethics? Did "God Himself"

permit people to believe that exorcism was successfully performed? If so, there was Divine sanction given to the practice of the art through the Christian centuries, to its retention to this day by the Catholic Church, and to the nameless barbarities inflicted on the most helpless of mankind through the long night of the "ages of faith." Even Dr J. Estlin Carpenter tells us, "He (Jesus) was obliged to use the forms of thought provided by his age, and they were inadequate to the greatness of his ideas. His principles far transcended the moulds which the time provided" (*The First Three Gospels*, p. 349, People's Edition). But did Jesus' proclamation of the Fatherhood of God "far transcend" what may be found in many a passage of Seneca? What was there in "the forms of thought provided by his age" to prevent Him from condemning the fiscal oppressions and land monopolies of His time? The Hebrew prophets before Him had done so in no measured speech. Why did He not do so? Are we to account for this silence on the plea urged by a recent anonymous but able writer (*The Creed of Buddha*) for the silence of the Indian saint?

Though much poetry has been expended upon it, I cannot understand what is meant by an "Imperfect God." Nor do I find any real assistance when homely English is exchanged for ambitious Greek, and scholars speak of a "Kenosis" and of a "Kenotic theory" involving real limitations in the Infinite and Omniscient God. The "emptying" of the Infinite God, whether in Greek or in English, is a process which conveys to me no intelligible meaning. Identifying Jesus with Christ, they make God a Being who is omnipotent, yet limited in power; omniscient, yet defective in knowledge; infinitely good, yet One who declines "to turn any part of His knowledge as God into science for man." This seems to me to be language which stultifies itself. It would be an abuse of language to say that it deals with a mystery. It is flat contradiction.

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BRADFORD.

THE MESSAGE OF MODERN MATHEMATICS TO THEOLOGY.

I

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IN the course of a recent¹ lecture dealing with Mathematics regarded as a distinctive type of thought and with its relations to other modes and forms of philosophic and scientific activity, I ventured to say: "I do not believe that the declined estate of Theology is destined to be permanent. The present is but an interregnum in her reign, and her fallen days will have an end. She has been deposed mainly because she has not seen fit to avail herself promptly and fully of the dispensations of advancing knowledge. The aims, however, of the ancient mistress are as high as ever, and when she shall have made good her present lack of modern education and learned to extend a generous and eager hospitality to modern light, she will reascend and will occupy with dignity as of yore an exalted place in the ascending scale of human interests and the esteem of enlightened men. And Mathematics, by the inmost character of her being, is specially qualified, I believe, to assist in the restoration."

That judgment, if it be sound, indicates an extremely important office of Mathematics. My belief that it is sound,

¹ *Mathematics*, University Press, Columbia University, New York.

my conviction that mathematics, over and above her humbler rôle as a metrical and computatory art, over and above her unrivalled value as a standard of exactitude and as an instrument in every field of experimental and observational research, even beyond her justly famed disciplinary and emancipating power, releasing the faculties from the fickle dominion of sense by winning their allegiance to the things of the spirit, inuring them to the austerities of reason, the stern demands of rigorous thought, giving the mental enlargement, the peaceful perspective, the poise and the elevation that come at length from continued contemplation of the universe under the aspects of the infinite and the eternal—my conviction that above and beyond these services, which by common consent of the competent are peculiarly her own, Mathematics will yet further demonstrate her Human significance by the shedding of light, more and more copious as the years go by, on ultimate problems of Philosophy and Theology, is not a passing fancy or a momentary whim. Whether mistaken or not, it is at all events the product of growth, slowly come to maturity, steadily deepened and confirmed throughout more than a score of years devoted to the study and the teaching of the science, with an eye to ascertaining its rightful place in the hierarchy of Knowledges, and for the most part in an atmosphere quick with the mingled interests and liberalising presence of nearly every variety of academic and scientific life.

Nevertheless I have to own that, by virtue of considerations without any bearing whatever on the merits of the subject, I enter on the present undertaking only after long hesitation and with no little misgiving. For how shall one, it may be asked, who is no theologian, contrive to address himself to a question of Theology, and that in terms of Mathematics, acceptably to readers who in their turn may promptly protest that they are not mathematicians? Yet I believe that a little reflection will readily reduce the immediate shock of the seeming double absurdity, and will discover, at least in the possibilities of the enterprise, a sufficient measure

of justification. I am indeed far from being a theologian, and can assert no other title to be heard in theological discussion than such a very defective one as may be derived from having, in my earlier and more expectant years, listened attentively to some hundreds of sermons, from having diligently read a few theological works, and from having reflected a little, not without some temperamental interest in the themes but all too desultorily, upon the great questions that so persistently attend the recurrent sense of the world's mystery and wait upon the leisure hour and the pensive mood. It must be conceded, too, that the subject does not admit of acceptable presentation to one who is not willing to bring to its consideration a little patience and penetration, and such measure, I do not say of mathematical technique but of mathematical spirit, as may properly be regarded as an essential qualification for aspiring to acquaintanceship with certain of the higher achievements of modern thought. That there are many who, albeit they are not familiar with the technique of mathematics nor even with the more accessible of the world-illuminating concepts that have come to the science in recent times, possess nevertheless the requisite spirit, patience, and penetration, I do not doubt. Finally, if I shall not be able, even with their co-operation, to bear the contemplated message home to the understanding, and yet may hope to show the possibility of such a service and be the means of inciting some one who is both theologian and mathematician to render it to those who are neither, I am well prepared to count the lesser privilege a happy fortune.

As a precaution against the bare possibility of creating, however unwittingly, and therefore of having to disappoint, over-sanguine expectations, I hope it is unnecessary to disclaim the slightest intention of attempting to furnish anything like a universal resolvent for theological difficulties. Certain questions concerning the reality of God, concerning the ultimate consistence of the attributes commonly ascribed to such a Being, questions of Evil, of Freedom, of Immortality, and

of other great matters that so easily triumphed over the sanguine dialectic of the Ancient World and contrived to baffle with equal ease the subtle and persistent genius of the Middle Age, not even the adventurous spirit of Modern Mathesis and Modern Science may confidently assail. One need not have "passed on life's highway the stone that marks the highest point" ere he learns to be content with less, much less, than the full measure of intellectual conquest dreamed of in youth. Not complete *solutions*, not *final* answers to the deepest questionings of the spirit, but ever-increasing illumination of them, felt accessions to the sustaining sense of their significance, the acquisition of fresh view-points and new perspectives, the advancement, in a word, and multiplication of insight and vision—such are the reasonable expectations, the precious fruits, the ample rewards of serious Speculation.

The answer of Laplace to Napoleon's question, why he had not in his *Mécanique Céleste* mentioned the name of God, is familiar to all: "Sir, I had no need of that hypothesis." Not so generally known, I believe, but equally brilliant, was the instant response of Lagrange on hearing from the Emperor prompt report of the memorable conversation: "Nevertheless that is an hypothesis that accounts for many things."

Nothing is easier than to miss the point of these immortal sayings, so mutually antagonistic do they seem at first in the respects alike of temper and of sense, so resembling the sudden sabre-thrust and counter-thrust of battle. Yet they do not involve even the slightest element of disagreement. Neither of them affirms or implies denial of the assertion or of the implications of the other. Their semblance of mutual opposition is pure illusion, due to the dramatic character of the situation and a certain contrast and dissonance of sound. It entirely disappears on closer examination, and the two speeches stand forth in their proper character as felicitous statements of fact, being at the same time in point of form clear tokens of the scientific temper common to their immortal authors. Is there, then, in Laplace's *mot* no ground for imputing irreverence?

And is there none in that of Lagrange for the ascription to it of immanent piety? None whatever. It would be foolish to assert that the scientific and religious tempers are identical, or that the presence of one of them implies that of the other. It may be that the distinction between them is radical and that they are essentially independent. But, as endowments of spirit, they are not incompatible; and everyone who will may know that they do in fact often coexist, not only in ordinary men, but—as the examples of a Leonardo da Vinci, a Pascal, a Spinoza, a Riemann, a Newton sufficiently show—in the most illustrious personalities as well. Whether such a union was actually realised in either or neither or both of the renowned *savants* whose words are here under consideration, it is aside from my present purpose to inquire. Suffice it to point out that, as an obvious matter of sound sense and logic, any principle of criticism or interpretation that might be invoked or invented to justify the imputation of irreverence, impiety, or lack of veneration in the dictum of Laplace, must equally avail to discover in that of Lagrange corresponding want of *scientific* temper, and such a verdict, as everyone knows, would be in the teeth of fact. It is easy to imagine that Laplace, at the close of his immortal work, might, like Newton, have discharged for a time the mood essential to its production, given himself to leisured contemplation of the wondrous cosmic visions gained in years of analytic toil, and that, thus receptively musing on the mighty mechanism of the stellar universe—its unfathomable deeps, the immeasurable energies of swift-revolving worlds of flame, the all-pervasive order, the silent reign throughout of majestic law—he might have felt a reverent sense of admiration akin to religious awe, and—again like Newton—have owned in words that such unity and perfection betoken the dominion of a Supreme Ruler and Lord of all. Had he thus chosen to signalise the triumphant end of many years of scientific labour by some expression of belief in a divine source and ruler of a universe whose profounder beauties he had been enabled to

behold and disclose, the testimony could not but seem fitting to everyone, and would be especially grateful to those fortunate souls who see in every great display of power a witness to omnipotence, in every striking manifestation of natural law an evidence of divine decree, in every nobler scene of beauty a token of divine perfection. But—and this is the important point—such an expression of belief, however profound and genuine, however creditable to the great astronomer in his character as a man, would not have been in any sense a *constituent* of the *Mécanique Céleste*, neither a postulate nor a theorem, no integrant part whatever of the great *description*, but only an after-effect, an epiphenomenon, a note of veneration evoked by subsequent recall and contemplation of the celestial scene *described*. Nor could such a proclamation, whether made at the beginning, in mid-course, or after the end of the work, have added a jot to its validity or its value as a work of science. No defect of fact or of logic could have been thus avoided, palliated, or cured, and no merit improved. Had some soldier of Euclid's time demanded of the illustrious geometrician why he had not in the *Elements* made mention of God, doubtless the wit provoked but yesterday by the challenge of Napoleon's question had framed itself in Greek two thousand years before. Or does anyone imagine that that imperishable work—stateliest among the edifices upreared by the *scientific* genius of the ancient world—could have been improved by adding to its underlying postulates the statement, There is a God? If one asks, for example, why planetary paths are elliptic, or why the earth is flattened at the poles, and receives for answer that there is a God and He so wills, the answer may indeed be quite correct, yet one who should seriously offer it as *scientific* would seem less logical than pathological, less like a Newton, Laplace, or Lagrange than like a fool. The resolute attempt of Science to explain the universe in terms of Mechanics cannot be furthered by the postulation of a God; it would be abandoned thereby; for one thing is certain: God, if God there be, is no machine.

And so Laplace's *mot* was more than justified: not only had he "no need of that hypothesis," but, his problem being one of mechanics, he could not, without stultifying himself, have even pretended to use it.

"Nevertheless that is an hypothesis that accounts for many things," and one of these—whether it may be otherwise explained or not—is the fact that, while Science herself, the pulley-lever kind, by the avowed terms and definition of her aim and undertaking, is, once for all and finally, atheistic, Scientific Man is not. For many a one, even the hardest, of the kind—unless indeed cut off before the mellowing touch of pensive years can ripen Knowledge into Wisdom—comes sooner or later to perceive, at all events to feel, that the mechanistic hypothesis, fruitful and wide-reaching as it is, yet cannot embrace the whole of life, can give no adequate account of the finer elements of "man's unconquerable mind,"—its radiance and joy, its conscience and love, its holy aspirations,—holds out no promise to spiritual yearnings, makes no answer to the deepest appeals of the human soul; and so, under the chastening influences of disappointment, increasingly awake to the subtler claims, the higher appetences, of his being, he comes, reluctantly perhaps, slowly it may be and late in life, to reconsider and rectify his earlier estimates, and, from the doubt that is "hungry, and barren, and sharp as the sea," craves and seeks relief, finding it at length, if not in faith, at least in something akin thereto—a nascent sense of a sympathising consciousness beyond his own, of subtle intimations of an all-pervasive presence of a living Spirit.

It is not, however, my primary purpose to show that, owing to its essential nature, the postulate of a God can find no place among the principles of an enterprise whose aim is a thorough-going explanation of the universe in mechanical terms, nor to argue at length that that high emprise is destined to fail for the reason, among others, that one of the phenomena to be explained is the felt promise in an ideal eternally at war with the quality of the explanation—the passionate longing, I

mean, for release from the fixity of mechanism ; aspiration to a spiritual freedom infinitely above and beyond every shuttlecock conception of the universe.

Important as are the quoted affirmations of Laplace and Lagrange, the weight of their significance lies, not in the differing declarations as such, but in their common point of view, in what neither one asserts but both of them imply, namely, that *God is an hypothesis*. Far be it from me to contend that God is that and nothing more. For not every logos is rational. And doubtless Theology, broadly conceived in accordance with its etymological sense, is vastly less and vastly more than scientific, not confined to deductive processes and theorematic content, but embracing a measureless wealth of emotional expression as well, the rapturous eloquence of prophet and seer, the songs and prayers of saints and martyrs, religious poetry and the voice of sacred music—all discourse of holy things—the silent testimony, too, of the cathedral church with its solemn pictures and statuary—in a word, the sacred literature and sacred art of more than the Western World. Neither do I deny that, so far from being a *mere* hypothesis, God may be a real being whose reality is, at times, to persons of a certain temperament, an immediate object of a genuine kind of knowledge, not only such knowledge as the mystic asseverates that he possesses, but also a kind of certitude that—though it is, like the mystic's, ineffable—yet is possible to the *natural* intellect—the kind of certitude, for example, that one may have of *purposefulness* of the universe who has repeatedly and seriously sought to deny it that quality, not merely in words, which is easy, but in a vivid sense (hard to gain) of the denial's essential meaning, and who, having won that sense, perhaps a hundred times in the course of thirty years, has each time lost it immediately, like the passing shadow of a flitting bird, a mid-day moment's dream of darkness at once dissolved in the light, a cut in consciousness instantly closed like a cleft in a sea : the denial of purpose being no sooner achieved in feeling than it has been completely over-

whelmed by the inrushing flood of the query : What then *is* it for?—as if some suddenly roused instinct, vital to Intelligence, had leaped to the defence of its threatened integrity and life.

But, after all such claims have been freely and fully allowed, the fact is clear that, for Theology regarded as a purely *scientific* activity, addressing itself to the average or standard intellect, appealing to the normal understanding, abiding by the accepted rules of evidence and argumentation, God *is* an hypothesis and nothing more. For the rapt vision of the seer, faith's evidence of things not seen, the mystic's immediate sense of divine communion, the above-mentioned certitude of cosmic purposefulness, all of these and such as these being by nature personal, private, ineffable, incommunicable experiences, are none of them forms of *scientific* knowledge; because scientific knowledge always is, potentially at least, impersonal, public, effable, communicable, sharply discriminated from other varieties of knowledge by its *social* character, by its transmissibility from mind to mind.

Here, then, we are face to face with the naked theme of our meditation : the supreme assumption of the human intellect—its last refuge—the Hypothesis, namely, of a being called God. How shall we frame it in speech? How describe the august Being it seeks to represent? Appeal to the greatest physical philosopher of all time calls forth from the author of the *Principia* and inventor of the Calculus the terse reply : “A Being eternal, infinite, absolutely perfect.” Ask him whose genius it was that conceived and produced the indissoluble alliance between the doctrines of Number and Space, brought together the sundered hemispheres of apodictic thought and thus created the world of Analytic Geometry. “Infinite, eternal, immutable, independent, all-knowing, all-powerful”—such are the resounding terms of Descartes' response. Similarly impressive the penetrating characterisation heard on turning to the “God-intoxicated” philosopher of Amsterdam : “Absolutely infinite, consisting of infinite attributes, each expressing eternal and infinite essentiality.”

These familiar citations will serve to remind the reader of the best efforts of human thought to give adequate formulation to the hypothesis of God. As an hypothesis it stands alone. The hypotheses that we meet elsewhere, as the nebular, the corpuscular, the ionic, the atomic, the molecular, the hypotheses of a space-pervading æther, of universal gravitation, of organic evolution, of conservation of energy and of mass, all such have in common a certain mark which that one does not possess, namely, they *divide* in order to conquer, each of them is restricted to some *fragment* of reality, confined to a field that is *bounded*, while on the contrary the hypothesis of God is distinguished by the fact that it alone attempts to span and bind the Whole. The all-embracing questions are : What does it mean ? What is it worth ? The latter question I do not here propound, but shall address myself to the former alone, attempting no estimate of worth except incidentally and in so far as judgment of value naturally accompanies determination of sense.

“The light of human minds,” says Hobbes, “is perspicuous words, but by exact definitions first snuffed and purged from ambiguity.” I ask : what, if any, precise meaning, available for the purposes of discourse that aspires or pretends to rigour, may be assigned to the fundamental adjectives of theological terminology ? Infinite, Eternal, Omnipotent, Omniscient, Omnipresent, and the rest : are these mighty terms, these vast resounding voices from the deeps of Feeling, destined to none but *emotional* significance ? Are they to be confined for ever to the impulsatory offices of Poetry and Prayer ? Or is it possible to define them sharply as *concepts*, to confer upon them the character of scientific notions, and thus, while preserving their power to express emotion and energise life, make them sources of light as well ? I hold that, by virtue of certain modern developments in Mathematics, such an achievement is become possible, and I shall proceed at once, in the simplest terms at my command, to point out what appears to me the way to at least a partial vindication of the

claim. To that end I bespeak the generous co-operation of the reader's patience and attention, more especially so, as the initial considerations to be adduced cannot but seem dreary and dull, resembling more the forbidding approach to an arid plain than an entrance to a valley of fruits.

No one can have failed to observe that among the properties of the Being hypothesised by Theology there is one that has the distinction of appearing both explicitly and implicitly, of being at the same time co-ordinate with the other properties and involved in each of them. That pre-eminent property, as I scarcely need point out, is the attribute of Infinity. If this central term, about which the self-styled "queen of all the sciences" has been eloquently discoursing for thousands of years without giving it a single definition available for scientific use, can be completely shorn of its indetermination, and thus brought at length under the dominion of Logic, the like submission of the related terms will readily follow, and the long-coveted, long-awaited advancement of Theology from the position of a merely speculative philosophy to the rank of a genuine science will have been begun. Other means to that high desideratum I can imagine none. Fortunately, it so happens that there is not to be found in Science, not even in the domain of Mathematics—the very home and fatherland of precision—a single idea, notion, or concept that is more clearly or sharply defined than is the concept of Infinitude. And there—strangely enough—for nearly half a century it has in vain awaited appropriation by Theological thought.

I shall present the concept by aid of two simplest examples drawn respectively from the doctrines of Number and Space. Imagine the surfaces of two concentric spheres, the surface¹ of the inner one white and named the silver sphere, the surface of the outer one yellow and called the golden sphere. Next imagine the sheaf (as it is called) of rays consisting of all the

¹ The terms "sphere" and "surface of sphere" are herein used as equivalent, in accordance with usage in higher geometry.

straight lines that have their beginning at the centre of the spheres and thence extend outward indefinitely in every direction. It is plain that any ray, R , of the sheaf pierces the silver sphere in a point, say S , and the golden one in a point, say G . Calling S and G a pair of points, it is evident that, by considering all the rays of the sheaf, the points of the one sphere are paired with those of the other—a unique and reciprocal, or one-to-one, correspondence being thus established between the points of the silver and of the golden sphere. We see at once that the number of points on the silver sphere, however small, is the same as the number of the points on the golden one, however large, and, moreover, that this number is precisely the same as that of the rays of the sheaf. Now conceive a curve—red, if you like, for the sake of vividness—to be drawn on the golden sphere and enclosing on it a region, A , exactly equal in area to that of the silver sphere. The number of points in the region A is, of course, the same as the number on the silver sphere, and is, therefore, the same as the number on the golden one. But the points in the region A constitute only a *part* of the *whole* of the points on the golden sphere. At once it is seen—and the fact is of the very utmost importance—that we have here a *part*—the ensemble of points in the region A —and a *whole*—the ensemble of points in the golden sphere—such that the number of points constituting the *part* is precisely the same as the number of those constituting the *whole*. It is to be noted carefully and once for all that the equality subsists, not between the *area* of the region A and that of the golden sphere, but between two point *collections*, the *part* collection in the region A and the *whole* collection upon the sphere. By virtue of this *equality* of *whole* and *part*, the whole is said to be *infinite*, and it follows, of course, that the adjective applies to the equal part as well. We are now prepared to grasp easily and firmly the general definition of the concept¹

¹ The terms “infinite” and its synonyms are employed in all that follows, not in their literary, but in their scientific sense.

of Infinitude: a collection, class, set, group, aggregate, ensemble, manifold, or multitude of elements—be these points or passions, ions or ideas, relations or terms, quantities or qualities, tones of colour or shadings of sound, degrees of wisdom or goodness or power, or any other forms, or modes or determinations—is *infinite* if and only if the collection, like the ensemble of points on a sphere, contains a part, or sub-collection, that is numerically equal to the whole. On the other hand, a collection is *finite* if and only if, like the collection of trees in yonder forest or that of the sands of the sea or that of the stars within the range of telescopic vision, it contains no part, or sub-collection of the same kind, numerically equal to the whole. Let not the reader be here deceived. He is not invited to a feast of mere opinion, but is asked to open his eyes and behold for himself. There stand the two concepts, absolutely clear; and there, too, stand the validating facts, absolutely unmistakable. The latter indeed may be multiplied at will. Examples illustrating the concept of finitude are of course familiar to all, being forced upon the attention by the vulgar necessities of life. Those illustrating the concept of infinitude, though they are less familiar, yet abound in even greater profusion, being found in the great and the small, the remote and the near, in Number, in Space, in Time, in qualitative distinctions, in the realm of pure relation—wherever the human intellect may penetrate—if the inner eye be only disciplined to detect their omnipresence. Let us return for a moment to our image of the sheaf and the spheres. Consider those rays of the sheaf that pierce the points of the region A on the golden sphere. Let us call the group of these rays a bundle. It is evident that the number of rays of the bundle is the same as the number of the points of the region A ; this number, we have seen, is the same as the number of points of the sphere; and this, again, the same as the number of the rays of the sheaf; whence it follows that the bundle, though but *part* of the sheaf, is equal in number to the *whole*; so that the sheaf

and the bundle serve alike to exemplify again the notion of infinite manifolds.

For a simplest example drawn from the inexhaustible resources of another field, consider the two sequences of integers :

$$\begin{array}{ll} (W) & 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, \quad 6, \dots, n, n+1, \dots \\ (P) & 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, \dots, 2n, 2(n+1) \dots \end{array}$$

By the series (*W*) of symbols I wish to call attention, not to that uncompleted row of marks itself, but to a certain definite invisible *whole* that the row suggests and serves to bring as an object before the mind, namely: the *totality* of the positive integers. On being confronted with the notion of this fundamental totality, at once so clear to thought and so baffling to imagination, many persons, especially the uninitiated, become restive for a time. A little reflection, however, will dissipate any reasonable scepticism, and show that our footing here is solid rock. It is true indeed that, however many integers we may singly specify or imagine, there always remain more and more. It is also true that the hand cannot actually write nor the physical eye behold a set of symbols matching one-to-one all the integers composing the asserted totality, if such a thing there be. What of it? Consider, for a moment, a familiar totality so obvious that none may question it—the totality, I mean, of the points of a circle. As in the case of the integers, so here, too, it is impossible to think all the points singly or singly to specify or symbolise them all. Yet there they are—not one now and then another—but all of them at once, a totality persisting as such and unescapable. What is the secret? The secret is that the totality is a conceptual thing, a thing for thought and not for sense or imagination, a thing carved out by a law transcending the powers of step-by-step perception and depiction, a law of definition that selects out of the universe of thinkable things a set of them unambiguously—the law, namely, that the things shall be points of a plane and be all of them equally distant from a point therein. So it is precisely with the totality of positive

integers. It does not exist for sense or imagination, it exists for thought, deriving its character as a totality, its completeness and one-ness, from the completeness and one-ness of the selective law defining it—the law, namely, that *besides any definite integer there is another greater than that by one*. Hereby inclusion and exclusion are both of them decisive, instantaneous, complete; and the things law-selected are bound and held together by the definition as by an encircling band. Is it yet objected that, if the integers be thought as arranged in a series, the latter extends beyond every assignable limit and is never completed? The objection originates in confusion of thought, and I reply: (1) that such a series, though having no end, would not, therefore, be incomplete, for endlessness is as definite a character as that of having an end; (2) that, though integer-symbols—being spatial things—may be arranged in a spatial series, integers themselves—being never “naked to the visible eye”—need not be thought as so arranged even if such an ordering were not strictly impossible; and (3) that the objection is decisively overthrown by the single consideration of its lying equally against regarding as a totality the points constituting, for example, an hyperbola, since each branch of the curve on which they lie extends outward and upward beyond every assignable bound. The fact is that it is precisely such sense-transcending totalities that constitute the essential subject-matter of rigorous thought, and to deny their validity would be to evacuate the Reason of all content and bar even the very possibility of Science.

We may, then, with the utmost confidence in the soundness of our footing, resume the advance. Comparing the totality (W) of integers with the totality (P) of even integers, it is immediately evident that a unique and reciprocal correspondence subsists between the numbers of (W) and those of (P), as indicated by the sequence of pairs:

$$(T) \quad 1, 2; 2, 4; 3, 6; 4, 8; \dots; n, 2n; n+1, 2(n+1); \dots$$

Note that the pairing is no creeping performance that never

gets performed ; neither is it a lightning process, for this were as helpless before the task of pairing the totalities step by step as the pace of a snail. No, the pairing is a deed of law wrought instantaneously, without lapse of time. The law is: *each number shall go with its double*. And its effect is simultaneous with its enactment. To choose the law is to say: "Let the pairing be done"; and behold! it is done. It is only contemplation of the deed and not the doing of it that requires time. There is possible a yet deeper view of the matter, namely, the static view. We may say, that is, that the integers as elements of the existing ideal world already stand at once in all sorts of possible interrelations, among them the relation in question, and that to choose the mentioned law of association in pairs is not indeed to enact that relation, for it subsisted before the choice, but is merely to select it from other relations in similar case—in a word, to designate by a single act of will the *pair*-totality (T) already existing prior to the designation. Whichever view of the matter be taken—and either is admissible for the purpose in hand—it is clear that a one-to-one relation does subsist between the elements of (W) and the elements of (P). The totalities are therefore equally rich in elements: the number of integers in the one is the same as that of the other. But every integer in (P) is an integer in (W), while (W) has integers that are not in (P). Hence (P) is a *part* of which (W) is the *whole*; and hence (W) is an *infinite* collection and so is (P).

It is needless here further to multiply examples. "These slight footprints suffice to enable a keen-searching mind to find out all the rest"—no, not *all*, as the maddened poet sang, but enough and more. For to eyes once open the brood of the infinite is everywhere, the light of the great concept gleaming and glittering in every aspect of being. In the entire domain of Reality there is no conceivable manifold of things but either it contains or does not contain a part that, in the sense already defined, perfectly matches in elemental wealth and in dignity of structure the whole to

which it belongs. By this potent principle, so simple indeed as to have eluded the eye of thought for thousands of years, the Universe of thinkable things is riven completely asunder. The cleavage, however, is not a spatial one, it is purely logical, and the two grand divisions—the realm of the finite and the realm of the infinite—marvellously interlocked, together constitute the dual abode of dual-natured man. The former is the domain of Practical Life; it contains no magnitudes but man may measure them, as the rim of a continent, the speed of light, the volume of a star; no multitudes but man may count them—the coins in the coffer, the cattle in the field, the deeds of a hero, the years of an empire; no series or room or manifold, no *whole* whatever, but is *more* than a match for its every *part*: the world of things that are finite is strictly as an island-world suspent in a sea. The other division—the realm of infinite things—that is the immersing sea, an ocean without bottom or surface or shore. It contains no totalities but such as are law-defined, never a whole of any kind that has not countless parts each matching it perfectly in respect of number, coequal with it in *Mächtigkeit* as it is called, in potence or power, in complexity of structure, in dignity and wealth of Reality. This is the domain of the Reason, the dwelling-place of those universals of thought that so persistently haunted the soul of Fichte and attuned his faculties to an almost lyrical key of philosophic exposition; here sense and imagination are transcended; here and here alone are the objects of knowledge proper, for, as Poincaré has justly remarked—of a multiplicity, unless it is infinite, a science is strictly impossible.

“Granted,” says one, “in itself what has been said is well enough. What of it? Where, pray, is Deity? I ask for bread and am given a stone: for a vision of God, and am invited to thread endless mazes of mathematics, to contemplate the vast and dazzling splendours of number and space. Let it be done. What does it all avail?”

"I heap up numbers enormous,
 Mountains of millions extend,
 I pile time up on time,
 World on world without end,
 And when I from the awful height
 Would a vision of Thee behold :
 The total sum of number's Might,
 Though multiplied a thousandfold,
 Is yet no part of Thee." ¹

The protest is temperamental. It is an unwitting confession: the familiar voice of Imagination proclaiming its natural inability to follow in the wake of Thought. Imagination and Thought. It is the amazing failure, well-nigh universal, to distinguish between these powers that has permitted multitudes of thinkers, even so virile a one as Hobbes, to contend that what is infinite cannot be known. It is true indeed that whatsoever is infinite does transcend the photographic faculties of the intellect, but not the conceptual, not the logical. *Ignorabimus* is the surrendering cry of the Imagination. For Thought the Unknowable does not exist. I have made no promise of a "vision" of God. My aim, I repeat, is to rescue from indetermination and obscurity the terms of the hypothesis God, to give character and form to the vast amorphous shapes that waver there and shift in the fog and dusk of speculation, to convert the nebulous terminology into symbols of concepts, and thus in a measure to beget or to justify the hope that the shadowland of Theology may yet be invaded with conquering engines of Scientific light.

And the heart of the enterprise is quickened by many a high consideration. How familiar the old despairing words: None but the infinite can comprehend the infinite! How often they have been solemnly pronounced ² in courts of philosophy and sunken in the soul like a leaden decree of fate, an unappealable sentence of doom! Where is the place, and where

¹ Haller, *Ich haufe ungehaure Zahlen*, etc., cited by Hegel in his *Logik*.

² To cite only the latest instance, we find Mr Frederic Harrison in his *Philosophy of Common Sense*, p. 27, repeating the old cry in the form: "Does the Infinite Universe through Space conform to the modes of mind of the human mites of this planetary speck?"

the time in the course of nearly two thousand years, that the voice of authority, from peasant priest to the Pope of Rome, has not laid them as an interdict on the intellects of men? The maxim itself is true; but false and pernicious the implication that man is a puny creature who should be for ever content to devote his flickering finite faculties, in meekness and fear and shame, to worship and adoration of majesty and might that he may never, without presumption and folly, even aspire to comprehend. For long, alas! was the human soul destined to cower in the fearful night of that impious piety. But not for aye. Thanks to the invincible spirit of thought, Day is come at length, and it is ours to dwell in the morning. The sword of Mathesis has rent the veil asunder, stripped the pall from the consciousness of man, and there! behold!—what the sudden apparition that startles his gaze? Awful apocalypse, astounding revelation that he himself is infinite. Can it be a fact? Or is it only a dream, a feverish fancy of his long-imprisoned mind? It is a fact. No certitude of Science, none in Mathematics, is better ascertained. But how? It is not merely an inference from universal discontent with partial knowledge, not merely faith in the felt promise of the intellect's unquenchable passion to know the whole. Such evidence, old as the intellect itself, is not indeed to be despised, but it does not convince. It is rather a prophecy than a demonstration, a harbinger of proof than proof itself. No, it is not from such sources that the fact derives its certitude, but from two considerations that render it absolutely indubitable. One of these is the rigorous demonstration by Richard Dedekind¹ that the world of man's ideas *as ideas*—the human *Gedankenwelt* as the author calls it—is strictly an infinite manifold. Shorn of context and non-essentials, the proof may be rendered in a line, and the reader, if he has been attentive, is prepared to grasp it at once. Denote by

¹ *Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen.* Also published in English under the title, *The Nature and Meaning of Number*, by the Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago, Ills., U.S.A.

G the whole *Gedankenwelt*, by I any idea therein, as that of a song, a deed of charity, a diamond, a birth or a death; by I_1 the idea of I ; by I_2 that of I_1 ; and, generally, by I_{n+1} that of I_n . As any thought may itself be object of another thought, I_{n+1} can never fail, and so we have the two totalities:

$$\begin{array}{l} (T) \quad I, I_1, I_2, \dots, I_n, I_{n+1}, \dots, \\ (T') \quad I_1, I_2, I_3, \dots, I_{n+1}, I_{n+2}, \dots, \end{array}$$

the latter a part of the former, and both of them parts of G . Now pair (T) with (T') , as shown in the following scheme:

$$I, I_1; I_1, I_2; I_2, I_3; \dots; I_n, I_{n+1}; I_{n+1}, I_{n+2}; \dots$$

At once it is seen that the *whole* totality (T) is perfectly matched by its *part* (T') . Whence it follows that (T) and (T') , and, *a fortiori*, their common container G , are *infinite*, each and all. A demonstration so simple and clear that even the secular mind of a child may understand it, and yet so unimposing, so free from pomp and circumstance, that, despite its revelation of the infinite range and wealth of the ideal realm of the human soul, the theologically wise are wont to pass it by unwitting or unimpressed. But not even these, it would seem, can remain for ever blind to the second consideration, for it points to the achievements, the flaming deeds themselves, of the prowess that the former serves to reveal only by pale subtleties of argument.

“Hier ist es Zeit, durch Thaten zu beweisen,
Dass Manneswürde nicht der Götterhöhe weicht.”

What, you ask, can the exploits be? I answer: within the memory of living men, human Thought, emboldened by achievement and a deepening sense of its boundless resources, borne aloft and onward by the burning ardour of its own genius as by a chariot of fire, has not only passed the utmost walls of the finite world, but established there, far beyond the ancient borders, the dominion of Logic; and there, within the realm of transfinite being, *Mannigfaltigkeitslehre*,¹ mightiest

¹ A well-nigh complete bibliography of this transfinite movement of thought is found in Young's *Theory of Point Sets*. No other memoirs on the subject afford the reader so profound a view of its abysses as do those by

among the empires of Reason, flourishes to-day, its radiance and power not only pervading the entire domain of mathematics but destined also to reach and penetrate every branch of knowledge and speculation. There the æther of thought pervades the infinite and eternal,

"Times unending
Comprehending,
Space and worlds of worlds transcending."¹

There Man is seen transfigured in the light of his genius, the soul comes to a sense of its own and "yields not in dignity to grandeur divine."

In the presence of such a vision, the terrors of Naturalism dwindle and vanish. Kant's exclamation that "modern astronomy has annihilated my own importance" ceases to have significance. We desire no instauration of the shallow and timid humanism that derived its estimate of man from a geocentric theory of the universe, cried alarm at the crumbling of a Mosaic cosmogony, and still shudders at the shrinking of the earth to a pebble in the cosmic perspective opened to the view by modern science. For that is no material scene—the mathetic mount of Humanity's transfiguration. And when Theology shall have learned, like Mathesis, to disdain the expanding bigness of the external universe, to discern the presence of "infinite riches in a little room," to behold with the inner eye, in the supersensuous world of Thought, the sublime dignity, the infinite power, the divine stature of Man, the droning organs of sacred discipline will become mighty instruments of inspiration.²

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

Georg Cantor, easily the Primate of all who have contributed to its development.

¹ From the prize poem, "The Merman and the Seraph," by Wm. Benjamin Smith, in *Poet Lore*, Boston.

² A concluding article, by the same author, will appear in the April issue. The reader is further referred to the article "The Concept of the Infinite," by Professor Royce, in the HIBBERT JOURNAL for October 1902.—EDITOR.

A GREAT REFORM IN THE TREATMENT OF CRIMINALS.

PROBATION AND CHILDREN'S COURTS IN ITALY.

MISS LUCY C. BARTLETT,

Of the Howard Association.

THE first society for the application of Probation in Italy was founded at Rome on 10th May 1906. In this past year three similar societies have been founded at Milan, Turin, and Florence, while a ministerial circular issued on 10th May last provides for the separate hearing of juvenile cases—in other words, marks the commencement of Children's Courts in Italy.

These results, as will easily be understood, have not been obtained without much effort, and the whole story of the struggle may perhaps have interest for those who care to trace the development of reforms. But that which lends to this movement a special interest is the fact that it has been entirely due to private initiative, and the initiative in most cases of very young people. The movement has now the royal patronage, and is assisted by a Government subsidy, while many notable men of the political and legal worlds are content to give it their support. But for its commencement and development it depended upon the faith and energy of a few young men, all under thirty years of age, and with them to-day, in great part at least, lies the merit of the success.

When, four years ago, I first began to speak in Rome of the possibility of applying the American Probation system

in Italy, most people told me I was mad. Some few gave me encouragement, but most people thought I was attempting a hopeless task. But I was sufficiently sanguine to sail for America in the March of that year, 1905, to study the system in the land of its birth. I gave three months to this study, and returned to Europe with my plans matured.

For in the city of Indianapolis I had found a system which I thought possible to transplant to Italy. It was the volunteer system—the system of employing only some three paid Probation officers to do the work of organisation and preliminary investigation, and for all the visitation and supervision of the children—the *moral* side of the work—relying on volunteer aid.

This system which I found in Indianapolis was the first which brought me a solution of my problems. For the difficulties which faced me in Italy were two: the impossibility of finding the money for many salaries—the impossibility, amongst paid officials, of finding the right kind of men for the moral side of the work.

But, watching the system of Indianapolis, my hopes rose high. I believed that I could find volunteers similar to these in Italy. And it was no small encouragement to me to find the Indianapolis system not only feasible for my purposes, but also, as I judged it, by far the best in America. Nowhere else had I found such accuracy of supervision and such intimacy of relationship as in this Court where volunteer citizens were used for the care of the children. And the explanation was not far to seek. Where a paid officer must needs, for economy's sake, be asked to supervise as many as two hundred cases sometimes, these volunteers had never more than two or three under their care. The tie with the child was close and personal. The volunteers, too, had been carefully chosen—not all who had offered themselves for the work had been appointed. But so great was the interest of the citizens that, even after elimination, it had been possible to form a band of one hundred and

twenty-five, including doctors, men of business, ministers of every cult, and some ladies of wealth—all fitted, and eager to lend themselves to this work of child-saving. I participated in the work of Indianapolis for some two weeks or more, attending the trials of the Juvenile Court and accompanying the officers on their visits, and it was with a high ideal of what Probation might be that I returned to Rome in the autumn of 1905.

My ideals I shared at once with a young doctor in law, Signor Emilio Re, and it is from this time on that I say the young men of Italy are responsible for the success which has been gained. This success has been too much ascribed to me, I being called everywhere the founder of this work. But in reality I did no more than bring the idea—it is with the youth of Italy that the credit of its application lies.

Signor Re at once gave to my ideas an Italian setting. He explained to me the Italian law on which they could be based. This Italian law, known as the Conditional Condemnation, is somewhat similar to the First Offenders Act of England, which was repealed with the passing of the new Probation Act in August 1907. According to its provisions, minors, women, and men over seventy, who have committed a first offence worthy of not more than one year's imprisonment, may be left at liberty, under the condition that they be not reconvicted within a period fixed by the judge; the same privilege is accorded to men between the ages of eighteen and seventy, guilty of a first offence, if this offence has merited not more than six months' imprisonment. This law was passed in Italy in June 1904; as will be seen, it gives the first offender his liberty, but gives him no assistance to use that liberty worthily.

This hiatus, which has ever constituted the weakness of all European laws of pardon, we in Rome desired to remedy by founding a society which should offer to minors receiving the Conditional Condemnation that assistance which the Probation Officer affords in America. We realised that our

work could not be equally efficient, since our volunteer officers would not have the weight of the law behind them in their supervision, but still we believed that it would be possible to achieve something, and that in this way a species of Probation might be introduced.

Signor Re first sought to form a band of young men who would promise themselves as volunteer officers after the fashion of Indianapolis. In this he succeeded without much difficulty : ere long fifteen young men, mostly young advocates, had promised their services. But it was desirable for an experiment as novel as ours to have some strong patrons, and here the first difficulty arose which tested the mettle of these young volunteers, and, deciding the whole future of the work, gave to them its glory.

Our strongest patron at this time was a certain deputy, a well-known penalist, a counsellor of the Court of Appeal, and a man who had considerable influence with the Government. It was indeed through his influence that we had been led to expect that our experiment, when floated, would be assisted by a Government subsidy. He had also spoken of the work in Parliament, and as our ultimate hope was that our experiment might one day lead to an amendment of the law, this deputy was for us a very important personage.

Our dismay may therefore be imagined when, after five months of weary preparation and delays, he suddenly announced that the plan of action must be changed, or he must withdraw his support. The work, he said, must not be founded on the Conditional Condemnation, but on certain clauses of the civil code, according to which rebellious children, denounced as such by their parents to a magistrate, can be sent to a reformatory. Some of these cases he desired should instead be given over to our care, and located with families in the country. It was a boarding-out system he desired. Probation vanished into thin air, for the children so placed would have been beyond the reach of our volunteers—visiting would have become impossible. Further, it would have been no penal

reform we should have been promoting along these lines, for these children have not offended against the penal code—they are merely misdemeanants, often not even that, but merely the children of parents who wish to get rid of them.

In short, we saw the whole structure of our work crumbling if we accepted this deputy's plan ; yet, on the other side, if we rejected it, we should lose not only his support, but that of the Government—we should be throwing away every prop we possessed, before our work was even launched. It was surely a situation which tempted to compromise, if not surrender. Yet these young men stooped to neither, and in that they proved their fitness for future conquest.

On the 8th April of that year, 1906, the decisive meeting was held. Everything in the way of conciliation was attempted. A well-known professor of jurisprudence of the Rome University, Professor Ottolenghi, voiced our views ; of the fifteen people present, twelve voted for the Conditional Condemnation as the basis of our work. But still the deputy mentioned remained obdurate, and after two hours of weary debate he still held to his ultimatum—his plan, or his retirement. With one accord we then accepted the latter, and he withdrew, taking with him, as we had expected, the Government representative.

In this way did the work begin in Rome—with a struggle which decided from the outset what the type of the work was to be—whether it was to be based on principles or personages. The difficulties served as a veritable threshing-machine. “You have ruined everything!” was the comment of this deputy's secretary to me in the hour that I let his chief depart. But I felt rather that everything had been saved. Not only had a right basis been secured, but the volunteers had passed a test which proved their fitness for the future work.

For it should ever be remembered that that which makes the whole force of Probation is the quality of the workers who engage in it. It is a system which calls for the influence of character on character. The offender is left at liberty instead of being shut within prison walls: the desire is to

persuade him to a permanent amendment, rather than force him thereto for a limited period. Coercion, with subsequent relapse, has been found unsatisfactory—prison walls are losing the public confidence—gentler and more educative methods, represented by systems like Probation, are winning an attentive hearing. And in substituting educative for coercive ideas the public is undoubtedly making a great step forward. But there is danger lest the reform stop at *ideas*. Education in its deepest sense—education of the heart and character—can never be communicated, it should be remembered, by any system. This is always a question of personal influence. A large corps of badly chosen Probation officers might visit regularly, and accomplish exactly nothing, in a moral sense. A few of the right kind, struggling even with enormous difficulties, can accomplish much.

This was the root of my confidence in the Rome work after the test above mentioned—it had shown me that the workers were of the right kind. Insight, courage, and enthusiasm had been proved—these educative forces I knew would be brought to bear upon the children, and efficiency would come with a little practice.

And so it has proved. It would be wearisome, in a general account such as this, to trace every detail in the development of the work from that moment to the present, but the main incidents I will just indicate briefly.

On the 10th May 1906—just a month after the loss of our deputy—our first Probation Society was successfully inaugurated, formed on the basis of the Conditional Condemnation, and taking for its name “Society for Minors Conditionally Condemned.” In the interim month we had gained the invaluable support of the Public Prosecutor of that time, Cavaliere Calabrese—now promoted to the Court of Appeal, and become the President of our Rome Probation work. Through his good offices we receive every week from the Courts a list of the names of those boys who during that week have received the Conditional Condemnation, together with all

particulars. This puts our paid agent in a position to visit the cases. Some cannot be traced, and many, for various reasons, are not suited for our care ; but such as are suitable, and willing to accept the assistance, are entered on the register of the society, and passed over to the care of the volunteers. There are now forty-one volunteers in Rome, and we have something over a hundred boys under our care. It says something for the tact of the volunteers that only in one single instance has their visiting been refused, although, as already stated, the parents have always the right to refuse the visits, our society having no legal powers. But the people have no desire to repulse us, and their growing confidence is shown by the frequent appeals we receive to help cases outside our domain. All this must be set to the credit of the volunteers, for no other member of the society comes into direct contact with the poor people.

The society of Rome numbers now three hundred supporters, including eight senators, four deputies, and various men high in the legal world, as well as many members of the aristocracy. Two professors of the University are on our Council, and three leading men of the commercial world : the former assist us by making the work known among their students, and sending them to recruit our corps of volunteers—the latter, by finding work for our protégés. When the society had been only a year at work, it was granted the Government subsidy which had seemed to be forfeited, and its work received a long and laudatory mention in Parliament. This past year a deputation of the society was received by the King, the Queen, and the Queen Mother, all of whom expressed approval, and promised patronage, while the Municipality has given great assistance by granting to the society, almost rent free, four rooms in a central locality. This possession of a headquarters will mean great extension of the work.

These are results which were gained in two years, without money, and without influence, in a city called, by all who

know it, "apathetic." Does it not say something for the force of the workers and the value of volunteer work?

Encouraged by the success in Rome, I went at the close of March of last year to Milan, to try, if possible, to start the work there. In Milan the difficulties which met me were quite different from those of Rome. Throughout the long campaign in the capital, scepticism and inertia had been the chief obstacles we had been required to combat. In Milan, inertia is unknown—the citizens are intensely wide-awake and energetic. And with scepticism too I was no longer obliged to struggle, for the success of the work in Rome set that aside. My difficulties were quite different—they lay in the monopolising spirit of an already existent society, and in the sharp division of the political parties.

With regard to the first difficulty, I was enabled to take the firm stand which I did take by reason of experience I had gained during my tour of investigation in America. In the city of New York the juvenile Probation work has been largely given into the hands of the New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children. Of the work of this society in its own line I wish to speak no word of criticism, but I voice not merely my own opinion, but that of many people, when I say it is matter for regret that the Probation work of the city has in part been given into its hands. Probation work requires, if not the undivided attention of those who are directing it, at least the first place in their thoughts and interest. For this reason is it becoming recognised as the ideal to reserve *one* judge for the trial of juvenile cases. A certain attitude of mind is required, which is disturbed by work diametrically different in nature. If this is true of the trials, it is also true of the period of supervision—even more true, since the tie between the child and his Probation Officer is a closer and more lasting one than that between him and the judge. If the visits to a child are paid by different officers, or by an officer with many different interests in his mind, the moral value is generally *nil*, and the Probation

system becomes a farce. And these dangers, I had learnt in America, are almost inevitably present when Probation is undertaken by a body whose interests are already engaged elsewhere. Accordingly, I should have objected to the probation work of Milan being entirely in the hands of the society above mentioned, even had I had in this society a greater faith than I had. But as a matter of fact I had no faith. I knew the society had already more work than it could manage, and was very hampered as to funds. It had put Probation on its programme, but on the programme alone I knew it would remain, if no other body of workers took it up. I asked its director to co-operate with a new society which was to be founded for that purpose. He refused, and his refusal rendered very difficult my work in Milan, but could not obstruct it. I obtained the support of the Mayor, the chief paper, and many of the leading citizens, and on the 4th April held a meeting which launched successfully in Milan also a "Society for Minors Conditionally Condemned." Fifty people joined the society that night, and the membership has risen considerably since. As elsewhere, this membership includes many prominent men of the legal world—the President of the Criminal Court is President of the Executive Committee, while young advocates largely compose the corps of volunteers.

My difficulty regarding political divisions was also to some extent resolved. I had been told in Rome that it would not be possible to form a neutral society in Milan—that I should have to be content to form it from one political party or another—the feeling on political questions runs so high, and parties are so sharply divided. This did not seem to me at all ideal, and I am glad to say that with a little effort it was possible to avoid such limitation. The Milan society numbers both Catholics and socialists among its members. The work, from the latest accounts, is proceeding briskly, very much along the lines of the work in Rome.

Senator Brusa, who had been my chairman at the Milan meeting, persuaded me to hold a similar meeting in Turin on

7th April, and this led to the foundation of the society there. Eighty people joined the society on this occasion, and among the supporters are Professor Lombroso and Professor Carrara. But the Turin work is still too much in embryo to make an account of it possible at present.

In Florence, on 13th April a large meeting, attended by many of the most notable people of the city, inaugurated there a "Society for Minors Conditionally Condemned." It is not too much to say that this work has aroused a wave of sympathy and enthusiasm wherever it has been mentioned through the country. Even at Naples—Naples, considered by many so hopeless in its social conditions—there is a brave little band of people struggling to prepare the way for its introduction. At the inaugural meeting in Florence the representative of the Mayor promised all the support of the Municipality to the new-born society. The Prefect, present in person, became a member of the directive committee, which, as elsewhere, was composed of very strong people. But with Cavaliere Moschini, the Public Prosecutor of Florence, and the President now of the society there, rests the chief honour for the splendid piece of work which has been done since.

In February, supported by Senator Brusa, I had had an interview with the Minister of Justice, in which I had described to him at some length the procedure of Children's Courts as I had seen it in America, and the many advantages pertaining to the separate hearing of juvenile cases. He had promised me that he would make such a separation in Italy, by issuing a circular which should reserve for the exclusive hearing of children's cases one room in each criminal court possessing several rooms; in the smaller places, he had explained to me, separation would not be possible.

With this promise I had been well content, but several months had passed without producing the circular, and though I mentioned the Minister's promise wherever I went, and tried indirectly to remind him of it, my hopes had begun to burn low. Then, to my deep joy, Florence acted on its own initiative.

Very shortly after the founding of the Probation Society there, Cavaliere Moschini, who had become its President, persuaded the President of the Criminal Court of Florence to fix a separate hearing for juvenile cases. Cavaliere Fiani gave sympathetic consent, and on the 26th May, with some solemnity, a Children's Court was inaugurated at Florence. From this time on all juvenile cases will be heard on Tuesday morning, in the "Second Section" of the Courts, by the same judge. On the 10th May the Minister's circular appeared ordering this change, but it was known to many that Florence had already made all the necessary provisions. The initiative of Cavaliere Moschini and Cavaliere Fiani cannot be too highly praised: it was such men as these made Florence great in the past, and will make Italy great in the future.

And warm praise must also be given to Cavaliere Calabrese, the President of the Rome Society for Minors Conditionally Condemned, for it was from a memorial composed by him that the Minister's circular was actually drafted. He presented this memorial towards the end of April, and on the 10th May, as already stated, the circular was issued. The four chief provisions of this much-desired circular are:—

1. That juvenile cases shall be heard separately from those of adults, in one room of the Courts reserved for the purpose, or at least at a separate hour.
2. That they shall be heard always by the same judge.
3. That this judge shall endeavour to treat juvenile cases in a psychological rather than a punitive spirit.
4. That children not concerned in the trials shall not be allowed to loiter about the rooms and corridors of the Courts, as they have hitherto done.

This circular of the Minister of Justice closes my account of Probation and Juvenile Court work in Italy. The circular must undoubtedly produce a species of Children's Courts in all the large cities ere long, while Probation work, based on the law of the Conditional Condemnation, shows also every sign

of spreading rapidly. The societies of Florence and Turin already number over one hundred members each, and this year may possibly see the introduction of the work at Naples and in Venice. These are the results. But before ending I should like to indicate clearly once more what are the forces and instruments through which such results have been obtained.

I have spoken of the volunteers of Rome, and the part they played in the inauguration of the first society. At Milan it was the same story. Young Signor Maino, a boy of twenty-one, was my right hand throughout all my difficulties there, and without his untiring aid the society in all probability could not have been launched. At Florence, similarly, the lion's share of the credit belongs to young Signor Ferrando, who had so prepared the ground before my coming that I had only to put the match to a mine already laid. And so is it going to be with Naples; and so will it doubtless be with every town where the work takes root. The forces which move this work are faith, enthusiasm, devotion—and these find their natural expression, their natural instruments, in the youth of the country.

And what of England? I would ask that question in conclusion. England enjoys now the benefit of a Probation Act—of legally appointed Probation Officers. But is the work going to be left without the co-operation of private interest, to become mechanical, or at best inadequate? This is a critical moment for Probation in England. So far, some magistrates have shown interest in the new law, and wisdom in applying it, but many have no confidence in it at all. A wider confidence can only be aroused if interest and co-operation are forthcoming from the public. There is need of many letters to the press at this juncture—letters asking for a wide application of the law, and showing an intelligent comprehension of, and interest in it, on the part of private citizens. It would be of great assistance too if the Home Office could see its way to paying good salaries to a few competent men, rather than piecework payments to many, which is the present method.

The well-paid Probation Officer, in charge of a district if it were London, or a whole town if it were a small provincial town, could and should be trusted, as a part of his office, to enrol such subsidiary aid as his work might require. Here is where volunteer co-operation—the co-operation of clubs, societies, and private individuals—enters in. The well-paid, efficient man is needed at the helm, to organise; then should come that spontaneous co-operation from the public which has given to the work its finest success in America and its whole success in Italy. Both are needed—the organisation and the life. But inasmuch as England, with its orderly spirit, can always be trusted to arrive at organisation eventually, I end this paper with a plea for the *life*. Are there no young men from our many social settlements ready to volunteer for this work after the manner of the young men of Italy? The work will soon be organised, no doubt; but if the forces of devotion and enthusiasm be left out, it will be arid and ineffectual. Probation introduces a new era in penal treatment, because it recognises man as an intelligence to be reformed by methods directed to the inner self, rather than a machine to be tinkered at externally. This is a great advance; but if the methods remain mechanical, then the supervision with liberty can obtain little more than the supervision with imprisonment. It is the spirit which must be changed as well as the form. United to order, we want elasticity—united to caution, hope. And these qualities are best found in young and eager workers who are giving themselves gratuitously to a cause. May volunteers not be lacking then to the Probation work of England—volunteers of the right stamp! And then in this penal field, as in every other, shall we be able to test afresh the power of that great principle of love, ever the harbinger of progress, and ever invincible where joined to wisdom.

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LONDON.

CHRISTIAN MISSIONS AS AFFECTED BY LIBERAL THEOLOGY.

AN APPEAL FROM THE MISSION-FIELD.

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THERE can be no doubt that the spirit which is called Liberalism is having to-day a very powerful influence, both direct and indirect, upon the Missionary enterprises of the Christian Church. That influence will become deeper in the near future, and must lead to important and characteristic modifications in both the practical policy and theoretical objective of Missions.

On the whole, the new spirit may be confidently expected to exercise a salutary influence. It will ultimately furnish the Missionary project with stronger and more abiding motives. We must not be surprised, however, if it is some considerable time before the mass, which so enthusiastically supports this activity of the Church, becomes accustomed to the new perspective. It may even happen, though there are no signs of it at present, that there will be a momentary declension of interest and a temporary paralysis of effort until the full force of the new imperatives has been substituted for the old. For it must be remembered that the modern views of God and His relation to men, of the future state, of the Bible and dogma, of the non-Christian religions, and, especially, of the future of the human race upon the earth, not only affect the

attitude of the Missionary on the field, but profoundly alter or qualify the motives of those who send him.

Those who have been trained in the "Old School" find it hard, if not altogether impossible, to understand how devotion can be preserved in the absence of those motives which they have held to be essential. They find it equally difficult to believe that the new grounds upon which modern Missionary effort is based are solid rock and not loose, inadherent sand. Sometimes they show bitterness in their criticism of the newer ways of thinking and become even rancorous. But far be it from the Liberal to give reply in the same spirit. The older views have been a noble row of shelter-trees in whose protection the young saplings of Modernism have grown. There must therefore be no vicious use of the axe. We are, because they stood between us and the biting east winds of materialism; and now, even though we imagine they are keeping the morning sun from us, we must be courteously patient. Our more vigorous life is draining the soil of that nourishment which was once theirs alone, and here and there withered and broken branches on those storm-beaten trees tell us that soon we must take their place and become, in our turn, the shelter of other saplings.

The present era of Missionary activity commenced, roughly speaking, two hundred and fifty years ago. It commenced at a time when scientific inquiry was in its go-cart and had not learnt to use its limbs. The ink was not dry upon Bacon's epoch-making book, nor were its pages digested by the intellectual men of that day. Missionary inspirations were drawn from beliefs that are no longer vital, and the motives of the enterprise were founded upon creeds which practically have lost their authority for us. Those aspirations and motives were real enough then. They pulsed with the arterial convictions of the men who acknowledged them. They sent a Carey to India and a Brainerd to America. But those motives do not inspire us to the same extent to-day. Some of them move us not at all. "Time makes ancient good uncouth."

The age has changed. The spirit of to-day is removed from the spirit of yesterday as far as the east is from the west, "and never the twain shall meet." We no longer sing—

The heathen perish day by day,
Thousands on thousands pass away;
O Christians, to their rescue fly!
Preach Jesus to them ere they die.

If we sing it, we do not believe it, or else we interpret it in a manner entirely foreign to Montgomery's meaning. This age is frankly humanitarian — almost utilitarian. It applies standards of judgment which, though they may be intensely spiritual in essence, are undisguisedly practical and *this-worldly*. Professor James applies ugly adjectives to us, and says that we are "pragmatical." So be it. The ladder by which we ascend to heaven must have its feet firmly planted upon the earth. It is not the *post-mortem* fortunes of the non-Christian people which disquiet the Liberal; he is troubled rather by their present limitations of goodness. He sees nations "sundered by the wastes of half a world," and he would fain make whole to them their opportunities of life and character. He seeks to give them with ourselves, so far as may be, equal chances to become sons of God and sharers in the spiritual wealth of the Kingdom which Christ revealed to the eyes of men. It is not that the individual is of less value than the old creeds asserted; but the unit can often be best helped through acting upon the mass. So our thought goes out, not so much to the tiny coral animal working on the edge of the reef, as to the great ocean currents which shape that reef and thus decide the environment of every inhabitant upon it. The new spirit aims at changing the currents of the great seas of human life, or, to change the metaphor, has as its objective the founding of the Kingdom of God *on earth*. It may be noticed, in passing, that Christ Himself had a similar ideal.

This spirit, then, which has been growing into maturity during the last thirty or forty years, now asks to be recognised by the Christian Church and to be enfranchised in the councils

of Missionary enterprise. It has been making, for many years past, large contributions of men and women to the Mission-field, and thus its claim has justice and reason to sustain it.

Necessarily, one of the first endeavours of the modern spirit will be to build up a *science of Christian Missions*. It is a child of that self-same scientific spirit which has unified knowledge and created method in the investigation of the physical world. The method and principles of the laboratory need not be incongruous in the realms of the spiritual. This new science will busy itself with collecting, scrutinising, and classifying the data from which working theories of Missionary practice may be deduced. For it must be admitted that there are gradually coming into view, as the result of several generations of experience, certain common principles of Missionary endeavour and policy. These are in sore need of classification and general application.

No student of Missions can blind himself to the fact that the Missionary programme has suffered many unnecessary interruptions through a lack of definite and settled policy. Instead of an organised army fighting in accordance with strict and ascertained military principles, with regiment supporting regiment in a carefully thought-out plan of campaign, we have the deplorable spectacle of thousands of undisciplined squads and irresponsible sharpshooters, without any acknowledged leader and utterly destitute of any concerted plan of action. The soldiers have been sent out in the most haphazard fashion with the vaguest instructions. Too often their equipment is ridiculously imperfect and the arms they bear sadly obsolete. The marvel is that with such lack of organisation and want of unity in operation there should be even the meagre success there is.

In only a few rare cases have the various Missionary Societies in any one country resolved upon a united course of endeavour. There is no evidence yet of any serious attempt to co-ordinate forces in a world-wide movement. In the great majority of cases there is no relation between the regi-

ments stationed in the individual field of battle. Too often the soldiers have not been formed into fighting units, but each goes a-warfaring at his own charges and according to his own judgment. If the Missionary be a capable man, after a few years of experience he usually forms a policy for himself, but he has no guarantee that his successor will carry it out. In the home churches there is a strong and permanent lay element which continues lines of successful policy and is not affected, to any large extent, by a change of minister; but in the Mission-field it is different. The converts are weak, and dependent, in a great measure, upon the guidance and direction of the Missionary. So it happens that Mission-fields are studded with half-built castles, and the graves of capable workers are marked by broken shafts of unaccomplished purposes. This is, to-day, the real tragedy of Missionary life.

It is to be recognised with thankfulness that this chaotic state of affairs is gradually being altered. A new spirit is brooding over the waters. There is a growing desire to place Missions upon a more scientific and stable basis. Missionaries themselves have felt this need for many years past; but hitherto they have been voices crying in the wilderness. Now, it would seem, they are coming into their kingdom. Missionary Congresses, Bureaux of Information, and "Chairs of Missions" in Theological Colleges are all contributing to this desired result.

In spite of the dramatic and enthusiastic utterances of the class usually associated, rightly or wrongly, with "Exeter Hall," Foreign Missions have not been the success they might reasonably have been expected to be, when the enormous expenditure of life and wealth is considered. This fact is admitted—privately, of course—by those who are in a position to judge. It is not the criticism of the unsympathetic, but the sigh of the disappointed. The successes are, as a rule, trumpeted abroad; the failures are discreetly hidden away. We hear much on Missionary platforms of the faithfulness and devotion of converts; but there is another side

—and it is to be feared the larger side—the instability, the unfaithfulness, and the greed of those who have been won. For information on these points we have to search laboriously through dry and almost unread Missionary reports. Certainly there is a philosophy behind this course of emphasising the best rather than the worst; but while it has some admirable qualities, it is also open to grave dangers. It often results in a state exceedingly difficult to change—the state of self-deception.

This dearth of success, which is secretly mourned by so many friends of the Kingdom and so blatantly advertised by so many of its enemies, is accounted for in many ways. Usually the explanation is the fundamental difficulty of the undertaking itself. It is to be admitted that the task which the Christian Church has set herself is far harder, and will take much longer to accomplish, than most enthusiasts imagine, yet the paucity of success is not explained by this fact. There is an alarming amount of misdirected energy upon the Mission-field. This is due, as has already been hinted, to a grievous lack of definite and comprehensive policy. If the energy expended year by year could be concentrated in some united action, much of this waste might be arrested.

Sometimes it happens that the meagre policy of a Society has no real relation to the special conditions which obtain on the field. This policy has been formulated thousands of miles away from the scene of operations. The Mission Secretary announces from time to time that the policy is working splendidly; and so it seems to be. But those who are allowed into the secret see that it works because Missionaries have either good sense enough to take no notice of its ridiculous elements or else have art enough to interpret it to suit their own ideas. Such a state of affairs can scarcely be called satisfactory. Nevertheless, these Mission Boards are composed of good men earnestly desirous of advancing the Kingdom of God. That they take themselves so seriously and, because they are still in the flesh, assume a sort of

Vatican infallibility, only complicates the case. Had they the saving grace of humour, and were they obliged by the articles of constitution to read certain chapters in *Bleak House*, wherein Mrs Jellyby dwells upon a scheme for educating the natives of Borrioboola on the left bank of the Niger—by teaching them to turn piano-legs!—the “policy” might be shorn of some of its absurdities. They might even stoop to collect opinions from experienced Missionaries.

In bringing about a more scientific and ordered policy on the part of the Missionary Societies by codifying and orienting the experiences of the past, the science of Missions will render signal service to the Christian Church.

There is space in this short article only to notice one or two of the more important and general problems which need to be dealt with by that science when it has come into being.

1. One of these is the question, *What races shall be evangelised first?* Reflection will surely force us to the conclusion that, from the Modernist’s point of view of a Kingdom of God upon earth, some races are more worth saving than others. It is far more important, for instance, that Japan should be Christian in life and spirit than that the whole of the South Seas should be converted. The inhabitants of these islands have evidently no function to perform in the great evolution of humanity, but he would be a bold man who would dare to outline the limits of Japan’s or China’s function. There is a fallacy underlying the statement that “one soul is as good as another.” Some souls mean far more to the future than others, and this should not be lost sight of in the Missionary effort of the Church. It would seem that the resources of Missions are strictly limited, and the fact has to be faced that, in spite of all the special pleadings, bazaars, exhibitions, cinematographs, and what not, Christendom is not prepared to spend very much larger sums upon the foreign field. But suppose that the Church were brought to some feeble realisation of her duty, and that, as the result, the contributions were multiplied by ten—a most unlikely event—even then it would

be impossible to equip the various fields of the whole world in any such manner as to ensure a satisfactory result. Seeing that it is manifestly impossible, at present, to attempt the conversion of the entire world, as wise Christian empire-builders we must *select* our fields. If it must needs be that some are to be left without the Gospel—who shall they be? Common sense would seem to say that we ought *first* to attempt the living and progressive peoples who hold in their hands the keys of the future. But it may be asked in astonishment, “Are you going to allow the natives of Africa and the South Seas to perish?” The reply might be well made, “Are *you* going to allow the millions in India and China to pass away without the hope of the Gospel?” This is really a matter of policy, and must be considered as such. It is a question of “first things first.” Paul was probably upbraided by certain well-meaning people for leaving the more primitive souls of Samaria and Judea to perish while he went to the more advanced races of Greece and Italy. But Paul was a statesman. He saw “the strategic points in the world’s conquest.”

Does the Church follow Paul in this? Is there not a tendency to choose fields where we may “count the game,” and to be satisfied with easy and rapid victory rather than be spurred to greater endeavour by temporary failure? “I believe in supporting a Mission-field like New Guinea in preference to India or China,” said a wealthy layman to the writer recently; “I get more souls for my money.” He was frank and candid about it. It must be remembered that it is a comparatively easy task to abolish cannibalism, infanticide, and idolatry. Mohammedanism can do, has done, and is doing that. But to overcome ancient and errant philosophies which are the very fibre of a people’s ideals, to correct spiritually deranged norms of conduct, to dethrone falseness and greed, to sap the foundations of religious systems solidified by the pressure of centuries into granite—these are the tasks which will test the strength of Christianity.

2. Another question which must be considered in all its bearings, and which is daily becoming more urgent, is that of *the doctrines which are to be taught to Christian converts*. It would appear as if Western Christianity is not so catholic as it assumes to be, for its conquests have been practically limited to European or European-dominated peoples. It does not seem to appeal to the East. Every attempt to force it upon the Oriental peoples has met with only the sparsest success. Where any great impression has been made, there has been a liberalising of doctrine, and the creeds of the Western Church have been allowed an alarming amount of elasticity. Is it not gradually borne in upon the conviction of the Missionary to Oriental peoples that many of the things which appeal to the West are but moonlight fancies to those who listen to his words? Does he not come to the conclusion that, to use the words of a recent writer, "the Christianisation of the Asiatic consciousness does not mean its transformation into the likeness of the West; and that the Mission of the Holy Ghost in the East may be to produce an Oriental Christianity different in institutional form and temperament from the Christianity of Europe and America"? All that the Missionary can do is to lead men to the well of life. He cannot prescribe how, or with what vessels, they shall draw from that well. The Englishman cannot enjoy his draught of water unless it be offered him in a sparkling crystal glass; the Indian would despise it unless contained in a fire-cleansed and polished brass *lota*. Which things are a parable.

The position to be assigned to the Old Testament is a case in point. Should we lead a non-Christian people through the wilderness of Jewish tradition and Semitic ideas? Should we ask a people weaker in the faith than ourselves to make those adjustments in religious thought which our early training has made necessary to us? The most dangerous trial of faith is that of *unlearning*. Shall we put this strain upon them?

Should we be wrong in allowing the more evolved races to place *their* Old Testament where we place the Jewish? If

God has spoken in divers manners through the prophets of the human race and has not left Himself without witness, can we be wrong in allowing to the Hindu his Isaiah who tells of the "Coming One"? The converted Hindu says that the prophet who spoke of the *Nish-kalank Avatar*—the Spotless Incarnation—who is to come at the end of this present *Kali Yuga* and bring in the *Satya Yuga*—the reign of truth and righteousness—spoke of Jesus Christ. He declares that *his* fathers saw Him afar off. Shall we deny him this view?

The problem of how much or how little should be taught the elementary and primitive races must be discussed. It would seem that the most simple and childlike ideas are all that are necessary. The training we give a child of seven or eight will suffice, for instance, most South Sea Islanders for the next few generations. It is example rather than precept the native needs—discipline rather than theology. To teach a Fijian to gabble over the Athanasian Creed, in language not deep enough to express its meaning, is only displacing incantation by incantation, and fetichism by fetichism. What can a Solomon Islander understand of the metaphysics of the Trinity or of the Hypostatic Union? The parable of the Prodigal Son is probably as far as the native can intelligently go. Some would not restrict that statement to native races.

3. The question of *the locale and organisation of the governing bodies of Missions* needs much consideration. It would appear from the writings of many Missionaries that this department of the work is in a very unsatisfactory condition, and is in urgent need of reform.

The China Inland Mission, I understand, has attempted the solution of the difficulty by managing all its affairs from within. The Missionaries on the field determine the policy and distribute the grants without any interference from outside. It would be interesting to have a peep behind the scenes, and to see how far this method has lessened friction and obviated difficulty. On the face of it, the method has the recommendation of being reasonable.

Most Societies, however, manage their affairs principally from without the fields they govern, and the result seems to be continual disagreement and misunderstanding between the "Board" and the "Field." This method, moreover, entails a great waste of money. For illustration: here is a society (these are actual figures taken from an official report) which receives £11,000 from the voluntary offerings of the Church it represents. Of this annual sum, £2730 is spent in office and general expenses. This means, roughly speaking, that only fifteen shillings out of the sovereign actually reach the field for effective work. Surely the science of Christian Missions could suggest some less expensive scheme.

There are many other points perhaps equally important and pressing which might be touched upon. The self-government of convert churches, the relation of the Missionary to secular education and to the industrial development of races, the training and selection of the Missionary himself—are all questions which are extremely vital. But probably sufficient has been said to indicate how real is the need for a more scientific and a broader treatment of the subject of Christian Missions. There is necessity for an Ecumenical Council—not to debate viciously concerning vowels in some theological terms, but to direct the splendid energy, unquenchable enthusiasm, and spiritual force of Christendom in this the widest of all its operations and the most ambitious of all its schemes—the founding of the Kingdom of God among all the nations of the earth.

J. W. BURTON.

DAVUI LEVU, FIJI.

RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF THE CULT OF ANCESTORS AND HEROES.

LEWIS R. FARNELL, D.Litt.

THE religious institution that is the subject of this paper has probably had a wider area of diffusion than any other that belongs to personal religion. Though certain European races and certain English-speaking communities have discarded it, yet it is still a living force among a vast number of our contemporaries both cultured and uncultured, and probably, whether we practise it or not, the mental inheritance of all of us is deeply indebted to it for good and for evil. Its exact influence upon the origins of our civilisation, upon religion, social morality, law, and art, is a baffling problem to solve, and only a few competent investigators are beginning to throw light on it. The statistics bearing on the facts are scattered through various papers and treatises, and we urgently require a comprehensive and luminous statement of all the relevant phenomena presented by ancient and modern, civilised and savage, communities. The present sketch is intended only to indicate certain results that have been achieved, to glance at some current hypotheses, and to call attention to a few important questions which the comparative and inductive method may hope to solve.

As regards its area, we find that it has been very widely prevalent, but we must not therefore assume it to be a universal phenomenon of every society in a certain stage of culture. We find it attested abundantly, not only of many

existing savages, but also of the Mongolian and some Semitic races, of the earlier Mediterranean peoples, of the pre-Spanish civilisations of America, and of most of the Aryan stocks, Greeks, Italians, Persians, Indians, Slavs and, we may now add, Teutons; for though, misled by a phrase in Tacitus, some of us used to think that our early Northern ancestors were too high-minded for hero-worship, yet the pre-Christian Icelandic saga reveals that they were at least occasionally capable of it. We have an interesting record of the chieftain Grim, "to whom sacrifices were made after he was dead, on account of the love men bore him."¹ But investigators have been prone to interpret much funeral ritual as proof of the worship of the dead, which by no means demands such interpretation. This worship, properly understood, is a special and sometimes relatively late product of the still more widely spread belief in the continuance and active consciousness of the departed spirit. Where this belief is strongly held it is likely to suggest many of the acts of posthumous honour that have been and still are performed at tombs all over the world. The theory of continuance carries with it the conviction that the departed need in the other world the things they loved and needed in this; and the mere affection of father, brother, son, is sufficient to prompt the surviving relatives to fling food into the grave, weapons and ornaments, to throw in slaughtered animals or slaves, perhaps even to drag up the Viking's or the Sea Queen's ship and raise over it a mighty tumulus, or to give the sea-rover the splendid funeral of the blazing ship turned adrift on the sea.

We must, in fact, carefully distinguish between "tendance" of the dead and actual worship. And the distinction is often difficult to draw. What is the most trustworthy criterion of worship? Not gifts, which we often fallaciously call "sacrifices," "victims," "oblations," while they may merely be tokens of respect and benevolence such as would often be proffered to the living, although sumptuous extravagance in

¹ Landnám Boc. 1, 6, 8 (*Origines Islandicæ*, p. 30, cf. p. 337).

giving to the dead allows us to suspect that strength of feeling in the giver which engenders worship. Nor are mere acts of communion a sure criterion, such as the blood-covenant with the dead, the family meal eaten with the dead, Achilles' gift of his hair to his departed friend, an act prompted perhaps by the same passionate desire of communion which moves living lovers to interchange their hair in lockets,—all such things may be conjoined with worship, yet are possible and are often practised without it. The surest criterion is prayer, accompanied by a feeling towards the dead as supranormal beings who are capable of supranormal acts. For example, nothing that is done in the funeral of Patroclus need be called worship; but when the post-Homeric legend tells us that the ghost of Achilles appeared to the departing Achæans and hindered the sailing of their ships, until they had sacrificed to him his betrothed and prayed to him for a favourable wind, this is shown to be real worship of the departed hero. Again, the worship must be regular and continuous if it is to be effective and to produce religious and social results of importance; for the mere immediate fear of the newly departed soul may evoke prayer or acts of magic or religion which only aim at exorcising or banishing the dangerous ghost for ever to a distant realm, so that the living may be safe from his influence,¹ and the phenomenon at this embryonic stage is of no great importance for civilisation.

It is also desirable to mark the difference between worship of ancestors and worship of heroes; both arise from the same stratum of belief concerning posthumous existence, both usually

¹ For instance, there seems a fleeting worship of the "sisa" or soul immediately after death among the Tshi-speaking people of West Africa (A. B. Ellis, *Tshi-speaking Peoples*, p. 152). An embryo form of ancestor-worship is also reported from the Kansas of North America; food is given to the spirit with entreaties to let the living alone, a prayer or incantation is pronounced over the dead such as "When you go, continue walking; do not face this way again" (*Annual Report of Bureau of Ethnology, Smithsonian Institute*, 1899, pp. 420-421, 421).

demand ceremonies at tombs; but the ancestor is revered as kinsman, as founder or progenitor of the tribe or family, the hero as a distinguished man who inspired such awe or affection in life that his departed soul must be conceived as endowed with supranormal influence. A powerful ancestor, worshipped for a long period, is certain to be regarded as a hero, but the hero is not necessarily an ancestor. For the ancestor-cult must be confined to the particular tribe or family that possesses the tomb. The hero-cult is also tribal and local, and as a rule associated with a tomb in a particular locality, where his bones or ashes lie; but he may have been so powerful that alien tribes in the vicinity may adopt his cult, though his local limitation is even then attested by the desire that will probably be strong in them to get possession of his bones or some relic of him. The saints of the Mediterranean world and of Catholic Europe are to be regarded as de-localised heroes, having no tribal or family connections; yet the various localities aspire to possess their relics, and saint-worship is more powerful if one has the saint's tomb in one's midst. Moreover, hero-cult can arise in a less fixed and settled condition of society than that in which ancestor-cult is likely to develop; and finally, the ethos that comes to attach to either may differ in quality and effect.

The formative influences and external conditions favourable to the development of ancestor-worship require careful consideration and extended study, for which the data have not yet been fully collected. Though its germs may be found in the unsettled migratory period, the hunting and pastoral stages of society, it is not likely to acquire power until the community has settled on the land in the agricultural life, and the various families have permanent plots in which the family graves may be maintained and safeguarded. It has also been observed¹ that society living under the matrilinear system is less likely to develop organised ancestor-worship than the

¹ *Vide* Fison and Howitt, *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, pp. 110-111.

patrilinear community, and we may assign two reasons for this; in the first place, the society that counts descent through the female, being usually exogamous, does not tend to the concentration of the family in one place; and secondly, the soul of the ancestress possesses less "virtue," "mana," "orenda"—to use the Melanesian or North American Indian's terms—than that of the male chief, for power is in the hands of the males in both forms of society. Therefore, as a matter of fact, the worship of female ancestors is exceedingly rare, while the cult of heroines is more common, though immeasurably less common than the cult of heroes. A matrilinear society may worship its king after his death, but as hero or god, not as ancestor.

Given, then, a settled family system, which might engender a strong sense of family union, we may imagine the gradual process whereby the worship of ancestors developed. The family bring annual gifts to the grave, the praise of the ancestor is recited or his achievements danced in mimetic dances, and for a time this may be tendance only, inspired both by affection and fear of offending the dead; but if it has been maintained through several generations, affection will pass away into awe, the inevitable belief will arise that a spirit which has held that grave and been tended with such ceremonies for so long a period must be of supereminent power, and tendance will pass into real worship. Therefore, when we find, as not infrequently in Greece, that an ancient grave has been tended for many centuries, we are sure of the religious significance of the ceremonies. One psychologic motive, active at the beginning of the process, may be assumed to be affection; and this feeling towards the dead is found at every stage of culture. But another more prevalent and still more effective motive—sometimes wrongly regarded as the sole one¹—is fear,

¹ *E.g.* by Karsten, in a recent monograph on *The Origin of Worship*. Yet he quotes (p. 39) the statement of Miss Mary Kingsley—*West African Studies*, pp. 131–2—that the ancestor-spirits are called by the negroes of West Africa "the well-disposed ones"; and other evidence is not wanting.

the aboriginal fear of death and of the dead, as of something weird and magically infectious, which has inspired a large part of animistic and personal religion, and from which only the lowest and the highest human intellects appear able to escape. In much of the ritual associated with All Souls festivals, the two motives appear intermixed; the dead are affectionately invited to the family feast, but precautions are taken against infection, and the souls may be firmly, though politely, requested to depart at the close.

It is probable that fear has been more operative in engendering cults of heroes than of ancestors; for the well-cared-for ghost of the local patriarch is likely to be mild and beneficent to his family, but the hero may have been a distinguished and dangerous stranger, feared in this life and still more to be feared after death: and many of the hero-cults of Greece were instituted to appease the dangerous souls of those who had been wrongfully slain. Yet here also we must reckon with the motive of gratitude prompting to the worship of benefactors.

Among the influences favourable or unfavourable to the prevalence of worship of the dead, we must consider the nature of the general religion of the society. It is not likely to flourish under a rigid monotheism, which forbids the multiplication of divine personages, and which does not countenance the belief in divine incarnations; thus it is alien to orthodox Judaism and Moslemism, though some Moslem tribes may have in this respect lapsed into heathenism and adopted certain Syrian cults of Christian saints.¹ Its most fertile soil is evidently polytheism, and we can study its laws of causation most favourably in ancient Greece and modern India. And in the former country we note certain phenomena in the higher religion which engendered certain cults of heroes and may have assisted the growth of hero-worship in general. Of

¹ *Vide* S. J. Curtiss, "Spuren der altsemitischen Religion in den Mittelpunkt des Islam und des Christenthums in Syrien," *Abhandl. d. ii. Internat. Congr. f. Religionsgesch.*, Basel, 154.

the manifold crowd of divine beings, some sink from the position of high gods, and become regarded and worshipped as heroes, with legends of human achievements attaching to them; or the descriptive epithet of a deity becomes detached, its proper denotation lost, and it is interpreted as the name of a mythical "heroic" man or woman. We have examples of this process in the evolution of such "heroic" figures as "Trophonios," "Eubouleus," "Iphigeneia." And the process was all the more natural when the god belonged to the underworld and was worshipped with "chthonian" rites in an underground shrine, which could easily be mistaken for the tomb of a buried mortal. But the observation that faded deities often degenerate into heroes and heroines has led to the prevalence of a very narrow theory, especially among Continental scholars, that all mythic heroes or heroines are only deities in disguise; and to the corollary that all saga is merely secularised *ἱερὸς λόγος* or ritual-legend. This blindness to the many strands in the rich web of saga has wrought as much havoc as the ardent sun-myth worship of the older generation of scholars. In considering the sources of ancestor- and hero-cult, we must now readmit among the *veræ causæ* the old hypothesis of Euhemerus, to which the mere suspicion of adherence was enough not long ago to put one outside the pale of science; we must allow, in fact, that many of these "mythic" ancestors and heroes were real men, worshipped after their death as real founders of families or dynasties or eminent leaders of the tribe. For modern anthropology has given abundant proof that this process of deifying or "heroising" actual men and women is, or has been recently, at work among many modern societies as cultured as those of Japan, China, and India, and as primitive as certain African tribes. Sir Alfred Lyall, in his fascinating *Asiatic Studies*, has collected for us many piquant examples. And a more recent instance may be quoted that is better than any that Euhemerus could have been aware of; Kibuka, the war-god of the Baganda, is known to have been a real man of striking

character about a hundred years ago, and his divine bones now repose in the Museum of Cambridge.¹ Dr Frazer has collected for us much evidence concerning the human divine-incarnation, the priest-king; and if such men were regarded as semi-divine in life, it would naturally happen in many cases that their ghosts would receive worship.

It is also to be considered that the worship of the dead is partly dependent on eschatological theories or the ideas that happen to be current concerning the condition and the abode of the departed spirit. Thus in Homer's poems, that picture the soul as a helpless tenement of a far-off world, there is deep pity and affection shown to the departed shade, but scarcely a hint of worship. Again, in Egypt, where the tendance of the dead reached a pitch of elaborateness unexampled elsewhere, there appears to have been little, if any, direct worship of the departed, except occasionally of the departed king; for the object of all the solicitude bestowed upon the mummy was to convoy the soul safely away through the perils of the underworld to the realm of Osiris, and to secure its future re-incarnation. And it is obvious that the early eschatology and the highest religious dogma of orthodox Christianity was adverse to the cult of the dead, though saint-cult came to be accepted as a compromise with a too powerful paganism. In fact, a flourishing and vigorous ghost-worship is more to be expected, when the ghost is supposed to reside in or near the tomb, whence it can be evoked by prayer or spell. Yet there is nothing in which there is apt to be more inconsistency than in the relation between our eschatologic beliefs and our feelings and behaviour towards the dead.

It is often supposed that the different modes of disposing of the body, cremation and inhumation, express different beliefs concerning the posthumous state and will react upon our conduct towards the spirits. But, so far as I have been able to collect and interpret the facts, I can discover no consistency in them. Among certain African tribes cremation is

¹ Vide *Man*, November 1907.

said to be used to destroy the evil influence of the ghost;¹ and in an Icelandic saga we hear of a great chief at his urgent request being buried under the threshold of his house, where, however, his ghost so plagued his family that they were obliged to exhume his body and send it out on a burning ship to sea. On the other hand, in India and elsewhere, the bodies of those who died in infancy, or women who died in childbirth, whose ghosts were particularly to be feared, were not allowed to be burned. Looking at the early Greek custom, we are tempted to believe that the Homeric age—if Homer can be regarded as its spokesman—was happily indifferent to the terrors of the shadowy world, and that this freedom may have been connected with the custom of cremation. But the Greeks of the post-Homeric age, among whom cremation was still customary, were abnormally sensitive to ghost-superstition. It appears, in fact, that the same feelings towards the departed soul, whether of affection or terror or both combined, and the same belief as to its condition and destiny, have been found and are consistent with either system of disposal of the body;² but that, on the whole, inhumation is more likely to generate vampire-imagination in morbid temperaments.

A religious phenomenon of such immemorial antiquity and wide prevalence, and of so close association with certain social institutions, is certain to have left a deep imprint on advanced ethic and religion or on the imagination that fosters and colours these. It is in the religious sphere where its influence is most obvious and traceable. Few scientific students are, indeed, now under the illusion of Herbert Spencer that ancestor- and hero-worship is the source of all religion. There is no one key to the mystery of religious origins. But the view that religion, which has been nourished by many springs,

¹ E.g. "Among the Ewe People," *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, 1904, p. 108.

² The Mycenæan world, unlike the later Greek, appear to have often buried their dead within their city wall, and may therefore be supposed to have been healthy-minded in respect of ghost terrors.

has drawn much from this particular one, can be proved, or at least reasonably believed.

Looking first at the cruder forms, we can observe how the belief in the world of ghosts, as it developed in the lower races, has impregnated certain systems of totemism and certain forms of animism. According to recent observation of the Bantus of South-Eastern Africa, their totemism is grounded on the belief that the spirits of the dead visited their friends and descendants in the form of animals. Each tribe regarded some particular animal as the one selected by the ghosts of its kindred, and therefore looked upon it as sacred. And Dr Frazer, who quotes this statement,¹ draws the natural conclusion that here at least totemism must be looked upon as a species of ancestor-worship; at the same time he rightly cautions us against believing that totemism everywhere was of this origin. And no doubt the widespread worship of animals was often wholly independent of totemism or of any beliefs concerning the ancestral ghost; but we have the right to suppose that one particular form of it, the snake-worship prevalent in the "Minoan" civilisation, among some communities of later Greece, and in modern Africa, owed much to the well-attested superstition that the ancestor-soul haunted the family grave or the family dwelling in the form of a snake. Among the Ewe-speaking peoples of West Africa, a chief's "noli" or soul often becomes the family protector and is propitiated as a minor god; and one of these souls was believed to have taken up its abode in an iguana, and hence iguanas were allowed free entry into the house and regarded as tutelary divinities.² Animism also has very close ties with the world of ghosts, who may be supposed to be operative in the wind and storm or in the growth of crops. An interesting example of this in one of the more advanced religions is the cult of the Tritopatores at Athens. The name denotes "ancestors in the

¹ From Mr G. M'Call Theal's "Records of South-Eastern Africa," *Man*, 1901, p. 135.

² A. B. Ellis, *Ewe-speaking Peoples*, p. 111.

third (*i.e.* remote) degree," and it may be that each of the Attic gentes possessed its special cult of *τριτοπάτωρ*; they were prayed to for offspring on the occasion of marriage, and yet, according to an ancient and authoritative interpretation, they were regarded as deities of the wind. Primitive thought for obvious reasons tends to associate the departed spirit with the wind, and this natural power is sometimes regarded as the source of birth and life, the philosophy of Greek orphism agreeing in this as in other respects with savage belief. Another very important product of early animistic religion is the sanctity of the household hearth, which sometimes leads to the ritual of maintaining the hearth-fire of the chief or king perpetually. And as the hearth is the strongest centre of attraction for family life and family cult, we should expect this ritual to associate to itself ideas drawn from the sphere of ancestor-worship: and of this we have certain examples. One of the most striking has been reported from New Zealand, and more recently attention has been called to the intimate connection in Chinese ritual between the souls of the departed members of the family and the cult of the cook-god of the hearth.¹

These and similar facts suggest, not that animism arose from the belief in family spirits or their worship, but that it has received many contributions and much strength from that source. And we may surmise that the world of animistic belief would be relieved in some degree of its terrifying and hostile character as the conviction grew that the spirit in the tree or the wind or the wild beast was one that was bound by close ties to the human family.²

We may now consider the influence of this system of worship in the sphere of the advanced religions. It is easy

¹ Frazer, *Journal of Philology*, xiv. p. 168 (the likeness of a human being, supposed ancestor, carved on the pillar behind the fireplace), *cf.* pp. 169–171. *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, 1907, pp. 24–26.

² Vide Preuss. *Arch. f. Religionswiss.*, 1906, p. 474 (the Cora Indians believe that the spirits of the dead are operative in the cloud and in the wild beast).

to enumerate certain institutions or ceremonies found in most of these, which are known to be a tradition or a deposit from the cult of souls, or from a belief in the divinity of living men; the higher dogma may tolerate them or assimilate them or protest against them; in any case they show a strange power of surviving. Thus the festival of All Souls, almost universal in Europe and found also in China, Japan, ancient Egypt and Greece, and many other communities, has been reconciled without difficulty to our orthodox religion; for most of the "All Souls" ceremonies in Europe imply no real worship of the dead, but affectionate tendance and loving commemoration; but it may well have been otherwise in pre-Christian Europe, and is otherwise in backward parts of Russia at this day, where the dead in return for the offerings are supplicated to guard and foster the family and crops. "Ye spirits of the long departed, guard and preserve us well. Make none of us cripples. Send no plagues upon us. Cause the corn, the wine, and the food to prosper with us."¹ Another more questionable legacy to Christendom from the same source is a form of fetichism, the magic use of amulets or "relics." Fetichism in itself, like animism, may be and often is entirely independent of the cult of souls; but when the worship of heroes and ancestors has developed, it attaches to itself a very powerful fetichistic superstition, in that it ascribes a magical or divine power to the bones or relics of the departed great one, and the religious feeling concerning "relics" and the traffic in them has troubled the higher religion of Europe.

But the worst indictment that the history of civilisation must bring against the religious institution that we are considering, is that it has undoubtedly tended to perpetuate, and in places has even suggested, the practice of human sacrifice. This is not the place to discuss the origin of this repellent rite. There are reasons that might be urged against the theory that the worship of the higher gods generally

¹ Prayer of the Votiaks of Russia before Palm-Sunday, quoted by Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, p. 252.

received it from the ritual common in ancestor-worship.¹ Yet this latter, in which it was very prevalent, may often have engrafted it upon the former. And we may understand why the human victim might seem often more appropriate to the buried ancestor or hero than to the higher god; for the departed chief would need slaves or brides; and again, the belief might prevail that the spirit could only maintain its power in the decaying skeleton if this was periodically warmed and vitalised with human blood.² At all events, whatever is the true explanation, we find in classical Greece that long after the higher religious conscience had revolted against ritual-murder, it might still be found necessary to gratify the blood-thirsty ghost in this evil fashion.

Apart also from any special deleterious institution which may be only occasionally found and is not inevitable, the general influence of the cult of heroes and ancestors may sometimes prove fatal to the full development and efficacy of a higher creed. How far this has been so in parts of Christendom must be left to each one's experience to decide. Recent reports of scientific travellers have attested that it is tending to obliterate the higher teaching of Islam in Syria and the ideal of Buddhism in Tibet. Its tendency is always polytheistic, and therefore it flourished and ripened best on the soil of Greece. A strong monotheism must be its antagonist, and by a true instinct it was abhorred by the teachers of Judaism.

Yet it may claim to have contributed certain ideas which have been turned to great account by the higher religions. Itself being the expression of the belief that the mortal body could be the habitation of a divine or semi-divine spirit, it has assisted to propagate the conception of divine incarnation, which is still the ruling idea of a dominant world-religion;

¹ This seems to be held by Sir Alfred Lyall in his *Asiatic Studies*, p. 287, etc., "Natural Religion in India."

² *Vide* Ellis, *Tshi-speaking People*, p. 162 (the Ashanti king worshipped as ancestor-hero and his skeleton washed with human blood).

it has gratified the human craving for mediators between God and man, and has softened the austerity of rigid monotheism by peopling the unseen with a multitude of good spirits, watchers and guardians of human life. More important still would have been its achievement if we could prove what at least we have good right to surmise, that it diffused and strengthened the conception of the fatherhood of God. The close association between this aspect of the divinity and the feeling towards the spirit of the worshipped ancestor, the father of his tribe, is obvious; yet the evidence does not prove that in the evolution of religion the latter was the parent of that conception. For it has been observed by recent anthropological inquiry that many savage communities, who have not developed ancestor-worship, possess a belief in a high and kindly god, and are sometimes in the habit of applying to him terms of human relationship, "father" or grandfather"; such being the only terms of flattery and endearment in a state of society where the only friendly tie is kinship.¹ But at least we have reason to believe that the feeling of the divinity of ancestors quickened and intensified the feeling of the ancestral-paternal character of the high God. We cannot exemplify this from the religion of Jahvé, which presents so vividly the paternal aspect of God and His ancestral relations with the community, for the ideal of this religion had discarded ancestor-worship, which lay probably in the background of the people of Israel; but we may draw sufficient illustration from the religions of Egypt and Greece. The ritual of the dead in the former country was a vital force in the popular religion, and the well-tended dead became identified with Osiris; this, we may imagine, would profoundly affect the inward religious sense of the Godhead, and strengthen the feeling of human kinship with the divine. In Greece the process of evolution and influence is clearer still, the strongly developed cult of ancestors reflects its rays upon

¹ Cf. *Peabody Museum Reports*, vol. iii. p. 207 (natural objects addressed as relations by North American Indians).

the image of the high god, Zeus becomes Πατρῶος the ancestor, and takes upon himself the functions of the great ancestral spirit, the guardianship of the family right, and the kindred organisations of the tribe.

Finally, one phenomenon of great moment in the ritual of mystic religion, the sacramental meal or communion with the divinity, may be shown to have been generated in part by ideas belonging to the family-cult of ancestors. As the kinsmen eat together, so at times they take a solemn meal with the departed spirits, to renew the bond of kinship ; then, when the deity has come to be regarded prominently as a kinsman of the tribe, it is natural for the tribesmen to solemnise a periodic meal with their god. The evolution of the more mystic forms of sacrament from this practice has been traced out by Professor Robertson Smith in his *Religion of the Semites*.

It is fair, then, summarily to state that this lower religious system that we are considering, while at times it may choke the growth of a higher, has deposited seeds of great vitality, which have fructified into pregnant concepts of advanced theology.

In the social and legal sphere we may discern its influence, both in past time and in the present, shaping certain rules of conduct and assisting certain growths of early law. It has served especially as the highest sanction of the rights and duties of family life ; and the religions and social records of Rome, Greece, India, Egypt, and China attest the force of its operation. As if Nature, unaided by spiritual sanction, were too weak to secure the primary end of society, self-preservation, ancestor-worship promulgates the law of the continuance of the family as a religious duty to observe. A man must beget lawful children in order to maintain the προγονικά ἱερά, "the rites of his ancestors," and the ritual service of the dead ; heirs of his own body failing, he must adopt a son ; even in uncultured races the belief has been found that the childless man will be punished after death for his non-fulfilment of the

ancestral tribal law. The great events of the human family, birth, marriage, death, are all consecrated by the ceremonies of the higher religions, but from time immemorial they have been coloured by religious feelings which belong to savage spiritual consciousness; for they all appear weird and awful to the primitive mind, being occasions when the ghosts or spirits are particularly active and powerfully present. Only where we find no superstition concerning ghosts, no belief in a future life, do we find no ceremonies at all at birth, marriage, and death.¹ Then when ancestor-cult is established, it may assuage and give more rational direction to the primitive animistic awe; the ancestors are the kindly ghosts who are chiefly concerned at and must be duly considered at these times. Finally, if a higher religion absorbs the ancestor-cult, it adopts in the main the same religious laws and same morality of the family, however much it may afterwards modify these.

Many minor family ceremonies may be traceable to the same belief in the power of the ancestral spirits and in their close association with the household. The new-born child is often believed to be a reincarnation of one of these; and this doctrine of the transmigration of the ancestral soul, a religious counterpart to the modern doctrine of inherited qualities, will prompt the giving to the child the name of that particular ancestor; this accounts for the custom prevalent at Athens of naming the child after the dead grandfather. For a name is more than a word, it is a powerful charm that evokes spirit, and our modern practice of giving family names is a faint reflex of an ancient world-wide superstition. On the other hand, in certain wild tribes the name of the deceased member of the family is so sacred that no one may utter it, and for a long time no one may bear it, probably through fear of evoking the ghost.²

Ancestor-worship and the veneration of the departed

¹ An interesting example has been recently quoted from the Malay Peninsula, *Anthropol. Journ.*, 1907, p. 293.

² Vide *Anthropol. Journ.*, 1907, p. 310.

spirit have also powerfully affected the evolution of the law concerning homicide. They transform into a religious duty what the natural primitive feeling of man is sufficient by itself to suggest, the revenge of a kinsman's murder; the blood-feud becomes a debt that one owes to the injured ghost. At a rude stage of society this institution has its advantages; it safeguards the individual to some extent and deepens the sense of public responsibility attaching to casual homicide, but it thwarts the development of a more equitable law and sometimes paralyses its action. For a long time the power of the family and the respect for the vindictive ghost may hinder proper consideration being paid to pleas of accidental or justifiable homicide; we have the clearest examples of this in Attic law, as I have shown elsewhere.¹ And the same superstition deeply tinged, if it did not actually evoke, the Greek cult of the Erinyes, who stand for the power of the dead man's curse, remorselessly pursuing the slayer with no respect to equity, and who in the great drama of Æschylus are champions of barbaric as against civilised justice. Yet this psychic cause, the fear of the wrath of the ghost, little as it seemed likely to contribute anything to civilisation, must be reckoned, at least in Greece, among the influences that at last evolved the conception of murder as a sin against the whole state; the matter could no longer remain an affair of the kindred only, if that wrath might fall upon the whole land. And it is a noteworthy fact that Athens attained to more civilised law concerning murder at the period when the worship of the dead was strongest and the reverential awe with which they were regarded was at its height.

It is possible that the development of the social institution of private ownership of land was in some communities assisted and sanctioned by the organisation of the cult at the grave, for the ancestral spirit dwelling in the earth could establish a *tapu* and thus support the family's claim. Roman law concerning the conveyance of land reserved to the original owner

¹ *Evolution of Religion*, pp. 140-152.

the right of access to the family tomb. And in certain parts of England the view still prevails that a funeral procession moving along a certain path establishes there a right of way henceforth. Finally, in the laws concerning inheritance and testaments, the influence may be traced of that belief from which ancestor-worship has sprung, the belief in the power of the departed spirit, who claims his share in the property and whose "will" must be respected.¹

The indebtedness of our civilisation to this ancient religion will be greater than we have hitherto admitted, if the recent theory could be proved that Greek tragedy arose in yearly ceremonies at the graves of heroes or ancestors. Examples may be found of commemorative mimetic dances at the tomb being instituted to please or appease the ghost; and we know that in Greece the worship of the Sicyonic hero Adrastus was celebrated with mournful choruses, setting forth probably his "tragic" life and death. A real tragic drama could have arisen on this foundation. If it really did so arise in Greece, as Professor Ridgeway has recently argued, it was an ancient funeral ritual that has given us Æschylus, Sophocles, and even Shakespeare. But this new theory of the evolution of the greatest growth of literature presents certain difficulties which cannot here be discussed.

Our concluding question must be, what influence this worship has exercised at various times upon the moral standard and moral practice of the individual and the community. Such questions are always most difficult and the answers are always vague, because we have no scientifically drawn moral statistics of even our own age, still less can we hope to have them for the past. In regard to the past we must depend on surmises from a few isolated statements; in regard to the present we can observe those communities where this religion is still a living force, and we may distinguish between the more backward, where the feeling of fear of the

¹ *Vide* Brunner, "Das rechtliche Fortleben der Toten bei den Germanen," *Deutsche Monatschrift*, 1907.

spirit-world predominates, and the more cultured, where this is blent with emotions of affection and veneration. One effect of these beliefs upon the primitive social temperament that we may note is a strong tendency towards conservatism of social customs; the ghosts are supposed to resent novelty and are the guardians of the ancient order of things, and the primitive man, in his fear of the ancestral spirits, is likely to maintain with more earnestness than the man of modern society, "What was good enough for my grandfather is good enough for me." Ghost-worship, then, may be a force acting against progress. But when the family has attained a more civilised life and higher stages of feeling, then the ancestor becomes the protector of the higher family law; the Roman son who injured his father, the Roman husband who sold his wife, fell under the wrath of the family spirits.¹ And the same spiritual sanction is invoked by Plato for the duty of showing mercy to orphans.² Doubtless the best and most direct result of the family-worship at graves has been the increase of family affection and the sense of union. It is significant that at Rome the ritual in which the "di parentales," the ancestral spirits, were worshipped was immediately followed by the "Carista," the family festival of the living, charmingly described by Ovid; of this Mr Warde Fowler well says,³ "It was a kind of love-feast of the family, and gives a momentary glimpse of the gentler side of Roman family life. All quarrels were to be forgotten in a general harmony; no guilty or cruel member may be present." And we cannot doubt that the fashion which came to prevail in later Greece of forming "thiasoi" or brotherhoods to maintain the worship of the defunct, whether as hero or kinsman, must have constituted a powerful social bond.

Nor is the element of fear, which is so dominant in the primitive mind touching the world of spirits, wholly unpro-

¹ See Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, p. 187. Plutarch, *Vit. Rom.*, 22.

² Laws, 927 B.

³ *Roman Festivals*, p. 309.

ductive for the growth of a moral sense. For it is closely associated with the deep sense of the impurity of death, from which has sprung a rigid code of asceticism imposing upon the primitive society severe self-control on the occurrence of a death and for some time after the funeral.¹ Quarrelling is specially forbidden at such seasons, and chastity enjoined; and from the same source arises our mild rule of charity, to speak well of the dead.

The potential value of hero-worship for general social morality depends entirely on the grounds of the "canonisation." In Greece the institution was vulgarised by the "heroising" of athletes, and one or two Greek writers speak as though the heroes were altogether "evil spirits," though this is merely an exaggeration of a certain popular terror. In early and mediæval Christendom, as at times in China and India,² celibacy and asceticism have won for the deceased the status of the saint; and here we see saint-worship acting against social morality and against its own "congener," the worship of the ancestor. On the other hand, the classical examples of the heroic honours paid to the patriots who fell on the battlefield, as the slain warriors at Plataea, to the great poets, philosophers and men of science of Greece, give us ground for believing that the system afforded powerful stimulus to social effort and sacrifice, for it appealed to the religious hopes of the credulous, and at least to the vanity of the sceptical; according to the story of the foundation of Antioch, the promise of the posthumous honours of canonisation was enough to induce a high-born maiden to offer herself a willing sacrifice for the prosperity of the new state.

But to test the moral quality of this worship among advanced peoples, we have the examples drawn from great contemporary societies. We know how it is embedded in the state-craft and state-morality of China and Japan; we may read certain eloquent passages in Dr Frazer concerning the

¹ *Vide my Evolution of Religion*, p. 113.

² *Vide Lyall, Asiatic Studies*, p. 125.

Japanese Feast of Lanterns, to gain an impression of the loving-kindness and grace with which they celebrate the worship of the family spirits.¹ The national stimulus that it supplies to this people is attested by the great records of the recent war; and in no other community of man does its patriotic appeal ever appear to have been so strong. Its power in private life, where it is likely to be associated with an aristocratic sensitiveness to honour and shame, is strangely exhibited in a narrative by Lafcadio Hearn,² of such mastery that the quotation may be allowed: "The other day in Najano a politician told a treacherous lie. Whereupon his wife robed herself all in white, as those are robed who are about to journey to the world of ghosts, and purified her lips according to the holy rite, and taking from the store-room an ancient family sword, thereupon slew herself. And she left a letter, regretting that she had but one life to give in expiation of the shame and the wrong of that lie. And the people do now worship at her grave, and strew flowers thereupon, and pray for daughters with hearts as brave." Truly a greater than Alcestris was here; and we can understand why the same writer should say, in another place, "I think we Occidentals have yet to learn the worship of ancestors."³ The national service of our people might be hereby quickened, but intellectual and religious reasons seem to rule out the suggestion. Yet our civilisation owes much to these discarded beliefs, and to their ancient appeal certain cells of our consciousness still faintly respond.

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¹ Vide *Adonis, Attis, and Osiris*, new edition.

² *Life and Letters*, vol. ii. p. 88.

³ *Ib.*, p. 28.

DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the *Journal*. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

HOW MAY CHRISTIANITY BE DEFENDED TO-DAY?

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1908, p. 152.)

THIS frank adoption of the attitudes of "Apology" and "Defence," so often and curiously confounded, suggests some reflections usually overlooked. In appealing to a generally cultivated audience we are too apt to use leading terms which for them have sub-conscious or sub-attentive associations tending to confuse the issue.

It may be suggested, from this point of view, that the first thing a writer on religion has to do is to abandon and proscribe the term Apologetic, cease to be an apologist, and also give up the attitude of defence. The former term has undergone a vitiating change of meaning, and the latter insults his theme. He must, in the religious and especially in the Christian contest, take the offensive or surrender.

The Apologist, we are here told, must first show what is the highest thing a man can do. "If he cannot show this, his apologetic is a failure." But in ordinary parlance that is not at all his business, which is to express regret for his conduct, or, on the other hand, to vindicate his position. At present, in fact, the term "apology" constantly covers the latter ground. While defending its motive we "apologise" for an intrusion, or we make a successful "apology" for our (doubtful) contention. In either sense it must therefore always, in the religious sphere, be a failure. At best it secures toleration, resulting on pardon or excuse for wrong, defect, or injury in act or word. Do we want men to accept our apology for the misdeed or mistake of religion, and above all, of Christ? Or do we want them to suppose that what ought to be obviously man's highest instinct needs defence? Professor M'Giffert insists that with a prevailing modern type of disbelief Christian faith has nothing to do, since it "moves wholly in another realm, the realm of ethical values." This at least undermines the popular confusion between belief and faith. The Christian faith leaves "belief" in its proper place, that of supposition or assumption. It takes

its own, that of fidelity to the death, towards the Best it knows. The ideals really precious to us here and now and in growing experience are in line with and not opposed to the universe of which we are beginning to learn the nature and the order. Because "divinity is at the heart of things, and they themselves are divine," apology to men who realise the true value of this ideal becomes a tragical farce.

It may be said that the word is used in a technical sense quite different from the popular one. But most of us are more swayed by current usage in speech than we know. Of course, if we are prepared to prohibit throughout elementary as well as university teaching the toleration of intolerable and really wanton misuse of important terms like apology, imitation, or phenomenon, serious writers will be left free to use them in the only fitting senses, and the gain will be great. But unfortunately this plain piece of common sense is still outside our practical programme. In this very case, the stress laid on the *inculcation* of the supreme human ideals in education, betrays the indirect mischief of the use of the term Apology. You cannot *implant* the highest ideals except in a secondary sense, as you implant or inculcate the conventions of your own form of civilisation—for the sake of economy or refinement in social function. Imposed ideals either tend to produce fanatics or else are a painting of the lily.

We are rightly reminded of the consecration of a life which humbly and faithfully—not apologetically or credulously—follows the divinely ideal life. But the religious man must be content to welcome here the re-interpretation of a divine ideal. His present interpretation fatally tolerates the method of apology for the purest heritage of mankind, for the highest of human aims. And he must give up defending, to men of good will, that very Good Will embodied, concentrated, operative as religion in serving, through a true humility of faith, the interests both of conduct and of knowledge, both of devotion and of reason.

VICTORIA WELBY.

DR SCHILLER ON INFALLIBILITY AND TOLERATION.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1908, p. 76.)

I SUPPOSE that in the case of a philosophy like Humanism, wherein our judgments of the true are based upon affective states, which, as Ribot has well emphasised, do not know "the principles of contradiction" forming the basis of our intellectual life, an accusation of inconsistency would be meaningless and absurd. All this the new philosophy has swept away with the other rubbish of rationality. But a few Rip Van Winkles have still a lingering prejudice against what seems to them remarkably like a frivolous juggling with serious matters.

In Dr Schiller's article in the October number,—an article interesting and even brilliant, as are all the products of his pen,—the assertions are made that the "common man" (*i.e.* the non-Humanist) subconsciously

claims infallibility (p. 78), and that in his case "there must be war unceasingly and unsparingly upon earth until one and the same Truth, immutable, infallible, and absolute, is established upon it, and is seen and accepted by all without exception. Thus persecution becomes a duty and tolerance a crime" (p. 79). "For all parties" (*i.e.* non-Humanists), continues Dr Schiller, "are in duty bound by their allegiance to absolute truth to wage war unflinchingly upon all views but their own, and wherever they can, to oppress, suppress, and persecute by all means in their power" (p. 81).

I wish merely to point out that when Dr Schiller published his formal apologia for his philosophy (*Humanism*, 1903), he felt differently, and consequently thought differently. Discussing the hypothetical case of the progress of knowledge leading to disagreeable conclusions, he said: "As soon as the pursuit of truth was generally recognised to be practically noxious we should simply give it up. If its misguided votaries unkindly persisted in their diabolical pursuit of truth regardless of the consequences, they would be stamped out, as the Indian Government has stamped out the Thugs. Nor is this mere imagining. The thing has happened over and over again. All through the Middle Ages most branches of knowledge were under black suspicion as hostile to human welfare," etc. (p. 201).

Dr Schiller then proceeds to give his approval to this mode of suppressing disagreeable conclusions. "And not only would this be done, but it would be an entirely reasonable thing to do in the case supposed. If the pursuit of knowledge really aggravated instead of relieving the burden of life, it would be *irrational*. . . . The alleged knowledge would be worse than useless, and we should fare better without it. . . . And natural selection" (*quære*, the murder of heretics and scientists?) "would see to it that those did not survive who remained addicted to a futile and noxious pursuit. This, then, would be the worst that could happen: the frivolity and thoughtlessness of the day-fly might pay better than the deadly earnestness of the sage" (pp. 201-2).

In view of the fact that, to the Humanist, what is for the time being "attractive and valuable and satisfying" is entitled to his allegiance, the foregoing is sinister enough, and to the "common man" would seem to suggest reserve in claiming that Humanism is necessarily the conspicuously tolerant philosophy. Indeed, that misguided person might argue that a Borgia, burning people for the sake of doctrines which he believed in only in the sense of their being "attractive and valuable and satisfying" to a hierarch who profited by them, was the true Humanist, and would have derived satisfaction from a perusal of *Humanism*. But let us rejoice that Dr Schiller now feels more humane sentiments to be more attractive, and has for the present abandoned an attitude, shared by only Professor Seeley, I believe, among modern English scholars¹—that of apologetic benevolence towards persecution for opinion's sake.

THOMAS S. JEROME.

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¹ *Eccle Homo*, cap. "Law of Resentment," *ad finem*.

PROFESSOR FLINDERS PETRIE ON "CONSTRAINT
RESPECTING LIQUORS."

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1908, p. 782.)

IN making application of his doctrine of "constraint" to the use of liquors (*Hibbert Journal*, July 1908), Professor Flinders Petrie has, it seems to me, fallen into some injurious errors.

The ethical right and the legal justification of constraint respecting the use of liquors lie in "the public good," which is far more seriously endangered by the habit than Professor Flinders Petrie seems to be aware. He would undoubtedly admit that ninety-nine men have the right to constrain the hundredth man from committing suicide by taking a *quick* poison. But have they not the right to restrain him from taking a *slow* poison that will end his life in five years? And if they have the right to prevent sudden suicide, have they not also the right to prevent the conditions (created by the drink habit) which produce directly or indirectly a very large proportion of all suicides? In fact, is it not the solemn *duty* of human society thus to protect itself and its members?

Professor Flinders Petrie would probably admit that Government has the right to prevent ten parents from striking their children, because one of the blows would make some child a lifelong cripple. But has it not an equal right to prevent parents from drinking whisky, because in more cases than one in ten the results are harmful to children? He would probably admit that the people have the right to restrain a family from using water from a well polluted with typhoid germs, although only one person in ten in the neighbourhood might contract the disease in consequence, and only one in five of those sick might die. But have not the people an equal right to restrain men from using what causes more disease and death, infinitely more misery and degradation, than polluted water? The legal right becomes here a public obligation. He would probably admit that the State has the right to prohibit men from investing their money in a lottery. But does not the State have an equal right to prohibit men, not only from wasting their money on liquors, but from using it in a way that incapacitates them for efficient citizenship? Moreover, a few lotteries would not be a social pest inciting to crime and producing poverty comparable with the drink habit, nor would they be a political plague like the liquor traffic, which demoralises the making and the enforcing of laws.

Professor Flinders Petrie argues against the application of "constraint" to the liquor problem on several grounds, three of which I will consider.

(1) It destroys self-reliance. But do restrictive health and sanitary laws destroy self-reliance? Do parental prohibitions of deadly poisons and vicious habits destroy self-reliance? No greater ethical fallacy ever entered the mind of man than the assumption that liberty to get drunk

produces self-reliance. One might as well argue that liberty to carry fire-arms makes people peaceable. Self-reliance is not the product of the wine cup or the whisky bottle. Common observation and scientific discovery prove that it is drink that destroys self-reliance.

(2) It weakens character by precluding temptation. This is an old but fallacious argument which an appeal to the facts of life decisively disproves. May we not in all soberness ask: Are there not temptations enough in life without adding those of drink? Moreover, if this is a sound argument, then, to develop character, we ought to invent new temptations: add opium, cocaine, and others—the more the better! It does not follow that the normal man of the twentieth century must have alcohol because his ancestors craved stimulants: their thirst for blood is no warrant for us to kill! That savages make bigger fools of themselves with drink than civilised men is surely no proof that the use of whisky develops character: why be a fool at all? Again, if drink strengthens character, why not give the savage more? The policy of “constraint” in Indian territory, America, has helped to save the American Indian, and these “Red-men” were themselves anxious to make prohibition a part of the constitution of the new state of Oklahoma.

(3) “Constraint” tends to deceit and lawlessness in prohibition states. But is not all law met by deceit on the part of criminals? The “deceit and lawlessness” to be found in our “prohibition states” is very largely intruded by those who live in “liquor communities.” There would be little of this lawlessness were it not for brewers and distillers outside, who force themselves in every way upon these temperance states, having, unfortunately, in their *lawless* operations, the support of the general Government. Is it right to hold prohibitionists in Portland responsible for the deceit inspired by the intemperate summer visitor from New York city, and for the lawlessness of the brewers of St Louis, who spend money lavishly to override the laws and corrupt the officials of Maine? But even with this intruded lawlessness, the state of Maine is not what Professor Flinders Petrie would have us believe it to be. He has been misinformed by the apologists of the drink habit and the liquor traffic. In proportion to population, its criminal and pauper and lunacy records are shorter, while its per capita wealth and newspaper circulation are larger than in any other part of our country. One other decisive fact may be mentioned here: Maine contributes, in proportion to population, more names to *Who's Who in America* than the average for the nation, and twice as many as such states as New York and Pennsylvania!

It is certainly surprising to read the assertion by Professor Flinders Petrie, that the State has no right to prevent men from going off into a remote valley, where there are no women to be mauled and no children to be corrupted, and having “a glorious drunk”! His argument is that we must not insist on “dry-nursing” for grown-up men! But if this is justifiable, why may not men go off by themselves and indulge in gambling? The simple fact is that the men who go off in this way soon come back

home and bring results that are harmful to their communities. It is not the same man who returns. He may not have mauled his wife, but he is all the more likely to do it because of that experience. His children may not have seen him drunk, but does it help them to know that he was on a debauch? It is not "dry-nursing" for the State to prohibit men from wasting time and energy, money and strength, in debaucheries that are out of sight. Brutish revelry is not innocent because hidden in a distant valley: its harmful influence cannot be hidden.

This temperance problem is, after all, not so much a mere matter of sentiment as a matter of science. The mighty wave of temperance agitation now sweeping around the world is a practical application of the discovery that alcohol, even in small quantities, is a "destroyer of life": it is a movement for race-preservation. Even those who contend that alcohol has some food and medicinal values, under certain conditions, admit that, on the whole, as commonly used, it is destructive to life. Therefore, the awakened and instructed conscience of mankind is insisting that every possible preventive measure must be used, educational, social, and industrial; that every possible means of protective nurture must be employed; and that every possible method for saner and safer amusements must be instituted. But in this gigantic struggle there is also a place for stern and inexorable law. The State has a right to restrain and prohibit where religion cannot persuade nor education prevent.

JOSEPH H. CROOKER.

BOSTON, MASS., U.S.A.

THE "JERAHMEEL THEORY."

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1908, p. 132.)

To the article with the above title, in inverted commas, which he contributes to the October part of the *Hibbert Journal*, Dr Cheyne has added as a sub-title, "A mistaken name for a genuine thing." But surely this sub-title is itself a striking example of the error in logic known as *petitio principii*! That the "thing" is "genuine" is what has to be proved.

This Dr Cheyne once more essays to do, with all the ability and critical acumen of which he is a past master; but notwithstanding, the writer in *The Guardian*¹ who says that all Dr Cheyne's persuasive powers are lavished in vain upon "an incredulous public," states what is undoubtedly correct.

Since Dr Cheyne refers to a statement which I made in my recent book no less than three times²—not without some suspicion of ironical surprise

¹ *The Guardian*, 21st October 1908.

² *Hibbert Journal*, October, p. 137: "The newest writer on Biblical archaeology refers me, in correction of my own views, to Professor Flinders Petrie"; p. 138: "Professor Petrie, whom our latest Biblical archaeologist brings up against me"; p. 139: "Dr Astley has accused me (not discourteously) of rashness on the ground of historical statements by Professor Petrie."

that a "new" writer should venture an opinion of his own—I will briefly give my reasons for that opinion, and also show why it is that "the man in the street" hesitates to accept the North Arabian theory as it is at present advanced.

Before doing so, however, I should like to assure Dr Cheyne that my attitude towards him is one of the deepest respect. It was he who first directed my steps in the way of Old Testament criticism more than twenty years ago; and although I have not been able to follow him in all his later developments, I shall always account him my master and teacher, and feel proud if he will allow me to number myself among his disciples.

In my book I referred to Professor Petrie's "proof of the real dominion of Egypt over the Sinaitic peninsula, and the consequent disappearance of any necessity for an independent 'land of Muzri,'" and to his "sarcastic references to the 'dominance of Jerahmeel in a large part of modern critical literature'";¹ and I did so because it appeared to me calculated to induce Dr Cheyne to call a halt in his unreserved acceptance and promulgation of this novel view. I was not thereby pledging myself to follow Professor Petrie in every particular!

But Dr Cheyne says that Professor Petrie is "eager and impetuous alike as an explorer and a writer," and will have none of his arguments.

As regards the "North Arabian theory" itself, as Dr Cheyne prefers to call it, there is no doubt much to be said for the view that North Arabian tribes, whether known as Asshūr (or Shūr), or Ashhūr, or Muzri, or Mizrim, or Jerahmeel, had more influence upon Canaan and upon Israel than has hitherto been supposed; and the Babylonian inscriptions to which Dr Cheyne refers make it possible, if not probable, that the name Muzri or Mizrim was applied to North Arabia, and perhaps also to Syria, as well as to the better known Mizraim, the land of Egypt. But, that the Israelitish clans never were in Egypt, that there was no Egyptian bondage and no deliverance, that all the ideas of more than thirty centuries are absolutely without foundation, and that *all* references to Muzri or Mizrim in the Old Testament are wrongly pointed in the Massoretic text so as to read Mizraim, *i.e.* Egypt, and must be limited to North Arabia (or Syria), as Winckler first advanced, and as Dr Cheyne strives hard to prove, is too difficult of belief without more cogent proofs than any yet adduced.

It is as though all references to "Scotland" in British history must be referred to "Ireland," because that country was first known as "Scotia"!

A great deal of stress is laid by the authors of the theory upon a supposed corruption of tradition and of manuscripts, whereby the name "Jerahmeel" can be obtained from the most unlikely sources, and Dr Cheyne ridicules (not unkindly) Professor Smith of Meadville for pointing out the dangers of this method.

But, indeed, when we are told that "Ham" is "an abridgment of the form 'Jarham,' and therefore equivalent to the racial as well as tribal name 'Jerahmeel'" (p. 140), or that "Arel[i] is only a popular corruption

¹ *Prehistoric Archaeology and the Old Testament*, p. 183.

of Jerahmeel[i]" (p. 144), or that "the second part of the name Bethlehem is a popular variation of some shortened form of Jerahmeel" (p. 145), or that "Tel-Melah" and "Tel-Harsha" are equivalent to "Tubal-Jerahmeel" and "Tubal-Ashhur" (p. 148), we can sympathise with Professor Smith in his wonderment at the names "Jabal, Jubal, Mahalaleel, Lamech," etc., being all forms of a lost "Jerahmeel"!

The whole process savours too much of the teaching of the Oxford professor of former days who declared to his class: "In etymology, gentlemen, you must pay no regard to the consonants, and *still less* to the vowels"! There is an appearance of juggling and verbal legerdemain about it, which must always fail to commend itself to the plain man.

H. J. DUKINFIELD ASTLEY.

EAST RUDHAM, NORFOLK.

BRITISH EXPONENTS OF PRAGMATISM.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1908, p. 632, and July 1908, p. 903.)

THE paper on "British Exponents of Pragmatism" was written after I had spent much time in studying Dr Schiller's works. After the first draft was finished I devoted myself further, I do not like to say for how many weeks, to poring over his *Humanism* and his *Studies*, examining all the "contexts" I could lay my hands on, and trying to make sure that I was not doing Dr Schiller an injustice. I did this because I really wished to be fair to him, and—I must confess—because my study of his writings had given me great misgivings as to his methods of controversy. Imagine my sensations, then, when I had read the first two paragraphs of Dr Schiller's reply in the July number of this journal, where he charges me with having compared "isolated doctrines, sentences, and even clauses" taken from his works with "similarly selected excerpts" from other writers, and with having by this "essentially garbling" procedure obtained "grotesque results." But, taking heart of grace, I pulled myself together as best I could, and managed to read on. Suddenly there came a revulsion of feeling that constituted one of the "releasing" moments of a life in the records of which Dr Schiller shows a gratifying interest. I found myself not only willing but anxious that "the value of Professor M'Gilvary's labours" "be gauged by the following specimens of his procedure."

(1) "His accuracy and competence are displayed in a 'definition' of truth he thrice attributes to me and argues about it for a page or so (p. 641). He makes me say that truth is 'a logical value.' This differs from the authentic form only by the insertion of the indefinite article: but the extra word not only ruins the definition and the argument leading up to it," etc. Dr Schiller's quotation-marks about the word "definition"

made me look for this word in the passage referred to, and I found that word only twice in the passage. The first time it occurs here is on p. 640, where I speak of a "definition of truth," but I find that this definition says nothing about truth as "a logical value." The second "definition" occurs in a footnote on p. 641, and as it occurs in connection with the words "a logical value" in the text of my article, I assume that this is the "definition" to which Dr Schiller refers. Let me quote what I said. The text reads: "If truth is a logical value now"; and the footnote to this reads: "The insistence on this fact forms the basis of the first definition of pragmatism given by Dr Schiller in his latest book." It will be observed that no mention is made here of "a 'definition' of truth." I spoke of a definition of *pragmatism*; and when I said "definition of pragmatism" I meant just what I said, and not "definition of truth." How Dr Schiller should misunderstand this passage and think that when I said "definition of pragmatism" I was attributing to him "a 'definition' of truth," I cannot imagine, unless it was because he believed that "pragmatism" is "truth."

Now, while I did not pretend to quote any "definition" of truth given by Dr Schiller, I did attribute to him a view as to what truth is, and this view is what I called "the basis of the first definition of pragmatism." The reader might possibly infer from what Dr Schiller says in this connection that a "definition" of truth is given in the passage in which this first definition of pragmatism occurs. To obviate this possible mistake, I will quote the definition of pragmatism to which I referred: "We arrive, therefore, at our first definition of pragmatism as the doctrine that (1) *truths are logical values*, and as the method which systematically tests claims to truth in accordance with this principle" (*Studies*, p. 7). Nothing is said here about "truth," but something is said about "truths," which I take to be the plural of "a truth" and not of "truth." The statement made about "truths," however, involves a view as to the nature of "truth," and this view, thus involved, is what I called "the basis of the first definition of pragmatism." I formulated this basic view by saying that "truth is a logical value." Dr Schiller thinks that I have thereby reduced his "definition" of truth to ruins. The "definition" of truth thus wrecked by me seems to be the one given one hundred and fifty pages farther on in his book; and if Dr Schiller had told the reader this, the reader might have seen that I was not trying to quote that definition, to which I did not even refer. The "definition" is as follows: "Truth we may define as logical value, and a claim to truth as a claim to possess such value" (p. 157). How does this definition differ from my formulation? It is true that mine has "the indefinite article" and his has not. This, however, is a merely verbal matter *if* the two formulations express substantially the same thought. Do they? To answer this question I must call attention to some ambiguities in the terms of the formulations—ambiguities which I believe do not mislead anyone who reads the two formulations in the contexts in which they occur, but which may become dangerous when an attempt is made to compare them apart from

their context. We have already been told by Dr Schiller that "truth" is ambiguous (his paper on "The Ambiguity of Truth"). I wish to call attention, in two or three sentences, to a similar ambiguity in the word "value." Value may be the meaning of *any* predicate we use in a valuation: thus, when we say, "Literary honesty is honourable and garbling is base," honour and turpitude are the "values" dealt with in the judgment. But, again, value may be used in a more restricted sense, so as to exclude what we disapprove and include only what we approve, as when we say, "Only honesty has any moral value in literature." Let us call the former meaning of value the inclusive meaning and the latter the exclusive meaning. Now when we say that truth is the only logical value, we are obviously using the term "value" in an *exclusive* sense. When we say that truth and falsity are logical values, we are obviously using the term "value" in an *inclusive* sense; and when the term is used in *this* sense it would be absurd to say that truth is logical value, because it is only one of two antithetical values. In this sense of "value" truth is *a* logical value and not logical value. Now Dr Schiller himself uses "value" in this inclusive sense when speaking of logical "values." In the immediate context of the first definition of pragmatism given by Dr Schiller, he says: "Thus the predicates 'true' and 'false' are nothing in the end but indications of logical value, and *as values* akin to and comparable with the values predicated in ethical and æsthetical judgments," etc. (p. 6; italics are "authentic"). On p. 36, again, Dr Schiller writes: The doctrine of Protagoras "differs from that of modern Humanism, apparently, only in the terminological point that 'true' and 'false' are not regarded as values essentially cognate with 'good' and 'bad'" In both passages it is evident that the plural "values" is the plural of value in the *inclusive* sense. Not only so. In the latter passage Dr Schiller recognises that the same thought can be expressed by using the term in an *exclusive* sense, for he goes on to say: "or, *in other words*, that they are used primarily of the individual claims to cognitive value rather than of their subsequent recognition." The three words I have italicised leave no doubt on this point. Now if Dr Schiller himself, when dealing with logical valuation, uses the term "value" in both senses, why should I be held down, when stating his views but not quoting his words, to the use of the term in only one sense? To compare two formulations of the same thought which contain the same word used with different meanings, and then to condemn one formulation because it is not a *verbatim* reproduction of the other, when it did not pretend to be—is *this* not garbling? And if garbling be the suppression of any expressions of an author which put the matter under discussion in an entirely different light, Dr Schiller has even garbled himself. This is, I believe, the consummate achievement in Dr Schiller's career of delicious drollery.

(2) "His ingenuity in selecting passages so as to obscure the meaning they plainly bear *in situ* is illustrated by another 'definition' foisted upon me on p. 644. Who would suspect from Professor McGilvary that the

connection between the 'making' of truth and of reality, the completeness of which his (incomplete) quotation would seem to attest, is *in the very same sentence declared to be incomplete*, and that in the immediate context the sense of the assertion is restricted and specified under three distinct heads?" I grant that no reader could have suspected that in this case Dr Schiller wrote a longer sentence than it appears from my quotation that he wrote. But if the reader conjectured from my quotation that I was giving the whole of Dr Schiller's views on the making of truth and of reality, I am sorry for the reader, but I cannot share with him the responsibility for believing that Dr Schiller ever held any views on any subject that could be completely expressed in one sentence. No one who quotes can reasonably be held accountable for inferences from his non-committal reticences, else every time one quotes from Dr Schiller one would have to quote at least three volumes entire. My reticence here was non-committal as far as the completeness of the making of truth and of reality were concerned. I did not touch upon that feature of Dr Schiller's views in that passage; and I do not feel myself called upon to quote more than I am going to make use of, *unless* what I make use of is a clause or a sentence or even a larger part of some discourse which, taken out of its context, suggests a different interpretation from that which it naturally bears in that total discourse. But even if Dr Schiller insists on holding me down to an absurdly rigorous standard of quotation which no one ever lives down to except the piratical publisher, even then, *in this particular omission* which he berates me for, I can plead to having observed the whole letter of his new law. Four pages farther on in my article, viz. on p. 648, I began a two-page discussion of the pragmatist view of freedom with a quotation from Dr Schiller in which he appears as utterly repudiating the "metaphysical prejudice" "that Reality is complete and rigid and unimprovable." Any reader, therefore, who might unwarrantably have imagined from my former incomplete quotation that Dr Schiller's reality is bought ready-made at some bargain counter, should have had his very licentious imagination checked and brought back within limits when he reached this passage of my paper. Now *who has garbled?* I, who made an incomplete quotation and who subsequently supplied the missing item? or Dr Schiller, who calls attention to the first omission and scores my perverse ingenuity as responsible for the omission, all the while keeping absolute silence about the subsequent quotation that makes good the previous omission?

(3) I achieve the astonishing by "accusing" Dr Schiller "of secretly cherishing an 'Absolute.'" I made no such accusation. I am far from believing that an author should be accused of holding views that he does not substantially acknowledge, even though they may be logically involved in what he does say. In this case I expressly said that I believed that Dr Schiller would do some disowning if he suspected the logical conclusion of his views. All I did was to quote some views of his which to my mind did logically involve the conclusion that all of us would ultimately be

rolled up into one undifferentiated solipsistic Absolute. Dr Schiller neither shows that my quotations are inexact or improperly used, nor does he discuss my argument, but he switches off into the entirely irrelevant assertion that his view of heaven is "just the 'naive' Christian conception," and then expresses his wonder that with my past I should not appreciate his hope of the future. I had neither asserted nor denied that his view was "naive" or Christian, and my past has nothing to do with the logic of Dr Schiller's views, which was the only point I discussed in my paper in this connection. If this most glaring *ignoratio elenchi* on his part convicts me of garbling, it must be because the humanist logic has an unpublished chapter on fallacies. But with a view to showing that I am not alone in my partial identification of the Absolute with the logical implications of Dr Schiller's idea of heaven, when taken with his view as to the condition for retaining self-consciousness, I will quote Professor James, who, standing so near to Dr Schiller in matters pragmatistic and humanistic, as Dr Schiller himself testifies, should surely be able to understand him if any one can. On a certain hypothesis, "total oneness would appear at the end of things rather than at their origin. In other words the notion of the 'Absolute' would have to be replaced by that of the 'Ultimate.' *The two notions would have the same content—the maximally unified content of fact, namely—but their time-relations would be positively reversed*" (*Pragmatism*, p. 159; italics mine). Professor James adds a footnote which leaves no doubt that he had in mind Dr Schiller's "Ultimate" when he identified the content of the "Ultimate" with that of the "Absolute." Even Professor James, of course, may have misunderstood Dr Schiller, but if he has done so, the probability is that Dr Schiller has not so clear views in the matter as he may think. I still venture to hope that when he does get clear in the matter he will see that Professor James and I are right in our interpretation of the logical implications of his ultimate Ideal. I do not ask, however, that he own up.

It is obviously impossible to prove here that I have not misrepresented Messrs Bradley, Bosanquet, Hobhouse, *et al.* in my citations from them. As Dr Schiller has not given any substantiation of his sweeping charges against me with regard to these gentlemen, I shall ask the indulgence that his accusations be considered a *res non adjudicata* till such time as, with the specifications before me, I have had my right to a day in court.

EVANDER BRADLEY M'GILVARY.

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REVIEWS

Orthodoxy.—By G. K. Chesterton.—London: John Lane. Pp. 297.¹

"I AM the fool of this story," says Mr Chesterton, knowing perfectly well that he is nothing of the kind. He is the clever man of the story, though, indeed, there is no story at all, and he is the only person in it. If there is any story, it is just the story of Mr Chesterton's cleverness; and it is interesting just because Mr Chesterton really is clever, and knows it and delights in it. Really clever people, after all, are much less common than we suppose; and still more rare are those whose cleverness has no touch of the sombre and sardonic. A man who is clever, as the grass is green and the wind clean and the sea full of motion, deserves just as honest a welcome in literature as these things receive in nature. And Mr Chesterton is this kind of man. There are people, of course, who are habitually offended at mere cleverness; but a man must be a fairly complete prig if he is going to take offence at Mr Chesterton.

However, if Mr Chesterton is ever going to offend anyone he will have done it in *Orthodoxy*. In *Orthodoxy* he has undertaken to defend the system of Christian beliefs formulated in the Apostles' Creed—to be orthodox is, for him, to believe that creed (p. 18). He has thus got a theme which may, without cant, be called deep and serious. And many persons will feel that it is a theme in the treatment of which mere cleverness is out of place. "A man," says Addison, "who cannot write with wit on a proper subject is dull and stupid; but he who shows it in an improper place is impertinent and absurd." It cannot, I think, be denied that much of *Orthodoxy* is both impertinent and absurd; and I fancy that its occasional impertinence and absurdity will give real offence to persons who are orthodox. On the other hand, a book may have much of this kind of thing in it and yet be a strong and sincere piece of work. He is a poor critic of literature as well as of human nature who marvels to see Religion and Flippancy meet and kiss one another. For myself, I am not offended in *Orthodoxy*; and even if I were orthodox, I still believe that I should not be hurt by it. For I believe the main stuff of it to be sincere; and the book, as a whole, to be something more than mere cleverness. Its sincerity in one sense I should, of course, not dream of questioning. If any man says that he believes in the Apostles' Creed,

¹ An article on "The Message of Mr G. K. Chesterton" will appear in the next issue.—ED.

there is an end of this matter. He is the only person that can know, and I accept his statement. When I call Mr Chesterton's book "sincere," I mean something different. I mean that, so far as I can judge, his beliefs are really a part of him; that he seems to me to give out in his writing a vigour and joy which has come to him from them. Being before all else a clever man, he gives out this vigour and joy in a clever way—in a way that will not appeal to stupid people. He believes in the Apostles' Creed; and where a less clever man might be found on his knees thanking God for it, Mr Chesterton is to be seen running down Fleet Street shouting like a schoolboy, and rocking with laughter at people who don't. This may be outrageous, but it is, I think, sincere behaviour. To some extent, of course, it is mere "showing off," but there must always be a certain amount of "brag" in all high spirits.

Mr Chesterton, then, strikes us in this book as being a more than ordinarily genuine person. On the other hand, I do not find in *Orthodoxy* much evidence of intellectual power, or any evidence of a real knowledge in its author of the subjects upon which he speaks. Mr Chesterton is honestly, I believe, seeking the truth. But his intellectual equipment is such that he is never able to do more than hunt out the plausible. He would laugh convulsively if he were told that in philosophy, for example, he ought to go to school for four years, and, full as he is of clever ideas, familiarise himself with the ideas of other people. Yet, after all, when he propounds Hume's theory of causation as though it were his own, and as though it never had been, and could not be, criticised, he is, speaking frankly, wasting his time. Some men, of course, have so quick and deep a sympathy with life that they can almost do without book-learning altogether. But Mr Chesterton is not one of these. In fact, his gravest defect is the want of a really deep sympathy. I am sorry to say this, but I felt it throughout the book. A man has only a very superficial sympathy with human nature who can preach so cheap and easy a doctrine of Free Will as that which Mr Chesterton develops in his first chapter. It is not helpful, it is not kind, it is not religious, it is merely inhuman to tell men, who could in no way have been different from what they are, whose lives have been a heroic and ineffectual struggle against their own sins, that they could help all this—that they are "free." And, indeed, how many men have been ruined just by their faith in their own freedom, or by the firm conviction that they can "pull up" at any moment? Mr Chesterton treats suicide, again, in the same careless way. He does not know that several of the greatest voices of the century—Goethe, de Sénancour—have been raised in defence of the suicide. A man who has spoilt not only his own life but that of others, whose existence is a standing disgrace to himself and his family, who has no hope of honest employment, and so none of social or civic usefulness—can we rightly impute to such a man either selfishness or cowardice if he casts back into the rubbish-heap of nature that which was in wrath and malignancy there conceived? Mr Chesterton talks a great deal of cant about "loyalty to the universe." But, as a

working principle, I prefer loyalty to oneself and one's friends. There is that, surely, often in suicide. And, as a matter of experience, is it not probable that of the persons who want to kill themselves and do not, ninety-nine per cent. refrain from cowardice against one to whom "loyalty to the universe" appeals?

But I must not forget that Mr Chesterton did not write this book for me, but, as he says, for Mr G. S. Street and the persons who read Mr G. S. Street. Hence, no doubt, some of the faults of which I complain. It is not much good with a democratic audience to be always seeing more than one side of a question; nor, perhaps, is it helpful to have had a proper philosophic training. At the same time, I cannot help asking whether it is worth the while of a man of gifts so brilliant and telling as Mr Chesterton's to write a whole book just in order to pull Mr G. S. Street's leg? As a matter of fact, many quite educated people read Mr Chesterton, and like him and respect him, and their reasons for doing so are good ones. They find him refreshing and tonic. He is clever and epigrammatic without any suggestion of decadence. Despite his deficiency in knowledge, he has abundance of ideas, and a vein of such whimsical speculation as keeps the mind always on the alert. He is for ever making the reader stop and ask himself, "Is this mere paradox, or is it something more than commonly true?" "Mysticism keeps men sane. As long as you have mystery you have health: when you destroy mystery you create morbidity" (p. 46). "At any street corner we may meet a man who utters the frantic and blasphemous statement that he may be wrong" (p. 51). There are two good examples of Mr Chesterton's *arresting* faculty. No one says these arresting things (amid much that is tiresome) more often. Every now and again, I fancy, Mr Chesterton says something that is even profound, though I have noted nothing of this kind in *Orthodoxy*; indeed, I rather fancy that *Orthodoxy* is one of Mr Chesterton's failures. Mr Chesterton has attempted in *Orthodoxy* exactly that for which he was not born—a piece of consistent thinking. The sort of thing for which he was born may every now and again be divined even in *Orthodoxy*. "Mr Blatchford is not only an early Christian, he is the only early Christian who ought really to have been eaten by lions" (p. 51). "Mr Shaw is (I suspect) the only man on earth who has never written any poetry." It is for this sort of small-profits-and-quick-returns criticism that Mr Chesterton has a real genius. He is, before all, also a critic of the men and things of the moment. And certain qualities—his readiness, his wholesomeness, his complete good-nature—fit him for real eminence in such a department. He has it in him to be a real force for good in the literature of his generation. If, instead of talking inferior philosophy, he would devote his gifts of clear writing and barbless raillery to exposing the futility and pretension of Bernard Shaw, he would put the age in his debt.

But *Orthodoxy* "will never do." Interesting, of course, it is, and I believe it to be sincere. Yet, as a whole, it is not only not convincing, but actually alienating. It is an "invitation" to religion, genuinely meant; but what

we are really invited to is what children call a romp. One day I mean to give an immense children's party, consisting of all the clergymen who have ever been kind to me, and I shall then ask Mr Chesterton to come in and amuse us. But the history of such a children's party would make poor literature. And Mr Chesterton's book is really a history of that kind of thing.

On p. 76 Mr Chesterton writes: "Joan of Arc . . . endured poverty as well as admiring it, whereas Tolstoy is only a typical aristocrat trying to find out its secret." I hope that in a second edition he will delete a sentence which dishonours one of the few heroic living men.

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Man and The Universe: A Study of the Influence of the Advance in Scientific Knowledge upon our Understanding of Christianity.—By Oliver Lodge.—Methuen & Co., 36 Essex Street, W.C.

MAN and the Universe is a large title. Greater precision is given to it by the sub-title, "A Study of the Influence of the Advance in Scientific Knowledge upon our Understanding of Christianity." Under the term "scientific knowledge" Sir Oliver Lodge includes, not merely physical science, but also biblical criticism, which is, or ought to be, of the same spirit with it. But naturally the stress of the volume lies upon the relation to Christian doctrine of physical science, wherein the author is himself an acknowledged master. It is interesting to see such a man step forward to mediate between Science and Religion. How strangely different is his attitude from that of Huxley or Tyndall! Is it that science has changed since their days? Not in the least. The difference is due to the appearance in the world of a new thing, a thing which was scouted and reprobated by the votaries of Science and Religion alike; and this new thing is Modern Spiritualism. This thing so despised and hated, in some of its aspects so hateful and despicable, has nevertheless revolutionised the whole situation. It is because he has consorted with this witch that Sir Oliver Lodge is able to interpose as mediator between Science and Religion. It was Modern Spiritualism which started Psychical Research, and Psychical Research, though it has not yet vindicated the main pretension of Modern Spiritualism, has nevertheless established results sufficient to render it ridiculous for Physical Science to suppose any longer that it knows all that there is to know. But while this new force has given pause to men of science in their attacks upon religion, it has at the same time brought very doubtful aid to Christianity. For by "naturalising the supernatural" it has shorn Christianity of the evidence to which it used to appeal in support of its exclusive claim to truth. But let us postpone comment until the reader has before him the terms of the compromise which Sir Oliver Lodge proposes between Science and Christianity. For it is plainly Christianity which he has in view when he

speaks of "religious doctrine." "Orthodox science" is a term which can pass muster as having a recognisable meaning, but "religious doctrine" in the abstract has no meaning at all; its contents are internecine. We must therefore accept an alternative phrase which we are offered, namely, "the general consensus of Christian theologians." Until recently such a phrase did convey a definite meaning. If modern theologians have whittled that meaning away, we must fall back upon their more stalwart predecessors. Now, taking the terms Science and Religion in the sense above indicated, let it be granted, to begin with, that there is still a real need to reconcile them.

Science presents us with a world which is under the reign of law, with no intervention from beings other than ourselves. Religion, on the other hand, requires us "constantly and consciously to be in touch—even affectionately in touch—with a power, a mind, a being or beings, entirely out of our sphere, entirely beyond our scientific ken." Science postulates that "the special volition of the Eternal cannot, or at any rate does not, accomplish anything whatever in the physical world." Religion, on the other hand, officially at least, still sanctions prayer for rain. "The two subjects, moreover, adopt very different modes of expression. The death of an archbishop can be stated scientifically in terms not very different from those appropriate to the stoppage of a clock or the extinction of a fire; but the religious formula for such an event is that it has pleased God, in His infinite wisdom, to take to Himself the soul of our dear brother," etc. (p. 10). Further on, the question at issue is focussed by Sir Oliver Lodge in this way (p. 62):

1. Are we to believe in irrefragable law?
2. Are we to believe in spiritual guidance?

We all of us, he says, hold one or other of these two beliefs, the alternative being chaos and a multiverse, instead of a universe. His thesis is that the two beliefs are compatible. But to stop here would be to award everything to Science, leaving Religion to console itself with an act of faith in finding a Divine Will behind the uniformity of phenomena. Where then does the compromise come in? It consists in recognising that the universe is far wider and deeper than the man of science deems it to be; that such things as "Premonition, Inspiration, Clairvoyance, Telepathy," though hard to understand, are within the range of fact; that, though man is the highest being that we know, it does not follow that there is nothing intermediate between him and God. Now, if telepathy is possible between ourselves, may it not be possible also between us and beings of a higher order? In prayer there may lie an efficacy greater than that which even religious people now are willing to allow. "Drugs and no prayer may be almost as foolish as prayer and no drugs." Answer to prayer, it will be observed, would on this supposition be due, not to the Deity directly, but to His agents. It is possible that some of these beings may stand to us in the relation of man to dog, or in that of a far-seeing statesman to a horde of slaves.

The idea of Creation has always distinguished Christian theology from pagan philosophy. Christianity declares that God made the world out of nothing; Sir Oliver Lodge reverts to the Greek maxim, "Nothing can come out of nothing" (p. 170). The doctrine of the Fall of Man is essential to the Christian scheme of Redemption; Sir Oliver Lodge denies that there ever was a Fall. The story of the Virgin Birth he unceremoniously sets aside as a legend; and he does the same with that of the Empty Tomb. The doctrine of Eternal Punishment, which is scriptural and Christian, he denounces as a blasphemous fable. The doctrines of the Vicarious Suffering of Christ and the Atonement by his Blood are explained to be mere vestiges of savagery. The Resurrection of the Body is denied altogether. Lastly, Christ is declared to have been "normal man" (p. 312). Now if we clear Christianity of such trifling accretions as the Creation, the Fall, the Virgin Birth, the Atonement, and the physical Resurrection, it is difficult, at first sight, to say what there is left. Sir Oliver Lodge, however, would tell us that there is left the Incarnation and the Deity of Christ. For in spite of the assertion about the normal humanity of Jesus of Nazareth, Sir Oliver Lodge holds him to have been incarnate God. An "apparent blasphemy," he tells us, "is the soul of Christianity. It calls upon us to recognise and worship a crucified, an executed God" (p. 312). It is in the double-faced doctrine of a human God and a divine humanity that Sir Oliver Lodge considers the essence of Christianity to consist. "The Christian God," he tells us, "is revealed as the incarnate spirit of humanity; or rather the incarnate spirit of humanity is recognised as a real intrinsic part of God" (p. 319).

There appears to be a sort of tacit agreement among what are known as "advanced theologians" that people are to believe what they like, provided only that they call it Christianity. It is assumed that Christianity must be true, and must therefore be in harmony with all other known truth. It is claimed as the great merit of this religion that it adapts itself to all times and places. Hence we hear so much at present, especially in the *Hibbert Journal*, of the need for a re-interpretation of Christian doctrine. The result is that the Christian religion, which was once so boldly dogmatic, has become a kind of Proteus, which, on your grasping it, evades you in a stream of pious phraseology. Sir Oliver Lodge appears unduly anxious to conciliate theologians. He has a good word even for the Athanasian Creed. "Whosoever will enter into the joy of the Lord must endeavour to understand rightly the cosmic scheme" is the reading which he puts upon that document. Again, in the doctrine of vicarious suffering he finds this germ of truth, "that the responsible task of evolution from animal to higher man, the struggle *humanam condere gentem*, could not be undertaken and carried through even by Deity without grievous suffering and agonising patience" (p. 231). A reference which is appended to Rom. viii. 22 seems to claim the sanction of St. Paul for this view. But whatever the Apostle may have meant by his mysterious words, "For we know that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth together until now,"

he would assuredly have repudiated the notion that under "creation" he included "the blessed and only Potentate, the King of kings and Lord of lords, who only hath immortality, dwelling in light unapproachable." The doctrine of a suffering and struggling God, Himself subject to evolution, and consequently liable to defect, cannot, I think, be truly described as "the revelation of Christ" (p. 318). Christ himself is spoken of by one of his followers as "the same yesterday, and to-day, and for ever." Much more would such language have been used of the Father.

When Plato promulgated his doctrine of Ideas, it was as a protest against the flux of Heraclitus. Individuals were transitory, but types were eternal. Only the other day it was discovered that species could pass into species; then the flood of Heraclitus swept away the Ideas; Nature was found to be careless even of types. Now we are told that God himself is swimming in the stream like the rest of us. The idea is interesting, but hardly Christian. Rather it is part of the trend of thought in our time. The Pragmatists hold it, if anything can be attributed to them collectively. At all events it is definitely the doctrine of Mr Henry Sturt. But it is not confined to them. Mr L. T. Hobhouse, in his *Morals in Evolution*, has given beautiful expression to the same idea, where he speaks of "an evolutionary conception of a Spirit striving in the world of experience with the inherent conditions of its own growth, and mastering them at the cost of all the blood that stains the pages of history, and all the unremembered tears that bedew the lone desert places of the heart." Ultimately the idea comes from Hegel. But such a God as this, a God striving with conditions not of His own imposing, is plainly not the great First Cause of all things, which is what Christian philosophers have meant when they spoke of God. If we predicate a striving God as the outcome of our experience, there will still remain the question—Whence came the conditions against which He has to strive? It is the cause of the conditions that is the real God, and that is left in the darkness in which it is likely to remain. A reverent Agnosticism seems to be our fitting attitude towards this awful and inscrutable Power.

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The Problem of Theism, and Other Essays.—By A. C. Pigou, M.A., Professor of Political Economy, Cambridge.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1908.—Pp. x+139.

IN the preface, Professor Pigou explains that for his general philosophical attitude he is chiefly indebted to the writings of the late Professor Henry Sidgwick. This makes one wonder, at first, what kind of a theism might be constructed on such a basis. Irresistibly we recall that interesting passage in his *Memoir* in which Sidgwick applied to himself Bagehot's account of Clough: "He had a strong realism. He saw what it is considered cynical to see—the absurdities of many persons, the pomposities of many

creeds, the splendid zeal with which missionaries rush on to teach what they do not know, the wonderful earnestness with which the most incomplete solutions of the universe are thrust upon us as complete and satisfactory." Nor can one forget the touching confession which immediately follows: "Feeling that the deepest truth I have to tell is by no means 'good tidings,' I naturally shrink from exercising on others the personal influence which would make them resemble me. . . . I would not if I could, and I could not if I would, say anything which would make philosophy—my philosophy—popular." Professor Pigou's book, however, shows that Sidgwick's philosophical outlook was by no means so uninspiring as it appeared to some. It will probably yet come to be considered one of Sidgwick's great services to English philosophy that, almost alone in his generation, he withstood the strong currents of idealism which carried his contemporaries off their feet. His seemingly cold, unimaginative realism was not something to conjure with, but it was sober. And ultimately it may even prove more valuable to the true interests of religion than are the air-castles of German idealism, with all its easy adaptability for the purposes of apologetics.

At present not a few votaries of philosophy are wending their way towards realism. Professor Pigou's first essay is an interesting illustration of this tendency. And to the present writer it is gratifying to meet Professor Pigou on the road to critical realism. Lying behind the sensible appearance of things, he maintains, there is a reality which remains the same whether the mind is in contact with it or withdrawn from it—though it is not eternally and necessarily divorced from mind. This thesis is not proved. The ground for its acceptance is only a postulate—the postulate, namely, that perceptions are innocent of fraud unless they are proved to be guilty. All perceptions, it is true, *may* be deceptive. This general possibility of error cannot be disproved. But the usual objections to the postulate are inconclusive, and our author dismisses them summarily. (1) Mill's sensationalism, in so far as it professes to rest on introspection, is confronted with the expert introspection of Sidgwick, who could not analyse his perception of matter into feelings or ideas of feelings, tactual, visual, or muscular. (2) Again, the attempt to explain away substance, space, and time by a genetic account of the way in which perceptions of things, etc., apparently other than our own states arose, is quite irrelevant to the consideration of the validity of these perceptions. Moreover, how can the perception of matter and space, for instance, be explained by reference to certain qualities and movements of sense-organs without assuming the reality of these sense-organs, and of the space in which they move? (3) The *a priori* objection that only feelings and ideas, and not real things, can be present in the mind, derives its plausibility from the ambiguity of the word *present*. A real teacup, for example, cannot be present in the mind if by *present* is meant present *in space*. But if all that is meant by its being present in the mind is that it is *known*, then to say that it cannot be present in the mind is simply to beg the question.

(4) Lastly, there is the neo-Kantian insistence that the percipient and the factors with which he co-operates in the production of the world of appearance constitute an inseparable unity, and that reality is to be found only in this unity of subject and object. This view derives its plausibility from the ambiguous use of the terms subject and object, namely, as the subject and object of *experience*. In this sense subject implies object, and object implies subject, and there can be no object independent of mind. But to identify the suggested independent reality with such an object of experience is really to beg the question in dispute. However deeply interfused the percipient and the factors with which he is alleged to co-operate may be, some part of these factors must in fact be recognised as real, independently of the percipient.

Having thus defended the thesis that there is an independent reality, the question arises: In what does this independent reality consist? Here we are at once met with the objection that such a question is unreasonable. For all objects of knowledge (it is urged) can only be known in their relation to the knower; what they are in themselves, independently of the knowing mind, must therefore for ever remain unknown. But this objection has been refuted by Sidgwick. No doubt, all objects of knowledge must stand in *some* relation to the knower, but it may only be the relation of being known as they are in themselves. The question has, therefore, not been proved to be unanswerable, and there is no reason why we should not try to answer it. Now there are three possible views on the relation between the percipient, the independent reality, and the world of appearance. (1) There is the Kantian view, that the human mind cannot apprehend things as they are in themselves; that the world of independent reality may be a cause, but not a part of the world of appearance. (2) Secondly, there is the assumption of naïve consciousness, that we only perceive things as they are in themselves (naïve realism). (3) Lastly, there is the view of critical realism, that we perceive some things as they are in themselves, and some things differently. Professor Pigou rejects the Kantian view, with its conception of the transcendental ideality of Time and Space, and he tries to show that the *theses* and *antitheses* of the antinomies urged against the independent reality of Time and Space are not equally plausible, but that in each antinomy either the thesis alone or the antithesis alone is true. The second view scarcely merited special examination, as nobody consciously maintains it—human liability to illusion and error being generally admitted. So there only remains critical realism—the view that some things are in themselves just what they appear to us to be, while others are not so. This is the view adopted by Professor Pigou, though it does not seem quite in keeping with the subsequent assertion that “*things are not what they seem; they are always tinged with, and sometimes bathed and submerged in, the element of subjectivity*” (p. 49).

Can anything further be asserted of the nature of independent reality? Well, negatively, it may be added that the two generalisations made by

Materialism and Spiritism respectively, namely, that the world consists of matter only, and that it consists of spirit only, are both of them false. Materialism is brushed aside without ceremony. As to Spiritism, the two arguments on which it is usually based are fallacious. The first argument is that the world is nothing apart from the relations involved in it, and these relations are inconceivable apart from a relating mind. To this it may be answered that relations (of time and space, for instance) may *be*, without being *conceived*; it is only for the *conception* of relations, not for their *existence*, that mind is necessary. The other argument is, that the universe must be intelligible, and must, therefore, be intelligent, or have intelligence behind it. This is true only if by "intelligible" is meant "imaginatively realised"; but this is not the sense in which the world *must be* intelligible. Positively, Time and Space belong to the independent reality; also the spirits of living men and perhaps of animals. Physical science suggests that another part of the independent reality consists in planetary systems of corpuscles in perpetual ordered motion through a rigid *plenum*; psychical science hints at the presence of discarnate spirits; and theology claims the existence of God. It is the business of the special sciences to evaluate these suggestions and claims, to the last of which—that of theology—the author turns his attention next.

The Theism with which he is concerned is the belief in a Spiritual Being who is not necessarily omnipotent, but who wills the good, and is powerful enough to make the good ultimately prevail over evil. Now the arguments most commonly adduced in support of Theism are these:—(1) First, there is the philosophical argument already mentioned as the first argument of Spiritism. This is quite inconclusive. (2) The second is the physico-theological argument, or the argument from Design—the oldest and most popular of theological arguments. The apparent adaptations of means to ends in nature are regarded as evidence of the existence of a Being by whom Nature was designed. Some of the objections advanced against this argument are not substantiated. Natural Selection, for instance, does not disprove Design, for it does not *produce* the fittest, it only *eliminates* the unfit; it can, therefore, explain only the *survival* of the fittest, not their *arrival*. All the same, Professor Pigou is not convinced by the argument from Design. The convergence of many phenomena to a *result* is no proof that the result was *foreseen and designed*. For, *some* result there *had* to be; and the odds against a converging combination are no greater than those against *any other* combination. Moreover, there are really no data for any kind of calculation of probability. So the whole argument from Design breaks down. But is Professor Pigou altogether consistent in regarding the theory of Natural Selection as sufficient to account for the evolution of a cosmos out of a chaos (p. 35), though not for the development of species? (3) The third and most important argument is based on religious experience. By this Professor Pigou does not mean the argument based on the *efficacy* of beliefs. He repudiates the validity of this. True beliefs are not the only ones that strengthen and

inspire men. The efficacy of a belief is therefore no proof of its validity. What he has in view are the numerous attestations of religious people that they have experiences of immediate awareness of God. That such experiences of direct apprehension occur cannot be seriously doubted. They may contain elements of illusion and error; they certainly are exposed to confusions between perception and inference. But they cannot be altogether explained away as purely subjective. For, from the standpoint of critical realism, what these people perceive are religious *objects*, not religious *sensations*, and "the burden of proof lies with those who hold that any particular aspect of experience is purely subjective, not with those who hold the opposite." Professor Pigou, though he refutes various objections to the value of the testimony of such experiences, realises the difficulties in the way of rightly estimating it, seeing that the content of these experiences differs so widely. Other sciences, however, know how to deal with widely divergent observations, and similar methods may be available for the evaluation of religious experiences, though these present peculiar difficulties. Already, he thinks, some positive results may be indicated on the strength of such observations. "If the intellectual content of Christian Theism be taken to be merely that there exists a powerful Spiritual Being who wills the good, I am inclined to suggest that the records of religious experience, inadequately sifted though they have been, may even now, on the whole, point with a doubtful and trembling hand towards the validity of this content." "Christian Theism," he adds, "is not proved; it is scarcely even rendered appreciably probable. But the way is not blocked. It is still open for, may be, more prosperous inquiry. To have traversed a stage or two of a road whereon we had hoped that a city might lie, and not yet to have emerged from the moorland and the mist, is not to have proved that the city will never be reached." At least, if we are to take the "Believe it not, receive it not" of Arthur Clough, we must take also his

*"But leave it not,
And wait it out, O man."*

According to the late Professor Sidgwick, humanity will not and cannot acquiesce in a godless world; the man in men will not do this, whatever individual men may do. "It is possible," adds Professor Pigou, "that in this refusal the man in men may be answering to a reality more deep than the cool transparencies of thought."

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Light Arising. By Caroline Emelia Stephen.—Headley Brothers, 1908.

Authority and the Light Within. By Edward Grubb.—Headley Brothers, 1908.

ARE mystics few or many? In one sense of the word we are accustomed to think that they are few. Few can follow such writings as those of

St Teresa or Jacob Boehmen; it may even be doubted whether long-established convention is not in part at least responsible for the reputation and popularity of the *Imitation of Christ*. A certain temperament underlies mysticism of this kind. This temperament may be compared to the mental perspective which enables a man to read Hegel with understanding: each implies conditions which, whatever might or should be the case, are in fact seldom found. But, as incapacity to read Hegel by no means implies incapacity to grasp the Idealist standpoint in philosophy, so inability to reach the level of St Teresa and the *Imitation* is far from signifying either denial of, or unwillingness to recognise, what is after all the central position of mysticism, that the ultimate thing in religion is not a Church, a dogma, a sacrament, but a fact of spiritual experience—that the Kingdom of God is within. And there are many who feel that in this sense mysticism is at once the key to and the essence of religion. To such persons the Quaker spirit, in its soberness, its sanity, its sincerity, is instinctively congenial: they find themselves in its utterances and are at home in its serene air. In the two works before us this spirit is presented both on its positive and its negative side; we are shown what this interior kingdom opened to us by the “light within” is, and how it contrasts with other conceptions of the spiritual world.

In its early days the Society of Friends bid fair to become a numerous body: two hundred years ago it numbered in the United Kingdom alone 75,000. These men had “visions of spiritual conquest in their eyes; they undoubtedly cherished the faith that God had raised them up to restore primitive Christianity, and to be the rebuilders of the Church.” These hopes in their original shape have disappeared. The Society has decreased in numbers; and, as proselytism is no part of its programme, it tends, as a particular body, to become a tradition in certain families, and only in exceptional cases attracts those without. But the Quaker spirit is permeating the Churches. “We shall all be Quakers some day,” said a shrewd observer of modern religious tendencies, meaning not that there will be any large movement into the Society—this is improbable—but that the main contention of Quakerism is less and less questioned by good men. “*Ecclesia spiritus; non est ecclesia numerus episcoporum.*” “The kingdom of God is not meat and drink”—neither Papacy nor Episcopacy nor Presbytery; not Transubstantiation, nor Apostolical Succession, nor Justification by Faith—no—but something very different: “righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost.”

Miss Stephen's striking chapter on rational mysticism sets forth and justifies this standpoint. A mystic, she tells us, is one who has, or believes himself to have, an “illumination from within.” This illumination is not the privilege of a select few—this is unthinkable;—nor does it involve a claim to infallibility—were it so, it would be in patent contradiction with fact. It is a universal possession of humanity; its degrees “experienced by different people or by the same person at different times vary indefinitely”; and the vision which it confers is as little infallible as

the dictates of the individual conscience: the more the duty of following each is recognised, the more important the "trying" the spirits becomes. In each case the medium is liable to perversion. It may distort the message from above, or fail to distinguish it from other promptings. Many disclaim its possession: if a man takes this position, we accept his statement just as we accept that of a witness who tells us that he has seen a ghost. In each case his self-analysis, we believe, is imperfect. What the denial proves is "that the consciousness of light is not necessarily coextensive with its existence"; in other words, that that of which we speak under the figure of Light may exist in a latent state. "The indispensable and most necessary figure of Light points, I believe, to something which it is hard to distinguish from the goodness and grace of God; from the Divine Spirit and life and power. And, if we believe at all in this Divine power and grace, we can hardly help thinking of it as universal." Hence an appreciation of the varied content of religious experience. "We are learning to recognise the infinite variety and complexity of the conditions under which people are struggling towards Truth, Goodness, and Beauty. We are beginning to see that we cannot blame people, the very focus of whose inner sight is unlike our own, for not thinking and feeling as we do on the deepest and most comprehensive of all subjects."

The bearing of this on the conflict between the old and new in theology is obvious. The Spirit promises us not accurate formulas but secure guiding. "So far from making the claim that feeling can, as such, deliver ontological messages which are of final validity, I believe that intuition cannot supply the form of verbal propositions at all. . . . In point of fact, the mystical sense of inward illumination has been found in combination with the most contradictory creeds; and the confusion of feeling with knowledge has brought discredit on the name of mysticism. But the true mystic will rather stand aloof from controversial thought, *even his own*, and is content to submit to reason whatever can be reasoned about, fixing his own gaze, not on explanation or proof, but on the Being of whom in virtue of this mysterious faculty he is so vividly aware."

The rock on which so much so-called mysticism has made shipwreck is its association with what has been called "the obscene supernatural"—abnormal states of consciousness, the lying wonders of the wizard and the seer. True mysticism, we are well reminded, owes nothing to the darkness; "it is essentially the light of day." The warning is timely. "It is not needless to insist that it can only be by the exercise of a real critical judgment that we can be preserved from delusions in these dangerous regions; that we must never, in obedience to the promptings of unseen and unknown powers, transgress the very slightest of the restraints imposed by conscience, by good faith, by fitness, or even by common sense. It is only when, on all these well-recognised grounds, we are sure that the step mysteriously indicated is fully open to us, that any question of obedience to the suggestion can arise."

Mr Grubb's aim is to exhibit the Inner Light as heir by default of the

several conceptions of authority in religion. Taken as final and absolute, the Church, the Bible, the recorded sayings of Christ Himself break down; they cannot be, they were not meant to be, used in this way. And when they are so used, "the position is extremely serious, for our Lord's authority is constantly being quoted to uphold positions which free and unfettered historical inquiry makes absolutely untenable."

The error, however, lies further back; the false step is taken when that which is without is put in the place of that which is within, letter for spirit. The more logically we reason from this standpoint, the wider of the truth is the conclusion at which we arrive. *Quaerebam te foris, sed tu eras intus*: the Kingdom of God is within.

To many, weary of the self-assertion of the sects and the empty declamation of theologians, this conception of religion, which, under the name of Immanentism, is gaining ground among Christians far removed by tradition and circumstances from Quakerism, comes as a refreshment—as "the shadow of a great rock in a weary land." The break with the historical order of Christendom—the visible Church, the sacraments, etc.—with which it was associated by the early Friends belongs to the setting, not to the idea. These good men did not invent it: it was before they were—in the Church, in Scripture, in the God-taught mind of man. No one has a right to reject religion who has not taken this standpoint into consideration, or to repudiate the fundamental tenets of Christianity till he has looked at them in the perspective which it gives. The doctrine of the Atonement—to take what is perhaps the most crucial instance—on which, on the one hand, the Mass, and, on the other, Justification by Faith is founded, appears in a new light when so viewed. To many, neither the Catholic nor the Protestant doctrine is even thinkable. Barclay saw deeper, far deeper, into the truth than the theologians of his day.

"It is probably safe to say that only along the line of thought here [in the *Apology*] indicated—that of the *identification* of Christ with God on the one hand, and man on the other, which is the kernel of the theology of Paul and John, will the Atonement hold its place in the minds of thinking men. The crude doctrine of substitution—which rests on the idea of *separate* personalities, and represents Christ as enduring the wrath of God, suffering instead of us a punishment which had to be inflicted on someone—is untrue to the real meaning of the New Testament. The mystics, with one consent, have gone deeper. They have felt out after a thought of 'conjunct' personality, which the psychological study of our own day is rendering more and more intelligible."

ALFRED FAWKES.

BRIGHTON.

Parallel Paths.—By T. W. Rolleston.—London: Duckworth & Co., 1908.

THIS book possesses a merit rare among philosophical works: it is easy to understand. In the first part, the author criticises two of the principal

modern biological theories, the "Darwin-Lamarck" and the "Darwin-Weismann," and expounds a third, that in which he himself believes, and which he terms the "Directive Theory"—another name, in effect, for "Vitalism." "I hope that this book," says Mr Rolleston in his preface, "besides whatever value its conclusions may have, will prove useful to some readers by putting them in a position to appreciate the extraordinarily interesting and fruitful discoveries of biology in recent years." This hope will not be disappointed. His exposition of Weismann's theory especially (a theory most difficult for the lay reader to follow in Weismann's own books) is admirably lucid.

In dealing with the bearing of biology on ethics, Mr Rolleston's conclusions are open to question. The main conclusion drawn from biology is summed up as follows: "Stimulus and response taken together constitute the directive force in obedience to which the world unfolds itself in the evolutionary process. . . . At the basis of all theories of evolution lies the fact of the responsive power of living protoplasm. But what does it respond to? This is the question of questions." The author's reply to the question is that living matter responds to "the life impulse," "the vital force," the "X factor in evolution." But surely an educated man who believes that Haeckel has solved the riddle of the universe is rarely met with. The question of questions for serious thinkers is not whether the X factor exists, but whether this X factor, relatively to mankind, is good or evil, known or unknown. Does it furnish a basis for ethics, or does it not?

In the second and principal part of the book, which deals with the ethical criterion and the ethical sanction, Mr Rolleston singularly fails to prove that it does. "The broad fact on which a system of ethics must be based is that the individual finds its goal in the cosmic life," he says; and farther on, "Right action in itself is simply the action which best subserves the central purpose of nature. . . . Nature does not directly want pleasure at all, but is resolved, at the cost of pleasure and everything else, to have life. . . . The ultimate question as regards the abstract morality of any act or class of acts must be, Does it make for life?" "To make for life," then, is the ethical criterion. But what kind of life are we to make for? Apparently not pleasurable life. All the information as to the life we must "make for" which we can gather from Mr Rolleston is that he is a monist and that "this . . . universal point of view which makes identical the interests of the whole and the interests of the individual gives to a natural ethics the criterion of all human action." *Yet it is precisely the universal point of view which we can never attain.* We do not know, we cannot even guess, what the interests of the whole may be. To know that would be to have solved the riddle of existence. "The Life Impulse!" Who can possibly predict what its purpose may be?

"Ethical Wisdom," it is said, "will clearly involve such kind of action as will afford to each individual the fullest opportunities for vital development." We do not know the ultimate purpose of life, and, when Mr Rolleston assumes, as he does here, that the interests of humanity are

identical with the interests of the universe, he adopts a hypothesis perilously near that of the Utilitarianism he contemptuously rules out of court. Utilitarianism, as the author implicitly allows, is the alternative basis for ethics to the revealed will of God; and if we are to be deprived of the latter criterion we must not be deprived of the former also, the only other there is. Bentham's philosophy, however "depressing," has mitigated the sufferings of countless unhappy wretches on whom the law has laid its hands. When there is exhibited any way in which a worship of "the X factor in evolution" can lead to a tenth part of the good wrought by Bentham's hedonism, it will be time enough to seriously consider it as an ethical guide. But the "Life Impulse" ethics have nothing to do with "good," only with life.

A courageous mind will allow no compromise between a personal God who makes His will known to us and an unknown mysterious "Life Impulse" of whose ultimate purpose we know nothing. The first belief does supply us with an ethical basis—God's will as revealed to men. The second does not. Now, our author acknowledges that his biology does not admit of a personal God. Though he does not explicitly say so, Mr Rolleston seems to realise the fact that the "Life Impulse" can afford us no ethical criterion. We are ignorant of its ultimate purpose, and he tries to get over this difficulty in a somewhat remarkable manner. He argues that some of us can cast off our "personality," our "I-hood," and so, merging with the unknown, become subjectively conscious of its will. There is nothing impossible in this contention. It expresses a familiar belief. But when we turn to facts to see if they confirm it, across the pages of history march bands of fanatics, anchorites, mormons, fakirs, anabaptists, and innumerable other witnesses to testify that men's subjective feelings mislead and betray them.

Christ and Socrates are quoted in support of the theory. Moral genius has been explained on biological grounds other than inspiration, and might be regarded as the exception proving the rule that our subjective feelings are deceptive guides. Yet, granted that Christ and Socrates were inspired, should we not better express the fact by saying that they were inspired by God, rather than by maintaining that they were inspired by the "Life Impulse"?

It seems as though Mr Rolleston has devoted a book on philosophy to advocate a belief in an "impersonal Life Impulse" that communicates its will by some mysterious union with the unconscious self, in place of the old belief in the God who upholds us in His everlasting arms. But the "Life Impulse," if it does communicate with and guide mankind, *is* a personal God. Since the two beliefs are practically the same, why seek to replace the beautiful language of common men, so full of meaning wrung from their heart's blood, with the harsh jargon of philosophy.

The ethical sanction afforded by the "Life Impulse" is as elusive as its ethical criterion. "Where the lower life can yield an hour of delight, why deny it for the sake of a higher life if in the next hour both must

end together?" The reply is, "I confess I see no escape from the implied conclusion if the premise is true." Mr Rolleston denies the premise, and finds the ethical sanction in immortality and monism. "The sanction is found in the fact that each of us is an organic part of the whole . . . our eternal life is not something to come . . . we are living it here and now."

Belief in immortality is supposed to be warranted by the fact that "men can communicate with and be responded to by Power, a Life, transcending that of which the senses inform us." What does this mean if not a belief in God? If we do not believe that the "Life Impulse" responds to our call, then it is no moral sanction; for a sanction can only operate on men through love, fear, self-interest, and force, and we cannot love an unknown "Life Impulse," fear it, gain anything from it, nor does it exert on us the compelling force of a policeman. Whereas, if we believe that the "Life Impulse" does speak to us, we believe in God—a God to love, and serve, and fear, and that certainly is one of the most powerful of moral sanctions. Mr Rolleston's ethical criterion and sanction resolve themselves on analysis into a belief in God. Then why change "Our Father which art in Heaven" to "The X factor in Evolution"? Mr Rolleston shuts his eyes to the fact that there is no *via media* between Theism and Agnosticism.

Part III. deals with ethical theories of Art. Mr Rolleston believes that art, in expressing something more than life as we know it, relates us to the deeper life beyond the phenomena in which we are imprisoned. His view differs from the agnostic view, which is more inclined to the belief that the symbolism of art cannot improve on the symbolism of nature; that the highest aim of art is not to express something more than life as we know it, but rather to select and retain all that is beautiful and fleeting in the world about us, and so develop and stimulate those emotions which constitute, for Agnostics, the ultimate ethical sanction.

The underlying refrain of Mr Rolleston's book is a vindication of Monism. "Dualism," he says, "is now rapidly disappearing from the religious thought of Europe." As a matter of fact, the controversy between the monist and the dualist is one that can never be decided. It is as impossible to conceive an eternal infinite universe composed of warring elements, as it is to conceive of one containing no opposing forces, but so constituted that it leads human beings to suppose that it does.

Yet even the reader who has no sympathy with Mr Rolleston's main contention cannot help being struck with the cogency of that part of his argument in which he suggests a spiritual line of thought too apt to be overlooked and forgotten in a materialistic age.

FRANCES PETERSEN.

WADHAM COLLEGE, OXFORD.

A Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels.—Edited by James Hastings, D.D., with the assistance of John A. Selbie, D.D. and (in the reading of the proofs) of John C. Lambert, D.D. Vol. I. Aaron—Knowledge, pp. xii+936, 1906. Vol. II. Labour—Zion, pp. xiv+912, 1908.—Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.

Any detailed notice of the lately completed *Dictionary of Christ* is not possible in these pages, but a word of congratulation is due to Dr Hastings on its production. To him, with the five volumes of the *Dictionary of the Bible* to his credit, and one of the ten volumes of the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* already successfully launched, it is possible that the *Dictionary* now under notice reckons only as a trifling *parergon*, but it contains over 1800 double-column pages, from nearly 250 contributors.

The only important criticism we have to offer affects the original conception rather than the execution. The *Dictionary* does not seem to have a satisfactory *fundamentum divisionis*. The title makes us wonder what is its relation to the *Dictionary of the Bible*, which, naturally, included Christ and the Gospels. The explanation in the preface does not quite convince us that the design was altogether well-conceived, or that it has been punctiliously executed. The editor tells us that this new *Dictionary* is "in a sense complementary to the *Dictionary of the Bible*"; but "a *Dictionary of the Bible*, being occupied mainly with things biographical, historical, geographical or antiquarian, does not give attention sufficient for the needs of the preacher, to whom Christ is everything. This is, first of all, a preachers' dictionary." So far, good; a preachers' *Dictionary of Christ*, complementary to the *Dictionary of the Bible*, would be a serviceable addition to their tools, and preachers would be grateful for it. Recognising the difficulty of the task, those preachers would not ask for perfection in the fulfilment of the ambitious claim made by this same preface, viz., to "include all that relates to Christ in the literature of the world." But Dr Hastings or his publishers were not content to issue a Christian supplement to their *Bible Dictionary*; they aimed at a new and self-contained work. This meant that where the same headings appear in both dictionaries, new writers had to be requisitioned. "Even when articles occur under the same title in both, they are written by different men from different standpoints." The new standpoint is presumably the needs of the preacher; and we are told that the contributors have been chosen from among those scholars who are, or have been, themselves preachers. But many of the contributors to the previous *Bible Dictionary* certainly had this qualification; and we suppose that the new men were brought in for the repeated subjects, whether they were or were not better scholar-preachers, simply to make this new dictionary an independent work. The result is a great amount of mere dittography. "The needs of the preacher" is an elastic phrase; but a very liberal interpretation of it does not suffice to differentiate many of the articles in the new dictionary

from its biblical predecessor. With less excuse this time, Dr Hastings has again produced a dictionary that deals mainly with things "historical, geographical, antiquarian."

What strikes us as a curious omission is that there is no life of Jesus in it. Mindful of Dr Bruce's great article in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, our first reference here was to "Jesus." There is no such heading, but there are two and a half columns of German erudition under "Jesus (the name)." Then we looked for the heading "Jesus Christ," remembering that it was under that title that Dr Sanday produced his sketch of the life of Jesus. There is no heading "Jesus Christ." Finally we turned to "Christ," and found that at least this heading did occur. We quote it:—"CHRIST. See ATONEMENT, AUTHORITY OF CHRIST, BIRTH OF CHRIST, DATES, DEATH OF CHRIST, MESSIAH, PERSON OF CHRIST, PREACHING OF CHRIST, ETC. ETC." We recalled Paul's question *μεμέρισται ὁ Χριστός*: The only other heading under "Christ" is "Christ in Art," and it stands at the head of fourteen columns thereupon. Surely it was not unnatural to expect that in an independent and comprehensive *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels* there should be a connected survey of the Life of Jesus.

The claim to which we have already made reference, to "include all that relates to Christ in the literature of the world" receives scanty justification in the main body of the Dictionary, but there is an appendix of eight articles which goes some way to vindicate it. The last is on Paul; but the other seven deal with Christ in—i. The Early Church; ii. The Middle Ages (Dante is not even mentioned in this article); iii. Reformation Theology; iv. Seventeenth Century; v. Modern Thought; vi. Jewish Literature; vii. Mahommedan Literature. These articles are among the most brilliant in the two volumes.

Dr Hastings has in this Dictionary relied almost exclusively upon British and American contributors. A few articles are drawn from the foreign mission fields: England supplies some ninety articles; Scotland about seventy; Ireland and Wales about twenty; and America between forty and fifty. We have noted only three contributions from Continental universities: they are furnished by Kattenbusch of Halle, Nestle of Maulbronn, and Johannes Weiss of Marburg. The ecclesiastical affinities of the many contributors are various. We did not expect, and we have not detected, any Roman Catholic name; but most of the Christian communions find representation.

The chief deficiency of the Dictionary is one that will not seem a deficiency from the editor's standpoint. After all that he gives us in these abundant pages, we still need, not a Dictionary of Christ, but a Dictionary of Jesus. No doubt the great majority of the preachers of Britain and America will accept Dr Hastings' phrase, that to them "Christ is everything." To them the dogmatic and theological discussions of these volumes will seem the appropriate idiom of their faith. But there are, nevertheless, some preachers and a large public who would with all reverence substitute the name "God" for Christ in that formula, but whose interest in Jesus is nevertheless eager and affectionate. To these, a

great deal of this Dictionary is little more than a new Protestant scholasticism. They search these copious columns in vain to find any adequate appreciation of the real human Jesus: he is obscured throughout by a spectral, supernatural, cold, theological Christ. They will hope that in due time a Dictionary of Jesus will be given to them. To do Dr Hastings justice, let it be added that they do not expect him to provide it.

J. H. WEATHERALL.

BOLTON.

Studiet av Religionen.—By Nathan Söderblom, D.D.—Pp. 120.
Stockholm: Aktiebolaget Ljus, 1908.

THIS unpretentious little book is one of the latest contributions to "The Study of Religion." It constitutes an important item in a new series of manuals, whose general title, *Populärvetenskaplig Studieledare*, may be translated "Guides to Popular Scientific Study." The collection of handbooks to which it belongs, issued under the auspices of the University Extension Society of the Students of Northern Sweden, will eventually include several scores of volumes which, published at popular prices in paper covers, are certain to gain entrance into hundreds and thousands of homes. The writers who have been invited to contribute are men of recognised competence. The departments of knowledge covered by the series will embrace philosophy, history, philosophy, theology, belles lettres, art, etc.

For this new library, Professor Söderblom of Upsala was at first asked to furnish the volume devoted to *Religionshistoria*. It was however decided, later on, to widen somewhat the scope of his treatise, in order that it might include all general topics proper to *Religionsfilosofi*. The task thus defined has now been executed, and it will readily be admitted that it has been achieved with conspicuous skill. The author has contrived, though within unusually narrow limits, to give a fairly adequate idea of the character of the religious studies with which not a few experts are busying themselves to-day.

In particular, Dr Söderblom traces very interestingly and forcibly the relationship which subsists between Christian Theology and Comparative Religion. In his preface he lays down the principle that modern scholarship refuses to recognise any dictum that would separate these departments of investigation, as though they belonged to two practically different spheres. The theologian is one who must acquaint himself with the tenets of all religions, and not exclusively with the teachings of Christianity. The fact that the Christian religion frequently advances its claim to be the absolute and final religion does not decrease, but on the contrary immensely increases, the necessity devolving upon that faith to examine honestly into the sanctions that have evoked reverence and loyalty among the devotees of many other faiths. A rigid confessionalism must no longer restrict the right and duty of thoroughgoing research. On the other

hand, the scientist must not debar the Christian theologian from expounding freely, and with every enforcement of local and personal emphasis, the grounds upon which his convictions ultimately rest.

In a word, Professor Söderblom holds that the study of religion reaches its apex in the study of Comparative Religion. It may not be amiss to reproduce an interesting tabular statement which the author prints on page 86. When translated, it runs as follows:—

| | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|--|---|------------------------------|---|--|---|--|--|
| History of the Religion of Israel. | } | Bible Research. | } | The Science of Christianity. | } | The Philosophy of the History of Religion. | } | The Philosophy of Religion or Comparative Religion (<i>jämförande religionskunskap</i>), culminating in the definition of the essence of religion, and in the appraisement of various religious types when compared one with another, and in the appraisement of each individual religion when viewed apart by itself. | |
| Gospel Research. | | | | | | | | | |
| History of Primitive Christianity. | | | | | | | | | |
| History of the Christian Religion, containing, among other items : | } | History of Dogma ; History of the religious ideal and of religious life ; Symbolics ; etc. | | | | | | | |
| Statistical Theology. | | | | | | | | | |
| Dogmatico-Ethics (Systematic Theology). | | | | | | | | | |
| General History of Religions. | | | | | | | | | |
| The Psychology of Religion and the Philosophy of Religion. | | | | | | | | | |

It will be noted that the writer apparently employs the name *jämförande religionskunskap*—the phrase *jämförande religionsvetenskap* is more commonly used in other parts of the book—as interchangeable with *religionsfilosofi*, whereas it is probably wiser to reserve the designation “The Philosophy of Religion” for work that lies *distinctly in advance* of “Comparative Religion.” But, without going into the question raised by this choice of nomenclature, the significance of Professor Söderblom’s attitude will certainly not be missed by those who read his book. The importance he attaches to the new science of Comparative Religion, now forcing its conclusions upon the attention of theologians in every land, is another indication that this latest field of inquiry will very soon come to its own. Even in circles where studies are pursued in accordance with the more popular methods of exposition, the rise and value of Comparative Religion are now being discussed, and with a zest hitherto unknown.

Professor Söderblom is to be congratulated upon the production of so useful and suggestive a volume. Already, while still within a year of its initial publication, a third edition has been called for, and will shortly be issued in a revised and amplified form.

LOUIS H. JORDAN.

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[See p. 454.]

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- 8 *Chesterton (Gilbert K.)* Orthodoxy. 279p. Lane, 1908.

[See p. 448.]

Purton (Lt.-Col. W. H.) The Truth of Christianity: An Examination of the more Important Arguments for and against believing in that Religion. 612p. 7th ed.

Wells Gardner, Darton & Co., 1908.

- 14 *Wells (E. G.)* First and Last Things: A Confession of Faith and Rule of Life. 283p. Archibald Constable & Co., 1908.

"The final confession of what one man of the early twentieth century has found in the for himself a confession just as final as the limitations of his character permit; it is his metaphysics, his religion, his moral standards, his convictions and the thoughts with which he has met them."

- Stanton (Stephen R.)* The Essential Life. 263p. Allison, 1908.

"A series of meditations upon spiritual themes."

- Chandler (A.)* An Obed. An Essay in Mystical Theology. 197p. Methuen, 1908.

"Mysticism is regarded as the religion of experience. Mystical Theology includes the processes in which this religion consists, and the laws to be ascertained."

- 15 *Scargood (J. G.)* Truth & Energy. Conclusion, July 1908.

(On the modern theory of electricity.)

- Paulin (P.)* Essai sur la notion de théorie physique de Poincaré & Galileo pour la relativité.

Annales de Phil. théor., Aug. 1908.

- Legrand (J.)* La science et la religion d'après les faits récents.

R. rev. d'Apolog., Sept. 1, 1908.

- Ward (H. H.)* Les Verifications des Chrétiens sur modernes Naturwissenschaften. Insel, 2. Miss. Th., Sept. 1908.

Loeb (Sir Oliver) Man and the Universe. A Study of the Influence of the Advances in Scientific Knowledge upon our Understanding of Christianity.

See 1. 470.

- 16 *Osby (J. E.)* Cosmos: or, The Place of Prayer in Modern Religious Life. 223p. Simpkin, Marshall & Co., 1908.

Part I, Biblical; Part II, Scientific and Philosophical; Part III, Theological.

- 17 *Osby (J. E.)* Cosmos: or, The Place of Prayer in Modern Religious Life. 223p. Simpkin, Marshall & Co., 1908.

Part I, Biblical; Part II, Scientific and Philosophical; Part III, Theological.

- 18 *BIBLE: I. The Test. I. New Test. I. Apocrypha.*

- 19 *Plum (William L.)* ed. Murray's Illustrated Bible Dictionary. With selected maps and 112 illustrations. 1001p. Murray, 1908.

"While this Dictionary is broadly 'conservative' in the right sense of that much-misunderstood term, none of the advances of 'science' made to our knowledge by 'criticism,' which are within the range of a 'culture' of this age, have been neglected."

- 20 *Barrows (W.)* Uncovering and Uncovering. 197p. Tinsdale, 1908.

(The address in 'The Uncovering of Jerusalem' and 'Christ and Jerusalem'.)

- 21 *Moulton (E. W. G.)* Upper Galilee. B.M. World, Oct. 1908.

- 22 *Bruton (K.)* La notion biblique de l'Église. R. rev. d'Apolog., Oct. 1908.

- 23 *Good (J.)* Was ich mit einem neuen Salomon erhalte.

1001. Insel, Oct. 4, 1908.

(Stating what he believes is required to bring another's work on the Bible Version (German, 1901) into the present requirements.)

- 24 *Good (J.)* On Some Early Editions of Luther's Translation. J. Th. St., Oct. 1908.

- 25 *Wies (Johannes)* Die Aufgaben der

evangelischen Wissenschaft in der Gegenwart. 189p.

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1908.

(An address given at Karlsruhe on Oct. June 1908.)

- 26 *Wright (James E. H.)* Light from Egyptian Egypt on Jewish History before Christ. 140p. Williams & Norgate, 1908.

Pratt (James E.) A History of the Ancient Egyptians. (Vol. 1 of the "Historical Series for Bible Students.") 482p.

Smith, Elder & Co., 1908.

- Green (J. K.)* The Decline and Fall of the Kingdom of Judah. 141p.

Adams & Charles Black, 1908.

(Review will follow.)

- Waller (E. H.)* Some Reflections on Dr. Barmby's View of the Religion of Israel. J. Th. St., Oct. 1908.

(Agrees with the doctrine of an early origin of Hebrew monotheism, and calls attention to the way of the truth in Jewish-Judaism, and to the influence of the study of comparative jurisprudence on religious further consideration.)

- 27 *Pratt (J.)* L'Égypte préhistorique. La préhistoire égyptienne.

R. rev. d'Apolog., Sept. 15, 1908.

- Pratt (J.)* L'Égypte préhistorique. Les prévisions relatives à la personne de Christ et à son œuvre. (Oct. 1908.)

R. rev. d'Apolog., Oct. 15, 1908.

(A comparison with our traditional view of religion.)

- 28 *Green (J. K.)* Uncovering and Uncovering. 197p.

(Uncovering and Uncovering: a comparison of biblical monotheism to the up of Moses in the historical and scientific development.)

- 29 *Osby (J. E.)* The Old Testament in Greek. Interpeter, Oct. 1908.

(Shows, by reading 400 verses, how the ground has shifted and some advantages have been gained through criticism.)

- 30 *Barrows (W. R.)* Uncovering and Uncovering. I. The Uncovering of Jerusalem. II. The Uncovering of Israel.

Tinsdale, 1908.

- Paulin (P.)* The Old Testament before Modern Criticism.

Interpeter, Oct. 1908.

(Shows, by reading 400 verses, how the ground has shifted and some advantages have been gained through criticism.)

- 31 *Barrows (W. R.)* Uncovering and Uncovering. I. The Uncovering of Jerusalem. II. The Uncovering of Israel.

Tinsdale, 1908.

(Shows, by reading 400 verses, how the ground has shifted and some advantages have been gained through criticism.)

- 32 *Barrows (W. R.)* Uncovering and Uncovering. I. The Uncovering of Jerusalem. II. The Uncovering of Israel.

Tinsdale, 1908.

(Shows, by reading 400 verses, how the ground has shifted and some advantages have been gained through criticism.)

- 33 *Barrows (W. R.)* Uncovering and Uncovering. I. The Uncovering of Jerusalem. II. The Uncovering of Israel.

Tinsdale, 1908.

(Shows, by reading 400 verses, how the ground has shifted and some advantages have been gained through criticism.)

- 34 *Barrows (W. R.)* Uncovering and Uncovering. I. The Uncovering of Jerusalem. II. The Uncovering of Israel.

Tinsdale, 1908.

(Shows, by reading 400 verses, how the ground has shifted and some advantages have been gained through criticism.)

- 4B *Pontifical Biblical Commission*. De Libris Israhel indolis et auctoritate.

R. de Clergé français, Aug. 15, 1906.
[Affirms all the traditional opinions. Latin text and translation.]

Stærk (W.) *Bemærkninger zu den Ebed Jahwe-Liedern in Jes. 40 ff.*

Zacher. f. wiss. Th., Sept. 1906.
[Discussed in connection with Hellen's *Das Rätsel des deuterischen Buches*.]

- C *Caldwell* (W. Henry) *The Second Temple in Jerusalem: Its History and its Structure*. 411p. John Murray, 1906.

[The book is largely one of an architectural restoration of a building, the existence of which has not seldom been denied or forgotten. A reasoned account of Ezekiel, its architect, its plan, and of the prophet Daniel; also of Ezra and Nehemiah.]

- 5 *Poirweather* (W.) *The Background of the Gospels; or, Judaism in the Period between the Old and New Testaments*. (Cunningham Lectures, 1907.) 180p.

T. & T. Clark, 1908.
[The period embraced is that beginning with the Maccabean revolt and ending with the destruction of Jerusalem under Titus.]

Weiser (Johannes), *Koranaph.* Die Schriften des Neuen Testaments neu übersezt und für die Gegenwart erklärt. 3te vermehrte Aufl. Bd. I. Die drei älteren Evangelien. Die Apostelgeschichte. 707p. Bd. II. Die Briefe und die johanneischen Schriften. 954p.

Vandenberg & Ruprecht, 1907-8.
Lacey (C.) *The Apostolic Group*. J. Th. St., Oct. 1906.

[Considered as bearing on apostolic relationships.]

Mader (J.) *Apostel und Herrenbrüder*. Bibl. Zacher., Heft 4, 1906.

[James of Gal. I. 19 is not an apostle. The apostle James (of Alphaeus) mentioned in second part of Acts is the President of the Jerusalem church; he is called James simply in I Cor. and Gal. (except I. 19), and is the son of the Baptist. The author of Jude is his brother, and is neither an apostle nor a "brother of the Lord." James of Alphaeus and Judas Thaddæus were not brothers—the former was certainly not a brother of the Lord, and the latter very probably not.]

Nesle (E.) *Hiesus-Isesus und verwandte Fragen*. Zacher. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 3, 1906.
[With other miscellaneous notes.]

- 9 *Buchner* (J.) *Studien zur Geographie Palästinas des im Neuen Testament*.

Zacher. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 3, 1906.
(1. Samaria-Stadt oder Landschaft? (Ap. viii. 26.) 2. Zu Ex. xlv. 1. (Söcher-Studien, etc.) 3. Tyropoon. 4. Magdala (Mt. xv. 36).]

- 10 *Anna*. *The Doctrine of Divine Immanence in New Testament Theology*.

Church Q.R., Oct. 1906.
[A discussion of the N.E. doctrine and of its place in modern theology, where it needs emphasizing.]

- 11 *Turner* (C. H.) *Historical Introduction to the Textual Criticism of the New Testament. I. Growth of the Idea of a Canon of the New Testament*. J. Th. St., Oct. 1906.

- 12 *Robertson* (A. T.) *A Short Grammar of the Greek New Testament: for Students familiar with the Elements of Greek*. 266p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1906.

[Not so elementary as Robinson, Green, or Harper and Weidner, and yet not so minute and exhaustive as Winer, Blau, or Morison.]

- x *Lake* (K.) *The Text of the New Testament*. (Oxford Church Text-books.) 6th ed., revised. 108p. Evingtons, 1906.

- 13 *Buchanan* (E. K.) *The Obedt Versments*. J. Th. St., Oct. 1906.

[Reviews of a fresh examination of the Old Latin MS. A.]

Duraud (A.) *Les Évangiles synoptiques de M. Loisy*.

K. prot. d'Appl., Aug. 15 and Sept. 1, 1906.

Kuntze (K.) *Christi Dornenkrone und Vergehung durch die römische Schicksals*. Bibl. Zacher., Heft 4, 1906.

[Defends the historicity of the episode, and reports it, against views which make it a name or Samaritanian story, as a natural verity of rough history.]

- 14 *Thurman* (Thomas James) *A Critical Examination of the Evidence for the Doctrine of the Virgin Birth*. 179p. Soc. for Promoting Christ. Knowledge, 1906.

- 15 *Fotheringham* (J. K.) *The Star of Bethlehem*. J. Th. St., Oct. 1906.

[The Star was professional astrologers, and had observed a star which answered to the signs for the birth of a Jewish king. Evidence in support is found in E. C. Thompson's *The Legends of the Magicians and Astrologers of Jewish and Babylon* (1900).]

- 16 *Henslow* (G.) *Certain Events and Utterances of St Peter unrecorded by St Mark*.

Interpreter, Oct. 1906.

[Gathered by comparison from the other Gospels. Identical passages between the Gospels, Peter not relating them or Mark suppressing them.]

- 17 *Gassler* (H.) *A Bohemian Fragment of the "Martyrdom of St Luke"*.

J. Th. St., Oct. 1906.
[Text and translation.]

Fleming (J. M.) *Zu Luk. I. 34-35*. Bibl. Zacher., Heft 4, 1906.

Schneckenmühl (Editor) *Der Reichenbach im Lukasevangelium* (Luk. ix. 51-xviii. 14).

J. Th. St., Oct. 1906.

[Illustrates the relation of this section to the common synoptic tradition.]

- 18 *Jongner* (E.) *Histoire des livres du Nouveau Testament. Tome IV*. 422p.

J. Gabalda & Co., 1906.
[Deals with the Johannine writings.]

Wasson (Brooks Foss) *The Gospel according to St John. The Greek Text, with Introduction and Notes*. In two vols., 478+504p. John Murray, 1906.

[Yielding to a pressing request, Wasson undertook the volume on the Fourth Gospel for the *Speaker's Commentary*, in which the Authorized Version was the basis of the work. He named, however, to work at the Gospel after the publication of his notes in the *Speaker's Commentary*, and prepared considerable material for the Greek edition. This is now edited by his son.]

- 19 *Thomas* (C.) *Does the Fourth Gospel depend upon Pagan Traditions?*

Amer. J. Th., Oct. 1906.

[Shows that more than certain terms of expression; and if these had not been present at all, the Johannine theology would not have been expressed very differently.]

- 20 *Sanders* (M.) *La prière dominicale établie à la lumière de l'Évangile*.

Rev. chrét., Sept. 1906.

- 21 *Arnold* (W. M.) *Professor Harnack on Two Words of Jesus*.

Bibl. World, Oct. 1906.

[Drawn from the *Proceedings of the Berlin Academy*, 1907, pp. 942-957. Matt. vi. 13=Luke xi. 4 means, "Lead us not into affliction (i.e. on account of our sins)." Luke xvi. 16=Matt. xi. 12, 13 means the prophetic period of preparation has ended with John Baptist—the Kingdom of Heaven is now coming with a rush.]

- 7A Wright (A.) A Short Introduction to the Study of the Acts of the Apostles.

Interpreter, Oct. 1908.

- B Burton (E. D.) Atonement in the Teaching of Paul. Bibl. World, Oct. 1908.

- D Steinmetz (K.) Textkritische Untersuchung zu Röm. i. 7.

Ztschr. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 3, 1908.

[Ch. xv. and xvi. are original parts of the Epistle; the doxology is authentic, and its original place is at the end of ch. xvi. A reader of another community, omitting the ch. xv. and xvi., concluded ch. xiv. with the doxology. Under the same circumstances in i. 7 and 15 the Roman references were deleted.]

- E Jenkins (C.) Origen on 1, Corinthians iv. J. Th. St., Oct. 1908.

[Continues the Greek text.]

- H Coffin (C. P.) Seeds or Seed, in Gal. iii. 16. Bibl. World, Oct. 1908.

[Gal. iii. 16b, "He saith not, And to seeds . . ." is not a part of the text, but a marginal gloss.]

Michelin (G.) Ta Eρωχεια του Κοσμου (Gal. iv. 3, 9—Coloss. ii. 8, 20).

Riv. stor.-crit. d. Scienze Teolog., Oct. 1908. [Expository.]

- L Rutherford (John) St Paul's Epistles to Colosse and Laodicea. The Epistle to the Colossians viewed in relation to the Epistle to the Ephesians. 207p.

T. & T. Clark, 1908.

[An attempt to trace the unity of thought and feeling, and even of verbal expression, pervading the Epistle to the Colossians and that to "the Ephesians," and also to show that the latter is really the Epistle to Laodicea.]

- 8 Robinson (J. Armitage) Dr Hort on the Apocalypse. J. Th. St., Oct. 1908.

- 9 Blau (L.) Das neue Evangelienfragment von Oxyrhynchus buch- und zaubergeschichtlich betrachtet nebst sonstigen Bemerkungen.

Ztsch. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 3, 1908.

[A study of the *format* and of the allusions to magic, leading to the conclusion that the fragment is the remnant of a book which was used as an amulet.]

Buonaiuti (E.) Luce dell' Oriente!

- Riv. stor.-crit. d. Scienze Teolog., Sept. 1908. [Reviews of Deissmann's *Licht vom Osten* and Milligan's *St Paul's Epp. to the Thessalonians, Greek Text, with Notes*.]

Nau (F.) Le problème d'Ahikar.

R. du Clergé français, Nov. 1, 1908.

[States the story of Ahikar as given in Tobit and in the supplement to the Arabian Nights, and the solutions so far proposed.]

Nissen (Th.) Die Petrusakten und ein bardensanitischer Dialog in der Aberkiosvita.

Ztschr. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 3, 1908.

Schade (L.) Hieronymus und das hebräische Matthäus-original.

Bibl. Ztschr., Heft 4, 1908.

[Jerome in the first decade of the fifth century gave up his previous identification of the Heb-Evan and the original Heb-Matt. The writer holds that the relationship between the two was not of the closest. Moreover, when J. speaks of Heb-Mt. he always means the Heb-Ev. and is not a first-rank witness for a primitive Heb-Mt.]

Steuernagel (C.) Bemerkungen über die neuentdeckten jüdischen Papyrusurkunden aus Elephantine und ihre Bedeutung für das Alte Testament.

Th. St. u. Krit., Heft 1, 1909.

[A temple in Egypt with macebas (the stone pillars of Pap. 1, line 9) must mean a pre-Deuteronomic settlement; cp. Dt. xli., xvi. 22. Pap. 1, line 13 f. show the temple was built in the time of the Egyptian kings and found in 525 by Cambyses, so that the community was settled before the Persian period. Is. xlix. 12, where we should read מִן הָאֶרֶץ סֻנִּים, "from the land of the Syenites," refers to this body. Now, Pseudo-Aristeas mentions that Jews were sent to help Psammetichus (I., 663-610) in his Ethiopian campaign. Dt. xvii. 16 bears this out, referring to Manasseh's sending troops to P. in return for horses. These soldiers were settled by P. at Elephantine. Is. xix. refers to these incidents, and must therefore be dated in the 7th century.]

- C CHURCH 14 Social Problems, 20 Polity, 42 Liturgical, 50 Sacraments, 60 Missions.

- C Giran (E.) Les Christianismes professés et la conscience moderne.

Cœnobium, July 1908.

[Announces the triumph of the modern conscience, not over Christianity, but over every present form of professed Christianity.]

- 15 Voysey (Charles) A Message to the Pan-Anglican Congress of 1908. 7p.

Longmans, 1908.

- 16 Gladden (Washington) The Church and Modern Life. 227p.

James Clarke & Co., 1908.

["These pages have been written in the firm belief that the Christian Church has its great work still before it, and that it only needs to free itself from its entanglements and gird itself for its testimony to become the light of the world. Something of what it needs to do to make ready for this great future, this little book tries to show."] Adams (B. W.) Is the Church a Failure?

And shall she be? Preface by the Bishop of Croydon. 80p. Elliot Stock, 1908.

- 42 Rule (M.) The Leonian Sacramentary: An Analytical Study. II.

J. Th. St., Oct. 1908.

- 43 Coit (Stanton) National Idealism and the Book of Common Prayer; An Essay in Re-interpretation and Revision. 492p.

Williams & Norgate, 1908.

[An attempt to show how the Book of Common Prayer could be modified so as to enable its being used by societies of ethical culture.]

- 50 Beeching (H. C.) The Bible Doctrine of the Sacraments. (Six Lectures given in Westminster Abbey.) 169p.

John Murray, 1908.

[A third series of lectures, the aim of which has been to interest and instruct those brethren of the laity who, with leisure to give their minds to such matters, have had no special theological training.]

- 58 Boudinhon (A.) L'Élévation et la génuflexion. R. du Clergé français, Oct. 15, 1908. [Historical inquiry into the rise of the customs. Adapted from Father Thurston's article in *The Month*, Oct. 1897.]

Stone (D.) Eucharistic Doctrine and the Canon of the Roman Mass.

Church Q.R., Oct. 1908.

[Examines the text of the Canon and the ritual acts, and concludes that they neither assert nor imply any doctrine repugnant to the standards of the Eastern or Anglican Churches.]

- 55 *Turner (C. H.)* Irregular Marriages and the Earliest Discipline of the Church.

Church Q. R., Oct. 1908.

[The Church had strictly then no law of marriage, which was regarded as within the State's province. But legal unions which the Church considered as not fulfilling the Christian ideal were met by discipline—by the forfeiture, temporary or permanent, of the privileges of Christian membership.]

- D DOCTRINE 10 .. *God*, 22 .. *Christ*, 60 .. *Eschatology*, 70 .. *Faith*, 90 .. *Apologetics*.

Hinzinga (A. v. C. P.) The Function of Authority in Life and its Relation to Legalism in Ethics and Religion.

Princeton Th. R., Oct. 1908.

[Mainly quotations.]

Nash (H. N.) The Saving Truth as it is in Jesus. Bibl. World, Oct. 1908.

Thilly (F.) Can Christianity ally itself with Monistic Ethics.

Amer. J. Th., Oct. 1908.

[Christianity does not agree with a consistent monistic philosophy; but Christian ethics may possibly be (inconsistently) grounded upon the patchwork philosophy which is what most monistic systems (e.g. the New Theology) really are.]

- h *Krüger (Gustav)* Dogma and History. (Essex Hall Lecture.) 84p.

Philip Green, 1908.

de Grandmaison (L.) Le développement du dogme chrétien. IV^e partie, Le développement proprement dit.

R. prat. d'Apologét., Sept. 15, 1908.

- 2 *Lepin (M.)* Les théories de M. Loisy exposé et critique. 382p.

Beauchesne & Cie, 1908.

[This work bears the *imprimatur* of the Holy See, and deals very fully with the doctrines and theories of Loisy.]

Sabatier (Paul) Modernism. (The Jowett Lectures, 1908.) 348p.

S. Fisher Unwin, 1908.

[Three lectures, translated by C. A. Miles, delivered in London, at the invitation of the "Jowett Lectures" Committee, during February and March 1908.]

- 10 *Barrow (G. A.)* The Christian Experience of the Trinity.

Amer. J. Th., Oct. 1908.

- 20 *Delitzsch (Friedrich)* Whose Son is Christ! Two Lectures on Progress in Religion. Translated by F. L. Pogson. 75p. Philip Green, 1908.

[Repudiates Trinitarianism.]

Warschauer (J.) Jesus: Seven Questions. Chapters in Reconstruction. 302p.

James Clarke, 1908.

[Purpose of these "chapters in reconstruction" is "to show that when modern criticism and modern thought have obtained a full hearing, the essential verities of our faith—the Divinity of our Lord, the Incarnation of God in Him, and the Atonement of God and man through Him—remain not only unshaken, but more firmly established than ever."]

Nolloth (Charles Frederick) The Person of Our Lord and Recent Thought. 376p.

Macmillan, 1908.

[Object of the work is to show that the result of the vast amount of research and criticism directed, during the last few years, upon the New Testament representation of Jesus Christ has been to confirm the views which the Christian Church has always held on this subject of religious thought.]

- 26 *Meyer (C.)* L'expiation et la mort du Christ. R. chrét., Sept. and Oct. 1908.

- 27 *Boone (E. W.)* The Belief in the Resurrection among the First Christians.

Bibl. World, Oct. 1908.

[The significance of the Resurrection for their thought and life, and of the doctrine of immortality for us.]

Fenn (W. W.) The Relation between the Resurrection of Jesus and the Belief in Immortality. Amer. J. Th., Oct. 1908.

[There is no logical inference from the former to the latter.]

Mackenzie (W. D.) The Relation between the Resurrection of Jesus and the Belief in Immortality.

Amer. J. Th., Oct. 1908.

[If faith in the Resurrection of Jesus has disappeared, the idealistic arguments for immortality begin to lose their power.]

- E ETHICS. 6 *Christian Ethics*, 7-9 *Transition to General Ethics*, 10 *Theories*, 20 *Applied Ethics*, *Sociology*, 23 *Economics*, 27 *Education*.

Murray (J. Clark) A Handbook of Christian Ethics. 342p.

T. & T. Clark, 1908.

[An important work, Part i. deals with the supreme ideal of Christian Life; Part ii. with the Christian Ideal in its Subjective Aspect; Part iii. with the Christian Ideal in its Objective Aspect; and Part iv. with the Methodology of Christian Ethics.]

- 6 *Gounelle (E.)* En face de la justice.

R. du Christianisme social, Sept. 1908.

[A strong vindication by a "free-believer" (i.e. a non-dogmatic Christian) of the social aim and social power of Christianity, against the attacks of "free-thinkers."]

Eagar (Alex. R.) The Absolute in Ethics. Hermathena, xxxiv., 1908.

[The only possible root of perfect Morality is a God who is truly the One God, and yet not God in His pure Infinity—who is Absolute,—who is both Immanent and in special "Humanisation" as God in a human existence and in lasting manifestation through all Humanity.]

- 10 *Westermarck (Eduard)* The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas, vol. ii. 865p. Macmillan, 1908.

[A review of the two volumes of this important work will appear in a future issue.]

Devey (John) and Tufts (J. H.) Ethics. (American Science Series.) 631p.

Holt & Co., 1908.

[Part i., dealing with the Beginnings and Growth of Morality, endeavours to follow the moral life through typical epochs of its development. Part ii., on the Theory of the Moral Life, is devoted more specifically to the analysis and criticisms of the leading ethical conceptions. Part iii., on the World of Action, is concerned with some of the typical social and economic problems which characterise the present age.]

Tufts (James H.) Ethical Value.

J. of Phil., Sept. 10, 1908.

[The particular kind of value which is ethical is a rational and social value. It has intellectual, as well as affective, and instinctive elements. It is, in the phrase of recent discussion, "judgmental." By abstraction it may be both described and felt.]

Super (Charles W.) Ethics and Law.

Inter. J. Eth., Oct. 1908.

Baillie (J. B.) The Dramatic and Ethical Elements of Experience.

Inter. J. Eth., Oct. 1908.

[Deals with the problem presented by that aspect of man's experience where the efforts of his will are thwarted by agencies which lie outside the seriousness of his own moral purposes, where his moral actions become part, and are seen to be part, of a plan wider than that covered by his own foresight.]

Benn (Alfred W.) The Morals of an Immoralist—Friedrich Nietzsche.

Inter. J. Eth., Oct. 1908.

[Nietzsche habitually posed as an emancipator from moral restrictions, speaking of what he called *Moralin* as a deadly poison. Yet he was a truly ethical genius, a thinker with whom problems of conduct constituted from beginning to end the supreme if not the sole interest of life.]

Wright (W. K.) Happiness as an Ethical Postulate. Phil. R., Sept. 1908.

[Endeavour of paper is to show that, provided happiness is defined with sufficient care, psychological support can be found for its employment as a moral postulate, and that this postulate will be found significant for ethics.]

Seth (James) The Alleged Fallacies in Mill's Utilitarianism. Phil. R., Sept. 1908.

[Writer is convinced that much of the familiar criticism of Mill's argument is essentially unjust. All that is necessary, in defence of Mill from the charge that he has fallen into fallacies which are patent to the veriest tyro in logic, is to interpret his argument in the light of its context and of the purpose the author has in view.]

Wright (Henry W.) Self-Realisation and the Criterion of Goodness.

Phil. R., Nov. 1908.

[Understanding the function of the self to be the extension of its power over a greater and greater field, the progressive realisation of its freedom, the ideal of self-realisation supplies at once a well-defined standard of moral judgment. An act is good in the degree in which it promotes self-organisation, and bad to the extent that it hinders the same process.]

Leighton (Gerald) The Greatest Life. 299p. Duckworth, 1908.

[Seeks to prove that the whole human personality—the physical, mental, moral, and spiritual in man—is the result of the operation of the same universal law; and that all development of every kind is in accordance with one and the same principle. It is this law which makes a scientific religion a possibility, and a necessity for the modern mind.]

Sharp (F. Chapman) A Study of the Influence of Custom on the Moral Judgment. (Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin, No. 236.) 144p. Madison, Wisconsin, 1908.

[A study in which use is made of the questionnaire.]

Bennett (W.) The Ethical Aspects of Evolution regarded as the Parallel Growth of Opposite Tendencies. 220p.

Clarendon Press, 1908.

[Purpose of essay twofold: in the first place, to enforce the view of evolution as the equal and parallel progression of opposites; and in the second place, to trace the connection of this principle with ethics or the systematic representation of our judgments on human conduct.]

Gillet (P.) L'éducation du caractère. Nouvelle édition. 308p. Desclée, 1909.

20 *Fell (E. F. E.)* The Foundations of Liberty. 254p. Methuen, 1908.

[Aims at setting forth Liberty, Personal and National—not as a mere Utility, as is usually the case—but as an *a priori* moral necessity, the *sine qua non* of all true civilisation. Great use is made of Wordsworth's works, the philosophy of which, political and moral, is wonderfully adapted to the problems of the present time.]

Stephen (Reginald) Democracy and Character. 225p. Williams & Norgate, 1908.

[Christianity is the only force adequate for social regeneration. Democracy needs Christianity in all its fullness; a religion of genuine earnestness and sincerity, a social and a dogmatic and sacramental religion.]

Beard (C. Austin) Politics. A Lecture delivered at Columbia University, Feb. 12, 1908. 35p. Columbia Univ. Press, 1908.

Wallis (Graham) Human Nature in Politics. 318p. Constable, 1908.

[An attempt to study the behaviour, unconscious as well as conscious, irrational as well as rational, of man as a "political animal." Review will follow.]

Starwell (F. Melian) The Modern Conception of Justice.

Inter. J. Eth., Oct. 1908.

[Argues that the whole problem of political and social justice is bound up with the question of immortality.]

Glasenapp (G. von) Die Leviratsehe: Eine soziologische Studie.

Vierteljahrsheft. f. w. Phil., xxxii. 3, 1908.

Deptoige (S.) Le conflit de la morale et de la sociologie (suite).

Rev. Néo-Scholastique, Nov. 1908.

Balmer (P.) Police des mœurs et traite des blanches.

R. du Christianisme social, Sept. 1908.

[Relates the proceedings of this year's assembly at Geneva of the International Federation for the abolition of the State regulation of vice.]

Plini (G. B.) Influenza delle Religioni sulla Civiltà. Cœnobium, July 1908.

Quiévreux (A.) La morale sans Dieu.

R. chrét., Oct. and Nov. 1908.

Gvizard (G.) La morale de M. Payot.

R. prat. d'Apologét., Oct. 1, 1908.

[Study of the "lay" moral system of Payot, whose work is said to have formed the mentality of thousands of French teachers.]

Richard (A.) La première conférence internationale des Ligués sociales d'acheteurs.

R. du Christianisme social, Sept. 1908.

[Reports the discussions of this Consumers' League at Geneva. 600 members adhered—professors, workmen, priests, pastors, liberals and socialists.]

Lilly (W. S.) The Right of the Father.

Fort. R., Nov. 1908.

Chastand (G.) Le respect de la femme.

R. du Christianisme social, Sept. 1908.

[Declaring that women are in a state of servitude, and claiming their moral and civil emancipation.]

Low (Frances H.) The Orphanage: its Reform and Re-creation.

19th Cent., Sept. 1908.

Hurd (Annie G.) Lost Homes and New Flats.

Cont. R., Nov. 1908.

27 *Anon.* Liberal Policy and Religious Education in Ireland and in England.

Church Q.R., Oct. 1908.

[Requires the same spirit and same policy in English elementary educational proposals as was shown in the recent settlement of the Irish University question.]

Ponsard (P.) L'éducation du sentiment esthétique chez les enfants (conclusion).

R. prat. d'Apologét., Aug. 15, 1908.

Thone (P.) L'apostolat par l'éducation.

R. du Clergé français, Oct. 15, 1908.

[A study in the principles of education.]

Wordsworth (Miss E.) The Higher Education of Women.

Church Q.R., Oct. 1908.

[Partly a retrospect, partly an estimate.]

Windle (Bertram C. A.) The Future Universities of Ireland. Dub. R., Oct. 1908.

- 30 *Bloch (Ivan)* The Sexual Life of our Time in its relation to Modern Civilisation. Translated from the 6th German edition by M. Eden Paul. 806p. Rebman, 1908.

F PASTORALIA. 2 Sermons.

Archer-Shepherd (E. H.) The Ritual of the Tabernacle: A Devotional Study. 168p. Rivingtons, 1908.

[Special object is to interpret the not least important part of the Old Testament in terms of the New.]

Monod (A.) Le débit oratoire.

R. chrét., Oct. and Nov. 1908.

[Address on preaching to students for the ministry.]

- 2 *Bain (John A.)* Questions answered by Christ. 246p. Andrew Melrose, 1908. [Thirty-six sermons.]

Ballard (Frank) Does it matter what a Man Believes? and other Themes for Thought. 253p. Culley, 1908. [Nine sermons.]

Matheson (George) Messages of Hope. 294p. James Clarke, 1908.

[These brief sermonettes are largely the product of the author's latest hours.]

Jones (J. D.) Things Most Surely Believed. 224p. James Clarke & Co.

[Sermons preached on Sunday evenings in the course of a ministry in Richmond Hill.]

G BIOGRAPHY. 2 English.

Godel (P.) Fr. X. Funk.

R. du Clergé français, Oct. 15, 1908.

[Obituary notice of a member of the Catholic Theological Faculty at Tübingen.]

- 1 *Alphandéry (P.)* Jean Réville.

R. de l'Hist. des Rel., May 1908.

[Obituary notice of the late editor. M. de Faye adds a review of his historic and scientific work.]

Barbano (O. M.) Henriette Renan.

Cœnobium, July 1908.

- 2 *Birrell (Olive)* The Early Days of Joseph Blanco White. Cont. R., Oct. 1908.

Newman (Cardinal) John Keble: An Unpublished Fragment. Dub. R., Oct. 1908.

Ward (Wilfrid) Ten Personal Studies. With 10 Portraits. 319p.

Longmans, 1908.

[Essays reprinted from *Quarterly R.*, 19th Century, and *Fort. R.*, on Balfour, Delane and Hutton and Knowles, Sidgwick, Lord Lytton, Father Ryder, Grant Duff, Leo XIII., Wiseman, Newman, and Newman and Manning.]

H HISTORY. x Persecutions C Christian M Mediæval R Modern 2 English.

- x *Bacchus (F. J.)* The Neronian Persecution. Dub. R., Oct. 1908.

- C *Crescenzi (A.)* Iconografia lauretana.

Riv. stor.-crit. d. Scienze Teolog., Oct. 1908.

[Classifying the iconographic material relating to the house of Loretto, and fixing its relation to the tradition.]

Dibelius (O.) Studien zur Geschichte der Valentinianer.

Ztschr. f. neuest. Wiss., Heft 3, 1908.

[I. Die Excerpta ex Theodoto und Irenæus.]

Dragoni (D.) Le Apologie correnti dell' Inquisizione.

Riv. stor.-crit. d. Scienze Teolog., Sept. 1908.

Dräseke (J.) Zwei griechische Apologeten.

Ztschr. f. wiss. Th., Sept. 1908.

[Review of Geffcken's work under the above title (Leipzig and Berlin, 1907).]

Fornari (F.) Bollettino Archeologico.

Riv. stor.-crit. d. Scienze Teolog., Sept. 1908.

Lanzoni (F.) Culmen Apostolicum.

Riv. stor.-crit. d. Scienze Teolog., Oct. 1908.

[Brings epigraphical evidence to show that this title originally was given to any bishop.]

Muzzey (D. S.) Were the Spiritual Franciscans Montanist Heretics? III. Antihierarchism. Amer. J. Th., Oct. 1908.

[No. The resemblances are accidental, their aims and methods were widely divergent.]

Stefano (A. de) L'Attività Letteraria dei Valdesi primitivi.

Riv. stor.-crit. d. Scienze Teolog., Oct. 1908.

[Claiming a greater literary activity and competence than is generally recognised.]

Vacandard (E.) La déposition des Evêques.

Rev. du Clergé français, Aug. 15, 1908.

[Historical account of what deposition and degradation have meant, and what their consequences have been.]

Sternberg (G.) Das Christentum des fünften Jahrhunderts im Spiegel der Schriften des Salvianus von Massilia.

Th. St. u. Krit., Heft 1, 1909.

Deissmann (D. Adolf) Das Urchristentum und die unteren Schichten. 2te Aufl.

Vandenhoec & Ruprecht, 1908.

[An address given at the 19th Evangelical Social Congress at Dessau on 10th June 1908.]

Batifol (Pierre) L'Eglise naissante et le Catholicisme. 516p.

J. Gabalda & Cie, 1909.

[A history of the origin of Catholicism, and of the notion of authority in the institution of the Church.]

- R *Guiraud (J.)* Chronique d'histoire de la Révolution.

R. prat. d'Apologet., Aug. 15, 1908.

[With special reference to its effects upon the French Church.]

- 2 *Bridges (George Fox)* The Oxford Reformers and English Church Principles: Their Rise, Trial, and Triumph. Prepared for publication and partly rewritten by Rev. W. G. Bridges, M.A. 317p.

Elliot Stock, 1908.

I INDIVIDUAL CHURCHES AND WRITERS. C Fathers 2 R.C. Church 3 Anglican.

Bishop (W. C.) The "Three Weeks' Advent" of *Liber Officiorum S. Hilarii*.

J. Th. St., Oct. 1908.

[The Advent season is not meant, but a period of preparation before Epiphany, prescribed originally for candidates for the Epiphany baptisms.]

- C *Stakemeler (B.)* La Dottrina di Tertulliano sui sacramenti della Penitenza dell' Ordinazione e del Matrimonio.

Riv. stor.-crit. d. Scienze Teolog., Sept. 1908.

Lancelot (H. J.) The Chronology of Eusebius' "Martyrs of Palestine."

Hermathena, xxxiv., 1908.

- 1 *Anon.* The Archbishopric of Cyprus.

Church Q.R., Oct. 1908.

[Relates the history of the dispute as to the succession, which threatens to end in schism.]

Cardinals, Archbishops, and Bishops of France Déclaration sur la neutralité scolaire aux pères de famille de leur pays.

R. du Clergé français, Oct. 1, 1908.

[Denounces the alleged violation of religious neutrality in the secular schools of France, and recalls parents to the remembrance of their duties and their rights.]

St Bernard On Consideration. Translated by George Lewis. 169p.

Clarendon Press, 1908.

Julien (E.) Bessuet et les Protestants.

R. prat. d'Apologét., Oct. 1, 1908.

Lestire (H.) La vérité du Catholicisme.

II. La valeur probante du miracle.

R. du Clergé français, Nov. 1, 1908.

Mondars (A.) Le Catholicisme et la question du pouvoir coercitif de l'Eglise.

R. prat. d'Apologét., Aug. 15, 1908.

[A Catholic may declare for the retention of this power to moral constraint, though that is not the official standpoint.]

La Piana (G.) Chiesa e Stato in Francia. Riv. stor.-crit. d. Scienze Teol., Sept. 1908.

[Describes the abuses of the time, especially the need of monastic reform, and deals with the reform projects of Fénelon, Fleury, and Saint-Simon and their views of the relations between the French Church and the Curia.]

Pope Pius X. Exhortation au clergé.

R. du Clergé français, Oct. 1, 1908.

[On the occasion of his sacerdotal jubilee.]

Venard (L.) La vérité du Catholicisme.

I. La valeur historique des livres saints.

R. du Clergé français, Oct. 1, 1908.

[The first of a series of answers in reply to a challenge of Loisy's.]

De la Sorcière (J.) La théologie de Bellarmini. (Bibliothèque de théologie historique.) 780 p.

Gabriel Beauchesne & Cie, Paris, 1908.

Villien (A.) Histoire des commandements de l'Eglise (concluded).

R. du Clergé français, Aug. 15, 1908.

[On Friday and Saturday fasting.]

Davidson (Thomas) Savonarola.

Inter. J. Eth., Oct. 1908.

[One of a series of lectures delivered at Philadelphia and other places by the late Thomas Davidson, on "The Leaders of Spiritual Thought in the Middle Ages."]

Huged (F. von) The Mystical Element of Religion as studied in Saint Catherine of Genoa and her friends. 2 vols. 489p. + 428p.

Dent, 1908.

[This book aims at three things. It would present a generous, expansive, deeply spiritual Catholicism. It would contribute one more detailed object-lesson in the growth of religious biography, and in the methods required by such studies. Review will follow.]

Ward (Wilfrid) The Ushaw Centenary and English Catholicism.

Dub. R., Oct. 1908.

Moyes (Canon) The Eucharistic Congress.

19th Cent., Oct. 1908.

- 3 *Anon.* The Lambeth Conference.

Church Q.R., Oct. 1908.

[A consideration of the Resolutions and Reports of this year's Conference.]

Anon. The Increase of the Episcopate in its Latest Developments.

Church Q.R., Oct. 1908.

Planque (G.) Chez les Anglicans.

R. du Clergé français, Oct. 1908.

[Specially reporting (and not unsympathetically) on the recent discussions at the Congress and Conference on Reunion.]

- 4 *Albrecht (O.)* Neue Katechismusstudien.

Th. St. u. Krit., Heft 1, 1909.

[Deals with, III., the Catechism of Justus Menius (1522), its relation to Luther's two catechisms, and with, IV., the two catechisms of Joh. Spangenberg, of the year 1541.]

- 5 *Moschall (W. M.)* The Presbyterian Church: A Brief Account of its Doctrine, Worship, and Polity. 295p.

Hodder & Stoughton.

[Chapters on the history, doctrine, worship, and polity of Presbyterianism, and upon Presbyterianism in England.]

Arbeuz (J.) L'aumônerie protestante des prisons de Paris (concluded).

R. chrét., Sept. and Oct. 1908.

[Describes a Protestant prison chaplain's work.]

Warfield (B. B.) The First Question of the Shorter Catechism.

Princeton Th. R., Oct. 1908.

[A search for the sources of the question.]

L LITERATURE. 2 English 3 German 5 Italian 9 Classical.

2V *Long (Frances)* Mark Rutherford: An Appreciation.

Fort. R., Sept. 1908.

W *Hair (W. G.)* Francis Thompson: In Memoriam.

Dub. R., Oct. 1908.

Jefferson (H. H.) Mr Frederic Harrison's Studies. Church Q.R., Oct. 1908.

[Criticism of the theological standpoint assumed in some of his recent publications.]

Ward (Mrs Wilfrid) Plots and Persons in Fiction.

Dub. R., Oct. 1908.

Atherion (Gertrude) The Gorgeous Isle.

191p. John Murray, 1908.

3 *Muthesius (Karl)* Goethe und Pestalozzi.

281p. Darr. 1908.

5 *Smyth (Mary Winslow)* Dante and Shakespeare.

19th Cent., Oct. 1908.

Udny (S.) Dante's Intuition of the Infinite.

Cont. R., Nov. 1908.

7 *Gribble (Francis)* Tolstoy and the Tolstoyans.

Fort. R., Sept. 1908.

Gosse (Edmund) Count Lyof Tolstoi.

Cont. R., Sept. 1908.

7 *Jeanmaire (J.)* Souvenirs de Grèce.

Rev. chrét., Sept. 1908.

[Describes a visit to Knossos.]

9 *Marrett (R. R.), ed.* Anthropology and the Classics. Six Lectures delivered before the University of Oxford, by A. J. Evans, A. Lang, Gilbert Murray, F. B. Jevons, J. L. Myres, and W. W. Fowler. 201p.

Clarendon Press, 1908.

M RELIGIONS. MYTHOLOGY. 4 Hindutism. 7 Judaism. 9 Demonology. 12 Occultism.

Lyall (Sir Alfred) The State in its Relation to Eastern and Western Religions.

Fort. R., Nov. 1908.

[Presidential address to recent Congress for the History of Religions. The historical relations of Buddhism and Hinduism to the State have been in the past, and are still in the present time, very different from the situation in the West. The civil government was at no time called in to undertake or assist propagation of those religions as part of its duty.]

Bros (A.) Le problème de la mort chez les non-civilisés. (1st art.)

R. du Clergé français, Oct. 1, 1908.

[Examination of the rites connected with death, funerals, and mourning, with a view to show the universality of belief in a life beyond death.]

Bros (A.) and *Habert (O.)* Chronique d'histoire des religions.

R. du Clergé français, Oct. 15, 1908.

[Devoted to Mithraism.]

Dunkmann. Die Idee der Entwicklung als Klassifikationsprinzip der Religionen. Th. St. u. Krit., Heft 1, 1909.

Gennep (A. van) Totémisme et méthode comparative.

R. de l'Hist. des Rel., July 1908.

[Resumes the discussion initiated by M. Tournain in the May number.]

Habert (O.) L'histoire des religions et la méthode sociologique.

Annales de Phil. chrét., Aug. 1908.

Le Roy (Alexandre) Chez les primitifs africains, I. Rev. de Phil., Sept. 1908.

[On their notions of the invisible world, the soul, the spirits, God.]

Farver (Reginald) In Old Ceylon. 350p. Edward Arnold, 1906.

Penny (F. E.) On the Coromandel Coast. 355p. Smith, Elder & Co., 1908.

Hogg (H. W.) Orientalia.

Interpreter, Oct. 1908.

[Some account of the International Congresses of this year in Berlin and Copenhagen.]

Reinach (S.) Phaëthon.

R. de l'Hist. des Rel., July 1908.

[In accordance with his principle that myths relating to suffering heroes are explanations of sacrificial rites, the writer finds the origin of this myth in the sacrifice of the white horse Phaëthon—the "cheval-soleil."]

Tournain (J.) L'histoire des religions et le totémisme à propos d'un livre récent.

R. de l'Hist. des Rel., May 1908.

[*S. C. Renel's Cultes militaires de Rome: les Kneisignes. The method—"comparative."* M. Renel calls it—condemned by the reviewer.]

Young (P. N. F.) Christian Science: A Criticism. Interpreter, Oct. 1908.

[In connection with Miss Sturge's book, *The Truth and Error of Christian Science.*]

3 *Guidex (H.)* Du changement de sexe dans les contes celtiques.

R. de l'Hist. des Rel., May 1908.

4 *Segerstedt (T.)* Les Asuras dans la religion védique (concluded).

R. de l'Hist. des Rel., May 1908.

5 *Poussin (L. de la Vallée)* Bouddhisme et l'apologétique.

R. prat. d'Apologét., Oct. 15, 1908.

[Introductory remarks of the nature of a criticism of principles, to a detailed memoir on the above subject.]

Author of the "Creed of Christ," The Creed of Buddha. 308p. John Lane, 1908.

[Review will follow.]

Dahlke (Paul) Buddhist Essays. Translated from the German by Bhikkhu Silācāra. 368p. Macmillan, 1908.

Ching (Hsiao) The Book of Filial Duty. Translated by Ivan Chén. (Wisdom of the East Series.) 60p. Murray, 1908.

7 *Bricout (J.)* Chez les Israélites français. L'Union libérale israélite.

R. du Clergé français, Nov. 1, 1908.

Momigliano (F.) Ebrei in Italia ed Ebrei in Russia. Cenobium, July 1908.

[With the sub-title *Modernismo Ebraico*.]

8 *Basset (E.)* Bulletin des périodiques de l'Islam (1906-1907). 1st part.

R. de l'Hist. des Rel., July 1908.

Sadi (Mushk-ud-Din) Scroll of Wisdom. Persian and English Text. Introd. by Sir A. N. Wollaston. 99p. Murray, 1908.

Brailsford (H. N.) Modernism in Islam.

Fort. R., Sept. 1908.

Morrison (Theodore) Can Islam be Reformed? 19th Cent., 1908.

12 *Mars (Gerhardt C.)* The Interpretation of Life. 818p. Appleton, 1908.

[An effort is here made to show the general reader the relation of Modern Culture to Christian Science.]

Taylor (J. E.) Essays on Theosophy. 67p. Sonnenschein, 1906.

Maillet (F.) Formules magiques de l'Orient chrétien.

R. de l'Hist. des Rel., July 1908.

P **PHILOSOPHY.** 10.. *Metaphysics*, 21 *Epistemology*, 33.. *Psychical Research*, 40.. *Psychology*, 60.. *Logic*, 70.. *Systems*, 90.. *Philosophers*.

Delacroix (H.) Le iii^e Congrès International de Philosophie.

Rev. Phil., Nov. 1908.

Alexander (Arch. B. D.) A Short History of Philosophy. 2nd ed., revised and enlarged. 627p.

MacLehose & Sons, 1908.

[The sections on Greek Philosophy have been rewritten.]

Wulf (M. de) Le mouvement philosophique en Belgique (suite et fin).

Rev. Néo-Scholastique, Nov. 1908.

10 *Saller (W. M.)* A New Type of Naturalism—Montgomery.

Inter. J. Eth., Oct. 1908.

[Discusses Montgomery's *Philosophical Problems in the Light of Vital Organization.*]

12 *Witz (K. F.)* Eine Einteilung der philosophischen Wissenschaften nach Aristoteles Prinzipien.

Vierteljahrssch. f. w. Phil., xxxii. 3, 1908.

[Suggests a division of mental activity according as it is free (in the sense of unconstrained) inquiring, or directed towards an end, corresponding to which would be the three disciplines of aesthetic, theoretical philosophy, and practical philosophy.]

13 *Kulowski (W. M.)* L'énergie potentielle: Est-elle une réalité? Rev. Phil., Oct. 1908.

Kaye (G. W. C.) Röntgen Rays.

Science Progress, Oct. 1908.

Thomas (W. Beach) Heredity and Radium at Dublin.

Science Progress, Oct. 1908.

Hartog (Marcus) The Transmission of Acquired Characters. Cont. R., Sept. 1908.

- Reid (G. Archdall)* The Alleged Trans-
mission of Acquired Characters.
Cont. R., Oct. 1908.
- Hartog (Marcus)* The Transmission of
Acquired Characters: A Rejoinder.
Cont. R., Nov. 1908.
- Hubrecht (A. A. W.)* Darwinism versus
Wallaceism. Cont. R., Nov. 1908.
- Cunningham (J. T.)* The Evolution of
Man. Science Progress, Oct. 1908.
- Berthau (M.)* Extrinsicisme.
R. prat. d'Apologét., Oct. 1, 1905.
[Discusses the metaphysics of Evolution.]
- 14 *Mansion (Paul)* Gauss contre Kant sur la
géométrie non euclidienne.
Rev. Néo-Scholastique, Nov. 1908.
- 15 *M'Taggart (J. Ellis)* The Unreality of
Time. Mind, Oct. 1908.
[Author holds that time is unreal, and bases his
view on the fact that the distinctions of past,
present, and future are essential to time. Since
these distinctions are never true of reality, there-
fore no reality is in time.]
- Leighton (J. A.)* Time, Change, and
Time-Transcendence.
J. of Phil., Oct. 8, 1908.
[Time-transcendence means, not the negation
of change, but the persistence, through change,
of an organised unity of ends that preserves the
effective continuity of its purposes throughout
the (from any finite point of view) endless suc-
cession of events.]
- 16 *Duhem (P.)* Le mouvement absolu et le
mouvement relatif. x.
Rev. de Phil., Sept. 1908.
- 21 *Chovet (F.)* Les principes de la raison
sont-ils réductibles à l'unité?
Rev. de Phil., Sept. 1908.
- Nunn (T. Percy)* On the Concept of
Epistemological Levels.
Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., viii, 1908.
[The cognitive process is at every stage only an
aspect of the development of a cognitive system,
and its character cannot be understood apart
from the affective aspect exhibited by the system
at the same level.]
- Gomperz (Heinrich)* Weltanschauungs-
lehre. Ein Versuch die Hauptprobleme
der allgemeinen theoretischen Philosophie
geschichtlich zu entwickeln und sachlich
zu bearbeiten. Bd. ii. Noologie: erste
Hälfte, Einleitung und Semasiologie.
305p. Diederich, 1908.
- Bakerwell (Charles M.)* On the Meaning
of Truth. Phil. R., Nov. 1908.
[Truth is always conceiving a particular object
in the light of its "idea," its concrete universal,
that is to say, simply conceiving it in its total
context or setting. The idealist and the realist
over-emphasise the objective side of truth; the
pragmatist over-emphasises the subjective side.]
- Creighton (J. E.)* The Nature and
Criterion of Truth. Phil. R., Nov. 1908.
[The pragmatist criticism is effective against
any view that regards thought as something by
itself in abstraction from the material of ex-
perience. Idealists have often erred by robbing
thought of all concrete meaning. Thinking is no
closed process which develops truth according to
an abstract principle of internal consistency, but
is essentially a going to facts, a process of ex-
periment and verification.]
- Fite (Warner)* The Agent and the
Observer. Phil. R., Sept. 1908.
[Contrasts the point of view of having an ex-
perience with that of contemplating the expres-
sion of such an experience.]
- Farley (J. H.)* Types of Unity.
J. of Phil., Sept. 10, 1908.
[The types are:—i. Individuality; ii. Individ-
uality; iii. Mere wholeness or aliveness; iv. Con-
tinuity of bare content; v. Concatenation; vi.
Harmony; vii. Kinesthetic purpose; viii. Tele-
ological unity; ix. Immediacy to all.]
- 26 *M'Dowall (S. A.)* The Study of Heredity
in relation to Freewill.
Interpreter, Oct. 1908.
- 27 *Eucken (Rudolf)* Geistige Strömungen
der Gegenwart iv^{te} umgearbeitete Aufl.
422p. Veit & Co., 1909.
[A new section on the Worth of Life is added,
and extensive alterations are made in the text.
The author criticises James' Pragmatism.]
- Latta (R.)* Purpose.
Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., viii, 1908.
[Wherever we have process leading to a result,
we have means and end; and wherever there is
means and end there is a certain degree of
systematic unity. This systematic unity is the
essence and core of purpose.]
- 28 *Haldane (R. B.)* The Methods of Modern
Logic and the Conception of Infinity.
Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., viii, 1908.
[Presidential Address, 1907. The real infinite
must be regarded as a self-contained system
which is real under the aspect of a process, a
progress of notional development within which
time and space and the limited self of experience
appear as stages, constituents, or moments.]
- Hodgson (Shadworth H.)* The Idea of
Totality.
Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., viii, 1908.
[The Universe, of which we find ourselves a
finite part, is to us a Whole in virtue of its con-
tinuity with our actual experience, but a Whole
which no human thought can grasp, that is,
conceive as complete, limited, and finite. We
have to think of it, as we perceive it, from
within.]
- Brown (H. Chapman)* Infinity and the
Generalisation of the Concept of Number.
J. of Phil., Nov. 5, 1908.
- 33 *Downey (Jane E.)* Automatic Pheno-
mena of Muscle Reading.
J. of Phil., Nov. 19, 1908.
- 40 *M'Dougall (William)* An Introduc-
tion to Social Psychology. 370 p.
Methuen, 1908.
[An attempt to deal with a difficult branch of
psychology in a way that shall make it intelli-
gible and interesting to any cultivated reader,
and that shall imply no previous familiarity with
psychological treatises on his part. Review will
follow.]
- Loveday (T.)* Studies in the History of
British Psychology: i. An Early Criticism
of Hobbes. Mind, Oct. 1908.
[An account of the work of William Lucy,
Bishop of St David's, whose *Observations, Cen-
sures and Computations of Notorious Errors in
Mr Hobbes* was published in 1683.]
- 41 *Hicks (G. Dawes)* The Relation of
Subject and Object from the Point of View
of Psychological Development.
Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., viii, 1908.
[An attempt to ascertain the conditions upon
which the origin of the distinction between sub-
ject and object depends, and to trace its growth in
the history of mind. The line of consideration
followed leads to the conclusion that neither the
matter nor the form of what is experienced can
be shown to be due to the fact of experiencing.]
- Alexander (S.), Ward (J.), Read (C.),
and Stout (G. F.)* The Nature of Mental
Activity. Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., viii, 1908.

[An important discussion. Professor Alexander maintains that mental activity in general can only be described in metaphorical terms, because of its extreme simplicity and its uniqueness. The best term is movement. In all our mental conditions, whether will, inference, perception, or sensation, we are aware of these movements, and these movements have direction and differ in direction.]

- 52 *Hoffmans (P. Hadelin)* La genèse des sensations d'après Roger Bacon.

Rev. Néo-Scholastique, Nov. 1908.

- 53 *Nakashima (Taizo)* The Time of Perception as a Measure of Differences in Sensations. J. of Phil., Oct. 8, 1908.

- 57 *Berger (Georges)* La notion de valeur: sa nature psychique, son importance en théologie. 365p. Georg & Cie, 1908.

[Value is something that is neither purely objective nor purely subjective. We may conceive of it under the form of a relation between subject and object. The relation of value is affective in kind, and every affective relation is capable of becoming a relation or value.]

Second (J.) La philosophie des valeurs.

Rev. Phil., Nov. 1908.

- Titchener (E. Bradford)* Lectures on the Elementary Psychology of Feeling and Attention. 412p. Macmillan, 1908.

[Assuming that the material of consciousness, the stuff out of which mind is made, is ultimately homogeneous, the author sketches a theory of feeling, according to which "affections" appear as mental processes of the same general kind as sensations, and as mental processes that might, under favourable conditions, have developed into sensations.]

- Ribot (Th.)* L'Antipathie: Étude psychologique. Rev. Phil., Nov. 1908.

- 58 *Pieron (H.)* Les problèmes actuels de l'instinct. Rev. Phil., Oct. 1908.

- 60 *Gibson (W. R. Boyes)* The Problem of Logic. 512p. A. & C. Black, 1908.

- 65 *Bowden (H. Heath)* A New Scientific Argument for Immortality.

J. of Phil., Sept. 24, 1908.

[A man is immortal when he has won survival value in the social evolution of his consciousness, when he has lived himself so completely into the lives of others that the interests and values of his own life are only realised by being identified with theirs. Such an immortality is individual and personal, i.e. a definite mode of function or behaviour persists.]

- 72 *Lehmann (Ernst)* Idee und Hypothese bei Kant.

Vierteljahrssch. f. w. Phil., xxxii. 3, 1908.

[Sharply distinguishes ideas, in Kant's technical sense, from hypotheses.]

- Watson (John)* The Philosophy of Kant explained. 526p. Maclellan, 1908.

[The result of a not unsuccessful experiment in the art of teaching continued over many years, the main object of which was to provide a method by which the tendency of the student to lean upon the authority of his teacher should be counteracted.]

- Kesseler (Kurt)* Die Lösung der Widersprüche des Daseins durch Kant und Eucken in ihrer religiösen Bedeutung: Eine philosophische Studie. 30p.

G. Krenscher, 1909.

- 73 *Carr (H. Wildon)* Impressions and Ideas: The Problem of Idealism.

Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., viii., 1908.

[A defence of Hume's scepticism as the only justifiable attitude in philosophy. The inference from impressions and ideas to reality that is not

experience is invalid because the inference is experience, and the thing inferred is but a content of the inference.]

- Cunningham (G. W.)* The Significance of the Hegelian Conception of Absolute Knowledge. Phil. R., Nov. 1908.

[According to Hegel, thought is genuinely objective, transcending the relativity of individual experiences and being the determination of things as they are in themselves. Thought finds its capacity to express the real in the fact that its universals are always the syntheses of differences, and not the blank universals of purely formal logic.]

- 74 *Schinz (Albert)* Professor Dewey's Pragmatism. J. of Phil., Nov. 5, 1908.

[Dewey is the most philosophical mind among the leading pragmatists, only his philosophy is at the expense of his pragmatism.]

- M'Gilvary (E. Bradley)* The Chicago "Idea" and Idealism.

J. of Phil., Oct. 22, 1908.

[An examination of Prof. Dewey's use of the term "idea." Writer can find no justification for Dewey refusing to accept the title of "idealist."]

- Moore (G. E.)* Professor James' "Pragmatism." Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., viii., 1908.

[A very able criticism of the things which James says about truth in his recent book. The paper is mainly concerned with a discussion of the two propositions:—"That all our true ideas are useful," "That all ideas, which are useful, are true."]

- Armstrong (A. C.)* The Evolution of Pragmatism. J. of Phil., Nov. 19, 1908.

[Discusses: i. Pragmatism as a methodological doctrine; ii. Pragmatism and Subjectivism; iii. Relation to Humanism; iv. Varieties of the pragmatic method in its stricter meaning; v. Pragmatism and Metaphysics.]

- Johnson (W. H.)* Pragmatism, Humanism, and Religion.

Princeton Th. R., Oct. 1908.

- 79 *Hollands (E. H.)* Neo-Realism and Idealism. Phil. R., Sept. 1908.

[To start with relations and try to arrive at reals, or to start with reals and try to arrive at the relations of reals, are equally abstract procedures. The concrete reality is a whole of related things; and the metaphysical problem is—What is the nature of this whole?]

- Baillie (J. B.)* Professor Laurie's Natural Realism:—i. The Epistemology of Natural Realism. Mind, Oct. 1908.

[A very appreciative exposition of Laurie's philosophy. Author regards the *Synthetic* as one of the greatest contributions to speculative philosophy which has appeared in English for many years.]

- Sellers (R. W.)* Critical Realism and the Time Problem, i. and ii.

J. of Phil., Sept. 20 and Oct. 22, 1908.

[Real time is identifiable with change; reality, as a process, is complicated; and the more complicated a part is, the greater the complexity and the intensity of change.]

- 80 *Adamson (Robert)* The Development of Greek Philosophy. Edited by Prof. W. R. Sorley and R. P. Hardie. 337p.

Blackwood, 1908.

[An exceedingly valuable series of lectures. The treatment of the Platonic Theory of Ideas and of the Philosophy of Aristotle is especially suggestive and original. A review will follow.]

- 82 *Steiner (R.)* I Filosofi Greci Prima di Platone, alla luce della sapienza dei Misteri.

Cenobium, July 1908.

[Examining in particular the relation of the teaching of Democritus to the Mysteries.]

84 *Temple (W.)* Plato's Vision of the Ideas.

Mind, Oct. 1908.

[In the Ideal Theory we have a doctrine to which logic and intuition have both contributed. Author tries to show the process by which he believes that the theory in its full form arose.]

Kinkel (Walter) Geschichte der Philosophie als Einleitung in das System der Philosophie. Theil ii. Von Sokrates bis Plato. 166p. Töpelmann, 1908.

Paul (Herbert) The Method of Plato.

19th Cent., 1908.

89 *Belmont (Séraphin)* L'existence de Dieu d'après Duns Scot.

Rev. de Phil., Sept. 1908.

90 *Rand (Benjamin)* Modern Classical Philosophers. Selections illustrating Modern Philosophy from Bruno to Spencer. 753p.

Constable, 1908.

[A useful series of extracts, containing some of the essential features of the chief philosophical systems. Some of the translations, e.g. that of Hegel's *Phenomenology* by Royce, appear here for the first time.]

Brett (G. S.) The Philosophy of Gassendi. 355p. Macmillan, 1908.

[A careful and systematic account of the main lines of thought of a much-neglected thinker. The book is divided into four parts—the first dealing with the Logic, the second with the Physics, the third with the Ethics, and the fourth giving a general review of the system.]

91 *Lederbagen (F.)* Friedrich Schlegels Geschichtsphilosophie: Ein Beitrag zur

Genesis der historischen Weltanschauung. 165p.

Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1908.
[Attempts to estimate the significance of Schlegel in the genesis of the historical *Weltanschauung*.]

94 *Thilly (Frank)* Friedrich Paulsen.

J. of Phil., Sept. 10, 1908.

[An appreciative sketch by an old pupil.]

Mügge (M. A.) Friedrich Nietzsche: His Life and Work. 452p. Unwin, 1908.

[Written for the purpose of gaining for Nietzsche some appreciation and justice in the English-speaking world. The sketch of his works has been written in imitation of that by Hollitscher.]

Crespie (A.) La Metafisica di Henri Bergson. Cœnobium, July 1908.

V ART. 83 *Sacred Music.*

Lalo (Ch.) Le nouveau sentimentalisme esthétique. Rev. Phil., Nov. 1908.

Auden (T.) The Relation between Religion and Architecture.

Interpreter, Oct. 1908.

[Briefly tracing how the primitive religion and primitive architecture developed historically together.]

30 *Barker (Ethel Ross)* Buried Herculaneum. 269p. Adam & Charles Black, 1908.

[The aim of this book is to give an account of past excavations at Herculaneum; to describe, as they once were, those buildings that have been stripped of their treasures, left in ruins, and reburied; and to connect with the buildings where they originally stood the bronzes and marbles now in the Museum at Naples.]

[NOTE.—For an explanation of the system of classification adopted in the Bibliography, readers are referred to HIBBERT JOURNAL, vol. i. p. 630 *seq.*]

G. D. H. and J. H. W.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

CREDO.¹

I BELIEVE in one God, Just, Merciful and Holy: Eternal in Being, Infinite in Wisdom, Unchangeable in Purpose, Adorable in Majesty, Ineffable in Perfection; for ever Blessing and for ever Blessed.

I believe in God as the Absolute and Only Good: in Whom there is Peace beyond all unrest; Harmony beyond all discord; Victory beyond all defeat: I believe that the whole Creation is moving towards the fulness of His Glory, and that He is for ever reconciling the World unto Himself.

I believe in God as the Beginning of Wisdom and the Satisfaction of Desire; the Life of all life and the Soul of every soul; Revealed and yet Hidden; Present and yet Beyond; Light of all Thought and Substance of all Things; sustaining the World by the Immanence of His Will, and Transcending the World in the Glory of His Being, the Depth of His Counsels, and the unsearchable Riches of His Love.

I believe in the Self-communication of God in every soul; whereby the lost is found; the broken healed; the seeker answered; the perishing made imperishable; and the finite creature clothed upon with Infinitude and Immortality.

I believe in a Divine Universe, revealing the Eternal Mind unto a Perfect Day; Radiant with the Beauty of God; the

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Temple of His Holiness, Built and still Building; the Word of His Wisdom, Spoken and Speaking for ever; the Habitation of Souls: I believe in the Reign of Law which is the Reign of Love: I believe in the Everlasting Gospel of the Kingdom of God—Everlasting and therefore ever-renewed, Ever-living in its essence and therefore ever-changing in its form.

I believe that I am in God, and of God, and for God; that He is mine and that I am His; that from Him I came forth and to Him I return; that by Him I am thoroughly known, righteously judged, and graciously loved.

I believe in the Brotherhood of Man; in the Communion of Saints; in the Holy Catholic Church of all worshipping souls; in the Church Militant and the Church Triumphant; and in the inspiration of the Prophets, past, present, and to come.

I believe that the faithful is justified and that the wicked has his due; that the merciful is blessed; that the mourner shall be comforted; that the pure in heart shall see God; that Death shall be swallowed up in Victory, and that the Righteous shall shine as the stars, for ever and ever.

I believe that Man is free and responsible; immortal and divine; of one Nature with God; imperfect but called to Perfection; good in becoming Better, wise in becoming Wiser, dying to Live: and I believe in the inexhaustible Riches of Eternal Truth, Immutable in Essence, but Endless in Progression and All-comprehensive in Diversity.

This I believe: a Covenant and a Promise; a Light of the Life that is; an Assurance of Life to come; True but incomplete; sufficing for present Knowledge, but falling short of the Glory that shall be revealed: I believe that other Words will be given, though we cannot bear them now: and I look for the fuller Vision yet to be; and for the endless transformation of all souls into the Nearer Likeness of God.

Religion is the consciousness of a spirit which knows itself to be one with the Highest and Mightiest. In religion there is and must be something dogmatic, authoritative, irrevocable, even defiant. What religion announces is a final decision, which may not be withdrawn, modified, or made the subject of negotiation under any circumstance whatsoever. It is the soul's ultimatum to the universe. If in one sense religion is the humblest of attitudes, in a deeper sense it is the most exalted. It claims to overcome the world and to put all things under its feet. Religion is content with nothing less than the absolute submission of the entire range of human experience to itself. Opposition only quickens it into completer self-assertion, and the hour when its foes are most active is the hour of its firmest carriage. When the highest interests of the soul are being threatened, and the foundations of life are on the point of being swept away, religion rises up with an answering menace, and delivers its ultimatum in the teeth of the facts. "For this cause," it cries, "came I unto this hour. Yea, though he slay me, yet will I trust him." It is the pillar of fire which burns at its brightest in the blackest night. It is the trumpet-call of man's unconquerable soul breathing a challenge to all the armies of doubt, sorrow, and sin.

The majesty of Religion is self-supported, and her authority is never merged in that of her ambassadors. Her splendours are unadorned, and she needs no devices of man's wit to make her acceptable. She has no *alter ego*, and refuses to be identified with that which is voted good by the majority. She is no member of the Grand Committee of Human Interests. To pass off Religion as Morality, Art, Science, singly or together, is to mistake the viceroy for the monarch and to ignore the hiding-place of Power. She will not be harnessed to the yoke of any human purpose whatsoever, and suffers no man to commend her as a thing that is likely to please.

Religion has no fellowship with idols; is never disguised; cannot be hidden under a phrase, nor revealed by a dance of thin abstractions. Of all the idols that usurp her place, those

are the vainest that are built up out of *words*. The vainest—but the most eagerly run-after in every age that boasts enlightenment. They are set up in the market-place; they deck the shop-windows of Eloquence; men sell them for money in the House of God. Religion weeps over these things as Christ wept over Jerusalem; and again she drives them from the Temple with a whip of small cords.

Before the overwhelming immensities of the universe, Religion alone remains unabashed. The doom of Earth is written in the sky; human life, through uncounted generations, is but a breath breathed forth into voids of endless time; the sun and the planets short-lived as a dance of fireflies on a summer night. All is as nothing. To an imagination like Carlyle's which has opened its arms to the terrors of Time and Space, or looked upon the littleness of man, as Dante's did, from the empyrean height, there comes a moment when Hope and Faith shrivel out of being and the very will to live expires. The soul is on the point of total collapse beneath the weight of the Everlasting No. Then it is, when all seems lost, that the mighty heart of Religion begins to beat. She knows that her hour has come: "Out of the deep, O Lord, I cried unto Thee, and Thou heardest me." None save a being infinitely greater than the world would be aware of his own infinite littleness within the world. Religion is the soul of that being. It is the shock of the entire universe of sense that has to be met; the deeps of immensity have poured out their legions, clad in the iron raiment of inexorable law; armies of negation are encamped beneath the walls and battering at the gates. This is the challenge; and well may we say that *all* is needed, and nothing less would suffice, to stir the soul of man into that final act of self-expression which we call Religion.

Unbroken by the cosmic challenge, Religion runs no risk of succumbing to any lesser strain. Summoned to action by the evils of the human lot, she gathers enthusiasm from the

magnitude of her task. Just because she is the spirit of the Best she rises to her greatest when she knows the Worst. Undisguised in her own majesty, she penetrates every disguise that is used to cover the malignancy of her foe. That evil should be extenuated or proved not to be; that black should be painted white; that the groaning and travailing of creation should be hushed up or put out of sight—this is no prayer of hers. Things are as they are; new names do not alter them; evil is evil, pain is pain, death is death; and it is only by accepting them in their naked reality that Religion can be true to herself. Let them be what they are, and she will deal with them. Let the sinner be a sinner and she will put her arms round him; let the sheep be veritably lost and she will recover them; let evil come armed to the battle and she will draw her sword; let the gloom thicken and her radiance shall glow like the noonday; let life be tragic and she will lift it up among the stars.

“When thou hearest the fool rejoicing, and he saith, ‘It is over and past,
And the wrong was better than right, and hate turns into love at the last,
And we strove for nothing at all, and the gods are fallen asleep;
For so good is the world agrowing that the evil good shall reap’ :—
Then loosen thy sword in the scabbard and settle the helm on thine head,
For men betrayed are mighty, and great are the wrongfully dead.”

It follows that Religion is the deepest principle of unity among men. The challenge she answers, the burden she lifts, the shock she encounters and repels, is one and the same for all men everywhere. Wherever her authentic voice is heard, no matter what its language, we feel that it speaks for us all; the answer it makes is the answer we fain would give, the battle it announces is the battle we are yearning to win. Religion may speak in propositions to which we cannot assent; may practise rites we cannot join; may build altars where we can lay no offering. But let it once appear that these things represent the self-assertion of a soul that is winning the victory over the world—fearless of Nature, of Death, of Evil, of Immensity—and who will not thankfully proclaim

that his own cause is being pleaded before high heaven? who will not acknowledge that these brave ones are holding the fort when his own soul stands in jeopardy? Shall there not be deepest blood-brotherhood between them and us? Shall not love go forth, unfeigned and entire, towards these masters of the fate that threatens us all? Is it not enough for unity that all men have one terror to face, one shock to encounter, one world to overcome, one agony to endure? Are not the ultimate terms of the human compact wholly fulfilled by any soul of man that shows us the way in bearing up against these things? Need we inquire into the secret of his endurance and refuse to accept him until he has answered—when once we have seen that he endures?

The spirit that is in religion is that of uncompromising loyalty to the Highest. Its fealty is entire and requires no confirmation by an oath. It lives in the whole, loves the whole with a patriot's devotion, and passes into utterance, or into action, "with the felt strength of the universe at its back." Religion stands by a Cause; but this rests on no reasoning, for it is the Cause of Reason itself. Religion is not afraid of its future, suffers from no sense of insecurity, and speaks in language that is both triumphant and serene.

Religion, therefore, does not apologise for itself, does not stand on the defensive, does not justify its presence in the world. If theorists would vindicate Religion, they may do so; but Religion comes forth in the majesty of silence, like a mountain amid the lifting mists.¹ All the strong things of the world are its children; and whatever strength is summoned to its support, is the strength which its own spirit has called into being. Religion never excuses its attitude, and when at last a Voice is lifted up it simply chants the Faith, until the deaf ears are unstopped and the dead in spirit come out of their graves to listen. There is nothing so masterful; and it speaks as one who has a right to the

¹ "The rest may reason, and welcome; 'tis we musicians know."

mastery. It is the major control of thought, to which all systems whatsoever bear witness, either silent or confessed. Authority is not what it requires, but what it confers. Its voice is peremptory but not violent, convincing but not tyrannical, and every truth that it announces passes insensibly into a command. Its indicatives are veiled imperatives; and no hypothetical proposition ever escapes from its lips. So that, unless a man is overborne by his religion, we may truly say his religion is vain.

Religion depends on no favourable conditions. It is a vain thing when we say one to another: "Go to now, let us make a garden in a sunny spot; let us create a soft atmosphere of happiness such as Religion loves; let us build a mighty hedge of argument to shield this tender plant from the ravages of the east wind." To argue thus is to look at life through the wrong end of the telescope. It is not in man to make Religion what he would have her be, but only to be what religion is making him. As weak, she makes him strong; as defeated, victorious; as naked, she clothes him; as exposed to every desolating wind, she wraps her mantle around him and he is safe. Were it easy for the natural man to believe in God there would be no such thing as Religion; were even the argument for morality a mere conclusion from premises there would be no such thing as doing right. Unless the soul were greater than its arguments it would never see the gaps in its own logic; unless it were mightier than its deeds it would never be aware of imperfection; and it is only as conscious in himself of a Rational Will which is fully expressed in none of his achievements, either of logic or of life, that man is able to assert himself above his failures, and bridge the gaps between the actual and the ideal. "The righteous man," says Kant, "may say: I *will* that there should be a God; I *will* that, though in this world of natural necessity, I should not be *of* it, but should also belong to a purely intelligible world of freedom; finally, I *will* that my duration should be endless. On this faith I insist and will not let it be taken from me."

To many who have inherited the Christian temper it may seem that statements such as these are at variance with the essential character of the spiritual life. That life is, before all else, meek and lowly, gentle and peaceable; it vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up, is not easily provoked. Its note is self-repression, not self-assertion. The humble, the contrite, the broken-hearted are its chief exponents, and the perfect symbol of its spirit is the little child. It does not strive nor cry, nor smite with the sword; its language is a prayer of submission and not a challenge; its deeds are the healing acts of love.

Such a rejoinder is true in all that it affirms, and false in all that it denies. Every one of the qualities here affirmed is truly predicated of Religion, and Christianity in particular bases on them its claim to represent the highest stage in the evolution of the religious life. But these finer qualities are often commended in language and illustrated by examples which suggest that they have their original spring in some weakness of the soul. They are, rather, the perfect fruit of the soul's strength, daring, and energy. Forgetfulness of this has, perhaps, done more than all other causes put together to discredit Christianity in the modern world. Among other damage it has given occasion to the invective of Nietzsche, and to the whole literature of the self-assertion of unconverted man. The summit-truths are always the easiest to pervert. And the doctrine which makes religion the refuge of the weak, and declares that only failures are ever beaten to their knees, is precisely such a perversion. For what is self-repression? Is it merely the turning of one's back on each particular object of desire, or the shutting of one's ear to every voice which cries "Lo here, lo there"? Were it only this, there would be no denying that in Nietzsche's philosophy Christianity has met its overthrow. But self-repression means infinitely more. Its essence is not the negative abandonment of the particular, but the dynamic grasp of the universal; not the mere forsaking of the husks, but the rising up in the total strength of manhood and the arduous climbing of the path which was so easy in

descent. Self-repression is self-assertion—or it is nothing. It represents the developing attack of the spirit on the Object of supreme desire, wherein the beggarly elements are not destroyed but transmuted—first compelled into unconditional surrender and then enlisted and taken up as the working forces of the great design. The fruits of the Spirit in all their sweet reasonableness are thus the fruits of a world that has been overcome; and the world is not overcome by running away from its perishing shows. In Goethe's lines there is one word that seems to bear the emphasis of this pleading:

Im Ganzen, Guten, Schönen
Resolut zu leben.

The great-heartedness of religion craves expression and must be expressed. There is a moment in the act of worship when neither the prayer of contrition nor the hymn of adoration will satisfy, when the Rational Will breaks the leash of constraint with which the understanding has held it back, and launches itself in holy defiance, and with the full force of its argument within it, against all that is irrational, dark, or terrible in the world. The precautions of apology and self-defence are now abandoned; the baggage train is emptied and left behind; the soul ceases to parley with Principalities and Powers, and, with a joy that is free from all fetters, lifts on high the battle-hymn of its faith. This moment is the very consummation of worship, gathering into itself the meaning of all that has gone before, and prelude to a yet greater moment when faith passes into action and truth becomes a deed. When sincere, there is nothing which so stirs the pulses of the spiritual life, nothing which puts such power into the arm of the Good. Religion, no longer entrenched behind bulwarks, is now seen marching into the open like an army with banners, the Ark of the Covenant in the midst, and the priestly trumpeters going on before.

Isaiah and Jesus had no other conception of religion than this. They spake with authority, and the note of triumph was

in their voices. When they argued it was unto conviction. The sense of power, ruling by the divine right of Eternal Reason, and dependent on no temporal suffrages whatsoever, rings out in every prophet's cry. The attitude of self-defence is foreign to the prophet; he must always attack, must always be of good cheer, must always go forth conquering and to conquer.

"Gladness be with thee, Helper of the World!
I think this is the authentic sign and seal
Of Godship, that it ever waxes glad,
And more glad, until gladness blossoms, bursts
Into a rage to suffer for mankind
And recommence at sorrow."

The attitude of self-defence is foreign even to the makers of the ancient creeds. Their creeds have been found inadequate to the expanding reason of mankind, but their spirit has been fatally misunderstood. They have been treated as having no aim save that of laying down articles of agreement for the Church of God, signed, sealed, and delivered. Were that all, we might truly say that the labour was vain. But they sought to satisfy a deeper need. Then as now a word was wanted to sustain the courage and confirm the loyalty of the marching host. In the stress and difficulty of life, which were more insistent for them than they now seem to us, religion could not be suffered to lose confidence in itself. Over and over again the issue must be frankly faced, for it is the issue of life or death; the soul must be reminded, and again reminded, that its ultimatum has been delivered; the final decision must be recalled and re-affirmed; the soul's covenant with God must be displayed, and the will of man recommitted to its clauses one by one. Such was the deeper intention of the ancient creeds. Would any lesser aim have secured their survival into an age which has grown beyond them; or made it possible that many good and enlightened men should still chant them in a voice of triumph when, by their own confession, they can give an unqualified assent to scarcely a single one of the propositions they utter?

Theirs was not the spirit of spurious open-mindedness, so much in fashion nowadays, which worships a note of interrogation—the timidity which dare commit itself to nothing; the half-hearted religion which negotiates for its status and proposes a perpetual parley with Doubt, Sin, and Death. “Such, my friends, are the principal objections which Christianity has to encounter at the present day, but I venture to think we need not despair.” *Retro Satanas!* The lines have indeed fallen unto us in a highly apologetic age. We apologise for the highest things; we introduce them tentatively—often with a veiled implication that their opposites are almost as good. But if the dogmatism of the Creeds is bad, this other extreme is infinitely worse. How can the world fail to despise a religion which is accompanied by a perpetual excuse for its own existence? The world knows well that the thing so offered is not religion at all. Whatsoever comes before man with the airs of a suppliant cannot be the Spirit of the Absolute Good. It is the devil who is the prince of apologists, and even he is not always fawning for the suffrages of his constituents. The Good, however lowly its form, does not apologise for itself, nor creep into the world with an abashed countenance and an air of “I hope I don’t intrude?” It stands on its rights.

Is there, then, no need of the Apologist, no service which he can perform? Most assuredly there is. Does not Faith, even when most confident, demand a base secure within Experience, and a line of communications kept open in History? Nevertheless a time may come, indeed has come, when the base is so distant and indistinct, and the lines of communication so long, numerous, and confused, that their maintenance drains the best energies of the host. When these conditions arrive, the whole position becomes insecure, Faith loses heart, and the Light ceases to invade the darkness. And weakness passes into decadence when, in addition, there falls upon the Church the task of protecting a huge baggage-train, packed with obsolete munitions and a mixed assortment of

worldly goods. What ought to be subordinate now becomes supreme. The priest drives out the prophet; religion gives no lead to life; laboured explanation displaces the word of command; the objective is lost sight of; the front is forgotten; force is scattered; loyalty perishes; demoralisation spreads; the host loses momentum and impact; strong men linger in the rear and quarrel over the spoils of ancient victories. The exclusion of Defence from the business of the Church is not indeed to be thought of; but let the things defended be worth defending, and such as are really assailed. Religion conserves nothing that it cannot use, for it is, before all else, a creative principle, an active Good, an invasive Ideal.

The loss of this central conception is the recurrent misfortune of every organised Church, and much of the theological literature of the present time shows little trace of its presence. The science of Christian Apologetics has grown to enormous dimensions, its convincingness inversely proportional to its mass. Sects, even, have arisen which devote no small part of the resources at their command to discovering a reason why they should exist—the characteristic occupation of sectarianism all the world over. The literature thus produced, whether in defence of doctrine or of denomination, is not inspiring though it seems to be popular. Many go to church for the purpose of hearing religion defended, and explained, and placed on some perilous footing of accommodation with alien things in which they really believe. There is a strong disposition to meet doubt half-way, discuss the matter as an open question, and effect some kind of feeble compromise. The Churches have laid themselves out to meet the demand, and the weakest of them all are the most apologetic. Meanwhile, there are devout men to whom the attitude of incessant apology is unspeakably repugnant and disheartening. These would be greatly helped if suffered now and then to join their voices to the great shout of the Church Militant—to sing the battle-hymn of their Ideal—and to go forth to the field inspired with its strains.

IS THERE A COMMON CHRISTIANITY?

PROFESSOR J. H. MUIRHEAD.

IN a recent article in the *HIBBERT JOURNAL*¹ Professor Dewey has called attention to the fact that the education controversy has had one unforeseen but most beneficial consequence. As the "social problem" has led to the spread and the deepening of reflection on the nature and ends of social life, so the religious problem in schools has had the effect of stimulating thought everywhere upon the essential meaning of religion itself. Though it is in England at the present moment that controversy is most acute, yet the question at issue is one of fundamental interest to the whole Christian world. In England itself the pause in actual hostilities which has succeeded the breakdown of the recent negotiations seems favourable to a more serious attempt than has yet been made to understand the real inwardness of the situation. It is only in its outward aspect that the controversy is national; inwardly it is concerned with some of the most vital problems the modern spirit has to solve.

He must be an obtuse observer or controversialist who has not felt as the fight went on that the difference goes far deeper than he had at first supposed, and who has not made some effort on his own account to reduce to their ultimate terms the assertions and counter-assertions which each side seems to assume as axiomatic. The present paper is an attempt to reach a better intellectual understanding of the underlying logic of the controversy, and to indicate in the

¹ See *HIBBERT JOURNAL*, July 1908.

light of the result the direction in which, in the judgment of the writer, ultimate peace is to be sought.

We do not need to go far to come upon the fundamental point of disagreement. On the one side, which for want of a better name we may call the undenominational, the case is summed up in the assertion that there is a body of religious truth common to all Christian denominations—a “fundamental Christianity” which may be made the basis of religious instruction in schools without offence to any but extremists. It is not denied that special doctrines and forms of ritual have their importance, more particularly that there is a deep line of cleavage between Catholic (whether Romanist or Anglican) and Protestant Christianity. But as peculiar to particular creeds these differences, it is held, are less fundamental than what is common to all, are easily separable from it, and can be postponed or entrusted to the care of other agencies provided by the particular denominations for this purpose. When challenged to give examples of these basal propositions the undenominationalist names the Fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of man, and the large number of ethical and religious truths that flow from them and which may be gathered from the more spiritual parts of Scripture, more particularly from the splendid grouping in the “Sermon on the Mount.” With these as our armoury is it not, he asks, the teaching of the merest common sense to close up our ranks in face of the common enemy, which is not this or that form of Christianity, not even this or that form of religion, but the spirit that denies in general—the spirit of irreligion?

The plea, it must be admitted, is attractive. It appeals at once to the man in the street and to some of the most distinguished of our men of science.¹ But it is no sooner announced than it is met by a flat rejection on the part, not only of extremists, but of leaders as representative of modern religious opinion as their opponents. It is true, they say, that you may name doctrines which in one form or

¹ See particularly Sir Oliver Lodge's *Man and the Universe*.

another are held by all Christian denominations, perhaps even by all Western religions, but the essence of religious belief is just the particular form in which they are held, the specific interpretation that is given to them in the Church's creed. It is this, and not any general and abstract statement, about which people really care; and rightly, because it is this alone that gives the belief its power. It is these definite beliefs that are the helmet of faith and the sword of the spirit, in the power of which the Christian is called upon to advance. There is nothing to gain but everything to lose by ignoring the particular quality and temper of your weapons and in joining forces with allies who trust to pasteboard shields and swords of lath.

There is indeed, it must be admitted, something at first sight paradoxical about this contention. Is it only, we ask, the things in which men differ that stir their enthusiasm? Is it not as though physicists or biologists were to maintain that there is no common body of physical knowledge which could be made the subject of school instruction without bringing in outlying controversies as to the ultimate constitution of matter or the heredity of habit, and as though no education in science could be begun until we had carefully segregated children into groups according as their parents preferred Kelvin to Rutherford or Spencer to Weismann? Yet, as the course of the controversy has abundantly shown, the argument is not so easily set aside.

"You appeal, on the ground of a common Christianity to which it is possible for the teacher to confine himself. But what," the denominationalist asks, "does this in reality amount to? You instance the Fatherhood of God; but, passing over the vagueness of the metaphor, what kind of God is He? through what channels does He communicate with us? in what works has He manifested Himself? by what authority do you speak of Him? The whole content and spirit of your teaching will depend on the answers you give to these questions, and such answers are what we mean by religious

doctrines. You may seek to evade the difficulty, as is often done by the hard-pressed undenominationalist, by denying that belief has anything to do with true religion. And you may quote Scripture to prove that it consists in doing justice and loving mercy, and not in any formulated doctrine. But this is merely to remove the difficulty a step further back. In what spirit? in whose name? by what means is justice to be done and mercy shown? You cannot evade doctrine and belief without reducing life to a mere play of personal feeling and sentiment, about which there is nothing to teach because nothing to be known in common."

In attempting a solution of the antinomy here indicated we must start, I believe, from the admission of the substantial truth of the denominationalist's contention. In the sense in which the existence of common truths is usually urged, we must admit that the claim is illusory. The so-called common truths turn out on closer examination to be no more than abstract formulæ concealing all sorts of specific differences, according to the setting they have in the general system of individual or corporate beliefs. Each of them takes on a colour of its own from its particular environment. Even though it were more possible than it is to separate off doctrines that resist the action of this transforming medium, they would be found to constitute not the most but the least important elements of religious faith—the mere abstract being of God, the historical existence of Jesus of Bethlehem, or at least of Nazareth, the fact of social sympathy and of fellow-feeling between the members of the human race—the commonplaces rather than the common bond of believers in Christianity. Yet with this admission we seem to be back at the paradox from which we started, and this is even more serious than at first appeared. For if second thought is sufficient to undermine the theory of a common Christianity, third thought seems to show that it is impossible to stop here, and that the argument is applicable, *mutatis mutandis*, to parties and even to members of

the several communities themselves. If it is impossible to discover a common Christianity in which separate Churches may unite, is it not equally impossible to find a common Anglicanism or Wesleyanism? This at any rate must be clear, that just in proportion as a group or an individual believer seeks to understand and appropriate his creed, to transform it from a dead aggregate of propositions into a living system of intelligently held beliefs, will each of its articles assume a specific meaning which by the very fact will differentiate it from the same article as it is held by another. But an argument which proves too much is an argument which suggests a revision of the premises on which it is founded. In the present case it forces us to ask a question which has been singularly neglected in the present controversy, yet is clearly vital to the issue. The dispute hinges on the assertion and denial of common elements in Christian creeds, yet no serious attempt has been made by either side to discover what is meant by a common element. An elementary analysis will show the ambiguity of the term.

Two senses lie upon the surface. I look along the tiled garden path from the window where I sit. Each of the bricks is different, yet they all have common features, the same shape, size, colour, etc. On the other hand, I look at the row of apple trees by the hedge. Where is the community of the parts? Each shape, each angle and curve, each dimension is different. Yet it is a row of *apple trees*. Each is stamped with the form of a common life. Somehow, in spite of the difference, there is community. More than that: instead of being shallower than in the case of the bricks, the community is deeper and more all-pervading. What is the reason of this difference? It is that in the one case we have mere common elements, which we can obtain by abstracting our minds from the dissimilarities, the kind of community which my luggage has in virtue of its labels; in the other we have a life or organic principle permeating the whole being of the tree, and, according to the differences of function and environment,

expressing itself in differences of form, size, texture, etc. It is this that makes it difficult to fix on common elements, yet at the same time makes the community that there is the wider and the more significant. I might extend my illustrations from plant to animal, and thence to human life, and the higher I went in the scale of organism the more difficult would I find it to fix on important elements that could be obtained by the simple process of abstraction, but this would not mean that I was leaving community behind, but that it is a community of a subtler, more profoundly operative kind—a community of principle or substance, comparable rather to that of the soul in its relation to the body, the spirit to the letter, than to a common bodily and imageable feature.

In dealing with doctrines and beliefs it is of the first importance to recognise that herein they resemble living things. They are no mere aggregates of propositions mechanically combined, but organic structures whose elements have been moulded to the form of the mind or minds of whose substance they partake. Hence it is that any particular theory seems to differ root and branch and fruit from any other in the same subject. Yet, more closely looked at, we can see that the separate theories reveal a large basis of agreement.¹ The point to notice is that the agreements are not to be reached by any facile process of merely leaving out differences, but by penetrating for ourselves to the truth of the subject, and endeavouring to see the why and wherefore of the different forms that theory has taken. Underlying all there are common acknowledgments, common principles of interpretation, a common spirit. But this community is not something that can be definitely formulated as common articles.

And what is true of theory in general is true of those theories which we call religious creeds. A religious creed is the attempt to formulate the relation in which a man stands to the universe around him, the sort of man which that universe calls on him to be, the steps it is necessary to take in passing

¹ See Bosanquet's *Logic*, ii., on Hypothesis.

from what he is to what he might be, from the natural or self-pleasing to the spiritual or God-pleasing, the appointed means for that transition. As the creed is thus concerned with the deepest and most vital things, it is not surprising that it should contain more vital energy than other forms of belief, or that it should show itself more like the living organism to which we have compared it, developing like an organism through antagonism and affinity to elements in its environment, forming itself into an individual system in which the elements both positive and negative are moulded into a form they have for itself alone and which it cannot be said in any proper sense to share with another. The differences that thus emerge are notorious; the exclusiveness with which creeds are held has passed into a proverb in the *odium theologicum*. But if our analogy holds true, the agreements may be expected to be proportionately wide and profound, seeing that it is the same human spirit that expresses itself in all, and these agreements must go as deep as the underlying community of human souls. The sense of such underlying unity may be the result of the touch of genius, as in a St Francis, or again of the touch of nature, as in the face of a common peril, both of which have the power of making the whole world kin. But it may also be—perhaps normally is—the result of labour of the mind consciously directed to the search for religious truth. To such a mind deep answers to deep; religions, if they have no common elements, are seen to have correspondences which have their root in a common principle.

More than any other faith Christianity from the outset has claimed to have a creed. More than any other, believers hold, it has had a history. Like the living thing which it is, it has grown and developed, here by opposing and rejecting, there by assimilating materials that have come to it from without. Attempts, indeed, are always being made to treat the doctrinal complexities with which Christian theology deals as accretions which obscure its real nature, and to direct us back to some central common core, which we are to reach by stripping off

its artificial wrappings. But the sounder view is that which Newman was the first to render popular in his *Development of Doctrine*. What we are coming to see is what Newman failed to see, that in this process, along with the movement towards unity and coherence of part with part, there has also been a movement of differentiation amounting to segmentation, which has made its development resemble rather that of a species or group than an individual organism. More particularly there were the great schisms into Eastern and Western, and more recently into Northern and Southern, Christianity. To some these seem to have had a shattering effect. They ought rather to be regarded as signs of the vigour of its life, and an underlying consciousness that elements quite vital to it as a whole were imperfectly recognised in the accepted synthesis, and that it was better that these elements should be asserted and developed in partial isolation than that they should not be asserted at all. If this is so we may expect that just where this living "reforming" spirit has been most active, as in England, Scotland, Germany, and America, the time will soonest come when the underlying unity will begin to re-assert itself, first in the poets and men of genius, then in the professional thinkers, lastly in the minds of the great mass of the people who are in touch with the sterner realities of life and whom this touch of nature has made theologically kin. This probably is actually taking place at the present time, and is the meaning of the claim put forward on behalf of the coming generation. If there is such a unity of spirit in Christian creeds and Churches, it is surely not less in the interest of the nation than of the denominations themselves that children should be brought up in it.

I have tried to show what this common element is not. But, having gone so far, I can hardly shirk the challenge to try to indicate what it is.¹

¹ This is all the more necessary in view of attempts like that recently made by Mr Chesterton, in his brilliant book on *Orthodoxy*, to prove that there is no root of unity in religions at all. We are told, he says, that creeds "agree in

Perhaps the form to which the question has been reduced makes the attempt less presumptuous than it appears. It suggests that while it is illegitimate to seek for the common root, the "grain of mustard seed," or the "leaven" of Christianity in any common articles in the creeds of the several Churches, it is not illegitimate to look for it in a common principle, a common attitude to the facts of inner and outer experience, a common sense of the relative values of things. Religion itself has recently been defined as the endeavour to preserve and perpetuate all that is of greatest worth in human life. But the great religions of the world have differed just in the things they have selected to endow with worship. One of the most striking results of the recent expansion of our outlook over the different ways in which religious consciousness has expressed itself is that we are coming to realise what in particular it is, what the particular scale of values is, for which Christianity stands. I select only those features in which it contrasts most strikingly with other creeds. (1) With all the higher forms of religion, both of East and West, Christianity is founded on a belief in an underlying unity in the world. It is a form of Monism. Nature and human life are unities in themselves and in relation to each other. But it differs from Buddhism and generally from the religious consciousness of the East in seeking for this unity in life itself and not in withdrawal from it. In this sense it is the religion of the outward. The eyes of its saints and prophets, as Mr Chesterton puts it, are not closed in drowsy indifference, but open and alert to the world. Its ideal is fulness of knowledge, fulness of life. To Christianity there is nothing common or unclean, for in all things may be seen the expression and the symbol of the Invisible. (2) Like all the higher forms of religion, Christianity believes in some form of spiritual transformation or conver-

meaning but differ in machinery. It is exactly the opposite. They agree in the mode of teaching; what they differ about is the thing to be taught." He does not see that the same argument would apply to the Christian Churches themselves. In that case what becomes of "orthodoxy"?

sion as a necessary condition of entry into life in the fullest sense. In order to live in the whole we must cease to live in the part, to realise the eternal we must cease to idealise the temporal, to enter the service of the spirit we must cease to strive for lordship of the world. But Christianity differs from the highest of these, even from the noble spiritualism of the Greek philosophers, in two respects. It calls for a more complete renunciation. For Christians no contrast short of that between death and life is adequate to express the depth of the change. We must die to live. No compromise, no reservation is possible. We have to put off the old man in its entirety, to be born again. And secondly, this passage to the new life is not one which is open only to a select few or dependent on external advantages. It is open to all—even more open to those who, owing to their circumstances, are least prejudiced by the world's standards, who feel the least security in its conventions. (3) With all forms of religion, Christianity recognises the limitations of human knowledge. "Who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been His counsellor?" is a note that it has in common with them all. But it differs from all forms of agnosticism, whether of the Areopagus or of the Royal Society, in its assurance of the truthfulness of our standards of value and the continuity of what we know and have achieved with what remains to be known and achieved.

We may express these beliefs as we choose. We may use the language of religion and theology and call them the belief in God's revelation of Himself in nature and human life, in the reality of sin and the need of regeneration, in the intrinsic worth and the equality before God of every human soul, in the veracity of God's word in the heart and in the mind. Or we may dissemble their significance in the language of everyday life and call them the belief that life is worth living; that we are not so good as we might be, and that we shall have to be a great deal better if we are going to be anything worth speaking of at all; that one man is as good as another, and a man's a man for a' that; that our senses don't deceive us, and that

when knowledge is so scarce it is stupid to distrust what knowledge we have. But whatever the form we give them, they are the beliefs that all share who have entered by whatever path into the spirit of the Christian world; they are common Christianity.

May such beliefs be taught in school, and is the teaching of them compatible with respect for the tenets of particular denominations? With this question we come back to the practical problem with which we started. But the question now presents itself in a form that will scarcely permit of two answers. For it is precisely such an attitude to the world of nature and man, together with the beliefs on which it rests, into which children have to be educated if they are to be prepared to enter the spirit of Christian civilisation at all. Of the abstract statements we shall have less in the case of the younger children, and perhaps the less the better in the school at any time. But to the teacher these beliefs stand for the spirit which must pervade the whole of the ethical training he seeks to give, and can be as little left out as the spirit of sincerity and truthfulness to fact can be left out of the ordinary subjects of study. Examples on paper are risky, but I venture to illustrate my meaning from a simple but, I think, a crucial instance.¹

There is no doctrine that has been the subject of bitterer controversy than the Eucharist. The doctrine of the Communion is the very sign of division! On none would it be more difficult to obtain any common formula on which Churches and Church parties might agree. But on none would it, I believe, be easier to put the child at the point of view from which the Christian doctrine with all its divergencies has sprung. Whether the lesson were in physiology or in Scripture, a child might be shown the continuity of the process whereby the material of the bread passes from the grain, which is not

¹ The reader will recognise that the illustration is suggested by R. L. Nettleship's brilliant fragment upon "Spirit,"—*Philosophical Lectures and Remains*, p. 20.

yet "bread," to the physical force engendered in the body, which is "bread" no longer, thence to the mental and moral force that makes the human being into a man and keeps the world going. With this would go the thought that the taking of it may be a blessing or a curse, according to the use to which it is put. Grace before meat or thanks after it may be shown, apart from any dogma, to be an aspiration after this blessing, a reminder of the place of food in the revivifying of our powers. No less near and natural is the illustration from the sacrament of the Churches where the bread is taken as the symbol of the grace by which, not our physical life alone, but the spiritual life and with it the life of fellowship with all those who share the same hope, is sustained. By such means and in such a spirit I see no reason why the sacredness or sacrament of the bread should not be taught in all schools, but every reason why it should and must. On the other hand, any theory of the way in which the divine is present in the human, the spiritual in the material—granted its appropriateness to the mind of the child at all—is clearly inappropriate in publicly supported schools. At the same time there is nothing in what I have said incompatible with instruction elsewhere or afterwards in the more specific doctrine. Indeed, it is difficult to see with what saving force teaching in any specific doctrine can come to those who have not caught some earlier glimpse of the idea which alone can give significance to it.

I pass from this to what seems to me the real difficulty of the situation. Granted that there is in this sense a common and a teachable Christianity, who, I may be asked, is to teach it? Does it not involve a training of the teacher, first in a group of philosophical ideas, and secondly in the way of using them in ordinary class-teaching, which there is no attempt anywhere to supply? The criticism touches the core of the problem. It means that for any real solution of the religious difficulty we must look in the last resort to the training colleges. The remarkable movement in the direction of the training of Sunday School teachers in method is a recognition

of this fact. But it is not merely, as the promoters of the movement seem to suppose, a question of *method*. One of the first discoveries that they are likely to make is that it is impossible here to distinguish method from matter. Still less is it a question for Sunday School organisations alone. It is a question that concerns all training colleges for teachers, whether denominational or undenominational. It is just in ignoring this that the great mistake has been. We have allowed our attention to be distracted by the popular cries. In particular we have treated the problem as one of two variables, religious doctrine and the mind of the child. We have forgotten that the real centre of the situation, the point where these two meet, is the mind of the teacher. It is true that this point is touched where the emphasis is laid, as it usually is among teachers themselves, on the "personality of the teacher" as the leading factor in moral and religious teaching. But this commonplace of teachers' meetings is insufficient of itself. What requires to be added is that personality is not itself a natural endowment, a fixed datum. It largely depends on the ideas the teacher has assimilated in the course of his own education and training. To cast the burden on his general outlook and prevailing sentiment, which is what we mean by personality, is merely to shift it from the accidents of home and church to the systematised method of forming personality that we call a school and college career. It is to these, and especially to the latter, that we shall have more and more to look for the ideas that are to underlie the religious and moral teaching of the future. What is true of training colleges is true of the universities to which many of them are attached. Until the universities charge themselves not only, as they are already to a large extent doing, with the task of expounding ideas which may form the basis of constructive or reconstructive beliefs in the field of religion and ethics, but of seeing that teachers in training have easy access to them and to instruction in the method of applying them in the classroom, I see no prospect of a solution of the present difficulty.

I am prepared to be met by the argument that the proposal is altogether Utopian and without relation to the present crisis. More particularly, I shall be told that there is a far simpler solution to hand in "secular education." In reply to the general objection I admit that there are difficulties to be overcome, but to those who are engaged in the actual administration of these colleges they will not appear to be so serious as to be insurmountable. Already attempts have been made in various directions to surmount them. What is wanted is no elaborate apparatus of doctrinal and historical and biblical instruction—all that may be left to the individual Churches and denominational colleges to provide—but an extension of the instruction in mental philosophy and ethics that already form a necessary part of the curriculum of all teachers in training. It might take the shape of formal lectures or it might be made the subject of informal, though not necessarily unsystematic, talks. But what I regard as essential would be—(1) the attempt to convey an *Anschaung* or an attitude of mind towards the great facts of man's experience that might have the effect of an *Orientirung* of the student—give him his bearings in the world of religious doctrine; (2) the organisation of some actual practice in the application of religious ideas, not in written exercises only, but in school lessons and as far as possible in the school itself. Colleges will differ in their power of fulfilling these conditions by reason of the personnel of the staff, but a college would be poorly equipped which had not a choice of teachers who would be able to give the necessary training.

What the result of such training on the mind of the teacher himself will be, it is indeed difficult to foresee. It is likely enough, and is in harmony with the analogy of theoretic differences in other departments, that those who thus seek in an atmosphere of freedom to put themselves in touch with the primary facts of the spiritual world from which all religious doctrine starts, and return with the insight thus acquired to test the truth of the different creeds in their abstract formu-

lations, will find much to alter and transpose. In these days education has made even the ordinary man critical of religious beliefs. As Socrates found the uncriticised moral life one that was not worth living, we are coming to recognise that the uncriticised religion, or the religion that will not bear criticism, is one that is not worth having. But as the Socratic criticism came not to destroy but to fulfil, and gave us in the sequel the great constructive morality of the *Republic* and the *Ethics*, the higher criticism of modern times may be trusted to bring with it not the impoverishment but the enrichment of man's religious faith. I at least have no doubt that the *truth* it is seeking will find witnesses in every Church. Those indeed who embrace it may feel that neither in Jerusalem nor in Samaria is God to be worshipped, but this will be not because He is in neither but because He is in both.

To the second objection I would put my answer in the form of an appeal. There are some secularists to whom I am aware it is useless to appeal. They are too deeply identified with the spirit of nineteenth-century Positivism to have anything to do with a point of view which is founded on the recognition of any wider principle of synthesis than "Humanity." But besides these "exclusionists" there are others, making, I believe, the large majority of those who advocate secular education, who occupy a different position. Their objection to the present system is not that it is religious and Christian in the larger sense, but that it identifies religion with a particular interpretation of it, that it sees sacredness only in a particular class of symbols, finds religious edification only in a particular range of texts, while it fails to see them or denies them in others. It is to these I would appeal, and I would ask them to consider whether the cultivation of the wider outlook which they desire is likely to be furthered or hindered by the refusal to give teachers in the future either motive or opportunity to concern themselves with religion as a factor in human nature or with the great things in art and literature in which the religious spirit

has expressed itself. Is it desirable? is it in the long run possible? I think I know something of the mind of the teacher in training, both secondary and elementary. My experience is that while there are few or none who go forward to their work in the spirit of a narrow denominationalism, there are just as few who are prepared to accept a post which would exclude them from the use of religious ideas in the attempt to touch the feelings and train the will to finer issues. They feel themselves the inheritors of a tradition dating back to the beginnings of Western civilisation and not confined to Christian times alone, that it is by the skilful use of these ideas that the deepest hold over the minds and hearts of children can be secured. Of this inheritance they are not likely to permit themselves to be deprived, to please either denominational exclusivists or puritanical secularists. It is for this reason that I hold with Mr Bernard Shaw that secular education, in this country at least, is an impossibility. It is quite possible, and now even probable, that the nation may be driven to nominal secularism as the only way out of a wrangle that has come to be intolerable, to cutting a knot which it sees no way of unravelling. But I find it impossible to believe that it will ever consent so to limit the freedom of the teacher as to forbid him all resort or even reference to the texts and literature of the Christian religion. These, no less than Shakespeare and Milton and Bunyan (who, of course, are included in them), are a national inheritance of which no teacher who realises his trust, or whose religious instruction at present counts for anything, would consent to be deprived without the strongest protest, and of which no English Parliament is likely to seek to deprive him. It is the plague of elementary education that it is subject to legal acts and definitions. It is all the more incumbent on those who are concerned with the living thing to look at facts. Under the "secular solution" the Scripture lesson will be a thing of the past, but the Scripture ought to remain, would remain, and wherever there was a place for

“talk” (whether under the name of moral instruction or any other) this or another breathing the same spirit will be the natural text and source of illustration.

Though, then, it becomes more and more obvious that there is no common Christianity which disputants may agree to have taught in schools as a non-controversial residuum, yet the air is full of hope and of the possibility of settlement on other lines. In every Church there is noise of going in the tree-tops. The best minds are coming to recognise that religion is greater than any of the religions. In its higher, distinctively modern and Western form religion rests on the twofold faith in the unity and the spirituality of the world. This faith takes divers forms in individuals and Churches. But it is the same human need and aspiration that embodies itself in all. To catch the common spirit is indeed no easy matter. Yet right instruction joined with the right moral experience counts for much. Such experience and instruction ought not to be beyond the reach of those who are preparing for the work of the teacher. It is in the last resort just that knowledge of himself, the knowledge of “what is in man,” which it is the aim of all truly liberal education to impart. In the whole matter a special obligation rests upon the universities. It is the modern university which is largely responsible for the situation. It is the free historical research and the free philosophical speculation which it has encouraged that has made it so difficult to accept the finality of the old formulæ. On the university rests also the responsibility of showing how the situation is to be met, how the old formulæ may be adapted or new ones created to express the truth as we know it. In this work of reconstruction and reinspiration of the work of the teachers there is nothing, I believe, that need rouse the opposition either of denominationalists or of secularists.

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CHRISTIANITY AMONG THE RELIGIONS.

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I.

THE roots of Christianity have never been thoroughly explored. Only in recent years, indeed, has Christianity been thought of as having roots, or as being a plant, a growth, at all. Rather has it been looked upon as a *donum Dei*, a supernatural deposit, a treasury of knowledge and beatitude delivered incomparable and complete to mankind. For the better part of two millenniums this conception prevailed. Now and again, however, the cunning eye of scientific criticism, trained in the laws of a universe inconsonant with this assumption, saw through its meagreness and caught glimpses of a wider relationship and a deeper meaning. The impossibility of a completely segregated, independent, and supernatural religion has become increasingly evident. Even from the first the dependence of Christianity upon Judaism was so clear that the two Testaments were incorporated as complementary parts of a single revelation. But that left the revelation still static, unrelated, isolated.

It meant the coming of a great change when the discovery was made that other Semitic religions, notably the Babylonian, disclose ideas, practices, legends strikingly similar to those of Israel, suggesting a common origin. Likewise was the assurance of the older Apologetic disturbed by the accumulating testimony of historical scholarship to the large place which

Hellenism has had in the development of Christianity. It was not merely an "influence of Greek thought upon Christianity," as Edwin Hatch termed it in his Bampton Lectures; it was a mighty current of idea and impulse that poured into Christianity from Greek Philosophy and mingled its waters with the earlier fount from Sion's hill and the fresh pellucid stream from the hillsides of Galilee. "The influx of Hellenism, of the Greek spirit, and the union of the Gospel with it," says Harnack, "form the greatest fact in the history of the Church in the second century; and when the fact was once established as a foundation, it continued through the following centuries."¹ Earlier even than this, in the Pauline and Johannine theologies, the moulding power of the Greek mind had begun to make itself felt in Christianity. And who can doubt that the Christianity of to-day, on its intellectual side, carries the permanent impress of the Greek mind? It is significant that so many of our church buildings are in the form (more or less) of the Greek temple.

But Judaism and Hellenism are far from exhausting the indebtedness of Christianity to other religions. That life-and-death conflict between good and evil—the good God and the righteous man pitted against the forces of darkness and falsehood—which absorbed the soul of the ancient Persians, made over to Christianity, chiefly through the Persian-Jewish contact in Babylon, its virile sense of powers to be overcome and wrongs to be overthrown, and has quickened the Christian spirit and moved it to greater earnestness in the battle with sin. The strength of the Christian belief in a future life and in the Fravashis, the spirits whose faces alway behold the face of God—does it not come in part from that firm-knit faith that nerved the souls of the followers of Zarathustra?²

¹ *What is Christianity?* Second ed., p. 214.

² "Before the Exile, the Jewish creed was very dim indeed as to resurrection, immortality, forensic judgment, and all we hold most dear. The Irano-Vedic lore developed in Iran the first definite form of our ideas as to the future state, according to the obvious data in the case." Dr Lawrence H. Mills, *Philo, the Archemenids, and Israel*, p. 208.

Modern Christianity is characterised by a devoted loyalty to the home—"the Christian home" we often call it, knowing how closely it is associated with that elevation of woman which everywhere follows the footsteps of the Evangel. Whence did Christianity acquire this devotion to the home? Hardly from the Orient alone. Jesus deeply sanctioned monogamy, and enforced the principles upon which alone the home can be built; but it was only with the advent of the Teutonic peoples into the family of Christianity, with that sacred fostering of the home-life which was their especial virtue, that the home came to occupy the place of peculiar honour and sanctity which it now holds in our Christian heritage.

Without attempting a summary of all the contributions, religious and ethical, which Christianity has received from sources outside its own immediate content, it is becoming increasingly clear that, both in origin and in development, it has drawn largely from the best religious thought and life of the race. The two deepest strata of the religious life of humanity, Semitism and Aryanism, have given of their richest ores to Christianity. When we say that Jesus was a Jew, and that upon the best religious inheritance and instruction of his people and age he constructed his faith, we may not forget that this heritage of his reached far back of Hebraism, back of Jacob and of Abraham, back to that primitive and shadowy realm of human origins in which there first sprang up the idea that there are gods at all and that a tie of some sort unites the individual man to his tribal god and to his tribal brother. Out of the Semite the Hebrew, out of the Hebrew the Jew, out of the Jew the Christian. And who shall say how much the Christian of to-day owes to that savage, remote Semite, struggling out of his animalism towards a dawning light within?

In the same way, when we say that Hellenism furnished a large part of the intellectual conceptions out of which Christian theology was formed, we may not justly leave out of account the *antecedents* of Hellenism. For Hellenism did not begin complete, any more than Athene sprang full-armed from the

head of Zeus. Far down in the early aspirations and out-reachings of the mind of the Aryan race, before its migrations from the steppes of Southern Russia, were germinating those rational unifying conceptions which the new religion of Jesus caught and consecrated to its urgent ends. Out of Aryanism Hellenism, out of Hellenism Platonism, out of Platonism Alexandrianism, out of Alexandrianism, reaching down to the present day, the New Theology.

Neither royal family of Europe nor self-made man of America can deny relationship with the savage man and the ancestral ape. Nor can Christianity ignore its kinship with religion in its lowest and crudest beginnings. What then? Is it degraded by the relationship, polluted by the superstitious crudities of religion's earliest awakening? Rather does it by this kinship gain touch with total humanity in its upward striving, added sense of the greatness of the instinct which out of such chaos and meanness can produce such harmony and grace—as the water-lily, with its roots in the slime of the lake-bottom, blooms snow-white and fragrant in the summer sun.

II.

The study of Comparative Religion is revealing Christianity in a wholly new light, from the vantage-ground of a fresh view-point. For the first time we are getting perspective. In two ways the gain is inestimable. Comparison is disclosing the inherent strength and superiority of Christianity as it could appear in no other way. All values are clarified by comparison. The great Kohinoor, placed beside lesser diamonds, does not render them worthless, but only thus does its own resplendence appear. When the birds are carolling their gayest, and suddenly the song of the hermit-thrush rises above the roundelay, soulful, wistful, masterful, one perceives to what wealth and height of expression a bird-song can attain. It is only when Jesus moves across the field of vision where other men have walked, that we know what a man can be. Other religions do not lose when placed beside Chris-

tianity, except relatively, but Christianity gains. There is at once a clearer understanding, both of them and of itself. The presence of the best reveals in the same instant the goodness of the good and the supremacy of the best. It was the folly of unfaith to hesitate so long to place Christianity upon a common base level with other religions, fully, freely, and without prejudice. For only as it stands on the same level can its true height be seen. The Parliament of Religions, though it cost many of us a pang of dismay at the time, was one of the greatest furtherances of Christianity that the friends of true religion ever accomplished.

The supremacy of Christianity appears by comparison, both in what it includes and in what it excludes. All that is worthiest and highest in other religions proves by comparison to be in Christianity. Is it the reverence of Hebraism, the freedom of Hellenism, the moral earnestness of Zoroastrianism, the mysticism of Brahmanism, the sacrificial spirit of Buddhism? All are here in Christianity, and here, not in excess of emphasis, but in full and balanced harmony. And in much, too, that is in other religions and not in Christianity, its supremacy may be seen quite as clearly. Angles of distortion, ignoble and limiting ideas of God, asceticisms that wrong humanity, conceptions of nature and spirit that fetter and retard the spirit,—how free on the whole from these defects of other religions Christianity is. Not that such excrescences have not become attached to Christianity and worked serious ill, but they do not belong to its spirit and essence.

We must not, however, suffer this broader outlook upon religion as a whole to blind our eyes to the true character of Christianity, lest we rob it of its own individuality. The fact that Christianity conjoined Hebraism and Hellenism by no means reduces it to a mere syncretism. Nor does the fact that it has incorporated elements from other religions make it an eclecticism. No one who understands Christianity would hesitate to say that it is far more than a union of Hebrew and Greek elements. Whatever Christianity has taken up it has

assimilated. This is its secret—a marvellous *power of assimilation*. With that astonishing alchemy which indicates originality of organism, Christianity has made its own, transformed, renewed whatever it has laid hold upon. Syncretisms combine, eclecticisms choose and construct, but only life assimilates. Explain it as you may, there is something in Christianity that enabled it to take Hebrew piety and Greek thought, and transform, vitalise, adapt each to its own nature and ends, so that it goes forth not wearing them as garments but incarnating them as life. It is only an inherently puissant and vital faith that can be receptive without becoming amorphous and demoralised. One has but to contrast Christianity and its power of assimilative receptivity with the later religion of ancient Rome and its heterogeneous confusion of incongruous faiths, to recognise that the difference is no less than that between life and death.

When we come to ask for the secret of this assimilative power, we find ourselves approaching that problem which has proved so fascinating of late: What is the essence of Christianity, where is the hiding of its power? It is not difficult, by analysing Christianity, as Harnack has done, to discover certain potent fundamental truths—the fatherhood of God, the worth of the soul, the kingdom of God—which, at least in the emphasis and fervour it gives to them, are distinctively and characteristically Christian. But after all, close as these truths lie to the heart of Christianity, they are not its inner essence. Our New Theology is in great part characterised by its showing that Christianity won its way by uniting two great truths concerning God which no other religious philosophy has harmonised—Transcendence and Immanence; but no one would think of finding even in that synthesis, important as it is, the essence of the Christian religion. The ethics of Christianity, too, and even its cult, reflect a simplicity and sincerity which help to account for the strong hold which Christianity secured and kept over the human mind; but none of these things solve the problem of its essence. To reach that, one

must go deeper into that profound and subtle realm that holds the hidden springs of all that moves us most—*personality*. At the very source and centre of Christianity there glows a Person who—say what we may of the incompleteness of his life-story and the later misconceptions which have obscured his true character—is the most compelling, transforming Fact in human history. The “incomparable significance of this personality as a force still working in history,” says Harnack¹—*this* is the real essence of Christianity. “When God and everything that is sacred threaten to disappear in darkness, or our doom is pronounced, when the mighty forces of inexorable nature seem to overwhelm us and the bounds of good and evil to dissolve; when, weak and weary, we despair of finding God at all in this dismal world,—it is then that the personality of Christ may save us. Here we have a life that was lived wholly in the fear of God—resolute, unselfish, pure; here there glows and flashes a grandeur, a love which draws us to itself.”² Making the largest possible allowance for idealisation in the portrait of Jesus in the gospels, there remains, as a necessary basis for it, a personality so strong, so pure, so noble, as to leave an indelible impress upon the human mind, which “far from fading, rather grows,” and gives promise of growing till it shall remould humanity into its likeness. “We needs must love the highest when we see it,” and, loving it, grow like it. Only let Jesus Christ be kept before humanity long enough and clearly enough, and he will make it over into his own image.³

But is not Jesus himself also a product of evolution?

¹ *Christianity and History*, p. 44.

² P. 47.

³ The supremacy of Jesus in the eyes of others than Christians is well illustrated in the recent words of an orthodox Hindu to his fellow Hindus: “How can we be blind to the greatness, the unrivalled splendour of Jesus Christ? Behind the British Empire and all European Powers lies the single great personality—the greatest of all known to us—of Jesus Christ. He lives in Europe and America, in Asia and Africa, as King and Guide and Teacher. He lives in our midst. He seeks to revive religion in India. We owe everything, even this deep yearning towards our own ancient Hinduism, to Christianity.” J. P. Jones, D.D., *India's Problem*, p. 357.

Yes, in a sense Jesus certainly was a racial religious product. Generations of spiritual culture entered into his individuality. He was the consummate flower blooming on the most vigorous branch that has put forth from the religious trunk of humanity. And yet that does not explain him wholly ; it does not touch the deepest secret of his being. That transcendent Self within him which rose above the physical, the temporal, the racial, which met and mastered limitation and circumstance, and all the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, and turned all into splendid victory—how shall we account for that ? It cannot be accounted for, save as one sees in him another self beside the merely racial man—the Second Man from heaven. Not that this twofold selfhood is peculiar to Jesus Christ—it belongs to man as man,—but that the eternal Self, which in us is but inconstant and indistinct, in him was so full-orbed and supreme that of him, as of no other, the author of the Fourth Gospel could write : “ And the Word became flesh.”

III.

The conviction is gaining ground that the hour has struck for a universal human religion, that the advance of humanity, as a whole, requires that mankind move henceforth under one spiritual leadership toward a common goal. Whether this is so, is too large a question to be dealt with in this or in any single paper. Suffice to say that the present writer shares the conviction, together with its appropriate supplement, that Christianity is the only religion that can possibly fulfil this office. In the light of the study of Comparative Religion, it seems an extreme, almost a fanatical aim, to advance Christianity as entitled to supersede all other faiths ; and yet it is only in the light of such a study that this aim gets its highest encouragement.

A sufficient reason—whether there be others or not—for pressing Christianity as the only religion fit to become the world's religion is that the others—to put it squarely, and I think fairly — have failed. Buddhism, Confucianism,

Mohammedanism, with the minor religions, have all failed. Not that they have failed in the sense of not holding their own outwardly, and even making gains, nor in the sense of not containing a great deal of truth, and of accomplishing great good—but in the sense of not having done for their adherents and for humanity what religion ought to do. Not that Christianity itself has been absolutely successful; far enough from that. But Christianity has, at least, not failed. In spite of serious deficiencies and limitations on the part of Christians, Christianity has, by comparison, accomplished vastly more for human progress than any other of the world's faiths. And not only by its works does Christianity make itself known, but also, and supremely, by that inherent, essential superiority which manifests itself to the eye of unprejudiced and pure rational judgment, discerning the things that are excellent.

In nothing is the true supremacy of the Christian Faith better attested than in the inner regeneration which takes place in other faiths when Christianity comes into close contact with them. This is the most remarkable religious fact, perhaps, in the life of the Orient to-day. Buddhism in India, in China, and in Japan is undergoing a marked purification in the direction of Christian ideals. Mohammedanism itself is becoming leavened with Christian principles to an extent but little understood. A Hindu, writing for the HIBBERT JOURNAL, has said of Christianity that "it has quickened Hinduism with a new, full life, the full fruition of which is not yet."

Why not, then, be content with this result? Why not let Christianity do its work indirectly, and depend upon these rooted religions to develop into a purity and power sufficient for the needs of their own races? The answer is that these religions, in spite of temporary resuscitation, are effete, and have not the power of development and adaptation; they lack the moral and spiritual vigour and resources to meet the multiplying demands of advancing humanity. It is the old parable of the new wine and the old wine-skins.

But, granted the need of a universal religion, and that none of the Oriental religions is able to meet the need, why should it be any individual religion, and not rather a new and greater religion made up of the best in all the religions, a religion of religions, a splendid hybrid obtained by what has been termed the "cross-fertilisation of religions"? At first blush there is a certain fascination in this idea. It has an air of breadth and cosmopolitanism that gives it glitter, but it soon fades. It is seen that a religion which is coldly compounded of various religions, which is everything in general and nothing in particular, is no religion at all. To disdain a particular religion in favour of Religion is, as Dr Oman has said, like objecting to being born because one cannot be *man*, but must be some particular man. The dream of a polyglot religion is evaporating. What humanity needs and will demand is a religion with a character of its own and a history of its own, a religion whose roots have gone down deep into the soil of many generations, which has grown up in its own strength and with a sense of its own mission, against which storms have beaten and suns have burned in vain, and which has stood the test of time and transplanting, and changing civilizations. A religion which has thus sufficient might of its own, and yet sufficient real breadth and inclusiveness to absorb and conserve the truth of other religions, is far better fitted to become the religion of mankind than any syncretism or eclecticism.

IV.

If Christianity is to be set forward, not simply as a missionary religion, a world-evangel, to summon responsive souls out of other religions unto itself, but rather as a world-religion, a faith for universal humanity, its adherents must strike away all the shackles that bind it, all the cumbersome, adventitious non-essentials that have become attached to it, and restore to it the freedom of its qualities, the strength and simplicity of its original unobscured vision and unencumbered

power.¹ Too many intelligent men of our own time, who have never looked for the essence of Christianity, have identified it with dogmas and forms which really have no more to do with real Christianity than clothing has to do with the man. Whatever any school of Christians may protest as to the infidelity of refusing to identify Christianity with a miraculous revelation, or an infallible Bible, of predestination, or substitutionary atonement, or eternal punishment, it is inexcusable for an educated person to be blind to the fact that these doctrines never were, nor can be, a part of essential Christianity. The Christian faith has won its way sometimes with the aid of these doctrines, sometimes in spite of them, but never because of them. Christianity is a religion of rational freedom, and if it has too often been forced to assume the form of religion of external authority, the result can only be a transient travesty of its true character, certain in time to be cast aside.

And not only must Christianity be divested of its *impedimenta* if it is to make conquest of the world, there must be restored to it also that genius of adaptation to varied human need and environment which enabled it to break the bonds of Judaism and respond to the unconscious call of the Gentile world. This inexhaustible adaptability, this power of lending itself to the deeper needs of varied races without losing its own character and individuality, is, I repeat, characteristic of Christianity. It can come only from a character so richly human that it speaks to the spirit of man as man. No other religion has shown a power of adaptation comparable with this. Who would have dreamed, at the outset, that Christianity could ever have found its most congenial home and development in the Teutonic race? Itself Oriental in origin and setting, why should it ever have won the Occident, save that it belongs to man as man?—so large and human in its

¹ "I must again express my belief that, before Christianity is to gain acceptance by the people of India, it must be dissociated from many Western ideas and practices which seem to us essential even to its very life." Dr J. P. Jones, *India's Problem*, p. 356.

resources that nothing else can vie with it in its appeal to a discerning and developing race.

It is a natural blunder to imagine that we of the West have made Christianity exclusively our own, explored it, exhausted it, stamped upon it its final form. We carry it back to the Orient as if it were our gift to the peoples that gave it birth. In a sense it is, in another sense it is their gift to us. Already Christianity is escaping our hands to do its own great work in its own way. The day of the missionary, noble as it has been and is, already draws toward its close. Vitalised and vitalising Christian churches and civilisations are rising with firm but not ungrateful insistence to claim the right to develop in their own way. Again the herald of the Coming One is forced to proclaim with mingled sadness and joy, "He must increase, but I must decrease."

V.

The result of placing Christianity among the religions, of subjecting it to a free and impartial comparison with other faiths, is thus twofold. In the first place, its kinship with other religions is proved. The religious development of the race is one, culminating in Christianity. The Christian faith has drawn up into itself and assimilated the highest ideas and aspirations of mankind. The life-blood of the religion of humanity flows in its veins; its victories are the fruitage, in part, of all the spiritual struggles of the race from its infancy. In the second place, such a comparison reveals the inherent supremacy of Christianity, its historical uniqueness, the vitalising personality of its Christ, its unparalleled power of adaptation and development, thus laying upon it, with increasing urgency, the divine obligation of universality.

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ISLĀM, THE RELIGION OF COMMON SENSE.

[As it is not usual for the HIBBERT JOURNAL to publish a contribution to its pages under an assumed name, I have undertaken to stand sponsor for my learned Muslim friend "Ibn Ishāk."

He is a native of Northern India, and was educated at the Anglo - Muhammadan College, established by the late Sir Sayyad Ahmad, Khan Bahadur, K.C.S.I., who has already a place in Indian history as the greatest Muslim reformer of modern times. He afterwards took a degree in an American college, and is a thorough English and Oriental scholar.

When I state that my friend, Mulla Ahmad, of Tungi, who assisted me in the compilation of my *Dictionary of Islām*, was assassinated, it will not be necessary for me to explain why the learned Muhammadan reformer, who writes the present article, assumes (at my request) a name which should conceal his identity.

The circumstances under which this article was written are as follows:—When President Jordan's article entitled "The Religion of the Sensible American" appeared in the HIBBERT JOURNAL, I remembered that, when I had occasion to review, for a New York paper, a Life of Mohammed, by the Laudian Professor of Arabic at Oxford, I had found that he had used a similar expression (at page 79), where he says regarding the prophet of Arabia, "Beneath the mask of the enthusiast there was always the soundest and sanest common sense." I therefore sent the HIBBERT JOURNAL for last July to

my Muslim friend, who happened to be in the Levant at the time, and in the vicinity of libraries, and suggested that he should send me an article on "Islām, the Religion of Common Sense," which is a very usual saying of his regarding the legislation of Islām, when compared with the more ideal legislation of Christianity. I have omitted his criticism of the assertion that the prophet wore the "mask" of an enthusiast, which roused his indignation, and with a few alterations the article appears in its original form.

For twenty years I spent my life among Muslims, and regularly visited their mosques. And in 1875, when I was but a tyro in controversy, I stated in the preface to my *Notes on Muhammadanism* that Islām "may be used as a school-master (παιδαγωγός) to bring men to Christ." This sentence was severely criticised by Christian missionaries at that time, but it touched the heart of the individual who now styles himself "Ibn Ishak." And now, after more than forty years' close study of Oriental religious systems, I am more than ever convinced that the methods used by Christian missionaries for the conversion of Muhammadans need to be revised and reformed. The pen is mightier than the sword, and it will be when such intelligent Muslims as the Hon. Ameer Ali, Syed, C.S.I., and the late Sir Sayyad Ahmad, K.C.S.I., enter the field that the Christian-Muslim controversy will assume just proportions. At the present time Muslims know very little of Christianity, and Christians know infinitely less of Islām.

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IBN ISHĀK.

"In the Name of the Merciful and Compassionate God."

RELYING on the guidance and protection of God (Allah), who is the Mighty One (Al-Aziz), the Opener (Al-Fattah) of the mind, and the Fashioner (Al-Mussawwir) of the

thoughts of men, and Who in the day that He says "Let it be, So it is" (Sura 6. 73), this unworthy servant of the Creator of mankind will endeavour to demonstrate and explain why, in his humble judgment, Islām is THE RELIGION OF COMMON SENSE—the creed and code of ethics for the average man.

In the first place, the controlling idea of Islām is that there is one God, and that this one God is the ABSOLUTE GOVERNOR OF THE UNIVERSE.

This stupendous thought is expressed in the *Fatihah* or Opening Sura of the Sacred Kurān, which takes a similar place to the *Pater Noster* of Christians. Occupying the front page of every copy of the Holy Book, and recited at the commencement of every prayer, it is uttered millions of times every day in every part of the globe where the Muslim religion is professed. It runs thus:—

"Praise be to God, Lord of all the worlds!
The Merciful and Compassionate!
King of the day of judgment!
Thee only do we worship!
To Thee only do we cry for help!
Guide Thou us on the right path,
The path of those to whom Thou art gracious,
Not of those who go astray!"

It was this clear and unquestioned recognition of the existence and power of God which gave such force to Islām, that within the short period of eighty years it had subdued not only the whole of Arabia and Syria, but the fairest provinces of ancient Persia. It was this mighty proclamation of the existence of a Supreme Governor of the universe that broke the atheistic rule of the Buddhists in Central Asia, and enabled Mahmud of Ghazni to subdue the people of Northern India, and extend his dominions to the Ganges. It is all-powerful, because it appeals to the head and heart of the man of sense. The armies of Islām were like the Ironsides of Cromwell: they were "men of religion."

The Sermon on the Mount spoken by Jesus Christ,

who is regarded by Muslims as the Spirit of God (*Ruh Ullah*), is undoubtedly the most beautiful expression of Christian Socialism, of which Count Tolstoy seems to be the only modern prophet. And THE SERMON ON THE MOUNT which the Arabian Prophet preached on Arafāt to his people, only a short time before his death, is one of the most pathetic scenes in history. Muhammad, his wives, his slaves, and his faithful companions, and more than a hundred thousand of his followers, were assembled on Mount Arafāt, on the ninth day of the "Hajj," or Pilgrimage, for mid-day prayer—a mighty host of faithful men and women. Ascending the wooden pulpit of three steps known as the *Mimber*, with his staff in his hand, the great chieftain opened his lips and said :—

"O ye people ! Hearken unto my words. Listen ! for God alone knows if I shall live another year. Your lives and your property are sacred to each other, even as this day and this month are sacred unto God. Remember that each of you must appear before God to render an account. Ye have rights over your wives, and your wives have rights over you. Treat them with kindness, for ye have taken them on the security of God, and they have been made lawful to you by His Word. And your slaves, your bondsmen and your bondswomen, see that ye feed them with such food as ye eat yourselves, and that ye clothe them with such stuff as ye clothe yourselves. If they commit faults ye must forgive them, for they are the servants of God. If they do that which ye feel ye cannot forgive, then part with them, for they must not be treated harshly. God is merciful to all. Know ye, O people, that we are all brethren. We are one brotherhood in Islām."

The great concourse of people, we are told, was moved to tears, and as the Prophet stepped down from the pulpit the people clasped his hands with great affection. It was a good, manly, common-sense sermon spoken from the heart, for the Prophet of Islām was a man among men. And yet he was the threefold founder of a people, an empire, and a religion.

This Prophet of Islām stands before us now, after the lapse of twelve centuries, as AN OPEN BOOK. Volumes have been written to prove that Jesus Christ was not a myth, and it is so with Gautama the Buddha, and with Zoroaster. But there is nothing mythical about Muhammad the son of Abdullah, of the tribe of the Kuraish, and of the family of Hashim. The day and the year of his birth are well

authenticated. He never professed to work miracles, but repeatedly assured the people that he was just one of themselves. On his death-bed he pleaded for forgiveness both from his fellow-men and from his God, just like any other man. And in the daily prayers he was careful to insert a petition for his own soul.

We know everything about this man Muhammad. He had the quick and hurried step of the man of business. He laughed so heartily that he showed his back teeth. He had a firm grasp of the hand. Even when he was the ruler of a people he visited the sick. He followed the bier of the dead when he met it on the road. He spoke words of comfort in the house of mourning. He clouted his own boots. He mended his own clothes. He milked his goats and waited upon himself. Muslims never grow weary of expatiating on the human side of Muhammad's character. As Mr Stanley Lane-Poole says, "The frank friendship, the dauntless courage, and the hope of the man all tend to melt criticism in admiration." Truly he was the prophet of common sense.

THE BOOK (Al-Kitāb), as the Holy Kurān is called, in its authenticity and genuineness appeals to the sensible man. The Book of the Muslim is not troubled with the Higher Critic! It was collated immediately after the Prophet's death, by men who had heard it recited, and who had had personal intercourse with him. The recension of the Kurān which was handed down to us by the Khalifah Usmān is unaltered. And even Christian writers such as the late Sir William Muir admit that there is no book in the world which has remained for more than twelve centuries with so pure a text. Muhammadans, like other religionists, have been divided into sects, and many have been their doctrinal disputes; but they have each and all received the same text of their Kurān, and have never questioned its authenticity. This fact alone presents a marked contrast to the endless controversies among Christian scholars regarding

the text of their sacred books. The sensible man must be impressed with this fact.

The TRADITIONAL ACCOUNTS of the sayings of the Prophet, known as Al-Ahadis, are frequently appealed to by Muslim doctors and historians; but whilst they are interesting for study and research, they do not appeal to the best judgment of the scholar. Al-Bokhari, who among the Sunnis is considered the most trustworthy collector, tells us that out of 600,000 traditional sayings of the Prophet he only selected 7000 as in any sense trustworthy, and there are thousands of such compilations amongst both Shiah and Sunnis. The Wahhabis maintain that the Kurān is the only "Hadis," or saying, which has come down to us with an undoubted "Silsila" or chain. Under any circumstances, the sensible Muslim hesitates to accept traditions which in some way or other have not the endorsement of the four "rightly directed" Imāms, Abu Bakr, Omar, Usman, and Ali.

The native SIMPLICITY OF THE MUSLIM'S CREED commends it to the man of common sense: "There is no god but God, and Muhammad is the Messenger (Rasūl) of God." In thus proclaiming himself the "Messenger" of the Almighty, this Prophet of the desert seems to have had the broadest possible conception of the gift of prophecy. He said that in the history of the world there had been as many as three hundred special messengers sent by God for the guidance and direction of mankind, and that there were as many as one hundred and twenty-four thousand persons who had had the gift of prophecy. He placed Plato, Æsop, and Zoroaster among prophets and inspired teachers; and the intelligent Muslim does not hesitate to place Shakespeare, Schiller, and Milton among the "prophets" in the West, just as he regards Zuhair, Nizami, and Jalal ud Deen Rumi among the inspired teachers of the East. The West has been unfortunate in its "prophets"! The East is the land of Wisdom, and the West of Action. We still travel in bullock-carts along the rough roads of life's problems! They in the West rush on

in express trains, which are not conducive to reflection! The Oriental world receives much from the Occident, but the East has often something to give back to the West. At least the sensible man thinks so.

There is nothing in the wide world of religious observance so impressive as THE CRY OF THE MU'AZZAN, when, in the stillness of the early morn, before sunrise, he calls the people to prayer: "God is great! I testify that there is no god but God, and that Muhammad is the Messenger of God! Come to prayer! Come to salvation! Prayer is better than sleep!"

Not long ago a member of the British Parliament wanted to put the clock on an hour or so to get people out of bed. This "Common-Sense Prophet of the Arabian Desert" anticipated the honourable gentleman by many centuries. He still turns his people out of bed before the first streak of the morning sun!

THE DAILY PRAYER OF THE MUSLIM has the inspiration of common sense. There is nothing equal to it in the whole compass of liturgical compilation — whether among Jews, Christians, Buddhists, Tauists, Majusis, or Sikhs. The "Sulāt" (Persian "Namāz") or liturgical prayers are remarkable for their simplicity and their fervid appeal to the Governor of the world. Travellers in Muslim lands are always impressed at the sight of a vast congregation prostrate in prayer under the open canopy of heaven, as the Imām, or Leader, raises the cry, "Allaho Akbar!" (God is Great!).

But the term "Sulat," or, in Persian, "Namax," is confined exclusively to the liturgical form of prayer which too often gives the Western traveller the impression that with the Muslim prayer is simply a mechanical act. But Islam is pre-eminently a religion of prayer, which is expressed by the Arabic "dua," and is defined as the uplifting of the soul to the Creator in every time of need or extremity. The liturgical form is said five times a day, or even eight, but supplications to God are made at all times. I take the liberty of

extracting a beautiful prayer from *The Spirit of Islam*, compiled by one of the most enlightened Muslims of the present time, the Hon. Ameer Ali, Syed, M.A., C.I.E., formerly judge of the High Court in Calcutta. It runs thus: "O Lord, I supplicate Thee for firmness in faith and direction towards rectitude, and to assist me in being grateful to Thee, and in adoring Thee in every good way; and I supplicate Thee for an innocent heart, which shall not incline to wickedness; and I supplicate Thee for a true tongue, and for that virtue which Thou knowest (I need). And I pray Thee to defend me from that vice which Thou knowest (I am liable to), and for forgiveness of those faults which Thou knowest (beset me). O, my Defender! Assist me in remembering Thee, and in being grateful to Thee with my whole strength. O Lord! I have injured my own soul, and no one can pardon the faults of Thy servants but Thou alone. Forgive me out of Thy loving kindness, and have mercy upon me, for verily Thou art the forgiver of offences and the bestower of blessings on Thy servants. Amen."

It is unfortunate that Mussalmāns still insist upon having the public prayers and the Friday sermon said in the Arabic tongue. In this they have copied Roman Catholic Christians. But to the COMMON-SENSE MUSLIM it would seem to be absolutely necessary that the people should say their prayers in a language which they understand, and that they should hear sermons which are intelligible to the ordinary mind. There is no doubt that this was a great source of strength in the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century.

"CLEANLINESS IS NEXT TO GODLINESS" is an old English proverb. And yet there are still the "Great Unwashed" in London. There are none in Mecca! The Prophet of the Arabian desert enforced cleanliness among the wild Arabs by making it a divine institution. Every Muslim, before he takes his place in the congregation for prayer, and even before he prays in private, must perform ablutions, and very minute are the instructions as expressed in the Holy Kurān.

Priestcraft has been a bane of civilisation. There is NO PRIESTHOOD IN ISLĀM. The "Imām," or Leader, of prayers has no delegated authority. He is merely the most suitable person in the congregation to lead prayers. In fact, the intelligent Muslim finds no Caliph (Khalifah) in Islām. The word is only used twice in the Kurān—once for Adam, and once for David. It is not used by the Persians. *Imām ul Mominin* is the correct title; because Islām is a commonwealth, and the Imām, or Leader, is chosen by the people.

THE OTTOMAN CALIPH is an excrescence and an intrusion in Islām. When Halaku the Turk captured Baghdad and slew the Imām, he did it as the enemy of the duly constituted authority. And when one of his successors captured Constantinople and slew the Christian Emperor at the gate of the city, and then sprang on the Christian altar in San Sophia and recited the Muslim creed, he violated the most sacred and cherished traditions of the religion of the Prophet. For, when Omar entered Jerusalem he was received by the Christian Patriarch at the gateway, and every protection was given to the conquered. When Khālīd, "the Sword of Islām," entered Damascus he allowed the Christians and the Muslims to pray in the same church. When Saladin (Salah ud Deen) re-captured Jerusalem in the year 1187 he released all prisoners, and supplied them with food. No woman was insulted. No child was hurt. No person was slain. And the standing shame of it is, that in defiance of the feelings of "orthodox" Muslims this Turkish monstrosity is kept on the Bosphorus by French and English bayonets. Withdraw this support and Islām would re-establish itself at Baghdad, and revive the noble traditions of the reigns of Abdur Rasheed and Al-Manun.

The seventy-five millions of Muslims in India recite the Khutbah on Fridays, not in the name of the Turk, but in that of "The Ruler of the Age," in which every loyal Muslim remembers His Most Gracious Majesty the Emperor of India, whom we designate a "Prophet of Peace." The Muham-

madans of India are the most loyal subjects of the British Crown.

THE ETHICAL CODE of Islām is clear and definite. There is no splitting of hairs over questions of right and wrong. As David said, "The commandments of God are exceeding broad." The Prophet of Arabia was an intensely human servant of God, and he gave his people a system which would adapt itself to every grade of human society and every form of civilisation. It would be impossible for the Irish poet, Thomas Moore, to have written of Islām as he did of Christianity :—

"I find the doctors and the sages
Have differed in all climes and ages,
And two in fifty scarce agree
On what is pure morality."

The "pure morality" of the Muhammadan religion is within the reach of the average man. But it is not so with Christianity. In the HIBBERT JOURNAL there is a notice of Bampton Lectures at Oxford which deal with "The Apparent Failure of Christianity as a General Rule of Life and Conduct." The Christianity of the present day is the perplexing outcome of ages of contention, and consequently it fails as a general rule of life and conduct. Some years ago, when a learned journalist was asked if he did not think Christianity had failed, he replied, "No, sir. It has never been tried." You cannot say this of Islām, because it suits the necessities of all classes. Protestant missions failed in Madagascar where Islām would have succeeded. In Central Africa whole tribes are almost immediately brought under its influence. In India the number of converts from Hinduism to Islām is very great every year. The Muslim does not consider it wrong to offer worldly inducements to a new convert, because as a man of common sense he understands that he must take care of the man's body as well as his soul.

THE PILGRIMAGE TO MECCA often excites the ridicule of the critic. To the devout Muslim this Hajj is one of the pillars of the faith. The Kaaba, "The Mystic Shrine," with

its empty walls, proclaims the extinction of idolatry and the worship of the true God. The Black Stone, as the centre to which every Muslim prostrates, is the emblem of a common brotherhood. Every prostration, every ceremony has its mystic meaning, and the heart of the pilgrim burns with devotion to his Maker as he presses on singing the "*Lubai kah!*" "I stand up for Thy Service, O God!" It is the sacrament, the masonic rite of Islām. The pilgrimage made such an impression on the mind of the distinguished Swiss traveller, John Ludwig Burckhardt, that he embraced Islām, and his grave in the Muslim burial-ground at Cairo is visited by travellers. He died in the faith, at an early age, October 15th, 1817.

The Firdous, or PARADISE OF ISLAM, is regarded as immoral by its opponents. The Prophet of Arabia did not begin his divine mission by preaching Islām to a nation of eunuchs, but to a community sunk in the very depths of licentiousness. These men had already begun to feel the social restraints of the Prophet's moral code, and it became expedient to present to them the glories of immortality in a language which they would comprehend. The delights of the promised Paradise were figurative, even as the Song of Solomon is figurative, and in the same strain as the verses of the old Arabic poets. When the Prophet told them that a man in Paradise would recline on seventy silk cushions, no one thought of taking him literally. "I take no pleasure in women," exclaimed a Bedwin of the desert. "My delight is in horses!" The Prophet replied, "If you get to Paradise you will have a ruby horse with two wings, and you will mount him, and he will carry you wherever you wish." "But my delight is in land!" exclaimed another. "In Paradise," replied the Prophet, "you will sow seed, and in the twinkling of the eye it will grow up and you will reap it, and it will stand in sheaves like mountains!" Thomas Carlyle says that it is very evident that Muhammad presented his Paradise in figurative language, just as John the Divine did in the Book of Revelation.

The Prophet of Islām taught THE EVOLUTION OF THE SPECIES. When, in the year 1859, Professor Darwin put forth his great work, *The Origin of the Species by means of Natural Selection*, it fell like a bomb-shell into the midst of "orthodox" Christianity. But it is an old truth in Islām, dating from its earliest age. It is taught in the Masnavi of Jalal ud Deen Rumi, who died A.H. 672—a work considered by intelligent Muslims as the result of an inspiration only inferior to that of the Kurān. He says that, dying from the inorganic, we develop into the vegetable world. Then, dying in the vegetable kingdom, we rise to the animal; dying as animals, we rise higher in the species and become human, and then on to the divine life. This is the belief of all Muslim mystics, and it is founded on the teaching of the Holy Kurān. In Sura 6. 8 we read: "No kind of beast is there on the earth, nor fowl that flieth with wings, but is a community like yourselves." It was this conception of the animal kingdom that made Muhammad so kind to animals. And the lady Ayeshah relates that on one occasion the Prophet's pet cat went asleep on the loose sleeve of his blouse, and rather than disturb pussy's restful slumbers he cut off the sleeve. There are many similar instances of his kindness to animals related in the traditions.

FASTING was specially commended by the Prophet. There are at least seven or eight special times of fasting instituted in Islām, but the pre-eminent season of abstinence is the month of Ramazān, when a severe fast from sunrise to sunset is enjoined to "burn away" (as the word implies) the sins of the people. It was a sensible arrangement whereby a people busily engaged in the vocations of life, or even in war, should be compelled to call a halt. This month is called the "Shield" of Islām, and it is observed by even the careless and irreligious. It is one of the many institutions whereby Islām became anything but a religion of ease or luxury.

THE MINISTRATION OF ANGELS, in these days of modern spiritualism, is one of the common-sense institutions of the Muslim's creed. In the Kurān it is written: "The angels

celebrate the praise of their Lord, and ask for forgiveness for all the dwellers upon earth" (Sura 3. 130). They watch over the faithful night and day. They pass to and fro along the lines of the congregation in prayer. They receive the soul at the moment of death. They take their places in front of the bier as it passes to the grave. And they descend into the grave with the departed and say to the true Muslim, "Sleep on, O child of the faithful, until the resurrection of the just."

The ancient Arabs in their time of ignorance called the angels the "Daughters of God," and in the sixteenth Sura of the Kurān there is a very beautiful poetic allusion to the destruction of female infants, whom he calls "the Daughters of God." The beauty of this portion of the Sacred Book, like many other portions, can only be seen in the original Arabic.

THE ABSOLUTE DECREE (Al-Kadar), incorrectly rendered "Predestination," is an article of faith. The subject is fully discussed in the works of Averoes, and is a matter of endless contention between the two sects of Islām known as the Asharians and the Mutazilites. The whole question is beyond the ken of the average man; but the great English "prophet" (Arabic, *Nabi*) of modern times, Alfred Tennyson, seems to clear up matters just a little when he writes:—

"Oh! yet we trust that somehow good
Will be the final goal of ill,
To pangs of nature, sins of will,
Defects of doubt, and taints of blood;

That nothing walks with aimless feet:
That not one life shall be destroyed,
Or cast as rubbish to the void,
When God hath made the pile complete."

THE POLYGAMY OF ISLĀM is considered immoral by Christian writers, and it always seems to excite the prurient curiosity of the Western traveller. No sensible Muslim regards it as an immoral feature in Islām. Nay, more, he is fully convinced

that Jesus Christ never forbade it. "They twain shall be one flesh" (Matthew's Gospel, xix. 5) means precisely the same as "They twain are of one soul" in the Holy Kurān (Sura 4. 1). Its meaning is evident to any sensible person. But when Martin Luther, of pious memory, and John Milton, the Puritan poet, advocate both polygamy and divorce it does not seem necessary that the Muslim should defend his Prophet when he endorsed both these institutions, which had the Divine sanction of the Almighty in the time of Moses. The restrictions of Islām put Western civilisation to shame. Not ten per cent. of the seventy-five millions of Muslims in India are polygamists, and divorce is not nearly as common among Muslims as it is in America at the present time. The unlimited concubinage (in which the woman has no rights at all) as it exists in the large cities of Protestant countries is infinitely more immoral than the polygamy of Islām. The dower rights of the Muslim woman are a great protection. Besides this, divorce is held to be a very disgraceful thing, and was condemned by the Prophet. Sensible Muslims who have travelled in Europe and America believe that a restricted polygamy must eventually be introduced into Christian lands.

The sensible Muslim holds that in order to keep a community together in the ways of justice and purity, secular education must always be given side by side with RELIGIOUS EDUCATION, and he is not surprised that in both Great Britain and the United States of America the matter is now being very seriously discussed, because crime and immorality are undoubtedly on the increase among the youth of both countries. In Islām every mosque is a school where both religious and secular education is imparted. Islām has always regarded education as the great inspiration and guide of the people. It is, of course, a matter of history that the Saracens of Baghdad, Cordova, and Grenada were the great patrons of learning. Dr Marcus Dods says: "When the din of war died down, the voice of the Muses was heard. The same fervour

which had made the Saracen arms irresistible was spent in the acquirement of knowledge.”¹

Islām is A RELIGION TO LIVE by. It is never thrust into a corner, but in the national, commercial, and domestic life of the individual it takes a first and paramount place. It undertakes to guide a man from the cradle to the grave. As soon as the child is born the midwife takes him to the waiting assembly, and some learned person shouts the call to prayer (Azān) into his ears. Then on the seventh day the child is named. As soon as he can talk he is taught the “Bismillah,” or the formula, “In the Name of the Merciful and Gracious God.” Then, although the rite is not enjoined in the Kurān, he is circumcised. As soon as he can walk he is sent to school. And the question of religious education is not a matter of discussion. The child has an immortal soul which must be fed, and he is taught to recite the Holy Kurān, and is instructed in the necessary elements of faith and practice. Then, as he goes out into the world of action he says his prayers five times a day, beginning before sunrise and closing as he retires to rest. “Marriage,” said the Prophet, “perfects a man’s religion,” and so the young man has a suitable wife selected for him, and the contract is honoured with the sanctions of religion. When the Angel of Death claims his soul, he is fortified with religious consolations; and when his body is buried in the earth it is in the hope of a happy resurrection. There is no endless hell in Islām. The sensible Muslim does not stay to discuss religion; he simply takes what God has provided for him in the Book as the Divine message to the people.

SLAVERY IN ISLĀM, when compared with the slavery in America in Puritan times, is a common-sense and exceedingly benignant institution. Traffic in human beings is strictly forbidden, and only captives taken in war can be enslaved.

¹ There is a very complete and yet concise account of Arabic literature, in German, French, and English, by Professor Clement Huart. The works of this eminent scholar are well known to Oriental scholars.

The emancipation of a slave was declared by the Prophet to be one of the greatest acts of piety. A bondswoman bearing a child to her master becomes *ipso facto* free, and a lawful wife. The slave is part of the family, and entitled to the care and protection of the master.

SUICIDE was as common among the ancient Arabs as it is in Germany and America at the present day. But it was suppressed by Islām. The belief that every human soul must render an account to God inspires the Muslim with a sense of responsibility which regards self-murder as a horrible crime. A Muslim will give his life willingly on "the Road to God," as a war for the extension of Islām is called; but he will not take his own life, because it is a trust from the Creator.

The stern prohibition of all INTOXICATING LIQUORS among the followers of the Prophet was a very sensible arrangement. Drunkenness may exist among the princes and nobles of Muslim countries, but it is unknown among the common people, and Muhammadan lands are thus saved from the degradation of many Christian countries.

FILIAL DEVOTION is a marked feature in Muhammadan countries, and the order and dignity of a Muslim home are always evident. The injunction in the Holy Kurān on this subject is most impressive (Sura 17. 4): "Thy Lord hath decreed that thou shalt be kind to thy parents, whether one or both of them reach to be old with thee. Ye must not say 'fie' to them nor grumble at them, but speak to them a generous speech."

MONOPOLIES AND TRUSTS seem to be "burning questions" in the United States of America at the present time. It is true that in Muhammad's day there were no Standard Oil or Steel Trusts, but there was such a thing as "a corner in wheat." And he declared that whosoever creates a monopoly is a sinner. The man who keeps back grain forty days in order to raise its price will go to hell-fire, for he is both a forsaker of God and is forsaken of God. In Muslim works

of jurisprudence, such as the Hidayah, there are very definite instructions on the subject.

Philosophers from Socrates to Addison, and teachers from Jesus Christ to Fénelon, have regarded HUMILITY as the greatest of all human virtues. The way in which the common-sense enthusiast of Arabia enforced it is very characteristic. In the Kurān (31. 16) we read: "O my son! twist not thy cheek proudly, nor walk haughtily. God loves not the arrogant boaster. Be moderate and restrained in thy walk and lower thy voice. Truly the voice of a donkey is offensive to the ear."

The income-tax in England and THE SINGLE TAX in the United States of America are great questions in national economy. But the common-sense legislator of Islām settled the matter from the very start. "Zakāt," which is one of the pillars of Islām, is wrongly rendered "alms" by English writers. The word itself means "purification," but in Muslim law it stands for a single tax enforced by divine law in the Kurān (2. 77). It is levied upon all property, and is spent in the propagation of religion, the feeding of the poor, and the release of debtors. Consequently there are no "workhouses" in Islām, nor have pensions for the aged become necessary. Nor is there such a thing as "tainted money," for it is "Zakāt"—"purified" through the tears of the widow and orphan. This is a very notable institution in a properly governed state.

It is often asserted that Islām has been propagated and enforced by the POWER OF THE SWORD. No sensible Muslim denies it. Nay, more, he finds in the history of nations that every religion has been propagated by the sword. And at the present time Germany, Britain, and Japan owe their positions as great powers to the sword. If all Christian nations were nations of Christians there would perhaps be no war; but as matters now stand, war is inevitable, and the sensible Muslim does not even apologise for it. The Holy Kurān not only justifies it, but sanctifies it, and very minute are the instructions for lawfully carrying on a "Jihād" or

religious war. The great American transcendentalist, Mr Emerson, says: "War educates the senses, calls into action the will, perfects the physical constitution, brings men into such close collision in critical moments that man measures man." But how lenient and merciful is the warlike spirit of Islām as compared with that of the Israelites, when the Lord is said to have instructed Samuel to send Saul against the Amalekites: "Thus saith the Lord of hosts: Now go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have, and spare them not; but slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass" (1 Samuel xv. 3). The Christian Crusaders were animated by the same spirit. Joseph Michaud, the French historian, tells us in his *Bibliothèque des Croisades* that, when the Christians took Jerusalem, in 1099, the "triumph of the Cross" was celebrated by the slaughter of seventy thousand people, and that neither age nor sex met with any mercy. But let us compare this with the capture of the Holy City by Saladin, eighty-eight years afterwards, or the taking of the city by Khalifah Omar in the early days of Islām.

Assuming that Modern Islām does no more represent the teachings of the Arabian Prophet than Modern Christianity represents the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth, the question arises: IS A RENAISSANCE POSSIBLE IN ISLAM? Such a "re-birth" of the intellectual and moral attitude as took place in Europe at the close of what is called the Middle Ages? Is such a thing possible in the East? We think it is possible, and highly probable. What has taken place in Japan can take place in China, India, Afghanistan, Persia, and even Arabia, as well as along the north of Africa; and we believe that Islām will rise to the necessary conditions. In both ancient and modern times religion has spread by conquest, by a higher civilisation, and by the demands of commerce. And there are now three great religions in the field: Buddhism, Christianity, and Islām. Each of these forms of belief is adapted to different forms of civilisation, and to different spiritual aspirations. And surely the time

is coming when "Ephraim shall not envy Judah, and Judah shall not vex Ephraim, and when every man shall sit under his own vine and under his own fig tree, none daring to make him afraid." Buddhism has a wide field before it in China; Christianity must readjust its social conditions in Europe and America; and Islām has a very special mission in Africa and Central Asia. The Prophet of Arabia seems to have foreseen the time "when the earth shall shake with its quakings, and shall bring forth her burdens, and men shall say, What aileth thee? On that day the earth shall tell her glad tidings, for the Lord shall inspire her. And men shall come up in SEPARATE COMPANIES to show their works unto God, and he who hath done an atom of good shall see it" (The Kurān, Sura 119).

IBN ISHĀK.

THE MESSAGE OF MR G. K. CHESTERTON.

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THERE is one qualification which I can claim for presuming to write upon the work of Mr Gilbert K. Chesterton with the view of indicating his spirit and intention—this, namely, that I start with a rather enthusiastic prejudice in his favour. For it is one of many proofs that Mr Chesterton has something vital to say to us, and challenges the very temper of the time, that of those who know his work with any real understanding, there are only two classes—those who receive him with enthusiasm, and those who become quite angry when you mention his name. There are, of course, others who adopt another attitude. They say he is simply a very bold and careless writer who has a trick of exaggeration and paradox. I do not propose to deal with these last: no good could come of it; we have nothing in common.

In dealing with a man's work, it is an advantage to have a prejudice in his favour. It seems to me indeed that it is only about those for whom we have a private regard that we should take upon ourselves to speak. Our prejudice gives us our point of view, and in every region our *view* is largely determined by our *point of view*. We know how very dangerous an exercise it is for us to be speaking about one who is absent, unless we are quite sure that we like him. We know how, otherwise, we are apt to fall into a merely

external and critical tone of voice, to make an unfair selection of his words or his actions, and so arrive at a conclusion which really all the time was predetermined by the bias of our mind. The fact is, certainly, that in dealing with a man like Chesterton, who is never for one moment engaged with anything less than the ultimate meaning of life, we cannot avoid playing with loaded dice. On ultimate matters, we have none of us mere opinions, in the strict sense of the word. We have really only prejudices. What we fondly imagine to be our opinions are without doubt the effect or resultant within us of an unfathomable wealth of instincts, reasons, desires, corroborated or modified or contradicted by education, by environment, by the stimulus of example, by the rebuke of pain—all these fixed, summarised, and sealed in moulds of thought or faith from time to time by some pre-eminent event of our personal life. The white sheet of paper with which we begin our life is an impossible fancy. We begin with, so to speak, a sheet of sensitised paper on which innumerable characters are already inscribed in invisible ink. We begin with a possible career ready to declare itself, ready to take advantage of occasions, ready to find correspondences in the world. What we see in life depends, when all is said, upon certain secrets of ultimate personality; and what we shall see in any man like Chesterton, whose whole intellectual interest is in life considered in its ultimate significance, will likewise depend upon the secret things of our spirit.

It is easy to name the features in Chesterton's work which have made the bricks fly at his head. Those features which have provoked this violence in certain souls have had a milder effect in the case of certain others: they scarcely know whether to accept him or not. For one thing, his confidence in the value of human existence, or (to use the words we know best) his belief in God, is a very strange thing in those high places of literature, and art and philosophy, which together form Chesterton's chosen ground. And in his case belief in God is no difficult attainment, no conclusion to

which he merely inclines simply to save him from despair or madness. (He sees very clearly that faith alone really does save men from despair and madness, but it was not because of that that he first believed.) He believes in God with heartiness and uproariousness. If you were to ask him, as many of his critics in various ways have asked him, for what reason he believes, he would probably retort by telling you that it is for the same reason as he eats, or laughs, or takes a walk in the moonlight, i.e., *because he wants to*. He would be quite willing to confess to you that ultimately the reason for the faith in his heart was precisely the same as the reason for, say, the nose on his face—namely, that there it is, that he was so made. Deeply considered, that is neither frivolous nor unphilosophical. We might make a list of the most serious thinkers of the world, beginning with St Augustine (to go no farther back), including such names as Pascal, and our own Butler, and closing with the contemporary school of philosophy in Oxford, and with William James of Harvard, the fundamental argument for faith in each case being simply that which Chesterton states and reiterates with violence and enthusiasm: that so we are made, that to be a man is to have—so to put it—some share in God.

This defence of faith which Chesterton has celebrated, viz. that the faculty and exercise of faith belong to the proper life and essence of man, that belief is a normal function of the human soul is his message to our time: it is the background and motive of all his work. He is the protagonist of normal men, seeking to declare and to defend their rights, and, above everything, their right to believe in God. I do not wonder, therefore, that those people should not like Chesterton, and should privately be rather astonished that a man of his wide-awakeness and erudition should be saying the confident things that he does say, and that his whole work should be penetrated by Christianity—those people who imagined that the whole Christian view of God and the world had received its quietus from Tyndal and

Huxley and Renan and Strauss, who have not been giving their minds to the later stages of the controversy, and who are therefore not aware of the embarrassments which pure materialism has discovered from its own postulates. But it is not only the substance of Chesterton which offends many; it is not only that certain people are enraged that the spiritual basis of life should have found such a cheerful and boisterous defender, who will not take the materialists so seriously as they take themselves: there are many others who are probably in perfect agreement with Chesterton's principles and point of view who are nevertheless offended and irritated by the manner in which he *will* say what he has to say. There is no doubt whatever that Chesterton's humour and playfulness—his ridiculousness, indeed—has had the effect of diminishing his authority for a great many people. It is a very curious thing that we all of us are much more easily convinced by a solemn manner than by a happy manner. For my own part, I agree with Chesterton that when we deal in a merely solemn way with the ultimate meaning of our life it is a proof that at that moment we ourselves are not very sure of it. It was this paradox which the plain man—a verger he is reported to have been—had at the back of his mind, when he professed that *although* he had heard some twenty courses of Bampton Lectures on the Defence of Faith he still remained a humble believer.

Let me bring before your minds an historical contrast. There is a very obvious similarity between the humour of Thomas Carlyle and that of Chesterton. There is, indeed, a very interesting identity between the messages of the one and the other, Carlyle girding at the Utilitarians of his day as Chesterton pokes fun at the "Scientists" of our own. But Carlyle has not to encounter the suspicion of people as Chesterton must, and this I believe really for one great reason. Carlyle is solemn, he is heavy, he is awful. It may not be true in fact that he counselled a humble tobacconist, who confessed that she had not the particular

brand that he asked for but had another quite as good, that she should always deal in the eternal verities—that may not be a true story, but it ought to be. Now Chesterton will not be solemn, and never is he so full of laughter and joy as when he is dealing with the most momentous things. Carlyle is always making his way towards some tremendous aphorism which shall embody the argument of a whole paragraph or chapter; whereas Chesterton is always making for some apparently frivolous instance or paradox.

Now I venture to say that just as the teaching of Carlyle—and this is true of all merely solemn minds—is much shallower than it looks, so that the farther you go into it the less original or profound it is; so the teaching of Mr Chesterton, gay and careless and ridiculous as it so frequently seems to be, is at the last always serious, and to anyone who knows the age in which we live, who knows what is being said, and the conclusions which are being formed, his words will always have the effect of sending the spirit sounding on and on.

For the fact is you cannot do justice to Mr Chesterton's humour and whimsicality, as an instrument for arriving at truth, until you take hold of this—that, in his view, the sense of humour, the happy way of looking at things, the faculty for joy, is an integral part of the human soul, having rights as inalienable as any other. In his fine paper in the volume on *Heretics*, in answer to Mr M'Cabe's criticism, that he ought to consider the intellectual problems of life more gravely, Chesterton deals at length with the charge; and almost on every page of his work he presents the same thesis. For example: "A man must be very full of faith to jest with his divinity. . . . To the Hebrew prophets, their religion was so solid a thing, like a mountain or a mammoth, that the irony of its contact with trivial and fleeting things struck them like a blow." "Merriment is one of the world's natural flowers and not one of its exotics. Gigantesque levity, flamboyant eloquence, are the mere outbursts of a human sympathy and bravado as old and solid as the stars." "We should all like

to speak poetry at the moments when we truly live ; and if we do not speak it, it is because we have an impediment in our speech."

In his volume on Dickens he says a thing which must have been suggested not only by the reading of Dickens, but by observing the processes of his own mind. "Dickens," he says, "had to be ridiculous in order to begin to be true. His characters that begin solemn *end* futile ; his characters that begin frivolous *end* solemn in the best sense. His foolish figures are not only more entertaining than his serious figures, they are also much more serious." We shall give an example of this in a moment.

Let us dwell for a little longer on this matter—I mean the medium of good-humour and gaiety and colloquialness which Chesterton uses, and cannot help using, in the interests of truth ; and let us keep before ourselves the literary medium which by contrast Carlyle adopted. I should say that the difference is just this : Carlyle, though by birth one of the common people, nevertheless speaks of the people or at the people from above. Chesterton, though by birth, as I should imagine, of a much higher rank, in all his writing and thinking speaks of the people from their own point of view, from the point of view which they would take up if they should ever become self-conscious and enlightened enough to express themselves. It is a definite charge which Chesterton makes against Carlyle, that he had no belief in the people, no belief in the elementary instincts of the masses of men ; that he assumed that his message was in advance of them, that he could be nothing else than a voice crying in the wilderness. And so, rather than change the pitch of his voice, he remained in his wilderness, and in fact got rather to like being there. Now merely to be a prophet, merely to fling thunderbolts of truth at people, is, in essential matters, to have given up the whole business. Our Lord said of a great moral teacher of his day that he was *more* than a prophet : I believe He meant that he was a good man. "There are two main moral necessities for the work of a great

man," says Chesterton, speaking of Carlyle: "the first is that he should believe in the truth of his message; the second is that he should believe in the acceptability of his message. It was the whole tragedy of Carlyle that he had the first and not the second. . . . It was this simplicity of confidence, not only in God, but *in the image of God*, that was lacking in Carlyle."

I seem to see everywhere in Chesterton, and this is in my own view the explanation of his entire literary manner, a kind of passion to be understood. His critics are perhaps quite right in saying that he chose his manner in order to startle people into reading him. I should not put it that way; though I think there is something in it. Chesterton would hold, I believe, as indeed we have quoted—that whatever is true is a thing that should be known, and known by as many people as possible. Truth is public property. One of our human and social duties is to communicate the truth to one another. He would say that a man has not got hold of truth who sets out with the idea that people will not hear it. That, on the contrary, it is the first business of a man who has anything to say that he shall say it in such a way that the people, the common people, the people who are most directly to be affected, shall become aware of it. A man gets a sight of truth not simply in order that he may embody it in words that please himself, but that he may embody it in such words as shall give it its greatest immediate reach; and so Dante writes his *Divine Comedy* in the lingua franca, in the speech of the common people; Luther translates the Bible into German; and, if I may dare the comparison, Chesterton makes use of good-humour, ridiculous illustrations, in order, if you like to put it so, to get a hearing—in order, as I prefer to put it, to get his message delivered to the proper quarter. "There are those," he says somewhere, "who declare that they have no doubt the Salvation Army is right in its aims, but they very much dislike its methods. On the other hand, I have my doubts about its aims, but I have no doubt at all about its methods, these are obviously right." For, he goes

on to say, there must always be something corybantic about religion, about the announcement of truth. The conclusion of this whole matter we might put in an image, not of Chesterton's own, but not unlike many a one of his.

If a man gets up on a lorry at a street corner and begins to hammer a huge gong so that everybody is compelled to look in his direction ; if he lays down the gong and takes up a bell, and rings it violently so that a crowd gather, you must not conclude that he is a mountebank. He may be a man who has something to say. He may indeed be one of those men to whom the world has all along owed so much, who imagine that unless the people who are passing stop and listen to him they will in various ways go to the devil. Recollecting the great and even tremendous figures in history, it is only fair to wait until we hear him say what he has to say ; not to condemn him by the grotesqueness of his appearance, remembering, say, John the Baptist, or by something in his voice that jars ; but judging him, if we must judge him, by the manifest passion which, as he goes on speaking, begins to kindle within him and to sway his words, and by the fire which, by a profound and unconquerable affinity, begins to kindle in our hearts as we listen to him. For in our day also as in the days of Elijah, fire is the sign of God.

Still working our way into the substance of Mr Chesterton's philosophy, let me here deal—it can only be in a hurried way—with another feature of his work which has been declared to be an offence. The common criticism of Chesterton is that he is always striving after paradox. That criticism, you observe, resolves itself into two separate charges. The first is, that he *strives* ; the second is, that the conclusions at which he arrives are always paradoxical. With regard to the first, viz. that Chesterton *strives* after paradox, I think it very manifestly unfair. I am quite sure that, on the contrary, his greatest artistic difficulty is to keep back the paradoxes which are crowding down to the point of his pen. Mr Chesterton never affects me as striving after anything.

It often happens with him, indeed, that he sees what is going to be the conclusion of his reasoning long before he has quite established it, and down it goes in all its crudeness long before he has prepared us for it. But that he strives after such effects never once occurred to me. A man does not need to strive after that particular way of expressing himself which he has practised consistently in every line of his writing, extending now over as much literary matter as would fill a small library. It is quite as natural for him to be picturesque as it is for a great many of us—not to be. It is as natural for him to be violent and excessive and uproarious as it is for other writers to be timid and futile and lady-like. It is as natural for him to arrive at paradoxes as it is for more solemn writers to arrive at platitudes. Indeed, there are perhaps only two conclusions to which all serious consideration of life can lead us—either to the uttering of a platitude, a truism, or to the uttering of a paradox, the discovery, *i.e.*, of a certain impassable chasm between subject and object, between things and the indomitable spirit of a man. I repeat, that what gives the impression of striving and posing to Chesterton's entire style is this: he sees at a glance the principle of the matter in hand, and then, without thinking further, embodies it in a very crude and haphazard illustration or figure. He knows—and it is this which makes his method quite legitimate—that if his *thought* is really right, then this illustration which he has created will bring out certain aspects or corroborations which he could not have stated with such concreteness of definition if he had restricted himself to the language of pure thought. There is nothing more characteristic of his style than this: that an image or figure which he has flung down begins to mean more and more for himself—begins to clarify his own intermediate processes, and to give edge and eloquence to his contention. In this, as in many other matters, it is easy to trace the great influence of Browning upon Chesterton. Carlyle tells us, in one of his translations of Tieck, of a baron who needed to jump back and forward over a table in order to get

himself into a good humour. Some men with the same object in view—I mean, in order to warm up their mind—take cold baths; some take hard walks over the hills; some drink strong coffee: Chesterton confronts his own mind with violent and unlikely situations. Let me give an illustration which, if we had time, we should find to cast light upon all these points, and especially upon this point, that Chesterton's mind works most easily under the stimulus of an apparently intractable metaphor or concrete illustration, and that the illustration which seems far-fetched so that people accuse him of striving after it, begins to fall back again into the living context of the man's thought. "Suppose that a great commotion arises in the street about something, let us say a lamp-post which many influential persons desire to pull down. A grey-clad monk, who is the spirit of the Middle Ages, is approached upon the matter, and begins to say, in the arid manner of the Schoolmen, 'Let us first of all consider, my brethren, the value of light. If light be in itself good. . . .' At this point he is somewhat excusably knocked down. All the people make a rush for the lamp-post. The lamp-post is down in ten minutes, and they go about congratulating each other on their un-mediæval practicality. But as things go on, they do not work out so easily. Some people have pulled the lamp-post down because they wanted the electric light; some because they wanted old iron; some because they wanted darkness, because their deeds were evil; some thought it not enough of a lamp-post, some too much; some acted because they wanted to smash municipal machinery; some because they wanted to smash something. And there is war in the night, no man knowing whom he strikes. So gradually and inevitably—to-day, to-morrow, or the next day—there comes back the conviction that the monk was right after all, and that all depends on what is the philosophy of light. Only, what we might have discovered under the gas-lamp, we now must discuss in the dark" (*Heretics*).

I detect no evidence of striving, or posing, or intellectual

levity in an illustration of that kind: and it is one of probably tens of thousands. I saw that some one the other day wrote an article in a newspaper full of veiled disparagement of Chesterton. The writer insinuated that it was simply a kind of trick such as he himself and some other people could easily affect if they had the mind to. I recall that that was the very condition on which Charles Lamb said a certain man could write the plays of Shakespeare—"if he had had the mind." But seriously, I wish some of these modest men would come out of their hiding-places and augment the great tide of speculative joy and fundamental confidence in life which Mr Chesterton has done so much to raise. I should say of most of us what he himself says of people who thought they could easily have written some of the easy-going but inevitable pages of Dickens: "Perhaps we could have created Mr Guppy, but the effort would certainly have exhausted us: we should be ever afterwards wheeled about in a bath-chair at Bournemouth."

It is perfectly true that Chesterton sees truth in paradox; but it is no merely literary form with him. The style here is the man; and to Chesterton truth is found by beings such as we are, and placed as we are, only in the guise of paradox. I cannot attempt to justify Chesterton's position here, or even to illustrate it, though if one had time it would be an easy matter to show that we are all quite familiar with what he means, and that it is our own habitual and unconscious attitude towards life and experience. But take, for example, such words as *faith* and *hope* and *love*. It is the very nature of *faith*, that it comes into play only with regard to matters which from certain other points of view and on other categories are unbelievable. There is and there must always be an opposition between the intuitions of faith and those materials and conclusions with which our merely intellectual faculty deals. The truth is as Hegel said "in a relationship." In this total world, there is room for faith as there is room for reason, but they deal with life

on different grades, and with different ends in view. So the very nature of *hope*, which Mr Chesterton so thoughtfully describes as "the irreducible minimum of the spirit," is that it goes beyond *experience*, and if need be contradicts experience. In Mr Watts' well-known picture, "What is Hope?" it is the figure of a woman, blindfolded, sitting on the circle of the earth. In her hand she holds an instrument of music. She has struck one string, and it has broken at her touch; she has struck another, and it too has snapped. One chord remains. It alone, it at last, must stand the strain and challenge of her touch. From it the music must come, else there is no music in this world at all. That is *hope*. Though one chord and another has given way, has snapped under the test; though only one thread remains as ground and reason for this invincible instinct of the soul, she prepares to strike, knowing that the last chord will *not* fail. So too, the very nature of *love* is, that it goes out towards the unlovely, towards those who at present seem incapable of appreciating or understanding love.

Paradox in literature has its counterpart in the antinomies of philosophy—which represent the farthest and deepest insight possible to us into the region of reality. Recollecting the ill-success which attended Mr Haldane's ingenuous effort, on a recent and notorious occasion, to enlighten the mind of a Lord Chancellor on the antinomies of Free Will and Predestination, I shall not abuse your patience, though really the whole matter is not so very difficult. It is one which was very accurately appreciated by the religious people of Scotland for two centuries, and ought not to have been beyond the dialectical skill of Lord Halsbury. I must content myself with repeating that paradox in literature is simply the expression of that apparent conflict between subject and object and yet that necessary relationship between subject and object which marks the boundary of our philosophical vision.

Now it is no part of Mr Chesterton's ambition to remain

in the clouds. Having discovered in the clouds the nature of paradox, or having pursued it into the clouds, having seen in the loneliness of his own most accomplished mind that truth must always have this paradoxical expression, he sees it everywhere, and discovers it to us, for our joy, and to keep off the dreadful tyranny of the merely scientific category. Taking the large question of life itself, he sees, like Tolstoy, like Carlyle, like every true and resolute thinker, that life is a much earlier thing than thought; that we live before we reason; that to this day the really great and characteristic things which we do, we do not at the dictate of our cool intellectual faculty, but in obedience to primitive and unfathomable instincts, appetites, desires, ideals, faiths. Seeing that this is so, Chesterton rejoices to point out to the soul of man its inviolable way of escape.

All this brings us, late perhaps, and circuitously, to what we must call the message of Mr Chesterton; for, as he himself defines it, "paradox simply means a certain defiant joy which belongs to belief."

To put the matter in as short compass as possible, leaving it to be modified in our own minds as we proceed, Mr Chesterton is the protagonist in our particular day of the natural man. He has been chosen by virtue of his temperament, by virtue of the fortunate emergence in him of certain primitive faculties which in most men of his condition have been rendered impotent or untrustworthy—he has been chosen to champion the rights of, so to call him, the average and catholic man. If the phrase were not so loaded with both a sinister and a merely affected connotation, we should say that his message is to call us back (or, as he would say, forward) to the joys and the duties and the faith of the natural life. The life of nature as man's sphere is, in Chesterton's view, something very different from a merely animal life, without social restraints or without those equally fundamental restraints which the wisdom of the race has discovered and approved. In his view, and as he himself might put it, the only thing in man which is as

obstinate as his love of liberty is his love of bondage. The only thing that man will do as inevitably as he will live a merely animal life, is that he will repent and put himself in irons. The only thing which is as true of man as that he is made of clay, is that into that clay, by some unfathomable mystery, a Holy God has infused something of His own. It is this *man* whose nature, which bears within itself traces of much besides its lower status, which bears within itself evidences of its long and hazardous journey, and of its difficult and precious enlightenment—it is this natural man, in the sense of *unsophisticated* man, whose total soul Chesterton celebrates and defends.

And arriving at the moment when he has arrived, Chesterton has acquired the quality of greatness. For a great man in these matters is a man who arrives at the right moment, who comes to the rescue of that in man which at the moment is threatened yet which must not be lost. I hail him as a great writer when I consider the great temptation of the hour with which he deals. That man in his measure is a great man whose word has the effect of reassuring us, just as that writer is a bad writer who disposes his readers to *succumb*. Anything is bad which disheartens us on our predestined journey. Anything is bad which raises a suspicion as to the value of our existence. Anything is bad which would lead us to disparage the human enterprise. Anything is bad which would make us let our hands fall and our knees shake, face to face with our elementary duties and responsibilities, and face to face with our own ignorance and the darkness that lies about us. Anything is bad which makes us regret life. All laughter at man is hollow and of the devil. The account of man which is thrust upon us by a hasty and dogmatic materialism is, from the point of view of man's instincts, and from the point of view of the highest words he has ever obeyed, a form of laughter at man. As such it is bad, a thing it may even be to be put down one day, as witchcraft was put down, and for the same reason—

that it is seducing man from his true and normal and natural life.

One general line of criticism which Chesterton applies to those tendencies in modern life and thought which in his view threaten that deposit of faith on which man has come thus far, is this. He convicts the opponent with whom he is dealing at the moment of neglecting some fact of the human soul which is just as trustworthy, just as inalienable to man, as is the faculty on which the threatening theory is basing itself. In short, in Chesterton's view, the specialists are always wrong when they leave their own particular field and impose their methods on what he would call "the rich and reeking human personality." He would say: You cannot exhaust all the qualities of a man. You cannot really sum him up. You can only examine him in the abstract. But then he does not exist in the abstract. You can examine him only after he is dead. All your reports about men are therefore of the nature of post-mortem reports; they have nothing to say as to the very thing which is of most importance—life itself. This, which is true of man, considered physiologically, is true likewise of him considered as a sentient being. Take, for example, the nature of personal happiness, or joy. You may make out a list of circumstances which ought to insure this joy; and you may be all wrong. You may surround a man, like Carlyle's shoeblack, with all those circumstances, and yet leave him miserable. You may see, on the other hand, a human being in rags and difficulties, with none of the circumstances which according to your inventory secure human joy. You may conclude that you are in the presence of a miserable creature; whereas you may be in the presence of one who is in love, and therefore delirious with human faith and confidence in the value of existence. Or you adduce your reasons for denying to man his imperishable confidence in a will beyond his own—in short, in God. You may forecast his inevitable doom, to perish like the beasts; but

"Just when you're safest, there is a sunset touch,
A fancy from a flower-bell, some one's death,
A chorus-ending from Euripides;
And that's enough for fifty hopes and fears
As old and new at once as Nature's self."

Chesterton would test every theory or proposition by its fitness to satisfy, or to control for a higher exercise, some ineradicable endowment of man—of man as we know him, in his glory and gloom alike, but above everything in his altogether divine perseverance in life. He would arraign all systems which invade man's sanctuary of feeling and desire and faith, as he would arraign a brother man accused of some crime against man's nature or the social compact—he would arraign them all before a jury of common men.

"The trend of our epoch up to this time has been consistently towards specialism and professionalism. We tend to have trained soldiers because they fight better, trained singers because they sing better, trained dancers because they dance better, especially instructed laughers because they laugh better, and so on and so on. The principle has been applied to law and politics by innumerable modern writers. Many Fabians have insisted that a greater part of our political work should be performed by experts. Many legalists have declared that the untrained jury should be altogether supplanted by the trained judge.

"Now if this world of ours were really what is called reasonable, I do not know that there would be any fault to find with this. But the true result of all experience and the true foundation of all religion is this—that the four or five things that it is most practically essential that a man should know are all of them what people call paradoxes. That is to say, that though we all find them in life to be mere plain truths, yet we cannot easily state them in words without being guilty of seeming verbal contradictions. One of them, for instance, is the unimpeachable platitute that the man who finds most pleasure for himself is often the man who least hunts for it. Another is the paradox of courage: the fact that the way to avoid death is not to have too much aversion to it. Whoever is careless enough of his bones to climb some hopeless cliff above the tide may save his bones by that carelessness. Whoever will lose his life, the same shall save it: an entirely practical and prosaic statement.

"Now one of these four or five paradoxes which should be taught to every infant prattling at his mother's knee is the following: That the more a man looks at a thing the less he can see it, and the more a man learns a thing the less he knows it. The Fabian argument of the expert, that the man who is trained should be the man who is trusted, would be absolutely unanswerable if it were really true that a man who studied a thing and practised it every day went on seeing more and more of its significance. But he does not. He

goes on seeing less and less of its significance. In the same way, alas, we all go on every day, unless we are continually goading ourselves into gratitude and humility, seeing less and less of the significance of the sky or the stones.

"Now it is a terrible business to mark a man out for the vengeance of men. But it is a thing to which a man can grow accustomed, as he can to other terrible things: he can even grow accustomed to the sun. And the horrible thing about all legal officials, even the best, about all judges, magistrates, barristers, detectives, and policemen, is not that they are wicked (some of them are good), not that they are stupid (several of them are quite intelligent)—it is simply that they have got used to it.

"Strictly, they do not see the prisoner in the dock: all they see is the usual man in the usual place. They do not see the awful court of judgment: they only see their own workshop. Therefore the instinct of Christian civilisation has most wisely declared that into their judgments there shall upon every occasion be infused fresh blood and fresh thoughts from the street. Men shall come in who can see the court and the crowd, the coarse faces of the policemen and the professional criminals, the wasted faces of the wastrels, the unreal faces of the gesticulating counsel, and see it all as one sees a new picture or a ballet hitherto unvisited.

"Our civilisation has decided, and very justly decided, that determining the guilt or innocence of men is a thing too important to be trusted to trained men. If it wishes for light upon that awful matter, it asks men who know no more law than I know, but who can feel the things that I felt in the jury-box. When it wants a library catalogued, or the solar system discovered, or any trifle of that kind, it uses up its specialists. But when it wishes anything done which is really serious, it collects twelve of the ordinary men standing round. The same thing was done, if I remember right, by the Founder of Christianity."

Mr Chesterton, like every other who would aid the human soul, has not delivered his message in so many philosophical principles. He does not speak or write *in vacuo*, but with his eye upon some threatening spirit of our time. And—at least so it seems to me—he has a faultless eye for the moment when any tendency is beginning to assail the abiding interest of man. Therefore he has been compelled to deliver his message in the way of criticism and opposition to tendencies in thought or speculation, and in life, which seem to him likely to seduce man from the main highway of healthy and natural and believing life on which alone he is equal to himself and secure. Even as the angel measured the foundations of the Heavenly Jerusalem, so Chesterton measures and tests the principles, the effects for man's present moral practice and his outlook, of certain ways of looking at life—he tests them

all "according to the measure of a man, *i.e.* of the angel." And therein also lies his confidence. The human soul he sees too firmly rooted in essential things, too firmly persuaded of the essential good of life, to be disturbed for more than a period from its true career. As Abraham Lincoln said—and it is the very quality of all great words to serve greater causes than their first cause—"you may deceive some people all the time, and all the people for some time; but never all the people all the time."

Man has seen what he has seen; and never can he be as though he had not seen it. And, Chesterton would add, man has seen Christ; and would rejoice with the dying Marius in Pater's great work (Pater, whom alone, as it seems to me, Chesterton does less than justice to), that in Jesus Christ there has been erected in this world a plea, a standard, an afterthought which mankind will always have in reserve against any wholly mean or mechanical theory of himself and his conditions.

In the course of his intellectual career so far, Chesterton has dealt with some of the chief doctrines for man which have been urged upon us in the name of enlightenment during the last generation. "Heresies" he calls these doctrines; and this not because they conflict with the theological propositions of the Church, but because, if accepted, they would seduce and ultimately destroy the soul of man as it has come to be and as we know it. Pessimism, with its strange and insane joy in its own success, he finds tolerable as a system of thought only so long as you take care that it never be translated into life and action; for if pessimism be true, then death is the only proper pursuit of man. "The popularity of pure and unadulterated pessimism is," he says, "an oddity. It is almost a contradiction in terms. Men would no more receive the news of the failure of existence or of the harmonious hostility of the stars with ardour or popular rejoicing than they would light bonfires for the arrival of cholera, or dance a breakdown when they were condemned to be hanged."

“The pessimists who attack the universe are always under this disadvantage: they have an exhilarating consciousness that they could make the sun and moon better; but they also have the depressing consciousness that they could not make the sun and moon at all.”

The fact is, those who write thus gloomily about life considered as a whole, are usually comfortable above the average lot in some particular of their life which they take care not to lose. “Existence has been *praised* and *absolved* by a chorus of pessimists. The work of giving thanks to heaven is, as it were, ingeniously divided among them. . . . Omar Khayyám is established in the cellar and swears that it is the only room in the house. . . . Even the blackest of pessimistic writers enjoys his art. At the precise moment that he has written some shameless and terrible indictment of creation, his one pang of joy in the achievement joins the universal chorus of gratitude with the scent of the wild flower and the song of the bird.”

It is because Atheism conflicts with an instinct of the soul which has been enticed and corroborated and purified by human experience, that Chesterton assails it and predicts its failure to tyrannise over men. It is because a doctrinaire Socialism is contrary to the heights and depths of man's soul, because it would restrict man to a tame paddock, man who has something in him which hungers for the risks of hazardous and unequal living, that Chesterton has no fear that it will ever be embraced. It is because Evolution is really the enemy of Revolution, and because, were it accepted as the whole truth that we are *fated* to rise in the scale, we should all sit down and wait either until we were raised, or cast aside to make room for another's rising, that Chesterton is afraid of *Evolution*. It is because Puritanism lays emphasis upon the spirit in man, that he celebrates its great service to our country. It is because Puritanism neglects the flesh that he condemns it. It is because Mediævalism and Æstheticism find their happiness in looking backwards, and thus cease to

make for that total victory of the race which if it is to be anywhere must lie in front of us; it is because many writers do not see that in their little plans and purposes for men they are often playing with fire, tampering, as Stevenson says, with the lock which holds down all sorts of sulphurous and subterranean things—that Chesterton lays about him with the ancient sword of the spirit.

And now, I must content myself with having written these things in appreciation of one whom I consider a very great and constructive force, altogether on the side of man, which is eventually on the side of God. Recalling his general line of criticism, I should say it is what pedants would call an *argumentum ad hominem*. Personally I have always held that on matters of prime human importance no other argument tells in the long run except the *argumentum ad hominem*. “Humanly speaking,” a student began. “My dear sir,” said his professor, “there’s no other way of speaking.”

When Tennyson protests against the materialistic doctrine of man, he protests in the name of a warm and instinctive desire for the contrary. His heart, he tells us, rises up like a man in wrath. In fact, he simply won’t have it. And really no theory will ever establish itself in the mind of man if his gorge simply rises against it. When Darwin’s *Descent of Man* was at the height of its popularity, George Gilfillan, a popular preacher of that time in Dundee, voiced the opposition in quite a happy phrase. “I won’t have a monkey for my grandfather,” said the good man. Now I venture to think that there is something in the protest which will always be invincible. And really it is something more than the recoil of the spirit from a proposed degradation. It is good science likewise. The really important thing for us is not, Where did we come from? but, Where are we bound for?

We may have had the lowliest of origins. The Bible confesses we are made from the dust; though it declares that it was God who made us. The point is, here we are, and we are not tired of rising, if we may, in the scale. Now there

must always have been something in us like a coiled-up spring which urged us on so far, leaving many things behind which belonged to our more lowly lot.

When the present German Emperor showed himself able to dispense with Prince Bismarck, when, in Sir John Tenniel's phrase, "he dropped the pilot," we all concluded that there was something in the German Emperor, both as a man and as a ruler of men, which made him equal to that. It is quite a fair thing to say, by the same token, that there must always have been something in man, something which was only awaiting its opportunity, that enabled man, in a word, to drop his tail.

Number Nine of the King's Regulations for Officers of the Navy contains these words: "Every officer is to refrain from making remarks or passing criticisms on the conduct or orders of his superiors which may tend to bring them into contempt, and is to avoid saying or doing anything which might discourage the men or render them dissatisfied with their condition or with the service on which they are or may be employed."

Chesterton sees the human soul, arrived thus far—not without difficulty. He sees that any fundamental health which we have is due to the power which is still within us of the Christian tradition as it gives an issue and a consecration to the fountain of our natural life.

And anyone who seriously interferes with the foundations of the soul, with the particular kind of hardihood which has become intertwined for ever with the Cross of Christ, Chesterton sees as a rebel or a traitor—as a heretic in the sublime sense. And because as such he is poisoning the wells of all sane and hearty living, and cutting man off from his Source, like the great Florentine, Chesterton would appoint him a place in hell.

JOHN A. HUTTON.

GLASGOW.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF BERGSON.

PROFESSOR WILLIAM JAMES.

PROFESSOR HENRI BERGSON is a young man, comparatively, as influential philosophers go, having been born at Paris in 1859. His career has been the routine one of a successful French professor. Entering the Ecole normale supérieure at the age of twenty-two, he spent the next seventeen years teaching at several *lycées*, provincial or Parisian, until his fortieth year, when he was made professor at the Ecole normale supérieure. Since 1900 he has been professor at the Collège de France, and member of the Institute since 1900.

So far, then, as the outward facts go, Bergson's career has been commonplace to the utmost. Neither one of Taine's famous principles of explanation of great men, *the race, the milieu, or the moment*, no, nor all three together, will explain that peculiar way of looking at things that constitutes his mental individuality. Originality in men dates from nothing previous ; other things date from it, rather. I have to confess that Bergson's originality is so profuse that many of his ideas baffle me entirely. Now, many men are profusely original in that no man can understand them : violently peculiar ways of looking at things are no great rarity. The rarity is when great peculiarity of vision is allied with great lucidity and unusual command of all the classic expository apparatus. Bergson's resources in the way of erudition are remarkable, and in the way of expression they are simply phenomenal. This is why in France, where *l'art de bien dire* counts for so

much and is so sure of appreciation, he has immediately taken so eminent a place in public esteem. Old-fashioned professors, whom his ideas quite fail to satisfy, nevertheless speak of his talent almost with bated breath, while the youngsters flock to him as to a master.

If anything can make hard things easy to follow, it is a style like Bergson's. A straightforward style, an American reviewer lately called it, failing to see that such straightforwardness means a flexibility of verbal resource that follows the thought without a crease or wrinkle, as elastic silk underclothing follows the movements of one's body. The lucidity of Bergson's way of putting things is what all readers are first struck by. It seduces you and bribes you in advance to become his disciple. It is a miracle, and he a real magician.

M. Bergson, if I am rightly informed, came into philosophy through the gateway of mathematics. The old antinomies of the infinite were, I imagine, the irritant that first woke his faculties from their dogmatic slumber. Everyone remembers Zeno's famous paradox, or sophism, as many of our logic-books still call it, of Achilles and the tortoise, which only gives a dramatic character to the difficulty inherent in understanding intellectually any phenomenon whatever of continuous change.

Take any such process of change, as, for instance, twenty seconds of time elapsing. If time is infinitely divisible, they simply cannot elapse, their end cannot be reached; for no matter how much of them has already elapsed, before the remainder, however minute, can have wholly elapsed, the earlier half of it must first have elapsed. And this ever-rearising need of making the earlier half elapse *first* leaves time with always something to do *before* the last thing is done, so that the last thing never gets done. If in the natural world there were no other way of getting things save by such successive addition of all their possible fractions, no complete units or whole things would ever come into our possession, for the fraction's sum would always leave a remainder. But in point of fact nature doesn't make eggs by making first a half egg,

then a quarter, then an eighth, etc., and adding them together. She either makes a whole egg at once or none at all, and so of all her other units. It is only in the sphere of change, then, where one part of a thing has necessarily to come into being before another part can come, that Zeno's paradox gives trouble.

And it gives trouble then only if the succession of steps of change is infinitely divisible. If a bottle had to be emptied by an infinite number of successive decrements, the emptying simply could not terminate. In point of fact, however, bottles and coffee-pots empty themselves by a finite number of decrements, each definite of finite amount. Either a whole drop emerges or nothing emerges from the spout. If all change went thus drop-wise, or pulse-wise, so to speak, if real time sprouted or grew by units of duration of finite amount, just as our perceptions of it grow by pulses, there would be no Zenoian paradoxes or Kantian antinomies to trouble us. All our sensible experiences as we get them immediately do thus change by discrete pulses of perception, each of which keeps saying "more, more, more," or "less, less, less," as definite increments or diminutions make themselves felt. The discreteness is still more obvious when, instead of old things changing, they cease, or when altogether new things come. Fechner's term of the "threshold," which has played such a part in the psychology of perception, is only one way of naming the quantitative discreteness of all our sensible experiences. They come to us in drops. Time itself comes in drops.

Our ideal decomposition of the drops, which are all that we feel, into still finer fractions, is but an incident in that great transformation of the perceptual order into a conceptual order, which is our intellect's task. It is made in the interest of our rationalising faculty solely. The times directly *felt* in the experiences of living subjects have originally no common measure. Let a lump of sugar melt in a glass, to use one of M. Bergson's instances. We feel the time to be long while waiting for the process to end, but who knows how long or how short it feels to the sugar? All *felt* times coexist

and overlap or compenetrates each other thus vaguely; but it pays us to reduce their confusion by plotting them on a common scale, and it pays us still more to plot, against the same scale, the successive steps into which nature's various changes may be resolved, whether sensibly or conceivably. We thus straighten out the aboriginal privacy and vagueness, and can date things publicly, as it were, and by each other. The notion of one objective and "evenly flowing" time, cut into numbered instants, applies itself to all the phases, no matter how many, into which we cut the processes of nature. They are now definitely later or earlier one than another, and we can handle them mathematically, as we say, and far better, practically as well as theoretically, for having thus correlated them.

Motion, to take a good example, is originally a turbid sensation, of which the native shape is very confused. But the mathematical mind intellectualises motion completely and puts it into a definition that can be used by logic: motion is now conceived as "the occupancy of serially successive points of space at serially successive instants of time." With such a definition we escape wholly from the turbid privacy of sense. But do we not also escape from sense-reality altogether? For this definition is of the absolutely static. It gives a set of one-to-one relations between space-points and time-points, which relations themselves are as fixed as the points are. It gives *positions* assignable *ad infinitum*, but how a body ever gets from one position to another it omits to mention. The body gets there by moving, of course; but the conceived positions, however multiplied, contain no element of movement; so Zeno, using positions exclusively in his discussion, has no alternative but to say that our intellect brands motion as a non-reality. Intellectualism here surely makes experience less instead of more intelligible.

We of course need a stable scheme of concepts, stably related with each other, to lay hold of our experiences by. New reality, as it comes, gets conceptually strung upon this or that element of the scheme, which we have abstracted and

named. The immutability of such an abstract scheme is its great practical merit; the same identical terms and relations in it can always be recovered and referred to. Change itself is just such an inalterable concept. But all these abstract concepts are but as flowers gathered; they are only moments dipped out from the stream of time, snap-shots taken, as by a kinetoscopic camera, at a life that is continuous. Useful as they are as samples of the garden, or to re-enter the stream with, or to insert in our revolving lantern, they have no value but this practical value. You cannot explain by them what makes any single phenomenon be or go—you merely dot out the path it traverses. For you cannot make continuous being out of discontinuities, and your concepts are discontinuous. The stages into which you analyse a change are *states*; the change itself goes on between them. It lies along their intervals, inhabits what your definition fails to gather up, and thus eludes conceptual explanation altogether. "When the mathematician," Bergson writes, "calculates the state of a system at the end of a time t , nothing need prevent him from supposing that betweenwhiles the universe vanishes in order suddenly to appear again at the due moment in the new configuration. It is only the t -th moment that counts—that which flows throughout the interval, namely real time, plays no part in his calculation. . . . In short, the world on which the mathematician operates is a world which dies and is born anew at every instant, like the world which Descartes thought of when he spoke of a continued creation." To know adequately what really *happens* we ought to see into the intervals, but the mathematician sees only the extremities of these. He fixes a few results, he dots a curve, he substitutes a tracing for a reality.

This being so undeniably the case, the history of the way in which philosophy has dealt with it is curious. The ruling tradition in philosophy has always been the Platonic and Aristotelian belief that fixity is a nobler and worthier thing than change. Reality must be one and inalterable. Concepts,

being themselves fixities, agree best with this fixed nature of truth, so that for any knowledge of ours to be quite true it must be knowledge by universal concepts rather than by particular experiences, for these notoriously are mutable and corruptible. This is the tradition known as rationalism in philosophy, and what I called intellectualism is only the extreme application of it. In spite of sceptics and empiricists, in spite of Protagoras, Hume, and James Mill, rationalism has never been seriously questioned, for its sharpest critics have always had a tender place in their hearts for it, and have obeyed some of its mandates. They have not been consistent; they have played fast and loose with the enemy; and Bergson alone has been radical.

To show what I mean by this, let me contrast his procedure with that of some of the transcendentalist philosophers whom I have lately mentioned. Coming after Kant, these pique themselves on being "critical," on building, in fact, upon Kant's "critique" of pure reason. What that critique professed to establish was this, that concepts do not apprehend reality, but only such appearances as our senses feed out to them. They give immutable intellectual forms to these appearances, it is true, but reality *an sich*, from which in ultimate resort the sense-appearances have to come, remains for ever unintelligible to our intellect. Take motion, for example. Sensibly, motion comes in drops, waves, or pulses; either some actual amount of it, or none, being apprehended. This amount is the datum or *Gabe* which reality feeds out to our intellectual faculty; but our intellect makes of it a task or *Aufgabe*—this pun is one of the most memorable of Kant's formulas—and insists that in every pulse of it an infinite number of successive minor pulses shall be ascertainable. These minor pulses *we* can indeed go on to ascertain or to compute indefinitely if we have patience; but it would contradict the definition of infinity to suppose the endless series of them to have successively counted *themselves* out piecemeal, and got beyond their own serial limit. Zeno made this manifest; so the infinity which our intellect requires

of the sense-datum is thus a future rather than a past infinity. The structure of the datum must be decomposable by our conception *ad infinitum*, but of the steps by which that structure actually got composed we know nothing. Our intellect casts, in short, no ray of light on the processes by which experiences make themselves.

Kant's monistic successors have in general found the data of immediate experience even more antinomic than Kant did. Not only the character of infinity involved in the relation of the various empirical wholes to their "conditions," but the very notion that empirical things should be related to one another at all, has seemed to them, when the intellectualistic fit was upon them, full of paradox and contradiction.

Bergson alone challenges the intellect's theoretic authority in principle. He alone denies that logic can tell us what is possible or impossible in the world of being or fact; and he does so for reasons which, at the same time that they rule logic out from lordship over the whole of life, define a vast sphere of influence where its sovereignty is indisputable. Bergson's own text, felicitous as it is, is too intricate for quotation, so I must use my own inferior words in explaining what I mean.

In the first place, logic, giving primarily the relations between concepts as such, and the relations between natural facts only secondarily, or so far as the facts have been already identified with concepts and defined by them, must of course stand or fall with the conceptual method. But the conceptual method is a transformation which the flux of life undergoes at our hands in the interests of practice primarily, and only subordinately in the interests of theory. We live forward, we understand backward, said a Danish writer; and to understand life by concepts is to arrest its movement, cutting it up into bits as if with scissors, and immobilising these in our logical herbarium, where, comparing them as dried specimens, we can ascertain which of them statically includes or excludes which other. This treatment supposes life to have already accomplished itself, for the concepts, being so many views taken after

the fact, are retrospective and *post-mortem*. Nevertheless, we can draw conclusions from them and project them into the future. We cannot learn from them how life made itself go or how it will make itself go; but, on the supposition that its ways of making itself go are unchanging, we can calculate what positions it will take, what phases it will exhibit hereafter under given conditions. We can compute, for instance, where Achilles will be, and where the tortoise will be, after twenty minutes. Achilles may then be far ahead; but the full detail of how he will have managed to get there our logic never gives us—we have seen, indeed, that it finds its own results self-contradictory. The computations which the other sciences make differ in no respect from those of mathematicians or mechanics. The concepts, all of them, are dots through which, by interpolation or extrapolation, curves are drawn, while along the curves other dots are found as consequences. The latest refinements of logic dispense with the curves altogether, and deal only with the dots and their correspondences each to each in various collections. The authors of these recent improvements tell us expressly that their aim is to abolish the last vestiges of intuition, *videlicet*, of reality, from the field of reasoning, which then will operate literally on static mental dots or bare abstract units of objectivity and on the ways in which they may be grouped.

In the sense of yielding deeper insight, concepts have thus no theoretic value, for they fail wholly to connect us with the inner life of the flux or with the real causes that govern its direction. Instead of being revealers of reality, they negate *sensible* reality altogether. They make the whole notion of a causal influence between finite things incomprehensible. No real activities, and indeed no real connections of any kind, can obtain; for to be distinguishable, according to intellectualism, is to be incapable of connection. The work begun by Zeno, and continued by Hume, Kant, Herbart, Hegel, and Bradley, does not stop till sensible reality lies entirely disintegrated, at the feet of "reason."

Of the "absolute" reality which reason proposes to substitute for sensible reality, I might say more were there space. Meanwhile, you see what Professor Bergson means by insisting that the function of the intellect is practical rather than theoretical. Sensible reality is too concrete for us. To get from one point in it to another we have to plough or wade through the whole intolerable interval. No detail is spared us; it is as bad as the barbed-wire obstructions at Port Arthur, and we grow old in the process. But with our faculty of abstracting and fixing concepts we are there in a second, as if we controlled a fourth dimension, skipping the intermediaries as by a divine winged power, and getting at the exact point we require without entanglement with any context. The operation is practical because its terminus is particular. The sciences in which it triumphs are those of space and matter, where the transformations of external things are dealt with. To deal with moral facts conceptually we have to use brain-diagrams or physical metaphors, treat ideas as atoms, interests as mechanical forces, our conscious "selves" as "streams," and the like. Paradoxical effect! as Bergson remarks, if our intellectual life were destined to reveal the inner nature of reality. One would then suppose that it would then find itself most at ease and at home in the domain of intellectual realities. But it is precisely there that it finds itself at the end of its tether. We know the inner movements of our spirit only perceptually. We feel them live in us, but can give no distinct account of their elements, nor definitely predict their future; while things that lie along the world of space, things of the sort that we *handle*, are what our intellects cope with most successfully. Does not this confirm us in the view that the original and still surviving function of our intellectual life is to guide us in the practical adaptation of our activities?

One can easily get into a verbal mess at this point, and my own experience with "pragmatism" makes me shrink from the dangers that lie in the word "practical." Rather than insist upon that word, I am quite willing to part company with

Professor Bergson and to ascribe a primarily theoretical function to our intellect, provided you simultaneously discriminate "theoretic" or scientific knowledge from the deeper "speculative" knowledge aspired to by most philosophers, and concede that theoretic knowledge, which is knowledge *about* things, as distinguished from living contemplation or sympathetic *acquaintance* with them, touches only the outer surface of reality. The surface which theoretic knowledge covers may indeed be enormous in extent, it may dot the whole diameter of space and time with its conceptual creations, but it does not penetrate a millimetre into the solid dimension. That inner dimension of reality is occupied by the activities that keep it going; but pure intellectualism, speaking through Hume, Kant, and Co., finds itself obliged to deny that activities have any intelligible existence. What exists for *thought*, we are told, is at most the results that we illusorily ascribe to such activities, strung along the surfaces of space and time by laws of nature which only state co-existences and successions.

Thought deals thus solely with surfaces. It can name the thickness of reality, but it cannot fathom it, and its insufficiency here is essential and permanent, not temporary. The only way in which to apprehend reality's thickness is either to experience it directly by being a part of reality oneself, or to evoke it in imagination by sympathetically divining someone else's inner life. But what we thus concretely experience or divine is very limited in duration, whereas abstractly we are able to conceive eternities. Could we feel a million years concretely as we now feel a passing minute, we should have very little employment for our conceptual faculty. We should know the whole period fully at every moment of its passage, whereas we must now construct it by means of concepts which we project. Direct acquaintance and conceptual knowledge are thus complementary of each other; each remedies the other's defects. If what we care most about be the synoptic treatment of phenomena, the massing of the like and the vision of the

far, we must follow the conceptual method. But if we are more curious about the inner nature of reality or about what really *makes it go*, we must turn our backs upon our winged concepts altogether, and bury ourselves in the thickness of those passing moments upon the surface of which they only occasionally rest and perch.

Professor Bergson thus inverts the traditional Platonic doctrine absolutely. Instead of intellectual knowledge being the profounder, he calls it the more superficial. Instead of being the only adequate knowledge, it is grossly insufficient, its only superiority being the practical one of enabling us to make short cuts through experience and thereby to save time. The one thing it cannot do is to reveal the inner nature of things. Dive back into the flux itself, then, Bergson tells us, if you wish to *know* reality—that flux which Platonism, in its strange belief that only the immutable is excellent, has always spurned. Turn your face towards sensation, that flesh-bound thing which rationalism has always loaded with abuse. This, you see, is exactly the opposite remedy from that of looking forward into the absolute, which our idealistic contemporaries prescribe. It violates our mental habits, being a kind of passive inward listening or auscultation, quite contrary to that effort to react outwardly and verbally on everything, which is our usual intellectual pose.

What, then, are the peculiar features in the perceptual flux which the conceptual translation so fatally leaves out?

When we conceptualise, we cut out and fix and exclude everything but what we have fixed. A concept means a *that-and-no-other*. Conceptually, time excludes space; motion and rest exclude each other; approach excludes contact; presence excludes absence; unity excludes plurality; independence excludes liability; “mine” excludes “yours”; this relation excludes that relation — and so on indefinitely; whereas in the real concrete sensible flux of life experiences compenetrates each other, so that it is not easy to know just what is absolutely excluded. Past and future, for example,

conceptually separated by the cut to which we give the name of present, are to some extent, however brief, co-present with each other throughout experience, the only present ever realised concretely being the "passing" moment in which the dying rearward of time and its dawning future for ever mix their lights. Say "now," and it *was* even while you say it.

It is just intellectualism's attempt to substitute static cuts for units of experienced duration that makes real motion so unintelligible. The living reality Achilles is only the name of a certain phenomenon of impetus, as the tortoise is of another, and asks no leave of logic. The velocity of his acts is an indivisible nature in them like the expansive tension in a spring compressed. The spaces and times in which he inwardly lives are probably as different as his velocity from the same things in the tortoise. The motion of Achilles carries space, time, and conquest over the inferior creature's motion indivisibly in it. He perceives nothing, while running, of the mathematician's homogeneous time and space, of the infinite cuts in both, or of their order. End and beginning fall in one for him, and all he actually *experiences* is that in the midst of a certain effort of his the rival is in point of fact outstript.

What to the majority of readers will probably make this account seem muddiest confusion is that it presents, *as if they were dissolved in each other*, a lot of differentials which retrospective conception breaks life's flow by keeping apart. But *are* not differentials actually dissolved in each other? Hasn't every bit of experience its quality, its duration, its extension, its intensity, its urgency, its clearness, and many aspects besides, no one of which can exist in the isolation in which our verbalised logic keeps it? They exist only *durcheinder*. Reality always is, in M. Bergson's phrase, an endosmosis or conflux of the same with the different. They compenetrates and telescope. For conceptual logic, the same is nothing but the same, and all same with a third thing are the same with each other. Not so in concrete experience.

Two spots on our skin, each of which feels the same as a third spot, when touched along with it, are felt as different from each other. Two tones, neither by itself distinguishable from a third tone, are perfectly distinct from each other. The whole process of life is due to life's violation of our logical axioms.

The great clash of intellectualist logic with sensible experience is where the experience is of influence exerted. Intellectualism denies that finite things can act on each other, for all things once translated into concepts remain shut up to themselves. To act on anything means to get into it somehow; but that would mean to get out of one's self and be one's other, which for intellectualism is self-contradictory, etc. Meanwhile, each of us actually *is* his own other to that extent, livingly knowing how to perform the trick which logic tells us can't be done. My thoughts animate and actuate this very body which you see and hear, and thereby influence your thoughts. The dynamic current somehow does get from me to you, however numerous the intermediary conductors may have to be. Distinctions may be insulators in logic as much as they like, but in life distinct things can and do commune together.

These scanty indications will perhaps suffice to put you at the Bergsonian point of view. The immediate feeling of life solves the problems which so baffled our conceptual intelligence. "How can what is manifold be one? How can things get out of themselves? how be their own others? How be both distinct and connected? How can they act on one another? How be for others and yet for themselves? How be absent and present at once?" The intellect asks these questions much as we might ask how anything can both separate and unite, or how sounds can grow more alike by continuing to grow more different. If you already know space sensibly you can answer the former question by pointing to any interval in it, long or short; if you know the musical scale you can answer the latter by sounding any octave; but you must know these answers as *sensations*. Similarly Bergson answers the intellectualist conundrums by pointing

back to our finite sensational experiences and saying, "Lo, even thus, even so, are these other problems solved livingly."

When you have broken the reality into concepts you never can reconstruct it in its wholeness. Out of no amount of discreteness can you manufacture the concrete. But place yourself at a bound, or "*d'emblée*," as M. Bergson says, in the living thickness of the real, and all the abstractions and distinctions are given into your hand: you can now make the intellectualist substitutions to your heart's content. Instal yourself in phenomenal movement, for example, and velocity, succession, dates, positions, and innumerable other things are given you in the bargain. But with only an abstract succession of dates and positions you can never patch up movement itself. It slips through their intervals and is lost.

So it is with every concrete thing, however complicated. Our intellectual handling of it is a retrospective patchwork, a *post-mortem* dissection, and can follow any order we find best. We can make the thing seem self-contradictory whenever we wish to. But place yourself at the point of view of the thing's interior *doing* and all these back-looking and conflicting conceptions lie harmoniously in your hand. Get at the expanding centre of a human character, the vital impetus of a man, as Bergson calls it, by living sympathy, and at a stroke you see how it makes those who see it from without interpret it in such diverse ways. It is something that breaks alternately into both honesty and dishonesty, courage and cowardice, stupidity and insight, at the touch of varying circumstances, and you feel exactly why and how it does this, and never seek to identify it stably with any of these single abstractions. Only your intellectualist does that,—and you also feel why he does it.

Place yourself similarly at the centre of a man's philosophic vision and you understand at once all the different things it makes him write or say. Keep outside, use your *post-mortem* method, try to build the philosophy up out of the single phrases, taking first one and then another and trying to make

them fit together and construct the vision, and of course you fail. You crawl over the thing like a myopic ant over a building, tumbling into every microscopic crack or fissure, finding nothing but inconsistencies, and never suspecting that a centre exists. I hope that some of the philosophers among my readers may occasionally have had something different from this type of criticism applied to their own works!

What really exists is not things made but things in the making. Once made, they are dead, and an infinite number of conceptual decompositions can be used to define them. But put yourself *in the making* by a stroke of intuitive sympathy with the thing, and the whole range of possible decompositions coming at once into your possession, you are no longer troubled with the question which of them is the more absolutely true. Reality *falls* in passing into conceptual analysis; it *mounts* in living its own undivided life. It buds and burgeons, changes and creates. Once adopt the movement of this life, and you know what Bergson calls the *devenir réel* by which all things evolve and grow. Philosophy should seek this kind of living acquaintance with the movement of things, not follow science in vainly patching together fragments of the movement's dead results.

Thus much of M. Bergson's philosophy is sufficient for my present purpose, so I will leave unnoticed all its other constituent features, original and interesting though they be. Doubtless some readers will think that his remanding us to the sensation life in this wise is only a regress, a return to that ultra-crude empiricism which our idealists since Green have buried ten times over. I confess that it is indeed a return to empiricism, but I think that the return in such accomplished shape only proves the latter's immortal truth. What won't stay buried must have some genuine life. *Am Anfang war die That*; fact is a *first*, to which all our conceptual handling comes as an inadequate *second*, never its full equivalent. When I read recent transcendentalist literature—I must partly except my colleague Royce!—I get nothing but a sort

of marking of time, champing of jaws, pawing of the ground, and resettling into the same attitude, like a weary horse in a stall with an empty manger. It is but turning over the same few threadbare categories, bringing the same objections, and urging the same answers and solutions, with never a new fact or a new horizon coming into sight. But open Bergson, and new horizons open on every page you read. It is like the breath of the morning and the song of birds. It tells of reality itself, instead of reiterating what dusty-minded professors have written about what other previous professors have thought. Nothing in Bergson is shop-worn or at second hand.

That he gives us no closed-in system, will of course be fatal to him in intellectualist eyes. He only evokes and invites; but he first *annuls the intellectualist veto*, so that we now join step with reality with a philosophical conscience never thoroughly set free before. As a French disciple of his well expresses it: "Bergson claims of us first of all a certain inner catastrophe, and not everyone is capable of such a logical revolution. But those who have once found themselves flexible enough for the execution of such a psychological change of front, discover somehow that they can never return again to their ancient attitude of mind. They are now Bergsonians, and possess the principal thoughts of the master all at once. They have understood in the fashion in which one loves, they have caught the whole melody and can thereafter admire at their leisure the originality, the fecundity, and the imaginative genius with which its author develops, transposes, and varies in a thousand ways, by the orchestration of his style and dialectic, the original theme."¹

This, scant as it is, is all that I can say about Bergson in this article, but I hope it may suffice to send some of my readers to his original text.

WILLIAM JAMES.

Gaston Rageot, *Revue Philosophique*, vol. lxiv. p. 85 (July 1907).

THE SOCIAL CONSCIENCE OF THE FUTURE.¹

II. THE NEW RIGHTEOUSNESS.

MISS VIDA SCUDDER.

V.

Now we come to the crucial question. Is this moral transformation on which we so perpetually dwell actual?

It is going on under our eyes. It is the modern miracle. This article is written, not to preach but to interpret—not to urge a far duty, but to reveal a present process.

True, the process is carried on against tremendous odds. Let us glance back at them a moment. Here, to begin with, is that instinctive hatred of restraint which we have seen to pervade the interior life in modern society—the profound, subtle, and deliberate practice of self-indulgence in its finer and more dangerous forms which has captured our education and our religion, and is fighting hard to capture our domestic ethics. Next comes the fact that socialism in its present militant phase does itself engender to a great extent that very spirit of egotism and revolt which will be fatal to the socialist state when it arrives. Remember, finally, that we have seen that the virtues which can alone maintain the socialist state are discouraged rather than fostered by the present order—some of the most important being discountenanced as mere passports to social failure:—and it becomes

¹ Continued from the January issue, 1909.

evident that to prepare the soul of man for the New Society is a task as difficult as it is glorious.

It is the task that lies before our generation ; and in the depths of life, individual and corporate, it is even now being achieved.

But just at this point confession is in order. Should any orthodox socialist happen upon these pages, he will dismiss them with a shrug. And the sacred teachings of Marx ? Economic determinism ? The class-war and class-consciousness ? The self-assertion of the proletariat as the only means of progress, and the general worthlessness to social advance of the altruistic or sentimental factor ?

As to some of these implications, one must simply deny them. The will and purpose of men have played their part among other more automatic forces at every stage of progress. And the struggle of the awakened proletariat for their rights has always been supplemented by some sympathy in the hearts of the privileged.

But as for the class-war, it is a fact, and a stern one. It smoulders in every factory ; it flares out in every instance of extortion and oppression. We perceive it in the cruel and vile distrust of the poor which is all too often encountered among the privileged ; it is seen no less in the rising indignation and bitterness of the workers. Strikes, lockouts, boycotts, injunctions, are its ominous weapons. In skirmishes now and again, red blood has been shed. Class is pitted against class, and the ranks are closing.

Will this guerilla warfare lead on to revolution ? We cannot know. The Christian churches, perhaps, hold the key to that situation. We trust that so cruel a failure of the American ideal need not be visited upon us : we shall do all we can to spell our revolution without the R. But the event is on the knees of the gods. And if Kropotkine's saying, that revolutionary crises are a necessary phase of evolution, is to find example once more, and the Christian peoples should prove stupid and blind enough to fling themselves into civic

strife, we may expect the socialists to fight as bravely as gravely. For their cause is sacred to them: most sacred of all causes that have ever called for heroes and patriots, since it is the cause of universal freedom.

Now it is obvious that under these circumstances, socialist morals must for the present be largely militant. The Marxian will tell you that non-resistance, fraternity, the spirit of service, are all very well for the future: they shall be the fair children of the civilisation to be. But the virtues begotten of the present are the virtues of the battle-field, and the true socialist to-day is soldier, not peacemaker.

Yet the greatest soldiers have been also great lovers of peace. And what must be asserted against claptrap, even if that claptrap be talked in the name of Marx, is that the socialist movement in Europe is disinterested in its aim. No sensible socialist expects a personal gain from his creed, or looks for the absolute triumph of his cause in his own lifetime. The socialist leaders are neither demagogues nor anarchists, impelled by the desire to snatch privilege for themselves. They are men so able that if they chose to leave the proletariat ranks they could easily make their way to personal success along accredited lines. What socialist parties seek is not, as they patiently and constantly explain, the transfer of privilege: it is the abolition of privilege.

Hate and rage enough are in the movement. Discontent and vague revolt fester in it poisonously. But these are simply the scum; the good brew is below. If socialists were not a little ashamed to appear as good as they are, they could win the world much faster. As for class-consciousness, it is not in itself an evil thing. The consciousness of the group has been from tribal days a chief form of moral education. Class feeling is not the last ideal; but we may question whether it is not at least as ennobling as family feeling, and whether loyalty to a class may not well be as glorious a thing as loyalty to a nation. In a way it is finer, in proportion as it is more comprehensive, and overcomes more deep-seated

antagonisms of religion and of race. Modern class-consciousness will probably be recognised in the future as the most widely ennobling form of group-consciousness evolved up to this point in the history of the race: this, at least, is the conclusion forced upon the dispassionate observer who watches the force actually at work, whether in socialism or in the trades-union movement. It is a long step toward that perfect loyalty to the Whole which Royce of Harvard proclaims to be the mother of all the virtues.

But of course this loyalty to the Whole is the end of our aspiration, though under real stress it is to be feared that few indeed of us achieve it positively and fully. This further passion for all humanity is not denied to socialism even in its most militant phases. The people are rallying to this banner, whether consciously or not, for the sake of all men. If they work for the emancipation of one class, that class comprises the majority; and they believe that with its salvation will come the salvation of all. They fight the battles of the oppressed in part for the sake of the oppressor, aware that rich as well as poor are to-day so fast in prison that they cannot get out.

Marx devoted his high powers to a brilliant and only in part fallacious analysis of inexorable economic forces. The time has come to recognise the correlative play of intelligence and will, and to acknowledge that the spirit which demands fair play and a fair chance for all is the conscious inspiration of the socialist movement. Sacrifice is at the heart of its revolt: its motives are disinterested as those of Italian patriots in the Risorgimento, or of combatants on either side in the American civil war. Many traits at present developed in the movement are, it is true, militant: some must be discarded, as we have seen, before the movement can be purified, and others are likely to impede rather than to help the civilisation for which they call. Yet among these militant virtues there are many that have enduring value and are not far from the virtues of peace. The drill of the soldier in

watchful patience, in submission, in alertness, in the power of collective action, is good preparation for the citizen to be.

And as for that more general preparation of spirit with which we have been more specially concerned, who can doubt the penetrating quality of the forces at work? The quick and sensitive ear hears the beat of a new music, to which men begin to rally. It is a concerted harmony, no mere solitary bugle-call; and those who march to it are more or less consciously swayed by a new rhythm. For it is notable that the rhythms of life are coming more and more to connote harmony rather than melody, or rather to weave many melodic phrasings into one complex whole. Association—or, to use the fairer word, fellowship—becomes a term of increasing modern cogency. There are still those who rebel against organised and concerted effort, and prefer to shape life and work so far as may be in isolation. But they are a minority: most people gravitate more and more into groups, whether the end be intellectual pleasure, religious experience, or social service. Within that infinitely varied consciousness, the nation, are forming varied voluntary fellowships—centres of common life, the hope and promise of the democracy. This immense development of organisations is no mechanical fact: it is a spiritual necessity. Whether or no they prefigure such forms of voluntary co-operation as shall control some day the social and industrial order, they have at all events a prophetic significance, for they bear witness to the craving among us for a high development of free associated life.

A surprising number of such organisations concern themselves with distinctly “social” activities. Preoccupation with the general well-being is swiftly growing from sporadic sentiment to sustaining motive. Oh, the battle is not won yet! When the Pan-Anglican Congress was planning, the authorities, after the manner of authorities, had omitted all provision for discussing the social aspects of Christianity. The pertinacity of one man forced the reference of the matter to the dioceses. So overwhelming a demand came back for discus-

sion on these lines that it was given a leading place on the programme, and threw every other interest at the Congress into the shade. Read the declaration, again, of a body of American ministers of all denominations :

“We believe that the present social system, based as it is on the sin of covetousness, makes the ethical life as inculcated by religion impracticable, and should give place to a social system founded on the Golden Rule and the royal law of the Kingdom of God, ‘Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,’ which, realised under the co-operative commonwealth, will create an environment favourable to the practice of religious life.”

Note the extraordinary growth of philanthropic effort and its swift enlightenment, so that where twenty-five years ago it was content with the ambulance work of caring for society's victims, it is to-day attacking causes and pleading for reconstruction, and announces officially at a quarter-centennial in New York that the feasible task before the coming generation is the elimination of poverty and the limitation of disease. But there is scant need to dwell on formal utterances or activities. Talk with your friends ; look into your own heart. Is not the social compunction which you find astir there shot through with strange flashes and pulses of hope ? Do you not at least know that if the prospect of release from the great burden of communal misery and social sin could be effectively offered, a large proportion of plain men and women would leap to that prospect more eagerly than to any prospect of personal gain ? Noting these things, who can doubt that a new spirit is born into the world, and that socialism, should it come, would come as no alien yoke but as the satisfaction of deep desire ? The ideal on which Christianity has been insisting against heavy odds for well-nigh two thousand years, now in the fulness of time, aided by the mature powers of democracy, has a chance such as history never before presented of being partially realised on earth. He who denies the possibility, denies democracy and Christianity alike.

VI.

But there is a more personal point of view, and a more intimate preparation is called for. "Let your conversation be in heaven," says the Apostle quaintly—meaning, by conversation, your relations with your fellow-men. How have our conversation in the heaven of fellowship and goodwill while we play our parts in a world where most men are eagerly bent on self-advancement? How live in celestial places while our feet tread the modern streets? To learn how is a task involving no small degree of self-restraint, initiative, and endurance; it is of those hidden tasks, involving unseen martyrdoms, by which the world is saved.

For the fulfilment of it we have no original virtues to propound. The attitude in which we must be training ourselves is extremely ancient: we have no new code to offer, only a new incentive. But it is an incentive that should help the race to a great moral revival. Thank God, those other-regarding virtues which will make men harmonious and contented citizens of the socialist state are among us even now, making the modern wilderness to blossom as the rose. But it is a wilderness still, adorned only with occasional and ineffectual blossoms, and so it must remain, so long as the virtues that make for self-protection have in the main the right of way. If, however, we are confidently looking to the hour when the practice of brotherly love, self-forgetfulness, and unworldliness shall establish rather than threaten social stability, if ours is the hope to change the wilderness into a garden, are we not strengthened in our inner disciplines here and now? To be humble and loving through a passion for moral beauty and for inward peace is much. But we can add to-day to these motives, springing from the ineradicable logic of the heart, another and a broader. "For their sakes I sanctify myself," said the Lord Christ, and reconciled in the phrase for ever the rival claims of spiritual self-culture and of social service. Is not the way being made plain for the race

to use the great Word more clearly than ever before as a lantern unto its feet? By the exercise of the deepest and most personal virtues we shall be doing more than save our own souls and lighten the burden of life for individuals near to us; we shall be preparing the world for a new freedom. Let us develop in ourselves that loss of self in the general life which is poverty of spirit; that noble sorrow over the sufferings of the world which will lead to the world's consolation; that indifference to self-advancement which is Evangelical meekness, and which shall in the new day literally inherit the earth. Let us hunger and thirst—as the Vulgate translation has it—after justice. Let us practise mercy, purity of heart, and that positive passion of the peacemaker which, far from being passive, is truly the master-passion that must evolve from the present the world we long to see. If we do all this, we shall indeed in all certainty inherit the last beatitude, and be persecuted for righteousness' sake; but we shall also be hastening the day when these virtues will be the natural soul and the impelling motive-power of the social and economic organism of the new society.

And now, in conclusion, let us indulge in a little foresight. Let us try to look somewhat more deeply into the moral life of the possible future. What are some of the things likely to happen to character under socialism?

This is really the final consideration. For there is nothing beautiful or interesting or valuable in the world to compare for a moment with the people in it. To eliminate poverty would not be in the least worth doing unless we were going by this means to get a more delightful human race.

Well, there is no use in mixing socialism up with the millennium. We are safe in contradicting people who feel that we depict it as a sort of Fra Angelico paradise, very pretty but devoid of shadows. On the contrary, there may very likely be more real wickedness in the socialist state than we have to-day: quite enough, in any case, to avoid moral monotony and to give zest to life! But one hopes that there

will be less moral confusion than at present. We have seen that many paradoxes that now render our pursuit of virtue languid may be cleared away. And evil impulses may flourish all the more lustily on this very account. Greed and self-seeking, for instance, are not likely to be in the least eliminated when they are put in their true relation to the life of the social organism, and are commonly recognised to be destructive rather than productive powers. At first, indeed, they may be strengthened, and we may have a fine crop of new hypocrisies, for which a corporate management of industry, whether through Government or through voluntary co-operation, will afford rich opportunity. The dishonest man will be more aware than to-day that he is offending the conscience of the race: his practices will be more secretive, his evasions more ingenious; and in proportion as he sins against light will his sin react more deeply on his character. As the modern thug is worse than that gallant lover of the poor, good Robin Hood, so will the embezzler of the future be worse than his brother who runs to Canada to-day.

One foresees a countless number of new perils and new emphases. To touch on one only, the fate of purity in the socialist state is a great question. Quite possibly it may have a harder struggle to maintain itself than it does even to-day. The reaction from individualism may bring here a curious result. Theories of free love have of course absolutely nothing to do with economic socialism, in spite of a foolish confusion of thought in some quarters: nevertheless, one foresees that, as the idea of the sacredness of property shrinks and dwindles, one inferior and adventitious support to the monogamic marriage may be withdrawn. If purity as the Christian world understands it is to hold its own, it must do so through the development of that social instinct which recoils from sinning against love, and through that ready submission to discipline and restraint which should be instinctive to the new citizen, and should help him in every department of life and morals to a temperate and chaste existence.

Sloth, too, one may grant, will threaten for a time to be more or less wide-spread. If the socialist state should come swiftly, say in the days of our children, a certain indolence may well be contagious, in reaction from the fearful nervous strain of our own day. And perhaps there will always be inert people who furnish reluctantly their daily stint of work, evade it when they can, and sink back—shall we say, on the Bridge of the future? A leisure class would be no new phenomenon: and socialism would probably tend to check it more than the present system does. But, after all, we do not know how matters will work out. There will be, one trusts, a more vigorous race in the course of a few generations—a race in which the average workman will not die worn out, as he does to-day, at fifty. This race, freed from the exhausting dominion of fear of want, will be endowed with more healthful nerve and muscle. Great incentives will be at play on it: the primal zest of activity keen in every sound living thing, desire for honour, creative joy, and the newly stressed happiness in service. Ambition, debarred from accumulating riches, will find new and better fields for its gratification. When one sees the effort that the young sons of privilege who have a reasonably good physique put to-day into sports and mountain-climbing, one may well give over worrying about incentives to energy and industry in the coming race.

As for the virtues, some ingenious people are anxious lest they should in the future have no field for exercise:

“Mercy would be no more,
 If there were nobody poor;
 And pity no more would be
 If all were as happy as we.
 And mutual fear brings peace:
 Misery’s increase
 Are mercy, pity, peace.”

So reflected that most sardonic of mystics, William Blake, and the little outburst captures agreement. Certainly, compassion, that fair flower of Christianity, all but unknown to the pagan world, furnishes to-day a dominant religious motive.

With people who have eyes and hearts, an intolerable pity threatens to become a prevalent mood. It will be wonderful to have this great burden lifted from us ; no longer to dwell, in the summers, with the aching consciousness of the tenement populations ; of the massed workers in factories ; of the dying throngs of consumptives, feebly gasping life away ; of the thousands of children to whom the heritage of childhood is denied. When the stifling thought of these things no longer haunts our days, is it possible that a certain recklessness, a hardening of hearts, a general indifferentism, will follow ? Will tenderness languish as well-being spreads ?

It may be so in some quarters. But it may also be that the cessation of more obvious demands on compassion will, with choice natures, simply clear the way for a finer exercise of the virtue. Even now, we have some tenderness to spare for immaterial sorrows ; nor does poverty itself appeal solely on the score of material sufferings. " It is not because of his toils that I lament for the poor," wrote Carlyle, indignantly, in 1830 ; " but what I do grieve over is that the lamp of his soul should go out." If poverty should cease, there will be plenty of troubles left for us to grieve over ! All the bereavements of life—its inevitable separations—its thwarted affections—the struggle of the spirit forever seeking God and forever finding Him in part only—the very pain of finiteness—all these will continue to stab human nature with pangs as keen as those which wound it now ; still make of men fit objects of compassion, calling forth every effort to enlighten, to console, and to heal. New pains, doubtless, will also be born of new conditions, just as many of the more inward griefs that haunt the modern poets would have seemed mere tissue of dreams to a contemporary of Vergil. We may hope that tenderness may become more sensitive as the cruder demands upon it fail. As the race grows more comely, each lapse from personal beauty will be more keenly felt, and quicken more eager love and pity. To-day, hunger for rest possesses the majority ; it will be hunger to create in those better days to be ; and

since opportunities are to be at least roughly equal, and men will undoubtedly remain unequal, the need of humility on the part of those who cannot achieve anything effective in the freedom left from their appointed toil will be matched by the delicacies of respectful pity with which they will be regarded by those who are blessed with the great gift of creative power. One hopes, at least, that this pity will always remain respectful, but sees here chance for subtle temptations on both sides. The responsibility for failure can always be thrown back to-day by a man's own mind on his conditions. This form of consolation in the socialist state will be at least somewhat modified. Deeper self-knowledge and a clearing up of the confusions that obscure real values will apparently be among the products of the new order; and men will have to carry on, under new and more searching conditions, the never-ending battle against self-contempt and self-conceit. No, there will be no lapse in opportunities for compassion; the infinite pathos of man's existence, as he shivers between two eternities, will become plainer and plainer when the accidental and the preventable have been partly eliminated from his lot.

Compassion, after all, is only the Latin form of the word sympathy: a fact touchingly suggestive of the ancient conviction that to feel with a fellow-mortal is to grieve with him. And sympathy is to be the very keystone of the virtues in the socialist state. One even foresees new moral perils involved in its great probable development. To maintain a clear vision of an ideal of perfection and an inexorable personal standard, while identifying oneself with myriad types of thought and feeling — never to let tolerance slip into indifferentism—all this may be harder than it is to-day. But who would not take this risk for the sake of the deepening and liberation of the intuition of the larger life? The very intuition will bring its own salutary discipline. It will force us to cultivate brotherly affection without bounds; to condemn self-indulgence in anything that separates us from our fellow-men; to practise gentle courtesy

and loving-kindness with the irascible, the stupid, and the ugly. But, on the other hand, it will know a rich reward; for "elective affinities" in the wider sense will have freer play than they have ever known. We have only a faint foretaste now of what fellowship may mean in the enfranchised world when those class-barriers that now, in spite of the American fetish of equality, impede intercourse at a thousand points, are gone for good. We are too used to these barriers to realise their effects; but we have only to picture to ourselves a world in which all share in some respects the same class-tradition, and where the same types of education are open to all, to perceive in how wide a range and with what entirely unhampered naturalness the seeking spirit will find its own. Men will feel and act together with a spontaneity to-day unknown; voluntary co-operation, already, as we have seen, one of the marked signs of the new era, will assume an importance hardly to be imagined,—scientists, philosophers, artists, lovers of golf forgoing with a new delightful ease and freedom. In public and in private life alike, a quite unlimited joy will be found in the divers kinds of fragrances yielded by divers kinds of fellowship—varied as those exhaled from a summer garden.

The longer one thinks, the more clearly one sees how many "virtues of delight," like sympathy, are to-day half-suffocated and inhibited from developing themselves in freedom. May not the new life release them, and restore them to us, as it were, in the body of the Resurrection? Loyalty will play a close second to sympathy, for fellowship can never thoroughly realise itself until loyalty has a constraining power. Generosity, debarred from showing itself through money doles, will find a truer and more difficult scope in sharing, sometimes at cost of distasteful choices, the gifts and graces of the personal life. Hospitality will become a less material, more spiritual quality, leading men to open their hearts as well as their homes to those temperamentally repugnant as well as to the congenial. The spirit of service will be potently at work

in every department of life, from one's work for daily bread to the last detail of personal intercourse. Manners, the fine flower of morals, ought to be very charming in the socialist state—the natural expression of the instincts of the socialised man. Manners, when sincere, are habitually bad to-day, because we are constantly afraid that somebody is going to tread on our toes. When we are free from this dread, and no longer have to be absorbed in making our own way—in a word, when we have shaped the economic structure more rationally—we may hope to become a more gracious race. And so one might go on, showing how one fine impulse after another might have freer scope than it does now. Even voluntary poverty, that virtue unpopular to-day, partly because we so feel the curse of her step-sister, may once more charm the ear. One can imagine religious orders refusing to profit by that assured comfort which will be open to all men, but living as austere as the companions of St Francis for the sake of a clearer vision of the unsubstantial good.

VII.

And what of Spirituality? Will it wane and perish? Will a refined materialism, a satisfying and passionate "love of the very skin and surface of this fair earth on which we dwell," as William Morris puts it, replace all longing for a better country in those fortunate citizens of the future to whom the world shall be indeed the "Alma Parens" of our dreams?

Here, too, one foresees subtle perils, old temptations endued with a new power. When the whips and scorpions which have driven man Godward through the ages—Want, Fear, and Slavery—cease their cruel work, it may well be that he will be tempted to abide no longer as a pilgrim, but as a lord, feasting fat and full, and joyous in the present, till the Eternal fades from his earth-bound vision.

But if the temptation is great, the opportunity will be great also.

For religion, like ethics, languishes to-day in bondage. The one imperative necessity of putting an end to the infamous and unchristian conditions in which the masses of men are living, and of achieving a decent degree of human justice, absorbs more and more the most devout instincts of the human heart. The socialists, by whom the love of man is usually assumed to be the sum-total of religion, have against the Churches the just and constant grievance that the followers of the great Physician and great Revolutionist take no lead in the struggle for emancipation.

They are cruelly right :

“Ahi Costantin, di quanto mal fu matre
Non la tua conversion, ma quella dote
Che da te prese il primo ricco patre !”

Even without echoing Dante's cry, or reverting to the fourth century, we must at least recognise that the Church made an all but fatal blunder in the revolutionary period, when she turned away distrustful from the new forces of democracy and allied herself with the old régime of privilege. Bitterly she expiates her sin: there is no greater tragedy in Europe to-day than the antagonism between socialism and catholicism which divides the most ardent and religious spirits into two hostile camps, when they should be united in a common pilgrimage. Yet when we look at the Anglo-Saxon world, we perceive another aspect. Whether or not on enlightened lines, the English Churches are increasingly concerned with ministration to the great mass of human misery. Preaching tends more and more to pure humanitarianism, often feeble enough; institutional work directed to the restoration or maintenance of social health claims all the energies of the faithful; and we can hardly wonder if a cry arises in some quarters that the Churches themselves are losing their supreme interest in the things of the Spirit, and devoting themselves exclusively to social ethics. There is truth in the charge. Such intense interest in purely spiritual problems as has marked the great religious ages would be hard to find

among us. And perhaps it ought to be hard to find. Who could to-day honour the mystic who in a great modern city should shut his ears to the cries of the oppressed, and dedicate himself to the pursuit of a metaphysical light, or the solitary practice of the presence of a heartless God! St Teresa is organising settlements instead of convents. St Catherine of Genoa is head of a training-school for nurses, which leaves her scant leisure for ecstasies of "Pure Love." The social situation forces materialism on us all, if by materialism is meant a primary and troubled pre-occupation with the bodily and social needs of the human race.

Yet all the time we are aware that there is more to religion than this. No thinker was ever satisfied with the description of St James. To do justly and to love mercy is all very well, but how about walking humbly with one's God? Detachment, recollection, impassioned union with the Eternal, are no mere delusions of the childhood of the race, fading with the advancing day: they are the deepest necessity of humanity's manhood. Already a reaction is in order; the quest after the ultimate meaning of this mysterious life of ours revives on every hand. Strange mysticisms, turning often to the East, rise and thrive where modern materialism is hottest. Philosophy presses eagerly on its lonely way toward new aspects of idealism. Speculative movements, pathetically wild, but all the more significant, bear their witness to the inextinguishable thirst of the human soul for some immediate contact with the Unseen.

Now, to a world feverishly rebelling against the materialism that binds it, the social democracy would come with high message of relief. It would give the longed-for conditions under which spirituality once more could thrive. That command of the Master, "Take no thought for the morrow," which to-day saddens or almost angers the heart by its impracticability, could be literally followed in a social order where the individual life carried on its fruitful activities, sustained instead of thwarted by the life around it; a heart and mind at leisure

for higher interests would be the happy outcome. The Churches, free from that ignominious duty to serve tables which they can only escape to-day by denying their Lord; the philosophers, breathing a clearer air than ours; plain men and women, finding the problems of earth less urgently insistent, might quite conceivably turn once more to heavenly thoughts.

"The ethics of socialism are the ethics of Christianity," says the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, in a now famous definition. We have tried to show how these ethics may have a freer and fairer field for their endless struggle to mould humanity to a better likeness in the society to be. We hope for a time when the paradox that limits our practice of pure Christian virtues to private life, and makes that practice even there half-hearted, will be done away, and when the great principles of the Beatitudes shall become the evident law of social progress, as they are now the law of individual holiness. It will be much. It will lift the whole moral life of the race to a higher level. But it will not be enough. Ethics alone will never satisfy the human soul so long as the stars shine overhead. When that good future dawns, the distinctively religious life shall, we may hope, be restored to us. The ancient interest in Theology, noble queen of arts and sciences, will probably be renewed; and who can tell to what new effect the philosophical mind of the future will study the great mysteries? At all events, the practice of the mystical virtues that centre in relation not to our fellow-man, but to God, will have their chance, unchecked by social compunction or by the engrossing cares of this world. Not that we need fear a lapse into the contemplative temper that has rendered the East unprogressive: the organisation of the socialist state, with its healthful and universal law of productive labour, not to speak of the temperament of the Western nations, will preclude that danger. But a little opportunity to pause for contemplation, for prayer, and for thought will not hurt us. Many an inspiring reason summons us, each and all, to work, through

self-discipline and social and political action, for the co-operative civilisation of the future. And the highest reason of all, if not the most compelling, is the desire to liberate the religious life. The thought is too great to treat with justice at the close of a long paper ; we shall return to it in a third article. Meantime, it should already be clear that in the new order created by the common will we may expect, in the true sense, a revival of religion ; a renewed recognition that the eternal as well as the temporal has claims upon us ; and that it is not forbidden even to our mortality to hold converse with the things that, being unseen, abide. Beatrice again will take her rightful place, long usurped by Matilda ; and we too, gazing into her eyes, may behold the Image of the Most High. If there be a God, the socialist state will offer Him a better opportunity than we of the Western world have ever given Him before to draw the hearts of men upward to Himself.

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THE INSUFFICIENCY OF SOCIAL RIGHTEOUSNESS AS A MORAL IDEAL.

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THERE are several tendencies in the modern mind which seem to converge upon something more objective and central than that mind can itself provide. Humanity cannot explain itself. It does not carry in itself the chart of its own drift or the key of its own destiny. It moves to a point outside itself, to a point in God. The Christian creed says this point is in history, but not of it. It is the Kingdom of God in the person, and especially the cross, of Christ. The crucifixion, of course, is a historic fact, like Jesus, but the cross, the Atonement, like the Christ, is superhistoric. And it is in this superhistoric consummation—the Kingdom in the Cross—that many of our finest modern aspirations come to unity and rest.

These features are such as the passion for (1) unity of conception; (2) cosmic range; (3) social righteousness; (4) mercy, pity, and kindness.

1. There is no feature that more marks the mind of to-day than the craving for unity, and especially for unity of conception. It dominates the higher science; it is at the root of the hasty refuge some take in monism. It determines the higher churchmanship; it inspires the search for a real authority. And it moulds the higher politics; it moves in the aspirations for brotherhood and the ambitions of democracy.

2. Nay, the passion for unity rises to a cosmic scale.

Under the guidance of modern science we escape from abstract universals and we exult in cosmic realities and the cosmic imagination. Planetary systems are now more numerous than stars were once thought to be. Space not only swells, but its distension is organised. And human destiny itself expands in proportion. The soul that renounces a historic God is yet invited to lose itself in a cosmic emotion or an enthusiasm of humanity. The all submerges the God of the all, the all-presence the All-Father, or the All-Father the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.

3. With this goes the modern passion for righteousness, not merely for personal goodness, but for boundless good, for social righteousness. The demand grows for a reconstruction, a revolution if need be, of the social order in the interest of an ideal righteousness of no private interpretation. Public justice slowly but surely bears down private interests. It emerges more clearly as the dividing line between the two great parties. It seizes some people so vehemently that it becomes their religion; and personal religion wanes in consequence, and, with it, the membership of the churches. There was never an age when the passion for public righteousness covered so many, or promised so much.

4. Add to this the humanitarian passion for mercy, pity, tenderness to the weak, consideration for life or suffering. You can get money for hospitals when you can get it for nothing else. The children of the community were never so cared for, and the young had never such chances. The submerged have at last emerged. We awake to the valuable products that can be extracted by new machinery from the wastage and wreckage of society. We have the politics of pity, or at least of sympathy—threatening at times even to swamp the politics of justice and the sanity of law. There is, of course, much that points the other way still, but there never was so much pointing that way—the way of mercy, pity, and love.

Take such features, then, as these alone—the passion for

a unity or a centre, the passion for righteousness, especially social righteousness, the passion of sympathy or pity, and the passion which moves to conceive of such things on a cosmic scale. And then consider, on the other hand, the increased confusion in life, the loss of a centre of unity, the disagreement about righteousness, the inadequacy of philanthropy, the sense of oppression by the vastitude of the cosmos. Take all the moral confusion and the soul-schism which lead first to deliberate yet passionate pessimism in the midst of our conquest of the world, and then to the settled despair which multiplies suicide. It is an age of very great spiritual derangement and moral dissolution, in spite of its spiritual instincts and ethical ardours. And to this confusion is offered by the Church the threefold unity of the cross—the holy love and grace of God, the saving judgment on sin, and the new Humanity. My interpretation is that those great groping lines of social tendency I named above draw together to this point, which history alone does not provide, nor mere humanity explain. They find their focus in God's act of Christ's cross—where they not only meet and blend, but where they are fused and vitalised for a new future in the one burning centre of man and the world and God. The cosmic passion (2) of a merciful (4) justice (3) at the heart of the whole world (1) is realised only in the cross as the crowning act of a holy and gracious God—a God holy because he is the whole goodness of existence, and gracious because of the merciful love with which he goes out to save us into his own holiness.

Of these I would discuss here but (3) and (4).

There is no issue so vital to human society as righteousness. A society rises in the scale in proportion as righteousness is felt to be central and supreme. The right of the stronger may indeed be curbed by a social order which secures a balance of interests; but a mere balance of interests is too mechanical to be the law of a society essentially moral; and as we ascend the scale we mark the growth of this one interest over all the rest—the ubiquity and prevalence of righteousness. It is the

interest which is above all others humane and ethical. It deals with an ideal, and it makes it a reality for the conscience. And what it hears in the conscience is the social voice. Morality, for the modern thinker, is at least the total demand of the social will. It may be more, but it is that at least. It is a voice to the individual indeed, but a voice with a social word and a public note. The most hopeful thing in modern life is the growth of this ethical note, the progress of the passion for righteousness, and the elevation of the idea beyond individual integrity to social justice. The idea of righteousness carries us up from the mere decent man, through the upright man, to the truly social man; from the goodness of a man to the righteousness of a community; nay, beyond that, to a universal community thus just and right. But do we stop there? Surely all these still mean obedience to a law, a power, a standard, an authority. What of that power and authority itself? Where is the moral authority which is its own authority? Where is the goodness that is self-fed, self-ruled, self-moved, self-sufficing on an infinite scale? Where is the conscience that accounts for itself, and swears by itself because there is none greater? Are we not planted before the ineffable presence of one who is for ever fed from within with all the moral strength he needs, and is therefore the centre and fountain of the universe—the changeless, self-sustained, absolute, and *Holy* One? Is not the Holy God the heart of things and the head of things—the eternal good, central, self-poised, unshaken amid the millions of souls that lift to him their eye, their need, their cry, their trust or their hate, as his holiness goes out in love? Would entire faith be possible without that eternal and holy goodness, changeless behind all the love we trust? A love that could change we might love, but we could not trust it, however intense. It is the absolute holiness within love that is the ground of such trust in it as makes religion. It is this holiness that enables us to meet the love of God with faith, and not merely with gladness; to trust it for ever, and not only welcome it at a time. And the Christian plea is that

that eternal holiness is nowhere secured and satisfied but in the sinless cross, which is therefore at the centre of life and things.

Our thought must take that line and that flight. In our pursuit of unity we expand from social justice to cosmic law, and pass from man's relation to man up to his relation to the universe; and so we are driven to its God. There may or there may not be other inhabited worlds than this, or other intelligences than man's; but surely the whole righteousness of the universe is not exhausted in human justice. Were the whole race organised to the completest social justice and kindness, surely, till it was in due communion with His holiness, it would still be something less than the fulness of the whole order and counsel of the universe. It would be unjust to God still. Unless, indeed, the race be the God. Unless our *Grand Etre* be Humanity, and there be no perfection beyond the unity of the race in love, order, and progress. But is there not a righteousness which is as much more than social as social is more than individual? The doctrine of the Trinity rose from the soul to say there is. Is there not a holiness as far above the stage of justice as justice is above integrity? Is cosmic not something more even than social? And righteousness, equally cosmic, social, and personal—what can it be but absolute holiness, righteousness as vast as a cosmos which science shows us to be infinite, and as social as the personal relations within a triune God?

This is a singular thing to me. We are in an age which teems with cosmic science, expands with cosmic ideals, and glows with cosmic emotion. That on the one hand. On the other hand, it is an age that thrills to the ethical ideal and the social passion of righteousness. How is it that for the holiness of a universal, triune, and therefore social, God there should be, even among the religious, so many that are either indifferent or shy. I have even found hostility. It is strange that there should be such *borné*, not to say vulgar, aversion for the theologian. He is simply an ethicist on a more than cosmic scale, upon the authority of the cross. He is the rational

expositor of a cosmic righteousness revealed as the infinite holiness. He faces, he inhabits, a world of moral realities whose action is perfectly sure and infrangible, which is not mocked, and whose laws in their kind are no more to be defied with impunity than those of Nature; for God spared not his own Son. "The real and eternal dignity of Humanity is so bound up with this cosmic order of holiness that man would be diviner if he were broken maintaining its honour, than if his mere existence were secured by ignoring it." That is the world of an absolute holiness. To the theologian the absolute holiness of God stands for the like capital to that which the physicist finds in the uniformity of nature. Press, therefore, the centrality of righteousness, and social righteousness, on the one hand. Rise to the cosmic range of thought on the other. The more you do both, as our age does, so much the more central for the cosmos, for universal existence, for all reality, must be the absolute righteous reality—*i.e.* the Holy God, the Holy Trinity; and the more stable and unsparing must be both his demand and his deed. These meet in the cross. If in his deed he spares not his own Son it is because the welfare of the universe is bound up, above all else, with the unsparing nature of his holy, loving law, whereof that willing Son is the historic witness, warranty, and "coefficient Creator."

From another point of view, I do not find it quite easy to understand how it should be that many noble champions of a social righteousness can sit down under such an arrest of thought as they accept. Or is it an arrest of moral experience, all the more surprising in so much moral enthusiasm? Your passion for public righteousness or social justice, I would crave leave to say to them, you nourish as a universal ideal. And more. Your conflict is sustained by the vision of an ideal which is not merely æsthetic; that is, it is not duly met by contemplation alone. But it is ethical and practical. It descends upon you with the force of a demand. Your moral ideal does not simply exist to be beautiful in some corner, or

even in some central spot, like a marble dream in some *salon carré* of the world's Louvre. But it descends on you out of heaven from God, or what for you is God. It comes to you with no mere spectacular effect, but with compelling power. It lays its demand upon you to translate it into effect. It makes you not its amateurs but its organs and champions. It lies and presses upon your conscience, and not merely your imagination. It makes you sacrifice. Now your imagination of righteousness is not only so large as to be cosmic, but it is exigent, piercing, and pervasive in proportion. The breadth and the height and the depth of it are equal. The more lofty the righteousness is, and the more universal, so much the more subtle, searching, and exacting it must be. Can you have a telescopic infinity which is not microscopic as well? Can you think of a moral ideal for the whole world which is not urgent also on each whole soul? You feel the exigent, revolutionary demand of this general and eternal righteousness on society; you feel the mockery that current society offers to that ideal. How is it that you do not search as freely as you sacrifice? How is it that, with your passion for moral thoroughness, it does not search and abash your own conscience more than appears? How, if it be so imperative for society, does it find so much that is impervious in you? (I speak but of what you allow to appear.) The society it tries to its base includes you as a moral monad. How are you so sceptical about its inquisition of you, so stoical in the self-respect of your apostolate, or so reticent about any humiliating or shattering visitations of you, however rare? Your apostolate of that unearthly righteousness is most convinced, sincere, and earnest. How do you escape the guilt, the fear, the repentance of it? Whither has moral fear gone from the cultured world? Does the moral power only deal with social affairs, with a collective responsibility? How does your ethical sensibility react at wrongs but fail at sins? Have you none? Or no light that throws them up as sins, and burns and brands them into you? How is it that your

indignation shows so little trace of reacting and deepening into humiliation? The parable you take up against society in the name of public righteousness, how is it that you are not driven to turn it upon yourself? (Do forgive me, but there is no discharge in this war, and men must press each other hard here.) Are you really able to face your own conscience, your own moral memory, or your race's, with the same confidence as that with which you confront the egotists and capitalists who keep man from his social paradise? Does the moral analysis you apply to rend them never turn upon you with so much the more deadly subtlety as your standard is higher than theirs, and as you are better able to read yourself than them? How is it that the demand of entire social righteousness upon society fails to become the demand of complete, infinite holiness upon it and you? Is the moral world less than absolute and eternal—and penetrating, unsparing, accordingly? You are so worthily exigent, I do not understand why you are not more so; why, as you are so uncompromising, you are not more thorough; why your ethic is not co-extensive with your deep personality, why it is not a positive personal religion as it is a social theory for you; why, as you are undoubtedly modest, you have never gone on to humility; and why, with that modest sense of unworthiness, you do not feel yourself damnable, if only as a member of a solidary race which, if there be condemnation at all, is under a collective and inclusive condemnation.

Can it be that your moral standard, high and wide as it is, needs still to be truly universalised by theology of a practical kind? You have a high ideal, which you insist on laying upon all souls. Your motto is "Thorough." Do you not need (do forgive me if I am thorough too) one more high, more subtle, more comprehensive, more uncompromising, more holy, which will force its way into your whole soul, even to the rending of it, it may be? Your large moral world needs to rise heavenward in its ethical note till it break into a spiritual world whose height and depth and breadth are equal—a world as thorough

in its spiritual penetration as it is in its moral exigence. Does your moral ideal pierce as much as it presses? Are its eyes as fiery as its wings? Would it not press much harder if it pierced much more? Does it search as powerfully as it urges? Has it power as it has weight and worth? Does your ideal of righteousness not need, ere it can master the soul, to become the ideal of a holiness before which you cannot stand? Is righteousness finally possible for society till holiness gets its own?

You are too engrossed with the soul's conduct instead of the soul's quality. Your society would be but a mosaic of souls instead of a body of Christ. You would change men without changing the inmost heart, change conduct and relations without changing life. You would increase men's power of will without altering their style of will. But "the supreme ethic," says Weinel, "is not, like other ideals, beyond our power in its height, so much as it is beyond our own will in its nature." You are working on the level of the self-respecting moral gentleman, of the admirable English university product, who is in a position to live comfortably and finely on his moral means, absorb spiritual ideas, and ignore spiritual powers as if they were no nearer than London neighbours. But the moral issue of the world is fought in a far more inward region than that, and it turns on a far more inward crisis. "There are no *rentiers* in the moral life." And the battle-field of Christianity is not the clean and solvent soul of the moral *rentier*, the moral gentleman, but it is the moral bankrupt. There are far more of these than the refined English gentleman or lady knows, far more than writers on social subjects know, far more than is realised by those who handle the final moral issue with no other equipment than liberal thought and current culture. The moral crisis of society is in a region which you may know little of. You are bred, perhaps, in the sober, unbitten, and untragic atmosphere of intellectual West Ends, where evil is a study and not a curse. You have never felt the bottom drop out of your own soul, the ground give

way beneath your own moral nature, while flying voices scream that Macbeth has murdered sleep. You are masters of current ethic, but dilettanti of the moral soul. You have never had the experience which would give you intimate knowledge of the life that lies outside your ordered ways and kindly sets. You know no more than to say that a tragic repentance is rare now, and the sense of sin being outgrown, or that there are few people who live in actual personal relation with Jesus Christ, or are governed by his will. Why, there is not a section of the Church, and certainly of the Free Churches, that could not show them in thousands. You have not the experience of the priest in the confessional, or the trusted pastor in his intercourse with his flock. I would go a long way round to avoid offending you, but how can any detour prevent me from saying that, high, wide, and fine as your moral range is, you lack some experience of men, and some moral sensibility at spiritual pitch? You respond to a supreme good, but you do not to the Holy of Holies. Your supreme good is but in the making. Your righteousness far exceeds Scribe or Pharisee, but you do not rise to thorough self-judgment; nor from that to the consciousness of the perfectly holy Self that judges even your judgment of yourself. A few even outdo my audacity with *you* in a kind of intellectual levity with *us*. They venture to lecture the theologians, with an ill-veiled contempt for their methods, if not always for their beliefs. They lecture them both on their spirit and *their subject*, without giving any indication that they have studied, in a scientific way, either a book of the New Testament or a single metaphysical master, or a single theological classic. Nay, they have been known to propound a theology publicly, giving clear indication that to them epistemology is a foreign country, moral philosophy an unknown region, and ethical ideas quite tractable with a cosmic calculus. But I willingly admit few have this confidence. And they cannot well be treated on my present line. They treat the problems of metaphysic with a mere hypophysic, and wield a calculus of the subliminal

rather than the absolute, one more appropriate to the powers of an abyss than to the eternal and living God.

What lies incumbent on society for you (if I have your leave to return to you) is a law of righteousness. Yes, but what is it that lies incumbent, urgent, searching upon you for society, nay, for the sake of the power which is above society? Society is a collective and impersonal entity, and a law is all very well for that. But the soul is no mere impersonal entity. And the power that should rule it is no mere moral order, and no scheme of righteousness, and no Church nor society. It must be another soul, the righteous source of rights and home of duties, self-sufficing in its righteousness, a soul absolutely holy, and holy unto infinite love. Would it not be possible to gain the whole world for righteousness and lose our own soul? If you say that that is absurd, that to lose the soul in such altruism is to find it, I suggest that the supreme Teacher of that doctrine spoke only of losing the soul "for my sake and the gospel's." And might I further remind you that, by the most enlightened and modern interpretation, that peril was the essence of the temptation of Christ himself? His tremendous sense of moral power presented to him the possibility of conquering a social righteousness in man for God on lines which ignored the holy will of God in the cross. What might he not have done for a reformed society, by a Cromwellian empire with an Ironside army, or by such service of man as made the regeneration of Faust? But where would his own soul have been then, in the face of *his* calling of God, whose grace to him was to make him taste death for every man? There are things which we may not sacrifice to the most promising and beneficent of social causes. Neither men nor women may unsex their soul for any dream or phase of the Righteousness of God. But why should they not if social effect, as they see it, be all?

Over all your judgment of yourself or your society in righteousness is the judgment of your righteousness by the

holiness of God. And practically that is the holiness¹ of God in Christ. But you present me, perhaps, with two difficulties. First, that you find the divine love in the mind of the Christ of the Gospels, but not the divine holiness; for he does not speak of it. And second, that criticism has so reduced our data that it is very little we can say about the consciousness of Christ. But are we, then, come to this, that we cannot speak with any force of conviction about Christ as the first moral figure of history? You will not go so far as that, perhaps. But if he be the first, is Humanity such a poor thing, in even its most eminent, that he has been unable to prevent his choicest followers for two thousand years from a moral blunder so great as that of finding in him the very incarnation of the holiness of God, and in his cross its supreme and complete assertion? They have not preached him as the world prophet of social righteousness; they have persisted in finding him the incarnation of God's holiness; and they have made his effect on social righteousness to depend on that. Have they made a tremendous moral mistake? Was idolatry of himself the chief legacy of our greatest man to posterity?

I have in my venturesome mind not the popular dilettanti of a social reformation upon ethical lines, but earnest and accomplished students of the matter. And yet I must make bold to say reluctantly, and with great respect, that their obsession by the theological antipathy has made them such victims of theology (by its negation), and has so narrowed their mind thereby, that they have never taken due measure of Christ as a moral fact, still less as a moral factor in history. They have indeed been interested in the historical Christ, and they have owned the spell of his character in the procession of prophets. Carlyle did, for instance. But they have not dealt as seriously with the moral meaning of the fact as with its moral

¹ Perhaps I ought to have been explicit before now that by holiness is not meant anything so abstract or subjective as mystical absorption, but the whole concrete righteousness of existence, self-sustained at white heat. For our God is a consuming fire.

effect, or its æsthetic or historical aspect. They have never integrated him into the moral philosophy of history, into the grand moral psychology, into the spiritual organism of the race—as theology has at least tried to do. The historic or the ethical sense will carry a man far. But it will not carry him as far as the person of Christ takes him, if he give to that path a mind unstunted by scientific methods, or unstupefied by religious sentiment. You cannot treat Christ adequately by the historic sense, psychic research, cosmic emotion, the canons of natural ethic, or tender affection. The only adequate treatment of a fact so unique as Christ is the treatment proper to the moral nature of such a fact, the treatment it elicits and inspires, the treatment to which, in the first disciples, we owe anything that we know about him, the treatment by faith. You must trust him ere he seem worthy of your trust. He is really God only to the faith which has confessed him as Saviour. His incarnation is an evangelical and not a logical, not a metaphysical, demand. The Church's views about his person were forced upon those whom he not only impressed but regenerated, forced on them by the logic of living faith poring on the new creation that had passed them from death into life. It was only the scientific forms of these views that were affected by the philosophy of the hour, which did not, and cannot, give the certainty of their substance. It was a real redemption that Athanasius sought to secure by the metaphysical Trinity. And the experienced verdict (and not merely the orthodox deposit) of his living Church in history is, that Christ is the incarnate holiness of the world and of Eternity; that he is no mere part of past history, but of the race's total life; and no mere starting-point for the ideal, but the living object of each age's absolute faith. To trust him is not a leap in the dark, but it is a venture none the less. It is a venture of courage and not of despair, of insight and not of bewilderment. In an age like this the greatest moral courage lies, not in challenging faith, as the crude public believes, which believes in little more than

pluck. That is cheap heroism now. But true courage lies in pursuing, amid the dulness of the public, the triviality of the pious, the desolations of criticism, the assaults of foes, and the treason of friends, such faith as places the precious soul, the wondrous age, and the cosmic world for ever and ever in those hands which twenty centuries ago were nailed for our advantage to the bitter cross. To do that with open eyes to-day is a very great achievement of the soul, a very great venture of faith, and a very great exercise of moral courage of the silent and neglected sort. The world knows nothing of its debt to those who for the soul's sake are incessantly facing and laying the spectres of the mind.

If, now, we turn from the passion for unity, which carries us from a soul to a world, and from a world to the cosmic soul of God; or from the passion for universal righteousness, which carries us up to the supreme and holy judgment upon the cross; if we turn to the passion of human kindness, we are borne on, with the same high compulsion, to the Grace in the cross. The love of Christ constrains it.

The effective sympathy of man for man has historically sprung from the grace and pity of God. I say the effective sympathy. The Stoics had a fine humanism which spread to include the whole race; but it was only in idea. It could not translate itself into action. Its finest representative was the severest of persecutors—I mean Marcus Aurelius. The real and active philanthropy of men has sprung from "the philanthropy of God." If you say it has taken long to grow, I remind you of the practical and popular benevolence of the first Christian centuries, and the silent beneficence and pity that make the sweetest note in the long history of the Church—so much of it unsweet. Appropriating, correcting, and hallowing the humanism of the eighteenth century, capitalising it, so to say, by rooting it in God, this Christian humanism took, in the nineteenth, a new lease of life. And it has now come to a point of strain where it must draw deeply upon the inspirations of grace if it is to survive

the disillusionments that await a democracy merely human, and a socialism chiefly concerned with rights and comfort. The rights of man are but revolutionary and sterile without the grace of God. As in France and America, they do not make brotherhood, so much as a negative, *borné*, and prickly liberty. The love of man for man owes more to the grace of the cross than to any other influence. And no other influence can keep it alive or preserve it from futile sentiment. Those who see most of men, who have most intimately and practically to do with them, and who therefore see shrewdly into the average man, are not among the great lovers of men. Nor are we ourselves sometimes, when the strain of their contradiction grows tense, till we come out of the holy place where we met with God's love. When the capitalist stops his charities because his property is threatened by legislation we learn how short in the fibre is the charity which is not founded on the love and pity of God. The real test of the love of man does not come till we love our enemies. The love of our enemy is only the love of our neighbour true to itself through everything. For an employer to love the strikers that have ruined his business after a long and bitter war is not in nature. Yet that is the kind of tax to which the love of man is at last exposed. And there is only one source in the world to feed it and keep it alive—which is God's love of his bitter enemies, and his grace to them in repaying their wrong by Himself atoning for them on the cross. Central to all our humane kindness at last is the grace of the cross. The grand human strike against God would ruin both the workers and the Master did he not, in his love's tremendous resource, find means over their heads to save both his cause and theirs out of the wreck.

Human misery is too great for the human power of pity. No heart but that of holy God is equal to inviting into it all that labour and are heavy laden, to pitying on an adequate scale the awful tragedy of man, or measuring man's suffering with that informed sympathy which is the condition of healing

it. None can pity our human case to saving purpose but a God who treats it with more holy grace even than heart pity, and who is stronger to save our conscience even than he is quick to feel our wounds. Our suffering can only be finally dealt with by him who is more concerned about our sin ; who is strong enough to resist pity till grief has done its gracious work even in his Son ; and who can endure not only to see the world's suffering go on for its moral ends, but to take its agony upon his own heart and feel it as even the victims do not, for the holy purpose, final blessing, and the far victory of his love. And this is what we have in the atoning cross of Christ. On the world scale we have it there alone. And the grace of the cross is as central to our human compassion as its judgment is to our public righteousness. The greatest human need is not only holy *love* but *holy* love.

This ethical, cosmic, eternal estimate of Christ cannot be based on his biography alone, or chiefly, but upon his cross, as we shall again find when we have surmounted the present fertile obsession by "the historical Jesus." Such an estimate is a judgment of value, a confession of faith, nay, a personal self-assignment. It is impossible to treat Christ adequately, except theologically and personally. Personally, for it is the theologian's hard and high fate to cast himself into the flame he tends, and be drawn into its consuming fire. And theologically, for we find the key of Christ's life in his work, find his work to be the cross, and find the cross to be God's atonement of Himself, and the world, and especially of our own soul, once for all. The spiritual interpretation of Christ centres in the cross ; and in the cross as a sacrifice offered *by* God more than *to* God, but to God more than to men. It is offered to the holiness of God before it is offered to the service of men. To both, indeed, but in that order. It is certainly not simply the classic case of man's service of man. That gives us a broad Christian but not a full Christ. And nothing but the fulness of Christ can maintain our breadth or replenish empty churches. To banish the Atonement from the creative centre

of Christianity is in the long-run so to attenuate Christ as to dismiss him from Christianity, and condemn him to be outgrown. As it was the cross that universalised Christianity, so also it is the cross that is the permanent, creative, and extensive thing in it. All its faith, theology, and ethic are created and organised from the evangelical centre there. And this divine atonement to infinite holiness through loving judgment is the only thing that can really appeal at last to the heart of the modern passion for righteousness when it is thorough with itself—a passion which is so much more deep than its own consciousness goes. We avoid this centre only by our plentiful lack of moral wit, by the lack of evangelical experience, or of intellectual thoroughness, or moral sequacity. Can we really think of righteousness without judgment, of a universal righteousness without a universal judgment—whether you put it in the pictorial shape of a last great assize or not? Must that judgment not arraign every soul? You cannot think (unless you fall to thinking of justice as mere utilitarian arrangement) of a universal righteousness which is not founded upon righteousness eternal and absolute, *i.e.* upon divine holiness. Can you think, then, of universal judgment except as the relation to that holiness of every soul? And not only of every soul, but of the whole soul ranged before the whole God and the holy God? Could a personal soul be judged by a mere historic process? Does it not call for a personal God? And if there be any religious protagonist of the race—I own I tax you, and I am sorry, but it has taxed me more—must he not stand vicariously before the judgment of that God, and take home that Love under the moral conditions of a righteousness so universal and a holiness so absolute? This is what (in the Church's faith) Christ did, and did once for all. It is the supreme service he rendered to social righteousness, and consequently to eternal—if we could but for an hour get far enough away from social problems to take their measure and proportion, feel their foregone solution, and so find rest and power for our souls. All this lifts Christ far

above the level of a historic figure. A mere historic, stationary Christ is but a transitory Christ—which is a paradox. But you cannot tell the truth about the cross without the lie of a paradox. A Christ who stood fixed only at a point in history would be, by his very fixture, a transitory Christ, because but a temporary, because he would be outgrown and passed by the moving race. A Christ merely ideal, stationed at a fixed point on earth but magnified to an ideal upon the clouds, would become a *Brockengespenst*. He would be a mirage whose very grandeur and purity would shame us far more than help us. And he would shimmer before us like an aurora, when we needed to be warmed and reared by a perennial sun.

The new passion for righteousness must end upward in a new sense of judgment; and especially among the religious, if their ethic is to grow more delicate and penetrating as well as more urgent. Social righteousness unaccompanied by moral delicacy and penetration could easily become another phase of Pharisaism. Love without holiness lends itself but too easily to dissimulation, to unreality. But to give God's judgment its due place in public righteousness is to raise ethic to religion, righteousness to holiness, and to make some kind of Atonement inseparable from real faith on any social scale, and certainly on the social scale of a Church transcending and outstaying all the societies of men.

What is our social ardour to live on after a few disillusioning generations? What moral reserve are we providing for the vicissitudes of the great business of history?

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THE OVER-EMPHASIS OF SIN.

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THE Church always has had a grievance, and maybe could not exist without one. Within living memory its *bête noir* has been materialistic science, or evolution, the higher criticism, or the charm of worldliness; of late the outcry has been against a decadent sense of sin. No longer is it true that "the dearest child of faith is miracle"; it is a tearful feeling of sin. It looks as if the official representatives of religion would not have been free from alarm had they found sin to be a vanishing quantity; but to discover a visibly dying sense of sin, while sin itself is believed to be growing more reckless and assertive, makes the situation doubly deplorable. The Church is not far out in its diagnosis, nor without good reason for alarm. Sin is the permanent stock-in-trade of all the churches, the main concern of clerical and ministerial functionaries; and the alarm may well be serious, considering the moral interests held to be at stake, not to speak of the pecuniary risks of officials who, like certain priests in the Bible, may be said to "eat sin for bread." It is perfectly evident that people without consciousness of sin can have no sense of need for a confessional, a penance, or a sermon whose intent is to convince them of sin against their will.

The malaria is no longer confined to those outside church and chapel. It has spread beyond its natural unbelieving

habitat and invaded the ranks of the elect. The virus is said to afflict "the present generation," always, of course, with the exception of a few who have been inoculated against the poison. This is a threatening calamity for all who accept Augustine's dictum that the soul of religion is "humility." Without a sense of sin, void of self-reproach, how is a man to humble himself sufficiently before the ordinances of the Church, or before his God? As a matter of fact, he cannot, and he does not. The Sunday assemblies are visibly diminishing quantities. In the churches the congregations still call themselves "miserable sinners" and "miserable offenders"; and in many chapels the preacher takes the responsibility of describing his people in such accusing terms as poured from the doleful lips of Thomas Shepard and Jonathan Edwards. It is an ancient custom of the pulpit and a helpless acquiescence of the pew,—little more can be said for it,—perhaps in no age truly voicing, and now for obvious reasons out of touch with, the actual feelings of the worshippers.

That there is plenty of transgression of the higher moral principles is obvious. In trade and commerce, as in every profession, there are many who violate truth and justice, and excuse in themselves what they stigmatise as sin or crime in others. In every great city there are hoary-headed reprobates, young unregenerate dudes, and women who are "sinners." But such abnormal personalities have had their fling in every age. There is no reason to believe that they are more abundant now, or that the community does not as earnestly reprobate such lawlessness as in any previous generation, though more charitable in judgment and more reticent in speech. These moral eccentrics do not constitute Society, nor represent its tone. The language which portrays their defalcations is not fit to describe the amiable shortcomings, or, at worst, the sins of the average Sunday congregation. In every such assembly there is much innocence; perhaps the worst are a few who, without the slightest ill intent, have been envious

of their neighbour, or have bought or sold in the open market without much regard to the interest of the corresponding party. Everything considered, the mass of a Christian congregation are about as innocent as men and women can well be in a world where natural temptations are so rife, and so many social adjustments discountenance heroic saintliness. The humiliating confessions that are adequate reprobations of deliberate evil in overt and injurious action are a gross exaggeration and a libel when employed to represent the everyday state of the Christian public. There are clergymen who presume upon the patience of their congregations, and try to browbeat them into the acknowledgment of tremendous sins. The other week the son of a late archbishop said in our hearing that recently in a small congregation the clergyman looked toward him, in ignorance of who he was, and said: "You were wondering as you walked up the aisle, Is there a greater sinner here than I?—remembering the scarlet procession of sins that passed before your mind as you lay upon your bed last night." No other profession would take such liberties with its clients. In the sermons of Jesus there is no wholesale accusation of human nature, though He lived in a most decadent age; men are not catalogued as wholly corrupt or void of good, though their particular shortcomings are denounced; only one class of offending women are described as "sinners." If the Master were counted worthy of imitation, the whole trend of clerical thinking and habit of denunciation would require to be recast. It is a confession of disastrous failure for the successors and representatives of One who came "to make an end of sin," to be for ever insisting that even lifelong Christians must heartily acknowledge themselves to be "miserable sinners," who can never get beyond the habit of offending Deity every hour they live. One might rather think that the struggle for existence had come to an end by the bringing in of perfection. Surely the Church which has existed for two thousand years should be able to grow, if not saints, at least clean men enough to save it from the humilia-

tion of having its entire constituency continually prostrate with shamefacedness before a God who is acknowledged to have such supreme claims upon His people's loyalty. As it is, by theological imputation, the Christian life is neither more nor less at the best than a season of sinning and repenting, with the enormity now added that the repentance is omitted.

The present irresponsiveness to the preacher's accusations is probably in part a reaction against what is felt to be a slanderous exaggeration, but doubtless other causes have been at work. Nietzsche says that atheism, when it takes hold of a man, gives him a sort of innocence. We have not become a nation of atheists, nor perhaps is this infidelity as prevalent as when the influence of Huxley and Tyndall was in the ascendant, but the whole theological outlook has changed immensely. Neither God nor man is the same as they were to our grandfathers. We are under a new heaven and in a new earth. Evolution has undermined the notion of the race having sinned in Adam, and being consequently born in a state of inherited corruption. Now, thinkers see the race cradled amongst animal entanglements from which it has to loose itself, and this natural struggle—which in itself is a virtue—almost by necessity issues in exaggerations and mistakes.

Es irrt der Mensch so lang er strebt,

and the reason which makes him responsible at the same time makes it possible for his mistakes to be the deeper and more fatal. Then, there is now a very liberal recognition of the forces of heredity and environment. Probably the influence of descent is being overrated. The late Dr Barnardo, who had unusual facilities for reaching the truth, was led to place little weight upon parental habits, and extreme importance upon environment; but the public imagination invests both with almost necessitating powers, and there is a consequent disposition to look more leniently on human nature's faults and failings. There is also the fact that the vast increase and general diffusion of wealth during the last sixty years

have softened the outlook upon life, and discredited the puritanical sentiments of the Evangelical school. It is now no sin to live in luxury, and tens of thousands devote Sunday to bridge, golf, and motoring, with an occasional appearance in their parish church in order to retain some reputation for respectability. One change still more radical has taken place: The British public has discovered a new Deity. The former Supreme, who was all eyes, and wrote down in a book of remembrance even our microscopic failings, no longer exists except for a few obscurantists who belong to a previous generation. On the throne there is a God of love, who understands and is more pitiful than the best of fathers. "Tout connaître, c'est tout pardonner" applies to Him. Accordingly, men are more kindly in their judgment of each other, and more hopeful of themselves. For these and other reasons sin, in the proper sense of wilful transgression of a known divine command, is not believed to be so omnipresent and rancorous as preachers declare it to be, and it does not sit like a nightmare on our consciences. The Pew takes a kindlier view of human nature than the Pulpit: it has been influenced more by the changed outlook of the nineteenth century, because not bound so much to conventional conceptions as a class which is notoriously prone to reverence tradition and to hedge behind what is regarded as safe.

The clergy would do well to consider whether the time is not come for them to paint their people's conduct in less sombre hues. There are plenty of vile men and women who are worthy of scorching words, and who should not be spared the whip when they come within its reach. But the common life of our Christian communities is not like theirs, and they should not be massed as constant sinners, void of good, and so hardened that they neither recognise nor feel their sins. Let us rather believe that their good far outweighs their ill, and that for conscious ills they are penitent enough. Much of our existing evil is simply the result of ignorance, and of immature, unbalanced natures. We are not born into the

world with a guarantee to please. No creature beginning life in such a rudimentary state, and with such conflicting elements all bound together, to be regulated by one feeble will, can well avoid mistakes, and worse. The young find themselves moving in a *milieu* of enticement upon one side and repression on the other.

Thou shalt abstain—renounce—refrain !
Such is the everlasting song
That in the ears of all men rings,—
That unrelieved, our whole life long,
Each hour in passing, hoarsely sings.

This itself is provocative of revolt, and likely to breed the resolution that

All of life for all mankind created
Shall be within my inmost being tested.

If we have been educated in the tenets of a severe theology, we shall likely take too serious a view of this spirit of adventure ; call it, with Amiel, “an enemy to law, bending under no yoke, rebellious to reason, to wisdom, and to duty.” It may relieve our feelings if, with that morbid soul, we call it “sin in our very marrow, flowing on like the blood in our veins, and mingling in our substance.” But if this instinct of independence belongs essentially to human nature, is an original creation, the design of whatever gods have been at our making, it is not our sin. The responsibility of its presence and action does not rest with us, nor are we justified in insulting God who made us, by repenting of what He has done. We might as well repent of the tiger and the snake, the earthquake and tempest in nature. If our fundamental or primary experiences are sin because they are not idealised or spiritual, they are not entirely within our control, and the burden of them must be laid upon another will. The shadow which is in man flits over the face of the earth, and darkens at times the very heavens. Is it sin as it arises initially in human life, and does the Author of all carry no responsibility ? Surely there is a suggestion of truth and sincerity in the quatrain of the *Rubáiyát* :

Oh Thou who man of baser earth didst make,
And who with Eden didst devise the snake,
For all the sin wherewith the face of man
Is blackened, man's forgiveness give and take.

We offer the suggestion that this penchant for revolt is neither an unpardonable sin nor an injury to man on the part of God. What is it but the necessary impulse of a budding soul which can realise itself only as it is conscious of self-will, and tests its powers and its rights in resistance to whatever seems inimical to self-realisation? Human nature is a paradox. Man is the world in little and God in little, and these two are contrary to each other, and it may even be the God within us, and not the beast, that resists dictation. Manhood is grown and perfected by beating itself against many walls, some of which it overthrows, and against some of which it is sadly bruised. A personality with no instinct of resistance against imposed authority would never attain to individuality. It would be shaped by its nature and environment, and remain a nonentity—a mollusc, without moral character. The growing man must reach out his tentacles and discover what, and what not, are his natural limitations. He has to make sure what are legitimate authorities and what are not; and it will necessarily be with a grudge that he submits to commandments that prohibit anything which his soul desires. Revolt is naturally awaked whenever he is crossed by a law which says "Thou shalt not." The mental life needs initiative as much as docility, self-assertion as much as self-surrender, the sense of individuality as much as deference, rights as well as duties, the assertion of independence as well as obedience. The growing youth needs a sufficient measure of insistency to give him backbone, and save him from being mere clay under the demands made upon him. Character implies that every man is what Kant called him—an end in himself; and in realising his own individuality, he possesses the inalienable right of making some blunders of his own. Is he much to blame if he tests all outside inhibitions, and wants to know by his own

experience whether they forbid him good or evil? This is the natural history of the human creature. The impulsive acts of a conscious selfhood are a necessity of his origin and development, and therefore he is wronged when, by the deductions of a supernatural theology, these native forces of his being are branded as sin, and he is told to be ashamed of himself. His callow nature and his errors of judgment are not sin, but mistakes to be pointed out for correction. Theology is right in affirming that sin is possible only because there is a God, and therefore the brand of sinfulness should be limited to acts of wrongdoing perpetrated in the face of moral principles which are recognised as divine. This limits the amount of sin in any human life. One of the hardest tasks set the human mind is to realise God, conceive the infinite under the limitations of personality, and to identify the conventional morality, often confessedly mistaken, with the Divine will. Certainty on these points usually has a restrictive influence on disorderly self-will. The element of delusion commonly enters into actual misconduct; and where a man violates his conscience his sense of wrong is frequently only the echo of a conventional judgment, of whose reasonableness and validity he has secret doubts. A man may indeed choose to ground all his actions on his own self-will, in defiance of all recognised claims, but such a moral monstrosity is rarely found. Mephistopheles himself is bad because he is "the spirit that denies"; if he could see his way to affirm, he would become a reformed character. Every evildoer is to some extent an ignorant fool; and his ignorance, even if blameworthy, is some mitigation of his guilt.

Hence the clamant need for discrimination on the part of religious teachers. A congregation of worshippers can contain only a small proportion of persons who deliberately violate any obligation which they know to be divine. Not one in a thousand has "garments spotted by the flesh," and fewer are so passion-logged that their evil is greater than their good. Human nature is cleaner and more wholesome in its living

than preachers appear to suppose. Corellian pictures of Society are made crude and tragic for sensational effect. Middle-class life is on the whole much saner than the life of the upper circles. The average life of our people is certainly less intellectual and more tainted with sensuous appetites and emotions than one could wish. "Life is not light, but the refracted colour." The proper name for the average attainment may be humbling enough, and we do not care how far down the ladder the preachers and editors of religious journals may place us. That may be only a question of the loftiness of the critic's ideals. Only a bitter and merciless spirit or a jaundiced judgment will scarify what, at the worst, is only faultiness as sin or a guiltiness that deserves everlasting punishment. Men will listen more profitably to accusations that bear at least the semblance of truth, than to thoughtless exaggerations which condemn them to undeserved shame. Best for preacher and hearer is "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth."

ALEXANDER BROWN.

ABERDEEN.

THE MESSAGE OF MODERN MATHEMATICS TO THEOLOGY.

II

(Continued from the January issue.)

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THE present plight of natural and speculative theology, judged by prevailing standards of knowledge, is indeed pathetic. With every incentive and opportunity for untold years to deepen and purge her doctrines against the approaching trial of them in the fierce light of modern science, duly warned that the allegiance of scientific men may not be won by any imposing array of wayward speculations and vaunting opinion, she nevertheless permitted herself to come to the Grand Assize unprepared, has there heard the verdict "pretentious, shallow, vague, incoherent, unintelligible," and there in the unpitying light sits the once proud and hopeful aspirant to permanence of spiritual leadership—timorous, apologetic, humiliated, impotent, even despised. And yet her *heart* is right. But hope of rehabilitation and advancement does not lie in renewing her old assertions of superiority over the common ways of reason. Those claims have been decisively disallowed, not by the wickedness but by the wit, not by the sin but by the sense of mankind. No, the hope of Theology lies in the possibility of *deepening* her Thought and *purging* it of Contradictions.

Where do those contradictions come from? They are of

two kinds, domestic and imported: contradictions that, indigenous to the soil, spring up within Theology's own domain; and alien contradictions fetched from adjacent fields. They are to be overcome by searching in the universe of thought till points of view are found from which they are seen to disappear. The domestic variety, the manner in which they arise, and the way in which they seem to admit of being resolved or transcended, may be briefly characterised in the abstract as follows, fuller and concreter treatment being reserved for a subsequent stage. Denote by B some being, some complex entity, the subject or object of thought. Let T_1 be one theory of B , and T_2 another. Regarded as a body of doctrine concerning the nature of B , T_1 , a definite basal system of compatible postulates together with a superstructure of rigorously deduced implications, is perfectly sound, thoroughly coherent, absolutely devoid of inconsistency among its component elements; precisely the same is true of T_2 . The two theories, though they have a multitude of propositions in common, do not coincide, are not in absolute agreement: one of the T 's contains at least one proposition that contradicts some proposition of the other. B is a multiphased being, regardable from various points of view, *each* of which, once it is found, may seem for a moment, an hour, a day, a decade, or a hundred or a thousand years, to command B *entirely*. Seen from the view-point P_1 , B appears exactly as T_1 describes it; from the view-point P_2 , exactly as T_2 describes it; and so on. But the thinker, the student, the investigator of B has found neither P_1 nor P_2 , and consequently has not constructed either T_1 or T_2 . Searching about, however, in the dark, putting forth the antennæ of his understanding now in this direction and now in that, he at length arrives at a position where a great light dawns upon him—he has found a point of view, P , different from P_1 and from P_2 but a kind of *composite* of them. Seen from P , B presents *both* all the properties stated by T_1 and all those asserted by T_2 . The thinker, finding so much light, attempts to construct a *single*

theory T of B , which, were it possible, would be a *union* of T_1 and T_2 ; but possible it is not, for a theory must be a self-coherent thing, and T_1 and T_2 , as we have noted, are held apart for ever by at least one contradiction. What is to be done? Conquer by division: P must be decomposed into P_1 and P_2 ; T_1 and T_2 must be constructed and retained as *two*; and *both* of them held as *true*. But how thus held, since they do not agree? The answer is: B is once for all and *finally* such a being that T_1 and T_2 are both of them affirmable of it: a being—to employ for clarity's sake the leanest of possible illustrations—like a quadratic equation, $x^2 - 4 = 0$, of which we can affirm that $x = 2$ or $x = -2$; not, however, that $x =$ at once both 2 and -2 . But look again: the equation is seen to be an entity that allows *either* assertion $x = 2$, $x = -2$, and we at once transcend the seeming necessity of the *alternation*, $x = 2$ or $x = -2$, by the *compound* affirmation, 2 and -2 are roots. Just so, perceiving that B is a being, an entity, admitting *either* of the assertion T_1 , T_2 , we seize and express that character of B , transcending the alternation T_1 or T_2 , by the compound assertion T_1 and T_2 . No trick, this; but a daily procedure of rigorous thought: the familiar bound of the spirit from a level of partial dissonance to the commanding bridge of an overarching harmony.

On the other hand, the imported variety of theological contradictions constitute a radically different class. They are like the contradictions that would defeat the ends of justice if, in the trial of a case at law, it were *assumed* and *held throughout* that all witnesses are honest or that none can be mistaken; or, again, like the hopeless confusion that would result to the science of hydraulics, did the student adhere to the assumption, as *universally valid*, that water runs downhill: contradictions, that is, that are due to importation, into a given thought domain, of postulates that, though valid elsewhere, are not valid there, but there, mingling with such as are valid, produce as if by magic a brood of incompatibilities to confound the thinker and darken his field. Herewith Theology is confronted.

by the terrific task of weeding her garden of *alien* postulates. The first lesson she has to learn is that the task is extremely difficult, that it may be endless, and that nevertheless she must enter upon it resolutely on pain of perpetual exclusion from the society of Sciences.

Perhaps the most noxious, certainly the most obvious, of Theology's foreign postulates—one that has engendered endless confusion within her field and brought upon her from without no end of ridicule—is the hoary assumption that *the whole is greater than the part*. Universal belief in the universal validity of that so-called axiom was the greatest calamity that ever befell the human race. It stayed the march of rigorous thought for thousands of years, and still surrounds the field of scientific speculation like a prison wall. The discovery, within the last half-hundred years, that the proposition, instead of being universally true, is generally false; the discovery that, instead of being an essential principle of reason, pervading the realm of reality and binding the whole, it is simply a principle of classification, a logical blade sundering the thinkable universe into two components; the discovery that one of these parts—called the world of *finite* things—is composed of wholes to which the proposition applies without exception; that, on the contrary, the other part—called the world of *infinities*—is composed of wholes for which, without exception, the proposition is invalid; the discovery that the latter world, the world of *infinities*, so far from transcending human reason, is its proper domain, readily yields its secrets to the eye of thought, its varied content to concept and classification, submits its structure to the scalpel of analysis, and its modes of behaviour to the law-finding processes of synthesis and generalisation:—that discovery I judge to be second in importance to no event in the history of mankind. And auspicious for Theology will be the day when she discovers that Discovery; learns that her subject-matter belongs to a *definite* world, the world of *Transfinite* being; and accordingly relinquishes the ancient dogma of whole and part as alien to her field.

An example or two illustrating the manner of the resulting emancipation must here suffice. Only yesterday in a western city of my country a great orator, speaking of the doctrine that the three persons of the Trinity are *each* Almighty and yet together constitute but *one* Almighty, of the doctrine that each of the Persons is equal to the One composed by all, evoked applause from a vast and splendid audience by characterising that doctrine as "infinitely absurd." Why? Because the speaker and hearers alike tacitly assumed that as a matter of course the whole must exceed the part. And why does Theology, instead of explaining the difficulty, content herself with avowing that the Trinity and the component Persons are all of them "incomprehensible"? Because she, too, makes the same assumption. And yet it is not the doctrine but the orator's characterisation of it that is "infinitely absurd"—a fact admitting of mathematical demonstration. I am not here concerned in the slightest degree with the question whether the venerable creed is *true*, but shall confine myself to showing that, so far from being "absurd," it is rigorously *thinkable*, and even that it would be so if the One it contemplates were asserted to be, instead of a trinity of persons, a multiplicity of order 4 or 7 or n . It is plain that we have here to do with the structure of infinite manifolds. As Bernard Bolzano—learned theologian, profound philosopher, immortal mathematician—pointed out more than fifty years ago, "there are points of view from which we perceive in God an infinite multiplicity (*unendliche Vielheit*), and there are no other view-points from which we attribute infinity to him." "Ich sage nun: wir nennen Gott unendlich, weil wir ihm Kräfte von mehr als einer Art zugestehen müssen, die eine unendliche Grösse besitzen. So müssen wir ihm eine Erkenntnisskraft beilegen, die wahre Allwissenschaft ist, also unendliche Menge von Wahrheiten, weil alle ueberhaupt, umfasst, und so weiter."¹ It is upon the term *unendliche Menge*, as the

¹ Bolzano, *Paradoxien des Unendlichen*, pp. 8, 9. This work was begun in 1847 and finished in the following year, in the last months of the author's life.

context clearly shows, that the emphasis falls. Now consider for example the following infinite manifolds: the totality E of the even integers; the totality O of odd ones; the totality F of fractions having integers for their terms; and the manifold M of the rational numbers, M being composed of all of the elements of E and O and F . As any child knows, E and O are equally rich in constituents, the fact being writ on the very surface of the eye. It is also a fact familiar in the modern doctrine of Real Numbers and capable of being acquired even by a freshman in thirty minutes that the number of elements in M is precisely the same as the number of those composing E or O or F . Denote the number of elements in E by a . Then $a =$ the number of elements in $E =$ the number of elements in $O =$ the number of elements in $F =$ the number of elements in M . What, then, is the situation? Simply this: we have here *three* infinite manifolds, E , O , F , no two of which have a single element in common, yet the three together constituting one manifold M that is exactly equal in wealth of elements to *each* of its infinite components. Indeed, mathematicians know that M involves, not merely three, but infinitely many manifolds each equal to M precisely. Why should such truth surprise or mystify? For the world of transfinite being—the home of Mathesis, and of Theology too, if she only knew it—is filled with just such truth, not seen darkly as through a glass, but face to face in the serene and supernal light of Reason.

As another example of the tremendous logical power that Theology finds herself possessed of the moment she ejects from her own realm and relegates to the world of finitude the whole-part axiom belonging there, witness the possibility of handling anew and in radical fashion the doctrine of Omniscience in its relation to the problem of Freedom. I shall briefly treat here but a single phase of the matter, the central difficulty, familiar to all. If, says the critic, God is Omniscient, he knows what I shall do, and, if he knows that, then to trust the feeling that I am free to choose is “to cheat the eye with

blear illusion." On the other hand, if God does not know all future events, he is not Omniscient, and thereby is shorn of *Dignity*. To which, with mathematical certitude, I answer *no*: Omniscience indeed is gone, but not the *Dignity* of it; that remains absolutely unimpaired, without the slightest loss or diminution of any kind. The problem is to reconcile, not Freedom and Omniscience, but Freedom and the Dignity of omniscience. The limits assigned to this article compel me to employ, without proving them here, certain mathematically established facts. Let π be a plane. It bisects Space. A one-to-one correspondence has been shown (mathematically) to subsist between the infinite totality T of points on *both* sides of π including those of π itself, and the infinite totality S of points on *either* side of π ; and since π is *any* plane, such correspondence will not fail if π be moved any finite distance parallel to itself. Now suppose each point of T to represent an *element* e of knowable reality, and denote by d the *element* of spiritual *dignity* attaching to knowledge of e . At once it is evident that a knowledge K , extending to all and only the elements e of the *part*-totality S , is precisely as rich in elements d of scientific *dignity* as is a knowledge K , extending to all the elements e of the *whole*-totality T . It merely remains to suppose that T is the *whole* of knowable reality, and we behold the astounding fact that what is now Omniscience, namely, K , does not by even the smallest mite surpass in *dignity* the partial knowledge K . The application and significance of that marvellous fact may be glimpsed at least by a slight change of imagery and orientation. Let us suppose, that is, that π is now a moving Time-plane, the Present—fore-front of Universal History—bounding off the Future from the Past. We may suppose the Past alone is known, the Future unknown and undetermined. As the Present, the time-plane π , wondrous transformer of Future into Past, keeping always parallel to itself, moves continuously forward with its infinite range and sweep of wing, the eligible, sifted, becomes in part the chosen; the possible, the actual;

the unknown, the known. Meanwhile the infinite Dignity of the knowledge of the growing Past remains for ever *invariant*, being absolutely equal to the dignity of Omniscience. Is it, then, contended that the future *is*, wholly or in part, unknown or undetermined? That is not the point. The point is that the assertion *may* be made without thereby imputing to God's knowledge a Dignity less than that of knowing all. The distinction herewith mathematically drawn between the Dignity of omniscience and Omniscience itself, whereby the former may be affirmed without affirming the latter, is fundamental; and if ever it shall come to be rigorously applied, not only to the theory of Omniscience but, as it evidently may be, *mutatis mutandis*, to all the other attributes, as Absolute Goodness, Omnipotence, Omnipresence, that involve the concept of infinitude, it will, I doubt not, produce a transformation of theological doctrine amounting to revolution. The bearings of the principle may not here be further traced or signalised. The notion of Omnipresence I shall treat briefly in another connection, in the light, however, of other points of view.

And here a word of caution, but not of discouragement. The immense labour to be performed by Theology in eradicating from the proper domain of her study the whole-part axiom with its ubiquitous progeny of confusion; and the light, the freedom, and the power that will thus accrue to her; these are not the end but only the beginning of her work and emancipation. For the domain of transfinite reality is not a dead level, like a plane, not a realm of homogeneous content, but endlessly intricate and diversified, deep under deep and zone over zone of being, beyond every assignable limit and all imagination: yet traversed and filled with reason—light-bearing æther of mind—and penetrable throughout by thought. Just as the whole-part axiom separates the thinkable universe U into the finite world F and the infinite world I , so other principles or postulates or properties, operating *within* I itself, divide and subdivide *it* into a sequence of infinite component worlds, I_1, I_2, \dots ,

I_{n+1} , I_{n+2} ,, and so on in endless succession: an infinite manifold of infinite worlds; each of them being in respect to *Mächtigkeit*, in respect to elemental wealth and dignity of structure, at once superior to every preceding world and inferior to all that follow. Such, in brief, is the spectacle that will gradually dawn upon Theology's vision as her study proceeds: world rising above world in measureless grandeur—a summitless hierarchy of Infinites. The infinite of *lowest* rank in the ascending scale is that composed of wholes each matching in *Mächtigkeit* such a totality as that of the integers or that of the rational fractions. An infinite of higher rank is that of the Continuum, and is exemplified by the aggregate of all the real numbers or by the ensemble of the points of a line. For it has been rigorously demonstrated that, if from this ensemble we remove in thought a point for each integer or each rational fraction, there will remain more points, even infinitely more, than the infinitude removed. Whether there exists an infinite intermediate in rank to the Continuum and the infinite of lowest rank remains a moot question, the answer to which, when found, will immortalise the finder. The two ranks here presented are, however, distinguished by the fact that the elements of an infinite of the lower rank may be so ordered that after *each* there is a *next*—that is, none between—and that, on the other hand, an infinite of the type of the Continuum does not admit of such an arrangement. Accordingly the postulate of *nextness*, though to the “natural” mind it seems to be universally valid, has nevertheless, like that of whole and part, near-lying limitations, and may not be used except with extremest care. In general, the postulate—whatever it may be—that yields division into I_n and I_{n+1} is valid for the former and all preceding infinites, but fails in case of the latter and all that follow it. Thus it is seen that as the investigator ascends the hierarchy of infinitudes, mounting from the level of one sublimity to that of another yet more sublime, he passes ever from the reign of more specific to that of more generic Law.

Among all the ranks and types of infinitude, there is one, namely, the Continuum—imperishable base of modern Analysis—that is especially valuable as a pattern of Theology's subject-matter and makes a singularly powerful appeal, because not only is it, like the other types, open to Thought, but it engages the Sense as well, beaming upon the eye from every aspect of the visible universe. And no sooner shall Theology enter upon this subject than she shall behold, even in the threshold of the mansion, very wonderful facts, facts of mathematical certitude indeed and yet more marvellous than any that she has ever dreamed of or beheld in visions of faith. She will see, for example, that a line-segment of *unit* length assembles within itself precisely as many points as the beginningless, endless line to which it belongs; she will see that a one-to-one correlation subsists, and that in an endless variety of ways, between the points of such a segment and all the points of a square or a cube having the segment for a side or an edge; she will see that it is possible in a countless diversity of ways to take from among the points within a sphere of a marble's size as many points as a sphere of planetary magnitude contains, and that there will yet remain within the little sphere as many points exactly as there are altogether in the total universe of Space; nay, she will see that a space having as many dimensions as there are numbers in the totality of integers, a space, that is, of infinite dimensionality and containing our own space as an exceedingly minute affair, a mere element,—she will see that even such a space does not surpass in wealth of points nor yet in richness of internal relationship a line-segment so short that even a microscopic imagination could not picture its length. And thus beholding such miracles of fact in the very fringe of the doctrine, she will advance to marvels greater still and the fiercer light within; will be there transformed; and will thenceforth confront the intellect and doubt of the world, not with the unavailing plea of “mysterious and incomprehensible” but with the achievements and the instruments of exactest knowledge.

From the position here attained we may readily advance to vindication of the logical possibility of Omnipresence—not by such inadequate analogies as immortal Bruno, for example, ingeniously employed in comparing it to a voice audible at every point of a room—but by considerations bringing it strictly within the category of doctrines rigorously thinkable. Here is a sphere so small that even if it were a brilliantly coloured globe, the most powerful microscope could not reveal its presence. It is to be carefully noted that the following statements regarding it are absolutely independent of its size, and remain true if it be supposed shrunk to any degree of parvitude, however small, so long as it has not vanished utterly. Denote by s the totality of points within the tiny sphere, and by S the ensemble of all the other points of the whole of Space. In the course of recent years and by means within the grasp of the average student a little disciplined in the ways of rigorous thought, it has been repeatedly demonstrated that there are precisely as many points in s , as in S , and that the former are joined to the latter in one-to-one fashion by relational rays of correspondence. As such correlation subsists in countless modes, suppose one of them chosen. This done, to any point of S , say the centre of the sun, corresponds a definite point of s ; to any other point of S , say the centre of the moon or the mass-centre of the Milky Way, corresponds another definite point of s ; and so on and on throughout the range of both totalities. Let not him, if such a one there be, essay Theology, who can fail to see clearly that in that tiny sphere, too small, mind you, for even microscopic vision, small indeed at will, there nevertheless exist point *configurations* matching perfectly in detail and every respect of inner constitution each and all of the infinitely infinite hosts of point configurations, minute and vast, simple and complex, here, there, and yonder, everywhere throughout the height and depth and length and breadth of Space. We have now only to reflect that the same scheme of representation obtains universally, being valid

at once for *all* infinitesimal spheres, and the truth dawns that the Whole really *is* incarnate in every Part—the Emersonian aphorism that “the universe contrives to integrate itself in every smallest particle” being thus completely justified on scientific ground. But this is yet not all. The universe is dynamic, charged throughout with innumerable modes of motion. Each point, however, of any moving thing—an ion of gas, a vibrating fibre of brain—is represented by a corresponding point in *s*, and so within the tiny sphere—indeed in *every* room however small—the whole dynamics of the universe is depicted completely and co-enacted by motion of points and transformation of point configurations. There in miniature proceed at once the countless play and interplay of every kind of motion, small and large, simple and complex, the quivering dance of the molecule, the wave and swing of universal æther.

“Wie Alles sich zum Ganzen webt !
Eins in dem andern wirkt und lebt !
Wie Himmelskräfte auf und nieder steigen
Und sich die goldnen Eimer reichen !
Mit segenduftenden Schwingen
Vom Himmel durch die Erde dringen,
Harmonisch all’ das All durchdringen !”

The limits of this article permit scarcely more than a passing allusion to another concept that is destined, I believe, as the eye becomes more and more adjusted to its light, to be a potent rationalising agency in Theology, especially elevating and amplifying her conception of the Conceivable, serving to bring not only the notion of Omnipresence, with which we are here concerned, but kindred notions as well, strictly within the category of understandable doctrines. I refer to the radiant concept of Hyperspace, which only a generation ago was regarded even by eminent mathematicians—most adventurous of men—as being purposeless and vain, but which meanwhile has advanced so rapidly to commanding position that even the following statement by Poincaré in his recent address before the International Mathematical Congress at Rome on “L’avenir

des Mathématiques" is well within the limits of conservatism: "Nous sommes aujourd'hui tellement familiarisés avec cette notion que nous pouvons en parler, même dans un cours d'université, sans provoquer trop d'étonnement." The fact is that the doctrine already exists in a vast and rapidly growing literature, flourishes in all the scientific languages of the world, and in its essential principles has become for mathematicians as orthodox as the multiplication table. The concept itself I have elsewhere¹ set forth at length in terms chosen with reference to the needs of the non-mathematician. The following brief considerations—a mere hint of the theological serviceability of the concept—are not designed for those amiable souls who instinctively turn away from the light, finding their best source of happiness in dreamy contemplation of the mysterious and the dark, but for such as are intolerant of vagueness in Theology and appreciate the finding of *modes* and *forms* by aid of which her doctrines admit of being thought with precision. I am, of course, far from intending to assert that God is actually omnipresent *in the manner* to be herein described. My aim is a purely logical one, namely, to show the *conceivability*² of an infinite being being present everywhere in an infinite region without being *contained in* the region. Anyone who will devote a few hours to continuous reflection upon the infinite wealth of points in a straight line L , and to the infinite wealth of combinations and relationships that subsist and may be detected among them, will discover to his astonishment that a linear being or intelligence λ inhabiting L and in its experience confined thereto would have all the material necessary for constructing mathematical doctrines matching in diversity and complexity all branches of geometry and analysis constructible by man.

¹ *The Monist*, January 1906. The non-mathematical reader will find very enlightening the judicious essay on "The Fourth Dimension" in Schubert's *Mathematical Essays and Recreations*: The Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago, U.S.A.

² Pointed out admirably by W. B. Smith in an address on "The Culture Value of Mathematics" in 1898 before the American National Educational Association, and published in the *Proceedings*.

Such a being λ , dwelling in the midst of such magnificence of order and law, naturally might attempt to construct a Theology and would encounter, among other difficulties, that of conceiving how the supreme being it hypothesised could be at one and the same time present everywhere in L . By hypothesis λ could have no sense-perception or intuition of the fact that the infinite region L , in which it lives, moves, and has its being, is itself contained in another infinite region of higher order, namely, a plane π ; hence it could not perceive, though it might conceive, the fact that the infinite, π , is actually omnipresent in L , every part of L being completely immersed in π ; and hence it could not perceive, though after some centuries of theologising it might conceive, the fact that the same attribute—omnipresence in L —would belong to a being whose reality, whatever its nature in other respects, was at least coextensive with π . It is obvious that precisely similar reflections would be equally pertinent, should we replace L by a plane and π by space itself. *We* live in Space and encounter exactly the same difficulties encountered by λ , and they are surmountable in the same way, namely, by the concept of hyperspace. For this concept presents us in the first place with a four-dimensional space S_4 completely immersing our own, being in contact with all its points and present at all of them, just as our space is omnipresent to π and π to L ; next, similarly related to S_4 , comes S_5 ; then follow, in order of ascending dimensionality, S_6 , S_7 , S_n , . . . and so on endlessly; affording thus conceptual provision for the presence everywhere in our dwelling-place of a Being whose reality, if you please, at the same time not only pervades but infinitely transcends any assignable space, however high its rank in the endless scale of hyperspatial grandeur.

Matter presses from every side, but this writing must close. Not, however, without a further word fulfilling in some measure the above-made promise touching Theology's difficulties of the domestic kind. As her investigation pro-

ceeds, engaging simultaneously in the analytic and the constructive study of the attributes ascribed by her to Deity, she is very probably or even certainly destined to discover, sooner or later, that those attributes, however indubitable or undeniable they may be when regarded singly, yet, taken together, involve essential and ineradicable incompatibilities of thought, and, therefore, must finally defeat every possible effort to combine them in *one* self-consistent body of doctrine. The question is, what is to be done in that event? Answering out of the fullness of her own experience in such cases, Mathesis will venture to offer her sister the following counsel. "My years and station," she will say, "and the character of my occupation entitle me to believe that I am not without some insight into the nature of your gravest difficulty and not without some knowledge of the means available for overcoming it. *Usus, magister egregius, hoc me docuit*. I, too, in the course of my long career have expended, I do not say have wasted, much time and energy in attempting to combine the non-combinable, in attempting, that is, to erect a solid and unitary doctrine respecting some object of my thought upon a basis of postulates that were indeed individually sound and eligible, but that, taken collectively as a system, were subsequently found to involve logical incompatibility and so not to allow any superstructure not doomed to quick decay by the presence within it of fatal contradictions. Fortunately, I have not besought or trusted any super-logical providence to preserve such architecture against external criticism or the destructive agency of its own defects, but have had the grace to tear it down myself and prepare to build anew. My practice has been to examine again and patiently to re-examine the basal postulates, to form from them by trial and experiment as many sub-groups as possible subject to the condition that each of these be entirely free of interior inconsistency, and then, upon the *sub*-groups as distinct though related foundations, to construct as many

distinct but kindred doctrines, each of strength to mock at time and endure for aye. And my practice, as you and all the world may know, has been justified of its fruits. Examples abound in every division of my commonwealth, and some have come to fame. To cite but three of these—behold the noble structures of Euclid, of Bolyai and Lobatschevski, and of Riemann. There stand the great geometries, each upon its own foundation of compatible postulates, and there, flawless within, unassailable from without, they will stand for ever, eternal witnesses of the fact that, contrary to many a venerated but shallow creed, *one* object of thought may, by virtue of its kind and not of limitations of the human mind, transcend the bounds of any one constructible theory, and in its own ultimate nature allow and validate at once, without annulling their differences, a *class* of dissonant doctrines. Thus you perceive, for example, that my Geometry is one, though my geometries are many—just as Music is one, though its forms be as varied as the moods of the sea. And I, Mathesis, am one, as Poetry is one, though my theories, my doctrines, are legion; for these but differ among themselves, as the myriad forms of Art: each is assertable, each being valid, of one great Form common to them all. My meaning, I trust, is clear. Conquest of your gravest difficulty demands division. By the method of trial and experiment, the fundamental attributes that you hypothetise of Deity must be assorted into sets each composed of harmonious elements. Implicit in each such group is a coherent and sacred doctrine. As these doctrines unfold, your conception of yourself will change: you, Theology, will indeed be one; but many, your theologies. And thenceforth the Object of all your thought will appear to you and will be shown by you to the world, not in the light of a solitary sun, but in that of a constellation.”

CASSIUS J. KEYSER.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE EMPIRE IN ROME AND IN CHINA.

THE REV. P. J. MACLAGAN, M.A., D.PHIL.

ONE of the most interesting sections in Sir William Ramsay's recent book, *The Cities of St Paul*, is that entitled "The Empire the Hope of the World." If we added to this title another clause, "and Christianity the Hope of the Empire," we would indicate still more fully the scope of the section. It gives us, along with much more, a very fresh illustration of the words of St Paul, "When the fulness of the time came." If, as the older apologetic pointed out, the establishment of the Empire favoured the spread of Christianity, so now is it made equally evident that Christianity could have furnished just what the Empire needed for the accomplishment of its aim.

The present situation in China offers in several respects an interesting parallel to the state of things which Sir William Ramsay describes as existing when Christianity was beginning its career in the early Roman Empire. I shall try to draw out this parallel, and indicate its suggestiveness.

In Rome, at that time, we have a vast republic in process of transformation, striving to organise itself and knit itself together in a well-ordered and stable Imperial polity. In China, now, we have an empire organised indeed in a way that we might more reasonably call loose if it had not resisted disruption for so long, but at any rate now beginning to tingle with a new sense of national unity and seeking a polity that will adequately express this new feeling. And just as the

Roman Empire, according to Sir William Ramsay, might have sought the solution of its problem along three lines—political, educational, and religious—so is it now in China.

On the first of these points Sir William Ramsay had no occasion to dwell. "The Empire," he says, "was trying to weld the separate nations into a great Imperial unity. . . . It is needless and impertinent here to describe or praise the skill with which the Empire attempted this task." The second matter, that of education, was not dealt with so satisfactorily; rather the Roman Empire deserves only blame for total neglect. The Empire was exposed to danger "from the enormous preponderance of an uneducated populace. This danger was all the more serious because the sovereign power nominally lay in the hands of the people. . . . It should have been the prime duty of the Empire to educate the populace so that it might become a rational, not an irrational and incalculable, force. . . . The Pauline Church in the Empire would have put an end to the danger, and strengthened the State as it spread. The educated middle class who constituted the Church would have grown and reached more deeply and widely into the uneducated masses, raising them to its level. . . . Such was the Pauline policy. The Imperial policy . . . was to neglect education but to feed and amuse the populace. . . . The Pauline policy would have saved the ancient civilisation by reforming the State. The policy which was actually carried into effect by the Emperors ruined the State by destroying education." Finally, Rome needed a universal religion. "The unity and brotherhood of the whole Roman world was the goal towards which Imperial policy was consciously tending. To attain the goal a common religion was needed, and Augustus found himself, against his own will and wish, forced to make an Imperial religion. . . . The majesty of Rome incarnate in the reigning Emperor was presented to Augustus by the popular choice as the common religion of the Empire. . . . The Imperial cult was demanded by the populace, the new universal religion of Christ was offered by the insistent voice

of Paul." So the Empire was committed to a fatal conflict with Christianity, which was carried on by succeeding Emperors more or less whole-heartedly and with more or less insight into its essential nature, until, too late, in Constantine an official Christianity was victorious.

How far, then, can we make out our suggested parallel between this situation in ancient Rome and the present state of affairs in China? That in either case we have, as I have said, an empire grappling with a serious problem of self-organisation to correspond to new conditions, will, I imagine, be easily granted. That China is seeking a solution of her problem along the three lines, political, educational, religious, that were also open to Rome—this too can be made evident.

In a sense, the government of China has always been democratic. The highest posts in government service have been open to aspirants from the lowest classes. Beyond the official ranks, too, there is a loose home-rule through local bodies of gentry and the village elders. It is recognised, however, that more is needed to meet new conditions—some political scheme which will give scope to the quickened interest in things political, and which will unite and express the popular will. Accordingly, self-government is being officially fostered by the formation of what, with rough accuracy, we may call Municipal Councils. Besides this, the Chinese Government, as is well known, has sent commissioners to visit Europe and America, to report on the political institutions of the countries visited, with a view to the introduction of Representative Government into China. These problems of local self-government and of representative institutions will assuredly task to the full the ingenuity of China's statesmen. We must wait to see if they will show that skilful political adaptiveness for which Sir William Ramsay praises the statesmen of Rome.

In the matter of education, however, the statesmen of China are wiser than those of Rome. The Chinese Government has inaugurated a vast educational programme, and is at least making some show of acting upon it. What may be at

present the exact proportion of show and reality is a difficult question to answer, nor happily is an answer necessary for the making out of our parallel. It is enough to point out that to China, as to her ancient analogue, education is presented as a necessity, and that she at least recognises this and is not altogether neglecting the educational factor of political stability.

I have more fear of being accused of forcing the parallel between Rome and China when I come to the third, the religious element. What is there to correspond to the institution of the Imperial cult of Rome? There is an imperially regulated worship in China, rites to be performed by the Emperor and by the magistrates, as well as a popular worship unregulated by law. Now it seems to me not without significance that just at this juncture in the history of China her Government should have singled out one element of the official worship and emphasised its importance. A decree was issued in the latter days of 1906 raising Confucius to an eminence exceeding even that which had been accorded to him before. "In view of the supreme excellence of the great sage Confucius, whose virtues equal Heaven and earth and make him worthy of the adoration of a myriad ages, it is the desire of Her Imperial Majesty the Empress-Dowager Tze Hsi, etc., that the great sage shall in future be accorded the same sacrificial ceremonies of worship accorded to Heaven and earth when sacrifice is paid by the Emperor." Since this decree, and indeed before its issue, from the very beginning of the new educational movement, reverence or worship of the sage—opinions have differed as to whether what was required was reverence or worship—has been prescribed in the schools and colleges of the Empire.

Confucius has long been, more than aught else, the name to which Chinese feelings of reverence attach themselves. From among the various objects of worship in China, no other could have been selected more likely to be a unifying principle for the Empire. Heaven—the worship of which has been restricted to the Emperor—is too distant, and any claims for

supreme recognition that might be put forward on behalf of the various canonised worthies (*lao-yeh*) would simply neutralise each other. But all parts of the Empire and all classes of the people have agreed in honouring Confucius, whom now this recent decree raises to the loftiest pre-eminence. Whatever may have been the case previously, it seems to make him now the object not only of reverence but of religious worship. Here, then, we seem to have a fair parallel to the institution of the Imperial cult in Rome.

We have now only to make the parallel between Rome and China complete by adding that as in the Roman Empire so in China, Christianity presents itself as a power to be reckoned with, proffering its aid to the Empire in its task.

If the situation in China is parallel to the ancient state of affairs in Rome, what will the issue be? Will China take up the same attitude to Christianity that Rome did? Would the result of such an attitude be equally disastrous? Or will she choose otherwise, and with what outcome?

The difference between ancient and modern conditions is such that we need not, at present, consider the possibility of a Chinese persecution of Christianity on the Roman scale. In spite of the apparent analogy of the Boxer rising—in part because of the result of that rising—an imperially organised attempt to exterminate Christianity is not now probable. But, short of persecution, the Chinese Government might take up a hostile attitude to the Christian religion, and at present it undoubtedly regards Christianity with some suspicion.

As everywhere, Christianity, by its intolerance of any rival—an intolerance which is the necessary result of its claim to be the absolutely true religion—and by the consequent aloofness of Christians from all the popular religion and from much of social life, provokes the charge of atheism and inhumanity. These old-world accusations are repeated in the charges *Wu shên ming, wu fu mu*, “No worship of spirits, no piety towards parents.” There is, besides, in China a peculiar intensification of the feeling that Christianity is a foreign religion, and that

those who follow it make themselves aliens. The missionaries are foreign, and the Churches they gather are known as the British or American or French Churches. Religious freedom is guaranteed by treaty with foreign powers, and foreign consuls are appealed to to protect the Christians. If it is said that the Emperor has sanctioned Christianity, the answer is that he did so under compulsion. Village elders and Government officials decline responsibility for the converts, and bid them apply to their missionary or consul. It is this foreign complexion of Christianity that exposed it to the fury of that anti-foreign rather than anti-Christian movement which we call Boxerism. It is this aspect, too, that makes it difficult for the Chinese Government to recognise Christianity for what it is, or welcome its co-operation.

However, this alien appearance of Christianity will diminish with the increase in the number of Chinese Christians, and the growth, so happily evident, of a native Church. The Chinese will become accustomed to Christian neighbours, and will find that they are neither impracticable nor destitute of the qualities of our common humanity. The Christians, too, strengthened by fellowship among themselves, will be less likely to fall back on the foreigner. Indeed, they too are touched by the general rise of a patriotic feeling, and are being stimulated by it to make themselves independent of foreign help. It may be hoped, therefore, that the foreign associations of Christianity may cease to be a hindrance to its being allowed to take its place among the forces of Chinese life.

At present, suspicion perhaps attaches to Christianity for another reason. The Chinese Government may be desirous of reform, but it certainly fears revolution, and perhaps suspects the Christian Church of being a mother of revolutionaries. I do not think that the suspicion is well grounded, though doubtless there may be rash, inconsiderate spirits among the native Christians. But such suspicion need not surprise us. The Taipings are an example of a revolutionary movement animated by a religion with Christian affinities; and if

students generally are, not without reason, regarded as likely subjects of revolutionary enthusiasms, the students of Christian schools and colleges will suffer from the general imputation.

It is to be wished, therefore, that the Chinese Government would look more closely into the characteristics of the Christian Church. It would then be seen that while Christianity favours reform it does not favour revolution, and that Christians, as such, are not likely to be found among the revolutionaries (*ko-ming tang*) of the Chinese Empire. "The Christians," says Sir William Ramsay, "were in the last resort the reforming party: the Emperors felt that reform must affect their own power. Whereas an uneducated populace could never use the power that it nominally possessed, and must entrust it to an autocrat, a people trained to think and to feel responsibility must seek to use it themselves, and perhaps destroy the autocratic system. The Church, therefore, presented itself to the imagination of the greatest and most far-seeing Emperors as their most dangerous rival; and, as a whole, the Imperial policy was inexorably opposed to the reforming party." No doubt Christianity is to-day what it was then. But though this be so, the old Roman conflict between Empire and Church need not be repeated in China if only the Chinese Government is sincere in its professed desire for reform. If the Christian ideas of the infinite worth of each man and of individual responsibility favour liberty, its subjection to the grace of God as its supreme rule excludes selfish lawlessness. Christian freedom is essentially an ordered freedom, and, apart from individual extravagances, Christianity may be depended on to co-operate towards any wise scheme of liberty, creating both the desire for freedom and the conscience that will use freedom aright. The native Christian community will be a valuable asset in any national reformation. Along the lines of political reorganisation there need be no conflict between Christianity and the Empire.

Nor, of course, is there any necessary antagonism between Christianity and Education. Education is undoubtedly

potent force not always for unmixed good. The Chinese Government just now, as it confronts the educational enthusiasm it has done something to encourage, is a little like Frankenstein in presence of his monster. An "enlightened" but undisciplined youth is everywhere an unstable and restless political element. It is possible that the recent elevation of Confucius and the emphasis put on the recognition of him in the very centres of the new learning may be intended to supply a conservative and moderating element, and to secure that the scholars of the new knowledge should not break absolutely with the old, but find in the Confucian books, if not the matter, yet at least the ethical spirit of their learning. Now Christian education, if it is worthy of the name, carries with it far greater safeguards against mere windy sciolism, and is leavened throughout by a spirit more potently ethical because not ethical merely but also religious. There is no reason, therefore, why, in the interests of education, the Chinese Government should look askance at Christian students or at Christian educational institutions. Unfortunately, there is yet no cordial recognition of Christian schools, either from a mistaken fear of the results of Christian education on its students, or, as has been suggested, from a fear lest the Government schools be outclassed by their Christian rivals; while, as to Christian students, the institution of the worship of Confucius, in effect if not in intention, makes it difficult for them to avail themselves of the State education. It is true that some have suggested another and more favourable interpretation of the edict with regard to Confucius. Only the Emperor, they argue, can worship Heaven. If, then, Confucius is to be worshipped with the same rites, these, too, must be restricted to the Emperor. It follows that students in the Government schools cannot be expected to engage in this worship, and thus a door is left open for the admission of Christians as students without doing violence to their consciences. The argument is ingenious, but it does not seem to be borne out by the facts. I am afraid we must

admit that Christian students and Christian schools are alike more or less "boycotted" by the Government.

This unfavourable attitude towards Christianity is of grave moment, for no one can contemplate without misgiving the issues of a purely materialistic education. The influence of Confucius—even if that influence is secured by the recent decree—is not religious. It is not anti-materialistic save in so far as it upholds an ethical ideal. One fears, however, that with the advance of even secular knowledge Confucius will not be able to maintain his giddy pre-eminence. Our estimates of his worth and historical magnitude may vary; but a wider knowledge will certainly not permit even the Chinese to regard him as this decree enjoins. Excessive adulation may result in excessive depreciation, and the real good that is in him be neglected because of the alleged good that is found to be wanting. If such a time should come, before a substitute for the Confucian influence is admitted, the whole educational system will be left without even that measure of moralising which Confucius might supply.

What China is seeking by the supreme elevation of Confucius, but will certainly fail to secure, Christianity can give her in a higher degree and in a form compatible with any growth in knowledge or change in polity. If China could exclude Christianity while admitting other Western influences, she would certainly fall under the blight of a purely materialistic view of things with all its superstitious by-products. Here, where the educational and religious interests meet, China must choose between Christ and Confucius. Unfortunately, the official bias is at present against Christ. On any strict interpretation of the declared intention of Government, a conscientious Christian would find it difficult to study in a Government college; and no pupil of a Christian college need look for Government recognition or employment. How much China would lose by the exclusion of Christianity from her schools, and of Christians from her official ranks, it is difficult to say.

Happily, however, decrees are not always strictly interpreted. Happily, also, China cannot now exclude Christianity from her national life. The Christian Church is a great and growing body. We may hope that the Chinese Government will see the folly of trying, or even pretending, to discriminate against so large a number of her not least intelligent, patriotic, and moral subjects. A state recognition of Christianity, such as was accorded to it in the Roman Empire by Constantine, is not to be desired. If China can learn from Rome the folly of opposing Christianity, the Christian Church may learn enough to decline any *donum fatale*. No more is to be desired by the friends of China and of Christianity alike than a fair field and no favour. China will then find all that is good in her Confucian ideal conserved for her. She will lose nothing and gain much. If she would learn the correct line of action, she has in Japan a nearer, and in this respect a happier, example than ancient Rome.

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VARIATIONS BETWEEN MATTHEW AND MARK.

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IT may be affirmed that now, after long controversy, it is settled that the custom in Hebrew literature which obtains in the Old Testament holds also to a great extent in the New. This custom is concisely stated by the expression "Books were made out of books." Our fathers in criticism would have stared at seeing each paragraph in Dr Driver's edition of Genesis distinguished by separate letters. To us J and E and P are no mysteries, but indispensable clues to the date and value of the paragraphs so marked. By the help of these letters, with D added, we can largely reconstruct for ourselves the appearance of the Hebrew scriptures in the eighth century and in the seventh and in the fifth. So we have at least three strata of narrative—each stratum distinguished by its appropriate fossil words and sentiments, and we can arrive at some determination of values. We discover that J contains traces of primitive cult, and usages which P would disown and obliterate. We discover that the Chronicler re-edits the narrative in Kings, bringing it into conformity with his own conceptions of what should have occurred. We discover that the compiler of Samuel is not disconcerted by the varying accounts received as to the inception of royalty, but inserts them both, although the older ascribes the change in government to the authority of Jehovah, the later (moved by experience) to the rebellious pride of the people.

These things are well-established conclusions of criticism. How far do they serve us as guides in studying the Synoptic Gospels? First of all, it is *prima facie* probable that what Jews wrote, even late in their history, would be written according to the received method of their race. Between the fourth-century book of Chronicles and the Synoptic Gospels we have the first-century Books of Maccabees, in which is continued the old tradition of re-writing events with a prejudice and a purpose. It is apparent also from this example that change of language did not carry with it change of literary form. Scratch the Greek writer and you will still find a Hebrew underneath. There is another point. Oral sources are presupposed and discernible in Old Testament narratives, but our analysis has to be content with getting back to the earliest *written* document; so in pursuing up the gospel to its origin we are dimly conscious of years of preparation as it passed through the mouths of men, but it appears lost labour to expect great results, if any, by going back to that embryonic stage. Only when what we may handle came to the birth in concrete shape, can reasoning find its basis and justification.

Happily, there is a fair consensus of scholars now, at least in England, that the main common source of the Synoptics was a written document: and again, that "Ur-Marcus" is a figment of the Teutonic mind which may be dismissed, with the assertion that we have in our present Mark the earliest written Christian gospel—the J of the New Testament. But not far behind it in date came another which has perished in its integrity, but survives in such portions of Matthew and Luke as are similar, if not identical, and absent from Mark. With regard to this second Synoptic constituent, known as Q, one is in difficulties. Professor Burkitt agrees with the Dean of Westminster in thinking that its outline should be taken from Luke rather than from Matthew; yet in the same series of lectures Professor Burkitt will have it from references (as he surmises) to Josephus, that both treatises of St Luke are subsequent to the appearance of the *Antiquities* in 94 A.D. This would give

us as the main authority for the Nonmarcan Q a writer posterior by ten or fifteen years to the other compiler, according to the usual reckoning of the date of the appearance of the Greek treatise called after Matthew.

We may perhaps gain some fruitful help in perplexity by detaching one particular point for discussion. Let us take Mark's narrative as embodying what was known of Jesus between the years 65 and 70, and the Gospel of St Matthew as reflecting the state of belief ten years or so after. What inferences follow from the comparison? What changes had taken place in the conception of the character of the Master, and in the record of his words? What is their authority, and which of the two statements is to be preferred—the earlier or the later?

If the analogy with Old Testament literature holds we should expect to find in the re-written gospel the like amount of tendency which we find in the E account of the origin of monarchy as compared with the J account (both in 1 Samuel), or as we find in the Chronicler's description of the whole course of monarchy as contrasted with the description in Kings. There we can have no hesitation which narrative to prefer, viz. the primitive rather than the idealised. Does the same preference hold between the two Synoptics, or does another factor known as "development" enter into the question, and simplify or, maybe, darken it? The variations into which it is proposed to enter are of two kinds: first, variations in actual statement, by addition or subtraction; secondly, variations in general sentiment, by virtue of a new setting given, or a fresh suggestion applied, to the same sayings or doings of Jesus.

Matthew had Mark's gospel much as we possess it, before him; that is generally conceded; and in reproducing he altered it, and the alterations show a bias or purpose greater than can be accounted for merely by difference in the persons addressed. This bias represents some ten years or so of growth in doctrine; is it in the direction of the better or the worse?

Here are some of the purposes apparent.

1. A *particularist* purpose narrowing the gospel, at least in its inception. In Mark (vi. 10) no bounds are set to the mission of the Twelve, whereas in Matthew it is expressly limited to the "lost sheep of the house of Israel" (xi. 6). In consonance with this limitation, when the Master is on Phœnician soil, Matthew (xv. 24) makes him say that he was *only* sent to the lost sheep of the house of Israel, whereas Mark (vii. 27) merely speaks of their priority in being fed. Did Jesus himself so narrow the gospel, or did he not?

2. An *ascetic* purpose. In his instructions to the Twelve, as given in St Mark (vi. 6-13), Jesus apparently has in view the pilgrim directions for the march out of Egypt: they are to set forth "with shoes on their feet, and staff in their hand." Matthew (xi. 10) misunderstands, and annuls this allowance, stripping them of everything, "nor shoes, nor staff." In keeping with this tendency we find Matthew (xix. 10-12) alone reporting a discussion on celibacy, in which the expediency of such a state is distinctly upheld by Jesus, in the case of those to whom it is given to receive the saying. But again, in exactly the opposite spirit, into the magisterial λέγω ὑμῖν of the Master concerning divorce, which Mark (x. 11) makes absolute, Matthew (xix. 9) introduces the qualification μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ, which he repeats in the Sermon on the Mount (v. 32), where Luke (xvi. 18) does *not* support him.

How are we to understand this alternate strictness and relaxation? Can our Lord's directions on general matters be modified by circumstances? Does contact with the world justify the Church in lowering the standard?

3. *Ecclesiastical purposes.* Although St Mark was considered to be specially in the confidence of St Peter, the momentous saying concerning the custody of the keys of the Kingdom had not risen on the literary horizon in 65 A.D., but emerged about 75 A.D. in solitary glory under Matthew's authority (xvi. 19), for Luke has no place for it in his careful chronicle. Neither can the equally momentous formula of baptism rendered at full by Matthew (xxviii. 19) be found even

in the supplement to Mark, nor does such a word as ἐκκλησία occur in any Synoptic but the first. Are these things fortuitous, or purposed?

4. But by far the most characteristic of all Matthew's purposes is one I may call *theological*: it concerns the person and work of Jesus. In contrast with Mark, he augments the number and force of the miracles. Whereas the earlier account represents the Master as flying from popularity, afraid lest the lust of the people for bodily cures should divert him from preaching, "for to this end came I forth" (Mark i. 35-38), Matthew insists on frequent and numerous wonders, altering "he healed many that were sick" (Mark i. 34) into "he healed all" (Matt. viii. 16), and quoting Isaiah to support him: it is not only devils which are cast out, but "all manner of sickness and all manner of disease" which is cured (Matt. iv. 23). There is one record of raising from death common to the Synoptics: you have only to read that record to see how the story grew in definiteness and magnitude. According to Mark (v. 23) Jairus says τὸ θυγάτριόν μου ἐσχάτως ἔχει, corresponding to St Luke's assertion (viii. 42) ἀπεθνήσκειν; in St Matthew (ix. 18) it is ἡ θυγάτηρ μου ἄρτι ἐτελεύτησεν. You may suggest that this comes of compression, in lieu of the subsequent message concerning her decease, but the Master shows an incredulity as to the truth of the message he could hardly have shown to the father's testimony. We should in all probability have taken the sentence "She is not dead, but sleepeth" (Mark v. 39) in a literal sense, had not Matthew's opening words defined the situation differently. St Luke accords with Mark rather than Matthew, and if you stumble at his expression "her spirit came again," you will find exactly the same expression in the text of Judges (xv. 19) respecting the recovery of Samson from a swoon.

Before we come to the particular Christology of Matthew, we must notice one significant omission on his part from the document *ex hypothesi* open before him. He had prefaced his gospel with an account of how it was revealed by an angel

that "that which was conceived of Mary was of the Holy Ghost" (i. 20), and how the babe was worshipped by Magi from the East with royal offerings. He must have felt himself precluded, therefore, from reproducing the one and only incident concerning Mary to be found in Mark. How could a mother with such assured knowledge and preconceptions have come over from Nazareth to Capernaum as one in a "*conseil de famille*," intending to lay hold of Jesus, "for they said he is beside himself"? (Mark iii. 21). Or can you give any other reasonable meaning to the passage than that the friends of chapter iii. verse 21 "who went out" *are* the mother and brethren who "arrive and send unto him" in verse 31? Would any other cause than a knowledge of their object have warranted Jesus in the preference he expressed for an unrelated family of the loyal over an unworthy family of his own blood? The survival of this notice in Mark resembles that of certain fossils embedded in J and E of the Old Testament, which tell of antecedent ages and earlier faiths.

Let us further consider how Matthew enhances Christ's personality. He does it, in the first instance, by *removing* phrases which savour of dishonour, because they show human emotions or infirmities. Jesus is *not* supposed to "marvel" at unbelief as he does in Mark (vi. 6); nor "to look round with anger, grieved at the hardness" of men's hearts (Mark iii. 5); nor to ask "Who touched me?" as not knowing (Mark v. 30); nor to desire to pass by his disciples in the boat, as not able (Mark vi. 48); nor to wish for concealment, and yet not obtain it (Mark vii. 24).

Then there occur *changes* in Mark's original language as too naïve. Jesus is not the carpenter (Mark vi. 3), but the "carpenter's son" (Matt. xiii. 55); the incredulity of Nazareth does not wholly incapacitate him from acting (Mark vi. 5); it but limits the number of miracles to a few in place of many (Matt. xiii. 58).

But the most striking alteration of all is that which sweeps away one Marcan assertion altogether, and substitutes for it

another of a very different complexion. A rich man had come to the Rabbi with a question, Διδάσκαλε ἀγαθέ, τι ποιήσω ἵνα ζῶν αἰώνιον κληρονομήσω; and Jesus had deprecated his form of address, τί με λέγεις ἀγαθόν; οὐδεὶς ἀγαθὸς εἰ μὴ εἷς ὁ θεός. So Mark (x. 17, 18) renders the opening of the conversation, and *Luke agrees* (xviii. 18, 19); but Matthew (xix. 16, 17) apparently conceives that an offence would lie in the words if literally reproduced. He takes, therefore, the epithet from Διδάσκαλε and conjoins it with τι, changing accordingly Christ's question into τί με ἐρωτᾷς περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ; but preserving εἷς ἐστὶν ὁ ἀγαθός, quite apart from its original context. The scrupulousness of Matthew is like the scrupulousness of the Chronicler (2 Chron. i. 3-6), who cannot mention that Solomon went up to the high place at Gibeon without an apology and a ritual explanation, on account of the subsequent scandal attaching to high places. So Matthew would depart from what Mark and Luke testify that Jesus said, rather than leave his words open to misconstruction.

There is much in St Matthew which reminds one of that Bishop of St David's who in translating the Psalms for the Bishops' Bible laid down for himself the principle so to render them as to agree with the New Testament quotations, "for the avoiding of offence." A small but significant instance occurs in the account of the crucifixion. The second evangelist knows of a charitable Roman soldier who offered Jesus at the time of crucifixion a narcotic, "wine mingled with myrrh," but he received it not (Mark xv. 23). The first evangelist remembered a complaint of the Psalmist that his enemies aggravated his sufferings, and he has it that the wine was mixed with gall, which surely was no narcotic, and "therefore Jesus tasted it, though he would not drink" (Matt. xxvii. 34).

The reader can hardly at times help being annoyed at Matthew's want of appreciation of the gospel he copied and at his clumsy endeavours to mend it. What can be more delicate and confiding than Jesus' way with his disciples accord-

ing to Mark? He would let them puzzle out by themselves the difficulty raised by some enigmatic saying; while according to St Matthew he suggests the answer, in advance of any time for reflection. It is surely a true consultation of their minds that the Teacher intends when he asks, "Who do men say that I am?" (Mark viii. 27). There is not much room for original thought when the question runs, "Who do men say that the Son of man is?" (Matt. xvi. 13). This may be but defect of literary style, did it not accompany similar inaptitude to follow the course of events as laid down in St Mark. Professor Burkitt has some excellent pages¹ in justification of the Marcan arrangement: Jesus has no breach with the Pharisees until after the feeding of the five thousand (Mark vii. 6); in Matthew he denounces them in his first open-air sermon (Matt. v. 20). Jesus does not encounter the Sadducees till he reaches their customary home, Jerusalem (Mark xii. 18); in Matthew they are found in Galilee in strange fellowship with the Pharisees (Matt. xvi. 1). Jesus wins the first confession of his *Messiahship* from Peter in the retirement of Cæsarea Philippi, in answer to a deliberate question at a definite crisis of his life (Mark viii. 29); in Matthew the disciples had already some time before worshipped him, saying, "Of a truth thou art the Son of God" (Matt. xiv. 33). It may be suggested that Mark has systematised, and that Matthew's incoherences are tokens of originality. But if that ground be taken up, there should be adduced proofs of priority on the part of Matthew's gospel. The differences taken in connection with points already dwelt upon make rather for degeneracy.

But variation in *sentiment* is even more apparent than in statement. What is the mental and moral attitude of Jesus in dealing with materialists, who would credit nothing but such a sign of authority over nature as Moses or Elijah exhibited—the one in bringing manna, the other fire from heaven? According to Mark he met them with a point-

¹ *The Gospel History and its Transmission*, pp. 79 ff.

blank refusal: "There shall no sign be given unto this generation" (Mark viii. 12). But Christians of a later age fidgeted for some more satisfactory answer: so in editing Mark, St Matthew (xvi. 4) added *εἰ μὴ τὸ σημεῖον Ἰωνᾶ*: then, in a doublet taken from Q, accepted the sign as consisting in the preaching of Jonah (Matt. xii. 41); then, not satisfied with that obscure reference, inserted (shall we say on the strength of the Christian consciousness?) the verse, "As Jonah was three days and three nights in the belly of the whale, so shall the Son of man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth" (Matt. xii. 40)—preternaturally retaining his life under abnormal conditions. Does it not therefore come to this, that what the Marcan Christ refused the Matthean Christ granted to the materialists?

Scholars are pretty well agreed that all the MSS. of Mark go back virtually to a single exemplar, and that this was providentially preserved through a period when its contents in their naïve simplicity were unacceptable to the dogmatic Christianity of the time. The abrupt close of the gospel (Mark xvi. 8) has been attributed to the mutilation—"accidental rather than intentional"—of the single copy. I sometimes think whether there is not another explanation possible. May not this early reverent writer approaching the crowning miracle of the Master's life, impressed by the mystery of things and the difficulty of describing them, have paused, intentionally, perhaps, relinquishing the revelation to another, or perhaps, as the Master described by him so often does, purposely consigning the matter to reflection, and reflection only?

There is a bust in the Uffizi at Florence of Marcus Junius Brutus left unfinished by Michael Angelo, but still beautiful in its suggestiveness. Someone, a friend, maybe, of the Medicis, wrote an epigram declaring that the sculptor had been hindered by his recollection of the man's baseness: to which in after days Lord Sandwich replied with another interpretation—

"Brutum effecisset sculptor ni mente recursat
Multa viri virtus, sistit et obstupuit."

And possibly the ἐφοβοῦντο γὰρ reflects not only the mind of trembling women, but the mind also of the awestruck evangelist who would rather leave incomplete than finish unworthily.

I have lingered over the details of the problem as being in no hurry to wrestle with the central difficulty. The questions at issue may, perhaps, be formulated thus. What authority had Matthew to alter Mark? Which of two varying accounts of what Jesus said or did is the more reliable? Supposing we bring in that "blessed word" "development," does that of *itself* cause the rough places to become smooth? Is there not a growth downward in the direction of ecclesiastical legend, as well as upward towards the region of spiritual purity? Is it possible to determine between the evolution which is decadence and the evolution which is progress? Suppose we try our hand among the main documents which go to make up the early books of the Old Testament. There we have J and E making on the whole for greater originality, D for a higher morality, P for fuller legality. Do we always of two blended or consecutive narratives prefer the older? Does it not depend on the subject-matter of the paragraph? When *history* is in question we endeavour to get as far back as possible towards the source. You can have no practical doubt, in ascertaining the origin of monarchy in Israel, that Samuel *was* the true kingmaker, with Jehovah's sanction, and anointed Saul in all good faith. It was only after sad experience that the idea of the people's pride and stubbornness arose, and was referred back. Still more when sacerdotal claims became prominent, you doubt the scholium of the chronicler (2 Chron. xxvi. 16 ff.) on King Uzziah, interpreting the ancient phrase "the Lord smote him" (2 Kings xv. 5) into a token of divine wrath, and adding as its cause a violation of the priestly right to offer incense. But there are occasions when we look back to D or even P with more confidence than to J or E. These are the occasions when time and thought have worked towards a fuller understanding than was vouchsafed to the

primitive scribe. In the centuries which elapsed between the original draft of the J account of creation and of the P account of creation, a process of refining legend had gone on, until we obtain a narrative, devoid of anthropomorphism, wonderful in divining the stages of God's handiwork and filling each stage with appropriate contents. Shall we not set this approach to scientific accuracy in the balance as against ecclesiastical romancing?

It comes then to this, that in studying the Hexateuch we are *not* content with following any one of its constituent documents: we weigh, we select, we compile for ourselves, noting the current opinion of each age, arriving at probabilities where we cannot reach certainties, through the process of comparison, which is in part literary, but in part also of a higher quality.

Should we not extend this process to the Synoptic Gospels? Mark furnishes the freshest, earliest impressions made by the prophet of Nazareth on his disciples: he pourtrays the growth of teaching, the growth of opposition—the maturing of the Master's purpose. To Matthew were vouchsafed thoughts of a mystery underlying facts, which sometimes renders him indifferent to exactness in his facts—ready to add, ready to omit, ready to vary. He is the commentator, not the historian: he inserts from his knowledge of later days, and sets words into the Master's mouth which it is hardly probable the Master spoke, but which may well have been within the Master's mind. The generation which condemned Bishop Colenso found offence in the thought that “the Lord spake unto Moses” could be other than literally true everywhere. Surely our generation will not shrink from applying to Matthew what we have learnt from the analysis of Deuteronomy, or insist on every phrase put into the Master's mouth having fallen from the Master's own lips? The first evangelist himself will at times give a hint that you are not to press what he relates too precisely, as though it were an actual occurrence. The Transfiguration is a “vision” (Matt.

xvii. 9), importing and imparting a secret. Shall we do amiss if we accept this clue towards the interpretation of what later on *appears* to be a portion of history—"the graves were opened, and many bodies of the saints arose, and came out of the graves after his resurrection, and went into the holy city and appeared to many"? (Matt. xxvii. 52). Can this be anything but a symbol of the transcendent power of the Cross? Is it not an instance of those things which are not facts, but yet are true? That way doubtless lies the creation of legends, but what more innocent in origin, or more instructive, rightly understood? I suggest once again a comparison with Old Testament documents. We prefer the first chapter of Genesis to the second, for it reveals the endeavour to purify the earlier account of its naïve simplicities; we distrust the same editor in the rendering of later history, for he interweaves with it notions derived from ceremonies or conceptions of his own epoch. St Matthew too has spiritual intuitions lacking to Mark; he has also ecclesiastical prejudices born of a later age.

I come back finally to the critical question, What authority had the first evangelist to alter—for improvement or otherwise—the received story of Jesus' life? But it is urged that there was another received story. Yes; that accounts for additions. I am speaking, however, of variations made in passages obviously copied from Mark. There was surely behind the uncertain personal Matthew some responsible power. Shakespeare believes in "the prophetic soul of the wide world dreaming on things to come"; we may also conceive of the contemplative soul brooding on things past, and quickening them with newness of life. The Abbé Loisy and those brave thinkers who strive with him to reconcile the old faith and the new criticism have no hesitation about the true organ of this world-soul. "*L'Eglise a qualité pour dégager constamment du symbole ancien les applications que comporte une situation qui ne cesse pas de se renouveler.*" Those who sympathise with this writer blame the Church, *not*

for modifying too much, but for modifying too little ; for not continuing the necessary adaptations of Scripture to present-day needs. We may be able to accompany the Abbé a certain way—assert that St Matthew represents ten years or so of Church inspiration working on the old materials ; we may proceed to say much the same of the further evolution witnessed in the Gospels of Luke and John. But how far dare we carry the process ? What of adaptations made in the later ages of the Church ? No doubt many fabricated gospels were suppressed, but what of the mountain of superstructure erected on the “Tu es Petrus,” which is a single utterance in a single gospel ? Is this a legitimate expansion ? Is not some check to Church exuberance necessary ? I know that the Abbé offers us a fairly wide definition of the Church—“la conscience collective et permanente du Christianisme vivant.”¹ But “vivant” is an ambiguous term, and perhaps Protestant critics may find themselves outside the pale. Can we escape in these matters from a large amount of individualism ? The Anglican Church pronounces on the errors of ecclesiastical bodies in the past : she yet imagines herself capable of expounding one place of Scripture so as not to be repugnant to another²—an almost, if not quite, impossible task. We are therefore as those who must themselves construct some reasonable shelter against the storm that has levelled their old home of an infallible Bible. This is a co-operative labour, each one adding his own solid suggestion, and correcting his brother’s flight of architectural fancy.

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¹ *Autour d'un Petit Livre*, p. 59.

² Art. XX.

ON TWO DISLOCATIONS IN ST JOHN'S GOSPEL.

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WHETHER there are dislocations in the Fourth Gospel has often been discussed. Particularly in two passages is there strong internal evidence of disarrangement :—

(A) One is ch. vii. 15–24. As has often been remarked (Wendt, *Das Joh. Evan.*, pp. 79–86, or Moffatt, *Hist. N.T.*, p. 690), this passage breaks the sequence where it occurs in the traditional order, but would fit in admirably at the close of ch. v.

In ch. v. Jesus heals a man on the Sabbath day: this irritates the Jews: he defends himself by appealing to his Father and to the Scripture, citing Moses in defence of his actions: “If ye believed Moses, ye would believe me; but if ye believe not his writings, how are ye to believe my words?” (ch. v. 47). Chapter vii. 15 continues the narrative: the Jews are amazed at his learning, *i.e.* his knowledge of the Law, which enabled him “to hoist them with their own petard.” Exactly the same points continue to be discussed in the following verses as were being discussed at the end of ch. v.—God as the source of Jesus’ teaching, Moses as the giver of the Law which they do *not* keep, their wish to slay Jesus, and Jesus’ defence of himself against the charge of Sabbath desecration. Indeed, these verses seem to contain several direct references to ch. v. “Why are ye seeking to slay me?”

asks Jesus, referring to the murderous intentions of the Jews, about which the Evangelist tells us in ch. v. 18. "I have done *one* work and ye all *are wondering*," says he again, though, according to the traditional order, this one miracle had happened a considerable time before.

Again, in its *present* context ch. vii. 15-24 is as unsuitable as it would be suitable at the end of ch. v. At the beginning of the seventh chapter Jesus is in retirement in Galilee on account of the hostility of the Jews in Jerusalem and Judæa. He rejects the suggestion of his brothers that he should go up openly to the approaching feast in Jerusalem. Only when the feast is half over does he make a public appearance in the Temple and begin to teach (ch. vii. 14). What surprises the Jerusalemites is the openness with which he is teaching, and the impunity he is enjoying, in spite of the hostility spoken of or implied, ch. vii. 1 and 10-13. (It should be noted that the hostility of these verses and of verses 25 ff. is not specially on account of Sabbath desecration, which is the chief burden of the charge against him in ch. v. and ch. vii. 15-24.)

(B) The other dislocation is in chs. xiii.-xvi. (see Wendt, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-101). Chapter xiv. 25-31 is evidently valedictory. Jesus looks back on the words he has spoken to them in the past, and promises his Spirit to remind them of these in the future, now that he is going away himself. He leaves them his peace, and asks them not to be disheartened because he is departing. In future he will not talk much with them (though, in the traditional order, the greater part of his address, chs. xv. and xvi., is yet to come). Finally, because of the imminence of the end, he summons them to rise from table and go forth with him (v. 31).

At several other places in these same chapters the results of disarrangement can be seen. In particular, ch. xvi. 5, "Now I go to him that sent me, and none of you asks, Whither goest thou?" is unintelligible *in its present position*. This very question had been asked by Peter in ch. xiii. 36, "Lord, whither goest thou?" and had been answered by Jesus.

Practically the same question was again put by Thomas, ch. xiv. 5,¹ and was again answered by Jesus. Evidently the order should be, that Jesus first gently reproached them for not having made this inquiry; then Peter (ashamed, perhaps, that the thought of his own loss had so filled his heart as to make him forget to ask his Master whither he was going, till the Master himself suggested it) put the question which Jesus had been waiting for, that through it he might direct the minds of the disciples to things beyond their present sorrow. This sequence of thought would be obtained if chs. xv. and xvi. were taken from their present position and inserted after ch. xiii. 35. By this arrangement also ch. xiv. would be valedictory, as it ought to be, followed only by Christ's high-priestly prayer, ch. xvii.

The internal evidence is so strong in favour of rearranging the passages referred to (chs. v.-vii. and chs. xiii.-xvi.), that one wonders a rearrangement has not been more generally accepted. The chief counter-argument (see Zahn, *Einl. in d. N.T.*, ii. pp. 569) seems to be the improbability of such disorder being allowed to creep into either the autograph or a MS. sufficiently early and important to be the archetype of all extant MSS. and versions. But this improbability will be greatly lessened if it can be shown, from what is known about ancient MSS. and ancient bookmaking in general, how such dislocations may well have occurred.

At first sight it may seem unlikely that the cause of these dislocations can be displacement of "leaves," inasmuch as books at the close of the first century of our era were always rolls ("volumes"), not codices (leaves bound together like modern books). But, as regards the date of the introduction of the codex-form, authorities differ. Kenyon (*Text. Crit.*, p. 34) thinks that although *vellum* codices were in use from the first century B.C., *papyrus* books, intended for publication, appeared in codex-form only from the third century onwards. Grenfell and Hunt (*Oxy. Pap.*, ii.) seem to favour an earlier date, and

¹ "Lord, we know not whither thou goest."

certainly in a book whose provenance at any rate is the same as the Fourth Gospel we find reference to what must be a codex, Rev. v. 1 (see Holtzmann, *Einkl.*, p. 18)—each of the seven seals sealing a *part* of the book.

But even if the Fourth Gospel was originally written, as is highly probable, on a roll (a “volume”), and not on a codex, still this does not by any means preclude the possibility of loose leaves.

1. In some cases at least the writing was first inscribed, by the author or his amanuensis, on loose leaves, and only when the writing was complete were these loose leaves gummed together into a roll (Ulpian, *Digest*, xxxii. 52. 5, “libri perscripti nondum conglutinati vel emendati”).

2. Not all rolls were rolled; some were *folded* (see Gardthausen, *Griech. Palaeog.*, p. 58 sq.). Such a book might have come apart in leaves, owing to the papyrus giving way at the creases.

3. But on the whole the most probable cause of these dislocations in the Fourth Gospel is the breaking up of the roll at a few places into its constituent *plagulæ*¹ through the wear and tear of constant use. I believe the autograph, or at any rate the archetype, of all our MSS. and versions was a roll, with columns of such width and height that ch. vii. 15–24 exactly filled two of them. Perhaps each of the *plagulæ* (κολλήματα, the leaves out of which the roll was originally composed) had room enough for two columns (σελίδες), with, in some or all cases, a little over, so that, *e.g.*, seven columns could be written on three pages (see Kenyon, *Palaeog. of the Papyri*, p. 21: “Alike in the best-written and in the worst-written MSS., the writing is frequently across the junctions”). But it is simpler to suppose that ch. vii. 15–24 filled two pages (*plagulæ*) of a roll that had one column to each page.

Evidently the two dislocations above referred to will give

¹ For the manufacture of papyrus, see Kenyon, *Text. Crit.*, p. 19, or Gregory, *Canon and Text*, p. 301.

a very searching test of the truth of this theory. For if the theory is true, then—

- (a) The verses from behind which in each case the pages dropped out must have ended a column.
- (b) The dislocated passages themselves must be one or more *full* columns (pages).
- (c) The passages between where these dislocations fell out and where they were wrongly inserted must also be one or more *full* columns (pages).

If, on examination, all these conditions are found fulfilled, the theory is strikingly confirmed. Now, if we take Nestle's Stuttgart edition of the New Testament, and if we suppose that each column (page) of the MS. contained 11 lines of this edition, then ch. vii. 15–24 which got displaced from the end of ch. v. contains exactly 22 lines (2 columns), and the other displaced passage, ch. xiii. 36 to end of ch. xiv., contains exactly 77 lines (7 columns). In fact, we are enabled to page the MS. throughout. The first five chapters contain exactly 462 lines, *i.e.* 42 columns. Chapter vii. 15–24, which ought to come next, filled exactly, as stated above, 2 columns of the same size. Chapter vi. to ch. vii. 14, which came next, contains 185 lines, only 2 lines short of 17 columns. Chapter vii. 25 to ch. xiii. 35 contains $659\frac{1}{2}$ lines, only half a line short of 60 columns. Chapter xv. 1 to ch. xvi. 33 contains $133\frac{3}{4}$ lines, less than 2 lines over 12 columns; and, as already stated, ch. xiii. 36 to the end of ch. xiv. contains exactly 77 lines (7 columns). I do not think it can be quite accidental that, of the six amounts here indicated, four are exactly commensurable with an amount of MS. that would fill eleven lines of Nestle, and the other two quantities are “off” by less than two lines.

Perhaps these results would be clearer if exhibited in a tabular form:—

- (1) Ch. i. 1 to end of ch. v filled columns (pages) 1 to 42.
- (2) Ch. vii. 15–24 filled what were, before dislocation, columns No. 43 and No. 44.

- (3) Ch. vi. 1 to ch. vii. 14 filled originally columns 45 to 61.
- (4) Ch. vii. 25 to ch. xiii. 35 filled columns 62 to 121.
- (5) Ch. xv. 1 to end of ch. xvi. filled columns 122 to 133.
- (6) Ch. xiii. 36 to the end of ch. xiv. filled columns 134 to 140 (there is no need to carry the pagination any further).

Thus the first sixteen chapters of the Fourth Gospel were contained in columns (pages) 1-140. For some reason or other—perhaps an accident, perhaps the wear and tear of constant use—columns 43 and 44 became loose, and were inserted—wrongly inserted—at a break which had occurred between the 61st and 62nd columns. In like manner, columns 134-140, becoming detached, were inserted—again wrongly, though in this instance *before* their proper place—in a break which had occurred between columns 121 and 122.

In an out-of-the-way place like this in which I am writing, it is impossible to test this theory as thoroughly as I could wish. Still, so far as I can see, the hypothesis does not involve anything inherently improbable. A similar hypothesis commands universal assent in the case of one or two writings of profane authors. And in the New Testament, in one other case at least, there is strong internal evidence that something similar has occurred. 2 Corinthians vi. 14-vii. 2 is manifestly out of place in its present context. It is a plausible conjecture that we have here a page from a lost letter of Paul to the Corinthians referred to in 1 Corinthians v. 9. Certainly the subject of 2 Cor. vi. 14 ff. is the same as the subject dealt with in the letter alluded to in 1 Cor. v. 9.

But perhaps some palæographers may object to the hypothesis on the ground that the pages (columns) presupposed are too small (eleven lines of Nestle). I find it difficult to obtain accurate information on this point; but, so far as I can see, this objection has little weight. The Codex Regius, though it has two columns to the page, has only nine lines of Nestle to the column (two lines less than in the MS. of John, according to my hypothesis). Some time ago Dr Rendel Harris

proposed a theory about "The New Testament Autographs," in which he suggested that the archetype of the Vatican MS. was one in which each column contained one-third of the material contained in a column of the Vatican MS., *i.e.* the columns of the archetype contained on an average less than seven lines of Nestle: similarly, the archetype of the Sinaitic MS. had in each of its columns one-quarter of what fills a column in this MS., *i.e.* the page of the archetype contained about four or five lines of Nestle. Kenyon (*Text. Crit.*, p. 30) criticises these suggestions adversely, chiefly because "columns of the size supposed by Mr Harris imply rolls of papyrus only 5 or 6 inches in height; but these are never found except in the case of the Herodas MS., which . . . is evidently intended for a pocket volume." . . . "The papyri discovered in Egypt show that even the poorest people used papyrus measuring 9 or 10 inches in height, and upwards." From what is here stated and implied by Kenyon, one can easily see that eleven lines of Nestle would be about an average pagina, and would fill a plagula of average size in the first century A.D.

Of course there are many seeming or real dislocations in the Fourth Gospel which my suggestion does not touch. If it explained two, though only two, it would not be quite valueless.

F. J. PAUL.

BUSHMILLS, IRELAND.

DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the “Hibbert Journal.” Reviews of books are not open to discussion. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the *Journal*. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

JESUS OR CHRIST.

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1909, p. 352.)

I do not presume to obtrude any criticism of the article which appeared in the January number. Its seriousness and sincerity deserve the most careful consideration and the most respectful answer. When a man has lost his foothold in the Christian faith and feels the things in which the Church has most surely believed breaking away from him, it is quite natural that he should show the extent of the desolation in a journal of free inquiry like the *Hibbert*, and should challenge some refutation or consolation from some competent pen. I have no doubt that such reply as the occasion demands will be forthcoming.

But what I venture to do is to remove a misapprehension into which any reader who is unacquainted with Congregationalism might easily fall, owing to the singular designation of the writer of the article as “Congregational minister.” It might seem from this unusual descriptive title that he was communicating the view of Congregationalists.

Congregationalism, however, is peculiar in this: it does not regard “orders” as indelible; it has no such theory as “Once a clergyman always a clergyman.” A “minister” is one called by a given church to the office of pastor and teacher. When he ceases to stand in this relation to a church he ceases to be a “minister,” except in the potential sense that he may be called to the ministry by another church in the future. Now the writer of this article has not been a minister in the Congregational sense for eleven years back. He might, of course, be called to the ministry of a church again, and then the title given him would cease to be misleading. But it must be evident to the reader of his most interesting and pathetic article that nothing is more unlikely than that he should seek, or than that a Congregational church should call him, to enter on the ministry again.

All Congregationalists will sympathise with him, will respect his candour, admire his ability, and be grateful for his trenchant and fearless

challenge; but they would not regard him as a minister, except by courtesy. It is desirable that this should be understood at a time when many Christians outside our pale are inclined to regard us as loose and latitudinarian, if not unbelieving and agnostic.

ROBERT F. HORTON.

HAMPSTEAD.

[*Editorial Note.*—The name of the Rev. R. Roberts will be found on the roll of Congregational ministers published in the *Year Book*. This Roll is described as that of ministers "officially recognised" by the Union. It is based on returns furnished by the County Unions of ministers officially recognised by them in their respective areas. The names and dates of the four pastorates held by Mr Roberts between 1876 and 1898 will be found under his name. Arrangements for a full discussion of the question raised by Mr Roberts are in progress.]

INFALLIBILITY AND TOLERATION.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1908, p. 76, and January 1909, p. 437.)

As the only thing Mr Jerome can apparently find to criticise in my views on Infallibility and Toleration as expressed in last October's *Hibbert Journal* is their inconsistency with views he believes me to have expressed formerly, and as I certainly do not claim any miraculous exemption, *a priori*, from the possibility of inconsistency, the charge is worth examining. It appears to arise out of the fact that Mr Jerome evidently has no taste for satire, and hence no sympathy with those who feel the difficulty of not writing it. This must render the study of my works a very arduous one to him, and it is no wonder that he sometimes fails to take their meaning. The present is clearly a case in point. When, in *Humanism*, pp. 201-202, I was describing from the inside and accounting for the intolerant practices of unregenerate human societies, I was not approving of them, and still less of the far cruder procedure of natural selection which forms the ultimate check on social follies. I was merely pointing out how insuperable an obstacle they formed to a universal acceptance of a pessimistic view of the value of knowledge, and of a denial that knowledge was in principle good and satisfactory. But I did not declare the methods for coping with such pessimism which are now in vogue in society and in nature to be the most rational and satisfactory. Nor did I say a word against social toleration. What I declared to be *irrational* was not toleration, but obstinate adherence to views whose nature rendered them incapable of surviving. For it is unreasonable to sacrifice oneself to impossible views and to perish with them. It is also quite unnecessary. For it is the function of human reason (which is a very different thing from the Pure Reason of rationalism) to foresee and

forewarn us of the fatal consequences of foolish beliefs, and so to forearm us. We are thus enabled to escape, by dropping the pernicious views and suppressing the instincts associated with them. The argument in *Humanism*, p. 60 (which also Mr Jerome might have cited for his interpretation), similarly justifies coercion only in the case of persons so brutally stupid that they cannot listen to reason, though it certainly does not deny that in extremest cases a certain amount of such coercion may still be requisite. But it has never entered my head to imagine that intellectualist metaphysics were socially mischievous enough to require forcible repression; they may even be relatively good things as compared with the things their perpetrators might do otherwise. And if I had believed in the *argumentum baculinum* I should have been inconsistent in arguing against them in the way I have done.

So much for the argument in *Humanism*. In the paper criticised it was merely carried one step farther, and completed by the suggestion of a positive and better alternative to the methods hitherto in vogue. I pointed out that persuasion is a humaner, quicker, and more efficacious method than persecution of inducing a reasonable willingness to abandon deleterious views. I also showed that whereas the new theory of truth removed the incompatibility of divergent views and destroyed the *duty to persecute* in the conscience of the dogmatist, the claim to infallibility inherent in the absolutist theory constantly acted as a social irritant and was the chief source of the past intolerance which Mr Jerome and I join in deploring. It seems clear to me, therefore, that there has been, not inconsistency, but progress in my argument, and I trust that this point has been made sufficiently clear to all (except those who are metaphysicians enough to hold that all progress is necessarily inconsistency). For it is really a matter of considerable social importance that philosophy should at length relieve mankind from the duty and imputation of congenital intolerance, and that the widespread tendency to dogmatism should be shown to be essentially an acquired characteristic, entailed by an unfortunate acceptance of an erroneous theory of knowledge.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE, OXFORD.

PROFESSOR JAMES ON FECHNER'S PHILOSOPHY.

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1909, p. 278.)

AFTER reading Professor James's splendid interpretation of Fechner's "Doctrine of the Earth-Soul" in the January number, I regret that these philosophers did not develop this line of thought to its conclusion, so as to give a fuller idea of the ultimate soul of the universe and our relation to it. On page 293 the article states that Fechner, in order to escape an

infinitely long summation, posits a God indefinite in feature. At several places Professor James half confesses a disapproval of the monistic tendency of Fechner's theory, and it is therefore not surprising that Professor James himself does not attempt to present a more systematic conception of soul-life in its totality. At any rate, one gets the impression from his article that with the ascending steps in the synthesis of soul-life there is not a corresponding increase in coherence and organisation.

I fail to understand why a more systematic and unitary view of consciousness need be regarded as a victory for monism, or even for psycho-physical parallelism. The psychical is but one of a number of features of reality, and a systematic account would only partially exhaust the nature of this one feature. There would be found in every constituent member the element of variety no less pronounced than that of uniformity.

I was impressed with the idea that every higher order of consciousness is capable of surveying and comprehending the faculties of the lower orders, although the view in the opposite direction is at least partially closed. Now, following this line, do we not approach in the final synthesis a supreme consciousness that combines the faculties of all the lower ones, including man, in one great centralised and intensified system?

This view, however, is in sharp contrast with that of the materialistic philosophers, who attribute to man the highest form of intelligence. They have a magnificent theory of a material universe, infinite in extent and ruled throughout by inexorable laws, but they make the psychical phenomena everywhere subordinate to the physical. I am not advocating the theory of psycho-physical parallelism. We may regard the universe as permeated throughout by both the physical and the psychical characteristics without regarding the two as being parallel in their manifestations; admitting, of course, that they are closely interrelated. Nor do I look upon these two characteristics as being the only fundamental ones.

If we now turn to view the nature of God such as is indicated by a further development of Fechner's theory, are we not overwhelmed by the wealth and grandeur of His attributes? He must possess at least all the faculties of the human soul, yet in infinitely greater intensity and development. He must understand our prayers and our needs far better than we are able to express them, although this does not imply that we should not appeal to Him, since intellectual intercourse with Him largely constitutes the bonds of relationship and the channels of interaction.

For many of us, these views, which now seem possible, perhaps come too late to be practically beneficial in any great degree. The faculties that must be employed, having been so long in disuse, are atrophied, and much difficulty may be experienced in the attempt to revive them. Hence the failure to realise immediate benefits in all cases must not be considered a refutation of the theory. Personally, I have recently adopted these conclusions, but I cannot say that I have acquired the habits of conduct implied by them. The vision is clear enough, but it shines as yet at a great distance and with a cold radiance.

Fechner's theory also appears to throw some light on the problem of evil. If the higher orders of consciousness are constituted so largely by the lower ones, they, too, must possess the dual nature, and in the final synthesis we therefore have the warring powers of good and evil on an infinitely vaster scale. We may abstract from this whole the elements that make for development and progress and name them God, but there remain the forces that tend toward retrogression and disintegration, and the interaction between the opposing powers may constitute the very essence of existence itself.

CYRUS H. ESHLEMAN.

GRAND HAVEN, MICH.

CRITICISMS OF THE NORTH ARABIAN THEORY.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1908, p. 132, and January 1909, p. 441.)

DR ASTLEY is not depreciated by me as a new man; surely it is a great advantage to be "the newest writer." But I do not think he was wise in referring me to Professor Flinders Petrie, for the reasons already given, which are not touched on in Dr Astley's paper. I am still more sorry that he refers to the "man in the street," because this course is only fitted to heighten prejudice, as we have seen before now in the controversies on the Pentateuch, the Psalms, and Isaiah. There are many true things which have long been scouted, but at last, perhaps slightly modified, become generally accepted. It would not have done for the pioneers of those truths to "call a halt," as Dr Astley would wish me to do. This bright writer himself affirms that quite possibly North Arabia may have "had more influence upon Canaan and upon Israel than has hitherto (?) been supposed." If that concession should be made by others, to whom will this be due? Dr Astley speaks of my "unreserved acceptance and promulgation of this novel view" (of an independent land of Muzri and of Jerahmeelite or Asshurite prominence), but he should have known that I am much more than a promulgator. Among the points in which Professor Winckler is less advanced than I am is precisely that discovery of Jerahmeelite or Asshurite prominence, which is chiefly mine, but partly Hommel's. Another point is the extent to which the confusion of Mizrim and Mizraim has gone in the Hebrew text. Dr Astley may comprehend the situation as regards this point better if he refers to *The Decline and Fall of the Kingdom of Judah*, Introd., p. xli. Dr Astley, then, does think that there may be something in my somewhat elaborate investigations, even though I may exaggerate. Nevertheless he objects to the sub-title of my article of last October, "A Mistaken Name for a Genuine Thing," and thinks I assume without proof that my theory reposes on "genuine" facts. He

fails to notice that I have myself explained this short phrase in my article. We want a title for the new theory that shall adequately express its reference. There are other ethnic or regional names which have as much right as Jerahmeelite to figure in the title. The only accurate title which corresponds to the genuine thing is "The North Arabian."

On textual criticism, which has a good deal to do with the new theory, Dr Astley shows no sign of having yet earned the right to speak; what he does say reminds me too much of the "man in the street," who is unacquainted alike with my principles and with the mode of their application. The old methods of textual criticism are not worn out, but require to be supplemented by new ones, derived from the study of classified textual phenomena, and of the habits of the scribes. Such a study would have preserved Dr Astley (who is primarily an anthropologist) from the portentous statement that Raḥam or Jarḥam cannot be shortened into Ḥam, *et cetera*.

The remark that my view about Mizrim is like always interpreting "Scotland" in British history as meaning "Ireland" (Scotia) is characteristic of an outsider. Most of our documents are Judahite, the work of the men who were most preoccupied with North Arabia. The fall of Samaria was a literary as well as a political calamity (see *Decline and Fall*, p. xxxvii). "Babylonian inscriptions" is a slip; it should be "Assyrian inscriptions."

Dr Astley wishes, most gracefully, to be "reckoned among my (former) disciples." It is true that where there is a personal bond there is less risk than there would otherwise be of any fatal misapprehension on either side. Another young and rising scholar, who thinks that I have partly misunderstood and over severely criticised (Dr A. T. Olmstead), is at any rate the disciple of a friend of mine (Professor Schmidt of Cornell University), and so I hope to have not much difficulty in removing his causes for complaint. I should mention that he has very courteously written his objections for my own eye; and that, in order to avoid the risks incident to controversy, he has left it entirely to me to arrange the mode of explanation. His book, *Western Asia in the Days of Sargon of Assyria* (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1908), came into my hands only just in time for me to use it, so that I fear I may not have done it the full justice which I would gladly have rendered. Dr Olmstead, on his side, informs me that the work had to be suddenly finished to avoid a long delay. I think it only fair to admit that my inference from a passage in his book, that he felt a "natural prejudice" against Winckler's theory of an independent state of Muzri, was mistaken. What he referred to was the improbable historical results which seemed to him to follow from that theory. For his own part he has had no "conservative" bias against Winckler's theory as he understood it. "No doubt," he says, "it will surprise you, but it is nevertheless true that when we began to explore the Negeb, I was 'almost persuaded' by at least Professor Winckler's theory. But a study of the actual topography forced me to change my mind, much

against my wishes, for such a conclusion largely reduced the value of our results." I have at any rate not omitted in my article to mention the disappointment of Professor Schmidt as regards the discovery of Tells in the Negeb, and made such observations as the case seemed to me then to require. I have also fully admitted that the complete solution of the complicated problem of the N. Arabian Muzri has not yet been reached. My own competence is specially, I suppose, in Old Testament textual matters, which, in my opinion, have been somewhat inadequately treated, but I do not think I can be accused of having neglected the work of travellers and explorers from C. T. Beke to Professor N. Schmidt and his party, and I hope to learn more from them in the future.

The point on which I spoke perhaps a little too strongly (for I seem to have unwillingly hurt Dr Olmstead) relates to the right understanding of Winckler's opinion as to the extent of his supposed state of Muşri. From vol. i. of the third edition of Schrader's work on the Cuneiform Inscriptions and the Old Testament (1902) there seems to me to be no doubt as to the wide range which he gave his Muşri, which, while it included the Negeb, also comprehended el-Ola, and one of whose towns was Yathrib (found by Winckler in the famous passage Hos. v. 13). Dr Olmstead, however, repeatedly speaks in terms of great surprise of the "Negeb Muşri" of Winckler, and I could not help thinking that this mistake vitiated his whole argument. In a second letter to me he admits "the el-Ola slip," but tells me that he has never denied that "you all make the Negeb extend east of the Arabah"; that it appears to him "that both of you throw the weight on the Negeb side," and that when he believed in it himself it was as a "Negeb theory." He adds that "if the Negeb is excluded, it is far more difficult to make your point, for most of the Muşri passages must, it seems to me, on topographical indications, be placed on the Negeb or beyond in Egypt." He also holds that both Winckler and I have sometimes expressed ourselves in a way favourable to a "Negeb Muşri."

I think myself that in discussing the matter with opponents one may sometimes have understated what one really means, but also that a thorough study of Winckler's most definite and authoritative statements would have corrected any misapprehension of his theory. I am sorry that Dr Olmstead's work had to be finished suddenly, partly because it is clear that when he wrote it he had not had time to revise and extend his knowledge of Winckler's publications, and to read my own works subsequent to the articles "Mizraim" and "Negeb" in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*. His own book, however, is so original, so full of archæological facts and acute criticism, that small excuse is necessary for any possible accidental shortcomings. Meantime my own opposition to a "Negeb Muşri," as I understand the phrase, continues to be strong, and the matter is really of much importance.

T. K. CHEYNE.

REVIEWS

Miscellanies, Fourth Series.—By John Morley.—Macmillan, 1908.

THE *Miscellanies* consist of these seven essays, which have appeared during the last twelve years: — “Machiavelli,” the Romanes Lecture, 1897; “Guicciardini”; “A New Calendar of Great Men,” on the Positivist Calendar, edited by Mr Frederic Harrison; “John Stuart Mill: An Anniversary,” a *causerie* published in the *Times*, May 1906; “Lecky on Democracy,” a review of the historian’s *Democracy and Liberty*; “A Historical Romance,” a review of Mr Frederic Harrison’s *Theophano*; and “Democracy and Reaction,” a review of Professor L. T. Hobhouse’s book of that title, published in 1904.

It is pleasant, little as it is necessary, to preface a consideration of these essays by a tribute to the distinction of mind and style which informs this, as it has informed all Lord Morley’s previous work. The honoured place which he holds in literature is to no small an extent due to the sense of worthiness he imparts to his subjects, which comes of the worthiness of his own regard of them. It is equally pleasant, if it is no more necessary, to express one’s admiration of the great range of reading and study demonstrated afresh in this collection. Much has he travelled in the realms of gold, and the wealth of illustration, from history and literature, with which he enriches his pages, strikes us all the more in that it always appears ready to hand, never as laboriously sought for. To those who would travel with him there could be few better guides to the general features of a landscape. And this gives him an appeal even when he treats of matters of which there are some, and these perhaps the most important, aspects to which he does less than justice: as particularly in the sphere of philosophic and æsthetic criticism. Many who have enjoyed his *Rousseau* will have felt that they have left it without getting a close grip of the merits of the Social Contract. Where in his literary criticism, as in his essay on Wordsworth and in certain of his observations here on some of the heroes of the Comtist Calendar, he treads the same ground as Matthew Arnold, there can be little doubt which is the finer and more penetrative critic. But this will hardly detract from that wide appeal he makes by giving us the impression that he is quite at home wherever he is journeying. And his readers could not find a more cultured and charming host, especially in the regions of French and Italian history and

politics, where Lord Morley is most thoroughly at home, and his guests may confess to feeling least so.

But if there is no cause for disappointment here, we may be allowed to utter a small complaint in a matter which has probably struck most of Lord Morley's readers before, and which rather forces itself on their attention in some of these essays. We feel at times inclined to say to him, as Nestor said to Diomedes, that "he has not reached the full end of his words," or, in less classical language, that he will not let himself go. He is, as we all know, both a man of letters and a man of affairs, and of great distinction in both. The charge has been brought against him, as a statesman—with how great or how little justice it would be out of place here to inquire—that he is apt to be "viewy" (a word he would loathe) or "doctrinaire" (a word he would approve). With regard to his writings we feel, if it may be so expressed, that the man of affairs is chiefly to be seen in the rigour with which he is excluded. And this is to be regretted where we may think that his experience would have been of real assistance to the writer, and have enabled him to speak out with more force and directness. Readers of the *Life of Gladstone* have remarked on the air of detachment which Lord Morley keeps even when he is treating of events of which he might justly say, "*Quorum pars magna fui*," and have expressed a disappointment—which need not be attributed to their own weakness—that so severe a restraint should have been exercised. So in some of these essays we feel that the fighting faith of the politician is kept too much in the background that it may not intrude upon the reflections of the writer. Thus, in his criticism of Lecky's *Democracy and Liberty*—the only polemical essay in the book—Lord Morley sets the historian right on several matters of fact, on which Lecky, in his undue zeal to damn democracy and all its works, has demonstrably misinformed himself; and he points out the untrustworthiness of the conclusions that have been drawn therefrom. But we feel all the time that Lecky has a better case against democracy than that which Lord Morley concerns himself to refute, and that Lord Morley would have made a far better case for democracy if he had allowed himself to write with the freedom and force which, we may conjecture, he would have employed if he had spoken of it as a politician. The review of *Democracy and Reaction* provides a still clearer instance. Professor Hobhouse's book was a very strong indictment of certain principles, or denials of principle, which, he contended, were poisoning our social and political life. Especially was it an indictment of the imperialism the fruits of which were to be seen in the South African war. It was essentially a tract for the time, though a work of far more than ephemeral value. Lord Morley pays a generous tribute to the merit of the book, and reviews it in detail. But we feel that he is constantly shifting his ground to look at democracy in some other light, and is rarely at an issue with Professor Hobhouse. Interesting as are the considerations which he raises, we think that Professor Hobhouse's issues are more important, and certainly more pressing. And then, as we remark Lord

Morley's philosophic detachment, we may smile to remember how, as a politician, he was ready to incur much temporary unpopularity for the advocacy of those very principles which Professor Hobhouse so strongly expresses in his book.

But it would be churlish to complain further, if one who has done so much to reconcile in his work the opposition between the contemplative and the practical life should sometimes, in going to his books, shake the dust of the conflict so thoroughly from him that some of its fire leaves him also.

There can be little question that the most interesting of these essays are those on Machiavelli and Guicciardini. The "Machiavelli" is indeed masterly, the "Guicciardini" scarcely less admirable, though its subject makes less appeal to the imagination. In each Lord Morley presents to us, and presents with extraordinary sympathy and clearness, the picture of a man who has done service to his state in circumstances which were not calculated to foster a belief in the goodness of mankind or the efficacy of high principles of conduct, and has set himself, in an unwilling retirement, the task of drawing his philosophy from his experiences. Each, like a gambler who has gone beaten from his game, goes over it again, explaining his system, for the benefit of those who may prove more fortunate players. That the system, which rests on expediency divorced from an ethical standard, has been condemned by the opinion of mankind is perhaps a trite reflection, as it would be also to reflect that, if not so openly advocated, it has not ceased to be practised. As we read Lord Morley's luminous summary of Machiavelli's political philosophy, we feel that his position is really the same as that which Socrates attacks in the *Gorgias* of Plato, and that it will not be till humanity has shown itself capable of rising to the high doctrine of the *Gorgias*, and contenting itself with victories which are not of this world, that we may look for a full abjuration of the Machiavellian system. That Lord Morley, in reviewing the career and influence of Machiavelli in the light of considerations such as these, does so in no trite or uninspired fashion, need not be said. He does equal justice to Machiavelli and Machiavellianism. As he shows us the great Florentine statesman and thinker outside that strange atmosphere of diabolism which so long surrounded his memory, he makes us see how fine and striking a figure he was—how admirable, if we could but grant his main postulate, his tenets of statesmanship. How far removed from the conventional picture of Machiavelli as a spirit of evil is this indication of the spirit in which he entered on his *De Principilibus*, quoted by Lord Morley from a letter :—

"After dinner I go back to the inn, where I generally find the host and a butcher, a miller and a pair of bakers. With these companions I play the fool all day at cards or backgammon: a thousand squabbles, a thousand insults and abusive dialogues take place, while we haggle over a farthing, and shout loud enough to be heard from San Casciano. But when evening falls, I go home and enter my writing-room. On the

threshold I put off my country habit, filthy with mud and mire, and array myself in royal courtly garments; thus worthily attired I make my entrance into the ancient courts of the men of old, where they receive me with love, and where I feed upon that food which only is my own, and for which I was born. I feel no shame in conversing with them and asking them the reasons of their actions. They, moved by their humanity, make answer."

That their answers are hardly marked by humanity will be the impression given by the extracts from the *Prince*, such as:—

"There are some good qualities that the new ruler need not have; yet he should seem to have them. It is well to appear merciful, faithful, religious, and it is well to be so. Religion is the most necessary of all for a prince to seek credit for. But the new prince should know how to change to the contrary of these things, when they are in the way of the public good."

If we might admit that the public good could be so achieved, and that it would not be coloured by the methods by which it was sought, then we should be on our way to give our adhesion to Machiavelli's doctrine of statesmanship: a doctrine, we might say, of "efficiency" against principle, if we should not be thought thereby to be inviting a comparison with present-day politics, from which Lord Morley would warn us as forbidden ground. But it is, as Lord Morley claims, in our repudiation of this assumption that we have been moving away from Machiavelli. He had, he says, as good a heart as could be made out of brains: "Yet at the bottom of all the confused clamour against him, people knew what they meant, and their instinct was not unsound. Mankind, and well they know it, are far too profoundly concerned in right and wrong, in mercy and cruelty, in justice and oppression, to favour a teacher who, even for a scientific purpose of his own, forgets the awful difference." To those who may think that Machiavellian principles have rather ceased to be justified than to be acted upon, Lord Morley has some comfort to offer. He contends that moral considerations tend steadily, however slowly, to influence the action of states; and we think he is justified in regarding Machiavellian principles in the light of the wisdom of our day, to "compare them with the bettering of the time"; though, as he well concludes, "It is true to say that Machiavelli represents certain living forces in our actual world; . . . this is because energy, force, will, violence, still keep alive in the world their resistance to the control of justice and conscience, humanity and right."

Guicciardini is chiefly known from the story of the criminal who was allowed to choose between Guicciardini's history and the galleys, and chose the history, till he came to the war of Pisa, when he went back to the oar. Lord Morley shows us how unfair it is that this fable should be the last word of him. His experiences had been not unlike those of Machiavelli, and his meditations upon them have much the same spirit. But he has not the force and brilliancy of his great contemporary. 'The

Ricordi, from which Lord Morley gives us copious extracts, "some sensible, some cunning, some a little odious," as he describes them, show Guicciardini to be a sort of moralising Machiavelli, shrewd, but not wise or highly inspired.

Of the remaining essays it must suffice to say that the *causerie* on Mill is a much-needed appreciation of a great man, whose work was perhaps more justly estimated by the thinkers of his own day than it has been lately; that the "Calendar of Great Men" only makes us wish that Lord Morley had allowed himself a little more space to treat of the many characters he passes in review; and that in "Theophano" he is at home with Mr Frederic Harrison in a brief survey of an interesting period of the Byzantine Empire.

LAWRENCE SOLOMON.

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First and Last Things: A Confession of Faith and Rule of Life.—By H. G. Wells.—London: Constable.—Pp. xii + 246.

The Venture of Rational Faith.—By Margaret Benson.—London: Macmillan & Co.—Pp. xix + 317.

"ONE thing I claim," says Mr Wells: "I have got my beliefs and theories out of my life and not fitted them to its circumstances." "We cannot believe in anything," says Miss Benson, "however true, which has no connection with what we know to be real."

This claim to stand upon reality is, of course, one which very often meets us in the preface of religious books; and in many persons it creates an attitude of cynicism towards all such literature. Yet this literary cynicism is surely a hopeless and blameworthy thing, for it is really a cynicism towards life. The lesson of life is that we should not be disappointed in it; that our souls should not turn sour; that we should go on thinking men better than they are. And so too with books, particularly religious books. They are part and parcel of the general *disappointingness* of life; and the only true critic of them is he who has resolved not to be disappointed, who insists on believing them better than they are, who judges them by their good things, with an eye for those occasional brilliant or pathetic strokes of nature which redeem dulness or silliness.

There is no silliness either in *First and Last Things* or in *The Venture of Rational Faith*. In both, on the other hand, there is a good deal that is rather dull; yet at the same time much that is true and telling, and that excites sympathy. I do not wish with either book to over-emphasise the dulness of certain parts, for Mr Wells' book is one that should interest everybody, and Miss Benson's, though not an important book, may interest a good many. But if I begin by saying how it is that a good deal of either book appears to me dull, I think that

I can, in this way, best give the reader an idea of the kind of book each is without doing injustice to the writer. I will speak first of Miss Benson's book, and, since I do not regard it as important, I will speak briefly.

Miss Benson begins, like Mr Wells, with a plea for reality; and I have sufficient sympathy for her book to feel that everything in it is very real for her. But when I ask myself what it all comes to in the end, I find that it comes to just this—average educated Christianity *plus* average Idealist philosophy. These two in their conjunction constitute for Miss Benson the most real creed going. For *me* this merely means that Miss Benson has added together two dying faiths, and taken the result for a rule of life. But for her and, as I know, for many others the result is something most living and real. But how? I do not, of course, expect this "how" to be plainly set forth for me in logical terms. But I have, I think, a right to expect hints and flashes and errant suggestions of it. And these I do not seem to get from Miss Benson. She never seems to me to touch the quick of human thought and feeling. The claim she makes for herself is, it is true, modest; she claims to write only an average book for average educated people. Her average, let me say gladly, is high. But I fear that the stuff of her book is conventional, and that the book itself is mostly dull for the reason that she nowhere gives us to see how the conventionalities which she handles have come to be to her so real. I will add that it is not a book written in a hurry, that wide reading has gone to it, and that it is clear and forcible. It has a good many memorable sentences. "‘I have swept the heavens with my telescope and have not found God,’ said Laplace. As well might a blind man say, ‘I have listened day and night and have not heard scarlet’" (p. 13). "‘There is no incredulity like the incredulity of the ignorant’" (p. 15). "‘Morality rises like a tide over the unmoral world, as life comes up over the inorganic’" (p. 187). "‘Recreation is certainly expedient, but it needs a very profound mind not to lose some sense of reality when attention is much centred on a golf-ball’" (Pref., x.). These, and other things in the book, are well and forcibly said, and are worth a good many pages of conventional philosophy.

I am not sure that I have any right to say that any part of Mr Wells' book is dull: for that Mr Wells should be dull is in itself so interesting; and the reason why parts of *First and Last Things* are dull is very interesting. Mr Wells has set out to say exactly what he thinks. He has a number of things on his mind, and he determines to get them all off it. He resolves to put down everything and extenuate nothing. He is absolutely frank, plain, sincere. But frankness, plainness, and sincerity so absolute must necessarily involve a man in bursts of dulness. He wants to put down everything, and he supposes that the way to do that is to leave out nothing. But it is not so. Homer has really put down everything about Achilles: but what a lot he has left out! Mr Wells will no doubt say that he is not Achilles: he is not, that is, an artistic creation, but a real and plain man to be viewed unvarnished. And yet surely every attempt at self-expression, even our ordinary talk, is in some

degree an artistic thing, obeying certain laws of art: we get necessarily further and further away from our natural and actual self as we bring that nearer and nearer to someone else. If we put ourselves down in speech or on paper just as we are, we fail, we do not "carry," we are dull. And Mr Wells has put himself down just as he is, without selection; and for this utter sincerity he has had to pay the price of being often dull.

Nevertheless, *First and Last Things* is an impressive book. Uneven in quality and containing a great deal that was not worth saying, it nevertheless has so much in it that is penetrating, first-hand, human, poignant—there is such an absence of anything factitious or pretentious, that a critic must be very cold indeed whom it does not again and again warm and touch. It is a book which has grown, as Mr Wells says, out of its writer's experience. I may perhaps be forgiven for saying, since Mr Wells is so frank about himself, that it shares some of the limitations of that experience. I will give one or two illustrations of what I mean. Mr Wells attacks (pp. 174-5) with vigour and acumen the code of "honour." "I set no greater value on unblemished honour than I do on purity. I never yet met a man who talked proudly of his honour who did not end by cheating or trying to cheat me, nor a code of honour that did not impress me as a conspiracy against the common welfare and purpose in life. There is honour among thieves, and I think it might well end there as an obligation in conduct." "I have never been able to understand the sentimental spectacle of sons toiling dreadfully and wasting themselves upon mere money-making to save the secret of a father's peculations, . . . or men conspiring to weave a wide and mischievous net of lies to save the 'honour' of a woman." When he says that he has "never been able to understand" these things, Mr Wells admits, I fancy, more than he means to. Here, as elsewhere, he hopelessly underestimates the value of a class tradition. There is a lot of silliness, of course, about "honour" (though I have never met people who talked about their honour). Yet of how many great and beneficent lives has not this sentiment of honour been, as it were, the very lodestar? Nor is it so "aristocratic" a thing as Mr Wells supposes. If it is perhaps all the morality which the aristocratic classes have, yet in poor and ignorant men also it has surely often kindled great endeavours.

Again, when he speaks of churches, creeds and subscription, etc., Mr Wells seems to me to speak from a limited point of view. He speaks perhaps to the rampant anti-clerical or militant agnostic. Such persons doubtless need conciliating and taming; and it is perhaps good that they should be told by a plain and freethinking man like Mr Wells to go to church, to swallow formulas, to get consolation from the Mass, to remain in, but not of, the communion of faithful Christians. Mr Wells, I fancy, even urges the non-believer to be a preacher in the Church. Now this sort of advice sends me sick and shivering. That is because I live among young men with whom such teaching is very popular and for whom it is very dangerous. They do not believe in the Resurrection, but they are

interested in social reform. Accordingly, they rush into the Christian Social Union or the priesthood, without taking time to be fair with their own souls, and without ever once thinking sincerely and ultimately upon subjects the most important. And being clever and interesting and enthusiastic, they mislead others. I speak from my experience, Mr Wells from his. The young men I speak of read Mr Wells. I hope he will remember them in his next book.

“Getting near to the keen edge of life”: that is a phrase of Mr Wells’ own (p. 103) which caught me in passing. It is a pretty good description of what Mr Wells is after, in this book and others. In a collapse of beliefs, he believes in life. That is what he is driving at in everything he says. “Much more to me than the desire to live is the desire to taste life. I am not happy till I have done and felt things. I want to get as near as I can to the thrill of a dog going into a fight or the delight of a bird in the air. And not simply in the heroic field of war and air do I want to understand. I want to know something of the jolly, wholesome satisfaction that a hungry pig must find in its wash” (pp. 59, 60). There is no doubt extravagance, revolt, whimsicality in all that. Yet it is somehow biting and salted and finely cogent. It has the note of a healthy howling against humbug. “Howling” is perhaps not the word. Nietzsche howls, Shaw howls—and both unhealthily—against humbug. Mr Wells whoops with something between wrath and delight. He has got his teeth into life, where other men are pawing and fumbling it. He is going to have no nonsense. He has seen more kinds of life than most men who take to literature; and when he uses words they are going to stand for things that he has felt or known or suspected.

I have said that Mr Wells is not like Nietzsche or Shaw. Nor, again, is he like Plato; and I am sorry to find that he has rather begun to think that he is. Let me mention one or two persons whom he is like.

First, he is rather like Moses. “God said unto Moses, I am that I am; and he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I Am hath sent me unto you.” Well, Mr Wells slays a few Egyptians, and is, like Moses, often perhaps overhasty in a good many things. But he has taken the shoes from off his feet reverently upon really holy ground; and above all he seems to have been sent to a world that hates facts by “I am.” “I am” hath sent him; and he is necessarily worth listening to.

Secondly, he reminds me, oddly enough, of Lord Chesterfield. Never able to transcend class prejudice, with a keen eye for surface values, yet fundamentally sincere and free from cant, with an assured knowledge of the kind of life he speaks of, with a touch of genuine chivalry—to these qualities, which he shares with a writer whom he probably despises, Mr Wells adds, as Chesterfield does, one yet more important—the desire to relate literature to actual life. “I wish,” says Lord Chesterfield to his son, “to combine in you two things rarely combined in any of my countrymen, books and the world.” Mr Wells is a fine democratic combination of those two things.

And then, of course, Mr Wells reminds me of two friends of his, of whom he speaks in this book tenderly and affectingly (pp. 238-241), Stevenson and Henley. He has not Stevenson's infinite delicacy: on the other hand, his optimism is less of a literary artifice, is more downright and real. He has not a certain titanic quality that Henley had: but then he tears himself less upon the bars of life, he is less mangled. But he is in the straight line of development from these two: he is making towards a more natural and quickened life.

I have mentioned Plato. Has Mr Wells ever read the *Greater Hippias*? There is a sentence of Hippias, in any case, in that dialogue which is a fair summary of Mr Wells' *Credo*. I offer it to Mr Wells as a motto for his second edition: "I say then that always for every man everywhere this is the finest effect: to have enough to live on, to have good health, to be respected by one's fellow-citizens—and having all that to come to old age, and having given noble burial to one's parents to be buried at last oneself by one's children with honour and circumstance."

To many, no doubt, that seems a pagan and rather thin ideal. Yet that particular sentence, with its direct and unsophisticated thought, always blows up to me like a clear breeze from the sea, freshening the conventional shore-atmosphere of our flaccid modern moralising.

H. W. GARROD.

OXFORD.

Towards Social Reform.—By Canon and Mrs S. A. Barnett.—
Pp. 352.—London: T. Fisher Unwin.

THIS volume is the mature product of an almost unique experience in philanthropic and social work. It embodies that sober idealism which went to the making of Toynbee Hall. It represents a combination of knowledge, sympathy, and what, for lack of a better term, may be called business method, acquired in active service by two lives distinguished by rare devotion and humanest wisdom. The reading of it has been a refreshment, and the memory of it will be grateful.

It may be feared that the modern mind, jaded to boredom by the furious output of volumes on social questions, and plunged into a darker depression by the present necessity of mastering the reports of the Poor Law Commission, is not likely to be stimulated by the prospect of reading a mere collection of papers and addresses of various dates and subjects. Yet, if it could be aroused to overcome its primary disinclination, it would find here something more valuable than the ripe practical suggestions that appear on every page, namely, a prevailing steadiness of moral outlook, a cheerful sanity of judgment, and a hopeful spirit of faith and good-will which cannot fail to brighten the baffled student and draw the despairing social worker into fresh and more sanguine effort.

Like the Labour Party, the authors decline to draw up a programme

beyond present needs and possibilities. "We appear, therefore, in these papers neither as Individualists nor as Socialists, but simply as advocating actions which lie in the way towards Social Reform." And again: "We would, in a word, limit State action wherever it interferes with the growth of manhood and womanhood in the nation, and enlarge its actions wherever it could assist that growth." They may be said to be preaching to the hard and dry individualist, who fears any final or ideal scheme of a co-operative commonwealth, a socialistic sermon from the text, "Without a vision the people perish"; and to the revolutionary socialist, for whom every palliative mean is only a mean palliative, an individualistic sermon from the text, "The eyes of a fool are in the ends of the earth." They test every proposal by its ability to bring out the powers of being in the people it reaches, by its likelihood to increase the sum of peace and goodwill among men. They believe that the application of that test must condemn many institutions, and also demand a further expenditure which ought to satisfy even a socialist. One feels that, whenever the authors seem to be speaking with the somewhat chilling accent of the Charity Organisation Society, it is always in the interests of a deeper moral socialism; and whenever they seem to be in complete accord with the demands of modern socialists—as, for example, on "universal" old-age pensions—it is always in the interests of a stronger individualism of personal resource, initiative, and responsibility. If on one page it is said rather loosely that "long experience has shown that it is only 'one by one' that the mass of human beings can be raised," this is corrected on another page, where we read that "the Spirit of Christ requires that the Christian community should act as a community to raise the fallen." If we are told that love without thought is weakness, it is only after we have been told that thought without love is often brutal; and both assertions only prepare us for the fuller truth that the supreme need is a public opinion which is directed by a thinking love.

It is, however, only incidentally that the writers touch on theories. The weary strife, always tending to the merest logomachy, between individualism and socialism finds no place in this eminently practical volume. If its reconciliation or transcendence in terms of human well-being is not already assumed, at least its significance as a strife is found within the very spirit and process of social reform.

In view of the reports of the Poor Law Commission, it is interesting to notice the attack on institutions. "Institutions are prejudicial to strength of character." Again: "Institutions preach sermons in stones against the virtue of independence." But we are not left with a blank and discouraging *non possumus*. When they condemn institutions (in connection with pauperism), it is in order that humaner principles may come into play, that the poor may be "boarded out," and so transplanted into a new but also a natural habitat of home-life in the country. The chapter on the workhouse and the whole section on poverty anticipate some of the severest strictures of the Minority Report. "The workhouse stands for the punishment of poverty. It is akin to a prison, and its inmates feel them-

selves treated as criminals when they have committed no crime." They do not hesitate to say that "the workhouse of to-day helps to demoralise society." Porters in uniform like prison warders, rooms called wards, tasks chosen not because of their use but because of their distastefulness, cranks to turn, stones to break, oakum to pick, inhuman segregation and a no less inhuman aggregation—these are some of the degrading factors in workhouse life. The reform advocated is the reconstruction of what is now a prison into a school; and the object must be, not a deterrent punishment of the poor and the incapable, but their training and preparation for industrial efficiency.

This human and humanising plea runs through the whole volume. It is the motive of the chapters which deal with education and recreation, and which amplify and develop a passage in the introduction: "The pleasure which excites—which, starting from outside the man, stimulates his sensations—is not as real as the pleasure which, starting from within, kindles his whole being. It is better to teach people to enjoy themselves than to provide amusements, better to teach them to play than to watch others play, better to give them a new interest than an empty holiday."

But, beyond the light of common sense thrown on particular problems, we have the warm glow of an undiscouraged idealism. The reader is made to feel that these economic and social difficulties are not in the nature of things insoluble, that it is only our cowardice or indolence or moral infidelity that baulks us. The idealism is convincing precisely because it is not Utopian, because it is in continuous contact with the facts of real life and actual human nature. When theory appears, it is theory thickened with the stuff of experience and effort, and vital with a sincere but unparaded sympathy with the hard lives of known men and women. What comes out most clearly is that the social reformer can never learn his business from books, not even from such good books as this, nor yet from sitting on Distress and Decision Committees, but must come face to face and heart to heart with the people whom he would help to redeem, and who would redeem him in turn from a too proud and academic detachment. We understand one of the main sources of the power of this volume, as well as the importance of the influence of neighbourhood, when it is Canon Barnett himself who makes the startling confession: "I find for myself that when I am living in the country I cannot speak or write about the poor as I can when I am living in Whitechapel." Wealth, not poverty, is the national danger: for it is wealth—wealth clotted in perilous masses—that dehumanises men and takes them out of physical and moral neighbourhood with their fellows.

Mr W. H. Davies, the "Super-Tramp," put this aspect of the case very simply and plainly in his poem on "Money":

"So, when I hear these poor ones laugh,
And see the rich ones coldly frown—
Poor men, think I, need not go up
So much as rich men should come down."

It is the sense of this truth that gives rise to "settlements," which are not what some cynic described as pathetic efforts on the part of the West-Enders to make the East-Enders a little more like themselves, so much as a means whereby East-Enders may contribute some of their own humanity and mutual loyalty and helpfulness to the West-Enders, and thus give even more than they receive.

There is one statement in this book that provokes contradiction. In welcoming the Labour Party as the coming power, Canon Barnett says that it "brings an element of reality into a political struggle which now partakes too much of the nature of a game." He claims that it "has faith in its demands and has therefore a force which is not exercised by parties who elaborate programmes with an eye to votes and put their trust in 'tactics.' But—and this is the serious matter—the Labour Party which has thought and faith has not knowledge." This was written in 1906. It seems, in the light of later experience, the merest justice to say that in Parliamentary discussions the Labour Party has shown itself to be at least as well equipped with relevant and even expert knowledge as either of the two great historic parties. Indeed, in dealing with questions like trades' disputes, old-age pensions, unemployment, and all such topics as are covered by this book, the accredited representatives of the Trades Union and Labour movement show a closer acquaintance with the problems and a firmer intellectual grip of the significant facts than statesmen of far higher repute.

J. M. LLOYD THOMAS.

NOTTINGHAM.

The Mystical Element of Religion.—By Baron F. von Hügel. Two vols. Pp. xvii + 466 + 421; 8vo.—London: Dent & Co., 1908.

If there is a certain amount of inevitable confusion in these 887 pages, it is from the fact that they are all too few for the wealth of research and learning that is crowded into them. In connection with mysticism they deal with all the profoundest problems of religious philosophy—with institutionalism, science, criticism, psychophysics, asceticism, morality, the problems of evil, of pure love, of quietism, of immanence, personality, pantheism, eschatology. All this is packed into the second volume, and treated in the light of the best that has been written on these subjects in the past and present—and this by one who has not merely appropriated this mass of thought, but shaped it into a system of his own.

In the first volume we have an example of that kind of critical biography which stands to biography proper much as what is called scientific history stands to history proper. The old hagiographers began with an intuitive estimate of the human and moral significance of the saint, and selected their biographical facts accordingly. Here we learn to proceed inversely, and control our thirst for edification. And the result is more edifying. For we are less moved and helped by the floating

unearthly ideal, than by the ideal incarnate and concrete, with all its limitations and imperfect self-utterance. St Catherine of Genoa is presented to us in these pages as the subject-matter or experimental basis of a study of mysticism. The ideal mystic (one, that is, in whom the mystical element of religion is perfectly balanced by the institutional and intellectual elements) does not exist; and in St Catherine both these complementary elements are somewhat defective. In her, we get a mystic who, though Christian and Catholic, owes strangely little to the Church and its theology, and whose inspiration was largely Neo-Platonic. As a Catholic she is of course influenced by the incarnational and sacramental principles of that religion; but one feels that, for her, the flesh is not the vehicle and organ, but only the symbol of the spirit, something to be discarded as soon as the reality is apprehended. Here she is at the opposite pole to pseudo-mystics or visionaries of the type of Sister Catherine Emmerich, in whom the mystical element of religion is overwhelmed rather than balanced by the institutional, and for whom the passion of Christ seems little more than an earthly tragedy of blood and tears, unillumined by any eternal and metaphysical significance. Between these two poles we find the more truly Catholic type of Dame Juliana of Norwich, for whom the flesh is luminous with the spirit as with another aspect of the same reality; for whom every moment of the sacred passion is no mere symbol, but a revelation of the Divine love. In her conception of the spiritual she is hardly less influenced than St Catherine of Genoa by the all-pervading Platonic tradition through the later Scriptures and the patristic writings; but she conceives its relation to the flesh in the friendly manner of the synoptic gospels, rather than in Alexandrine fashion. She is at once profoundly spiritual and profoundly human; whereas, were it only in her total lack of humour, we feel that St Catherine is a little bit inhuman.

Baron von Hügel has studied the latter in the spirit of his motto: "Grant unto men, O Lord, to perceive in little things the indications, common-seeming though they be, of things both small and great" (St Augustine)—in the conscientious, scrupulous spirit of science, which to loose thinkers seems tiresome and pedantic.

The labour he has bestowed in the Appendix on the growth of her Life and Legend will not seem idle to the few who have come to realise the priceless value of the smallest scrap of historical truth. They will find in it, as in the whole of the biography, an object-lesson in that critical art which is helping us to tunnel a way to the open through the mountainous lies of the loose-thinking past. A sympathy at once with the spirit of science and the spirit of mysticism is rare. Both in practice and theory Baron von Hügel shows that it is not paradoxical—that they need and supplement one another. Science, the supposed enemy of religion, is really its best friend and benefactor; not merely as the obvious foe of superstition and pseudo-mysticism, but as importing a constituent element of a healthy and full-bodied religious sentiment. There is more than cant in

the claims of Positivism to produce an ethical type from which Christians might have something to learn in the way of modesty, humility, and self-effacement. Yet this it does, not in virtue of what it denies, but of what it affirms, and of what Christians ignore rather than deny. The decentralising of our earth was a good purge for human conceit, and we are greater for the absence of that littleness. But the scientific outlook will not profit us morally and spiritually except in conjunction with the mystical outlook. We need faith, hope, and love to lift us out of the void of our individual nothingness. Each outlook is partial and, so far as it claims to be complete, mendacious. Nor can we ever reconcile them, since we cannot stand at the point where they blend. All life, according to the author, consists in a patient struggle with irreconcilables—a progressive unifying of parts that will never fit perfectly. Woe to us if we yield to tempting simplifications and cast out recalcitrant but vital elements!

The underlying *Weltanschauung* reminds us in many ways of Bergson, to whom the author is indebted for some of his explicit opinions. It suggests a divine fecundity prolific in all senses and directions, not so much working according to some logical plan in view of some one final resultant or end, as struggling to reconcile the inevitable conflicts of these infinitely multitudinous and various existences. Whether in the individual soul, or in society, or in the world of life, or in the world at large, we have this same problem of wasteful overcrowding, of conflicting ends and intentions. The care for each, which is undoubted, seems to be incompatible with the care for all. That at least is what we see. If the problem is solved or soluble from some higher standpoint, that is matter for faith, not for vision; for endeavour, not for attainment.

The author is more explicitly with Boutroux and Bergson in his attitude towards the determinism of Nature, which he regards as relative, not absolute; provisional, not ultimate. Relative to man's brief duration and narrow experience, Nature seems in many ways uniform and immutable, and thereby warrants common sense and science in the working hypothesis of an absolute uniformity and determinism. But the hypothesis may not be projected into the real world where the principle of creative growth and variation is only limited by the past and the given—in the sense that it must include what it adds to.

If these volumes are not the last word, they are certainly the fullest word that has been spoken on the subject of mysticism. They include and add to all that has yet been said, and no future addition will be solid that does not include and take account of them. They are difficult reading as well as difficult writing, and make no pretence of closing eternal questions.

G. TYRRELL.

LONDON.

Modernism. The Jowett Lectures for 1908.—By Paul Sabatier.—
T. Fisher Unwin, 1908.

THE average English reader will probably, at the first glance, think that there is a little too much of what Carlyle called "rose-pink" about M. Paul Sabatier's three lectures on Modernism, here excellently translated by Mr C. A. Miles. The leaders of the new movement are always palpitating with the finer emotions; they are full of "fervour and power"; they are, in spite of appearances, "the most devoted children" of the Papacy; they are widely diffused and work in different spheres, yet "they know each other by instinct, draw together, and become one heart and one soul"; "they advance calmly and courageously to face life, the whole of life." They never appear to fall into sophisms or violences (yet these traits are certainly not quite absent from the writings of von Hügel, Houtin, and others); their opponents, on the other hand, are uniformly ignorant, bigoted, and mean. In other words, this book is not a critical study of the Modernist movement, but an *apologia*, and an *apologia* written by a Frenchman, and, if not a Catholic, yet a writer imbued with the Catholic tradition and Catholic feeling. But taking it frankly on that basis, let us say at once that it is an admirable and eloquent plea, written by a scholar of lofty intelligence on a theme which he has made his own by sympathy and by knowledge. It may be commended to all readers who wish to gain a general idea of the movement of which it treats without an extensive study of the French, Italian, and German authorities.

To the present reviewer, as no doubt to most English students, the Modernist movement appeared at first as a desperate and rather disingenuous attempt to reconcile Catholicism with intellectual liberty. Anyone trained in the individualist traditions of Protestantism must necessarily at the outset feel a little repelled by the attitude of men who apparently cling to the advantages, spiritual and other, of communion with a mighty ecclesiastical organisation, while claiming the right to reject what have always been understood to be its most vital and fundamental principles. Protestants in general have no such temptations as Catholics have to play fast and loose with an official creed, and consequently any suspicion of playing fast and loose is apt to be one of the most injurious they can entertain in regard to a new movement of thought.

Of this feeling, this prejudice, about the Modernist movement, M. Sabatier is evidently well aware, and he addresses himself pointedly to its removal. Mr Lilley, in his recent volume on "Modernism," had, of course, done the same thing, but Sabatier's work has naturally more unity and force—though certainly not more knowledge or more sympathy—than Mr Lilley's collection of articles, written as they were on various occasions, and at long intervals of time. But does Sabatier make out his case? The question is one of cardinal importance, for the whole future history of the movement may depend on whether the Modernists are, as they claim, at the very heart of the Catholic conception, or whether Pius X. is,

Let us quote one of the passages in which Sabatier deals with this question:—

“The strength of his [Loisy’s] position and the Modernists’ is that their scientific honesty, far from leading them to a bare negation of religion, brings them, on the contrary, to firm scientific ground, on which religious thought can develop with a vigour, security, independence, and boldness such as the world has never seen. . . .

“Anti-religious rationalism and orthodox intellectualism—they are more opposed in appearance than reality—both start from the same idea of the absolute. Modernism moves on a very different plane—the plane of reality, of life, of experience; the Modernist has no more need to believe his Church to be metaphysically infallible than he has to believe his parents to be impeccable or omniscient in order to love and obey them. It is indeed true that mankind’s great witnesses to the religious life seem to him much closer to us common men; but if they appear less majestic, they become more real, and a truer view is gained of them.

“The Modernist has a sense of the life of the Church in our day, and he enters vigorously into it. He does not in the least share the Protestant idea—an idea which from Protestantism has everywhere filtered through into Catholicism—that revelation ceased with the composition of the sacred books, that the great epochs of religious thought are closed, and that all we have now to do is to live on the interest of our spiritual heritage.”

This conception of the Modernist position, with all its implications, does certainly put another face upon the matter. The Modernists, being men mostly of the Latin race and trained in the Catholic tradition, naturally realise more deeply than do most non-Catholic Christians the need and value to the individual of membership in a great religious communion. But the need and value are the same for all. Were it only “two or three” souls, a gathering together seems a necessary part of all religion. Now the essence of Modernism, according to Sabatier, is not to divide but to comprehend, to gather together. It is immaterial whether, as one would be apt to conclude from the pages of Sabatier and of Lilley, Modernism has its root in a new religious philosophy and has only come into conflict with the Church by applying this philosophy to questions of biblical criticism, or whether, as one would rather gather from the Modernists themselves (notably from their famous “Programme” written in reply to the Encyclical *Pascendi*), the philosophy is, historically, an attempt to make room for the conclusions to which biblical studies have forced them. The precise door through which the mind enters into a new truth is of little consequence. The great fact is, that by taking away from dogma and from history all *absolute* value for the religious life, they have opened the way to a conception of *relative* value which saves—as nothing else can possibly save—the Church’s doctrine of the continuity of inspiration, and reconciles it with the scientific conception of the continuity of organic growth. Such, at least, is Sabatier’s conception of the

Modernist position; but it must be noted that he is painting with very broad and summary strokes a number of more or less tentative and sometimes even divergent views on the part of various Modernist thinkers. The religious philosophy of Blondel and Laberthonnière is expressly disavowed by Loisy (*Simplex Reflexions*, p. 17); and, again, Loisy's idea of the true *via media* "through Scylla and Charybdis" appears to me to bear much more resemblance to Auguste Sabatier's conception of the vital growth of dogma than it does to Tyrrell's elaborately worked-out comparison of dogma and religious history to a painting or a romance which takes up a matter of objective fact and rehandles it with an artistic intention (*Scylla and Charybdis*, pp. 244-253). All these tentatives, however, do indisputably meet at one point—the point of real importance, the point on which all Modernists are in agreement. Their *trait commun* is, in Loisy's words, "le désir d'adapter la religion catholique aux besoins intellectuels, moraux, sociaux du temps présent." And their common method is to find an escape from the bondage of "the letter that killeth," by denying to the letter the character of absolute truth. There seems, to an outsider at least, nothing anti-Catholic in this position; in fact, it brings the catholicity of Catholicism for the first time clearly into sight. The famous *Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*, is, after all, a thoroughly Modernist criterion of truth; it is a criterion which never can be absolute until Time has run out.

Sabatier, I think, then, has fairly made out his case. But if that is so, the issue of the Modernist movement becomes one of immense practical importance. What divides men in religion is the fact that they worship different idols. Modernism would abolish all the idols—all, as objects of worship, and yet retain them all as symbols and expressions of the divine. In other words, Christianity is neither theology nor history, but a manifestation of spiritual life, and one which has never ceased to well up from its hidden source. Were but a Pope to be found who could embrace this profound conception, the reunion of Christendom under his hegemony might soon become more than a pious dream.

Sabatier contrasts German Protestantism very effectively with Latin Catholicism, as illustrated respectively by Harnack and Loisy. It should not, however, be forgotten that that great thinker and originator, the German pastor's son, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, had fully grasped the root of the Modernist position over a hundred years ago. In conflict at once with Rationalism and with Dogmatism, Lessing, as a theologian, occupied a position which no one in his day could understand. He opposed the one because it tried to establish arbitrary canons of religious truth and falsehood; he opposed the other because it fettered research and inquiry. "Education is revelation for the individual—revelation is education for the race, and it is still in progress"—the basis of the Modernist movement is there. What is called Newmanism was a timid and limited application of the same principle. In Modernism it appears with breadth and fulness, and takes formal possession of a great section of Christian thought.

Sabatier has no doubt of the success of the movement, and the consequent rehabilitation of Christianity in a form capable of appealing alike to the philosopher and to the peasant. Yet it may be gravely doubted whether it can effect this in and through the Church in which it originated. Christianity could only have arisen from Judaism, but it could not transform Judaism; it was thrust out. Like Judaism, the Church has come to be a machine for the exaltation of a priestly caste—every dogma, every ordinance, every superstition makes in that direction. But Modernism is totally incompatible with a system in which a Pope can forbid his clergy to express themselves, and the clergy can forbid the laity to study and to speculate. It is certainly a hopeful sign that so many of the leading Modernists are clerics. Yet the spectacle of a sacerdotal body, as a whole, abandoning pretensions to magical powers and to supernaturally derived authority in obedience to an influx of new thought, and to that alone, is one which the history of religion can hardly show an example. It would be nothing less than a miracle if it happened now. Yet, after all, miracles do happen. Life is the great miracle, and Modernism is life. In any case it seems likely that we are witnessing the first scenes of a drama in the spiritual history of man, strongly resembling, in its essential features, that which was played in the Roman world during the first centuries of Christianity, and, perhaps, no less pregnant with far-reaching consequences.

T. W. ROLLESTON.

GLENEALY, CO. WICKLOW.

Lollardy and the Reformation in England.—By James Gairdner, C.B.,
Hon. LL.D. Edin.—Macmillan.—Two vols.

WHILE no student can afford to neglect this book, none can safely accept even its detailed statements without careful verification, quite apart from its somewhat paradoxical conclusions. Previous reviewers have perhaps sufficiently emphasised the fact that Dr Gairdner's main contentions, if true, would make the Reformation a great historical mystery; but nobody, so far as I know, has yet pointed out in detail the insecure documentary foundations on which these contentions are mainly based. It is the more important, therefore, to insist here upon the careless use of important evidence, which must rob this book, however learned and able otherwise, of all pretensions to a definitive history. The first few pages, dealing with royal supremacy and Wycliffe's doctrines, show us at once what Dr Gairdner's methods will be. His confused and somewhat contradictory arguments on the former point would take too long to expose here; but his special pleading is well illustrated in Wycliffe's case by the paragraph in which he tries to minimise the significance of the reformer's theological innovations by arguing (*inter alia*) that he repudiated transubstantiation "only in his later years"—a plea which would reduce

Home Rule to a mere accident in Gladstone's career, and rule out Christ's public ministry altogether (i. 12). Similarly, in Tyndale's case, Dr Gairdner not only takes for gospel nearly all More's bitter accusations, but adds a further injustice of his own (i. 370). "He preserved a positive mistranslation of one text . . . [John v. 39] . . . whereas the verb is plainly in the indicative mood." Many readers will be struck by Dr Gairdner's rashness in dogmatising upon a point deliberately left open by Westcott; but few would guess that this translation "Search ye the Scriptures," which is here made such a crime against Tyndale, is in fact that adopted by St Augustine, by Bishop Pecock and More in their anti-Lollard controversies, by the Romanist Douay Version, and even in the seventeenth century by the great patristic summarist, Cornelius a Lapide. In plain words, Tyndale is unmercifully belaboured because his translation here agrees with that of orthodox Catholics, and only fails to anticipate the objections of Dr Gairdner and other learned heretics in the distant future! Dr Gairdner habitually quotes the words of orthodox controversialists as conclusive against the Lollards: a great, and perhaps even the greater, part of his evidence comes from such tainted sources. He accepts unhesitatingly the immoralities imputed to them by their opponents, but makes no attempt to collect the numerous cases in which these latter confessed that Lollard teachers succeeded partly in virtue of their "outward appearance of holiness." In short, here as elsewhere, he treats the detested heretics as Gibbon treated the early Christians; and in several important passages which I have no space to deal with here, he judges them by laws under which Christ and His apostles could not have been acquitted.

Moreover, though Dr Gairdner is the greatest living authority on the state papers of Henry VIII.'s reign, yet even in that period he walks far less surely among ecclesiastical affairs, and his scholarship leaves a good deal to be desired in the earlier period, with which he deals now for the first time. Much of importance has escaped him even in Gascoigne and Wilkins; he altogether ignores Gower with a number of essential witnesses whom I shall presently have to quote; and he knows little of the episcopal registers. This last defect vitiates seriously his attempt to argue from the growing rarity of public executions to the almost total extinction of Lollardy itself. Such an argument *a silentio* is always dangerous, and far more so in the hands of a writer who has not nearly exhausted the available sources. Special students will find frequent indications of unfamiliarity with the peculiar mediæval connotations of certain words, and still more significant lapses in matters of custom or law. For instance, all that Dr Gairdner says about the law of burning for heresy, and the delivery to the secular arm, shows not only great partiality, but a most confused notion of the actual facts. Especially unfair is his treatment of this subject in his summary of More's *Dialogue* (I. 575); and, indeed, More's whole book, if he had read it with more care, might have suggested very serious modifications of his main thesis.

It may indeed seem rash to suggest that Dr Gairdner has not read care-

fully a work which he summarises at so great length (thirty-five very closely printed pages) ; but anyone else who takes the pains to institute a thorough comparison will probably agree with me. On p. 574 he hardly notices one of the most important chapters in the book (book iii. chap. 16), which, if he had printed it in full side by side with his own chapter on the "Story of the English Bible," would have given the reader a far clearer idea of the real facts, and flatly contradicted other passages in which Dr Gairdner has attempted to justify the attitude of the clergy towards Bible-reading. On p. 558 he omits a passage which throws considerable doubt on the efficacy of monastic discipline (More's *Works*, p. 135B). On p. 575 he summarises, quite falsely, that the heretics were "never visited with temporal punishments till they became violent themselves": whereas even the controversialist More only ventures to plead that there was "*little* violence," and admits that "they were put sometimes to silence upon pain of forfeiture of certain money"—an admission which, to the modern mind, would amply justify the heretics in finally "becoming violent themselves." But Dr Gairdner's worst misrepresentation is in his abstract of book iii. chap. 12. In this abstract, the very damning criticisms which More makes *in his own person* upon the clergy of his day are represented as coming only from his somewhat heretically inclined adversary ; and Dr Gairdner further misrepresents them by adding an innuendo of his own, which betrays an imperfect comprehension of that early monasticism to which More evidently alludes. Yet, in this part of the *Dialogue* at least, the text is so plain as to leave no excuse whatever for so serious a misrepresentation ; and here again, if the summarist had found room to print the whole chapter *in extenso*, it would have given a very different complexion to his whole book.

It is the more important to insist upon all this because it is not sporadic, but characteristic. Dr Gairdner's summaries of Walden's and Pecock's treatises are extremely misleading ; and on the monastic question—the capital importance of which he rightly emphasises—his treatment of the evidence is still worse. He implies, to begin with, that Walden and Pecock answered the Lollards fully on this point ; yet nothing is more remarkable than their doubtful attitude towards accusations which certainly were definite and frequent enough. Pecock's halting and half-hearted defence of the monks, in particular, is far more significant to an unprejudiced mind than the plain accusations of Wycliffe. Again, when Dr Gairdner comes to deal directly with this subject (ii. 44) he tells us practically nothing new, and contents himself with re-slaying the already slain royal visitors. Moreover, even here he is betrayed by Abbot Gasquet into serious errors, into which no special student ought to fall nowadays. He twice imputes to mere bad faith on Henry's part disciplinary regulations which rested on orthodox time-honoured monastic principles (ii. 59 and 77). He does not, indeed, garble Fuller's evidence quite so hopelessly as Abbot Gasquet ; yet his appeal to it is most misleading throughout, and culminates in the suppression of the essential evidence about Sir William Stanley (ii. 71). Moreover, he does not hint, though

he ought to know, that even orthodox visitors had frequently treated nuns with scarcely less brutality than this which is attributed by extremely suspicious witnesses to Henry's emissaries; and he might well have remembered that such scandals are still repeated and believed among the natives who so bitterly resented our own measures for the repression of the Bombay plague.

If Dr Gairdner is so unsafe on his own peculiar ground, he is far more so when he ventures further abroad, and attempts to justify the monasteries by comparing the reports of the royal visitors with those of their orthodox predecessors (appendix, ii. 95). Such a comparison, unless accurate, is worse than valueless; and this appendix is hopelessly inaccurate. To begin with, he practically neglects altogether the overwhelming evidence borne by these orthodox visitors for that waste, mismanagement, and peculation upon which the Statute of Suppression laid almost as much stress as on immoralities. Again, his *précis* of the Wymondham visitation of 1514 omits (i.) that the Prior had tried to kill two other monks besides the one he mentions; (ii.) that one of the monks was sometimes drunken; (iii.) and was suspected of adultery with one Poynter's wife; (iv.) that another monk who was now most vehemently suspected with different women became prior of the monastery six years later; and (v.) that yet another had broken the seal of confession—a crime more heinous in those days than adultery. In his *précis* of the Norwich cathedral visitation of 1526 there are omissions almost or quite as serious, apart from a blunder as to the meaning of *caligæ cum diploide* which leads him into a false estimate of the evidence on an important point. In 1532, again, he says, "We hear nothing . . . of unchastity," yet the report runs, "*Dompnus Johannes Kirby, suspectus, conversatur cum multis cujus prætextu infamia oritur in scandalum ecclesiæ.*" There are many other less serious inaccuracies, but his *précis* of the Westacre visitations shows perhaps the most unpardonable omission of all. The royal visitors of 1536 here reported unnatural crime, yet Dr Gairdner suppresses the fact that the same crime had been recorded in 1526 at the bishop's visitation. Somebody—probably a scandalised reader—has indeed run his pen through the very circumstantial evidence of the first witness in this case; but the next witness's deposition stands untouched. "John Thory, a novice, says . . . that Brother John Barbour is grievously suspected of the aforesaid crime." Such and similar suppressions naturally lead the unwary reader to suppose that these visitations are favourable to Dr Gairdner's thesis, whereas an unsparing analysis of them would in itself have sufficed to explain the ease with which Henry suppressed the monasteries. Nor is Dr Gairdner less misleading in his complete exclusion of other equally important witnesses. The proposals for disendowment made by a strong party in the parliament of 1395 were based on the public assertion that the inveterate vicious living of prelates and monks had infected the whole people. The petition of Oxford University to the king in 1414, though strongly anti-Lollard in tone, pleaded that "exempt cloisterers, at the devil's institution, are

frequently defiled by fleshly vices," and begged for more stringent measures against them, especially in the case of fornications committed outside the monasteries. The anti-Wycliffite Gower speaks equally strongly and at greater length; Gascoigne and the numerous records of Benedictine Chapters-General bear witness to a general decay of discipline which made such charges only too credible; and no pre-Reformation author, I believe, ever ventured roundly to deny these plain accusations of immorality. Having turned his face away from these notorious facts, Dr Gairdner exchanges his advocate's wig for that of a judge, remarks that "exact evidence is clearly impossible to obtain," and records his sentence of *not proven* with a measured solemnity which adds insult to injury (i. 95). No student, as I have said, can afford to neglect his book; but the foregoing instances are only a few out of many which might be quoted to warn the reader that Dr Gairdner's bias is sometimes strongest where his tone is most judicial.

G. G. COULTON.

EASTBOURNE.

The Gospel according to St John. The Greek Text, with Introduction and Notes.—By the late Brooke Foss Westcott, D.D., D.C.L., Bishop of Durham, sometime Regius Professor of Divinity, Cambridge.—2 Vols. Vol. I., xcvi+283; Vol. II., 394. London: Murray, 1908.

No editor's name appears on the title-page of these fine volumes, but the preface is signed by one of the Bishop's sons, the Rev. A. Westcott, who writes of "the privilege of presenting my father's latest words on the Gospel of St John to those who will value them"; and these, let me say at once, will be all who value the Fourth Gospel, for never has it had a more discerning commentator, or one who was more deeply imbued with the very spirit of its author. Bishop Westcott firmly believed that the author was St John himself; and whether he was right in that belief or no, one feels that between the actual author and the commentator there is such a community of spirit as ensures that the disciple enters fully into the master's mind. And to say that Dr Westcott was the disciple of the author of the Fourth Gospel, above all other teachers, after the great Master himself, is to affirm what every student of his writings will probably be willing to assent to. Every such student will be desirous of adding these volumes to his collection of the great theologian's works; but he will do well to remember that the date of the Bishop's death makes it impossible that they should be "up to date" in their criticism. Nevertheless, there is here a vast amount of material which is of value in helping to form one's judgment on the questions which are most hotly debated at the present moment.

We are told that so far back as the years 1859 and 1860, when a plan for a "tripartite" Commentary on the New Testament was discussed

between Westcott, Lightfoot, and Hort, the Johannine writings were assigned to the first-named. In 1869 he "yielded to a pressing request to undertake the Gospel for the *Speaker's Commentary*, and in consequence was reluctantly compelled to substitute the Authorised Version for the Greek text as the basis of his work," though he "reserved his right to utilise his published notes" for an edition of the Greek. The present edition is the result of this reservation, and of work subsequent to the *Speaker's Commentary*. "The mass of the revised Commentary," the editor thinks, was "compiled during the years 1883-1887," though "other notes were subsequently added, and a few of the latest pencilled additions probably belong to the last years of his life."

The latest literature to which I have myself observed a reference is the *Report of the Palestine Exploration Society*, 1881 (I. 145). The present volumes are, indeed, very largely a reissue of matter previously existing, but not brought together in this convenient form. With the exception of the section on the quotations from the Old Testament, which Dr Westcott had revised, the introduction is taken practically verbatim from the earlier work, the reader not even being informed that Lightfoot's *Contemporary Review* articles, freely referred to, have been collected in book form. "The Greek text is that of Westcott and Hort, with occasional preference for marginal readings," while the English translation which faces it has for its basis the Revised Version. "I have," says the editor, "only altered the text (or marginal text where preferred) of the Revised Version in those cases where it seemed that its rendering would not have satisfied my father." Many of the notes are identical with those in the previous edition, but parts of the Gospel have been re-annotated, viz. "practically the whole of chapters iii., iv., vi., vii., viii., ix., x., xi., and xii., and considerable sections of chapters i., xvi., and xx. In other parts of the Gospel he has only made occasional notes." One feature which distinguishes the revised commentary is the large number of quotations from patristic writings. Rupert of Deutz (†1135) is drawn upon extensively, and was evidently a favourite study of Westcott, who (on iii. 10) contrasts his "deeper insight" with that of the Greek Fathers. As an instance of his appositeness, here is his comment on iv. 17: "Non expectavit aut exegit ut totum diceret, sed clementiæ manum porrigens pepercit pudori, subvenit conscientiæ fluctuanti."

While we are on the subject of the notes, one or two details may be referred to. i. 41 affords an example of how a little discovery may alter the current view of a passage, and supersede many expositions. Westcott of course reads, and comments on, "He findeth *first* his own brother"; but so recently as February of this year Mrs Lewis has shown (in the *Expository Times*), on the evidence of two old Latin MSS., which read "mane," and of the Syriac of the Sinai Palimpsest, that there was a very early reading of $\pi\rho\omega\acute{\iota}$ instead of $\pi\rho\acute{\omega}\tau\omicron\nu$, and this may probably be the original. At all events it makes much better sense. ii. 1 is a case where the editor has been caught napping: "See Mark

vi. 3, note," we read; and we ask, When did Westcott comment on St Mark? Whereupon we are reminded that the first issue of this commentary was one of a series, so that the reference is to a companion volume in the *Speaker's*. In the additional notes on ch. xix. is a lengthy argument leading up to the conclusion that St John follows the modern Western mode of reckoning the hours of the day. We might have been warned that Dr Swete, in his *St Mark* (on xv. 25), says this argument has been "considerably shaken by recent research." And finally, a distinction might have been drawn between John Lightfoot and J. B. Lightfoot, both of whom appear to be referred to by the surname alone, so that a young student will almost certainly suppose that only one writer is in question, and he the Bishop of Durham, Westcott's predecessor in the see. I have known the mistake to be made in consulting a library catalogue, the New Testament commentaries of the modern scholar being sought under the name of the older. In a small way it is something like the confusion between the two Johns of Ephesus! Misprints, so far as I have observed, are very rare, the most serious being "exclusively" for "conclusively" on p. xiv of the Introduction. On the whole, the editor has done his work well. The book is well printed on good paper, and in its black binding, with gold lettering and gilt top, has a goodly appearance. The volumes are convenient to handle, and lie open easily.

The Introduction, as has already been remarked, except for one section, is practically a verbatim reprint of what was written now many years ago, and consequently it cannot deal with the Johannine problems in the shape in which they present themselves at the present day. But the present problems are only the old problems in a new guise, and it is always useful to keep in mind what so great a master thought and wrote. When one again reads through these proofs, both internal and external, that the Fourth Gospel was actually the work of John the Apostle, and when one further refreshes one's memory with Lightfoot's arguments to the same effect, the case seems for the moment to be finally settled. But then one recollects that as a matter of fact it is not settled, but the controversy is going on as merrily as ever, both in regular set books and in articles in the theological reviews. A prophecy of Lightfoot's has, however, come true. In 1871 he wrote: "We may look forward to the time when it will be held discreditable to the reputation of any critic for sobriety and judgment to assign to this gospel any later date than the end of the first century, or the very beginning of the second."¹ No one now seems to find it worth while to discuss the Tübingen theory. Yet there are many scholars who deny the authorship of a companion of Jesus; others who feel the weight of the evidence for John too strong to be resisted, but who nevertheless regard the contents as not necessarily history; while others are indifferent as to the actual author, holding the entire work to be more or less allegorical. And, indeed, on whichever side we range ourselves the difficulties

¹ *Biblical Essays*, p. 11.

are immense. If the actual evidence forces us to believe that John was the author, we are at once met by the difficulty of reconciling his portraiture of Jesus with that of the Synoptists, and his view of the ministry with theirs. If the three are right in their representation of the gradual unfolding of the Messianic character and claims of the Lord, how does the fourth come to represent them as taken for granted by everyone from the beginning? And if affinities can be shown (as they can) between the discourses in the last Gospel and the sayings in the earlier ones, how does the effect of the whole come to be so very different? And how does the Evangelist come to give the private conversation of Jesus with the Samaritan woman?—for we can hardly accept Westcott's suggestion that either John was present (which he admits to be unlikely), or that the account was derived either from Christ or the woman. Yet there is no other alternative if the narrative is historical. There is much force in Loisy's words: "Tous les discours du quatrième Évangile sont, au point de vue chrétien, comme des paroles du Christ glorieux, anticipées dans sa carrière terrestre; elles sont donc aussi, pour l'historien, une expression du sentiment chrétien, un témoignage de la foi chrétienne." On the other hand, I must confess that, while I can see that xxi. 20-23 is reconcilable with John's death before the narrative was written, yet to my mind it conveys the impression that he was still alive. The passage *may* be consistent with John's being already dead; I cannot see that it is any proof of it. "A great Hebrew epic," was Westcott's description of the Gospel in 1859; perhaps here we have the clue to all our difficulties.

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Religion in the Further East.

ONCE more the *Bhagavad Gītā*, "the Divine Lay," as it has been called, attracts a translator and expounder in the person of Mr Charles Johnston, formerly Sanskrit prizeman of Dublin University and the Indian Civil Service. The philosophical interest of the book, the part which it has played in Indian religious life, the intrinsic beauty of much of its teaching, all combine to fascinate the student, and Mr Johnston probably yields to none of its admirers.¹ A brief general introduction is followed by an analysis of the eighteen cantos of the poem, which are rendered in prose. Mr Johnston's judgments at the outset are not such as to inspire confidence in his guidance. With courageous independence he takes no heed of predecessors.² He boldly affirms that the poem, which he admits to contain elements of various dates, was completed in its present form before the teaching of Gotama the Buddha, 500 B.C. He places Çankara Āchārya,

¹ *Bhagavad Gītā*, "The Songs of the Master," Charles Johnston, Flushing, New York, 1908.

² Professor Garbe's analysis (1905), for instance, is not mentioned, nor the still later rendering of Professors Deussen and Otto Strauss (1906).

who is commonly assigned to the early part of the ninth century A.D., and who is even said by some distinguished scholars to have composed his commentary on the poem in the year 804 A.D., "some twenty-two centuries ago" (p. xvi)! Such are the chronological uncertainties of Indian literary tradition. This of course enables him to dispose altogether of the theories of Christian influence which have been so keenly debated among recent critics. But he has his own sense of analogy, and freely uses the Gospels and the Apocalypse (not always, perhaps, quite happily) for purposes of illustration. Neither the Logos nor the worship of the Lamb seems altogether appositely introduced. The difficulty of the translator, of course, lies in the philosophical terms. Mr Johnston evidently desires to make his version intelligible and interesting to English readers. He therefore strives to avoid all technicalities, but he is landed consequently in frequent vagueness and inexactitude. To take one or two examples at random (xiii. 19): "know that both nature and spirit are beginningless; and know that changes and powers are nature-born." Here "nature" (the term is also used by Professor Barnett in his admirable version, but then there is a more explicit introduction, and a little sheaf of notes) represents the famous Prakriti. It is not the organised cosmos that we know, the scene of ordered thought and scientific unity, but the primitive, formless, undifferentiated matter. The "powers" that are "nature-born" are the three mysterious Guṇas, usually termed "qualities," and commonly designated "goodness," "passion," and "darkness" (or, as Mr Johnston calls them, "substance, force, and darkness"), by whose action the original matter passes through various transformations into the world of our experience. All this is lost by the simple rendering "powers." The same English word reappears in iv. 27: "all the works of the powers and the works of the life-force." Here items of physiological psychology lie hidden underneath more general names. The "powers" are the *indriyas* or organs of sense, eye, ear, and so forth; the "life-force" is the group of *prāṇas* or vital breaths. The fact is that a translation of this type really needs a running commentary to explain it; the introductory analyses are insufficient. With the ethical and religious vocabulary Mr Johnston is far more successful, and his deep sympathy with some of the fundamental conceptions of the poem makes his interpretations full of suggestiveness. As everyone knows, the Gītā (to give it the abbreviated name of its Indian lovers) is concerned with the way of deliverance for the soul from the bonds of worldliness, and its passage to the world of light and love. There, mythologically, is the heavenly throne of Vishnu; there, spiritually, is the way of union with that Infinite Life which philosophy had long learned to conceive under the triple form of Being, Thought, and Joy (*Sac-cid-ānanda*).

The divine hero of "the Lord's Song" announces to the listening Arjuna that though his essence changed not, and could feel neither birth nor decay, he yet condescended to be born from age to age when religion declined and irreligion prevailed, "to guard the righteous, to destroy

eildoers, to establish the Dharma (truth, law, religion)" (iv. 6-8). That is the application to Vishnu (in the person of Krishna) of the beneficent purpose realised by the Buddha, save that Buddhism seeks not the destruction but the conversion of sinners. The disciple of Krishna, however, did not venture to aspire after any share in this great function. Nor did early Buddhism place any such aim before the follower of the Sākya Teacher. The primitive "arahat" or saint attained deliverance for himself out of the weary round of re-births by the steadfast practice of the Eightfold Noble Path. But he did not seek to make this personal "salvation" effective for others also. The missionary preachers of the first ages of the faith might indeed be the instruments of bringing many to righteousness; but the saint, though he must have a heart full of love for all creatures, was not pledged to incessant labour for their rescue from the bondage of ignorance and sin. The ideal of individual holiness had thus certain egoistic limitations; it was a "vehicle" that only held one in the transit through the sphere of rebirth.

But under influences which it is impossible here even to indicate, this ideal gradually expanded. The skiff in which the believer made his lonely voyage across the ocean of transmigration (to use another familiar figure) grew into a vessel capable of holding many; and the system known as the "Great Vehicle" held up new visions in which the disciple saw himself called upon to undertake the same beneficent labour for others which the Teacher had already wrought for him. To take the great vow to become a Buddha, to devote every energy of body and mind to preparation for attaining supreme enlightenment and diffusing it among all beings from the highest heavens to the lowest hells,—this was the new duty which profoundly transformed both the theory and practice of Buddhism. It was connected with a philosophical change which brought back into Buddhist thought the great ontological conceptions so strictly repudiated by the Founder, and issued in a scheme of transcendental idealism absolutely opposed to the empirical idealism of an earlier day.

By this altered environment the ethical culture of the "Little Vehicle" was transmuted into a religion of communion in the Great. The believer found himself encompassed by innumerable spiritual powers, with the beautiful figure of Avalokiteṣvara at their head, each pledged to the same task, a share in the deliverance of all living beings from the fetters of worldliness and the snares of sin. These formed the vast multitude of the Bodhisattvas or Buddhas-to-be, sustained by the power and grace of the Eternal with whom they were in some way or other indissolubly connected. An enormous literature arose to describe the scope of their labours, and the stages of their advance towards attainment. One of these poetic manuals has recently been translated with loving care by the eminent scholar in Buddhist Sanskrit, Professor Louis de la Vallée Poussin, of Gand.¹ It is ascribed to a Teacher of the Great Vehicle, Ćāntideva, whose date is

¹ *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, "Introduction à la Pratique des Futurs Bouddhas," Paris, 1907. The translation is provided with very valuable analyses and notes.

placed (for instance by the late Professor Bendall) in the middle of the seventh century A.D.¹ It is founded on the idea that the higher insight abolishes the distinction between "self" and "others," and the disciple can only secure his own victory over evil by whole-hearted devotion to the liberation of those around him.

The poem is divided into nine cantos of very unequal lengths; a tenth, viewed even by the Buddhist tradition as of uncertain authority, has been left untranslated. It breathes an air mingled of strenuousness and compassion towards the sinful sufferers around and beneath, and of lowly submission to the Buddhas above. It is not exactly a Buddhist counterpart to the "Imitation," though the type of the Buddha's self-devotion everywhere forms the background. Rather might it be compared with the "Spiritual Exercises" of Loyola, save that the note of obedience to authority is wholly wanting, and a certain passion of self-confidence and enterprise in the undertaking of great tasks is encouraged (see canto vii., on *virīya*, "energy"). It contains acts of faith, and humble confessions; but it affirms that active desire for the good of the world is more meritorious than the cultus of the Buddhas (i. 27), and it urges the disciple to make the great vow for the attainment of Bodhi (the supreme knowledge) to promote the true goal of universal deliverance (iii.). Then follow a series of delineations of the moral conditions needful for the fulfilment of the high purpose. A tremendous responsibility lies on him who thus devotes himself: "If I do not accomplish the vow, I deceive all living beings" (iv. 4); freedom from distraction, therefore, and subjugation of all disturbing passions, are essential. Various systems of thought are reviewed and refuted. Theism is impaled on the dilemma that if God acts without desiring it, He is subordinate to some extraneous power; if He acts through desire, He is under its control and is not sovereign (ix. 126). A curious tradition relates that after proclaiming verse 35—"When both being and not-being have ceased to present themselves to the mind, as there is nothing more to affirm or deny, the mind is at peace"—Çāntideva rose in the air and disappeared. But the ascended saint continued the poem, and the remaining 130 verses were *heard* and recorded by pious followers. All students of the later Buddhism will feel deep gratitude to the translator for putting into their hands so precious a work of Buddhist piety. Not till Christian missionaries have thoroughly assimilated its spirit can they understand how great an obstacle the doctrine of eternal punishment without hope of permanent redemption, or even of temporary relief, perpetually places in their way.

The remarkable articles on Japanese Shintoism, recently published in the *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions* by M. Michel Revon, have been collected into a substantial volume and provided with an admirable index, under the general title *Le Shinntoïsme*.² The exposition is on a very

¹ See his edition of the *Çikshāsamuccaya*, 1902, pp. iii-vi.

² There is no title-page, but the table of contents bears the date, "Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, Novembre 1907."

comprehensive scale, for the present issue (comprising 473 pp.) deals only with the gods of Shinto, their origin, nature, and life; the whole practice of Shinto, including the worship of ancestors, with its immense social significance, being reserved for future treatment.

M. Revon has lived long in Japan, and is steeped in knowledge of its early literature, together with the commentators of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. He is perfectly familiar with the labours of the English scholars, Satow, Chamberlain,¹ and Aston. And he writes with a wide outlook over the general history of religious evolution; beside the names of A. Réville and the lamented Léon Marillier, the English reader welcomes those of Tylor, Frazer, and Lang. The text is generally brief, condensed, and pointed (occasionally M. Revon permits himself a pungent criticism on the treatment of the Eastern nations by the West), while the notes contain a vast quantity of subsidiary illustration. No such study of ancient Japanese religion has as yet appeared, the English treatise of Aston (*Shinto*, 1905) being usually limited to description, and almost devoid of references.

The evolution of Shinto is essentially analogous in M. Revon's view to that of other primitive religions. If any further refutation were needed of Spencer's discarded thesis, this book would suffice to supply it. The interest of the Japanese field lies partly in the fact that the earliest literary deposits in the Kojiki and the Nihongi are almost wholly the product of antique tradition, the occasional traces of later Chinese culture being easily separable. In a series of very suggestive pages (pp. 332-351), M. Revon discusses the question of the origins of the Japanese people, and traces in them a double strand of race, Mongolian on the one hand, and Malay or Malayo-Polynesian on the other. To the latter element (which produced a victorious aristocracy) he traces some of the characteristic features of Japanese character—the quick intelligence, the proud warrior spirit, and the joyous love of nature and art, which have made the Japanese a people unique in Asia. The Japanese pantheon, however, was formed in their own islands; and the relative significance of mountain and river, wind and rain, is reflected in the varying importance of their deities in early myth. There is no living Sky as in ancient Chinese thought to co-ordinate and unify the powers of nature. M. Revon does not even name one of the figures of the Nihongi, Ama no minaka-nushi, "Heaven-august-centre-master," in whom some students have seen the pole-star, and others "a personification of the sky, which has already reached that secondary phase in which the God has become distinct from the natural phenomenon" (Aston, *Shinto*, p. 142). The stars play but a small part in ancient Japanese mythology; the earth and its products provide the chief objects of interest next to the sun and moon, and supply the scenery and equipment both for the upper and the under worlds.

The often-repeated charge that Shinto has no morality, is incidentally

¹ It is a pity that Chamberlain's *Things Japanese* is always cited from an early edition, instead of the much enlarged edition of 1902.

refuted by M. Revon again and again. It is true that Shinto has no "Ten Words" like Israel, not even a modest *pañca-sīla* (Five Precepts) like Buddhism. But it is not, therefore, destitute of ethical significance. Its deities are, for the most part, beneficent; there is no diabolic aristocracy, the spirits of evil are anonymous (the later demonology shows Buddhist influence); the attitude of the worshipper, as the early rituals amply prove, is one of trust and gratitude, of love and hope. Myth and tradition alike show the presence of brutal passions; but a moral order is being slowly evolved. Crime is placed under religious sanctions of punishment; children are submissive and obedient; the women are better than the men; there are consecrated formulæ for marriage and divorce. The singular mixture of the ceremonial and the moral (which has so many parallels elsewhere) may be seen in the ritual of the "Great Purification."¹ Before the eighth century it seems to have been celebrated only occasionally, and for special reasons. But as new ethical influences streamed in with Confucian culture and Buddhist missionary enterprise, Shinto acquired a deeper moral consciousness, and a half-yearly ceremony on the 30th of the sixth and twelfth months became the rule. A decree of the present reign in 1872 fixes the ordinance to the last day of June and December, and requires its performance at all Shinto shrines, whether supported by the government or maintained by local piety. Four or five days before the close of the month the believer procures from the priest a white paper cut in the shape of a garment. On this he writes the year and month of his birth and his sex, rubs it over his whole body, and breathes on it. His sins are thus transferred to the paper robe; it is taken to the shrine and placed on a table while food offerings are presented and purifying ceremonies are performed. Finally the paper garments are packed in cases, put into a boat, rowed out to sea, and committed to the deep. There they are carried to the great Sea-Plain by the Maiden-of-Descent-into-the-Current, who bears them to the Maiden-of-the-Swift-Opening, dwelling in the Eight-Hundred-Meetings of the Brine-of-the-Eight-Brine-Currents. She swallows them down with gurgling sound, and the Lord-of-the-Breath-Blowing-Place then blows them away into the Root-Country, the bottom, apparently, of the under world!

The contrast between different ways of dealing with sin in modern Shinto ritual and Buddhist preaching receives remarkable illustration in the sermons of Tada Kanai, of the Shin Shu Sect (the True Sect of the Pure Land), translated with admirable sympathy by the Rev. Arthur Lloyd under the title *The Praises of Amida*.² The characteristic features of this sect were described in this Journal by Mr Troup (Jan. 1906); it is only necessary to recall the conception on which its teaching is founded, that faith in the Buddha of Infinite Light and Life is the sole

¹ This is no doubt reserved by M. Revon for his future volume. See the account of the present practice of Norito x., by Dr Karl Florenz, in the *Trans. Asiat. Soc. Jap.*, vol. xxvii., pt. i., pp. 16 ff.

² Tokyo, 1907. Published by the Kyōbunkwan.

requisite for the believer's salvation. In these sermons the preacher avails himself of all the resources of literature, ancient and modern, to awaken the careless to a sense of their danger, to strengthen the wavering, to comfort the troubled. Passages from the sacred texts, from Epictetus or Emerson, sayings from the Gospels, incidents from the romances of Hugo, Hawthorne, or Tolstoi, show that the Buddhist teacher is confronted with the same moral problems as the men of insight in all ages. How to find the gate of true peace, what is the tender mercy of Amida in calling us to him out of the storms of evil into a safe refuge, how even "our sin only serves to bring out more clearly the workings of the Divine Mercy," how there is only One Rule, One Law, One Buddha, and One Paradise, how all men must be bound into union by means of the One Name and the Great Parent awaits their coming to him, how we must all prepare to go forth from the hostelry of this life and turn our faces to the City of Light—these are the preacher's themes. It will be to the lasting shame of Christian sectarianism if the Buddhism that expresses itself thus remains estranged from the character and the message of Jesus Christ.

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The Culture of the Soul among Western Nations.—By P. Rámanáthan, K.C., C.M.G.—New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1906. Pp. 262.

It ought to be widely recognised that the cultivation of the soul according to the precepts of the Christianity of Jesus is something that the best Hindu minds appreciate no less highly than do the religious teachers of the Occident. But the Hindu makes a sharp distinction between true Christianity and ecclesiastical Christianity, or "Churchianity," and whenever he writes concerning religion in Western nations, his emphasis is not on existing conditions there, but bears rather upon the religious attainments that *ought* to be realised wherever Jesus is the accepted ideal example.

Mr P. Rámanáthan, of Ceylon, is the author of a book composed of seven discourses delivered by him at the invitation of Monsalvat School for the Comparative Study of Religion. According to this author, the unfortunate sectarianism that prevails in the Occident is chiefly due to the loss of the traditional oral interpretation of the Scriptures, which was regarded in the early period of the Christian Church as of the first importance. This unwritten interpretation was then heard from the lips of spiritual sages and seers who had attained, to a high degree, the very ideals of purity, wisdom, and love towards which they sought to attract their hearers. Men irresistibly follow such soulful leaders, but how few such are leading in the West to-day! In India, it is asserted, there is not this lack of spiritual mastership. Broad-minded students of religion who

have noted that fact will welcome Mr Rámanáthan's book as a more helpful guide to pure Christianity than most Christian writers are able to produce.

The author's point of view is shown in such clauses as these: "Faith is much more than belief. It is the attachment or *bond of love* which springs from belief" (p. 15); "The waxing of the love of God depends, indeed, upon the waning of the love of the world" (p. 23); "The western nations know of only one Christ, but India knows of scores in each generation" (p. 81); "God is known by the soul only when the mind runs down to a calm and lies quite still" (p. 97); "God and soul, being purely spiritual, cannot be explained sufficiently by words. No description on the part of a person who has known them can make another know them, even as the taste of water cannot be expressed in words" (p. 45); "A worldly saying is best interpreted by a man of worldly experience, . . . a spiritual saying by a man of spiritual experience. Experience, indeed, is the touchstone of interpretation" (p. 38); "God is to be seen (that is, known) only where the 'world' is not, that is, only in the reign of pure consciousness" (p. 103); "The truth, as experienced by *Jñānis* (knowers of God), is that consciousness is wholly distinct from the mind and the senses" (p. 107); "Consciousness is the *Be-ing which knows*, and must not be confounded with the states or sensibilities induced . . . through the excitation of the senses and thoughts" (p. 121).

These quotations are sufficient to show that the view-point of the Oriental thinker is widely different from that which is held in the Occident. And not alone that, but his spiritual vision is introverted and subjective in much the same way that characterised the experiences of Jesus—also an Oriental thinker. Western religion, as a rule, is not subjective, but objective, for which reason it idealises and worships Jesus in lieu of understanding him. This is just what the Master would most surely deprecate. Objective religion exists where the religious consciousness has not yet attained fulness or maturity, and it is objective because it depends upon perception instead of apperception. This perception cannot discern the spiritual centrality within, but is habitually occupied with something external—some inspired book, doctrine, or idealised person wholly out of touch with present-day experience. This is aptly illustrated by the case of the lady of distinction who has a beautiful copy of Murillo's "Transfiguration of the Virgin." Often does she gaze upon the picture in reverent admiration, but would she herself be like the ideal portrayed there? Never! Impossible! The question is: How can she and such as she ever understand what true religion is? Who can deny that objective religion is virtually sentimental religion, in the exercise of which there is much looking up, but very little *moving up*, toward the divine ideal? What Jesus thought of this sentimental religion is made plain in these words of warning: "Not every one that saith unto me, 'Lord, Lord!' shall enter into the kingdom of heaven, but he that doeth the will of my Father."

The most notable of Mr Rámanáthan's seven discourses is entitled

"The Key of Knowledge, or the Fundamental Experiences of the Sanctified in Spirit." This relates to the *Jñānis* of India and their way of attaining the "state of godliness," which is life raised to a state of pure consciousness—that is, consciousness of the *Self*—after the renunciation of the "earth-bound or worldly I" and its desires. The Christianity of Jesus is here radicalised and carried to its logical conclusion—as a life, not a system of belief—but the great majority of professing Christians will hardly be ready to follow where this profoundly practical religion leads. They will first need to unlearn their myths and half-truths about God, Jesus, and "eternal life," and see all understandingly. Only in the light radiated by one's own indwelling divinity can this insight be experienced, and perhaps the author is justified in maintaining that those who have not yet attained such insight should trust in the authority of their spiritual superiors for religious guidance.

After reading this suggestive, heart-searching book, one can but wonder how the gulf between the highest ideal of Eastern religion and that of Western religion is to be bridged. By letting the mind "run down to a calm"—the calm of non-desire—the Oriental aspirant finds the "peace which passeth understanding." But to the restless Western mind, non-desire is only a state of vacuity, and it has convinced itself that this entails the loss of individuality. Now, it is fair to presume that the Western mind has arrived at such a conclusion because not yet cognisant of the deeper resources of the subjective-spiritual. It would hardly be possible to write of these resources confidently and impressively without first entering into the experience of them, and this the author has undoubtedly done. Western devotees of religion who are bent upon understanding Jesus, need just that frequent introversion of thought and feeling from the interests of the outer life to those of the inner. Committed to this, they would appreciate the fact that the true test of spiritual progress is the waning of the desire for the worldly. Committed to this, they would become convinced of what Jesus constantly saw, *i.e.* that a wholly sincere desire for godliness and God-consciousness involves non-desire for everything that prevents that realisation. It is a choice—the right choice—between the verities and the vanities, for they will not mix. It sloughs off personalism, but preserves and magnifies true individuality.

There may be a good and sufficient reason why religion among Western peoples lacks the profundity and absorbing appreciation with which the highest classes of Hindus invest it. Presumably, subjective development is not so far advanced in the younger nations as in India. This difference should be expected. The critic of soul culture as seen in such nations should allow for the conditions which are bound to prevail wherever mental activities are, for the most part, exhausted by the demands of the physical.

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[By treating the O.T. as real literature, the author attempts to get at the heart of the people from whom it came, and to grasp its real revelation.]

- Orchard (W. E.)* The Evolution of Old Testament Religion. 287p. Clarke, 1908.

[Written from the point of view of the Higher Criticism. "This book is an earnest plea for earnest men to consider whether it is not open to be shown that from these facts there comes to us a much clearer understanding of God's ways with man; a more certain conviction that in the past God has actually spoken through the Scriptures."]

- u2 *Sunde (H. B.)* The Old Testament in Greek. II. The Greek Old Testament in the Christian Church. Interpreter, Jan. 1909.

[The LXX. was one of the parents of Christian literature—of the N.T. and of the other writings of the early Church. It supplied the preacher of the first age with the text and with much of the materials of his preaching; it supplied the leaders of Christian worship with the backbone of a liturgy.]

- y *Box (G. H.)* A Short Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament. (Oxford Church Text-books.) 148p.

Rivingtons, 1909.

[Written for beginners, and intended to be used in conjunction with Canon Otley's volume on *The Hebrew Prophets.*]

- Foakes-Jackson (F. J.)* The Old Testament before Modern Criticism. II. How the O.T. emerged from the Test.

Interpreter, Jan. 1909.

[Despite our loss of certain beauties, which we often part with only to find in another form, we get a truer picture of God's dealing with Israel. And we discover under the new conditions of criticism a new interest in periods of Jewish history which had once seemed devoid of stirring incident.]

- 2A *Wiener (H. M.)* Essays in Pentateuchal Criticism. III. The "Clue" to the "Documents." Biblioth. Sacra, Jan. 1909.

- B *Coggin (Frederick Ernest)* Man's Great Charter: An Exposition of the First Chapter of Genesis. Revised edition. 207p.

Nisbet, 1908.

- K *Barnes (W. E.)* The David of the Book of Samuel and the David of the Book of Chronicles. Expos., Jan. 1909.

- [The writer's interest in the Temple introduces the figure of David and colours his portrait.]
- 3B *Vidal (J. M.)* L'idée de résurrection dans Job.
R. du Clergé français, Feb. 1, 1909.
[First of two articles.]
- 5 "X." Professor Mayor and the Helvidian Hypothesis. Expos., Dec. 1908.
[A warm rejoinder to Mayor's answer in this discussion of the nature of the relationship of Christ and "his brethren."]
Lewis (Miss Agnes M.) Letter to the Editor. Expos., Jan. 1909.
[Correcting the statement of "X" in the December number to the effect that the *Syr. Sin. Palimpsest* has suffered erasure with a knife at the hands of the orthodox librarian. Erasure has taken place, but impartially, with the only object apparently of getting a clear surface for the seventh or eighth century "Stories of Holy Women."]
Mayor (J. B.) The Brethren of the Lord: Second Thoughts. Expos., Jan. 1909.
[Maintains the hypothesis, but modifies some arguments.]
Wilson (A. J.) Emphasis in the New Testament. J. Th. St., Jan. 1909.
- k *Turner (C. H.)* Historical Introduction to the Textual Criticism of the New Testament. II. The Contents of the Canon of the New Testament. (A) The Four Gospels. J. Th. St., Jan. 1909.
Moulton (J. H.) and *Milligan (G.)* Lexical Notes from the Papyri.
Expos., Dec. 1908, Jan., Mar. 1909.
Ross (J.) Ἐπερυσίθαι in the New Testament. Expos., Jan. 1909.
Mayor (J. B.) Note on Ἐπερυσίθαι.
Expos., Feb. 1909.
[Pointing out to Ross that he had already published the opinion Ross maintains, that the verb in Biblical Greek is always passive.]
- 6 *Kennedy (H. A. A.)* The Functions of the Forerunner, and the Storming of the Kingdom. Expos., Dec. 1908.
Ramsay (Sir W. M.) The Time of the Transfiguration. Expos., Dec. 1908.
[Adopting Col. Mackinlay's suggestion that the Transfiguration occurred at the Feast of Tabernacles, the writer compares the Synoptic account (Mark ix. 2 ff., Mt. xvii., Luke ix. 28 ff.) with that of John vii., and finds that, while not a detail of one appears in the other, the two yet dovetail perfectly, chronology and tone wonderfully agreeing. The two narratives must be therefore founded on personal knowledge or firsthand information.]
- w *Sardi (M.)* Il "Figlio dell' Uomo."
Riv. stor.-crit. d. Scienze Teolog., Jan. 1909.
[The term sometimes = Messiah, sometimes the Kingdom of God. Christ used it to designate himself, its advantage being that it was so indeterminate as to be capable of receiving a manifold significance.]
- c *Büchler (A.)* St Matthew vi. 1-6 and other Allied Passages. J. Th. St., Jan. 1909.
[The difficulty as to praying in the street and sounding the trumpet is explained by referring the occasion to a public fast, when these customs were followed.]
- D *Bacon (Benjamin Wisner)* The Beginnings of Gospel Story. A Historico-Critical Inquiry into the sources and structure of the Gospel according to Mark, with expository notes upon the text, for English readers. (The Modern Commentary Series.) 279p. Yale University Press, 1909.
[Review follows.]
- E *Bacon (B. W.)* The Ascension in Luke and Acts. Expos., Mar. 1909.
[By treating Acts i. 3 as "the historian's attempt to compensate for the omitted traditions" (the appearance to Peter among them), the writer argues there is no contradiction between Luke and Acts as to the time of the Ascension. Both put it at the beginning of the forty days, as all available apostolic and post-apostolic testimony agrees.]
- W *Carr (A.)* Christus Aedificator.
Expos., Jan. 1909.
[A comparison between St John ii. 19 and Zechariah vi. 13. "Our Lord was directing the thought of his hearers to an Old Testament incident, which would not only indicate His claim to authority, but open out the significance of the temple itself in the light of prophecy."]
Denney (J.) Jesus' Estimate of John the Baptist. Expos., Jan. 1909.
- 7A *Liberty (S.)* St Peter's Speech in Acts i. 15-22. Expos., Jan. 1909.
[Discusses the syntactical connection and exegesis of the verses.]
Ramsay (Sir W. M.) The Authorities used in the Acts i.-xii.
Expos., Feb., Mar. 1909.
[And to be continued.]
Harnack (Adolf) The Acts of the Apostles. Translated by the Rev. J. R. Wilkinson. (Crown Theological Library.) 346p. Williams & Norgate, 1909.
[Review will follow.]
Bacon (B. W.) Professor Harnack on the Lukan Narrative. Amer. J. Th., Jan. 1909.
[Professor Bacon expresses himself as hardly ready to accept H.'s conclusions. At any rate, the author of Acts is not Pauline at all, but Petrine in views and teaching.]
- 7B *Garvie (A. E.)* The Doctrine of Christ. Expos., Jan. and Feb. 1909.
[A study in Pauline theology.]
Garvie (A. E.) The Need of Salvation.
Expos., Mar. 1909.
[Another study in the Pauline theology.]
Quetteville (P. W.) Paul the Missionary, and other Studies. 265p. P. Green, 1908.
- b *Lake (Kirsopp)* What was the End of St Paul's Trial? Interpreter, Jan. 1909.
[Thinks there is fair reason for the conjecture that St Luke means, in the concluding portion of Acts, that the case against St Paul came to nothing owing to the continued absence of the prosecuting Jews, and that after two years he was released.]
- 6D *King (E. G.)* The Disciple that Jesus loved: A Suggestion.
Interpreter, Jan. 1909.
[The suggestion is that the reference is to the rich young man of Mk. x. 21.]
- 7M *Ramsay (Sir W. M.)* Dr Milligan's Edition of the Epistles to the Thessalonians. Expos., Jan. 1909.
[Commended.]
- S *Maynard (J. D.)* Justin Martyr and the Text of Hebrews xi. 4. Expos., Feb. 1909.
[Trypho, c. 19, supports Cobet's emendation of ΗΑΕΙΟΝΑ into ΗΑΙΟΝΑ.]
- U *Blunt (A. W. F.)* The Epistle of St James. Interpreter, Jan. 1909.
- V *Harris (J. Rendel)* An Emendation to 1 Peter ii. 8. Expos., Feb. 1909.
[Seeks to establish the currency of the doctrine of Christ as the Stone—which suggests the reading εις ὃ ἐρέθη.]
- Y *Law (Robert)* The Tests of Life. (Kerr Lectures for 1909.) 436p. Clark, 1909.
[An elaborate study of the first epistle of St John.]

- 8 *Moffatt (J.)* Wellhausen and Others on the Apocalypse. Expos., Mar. 1909.
 9 *Plummer (A.)* The Relation of the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs to the Books of the New Testament.

Expos., Dec. 1908.

[Challenges Charles' view that the parallels are due to the dependence of the N.T. on the Testaments. P. reverses the case, asking why the admitted Christianising of the Testaments may not have been extended to the insertion of N.T. parallels—and why, on Charles' theory, the influence of the Testaments on the Fathers should be practically non-existent.]

- Charles (R. H.)* The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs in Relation to the New Testament. Expos., Feb. 1909.

[An answer to Plummer.]

- Deismann (A.)* Primitive Christianity and the Lower Classes. Expos., Feb. 1909.

[Describing some of the detail of the life of the people of the period as gathered from papyri and ostraca.]

- Deismann (A.)* Primitive Christianity and the Lower Classes. Expos., Mar. 1909.

- Gry (L.)* Le messianisme des paraboles d'Hénoch. Le Muséon, vol. ix. No. 4.

- Mari (F.)* Le Idée escatologique del Libro di Enoch (to be continued).

- Riv. stor.-crit. d. Scienze Teolog., Jan. 1909.

- Ragg (L.)* The Mohammedan Gospel of Barnabus. Church Q. R., Jan. 1909.

[Concludes that this Vienna MS. had a Venetian origin towards the end of the sixteenth century, but that there was an earlier Italian original of the fourteenth century.]

- C CHURCH** 14 .. *Social Problems*, 20 .. *Polity*, 42 .. *Liturgical*, 50 .. *Sacraments*, 60 *Missions*.

- M'Giffert (A. C.)* Was Jesus or Paul the Founder of Christianity?

Amer. J. Th., Jan. 1909.

[As an institution, and a system of principles, beliefs, and practice, the Church must be traced back to St Paul. The underlying spirit and gospel of it come from Jesus.]

- 14 *Nonconformist Minister.* Nonconformity and Politics: A Word from Within.

Fort. R., Jan. 1909.

[Protest against the tendency of Nonconformity to make political pronouncements, to look upon itself as called upon for direct interference in the political questions of the hour, to constitute itself officially a champion of political ideas.]

- 16 *Tolstoy (Leo)* The Law of Force and the Law of Love. I. Fort. R., March 1909.

[“The cause of the wretched condition of the Christian nations is the absence of a supreme conception, common to them all, of the meaning of life, of faith, and of guidance for conduct resulting from faith.” A plea for the Christian teaching in its real meaning.]

- Carnegie (W. H.)* Churchmanship and Character. 272p. John Murray, 1909.

[The Christian is (i.) a natural life, for by nature man is subject to the supreme authority of conscience; (ii.) a complete life, for its principle is applicable to the whole range of man's activities; (iii.) a free life, freedom through submission to the highest law; (iv.) a supernatural life. A great Church movement will not arise till (i.) the Church type of character is recognised as the best type; (ii.) the Church's organised activities bear visible witness to the greatness of her ideal and power.]

- 21 *Brooke (Hubert) and Others.* The Church

of Christ: Its True Definition. Preface by the Dean of Canterbury. 152p.

Scott, 1908.

[A call by evangelical pastors for the concentration of ministerial work on the salvation of men's souls, on their deliverance from sin, by faith in Christ, and on the purification of their souls by the Holy Spirit.]

- Faunce (William Herbert Perry)* The Educational Ideal in the Ministry. (Lyman Beecher Lectures, 1908.) 293p.

Macmillan, 1908.

[Lectures deal with (i.) Place of the Minister in Modern Life; (ii.) Attitude of Religious Leaders toward New Truth; (iii.) Modern Uses of Ancient Scripture; (iv.) Demand for Ethical Leadership; (v.) Service of Psychology; (vi.) Direction of Religious Education; (vii.) Relation of the Church and the College; and (viii.) Education of the Minister by his Task.]

- Dykes (J. Oswald)* The Christian Minister and His Duties. 379p.

Clark, 1908.

[This volume by the former Principal of Westminster College, Cambridge, is designed to meet the requirements of candidates for sacred office and of the junior clergy, not in one Church only, but in every evangelical communion. The four parts deal with (i.) The Modern Minister; (ii.) The Minister as Leader in Worship; (iii.) The Minister as Preacher; (iv.) The Minister as Pastor.]

- 58 *Mangenot (E.)* Les soi-disant antécédents juifs de la sainte Eucharistie.

R. du Clergé français, Feb. 15, 1909.

[Describes the recent theories of Box and others, and rejects them. These writers have made an error in the interpretation of the Mishna, and by joining to the true Kiddush (which was a special ceremony for feast-days) a blessing of the bread, which was a daily custom, they have created an imaginary Kiddush which bears some resemblance to the Last Supper, and have quite wrongly supposed their original identity.]

- 56 *M'Kenna (P.)* The Tribunal of Penance. Irish Theol. Quar., Jan. 1909.

- D DOCTRINE** 10 .. *God*, 22 .. *Christ*, 60 .. *Eschatology*, 70 .. *Faith*, 90 .. *Apologetics*.

- Mathews (S.)* A Positive Method for an Evangelical Theology.

Amer. J. Th., Jan. 1909.

- Mackintosh (H. R.)* The Unio Mystica as a Theological Conception.

Expos., Feb. 1909.

[The mystical union with Christ is vital in St Paul and especially in St John, and is the fundamental idea in the theory of redemption. The union is inclusive of, but transcends, the moral.]

- 2 *Herbermann (C. G.) and Others, Ed.* The Catholic Encyclopedia: An International Work of Reference on the Constitution, Doctrine, Discipline, and History of the Catholic Church. Vol. iv. Claud-

Diocesan. 814p.

Caxton Publishing Co., 1908.

- Perrier (J. Louis)* The True God of Scholasticism. J. of Phil., Dec. 17, 1908.

[God, according to scholasticism, is not a general manager who directs his business from a distance. He takes care of the minutest events of the world.]

- MacRory (J.)* Loisy's Theories in the Light of his Later Writings.

Irish Theol. Quar., Jan. 1909.

[“Not the Catholic Church alone, but every Christian Church and sect of whatever shade, would be the merest sham if Loisy's views were

correct. If Christ were not God, if He did not die for man's salvation, if He founded no Church and instituted no sacraments, what solid reason can be given or defence made for the existence of any Christian institution?"

Dubois (F.) La vérité du Catholicisme. V. L'Évangile et le dogme.

R. du Clergé français, Feb. 1, 1909.

[Defending, against Loisy, "the Catholic conception which derives dogma from the Gospel."]

Egerton (Hakluyt) Father Tyrrell's Modernism: An Expository Criticism of "Through Scylla and Charybdis" in an open letter to Mr Athelstan Riley. 216p.

Kegan Paul, 1909.

[Criticises what is taken to be the Modernist's central doctrine—that revelation is "experience" not "statement."]

Johnston (J. S.) Sabatier's "Modernism." Interpreter, Jan. 1909.

[Writer discerns in Modernism a tendency towards drawing a sharp distinction between "historical truth" and what is called "faith-truth." Another tendency shows itself in a species of Pragmatism, an inclination to place "judgments of value" above standards of truth.]

Henslow (G.) The Vulgate: The Source of False Doctrines. 151p.

Williams & Norgate, 1909.

[Object to show that, since the knowledge of the Bible in the early centuries of our era was based entirely upon the Vulgate, a familiarity with the Greek language being in abeyance, this Latin version supplied nearly all the terms required for ecclesiastical doctrines.]

3 *Round (J. Horace)* A New Anglican Argument. Cont. R., Jan. 1909.

[Deals with Dr Henry Gee's paper on "The Continuity of the Anglican Church" at the last Church Congress.]

5 *Selbie (W. B.)* Historic Fact and Christian Doctrine. Cont. R., Feb. 1909.

[It was the force of the personality of Christ which originated the Christian Church, and has transformed and inspired men and women all through its history. The history of the Person is not confined to the few years that Jesus spent on earth, but is spread over the ages, and is to be studied in the results it has produced. In estimating it we must believe, as Emerson puts it, "what the years and the centuries say against the hours."]

17 *May (Joseph)* Miracles and Myths of the New Testament. 144p. P. Green, 1908.

[Rejects the miraculous.]

26 *Foley (George Cadwalader)* Anselm's Theory of the Atonement. (Bohlen Lectures, 1908.) 342p. Longmans, 1909.

[Primary purpose of this study is negative, to exhibit the lack of authority for the theory framed by the Reformation divines. Contains a full exposition and detailed criticism of *Cur Deus Homo*.]

27 *Robinson (C. H.)* Studies in the Resurrection of Christ. 160p. Longmans, 1909.

[A concise examination of the evidence for and against the Resurrection by the editorial secretary of the S.P.G.]

29 *Naylor (T.)* Light on the Advent. 187p. Elliot Stock, 1909.

[The thesis is that "the advent, or second coming of the Messiah, took place, in fulfilment of prophecy, at the end of the siege and destruction of Jerusalem and its magnificent temple by the Romans (A.D. 70)."]

60 *Oesterley (W. O. E.)* The Doctrine of Last Things, Jewish and Christian. 244p.

Murray, 1908.

[Written for working or for lay readers interested in theology, of which the main object is to study, with illustrative quotations, the eschatological

teaching (i.) in the O.T., (ii.) in the Apocryphical literature, (iii.) in Rabbinical literature.]

65 *Thompson (John Day)* The Doctrine of Immortality: Its Essence, Relativity, and Present-day Aspects. (Hartley Lecture, 1907.) 277p. Edwin Dalton, 1909.

[Argues for Pre-existence and Re-incarnation.]

Holmes (E. E.) Immortality. 335p.

Longmans, 1908.

[A thoughtful working-out of the Churches' doctrine of immortality. The book contains much that will be helpful to the laymen for whom it is intended.]

Burney (C. F.) Israel's Hope of Immortality. Four lectures. 105p.

Frowde, 1909.

[An attempt to trace with some amount of exactitude the growth of a belief in a future life in the religion of Israel.]

Potter (Beresford) Some Christian Conceptions of Immortality and Resurrection in the Ancient Egyptian Religion.

Interpreter, Jan. 1909.

Stead (W. T.) How I know that the Dead return. Fort. R., Jan. 1909.

[Gives instances from personal experience of a class of messages for which telepathy from incarnate minds, conscious or unconscious, cannot account.]

Bascom (J.) Immortality.

Biblioth. Sacra, Jan. 1909.

80 *Richmond (Wilfrid)* The Creed in the Epistles. 135p. Methuen, 1909.

[A survey of the Creed of the first age of the Church as exhibited in the early epistles of St Paul.]

E ETHICS. 6 *Christian Ethics*, 7-9 *Transition to General Ethics*, 10 *Theories*, 20 *Applied Ethics*, *Sociology*, 23 *Economics*, 27 *Education*.

10 *Guskar (H.)* Der Utilitarismus bei Mill und Spencer in kritischer Beleuchtung.

Arch. f. system. Phil., N.F., xv. 1, 1909.

[A real basis for the truly empirical treatment of ethics is only to be found speculatively in the life of impulse in man. It is reason that transforms animal impressions into ideas, and raises them into conscious determinations of the will.]

Tichý (Gustav) Altruismus und Gerechtigkeit.

Arch. f. system. Phil., N.F., xiv. 4, 1908.

Rauh (F.) L'expérience morale.

Rev. de Méta. et de Morale, Jan. 1909.

[Preface to the second edition of the author's book under this title.]

Müller-Freienfels (Richard) Die Bedeutung des Aesthetischen für die Ethik.

Vierteljahrssch. f. wiss. Phil., xxxii. 4, 1909.

[Author distinguishes three main kinds of effect which aesthetic influences have upon the moral conditions of life—called by him the *auflockernde*, the *auswählende*, and the *befreiende*.]

Aars (Kristian B. R.) Der Hass und die Liebe.

Arch. f. system. Phil., N.F., xiv. 3, 1908.

Dugas (L.) L'antipathie dans ses rapports avec le caractère.

Rev. Phil., March 1909.

Hilferding (O.) Die Ehre: Ihr Wesen und ihre Bedeutung im Leben.

Arch. f. system. Phil., N.F., xv. 1, 1909.

Deploige (S.) Le conflit de la morale et de la sociologie (*suite*).

Rev. Néo-Scholastique, Feb. 1909.

- Jones (E. E. Constance)* A Primer of Ethics. 109p. Murray, 1909.
[A brief Introduction, based largely on Sidgwick.]
- 20 *Racz (Ludwig)* Die Rechtsphilosophie in Ungarn.
Arch. f. system. Phil., N.F., xv. 1, 1909.
- Whetham (W. C. D.)* Inheritance and Sociology. 19th Cent., Jan. 1909.
- Trotter (W.)* Sociological Applications of the Psychology of Herd Instinct. Sociological R., Jan. 1909.
- Barnett (S. A.) and Mrs Barnett.* Towards Social Reform. 352p. Unwin, 1909.
[See p. 684.]
- Reason (Will)* Poverty. Preface by L. G. Chiozza Money. (Social Service Series.) 175p. Headley Brothers, 1909.
- Bosanquet (Helen)* The Poor Law Report of 1909. 270p. Macmillan, 1909.
[A summary, explaining the defects of the present system and the principal recommendations of the Commission, so far as relates to England and Wales.]
- Good (T.)* Unemployment from the "Unemployed" Point of View. 19th Cent., Jan. 1909.
- Gide (C.)* Les contrats de travail. Le Christianisme social, Jan. 1909.
[Discusses work and wages' contracts between capital and labour.]
- Urwick (E. J.)* Causes and Remedies of Unemployment. Church Q. R., Jan. 1909.
- Beveridge (W. H.)* Unemployment: A Problem of Industry. 333p. Longmans, 1909.
[A course of lectures delivered in Oxford during the Michaelmas term, 1908.]
- Hobson (J. A.)* The Psychology of Public Business Enterprise. Sociological R., Jan. 1909.
- Savage (G. H.)* The Control of the Feeble-Minded. Quar. R., Jan. 1909.
[With reference to the Report of the Royal Commission.]
- National Social Purity Crusade.* The Cleansing of a City. 177p. Greening, 1908.
[Essays by clergy of all denominations on how best to safeguard purity of thought and deed during the perilous years of adolescence.]
- Barry (W.)* The Censorship of Fiction. Dub. R., Jan. 1909.
- Passy (P.)* Christianisme et Socialisme. Le Christianisme social, Jan. 1909.
[1st art. "There is a striking harmony between the two—of which one appears to be the transposition of the other into the material order."]
- Anon.* Catholic Social Work in Germany. III. Organisation and Method. Dub. R., Jan. 1909.
- Belloc (Hilaire)* The Measure of National Wealth. Dub. R., Jan. 1909.
- Dacey (A. V.)* Woman Suffrage. Quar. R., Jan. 1909.
[Deals largely with Mill's arguments.]
- 27 *Barth (Paul)* Die Geschichte der Erziehung in soziologischer Beleuchtung VII. Vierteljahrssch. f. wiss. Phil., xxxi. 4, 1909.
[Deals with the condition of social classes in the time of the Renaissance and Reformation, with the spiritual significance of Italian Humanism, and its influence upon the theory and practice of education.]
- Delvolvé (J.)* Conditions d'une doctrine morale éducative (suite). Rev. de Méta. et de Morale, Jan. 1909.
- Winch (W. H.)* A Modern Basis for Educational Theory. Mind, Jan. 1909.
- Andrews (C. F.)* Indian Higher Education. I. A Criticism. Hindustan R., Jan. 1909.
[Condemns the neglect of the Indian inheritance and of Indian ideals.]
- ## F PASTORALIA. 2 Sermons.
- Findlay (G. G.)* Fellowship in the Life Eternal. 431p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1908.
- Tucker (Horace Finn)* Light for Lesser Days. 275p. Elliot Stock, 1909.
[Studies of the Saints. Readings, Meditations, Devotions, and Illustrations for the minor festivals commemorated in the English Calendar.]
- Corbet (Rowland W.)* Letters from a Mystic of the Present Day. 4th ed. 231p. Elliot Stock, 1908.
- 2 *Peile (James H. F.)* Ecclesia Discens: The Church's Lesson from the Age. 311p. Longmans, 1909.
[Sermons and essays, connected by a common thought, that the Church, which somehow seems to have lost the right and power to teach the world, has now to learn from it, if nothing else, at least how to become its teacher again.]
- Ellis (Percy Ansley)* Old Beliefs and Modern Believers. 191p. Andrew Melrose, 1909.
[Ten sermons by the Vicar of St Mary's, Westminster. The purpose is to deepen the conviction that the essential truths of Christianity appeal to every eye, and are not identified with the modes of apprehending them which belong to any passing generation.]
- Horder (W. Garrett)* The Other-World. 199p. Macmillan, 1908.
[A number of sermons designed to clear away unreal ideas as to the nature of the Other-World and to establish ethically tenable ones in their place.]
- Goodman (J. H.)* The Chambers of Imagery, and other Sermons. (Methodist Pulpit Library.) 246p. Culley, 1909.
- Levis (F. Warburton)* The Work of Christ. (Methodist Pulpit Library.) 203p. Culley, 1908.
[Seventeen sermons preached at Holly Park Church, Crouch Hill.]
- Talbot (E. Stuart)* The Fulness of Christ. Three Sermons preached before the University of Oxford, and other Papers. 73p. Macmillan, 1908.
- Gollancz (Hermann)* Sermons and Address. 661p. Unwin, 1909.
[Given to Jewish audiences chiefly at the Bayswater Synagogue.]
- Mackay (D. S.)* The Religion of the Threshold, and other Sermons. 377p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1909.
- ## G BIOGRAPHY. 2 English.
- Mitchell (H. B.)* Swedenborg or the Mystic? Theosoph. Quar., Jan. 1909.
- Phillimore (J. S.)* Eugène Fromentin. Dub. R., Jan. 1909.
- 1 *Charmes (F.) and Houssaye (H.)* Marcelin Berthelot. R. du Clergé français, Feb. 15, 1909.
[Discourses pronounced at the French Academy on the election of the former to Berthelot's seat, giving a critical estimate of the man and his work.]

2 *Fleming (D. Hay)* John Howie of Lochgoon. Princeton Th. R., Jan. 1909. [The "works and the forebears" of the author of *The Scots Worthies*.]

MacVannell (J. Angus) Edward Caird.

J. of Phil., Dec. 3, 1908.

[Caird was less original than either Jowett or Green, but was able through a unique power of assimilation to interpret Hegel more truly to English readers.]

Fishe (Marian H.) My Father's Business; or, A Brief Sketch of the Life and Work of Agnes Gibson. 80p.

China Inland Mission, 1908.

[A record of missionary work in China.]

Hamond (Mrs.) A Fruitful Ministry: A Memoir of the Life of the Rev. Robert Henry Hamond. 289p. Thynne, 1909.

Garratt (Evelyn R.) Life and Personal Recollections of Samuel Garratt. 325p. Nisbet, 1909.

[The late Canon Garratt carried on a remarkable ministry, first in London, then for twenty-eight years at Ipswich.]

Brown (George) Autobiography. Pioneer, Missionary, and Explorer. 536p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1908.

H HISTORY. x Persecutions C Christian M Medieval R Modern 2 English.

Ker (William Paton) On the Philosophy of History. Address to Historical Society of University of Glasgow. 25p.

Maclehose, 1909.

[Lays emphasis upon the sound critical judgment of Hegel and upon the value of his conception of history.]

V *Adeney (Walter F.)* The Greek and Eastern Churches. (International Theological Library.) 648p. T. & T. Clark, 1908.

[Part i. traces the history of the main body of the Church throughout the Eastern provinces of Christendom, until by losing one limb after another this is seen to become more and more limited in area, although still claiming to be the one orthodox Church. In Part ii. there is taken up the stories of the separate Churches.]

C *Maude (J. H.)* The Foundations of the English Church. (Handbooks of English Church History.) 244p. Methuen, 1909.

[The six chapters deal with (i.) The Celtic Church, (ii.) Augustine and the Roman Mission, (iii.) Aidan and the Scotch Mission, (iv.) The Conference at Whitby and the Great Plague, (v.) Theodore and the Work of Consolidation, (vi.) The Eighth Century.]

Crutwell (C. T.) The Saxon Church and the Norman Conquest. (Handbooks of Church History.) 284p. Methuen, 1909.

[From Eggebeht to Henry I.]

Ramsay (Sir W. M.) A Laodicean Bishop. Expos., Dec. 1908.

[A discussion for the elucidation of the various problems arising from the epitaph of the Lycian fourth-century bishop, Eugenius.]

Gregory (C. R.) The Reading of Scripture in the Church in the Second Century.

Amer. J. Th., Jan. 1909.

[Critical note on Paul Glaue's *Die Vorlesung heiliger Schriften im Gottesdienste*.]

Albe (E.) La vie et les miracles de S. Amator. Anal. Boll., tom. xxviii. fasc. 1.

[Introduction and text.]

Albertz (M.) Zur Geschichte der jung-arianischen Kirchen-gemeinschaft.

Th. St. u. Krit., Heft 2, 1909.

[I.e. of the Arian body who followed Aetius and Eunomius.]

Lanzoni (F.) Le origini del cristianesimo e dell' episcopato nell' Etruria Romana (concluded).

Riv. stor.-crit. d. Scienze Teolog., Jan. 1909.

Loofs (F.) Zur Synode von Sardica.

Th. St. u. Krit., Jan. 1909.

Manucci (U.) La topografia cristiana di Cosma Indicopleuste e l' insegnamento teologico nella Scuola Antiochena.

Riv. stor.-crit. d. Scienze Teolog., Jan. 1909.

Ottolenghi (R.) Problemi della primitiva storia cristiana. Ccenobium, Jan. 1909.

[Reply to Professor Labanca's criticism of the author's extreme negative position in biblical criticism.]

Sternberg (G.) Das Christentum des fünften Jahrhunderts im Spiegel der Schriften des Salvianus von Massilia (conclusion). Th. St. u. Krit., Heft 2, 1909.

Vogt (A.) Vie de S. Luc le Stylite.

Anal. Boll., tom. xxviii. fasc. 1.

[Introduction and text.]

R *Maes (L.)* Lettres inédites d'André Schott. Le Muséon, vol. ix., No. 4.

[Correspondence with Hugo Grotius, Gervatius, and others.]

MacCaffrey (James) Dr Gairdner and the Reformation in England.

Irish Theol. Quar., Jan. 1909.

Anon. Venice and the Renaissance.

Edin. R., Jan. 1909.

I INDIVIDUAL CHURCHES AND WRITERS. C Fathers 2 R.C. Church 3 Anglican.

C *Slack (S. E.)* Early Christianity. (Religions, Ancient and Modern.) 104p. Constable & Co., 1908.

[A very useful and carefully written little book, making use of the results of the study of comparative religion and of recent archaeological research in the East—especially in Egypt.]

Stalker (J.) Studies in Conversion. I. Justin Martyr. Expos., Feb. 1909.

Jenkins (C.) Note on a Reading in Eusebius's *Ecclesiastical History*, i. 2.

J. Th. St., Jan. 1909.

Turner (C. H.) Notes on the Text of Origen's Commentary on 1 Corinthians.

J. Th. St., Jan. 1909.

2 *O'Neill (H. C.), Ed.* New Things and Old in Saint Thomas Aquinas: A Translation of various Writings and Treatises of the Angelic Doctor, with an introduction. 328p. Dent, 1909.

[A useful series of selections.]

Douais (Mgr. J.) Encore l'Inquisition: La peine de mort pour hérésie et l'Eglise incompétente.

R. prat. d'Apologét., Jan. 15, 1909.

[A letter to an inquirer. The Bishop affirms that the Church did not and could not condemn to death.]

Morison (J. L.), Ed. Reginald Pecock's Book of Faith: A Fifteenth-Century Theological Tractate. Edited from the MS. in the Library of Trinity College, Cambridge, with an introductory essay. 315p. Maclehose, 1909.

Van Ortoy (F.) Une nouvelle histoire de la Compagnie de Jésus.

Anal. Boll., tom. xxviii, fasc. 1.
[Account of three volumes of the History now being written by members of the Society.]

Ward (Mgr.) English Catholics in the Eighteenth Century. Dub. R., Jan. 1909.

3 *Anon.* The Death of Clergy.

Church Q. R., Jan. 1909.
[Finds the prime cause not in the Archbishop of Canterbury's committee's "financial reasons," but in theological unrest. Some practical suggestions are made.]

Anon. The Ornaments Rubric, legally and historically considered.

Church Q. R., Jan. 1909.
[Neither the Injunctions of 1559 nor the Advertisements of 1566 were the "taking of further order" forbidding the vestments of 1549; and even if they were, the deliberate introduction of the present rubric overrides them. In law, vestments are obligatory; in practice, all that is possible is their permissive and regulated use.]

Anon. Presbyterianism and Reunion.

Church Q. R., Jan. 1909.
[This could be effected by following the precedent of 1610, when three Presbyterian ministers were made bishops without previous ordination as deacons or priests. The bishops would become presidents of the General Assembly, all other features of government remaining unchanged.]

4 *Doumergue (E.)* Calvin: An Epigone of the Middle Ages or an Initiator of Modern Times? Princeton Th. R., Jan. 1909.

[Claims Calvin as a formative influence in our modern development, against what he calls the Lutheran bias of Ritschlian writers.]

5 *MacLagan (Robert Craig)* Religio Scotica: Its Nature as traceable in Scotie Saintly Tradition. 241 p.

Schulze, Edinburgh, 1909.

8 *Milton (John)* On the Son of God and the Holy Spirit. From treatise *On Christian Doctrine*. Introduction by Alexander Gordon. 147p.

British and Foreign Unitarian Assoc., 1908.

L LITERATURE. 2 *English* 3 *German*
5 *Italian* 9 *Classical*.

2 *Austin (Alfred)* Milton and Dante: A Comparison and a Contrast.

Quar. R., Jan. 1909.

Paul (Herbert) Milton.

19th Cent., Jan. 1909.

V *Anon.* Henry Irving.

Edin. R., Jan. 1909.

Escott (T. H. S.) The Works of Anthony Trollope.

Quar. R., Jan. 1909.

Cook (E. T.) and Wedderburn (A.), Ed. The Letters of John Ruskin. (Library Edition of Ruskin's Works, xxxvi. and xxxvii.) Vol. i. (1827-1869), 706p. Vol. ii. (1870-1889), 757p.

George Allen, 1909.

[Most of the letters appear for the first time.]

W *E. M. D.* The Writings of W. W. B. Yeats.

Fort. R., Feb. 1909.

Young (Filson) The New Poetry.

Fort. R., Jan. 1909.

[A very appreciative estimate of the poetry of John Davidson.]

Newbolt (H.) A New Departure in English Poetry.

Quar. R., Jan. 1909.

[A very appreciative article on Mr Hardy's poem, "The Dynasts."]

Tau. English Literature and the Indian Student. Cont. R., Feb. 1909.

Lawson (Robb) The Psychology of Acting. Fort. R., March 1909.

3 *Meyer (R. M.)* German Literature. Cont. R., Jan. 1909.

[Compares English and German conceptions of the nature of poetry and romance.]

4 *Kettle (T. M.)* The Fatigue of Anatole France. Fort. R., Feb. 1909.

Anon. The Novels of M. René Bazin.

Church Q. R., Jan. 1909.

[A sympathetic notice.]

5 *Reade (W. H. V.)* The Moral System of Dante's *Inferno*. 445p. Frowde, 1909.

[Review will follow.]

9 *Zimmerman (A. E.)* Was Greek Civilisation based on Slave Labour?

Sociological R., Jan. 1909.

[It is necessary to distinguish sharply between two sorts of slavery—chattel-slavery and apprentice-slavery. Both forms existed in the Greek city-state; but the evidence seems to show that apprentice-slavery predominated.]

Grundty (G. B.) Herodotus the Historian. Quar. R., Jan. 1909.

[With reference to Dr Macan's volumes on the last three books of Herodotus.]

M RELIGIONS. MYTHOLOGY. 4

Hinduism. 7 *Judaism.* 9 *Demonology.*

12 *Occultism.*

De Jong (K. H. E.) Das antike Mysterienwesen in religionsgeschichtlicher ethnologischer und psychologischer Beleuchtung. 372p. Brill, 1909.

Frazer (J. G.) Psyche's Task: A Discourse Concerning the Influence of Superstition on the Growth of Institutions. 93p. Macmillan, 1909.

[Review will follow.]

King (Irving) Some Notes on the Evolution of Religion. Phil. R., Jan. 1909.

[Beginning with fetishism, religions are said to pass through animism, naturalism, higher pantheism, henotheism, and ethical monotheism. All such schemes have a rough and ready merit, but at best they fail to take into account the great complexity of the data involved.]

Le Roy (A.) La Religion des Primitifs. (Études sur l'Histoire des Religions, I.) 525p. Beauchesne, 1909.

Harrison (Jane E.) The Divine Right of Kings. Fort. R., Jan. 1909.

[Attempts to estimate the import of the fact that kings were anciently accounted gods not by the ancient Greeks alone, but by primitive peoples pretty well all over the world.]

Johnston (C.) Natural Psychological and Spiritual Bodies.

Theosophical Quar., Jan. 1909.

[Translation, with introduction, of "Gaudapada's poem on the Mandukya Upanishad."]

Mather (J. S.) A Rationalistic View of the Arya Samaj. Vedic Mag., vol. ii. No. 7.

Keightley (A.) Theosophy as an Influence in Life. Theosoph. Quar., Jan. 1909.

Raleigh (Sir T.) The Mind of the East.

Church Q. R., Jan. 1909.

[An interpretation of Indian thought and customs.]

Waite (A. E.) The Hidden Church of the Holy Grail. 714p. Rebmam, 1908.

[An elaborate investigation of the Grail legend, and its connection with a "Hidden Church of Sacramental Mystery."]

7. *Schechter (S.)* Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology. 406p. Macmillan, 1909.
Gollancz (Hermann) The Targum to "The Song of Songs"; The Book of the Apple; The Ten Jewish Martyrs; A Dialogue on Games of Chance. Translated from the Hebrew and Aramaic. 219p. Luzac, 1908.

Isaacs (A. S.) What is Jewish Literature? Biblioth. Sacra, Jan. 1909.

Bricout (J.) Chez les Israélites français. L'Union libérale israélite.

R. du Clergé français, Jan. 15, 1909.

[Liberal Judaism, under its Hebraic forms, is theism, organised as a religion.]

9. *Thompson (R. Campbell)* Semitic Magic: Its Origin and Development. 354p. Luzac, 1908.

Leuba (J. H.) Magic and Religion.

Sociological R., Jan. 1909.

[Supports two theses: (1) the primary forms of Magic probably antedated Religion; (2) whether Magic antedated Religion or not, Religion arose independently of Magic; they are different in principle and independent in origin.]

12. *Harris (J. Rendel)* The Cult of the Heavenly Twins. Cont. R., Jan. 1909.

[What gives its real importance to the study of the Cult of the Twins lies not in the conservatism of seafaring men, but in the more striking tenacity of ecclesiastics of a certain type, who drink in paganism as if it were their native air.]

Podmore (Frank) The Pedigree of Christian Science. Cont. R., Jan. 1909.

[Endeavours to determine the reasons of Mrs Eddy's influence.]

Schofield (A. T.) Spiritual Healing.

Cont. R., March 1909.

[Deals with the matter from the standpoint of a medical man. "There does reside in some persons a remarkable therapeutic agency, the cause of which I would suggest is, that by some unconscious means, and without effort, they are enabled to reach and stimulate the curative power resident in the patient."]

Newcomb (Simon) Modern Occultism.

19th Cent., Jan. 1909.

- P PHILOSOPHY. 10. *Metaphysics*, 21 *Epistemology*, 33. *Psychical Research*, 40. *Psychology*, 60. *Logic*, 70. *Systems*, 90. *Philosophers*.

Stein (Ludwig) Philosophische Strömungen der Gegenwart. 468p. Enke, 1908.

Koigen (David) Jahresbericht über die Literatur zur Metaphysik, VI. (Fortsetzung).

Arch. f. system. Phil., N.F., xiv. 4, 1908. [Deals mainly with Rickert's Philosophy of History.]

Zieleńczyk (A.) Ein Abschnitt aus der polnischen Philosophie der Gegenwart.

Arch. f. system. Phil., N.F., xiv. 3, 1908.

Léon (Xavier), Ed. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale. Numéro exceptionnel. 393p. Colin, Nov. 1908.

[Contains the papers in full of the French contributors to the International Congress at Heidelberg, and also a report of the proceedings of the sections and general meetings. The number opens with Boutroux's memoir on Philosophy in France since 1867.]

Mittenzwey (Kuno) Der III. internationale Philosophenkongress.

Vierteljahrssch. f. wiss. Phil., xxxii. 4, 1909.

[Gives a good epitome of Windelband's address on the conception of law, and of the discussion

thereon. The debate on Pragmatism the writer characterises as a complete waste of time.]

Leard (Henri) Le troisième congrès international de Philosophie.

Rev. de Phil., Feb. 1909.

[Refers particularly to the contributions of Royce, Croce, Boutroux, Windelband, and Maier.]

Armstrong (A. C.) The Third International Congress of Philosophy.

Phil. R., Jan. 1909.

[Refers especially to the addresses of Windelband, Royce, Boutroux, and Maier at Heidelberg.]

10. *Read (Carveth)* The Metaphysics of Nature. 2nd ed., with appendices. 385p. Black, 1908.

Wendel (Georg) Metaphysische Ausblicke.

Arch. f. system. Phil., N.F., xv. 1, 1909.

[Combines Kant's view of phenomena with Spinoza's conception of Attributes. The world of phenomena is as it were only one side of the thing in itself, but this may have, in Spinoza's phraseology, an infinite number of other attributes, wholly unknown to us.]

Gaultier (Jules de) Les deux erreurs de la Métaphysique. Rev. Phil., Feb. 1909.

11. *Norström (Vitalis)* Naives und wissenschaftliches Weltbild, II.

Arch. f. system. Phil., N.F., xiv. 4, 1908.

[A complete and satisfying scientific representation of the world will only be obtained when the explanation of personality from nature is supplemented by the explanation of nature from personality.]

Overstreet (H. A.) Change and the Changeless. Phil. R., Jan. 1909.

[Change may be conceived as of a kind consistent with thorough wholeness of life: we find a suggestion of such change in creative work. Creative work in its perfection means unhindered self-expression; and there is no contradiction in attributing such work to perfect being.]

12. *Wendel (Georg)* Prolegomena.

Arch. f. system. Phil., N.F., xiv. 4, 1908.

[Discusses the relation of the special sciences and the various branches of philosophy to philosophy.]

Stein (Ludwig) Das Problem der Geschichte.

Arch. f. system. Phil., N.F., xiv. 3, 1908.

[Lays emphasis upon the great influence of Windelband's address on "History and Science."]

Lifschitz (F.) Zur Kritik des Relativismus. (Aus einer Methodologie der Wirtschaftswissenschaft.)

Arch. f. system. Phil., N.F., xiv. 3, 1908.

[Relativism and dogmatism are not in fact antithetical. The doctrine that all is relative is in truth the most thorough-going dogmatic principle that was ever formulated.]

13. *Biddlecombe (A.)* Thoughts on Natural Philosophy (with a new reading of Newton's first Law); and The Origin of Life. 32p. Ward & Sons, 1909.

Ignotus. Suggestions for a Physical Theory of Evolution, I. Fort. R., Feb. 1909.

Rossignoli (C. G.) Le potenze dell'anima esistono?

R. d. filosof. neo-scol., Jan. 1909.

Driesch (Hans) The Science and Philosophy of the Organism. (Gifford Lectures before University of Aberdeen, 1908.) Vol. ii. 397p. Black, 1908.

Anon. Biological Problems of To-day.

Edin. R., Jan. 1909.

[Deals with the Mutation theory, the group of facts known by the name of Mendelism, and the question of the inheritance of acquired characters.]

Wallace (Alfred Russel) The World of Life as visualised and interpreted by Darwinism. Fort. R., March 1909.

[Neither Darwinism nor any other theory in science or philosophy can give more than a secondary explanation of phenomena. Some deeper power or cause always has to be postulated. Beyond and above all terrestrial agencies there is some great source of *energy and guidance*, which in unknown ways pervades every form of organised life, and of which we ourselves are the ultimate and fore-ordained outcome.]

Pettigrew (J. Bell) Design in Nature. Illustrated by nearly 2000 figures, largely original and from Nature. Three vols. 1467p. Longmans, 1908.

[Endeavours to explain that in plants and animals there is gradation and advance from lower to higher forms, according to a gradually ascending scale, as apart from evolution.]

15 *Rechenberg-Linten (Paul von)* Die Zeit. Arch. f. system. Phil., N.F., xv. 1, 1909. [Inquires as to whether time is only a form of thought, or whether it is also a reality of the external world.]

16 *Duhem (P.)* Le mouvement absolu et le mouvement relatif (Appendice). Rev. de Phil., Feb. and Mar. 1909.

17 *Gomer (A. de)* Ame et matière. Rev. de Phil., Mar. 1909.

19 *Haldane (R. B.)* The Logical Foundations of Mathematics. Mind, Jan. 1909.

[Replies to B. Russell's strictures on the Address to Aristotelian Society. It is not true that the processes even of pure mathematics are only concerned with mere logical conceptions. Whether we look at the methods of Euclid or at those of Dedekind and Cantor, they start from actual concrete images and proceed by making abstraction from all, or as much as possible, that is not relevant to their purpose.]

Voss (A.) Ueber das Wesen der Mathematik. 98p. Teubner, 1908.

21 *Bergson (H.)* Le souvenir du présent et la fausse reconnaissance. Rev. Phil., Dec. 1909.

[A criticism of current explanations of the illusion that one is reliving some instants of one's past life, and an interpretation of the phenomenon as a result of the interplay of perception and memory under conditions of a lowered tone of attention to life.]

Bradley (F. H.) On Our Knowledge of Immediate Experience. Mind, Jan. 1909.

[Asks how "immediate experience" is able to know itself and to become for us an object. The answer is:—"When my object is increased and the addition comes from that which was and is felt, there is, in such a case, first, a positive sense of expansion and of accord. And there is, next, an absence of the feeling of complete otherness and newness. We have not here quite the same experience as when the object is increased from the undistinguished not-self, but we have an experience more or less similar."]

Fonsegrive (G.) Certitude et vérité, III. and IV.

Rev. de Phil., Dec. 1908 and Jan. 1909. [Strongly criticises Pragmatism.]

Chovel (F.) Les principes premiers: leur origine et leur valeur objective.

Rev. de Phil., March 1909. [Discusses Fonsegrive's articles.]

Raff (Emil) Ueber die Formen des Denkens. Arch. f. system. Phil., N.F., xiv. 4, 1908.

[Maintains that "the Ego is that which stands in the way of knowledge of the Ego."]

Rey (Abel) L'énergétique et le mécanisme

au point de vue des conditions de la connaissance. 187p. Alcan, 1908.

Micault (H.) Sur de récents travaux de philosophie physique d'Abel Rey.

Rev. de Méta. et de Morale, Jan. 1909. *Devey (John)* Objects, Data, and Existences: A Reply to Professor M'Gilvary. J. of Phil., Jan. 7, 1909.

Losskij (N.) Thesen zur Grundlegung des Intuitivismus. Arch. f. system. Phil., N.F., xiv. 3, 1908.

Perry (Ralph Barton) The Hiddenness of the Mind. J. of Phil., Jan. 21, 1909.

[The mere fact that ideas are always included within some mind, and thereby excluded from what is altogether not that mind, contributes no evidence for the absolute privacy of mind.]

Canella (G.) Gli elementi di fatto per la soluzione del problema criteriologico fondamentale. R. d. filosof. neo-scol., Jan. 1909.

23 *Baumann (Julius)* Der Wissensbegriff. 239p. Winter, 1908.

Gabrilowitsch (Leonid) Ueber zwei wissenschaftliche Begriffe des Denkens. Arch. f. system. Phil., N.F., xvi., 1909.

[An able article on the distinction between the logical and psychological treatment of thought. Largely on the lines of Husserl, but introducing the Hegelian conception of an organic whole of reality.]

25 *Richard (P.)* La causalité instrumentale. Rev. Néo-Scholastique, Feb. 1909.

[An able discussion of the conception of causality as an instrument of activity in nature.]

Janssen (Otto) Gedanken über den empirischen Ursprung der Kausalität! Arch. f. system. Phil., N.F., xiv. 3, 1908.

33 *Boole (Mary Everest)* The Message of Psychic Science to the World. 281p. Daniel, 1909.

40 *Joachim (Harold H.)* Psychological Process. Mind, Jan. 1909.

[If by the distinction between "logical content" and "psychical process" it be meant to sever, *within my knowing X*, the *X known* from my *knowing*, and if the "psychical process" is such a severed process of knowing, then "psychical process" is either nothing at all, or at any rate nothing which I or anyone else can study.]

Beaunis (H.) Comment fonctionne mon cerveau: Essai de psychologie introspective. Rev. Phil., Jan. 1909.

Masder (A.) Une voie nouvelle en psychologie: Freud et son école. Conobium, Jan. 1909.

[Describes Freud's ideas, and gives analysis of a number of cases.]

Wundt (Wilhelm) Volkerpsychologie: Eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungsgesetze von Sprache, Mythos und Sitte. Bd. ii. Mythos und Religion. Dritter Teil. 804p. Engelmann, 1909.

[This volume consists of two long chapters on the *Naturmythos* and the *Ursprung der Religion*.]

42 *Seligmann (R.)* Zur Philosophie der Individualität. Arch. f. system. Phil., N.F., xv. 1, 1909.

[Every organism is an individual, and the most perfect organism known to us is self-consciousness or personality.]

48 *Gehring (Albert)* Racial Contrasts. 243p. Putnam's Sons, 1908.

[A study in race psychology made with the purpose of differentiating the moral, intellectual, and spiritual qualities revealed in the literature,

- life, and art of the Græco-Latin peoples from the characteristics of the Teutonic race as seen in the same fields.]
- Dugas (L.)* Psychologie et pédagogie ou science et art.
Rev. de Méta. et de Morale, Jan. 1909.
- 49 *Myers (Charles S.)* Text-book of Experimental Psychology. 448p.
Arnold, 1909.
[Professor Myers' book is designed to meet a keenly felt want. It contains a very full and accurate account of recent experimental work, and discusses the conclusions to which such research leads. The book will be indispensable to every student of psychology, as well as to the worker in the laboratory.]
- Sidis (Boris)* An Experimental Study of Sleep. 108p.
Badger, 1909.
- 53 *Judd (Charles H.)* What is Perception?
J. of Phil., Jan. 21, 1909.
[Defends the position that percepts do not contain revived elements in any such fashion as appears in the conventional discussions.]
- Judd (Charles H.)* Motor Processes and Consciousness. J. of Phil., Feb. 18, 1909.
[Unity of percepts and unity of ideas are phrases which describe an aspect of consciousness dependent on motor tendencies.]
- Tassy (E.)* De la connexion des idées.
Rev. Phil., Feb. 1909.
[Discussion of association by contiguity, resemblance, and contrast.]
- Beaupuy (P.)* Psychologie de la pensée.
Rev. de Phil., Jan. 1909.
[Considers the development from perception to conception, and discusses the function of images in thinking.]
- Spindler (Frank N.)* Some Thoughts on the Concept. J. of Phil., Dec. 3, 1908.
[A concept is more than merely a class notion, or a class idea, or a general idea; it involves complicated functionings, many unnoticed motor tendencies, and, especially, it involves and must have a name.]
- 57 *Marshall (H. Rutgers)* Algedonics and Sensationalism. J. of Phil., Jan. 7, 1909.
[Defends his view of pleasure-pain as against Titchener.]
- Judd (Charles H.)* The Doctrine of Attitudes. J. of Phil., Dec. 3, 1908.
[Defends the thesis that the feelings are more subjective than sensations and are closely related to complex subjective organisations or reactions of the individual upon his sensations.]
- 59 *Pikler (Julius)* Ueber Theodor Lipps' Versuch einer Theorie des Willens. 58p.
Barth, 1908.
Pikler (Julius) Zwei Vorträge über dynamische Psychologie. 26p. Barth, 1908.
- 60 *Urban (F. M.)* On a Supposed Criterion of the Absolute Truth of some Propositions. J. of Phil., Dec. 17, 1908.
[Discusses Royce's contention that a proposition is absolutely true if its denial implies the proposition.]
- 61 *Bubnoff (Nicolai von)* Das Wesen und die Voraussetzungen der Induktion. Kantstudien, xiii. 4, 1908.
[A careful study, in four parts, dealing with (i.) the general characteristic of the inductive methods, criticising the views of Erdmann; (ii.) the presuppositions of inductive procedure; (iii.) the problem of the irreversibility of natural laws; (iv.) induction in history.]
- 69 *Chide (A.)* La logique de l'analogie.
Rev. Phil., Dec. 1908.
[Logicians usually regard analogy as of secondary importance, but it is involved in the establishment of all general notions whether of inductive or deductive logic.]
- Sageret (J.)* L'analogie scientifique.
Rev. Phil., Jan. 1909.
[Scientific theory, hypothesis, experience, observation, scientific fact and generalisation, synthetical and analytical progress in knowledge, —everything, in a word, in science, is traceable either directly or indirectly to analogy.]
- 72 *Prichard (H. A.)* Kant's Theory of Knowledge. 320p. Clarendon Press, 1909.
[An attempt to think out the nature and tenability of Kant's transcendental idealism, an attempt animated by the conviction that even the elucidation of Kant's meaning, apart from any criticism, is impossible, without a discussion on their own merits of the main issues which he raises. The standpoint of the author is that of a critical realism.]
- Hönigswald (Richard)* Zum Begriff der kritischen Erkenntnislehre. Kantstudien, xiii. 4, 1908.
[With special reference to Goswin Uphues' book *Kant und seine Vorgänger*. Whilst criticising Uphues' work, the author ascribes great value to it.]
- Wendel (Georg)* Kritik einiger Grundbegriffe des transzendentalen Idealismus. Arch. f. system. Phil., N.F., xiv. 3, 1908.
[Criticises Kant's separation of understanding and reason, and especially the distinction of knowledge and thought, which in truth are one and the same.]
- 74 *James (William)* Hébert's *Le Pragmatisme*. J. of Phil., Dec. 3, 1908.
[“The object, for me, is just as much one part of reality as the idea is another part. The truth of the idea is one relation of it to reality, just as its date and its place are other relations. All three relations consist of intervening parts of the universe which can in every particular case be assigned and catalogued.”]
- Huizinga (A. v. C. P.)* The American Philosophy of Pragmatism. Biblioth. Sacra, Jan. 1909.
Schinz (Albert) Anti-pragmatisme: Examen des droits respectifs de l'aristocratie intellectuelle et de la démocratie sociale. 309p. Alcan, 1909.
- Pratt (J. Bissett)* What is Pragmatism? 268p. Macmillan, 1909.
[An able criticism. “When the movement first began,” the writer says, “I was an enthusiastic pragmatist, and my enthusiasm lasted until I came to understand clearly what it really meant.” Author maintains that the “pragmatist” is at every point making use of the very conception of truth he is trying to refute; he is claiming for his doctrine the very kind of truth which he says is no truth at all.]
- Chiappelli (A.)* Naturalisme, humanisme et philosophie des valeurs. Rev. Phil., March 1909.
[Pleads for a Neo-Hegelianism which shall be enriched with all the ethical elements implied in the conception of an immanent end that is associated with voluntarism. The glory of man consists in the pursuit of virtue and knowledge, but not in possessing these in their entirety; otherwise every spiritual activity would be dead.]
- Lessing (Theodor)* Philosophie als Tat. Arch. f. system. Phil., N.F., xv. 1, 1909.
[The aim and purpose of all speculative philosophy should be ethical. But “Philosophie als Tat” is not to be identified with Positivism or Pragmatism. The doctrine that truth is that which works is the triviality of the “English common-sense” gone mad.]
- Doan (Frank C.)* An Outline of Cosmic Humanism. J. of Phil., Feb. 4, 1909.
[On the ground of known experience the humanist may insist (a) that the cosmos conceived as world-experience must be inwardly a

pure function, and (b) that in its initial processes of growth it was an inchoate matrix of perfectly plastic yet blind impulses-to-be.]

- 76 *Miranda (L.)* Il Positivismo de Roberto Ardigò. Cœnobium, Jan. 1909.

[It is the old sensationalism against which "the dissolving sceptical criticism of Hume is eternal."]

- 77 *Urguhart (W. S.)* The Pessimistic Tendency of Pantheism.

Cont. R., March 1909.

[Spinoza's philosophy destroys the springs of action within us, and at the same time we cannot see that action is unnecessary. Yet the felt need of action is but a mockery of our helplessness, and serves only to make us realise the weight of our fetters. We feel as if we were walking in a dream, lost in the emptiness of infinity, companionless on the earth, or wandering in a world of shades.]

- 79 *Sichler (Albert)* Ueber falsche Interpretation des kritischen Realismus Wundt's (Fortsetzung).

Arch. f. system. Phil., N.F., xiv. 3, 1908.

[Defends Wundt against criticisms of Maier and Külpe. Insists that according to Wundt the metaphysical conception of will is to be clearly distinguished from the conception of the will as a psychical fact.]

- 80 *Bakewell (C. M.)* Source Book in Ancient Philosophy. 395p. Unwin, 1909.

[Translated extracts from writers from Thales to Plotinus by the Professor of Philosophy at Yale.]

- 84 *Laguna (Theodore de)* The Interpretation of the *Apology*. Phil. R., Jan. 1909.

[Socrates stood to Plato as the very incarnation of the spirit of philosophy. To depict his personality meant to show to the world how a true philosopher had lived and died. The *Apology*, then, is an apology, not alone for the historical individual, but for the philosophical life.]

- 85 *Smith (J. A.) and Ross (W. D.), Eds.* The Works of Aristotle, translated into English. Vol. viii. Metaphysica. Trans. by W. D. Ross. xv+980a to 1093bp.

Clarendon Press, 1908.

[A very careful and scholarly piece of work that will be invaluable to philosophical students.]

- 89 *Deploige (S.)* La filosofia neo-scolastica et le science sociali.

R. d. filosof. neo-scol., Jan. 1909.

- Sentroul (C.)* Che cos'è la filosofia neo-scolastica? R. d. filosof. neo-scol., Jan. 1909.

[Discusses: (1) What is philosophy considered according to its purely ideal concept? (2) Which among the different philosophies is the true one? (3) In what relation does this true philosophy (i.e. the neo-scholastic) stand towards the other forms of truth, i.e. science in the natural order, and the Catholic faith in the supernatural order?]

- Picavet (F.)* Thomisme et philosophies médiévales.

Rev. Phil., Dec. 1903 and Jan. 1909.

- Belmond (Séraphin)* L'Être transcendant d'après Duns Scot. Rev. de Phil., Jan. 1909.

- 90 *Hoffmans (Hadelin)* La sensibilité d'après Roger Bacon.

Rev. Néo-Scholastique, Feb. 1909.

- 91 *Alexander (S.)* Locke. (Philosophies, Ancient and Modern.) 91p. Constable, 1908.

[Locke's philosophy is dealt with in a new and interesting light. It is insisted that Locke always uses the term "idea" for an object of mind. An "idea of sensation" is an idea supplied by sense; an "idea of reflection" is an act of perceiving, willing, thinking, or feeling, apprehended as an object. Locke's error lay in assigning to ideas a twilight existence between things and the mind.]

- Fraser (A. Campbell)* Berkeley and Spiritual Realism. (Philosophies, Ancient and Modern.) 96p. Constable, 1908.

[In this little volume Professor Fraser gives an account of Berkeley's life, and then deals with (i.) the material world and its natural order; (ii.) the human world and moral disorder; (iii.) God, or the Universal Mind, and Theistic Optimism. It is an excellent introduction to Berkeley's philosophy.]

- 93 *Spranger (Eduard)* Wilhelm von Humboldt und die Humanitätsidee. 516p.

Reuther & Reichard, 1908.

- 94 *Renouvier (Ch.) et Secrétan (Ch.)* Correspondance inédite.

Rev. de Méta. et de Morale, Jan. 1909.

[The correspondence is largely upon questions connected with the philosophy of religion.]

- Andler (Charles)* Le premier système de Nietzsche ou Philosophie de l'illusion.

Rev. de Méta. et de Morale, Jan. 1909.

[i. The Illusion of Knowledge; ii. The Illusion of Morality; iii. The Illusion of Art.]

- D'Aragona (R. G.)* L' "Estetica" di Benedetto Croce. Cœnobium, Jan. 1909.

- Le Corne (C.)* Les vues philosophiques d'un académicien, M. Henri Poincaré.

Rev. chrét., Feb. 1909.

V ART. 83 *Sacred Music.*

- Ellis (Havelock)* The Love of Wild Nature. Cont. R., Feb. 1909.

[The appeal of wild Nature can only be perfectly felt by men who are, by temperament and circumstance, rebels against the laws and conventions of their time. It is a passion that arises in ages of splendid individualism. We are drawn to-day to the more humanised and socialised forms of Nature, mixed with personal intercourse and deliberate art. We witness the revived love of beautiful gardens.]

- Martin (F.)* Chronique artistique: La question Van Eyck.

R. du Clergé français, Feb. 15, 1909.

[Seeks to answer the question as to who painted the great polyptych, the *Mystic Lamb*, the greater part of which is at the Church of S. Bavon at Ghent.]

- Ullitz (E.)* Grundzüge der aesthetischen Farbenlehre. 164p. Enke, 1908.

- 20 *Anon.* Græco-Roman and Roman Sculpture. Edin. R., Jan. 1909.

- 83 *Newman (Ernest)* Mendelssohn in 1909. Cont. R., Feb. 1909.

[Almost the whole of Mendelssohn is summed up in two typical works, one at the beginning and the other at the end of his career—the overture to the "Midsummer Night's Dream" (1826), and "Elijah" (1846).]

[NOTE.—For an explanation of the system of classification adopted in the Bibliography, readers are referred to HIBBERT JOURNAL, vol. i. p. 630 *sqq.*]

G. D. H. and J. H. W.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

RELIGIOUS LIFE AND THOUGHT IN GERMANY TO-DAY.¹

PROFESSOR HEINRICH WEINEL,
Jena.

At the end of the nineteenth century three essential influences were at work upon the intellectual and cultured life of Germany. The first was Natural Science — its character almost entirely materialist. It gave itself out as a comprehensive view of the world, was simplified and introduced to the people by a thousand busy hands, and became familiar to the masses. Its ethics were derived from Utilitarianism, which developed either along individualist and liberal lines, or else into Socialism. Side by side with this, Ultramontanism dominated a large section of the people — Ultramontanism and the old world-view of the Catholic Church. This influence operated through the power of the clergy, especially of the very active lower clergy, and by means of an electoral apparatus which worked with extraordinary certainty. Neither movement has won any noteworthy increase of life in recent years. The leaders belong already to a past generation. Marx and Ketteler, Liebknecht and Windhorst, are as men of another world to our own day; while even Bebel and Haeckel are, to their own age and its interests, survivals from

¹ *Religiöse Bestrebungen und Bewegungen in Deutschland.* Translation revised by the Author.

the seventieth year of the nineteenth century. They are no longer the leaders of the generation which lives and works. The third of the intellectual influences aforesaid was dominant among the youth of the nation, in so far as this had not fallen, really or apparently, into a neurotic and decadent condition. This was Individualism, whose most conspicuous leader was, not so much Nietzsche, as the strong man whom Nietzsche so bitterly hated—Bismarck. For Bismarck, although in his own person an old-fashioned and pietistic Christian, impressed his age as an incarnation of “the will to rule” (*Wille zur Macht*). Among the most refined of our generation, Individualism possessed a character of æsthetic and intellectual dignity, often a certain nobility; among the half-educated, who misunderstood Nietzsche, it frequently became vulgar and base. Nevertheless, it appeared to be the only possible mode of life at a time when the scepticism diffused throughout our educated classes had almost entirely undermined the old ethical values and their religious foundations.

For the evangelical churches in Germany—it is well known that we have more Churches than States—persisted, of course, in the old ways; but religious life had often withdrawn from them, and they counted for little in the intellectual life of the leaders of the nation. All the conservative elements of the national life, especially the nobles and the peasants, supported the Church as the guardian of what was established; at the same time, however, Pietism, which was constantly growing, and is thoroughly orthodox, took its line as “*Gemeinschafts bewegung*” (a separatistic methodistic movement) of the laity rather outside the Church—a line, indeed, thoroughly opposed to her interests. At the present moment this movement remains perhaps the most living element in the religious life of Germany; intellectually it is wholly retrograde, but in religion it is extremely pushing and active, indeed so modern that it gives us Germans quite an American tone. Its best preacher is Samuel Keller, who is a well-known author (Ernst Schrill). His antiquated view of the world, with devils, hell,

and a bodily resurrection, has an occasional appearance of being affected in so distinctly modern a man. Stoecker, who stood nearer to these circles—he died a few weeks ago—has remained much more closely bound to the Church, and has played a somewhat anti-pietistic part by taking a strongly political line, founding an anti-Semitic Christian-Socialist party, and engaging much more closely in current affairs than is usual with individualistic Pietism. But neither he nor Samuel Keller have any significance whatsoever in the intellectual life of Germany. They contribute nothing towards satisfying the needs of our educated people.

And an actual religious need has in the meantime taken shape. The jubilation over the gains of modern culture and the victories of science is becoming silent. We are looking around us with sobered eyes and counting the gains and losses of the mighty labours of the vanished century. And we recognise that our life has indeed become richer and more stirring by reason of all the good things which commerce and technical science have conferred; life has also become more secure, and easier even for the poorest. But the feeling exists that in reality we have not grown happier, nor inwardly richer, merely because we ride in trains and motors and are able in an instant to flash our thoughts through a wire from one end of the earth to another. Science grows continually more cautious and restrained, and feels her limits more intimately. She knows that the pretence of solving the "world-riddle" by her means alone is a mere echo of youthful enthusiasm; and only our half-educated public, which founded the "League of Monists" two years ago, now listens to cant of this kind. Earnest workers in all branches of science know how narrow is the circle of what can be scientifically proved and exactly defined.

In all quarters there is revealed a longing for new life-values, an aspiration towards what is eternal. A religious movement is waking into being, and men are longing for that deep, still happiness of the soul which can only be found in God—for strength, fulness, joy, health, such as blossom only in a life

wholly lived in the ideal. Needless to say, frivolity and stupidity are still plentiful, the pressure of old organisations of the churches, of the State, and of parties, powerful enough; while radical resentment is widely diffused—stronger, it may be, than the aspiration after that new life which is moving men's hearts. But that longing is an actually present fact even among the masses of Socialists and Ultramontanés. Even the Catholic Church has seen Modernism suddenly come forth into daylight—a movement which had matured in complete silence as a protest of the heart against the reign of Ultramontanism. In Switzerland, at least, Social Democracy has again found the way to church, since Kutter in Zürich, and others, have found the way to the deeper needs of the social democrats.

Idealism, long considered dead, is everywhere beginning to awake, and a rejuvenated and renewed Christianity is preparing to go forth among the people from venerable churches and from the quiet studies of scholars, announcing and testifying to that which has been discovered in the silence where the awakened desire for deeper life has made itself felt.

Nevertheless, the philosophy of the present still hesitates. It is still too much under the influence of the period, just expiring, of exact historical and psychological departmentalism, whose masters—for example, Erdmann, Stumpf, Windelband—held aloof entirely from the new movement, though it is the fashion for everybody to reckon these men as idealists. Windelband, however, has written the prolegomena of a future systematic philosophy (*Präludien*). True it is that more than mere history is to be learnt from his historical books. And this holds with greater force in regard to the penetrating works of Dilthey. Nevertheless, it is significant that even these men constantly prefer to write history rather than constructive system. And even where system is professed, as in Wundt's immense compilation, one receives the impression that what is presented is rather a mighty collection formed from the results of the special sciences than a complete system developed from within. In sympathy with the demand for a fuller life, newly

awakened among our people, Paulsen was an active influence chiefly in his last years, at least in so far as he held forth a clear and lofty ideal in regard to all questions of public interest. Nor did he take an attitude so elevated as to prevent him from speaking through the newspapers to his fellow-countrymen in a direct and incisive manner.

But the strongest influence which the newly awakened life of the present is feeling is that of Rudolf Eucken. Difficult as most of his books are, they have rendered the greatest service in satisfying the demand for a deeper comprehension of Reality and the desire for religion. It is a mark of the strength of the young movement that Eucken's books are the most widely current philosophical writings of the present day. All of them have appeared in several editions, and new ones are constantly coming out. What his books give to the present age is the quiet consciousness of a belief in the inward and higher nature of man and in a universal life of the spirit, superior to all particular interests—a life comprehensive and secure, in which the individual, with his ideals and his faith in God, feels himself able to defy the attacks of naturalism and the pressure of the perplexing materialist life of the present. Untiringly does Eucken call attention to the fact that a life of fuller content shines through the very struggles and perplexities of our existence, and is indeed the origin both of their sufferings and their satisfactions. Only because of the vaster Deep which stirs within us, but comes not to full expression, are we in such uncertainty. And if our time is a time of self-criticism and of scepticism, this very fact, when seen from the other side, is only a proof that humanity bears within itself a standard transcending all individual opinion and arbitrary choice, and not to be shaken by anything that moves either in ourselves or in our circumstances. And if all things are viewed as in process of development, it follows that we must have within us something eternal and permanent, in the light of which we recognise the general flux of a world which is always in a state of becoming. Thus Eucken is ever guiding

us back to an elementary matter of fact, to an independent life of the spirit, which transcends human consciousness, though it first appears in consciousness—as upon the stage where the transition from nature to the conscious spiritual life is accomplished. Not without the decision and the action of man does this transformation take place. Human nature is founded upon its freedom and upon this affirmation of its higher life. But it is through the very effort to raise himself above his small and limited human existence that man first finds his true being, which is the spiritual world, present within him and stretching beyond him.

This idealistic philosophy Eucken has built out on all its sides. But more especially he has developed it as a philosophy of religion presenting the *Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion* while avoiding the defects of the old dualistic religions. In 1907 he went on to discuss the *Hauptprobleme der Religionsphilosophie*. And in all his writings the religious note is heard. Indeed, what Eucken finally intends is a renovated and theoretically vindicated Christianity, in spite of his anxious avoidance of everything which has the appearance of metaphysical dualism. That Christianity and its logical foundations are his central concern is evident whenever he adversely criticises the modern idea of evolution so far as this may be applied to the moral and spiritual life of man. Eucken, again, continually makes it clear that something else is involved in the moral life, which is a sharp and distinct opposition of the higher to the lower stages of reality—a conflict and an overcoming, and not a mere “evolution.” In abandonment of the narrow and limited human attitude, a new kernel of character must be formed ; and not until the kernel exists is that wholeness of life attainable which draws into itself what has affinity with its own nature and repels what is hostile. Thus it is that Eucken places in the centre of his system nothing less than the essential Christian idea of the New Birth, though under another name. This is decisive as regards the Christian character of Eucken’s philosophy.

To heal the religious distress of our time by a renewed and deepened Christianity which understands its own nature and draws thence answers to the questions of our actual life—this, in a far higher degree, is the distinctive purpose of our “Modern Theology.” For a whole generation this theology has laboured in silence. Much exact work was devoted to the investigation of dogma and of the Old and New Testaments before this theology ventured into the conflict for a new content of life. But since the appearance of Harnack’s *Wesen des Christentums* it has entered at a bound into the centre of public interest. If Eucken’s writings have been read in thousands of copies, Harnack’s book has found tens of thousands of readers—few enough, it is true, in comparison with the two hundred thousand copies in which Haeckel’s *World Riddles* have been sold. With these, however, Frenssen’s novels have kept abreast in the number of their readers; and of these *Hilligenlei* directly presents a life of Jesus which Frenssen has sketched, though not quite happily, on the lines of modern inquiry, while *Jærn Uhl*, a greater and stronger work, telling the story of a peasant’s life in Holstein, is founded on views which reveal the best and deepest convictions of our Modern Theology. Besides these series of books, there is much other evidence that our people are demanding the very thing which Modern Theology is able to supply.

Since the commencement of a movement in Rhineland and Westphalia which is called “Friends of Evangelical Freedom” and has now hundreds and thousands of members in nearly all towns of Rhineland, new life has come into all the old societies, such as the “Protestantenverein,” and similar societies of evangelical freedom have been formed in other parts of Germany. New literary undertakings have come into existence, such as the *Popular Tracts of the History of Religion* (Religions-geschichtliche Volksbücher), of which tens of thousands of copies have been circulated, and the *Problems of Life* (Lebens-fragen), of which the present writer is editor; new journals have been founded, while those long established (of which

the most serious and important is the *Christliche Welt*, edited by Professor Rade in Marburg) have increased their circulation. Remarkable growth has been shown by the *Gemeindeblatt für Rheinland und Westfalen*, conducted by Pastor Traub of Dortmund, a man of great activity and importance. This journal has recently adopted the title of *Christliche Freiheit*, and is devoted more especially to the church policy of the new movements. Orthodoxy, impressed by the scientific and practical successes of Modern Theology, has also received a new influx of life, and the demand has arisen for a "modern-positive," or a "modern theology of the old faith." Professor Seeberg is the leader of the first tendency; Th. Kaftan, the Superintendent-General of Schleswig, is the champion of the second. Just as Seeberg has been influenced by Ritschl and Harnack, so the effect of the modern school of Historical Religion is distinctly traceable in the work of Seeberg's pupils—Grützmacher in Rostock, Stange in Greifswald, and others. And notwithstanding the strenuous opposition of these men to the Theology of Historical Religion, they endeavour to imitate it in all their undertakings. In the same binding as that of the *Tracts of the History of Religion* they have published *Biblical Questions of Present-day Controversy* (*Biblische Zeit und Streitfragen*), have matched my *Problems of Life* with *Problems of Eternity* (*Ewigkeitsfragen*), and have started as a counterpart to the *Theologische Rundschau* a newspaper, *Die Theologie der Gegenwart*, and so forth. In all of which they merely display their thorough-going dependence, both inwardly and outwardly, upon Modern Theology.

I have said so much concerning the external success of the various efforts of the modern school of German theology because the readers of the HIBBERT JOURNAL are presumably well-informed concerning its essential inner content. Of this latter a full description is not necessary, and a mere reminder will suffice. I need not inform them at great length of the significance of Harnack's work as a scholar, how his untiring industry and his penetrating genius have shaped for whole

decades the problems of the time and everywhere promoted their solution. But I may be permitted in a few plain words to tell them what his name signifies in our religious life. He does not often appear in public. His chief love is given to his quiet scholar's study, though he plays an active part in life. At the present time he takes a leading part in all that concerns the management of libraries in Prussia; he has rendered an essential service in bringing to completion the reform of Girls' Schools; and for some years past he has been addressing his fellow-countrymen directly, and more frequently than before, through the medium of the Press. This has happened especially since he became president of the evangelical "Social Congress." I place a far higher value, however, upon the rich and deep life which has flowed forth upon all his pupils from this great man and lofty character. To his pupils he has devoted himself heart and soul as a genuine teacher. He is the teacher of an entire generation of theologians and not merely of a school; and all of them, not excepting his opponents, have enjoyed the influence of his rich and inspiring personality. Many owe to him the direction of their lives, and a wealth of inner treasures which have rendered them happy and impelled them to the service of our people.

Side by side with Harnack stands to-day a long line of men of his own generation all of whom are more distinctively scholars pure and simple, and men of science. I mention only Wilhelm Herrmann, our best-known teacher of dogmatic theology; and Adolf Jülicher, learned and penetrating both as a patristic and New Testament scholar. But there is a younger generation growing up and now in the fulness of its power and activity which, to a degree beyond that of the names just cited, is taking an active and direct part in life on the lines of a renovated Christianity. The most significant and perhaps the most learned among them is Ernst Tröltsch, who has not only turned systematic theology in a new direction but also has given a new account of the intellectual and religious

history of the last four hundred years. This he has done in many single articles, and finally by his description of Protestantism in the great compilation *Kultur der Gegenwart*.

In the same rank with Tröltzsch stands Hermann Gunkel in Giessen. His labours in the History of Religion have contributed to the broadening of our outlook from the Old Testament to the Old Orient. By means of a singularly delicate æsthetic instinct and a sensitive historical imagination, he has disclosed entirely new aspects for work on the Old and New Testaments. Strongly influenced by him, but more learned and active in practical life, is Wilhelm Bousset of Göttingen; while Paul Wernle, in Basel, is perhaps most distinguished by his personal religious enthusiasm, combining in his books strength and simplicity in a way which is all his own. This younger generation is now comprised under the name "Religionsgeschichtliche Schule," inasmuch as all of them are bent upon extending historical and systematic study beyond the limits set by the earlier isolation of Christianity, and restoring it to its proper place in the study of universal religion.

But what unites us all is not so much our method as a strong and common determination to apply our studies to the service of life, to rescue Christianity from its state of isolation in regard to the modern world, and to put our fellow-countrymen once more in possession of its best elements, its eternal content, which amid the vast technical and intellectual development of the last centuries it had almost lost. We are all agreed in an unconditional and unreserved recognition that the ultimate foundations of our modern theory of the universe are to be sought in Nature and History. We have seriously embraced the conviction that the notion of miracle cannot be introduced any more into science nor into history. We have all admitted into our work the great scientific idea of evolution, and we confront the results of science with entire impartiality, accepting them all without prejudice. We have abandoned not only the old proofs of the existence of God but also the attempt to build any purely metaphysical foundation for

religion, seeking the basis of our faith in God, with Kant and Schleiermacher, in quite other provinces of life. We believe that God meets us in the persons of those great men who are the active agents in evolution, the creators of ideals, and the prophets of the unknown Deity. The History of Religion has shown us that there are but few ultimate ideals open to the choice of mankind, when once the resolution has been made to find satisfaction in that Higher which speaks in human nature, and not to vegetate or live the life of a mere brute beast. The choice lies between a life of pessimism and agnosticism on the one hand, and, on the other, a life which answers the challenge of all suffering, of all mystery, even of all sin, by affirming the "Everlasting Yea." On that side stands Buddha, and on this two contrasts equally opposed to him—first, Jesus, whose affirmative attitude towards life takes the form of a bold faith in a fatherly God, guiding the world towards its goal of goodness and perfection, a faith which springs from an ideal of goodness and love embraced with enthusiasm amid the pain of the new birth; and secondly, confronting Jesus, a foolhardy Egoism, which presumes to overcome the world, and is either the "will-to-enjoy" or the "will-to-have-power," as celebrated by Nietzsche.

Such are the chief forms of salvation from the suffering, the confusion, and the guilt of life which men have found, or think they have found. To us, however, Jesus has given his life, radiant with goodness and with a love extending beyond all limited human morality; so that for us nothing else remains possible than to live for this ideal and to believe in the God who has made himself known in Jesus. Hence it is our business to testify of this new-found life as well as we are able to do. No longer do we announce a doctrine of Christ, but Christ himself; himself, however, not as a dogma or a law but as a Leader and Saviour, even as he leads and saves ourselves. We are not preaching his doctrine in its historical details, but the innermost content of his spirit—his seeking out of the rejected, the lost, and the oppressed, his

grace and truth, his purity of heart, and the eagerness of self-surrender and of service. And all of this springs directly from a faith in God which does not count up and quibble, but feels the love of God both in rain and sunshine precisely because they fall impartially upon just and unjust. To be perfect in the faith that the secret of life is revealed as a Loving Will through the very medium of such apparent injustice—that is Christianity. And that Christianity we offer, no longer mingled, as in the old dogmas, with an antique picture of the world, but in intimate union with modern cosmology and therefore exempt from the objections which broke up the old systems. This, I say, we offer to our fellow-countrymen, not on authority, or as the only way—but we speak what we have known. Whosoever will hear us and will receive this loftiest ideal and this deepest blessedness through the medium of our hands, him will we serve.

To this renovated Christianity there stands opposed, in Germany, the second great world-religion—Buddhism. It is through the influence of one of our greatest philosophers and the music of one of our greatest composers that the spread of Buddhism has been promoted in Germany. Arthur Schopenhauer and Richard Wagner have been its great preachers. And though Schopenhauer's success came later on—he hardly lived to see it himself—his influence nevertheless was extremely strong towards the end of the century. His works were widely distributed, especially after they were able to be published in cheap editions in 1899. The influence of Richard Wagner would have been still more considerable if his *Parsifal*, of all his works the one most deeply steeped in Buddhism, had been allowed to be produced outside of Bayreuth. When in the year 1913 the production of this work will be possible in all theatres, it is probable—and I would add it is to be hoped—that it will be too late for it to exercise much influence upon the religious movements of our times. It is true that Wagner's religion is not so strongly Buddhistic as is Schopenhauer's theory. In Wagner's case

deliverance from the sufferings of life is sought not entirely in a final submergence of personality in Nothing, nor entirely in those moments when the individual will vanishes into the oblivion of ecstasy, but rather in those other moments when man loses himself in the delights of artistic creation or of love. *Tristan und Isolde* is the pœan of these modes of deliverance. And, in the second place, Wagner has a much more active ethic, presenting the conflict with the world and the overcoming of the world as the primary ethical demand, notwithstanding that his regeneration of humanity is to be fulfilled by the instrumentality of vegetarianism. Yet his *Parsifal* became a knight and fought with the lance before he put his armour off and became a saviour of men. But the broad outlines of Wagner's musical gospel remain throughout Buddhistic, as he himself has explained it in plain prose in his important work on *Religion and Art* (1876). Although Wagner has now been dead for nearly thirty years, I have named him in this connection because it may be said that the first Buddhist community was formed in Bayreuth—I might even call it a church. Every year thousands of persons congregate there to celebrate together the cultus of this religion. And it is a genuine cultus. Both the fashionable crowds and the pure musicians are affected by it as by an act of religious consecration, at least in the solemn hours when the drama is drawing to a conclusion. And a community of feeling prevails among all the foreign visitors, such as only the common participation in a deep experience can confer. Nor has the darker side of church development failed to display itself already in Bayreuth in the stiffening of the Master's spirit into an orthodoxy, the fostering of what is old, the making of heretics, the conversion of a great institution to the money-power, and similar corruptions common to every religion which assumes an ecclesiastical character.

Far less gifted with genius than either Schopenhauer or Wagner, but more modern than they—for he lived to see and absorbed more of the scientific development than

Schopenhauer did—stands Eduard von Hartmann, the third preacher of pessimism, next in order to the two great men aforesaid. Precisely because he is an average man with a great gift of easy exposition and fluent description, he seems to gain in significance for the present generation; while eager pupils endeavour to extend his teaching in still more popular form. His works have appeared in many editions, since the *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, coinciding with the pessimistic tendencies prevalent from 1860 onwards, made such a marked success. As the *Philosophy of the Unconscious* is so well known in England and America, I need not characterise Hartmann's teaching in detail. I must content myself with the reminder that Hartmann, in his theory of knowledge, opposed to Kant an entirely critical Realism, which, starting from an empirical basis, professes to prove the hyper-empirical world of the Absolute. The old proofs of the existence of God were all converted by Hartmann into modernised terms with the purpose of showing that the Absolute is existent, intelligent, and purposeful. After thus laying the basis of metaphysic in its essential object, Hartmann defines this object again, on the lines of a theory starting from empiricism, as the Unconscious. This conception, Hartmann contends, affords a better description of the nature of the Absolute than does the conception of Spirit, which Hegel has made current, because the latter does not include the Unconscious; better also than Schopenhauer's "Will," which is thought of as in opposition both to Reason and Spirit. The Unconscious is Intelligence and Will, but not Consciousness. Consciousness is kindled only in the little eccentric world where man stands in the presence of an object; the Unconscious is greater, an unmediated activity of creation which never errs, never weakens, never doubts, and never wavers after the manner of individual consciousness. The world, looked at from this point of view, is the best possible world, as it had been already named by Leibniz. But—and here Hartmann makes the transition from metaphysic to religion, from a theory of the world to an estimate of the

world's value—when we question the universe as to whether it satisfies man's desire for happiness, the answer is in the negative. All the goods of the world, including the goods of human society, marriage, the family, friendship, and the rest, are analysed by Hartmann so as to yield the pessimistic conclusion that they are unable to confer upon man an entire and lasting satisfaction. And though man in his childhood deluded himself in regard to these things; though in the Middle Ages, when he was grown to youth, he learnt to despise the goods of this world through the visionary attractions of heaven; and though in more recent times, when he was come of age, he again fell into the delusion of setting his hopes on an earthly future, yet now at last, at the end of the nineteenth century, his intelligence has become mature. He understands all these illusions, and is yearning for deliverance from the sufferings of existence. This deliverance can only be found if the world-process itself comes to an end. In regard to this, Hartmann, in his practical philosophy, advocates with much originality a way very different from that of Buddhism and Schopenhauer. What he inculcates is not asceticism, not the flight of the individual from the world, but rather the most active participation in the work of a developing culture in order to bring the entangling world-process to its end. Only through the deliverance of "God" himself, *i.e.* through the deliverance of the Unconscious from existence into which it entered by an inconceivable and unintelligible act of his own nature, so far as it was will and impulse, only thus can the individual find his own deliverance. Along this path Hartmann professes to have made it possible to develop the ethic of humanity from the ground of a pessimistic and Buddhistic valuation of the world—an ethic which presupposes the worth of life and of the individual, and is, indeed, as such nothing else than a diluted Christianity. This mode of thought has been brought forward by Hartmann himself as a philosophy of religion, and taught by him to his contemporary thinkers, in his *Religion of the Spirit*, as the

peculiar nature both of Christianity and of Buddhism. Towards every form of Christian theology his attitude is one of decisive refusal—most decisive, however, towards the old liberal and the modern liberal, as this has been described above. This he condemned as superficial optimism, and entirely repudiated its return to Jesus and to early Christianity. As early as 1870 he had written a work, under the pseudonym F. A. Müller, against early Christianity and what he regarded as its ascetic, world-despising morality. It is a pity that the second edition of this book in 1907 is the last work of Hartmann, for a more superficial piece of dilettantism can hardly be conceived. It displays a narrow judgment which is sometimes irresistibly comic, as, for example, when he complains that he looks in vain to Jesus for the consecration of human labour, and demands of him that he ought at least once in a way to “have performed labour symbolically.”

A criticism of the metaphysic of Schopenhauer or Hartmann is no more my present task than is a detailed exposition of the art of Wagner. I can only indicate that satisfaction is not to be had from the metaphysic of Hartmann, with its amorphous mixture of Schopenhauer and Hegel under the catchword of the Unconscious, which again is borrowed from Schelling; nor can his Theory of Knowledge be made good against the doctrine of Kant. What does concern us here is the significance of this religion of Neo-Buddhism, and its prospects in Germany. One consideration is immediately suggested, namely, that both Schopenhauer and Hartmann are wholly precluded from being counted among the founders of religion. Both of them are distinctly sensible that their method is for those who would philosophise about religion, but not for those who would live religion and sow its seed. The feeling is justified; and those persons in Europe who are anxious to escape from the world, who desire renunciation and absorption in the All-One, will always better consult their safety by taking the road which leads to the Monachism and Mysticism of the Catholic Church, where the theory is actually

lived out, than by having recourse to a school of philosophy which merely talks about these things. All of Buddhism that the West can make use of is to be found in the Catholic Church. It offers, on a vaster scale, an inner support to great communities of persons who actually live according to the doctrine, and confers this support on a marvellous system of ritual which stirs the deepest emotions of mystical worship.

And for this even Bayreuth cannot give any equivalent. Bayreuth provides a theatre, while Catholicism gives reality. In Bayreuth there is stage machinery and pasteboard, while in Catholicism the venerable night of old churches appeals to sentiment and invites to prostration. Were all this to count for nothing, it would still remain true that what goes on in Bayreuth is not actual life in a religion of sympathy, but a life of æsthetic appreciation; and the people whose temperament draws them thither are a crowd of artists and not a band of apostles and martyrs.

To hear Hartmann's doctrine preached in its thoroughgoing form as a way of salvation has something of a comic air. For it suffers from a strange contrast which perhaps may be best exhibited by means of the jest which is often heard in connection with the use of alcohol. Whosoever would pre-occupy himself with culture, heart and soul and with all his powers, on the ground that this is the best mode of bringing both culture and the whole world to an end, bears a striking resemblance to the drunkard who proposes to rid the world of alcohol by drinking as much of it as he can get. At least we may say that the doctrine which recommends to man a life of culture with the purpose, or implied purpose, of rendering him disgusted with culture, is obviously afflicted with something that is contrary to nature. It is more repellent and harder than Stoicism, which aims to render man independent of the joys of life even when he is surrounded by them.

More perhaps is to be expected from influences working in the same direction which have recently passed over into Germany from English and American theosophy. We have,

it is true, contributed to the movement men of only the second or third rank—men like Rudolf Steiner and Franz Hartmann. But theosophical lodges already exist among us in considerable number, and Christian Science also heals among us many kinds of sickness. It appears to me, however, that the whole subject is a special pursuit of sickly people who in states of nervous excitement desire intercourse with their departed dear ones; or of those to whom their precious health may have become the highest goal of religion. Finally, there are many in this country who, like their leader Annie Besant, have merely changed over from the pretended scientific world-view of materialism to the equally pretended science of spiritism—from which they receive hardly a breath of religion, of reverence or communion with God. It is hardly to be expected that this form of modernised Buddhism, interwoven as it is with Christian elements, will gain much significance. It seems to me as though, on the whole, we had about done with this *fin-de-siècle* religion, which marks a time of universal nervousness in the educated classes; and as though the needs which made them restless were continually disappearing with the new century: the reason being simply that our attention, more than that of any earlier generation, has been applied to a reasonable care for the health of the people, public hygiene, and sport. Bodily health is after all the best antidote against all pessimism of æsthetic extraction.

Far more important than this modern perversion of Buddhism appears to me the ever-growing revival of Nature-mysticism. The guides of this movement start from modern science; but they refuse to ally themselves with materialism, and even a monistic view of the world, like that which Haeckel has so dogmatically advanced—and some of them are Haeckel's pupils—does not satisfy them either in regard to their æsthetic sense or their religious need. But monists they certainly are, and their writings are filled from end to end with polemic against Christian Theism and Deism. In a work on *Monism* (Verlag Diederichs, 1908) they have recently announced their

alliance with the school of Eduard von Hartmann in opposition to Christianity, with its belief in a supra-mundane God and a supra-mundane life. But religion they must have. And they regard themselves with pride as the bearers of a new religion, which shall unite the noblest elements of all mysticism with the results of modern science. At first science meant for them simply the science of nature; but recently they devote themselves also to the history of religion, and endeavour, like the Theosophists, to discover mystical elements everywhere present in it, and to combine these in a new construction.

There used to be in Friedrichshagen, on the shore of the Müggelsee near Berlin, a circle of young writers tired of Naturalism in art (some of them had been its leaders in the daily press), who founded a community for the purpose of cultivating this new religion in the course of common walking-tours. Their intention was to cultivate the power of listening to the secrets of Nature, of feeling and reverencing the great All of life, which, surrounding us on every side, speaks to us in mysterious language through man and beast, through tree and flower, through wood and lake and rock. By these means they would behold the "New God," and conquer the "Future Land" of humanity, the "Third Realm," the "Realm of Fulfilment" — these expressions being all the titles which Heinrich and Julius Hart gave to their books. It fell to the lot of Bruno Wille to listen to the "Revelations of the Juniper Tree" and to write them down in a novel. He it was also (he is a pupil both of Haeckel and Fechner) who preached the gospel of the "Living All." The best known of them all is Bölsche, whom a lively fancy had endowed with a happy gift of making the latest results of natural science savoury and interesting to the general public. He is the most lovable of the group. His view of the world is most clearly expressed in his book *The Secret of Nature*, published in 1905 by Diederichs. It is a pantheism which rejoices in the world, combined with the ideal of the love of one's neighbour, which is taken either from Christianity and the general religious development of

humanity, or else made to rest upon pantheism. This love proceeds from the comprehensive unity of all Being. The group in Friedrichshagen has broken up; it did not possess the vitality needed to found a strong and living community. There was not a single artist among them to sing their thoughts to our people in classic form. Bruno Wille, however, is the most popular. The "free-thinkers," still remaining from the earlier Liberal movements, which, on the whole, lead a troubled life, have accepted him as their public lecturer; and he is permitted to announce his religion to that social democracy to which he belongs, — apparently without much success. Moreover, he has recently become active as a travelling lecturer to the "League of Monists," notwithstanding that he is divided on almost every point from orthodox Haeckelism—the prevalent doctrine of the League. The teaching of the "League of Monists" is too superficial and out-of-date to inspire men of an artistic or of a pious temperament. Unfortunately, the hope cannot be entertained that the "League of Monists" will be guided by him and its other supporters from Nature-mysticism on to deeper lines. There is not sufficient power of will to produce such a result. There was another thinker in the "League of Monists" from whom this might have been expected—I mean Pastor Kalthoff of Bremen, chosen by Haeckel as president of the League. Unfortunately he died too early, in 1907, when fifty-six years old. In 1902 appeared his book *The Problem of Christ*, in which he endeavoured to prove, in a dilettante fashion and with absolutely insufficient means, that Jesus was only the imagined ideal of a revolutionary class of slaves in Jewish-Hellenistic Rome. When the book appeared one could only vaguely guess that the whole of this entirely negative criticism, combined with its vigorous attack upon Harnack, had any place in the service of a comprehensive programme of religion.

But the sermons of Kalthoff, which soon began to appear, showed that he was in reality a man of religious fire and force, perhaps more an orator than a poet, little capable of producing

original work but rather disposed to fuse together into a formless mass all the tendencies of modern life—Nature-mystic, Nietzsche, and the theories of social democracy. But, in any case, Kalthoff was a force, which might have promised a noteworthy development of the “League of Monists,” while it now seems condemned to orthodox Haeckelism,—unless the “Keplerbund,” unfortunately founded at an inopportune moment by Christian orthodox influences, will give the movement new life. This “Keplerbund” conducts its apologetic in the old style of petty disputes about incorrect pictures of embryos and details of Darwinism, and hopes by these means to save Christianity. Little or no influence, so far, need be ascribed to the attempts of which the object is to stir up “Neuromantics” and to revive the old mysticism. Eugen Diederichs, the energetic publisher of Jena, has taken a deep interest in the matter. It is he who has given us Germans a fine edition of Maeterlinck and of the old German mystical writers. He has also made Master Ekkhart, the German Theology, Angelus Silesius, as well as the ancient mystics, Plato and Plotinus, once more accessible to educated Germans. But Maeterlinck continues to be little understood in Germany, except in so far as his book on *The Life of Bees* and his essay on *The Intelligence of Flowers* falls into line with our Nature-mystic. The old mysticism seems to find adherents only among quiet little souls. Our Neuromantics, like Stephan George and Hugo von Hoffmannstal, are not strong men, but tender souls entirely sunk in *fin-de-siècle* decadence. They have not advanced beyond Maeterlinck’s first period, and perhaps they never will. All these shadows and ghosts will not succeed in awakening a religion which overflows with the clear waters of modern life. They are, however, of high significance for the deepening of our inner life, and one of them, perhaps, signifies something more. A genuine and thorough poet—a gift not bestowed upon the group in Friedrichshagen—has arisen in the person of the young Austrian, Reiner Maria Rilke. No other writer in our language has shown the power he

possesses of singing and telling forth the presence of the Divine in Nature, especially in the quiet and unobtrusive life of small things; no other has so fully expressed the emotion of man as he mingles his being with the All and feels the wind of God breathing through him. Perhaps he has learnt from the young Maeterlinck the note of fatigue which belongs especially to his early poems. It may be simply the mark of youth not yet understanding itself, and something yet stronger is to be expected from Rilke. He is, moreover, no leader; for like all these mystics, he lacks an ideal of life.

Of course, attempts have not been wanting to make good the old ideals in connection with these new religions. I have in mind especially the efforts of Ellen Key to combine the individualistic ideal and Nietzsche's teaching with Nature-mysticism into a pantheistic picture of religion. This attempt, moreover, has engaged many enthusiastic young men in Germany, and more especially many young women. What is tempting and captivating about Ellen Key's books is precisely the union of these two elements, though in reality they are absolutely incapable of being united. For the brutalities¹ of even the loftiest Individualism would be quite intolerable to these people, had they not the necessary counterweight in the tenderness and inwardness of communion with Nature. The only logical ethic which can be derived from pantheism is an ethic of love or of sympathy.

Hence the attempt to found Christianity on the new mystical feeling for Nature is more intelligible. The earlier theologian, Johannes Müller, undertook the task of "Germanising" and "modernising" the Sermon on the Mount in this sense. When Jesus speaks of "our Father in Heaven" he means the everlasting, vital glow of the All, supporting and permeating us, under whose influence we thrill with a mysterious impulse which we control for creative ends, and feel pressing upon us in all events as a quickening influence—

¹ This warm-hearted woman herself goes so far as to maintain that the offender ought not to be pardoned but "extinguished."

the Fountain-head of our being and the Healing Power of life. From this experience there arises a morality of overflowing life. Love is not a moral relation which man can call into being by means of a good will, but an original faculty ; not an affinity which is awaked by attractive or sympathetic persons, but the self-assertion of the soul, the abounding inner life which pours out its ripened fulness because it cannot hold back the riches of its hidden wealth. Like the streaming of the sunshine and the quivering movement of fiery heat, this love encompasses men and permeates them with vigour and the joy of life.

In these few sentences of Müller's we trace his own peculiar genius, and perceive that the preacher is not Jesus but a modern man, who has learnt the best that he has to give mainly from Nietzsche, especially from Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* ; and this is the ideal of joy, and a virtue which pours forth in perpetual outflow. Indeed, it is not individualism so much as egoism which here assumes the name of the Sermon on the Mount, the self-expression of a soul irradiated by the glow of pantheistic experience. Müller's followers in Germany are numbered by thousands ; hundreds of them gather every year at a castle on the Main, which has been assigned him by one of his admirers for the purpose. Here they fortify themselves by a common life and develop in intercourse with the master. He must be a man of force and great warmth of heart, for he attaches quite old-fashioned Christians to himself, though he himself has now gone over from orthodoxy to pantheistic nature-mystic. His *Blätter zur Pflege persönlichen Lebens* answer the same requirements of the modern man as do the essays of Ellen Key. They meet the individualistic aspirations of youth as well as its cravings for religion. What is wanting is unity and a clear ideal for actual life.

We have now placed in review the chief directions in which modern religion is moving in Germany. What will come out of them ? Will any one of these tendencies be victorious ? Will an eclecticism develop out of them all ? Shall we see a

return to abandoned forms of Christianity, as in the time of the old Romanticism at the beginning of the nineteenth century? Who can venture to predict in such a matter!

But I must not conclude with mere historical information. Nay, rather, I have yet to indicate briefly the goal which hovers before me as offering a way out of the strife and confusion of the present. From Nature-mystic life can derive no clear ideal; while the doctrine of the spirituality of Nature is generally lacking in religion. This doctrine is not an appreciation of the world, but an attempt to explain the world. A definite goal is provided, first, by æsthetic individualism in its coarser or its finer sense; secondly, by Buddhism with its renunciation of life; and thirdly, by Christian love, the highest flower of the altruistic dispositions of men. Henceforth humanity has to choose between these ideals. If Christianity is to remain victorious it must advance along the lines which have been sketched above. It may not forego its character as a New Birth, as pantheism demands; but it must attach itself to the new feeling for Nature and to the new knowledge of Nature, after first cutting itself free from every antiquated picture of the world and from every antiquated dogma. Jesus himself in a unique manner lived in Nature and from Nature. It was from Nature that the voice of his Heavenly Father spoke to him in the bending and waving corn, in the varied clothing of flowers and the singing of birds. But he also maintained an inviolable reverence for God, as the blessed Power which spreads unexhausted over Nature, and whose loving will has to be served by Nature as well as by History, so that the world may become at last a Kingdom of God. This God comes to meet the man who seeks a goal for life, the God of the Ideal who reigns above that highest reach of our human nature, whereby we are distinguished from all beings known to us—our moral life. On the other hand, Theology has something to learn from reformed Buddhism. Liberalism and Modern Theology were only too ready to be satisfied with the world as it is. These have often lacked

the element of sternness so distinctly expressed by the bitter condemnation of the world in early Christianity. Not only a serious attention paid to the suffering in the world, but a firm determination to introduce the Ideal into life, should lead us into deeper earnestness. In this regard Modern Theology is often defective. The Old Theology attached itself almost without condition to a State which was not truly Christian, and to every social prejudice which professed to be Christian, so long as it wore the outward garment of the Church. Modern theology, also, has often suffered itself to be driven along the false path of renouncing the practical attempt to transform the world to its ideal pattern — in our day influenced, no doubt, by the fate of Friedrich Naumann. Naumann began a brilliant career as a prophet of morality and religion, his devotional work *The Help of God* being, perhaps, the noblest product of modern piety. But, despairing of a thorough-going introduction of the Christian Ideal into human life, he threw in his lot with those politicians who look upon power and economical welfare as the central concern of the life of nations. This has caused the courage of many to fail. The resolve to achieve a new world, a Kingdom of God, is far too weak among us. I mean the aspiration after a world ruled by Truth, Love, and Purity, in which all that is shameful in the political and social life of the present day shall be impossible; a world in which war and retaliation, duelling and revenge, prostitution and the exploitation of the unfortunate, and all that opposes the Will of a God of Love, shall be no more. Only when this lofty ideal of Christianity shall be again preached in all seriousness, when God shall be again vitally felt as ever present and speaking to us—only when Christianity thus rejuvenated, in earnest and enthusiastic, again becomes powerful in our midst, will our generation appear to be inwardly not unworthy of the splendid age in which it outwardly lives.

H. WEINEL.

JESUS OR CHRIST?

A REPLY TO MR ROBERTS.

I.

G. K. CHESTERTON.

BEFORE remarking on the Rev. Mr Roberts's article called "Jesus or Christ?" it is only fair for me to say that the title affects me personally as would some such title as "Napoleon or Bonaparte?" I can comprehend a *nuance* of difference between the terms; that one would use the surname in one connection, the imperial name in another. But I could not comprehend a person trying to prove that Napoleon was clever while Bonaparte was stupid, or that Bonaparte was a coward while Napoleon was very brave. If there were no life of General Bonaparte there would (to my narrow and unphilosophic mind) be no legend of Napoleon; his public life may have been more glorious than his private, but it is essential to my sentimental interest that they should both have happened to the same man. In the same way the achievements of Christ as the founder of a Church and the chief deity of a civilisation may be more gigantic and inspiring than His activities in Galilee or Jerusalem. But if the two persons are not one person I lose my existing interest in both of them; one of them is an obscure Rabbi like Hillel, and the other is a myth like Apollo.

But I must make one preliminary explanation, in case I have not understood Mr Roberts's main design. If Mr Roberts

merely means this: that the Jesus of the Gospels is not enough for all human purposes; that we need more codification and science in our morals than so poetic a vision can give to us,—I agree with him at once. I do not know what deduction he draws; the deduction I draw is that Jesus left on earth not only four lives of Himself, but also a Church and a Catholic tradition. If Jesus means the Gospels and Christ means the Church, and if Mr Roberts chooses to put it in the form that we need Christ in addition to Jesus, I have no quarrel with him there. But if he means (as I think he certainly does mean) that the Jesus in the Gospels is definitely unreliable and undivine, that He can be convicted of error, that He has been outgrown, then I have a very large and hearty quarrel with Mr Roberts; and it is simply a quarrel about the facts.

I will follow his example and divest myself of any old-world disguises of reverence; and I will speak as he does of the actual Jesus as He appears in the New Testament; not as He appears to a believer, but as He appears to anybody; as He appeared to me when I was an agnostic; as He appeared and still appears to pagans when they first read about Him. If, therefore, in this article I speak of Him with something that even sounds like levity, let it be understood that I am speaking for the sake of argument of a hypothetical human Jesus in the Syrian documents, and not of that divine personality in whom I believe.

Now, the thing that strikes me most about Mr Roberts is that he is wrong on the facts. He is especially wrong on the primary fact of what sort of person the Jesus of the Gospels appears to be. The whole of Mr Roberts's contention is ultimately this: that when we look, so to speak, through the four windows of the Evangelists at this mysterious figure, we see there a recognisable Jew of the first century, with the traceable limitations of such a man. Now, this is exactly what we do not see. If we must put the thing profanely and without sympathy, what we see is this: an extraordinary being, who would certainly have seemed as mad in one century as

another, who makes a vague and vast claim to divinity, who constantly contradicts himself, who imposes impossible commands, who where he seems wrong to us would certainly have seemed quite as wrong to anybody else, who where he seems specially right to us is often in tune with matters not ancient but modern, such, for instance, as the adoration of children. For some of his utterances men might fairly call him a maniac ; for others, men long centuries afterwards might justly call him a prophet. But what nobody can possibly call him is Galilean of the time of Tiberius. That was not how he appeared to his own family, who tried to lock him up as a lunatic. That is not how he appeared to his own nation, who lynched him, still shuddering at his earth-shaking blasphemies. The impression produced on sceptics, ancient and modern, is not that of limits, but rather of a dangerous absence of limits ; a certain shapelessness and mystery of which one cannot say how far it will go. Those of his contemporaries who said that he was possessed by devils seem to me much better critics of biography than Mr Roberts.

I deny, therefore, Mr Roberts's facts ; but it would hardly be courteous to leave such a statement as mere assertion, therefore I will briefly give my proofs. There are at least three practical and final reasons why the Gospels cannot be used for this purpose of catching Jesus out in ignorances or mistakes. The first is the scope and style of the Gospels. There is here a very queer confusion of thought which Mr Roberts has not foreseen or avoided. He says, very truly, that the materials are meagre, or in other words that the New Testament is a very little book. He then goes on to say, as if it were part of the same argument, that we can see in this book the small contemporary prejudices of the Jew. But if these two things are true they must be true in spite of each other. So far as they go they destroy each other : the less there is about Jesus the less it is possible to belittle Him. The limitation of the book prevents the limitation of the hero. It would be much harder to find out a man's limitations from a

short post-card than from a long letter. If a man talks for fifteen minutes you may possibly find that he is a fool ; if he talks for two hours it is barely possible that you may learn that he is a bore. But if he only says, "A fine morning !" he may be Shakespeare or Socrates for all you know. But Mr Roberts actually quotes, in order to limit Jesus, that biographical brevity which in fact makes it impossible to limit Jesus. For instance, the mere fact of the size and plain purpose of the Gospels makes nonsense of the whole of Mr Roberts's laments about things being absent from them. One might as well complain of some subjects being left out of a telegram or a triolet. Mr Roberts's complaint that Jesus does not mention debtors and creditors or the slave-system, is utterly absurd when taken in connection with the nature of the books. He might as well object that the Lord's Prayer is entirely silent on the subject of a Second Chamber, the duty of doctors in time of plague, the art of Botticelli, the advisability of reading novels, and the use of tobacco. The Lord's Prayer is, in shape and purpose, a short prayer. The Gospel of St Luke is, in shape and purpose, a short account of such sayings and doings of Jesus as a particular person happened to remember. As I have already said, I agree that this leaves the Gospel Jesus too shadowy to be all-sufficient ; that is the argument for a Church. But the same brevity and obscurity which make it a little difficult to define His doctrines make it mere impudent nonsense to talk of His limitations.

But Mr Roberts does something worse than complain of the omissions of Jesus ; he supplies them. It is borne in upon me that he has pursued a course not uncommon among cultivated modern persons—a course which I pursued myself for many years of my life ; I mean that he has read all the books about the New Testament and forgotten to read the book itself. His memories of it, at any rate, are singularly hazy and exaggerative. Before I leave this first objection, that the limit of space limits the limitation of Jesus, let me give one truly extraordinary example. Let me show how

huge and systematic are the unconscious fictions built up in Mr Roberts's brain; and let me show (what is more to the point) how utterly and obviously unfitted are the curt texts of the Evangelists to be the basis of such structures.

Speaking still of Jesus, Mr Roberts writes as follows: "His teaching on divorce recognises the husband's right to accuse, judge, condemn, and dismiss the wife; while the wife, having no such rights as against her husband or even over her own children, is left the helpless victim of the husband's caprice. There is no recognition of adultery on the part of the husband as a ground for divorce which the wife might urge, while the right of the husband to decide these matters himself without reference to any constituted law courts strikes the modern mind as callous and iniquitous to the last degree. The teaching is governed throughout by an admission of the iniquitous principle of sex-inferiority as against woman, and let it be remembered this principle has inflicted infinite suffering on half the human race."

Anyone would imagine from this that Jesus Christ read out an Act of Parliament, with twenty-five clauses and fifteen schedules. I was puzzled by this, because, as far as I could remember, He only answered a casual question in the street. I do not profess to be any more verbally irreproachable than Mr Roberts in my memories of Scripture; still, I could not recall anything in the Gospels about any of these things, about the custody of the children, about not having any law courts, or about the iniquitous principle of sex-inferiority. But in a note at the bottom of the page referring to the above paragraph, Mr Roberts has written the following undecorated but highly misleading statement: "Matt., c. xix., vv. 3-9; Mark, c. x., vv. 11-12; Luke, c. xv., v. 18."

This made the matter simpler; so I looked up Matt., c., etc., and found nothing even resembling the above immense system for getting rid of wives. I found a hasty and somewhat disdainful statement in answer to a few hecklers; the statement was entirely concerned with telling people that

marriage was a final and sacred state, and that therefore, except on one parenthetical supposition, men ought to cleave to their wives. There was nothing about the husband having the children or anybody having the children; there were no law courts or absence of law courts or remote mention of law courts; there was nothing whatever about anybody being inferior to anybody. This is the whole text of Matthew:

“The Pharisees also came unto him, tempting him, and saying unto him, Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause? And he answered and said unto them, Have ye not read that he which made them at the beginning made them male and female, and said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife: and they twain shall be one flesh? Wherefore they are no more twain, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder. They say unto him, Why did Moses then command to give a writing of divorcement, and to put her away? He saith unto them, Moses because of the hardness of your hearts suffered you to put away your wives: but from the beginning it was not so. And I say unto you, Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery: and whoso marrieth her which is put away doth commit adultery.”

I quote verbatim lest I should seem unfair if I summarised. But would any human being think me unfair if I summarised the above thus?—A man asked Jesus if wives should be divorced. Jesus replied, No; a man should leave everything for his wife and cleave to her, unless she practically left him. The custom of divorcing wives was a bad custom only permitted in a brutal society. The normal ideal was absolute fidelity. If it does not mean that, I can offer no conjecture as to what it means. The exact words of Mark are as follows:

“And the Pharisees came to him, and asked him, Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife? tempting him. And he answered and said unto them, What did Moses command you? And they said, Moses suffered to write a bill of

divorcement, and to put her away. And Jesus answered and said unto them, For the hardness of your heart he wrote you this precept. But from the beginning of the creation God made them male and female. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and cleave to his wife; and they twain shall be one flesh: so then they are no more twain, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder. And in the house his disciples asked him again of the same matter. And he saith unto them, Whosoever shall put away his wife, and marry another, committeth adultery against her. And if a woman shall put away her husband, and be married to another, she committeth adultery."

I request any rational person to look at the last sentence and ask himself what has become of Mr Roberts's Oriental vision of the shuddering, inferior woman, and the husband sitting like a sultan on a cushion to judge her. The very phrase "put away" which is the basis of the whole business is here assumed in both sexes and condemned in both. In Mark the sexes are told to cleave to each other. In Matthew only the man is told to cleave to the woman; and in Matthew an exception is mentioned. That is all. Henceforth I shall make a point of looking out the references given in rationalist articles.

The third reference is to Luke xv., verse 18. I have looked this out also, and it runs, "I will arise and go to my father, and will say unto him, Father, I have sinned against heaven and before thee." Here I confess my brain gives out: I can no more. I cannot conceive what this text has to do with it, unless the iniquitous principle of sex-inferiority prevented the Prodigal Son from arising and going to his mother.

I have thought it worth while to dwell on this excellent specimen of the Higher Criticism, because I think it is time that this sort of thing should stop. But I mentioned it originally not so much to show the unreasonableness of Mr Roberts's deduction as to show the unreasonableness of making any detailed deduction. The short, sword-like sentences used by Jesus Christ in combat are not elaborate enough for

this purpose. Here, for instance, He struck unmistakably one sentiment so that it rang—that marriage is sacred and divorce bad; as for the remote inferences, Mr Roberts's or anyone else's, one would not hang a dog on them. In short, the sharp incidental style of Jesus is against Mr Roberts in his amiable attempt to find limits. The sayings, whether convincing or not, are not of the literary type which reveal a man's mental boundaries. They are mostly abrupt, generally symbolic, and often ironical. If we are to find a man's mental limitations we must have a long sample of his connected thought; thus I do not think it difficult, after reading his article, to find the limitations of Mr Roberts. But it is impossible with utterances that are partly epigrams, partly oracles, and often something like songs. The thing to say about Jesus if you do not like Him is that He was a megalomaniac like Nero or a deliberate mystagogue like Cagliostro. But whether or no He was small, it is plain that the Gospels are too small for Him. Whether or no He is large, He is too large for the stage.

There is a second more emphatic reason for refusing to find these limitations in the Gospel figure. It is the moral nature of most of the sayings, which are intrinsically defiant, visionary, and even paradoxical. Here Mr Roberts has been horribly unfortunate. The examples he gives prove exactly the opposite of what he is trying to prove. For instance, he quotes the old "Take no thought for the morrow." It is indeed a very extraordinary utterance; but for that very reason it is not the ordinary utterance of a first-century Jew. Does Mr Roberts believe that it was ever a customary thing for a Jew to take no thought for the morrow? Does he suppose that Zebedee never mended his nets, that Nicodemus never counted his money, that people in Palestine did not sow or reap? Surely it is as plain as a pike-staff that such a saying would have been a paradox if uttered in any age or country; as much a paradox to Jews under Tiberius as to Englishmen under Edward VII. As to its true meaning,

I am not discussing that now. It may have been a special counsel to certain *illuminati*; it may have been a mystical joke; it may have been a perfection we shall one day reach; it may have been irony; it may have been insanity. All that we agree to leave open. But whatever it was, it was not a current convention. So far from showing Jesus surrendering to the limits of his age, it shows Jesus apparently breaking out of the limits of all ages. It shows Him gigantic, in an incredible attitude, defying the limits of human life.

Mr Roberts mixes up these two opposite ideas for several pages. Sometimes he reproaches Jesus with saying what everybody thought and sometimes what nobody could ever think. But surely every paradox of Jesus obliterates a limitation of Jesus. Take this, for instance: "On non-resistance and oath-taking the rule attributed to Jesus is absolute. Yet, as a whole, Christendom has openly violated it throughout its history. His most distinguished followers, popes and bishops, have waged wars and consecrated battleships; and the existence of Christian armies proves that Jesus has been unable to get His own followers to obey His rule." The command about the other cheek is highly startling; but it would certainly have startled people in the Roman Empire as much as ourselves, if not more. I can see how it might be maintained that this phrase of Jesus proves His unlimited extravagance, but I cannot see how it proves His Syrian limitations. Were the Maccabees or the Zelots non-resisters? Did the Romans turn the other cheek? Here also I am discussing not the theory, but the facts. Christ's command about giving the coat as well as the cloak was, very possibly, a humorous suggestion of embarrassing the enemy. "If a man knocks your hat off, offer him your umbrella; and it is he who will look the fool." But my interpretations are not in question, but Mr Roberts's; and by no conceivable means can Mr Roberts make this paradox a current or local prejudice. That "popes and bishops have waged wars and consecrated

battleships" is a very fortunate fact for Mr Roberts and for other Western Europeans. For certainly, if the Pope had not launched a fleet and hurled back the Turks at Lepanto, Mr Roberts and the rest of us would be living under a Turkish civilisation, in which he might find the view of woman even less satisfactory than that expressed (so obscurely) in the parable of the Prodigal Son. But if human conventions have contradicted Jesus on this matter, it may prove that Jesus was wrong, but it can hardly prove that He was conventional. So it is with the matter of marriage on which I have already touched. The substance of the speech of Jesus is simply that divorce is wrong because sacramental marriage is right. I could understand a person calling this quixotic or idealistic or too cruel a strain on human nature. But to say that Jesus got it from the Jews or the Roman Empire is absurd. We come back to the same fact : if Jesus is impossible, it is because He is individual and idealist, not because He was like His land or age. If He is outside practical politics, it is not because He is limited to his age, but because He is quite astonishingly in advance of ours.

Thirdly, there is one element in the thoughts of Jesus which again may make a man conclude that they are worthless, but which cannot possibly make him conclude that they are limited. I mean the element of apparent contradiction. If I meet a man who says he is an atheist, I may consider him a limited man ; I generally do. If ten minutes afterwards I overhear him praying passionately to God, I may conclude that he is mad, or a humorist, or has some singular synthesis. But exactly the thing I cannot say is that I know his limits. Now, Jesus told men to turn the other cheek ; He also told them to buy swords to fight people ; He also set them a healthy example by thrashing the money-changers in the open Temple. This may be madness, but it is not limitation. Jesus said, " He that is not for us is against us." He also said, " He that is not against us is for us." This may be illogicality, but it is not limitation.

Lastly, one other argument of Mr Roberts is put in this simple form: "If Jesus was God He knew that the people's belief in diabolic obsession was an error." He does not seem to see that this rather transfers the discussion from the question of whether Jesus was God to the question of whether Mr Roberts is God—a question into which I have far too much delicacy to enter. But I think a man might be a little more modest than to begin two or three sentences with, "If he was God he knew that——" and then add all his own private opinions or all the most ephemeral prejudices of his season and his set. How, may I ask, does Mr Roberts know exactly what God thinks about diabolic possession? To understand men or the most ordinary life is mystery enough for most of us; and here is an enlightened gentleman who not only knows about God, but knows God's private opinion upon the mystery of evil. One would think that the meditations of the Omniscient upon the subject of devils might reasonably be left undisturbed. But since the indiscretion has already been committed, and Mr Roberts is in possession of the Divine view of the relations between moral evil and animal torture, I suggest that he should tell us at once what they are, instead of taking, with this mistaken shyness, the indirect method of attacking Jesus of Nazareth. Who hath laid the measure thereof, declare since thou knowest? or, who hath stretched the line upon it? Have the gates of death been open to thee, or hast thou seen the doors of the shadow of death? What is pain? What are devils? What is the relation between the body and the soul, between the soul and the other souls outside it? Do Mr Roberts and I know so much about any of these things that we should say that there is no such thing as diabolic possession? Is there any particular logic in denying that the Son of God might cast our devils out, merely because most modern doctors are obliged to leave them in? But Mr Roberts is hardly enough of a Catholic to be an agnostic; and it may be that this sort of intellectual humility appears to him merely hazy and remote. I will appeal to him upon

a side on which I am sure he is sensitive. I will point out to him that he is decidedly behind the times. He is by no means modern. Psychological science in our time has come uncomfortably near to a belief in the casting out of devils. Dual personality is surely something uncommonly like diabolic possession; it seems only to resolve itself into a delicate problem of which person should be thrown out. Moreover (and this is yet more important), if you had asked any of the manly old freethinkers, Tom Paine or Diderot, to believe in dual personality, they would have told you that they would just as soon, while they were about it, believe in diabolical possession. In the very issue of the *HIBBERT JOURNAL* in which Mr Roberts takes it for granted that God Almighty is an early Victorian rationalist, there are no less than three articles dealing with psychical marvels which all the early Victorian rationalists would have classed with the Cock-Lane ghost. And America is already roaring with a new religion which maintains not only that this or that disease might be a devil, but that all disease is one vast devil—a universal diabolic possession. Surely Mr Roberts might be induced to wait a little while before he deprives his Christ of the only body and the only biography which that being ever possessed.

In conclusion, it is my business, I suppose, to put very briefly my sentiment on the whole subject. I will put it thus. If I take it for granted (as most modern people do) that Jesus of Nazareth was one of the ordinary teachers of men, then I find Him splendid and suggestive indeed, but full of riddles and outrageous demands, by no means so workable and everyday an adviser as many heathens and many Jesuits. But if I put myself hypothetically into the other attitude, the case becomes curiously arresting and even thrilling. If I say, "Suppose the Divine did really walk and talk upon the earth, what should we be likely to think of it?" then the foundations of my mind are moved. So far as I can form any conjecture, I think we should see in such a being exactly the perplexities

that we see in the central figure of the Gospels: I think he would seem to us extreme and violent; because he would see some further development in virtue which would be for us untried. I think he would seem to us to contradict himself; because looking down on life like a map he would see a connection between things which to us are disconnected. I think, however, that he would always ring true to our own sense of right, but ring (so to speak) too loud and too clear. He would be too good, but never too bad for us: "Be ye perfect." I think there would be, in the nature of things, some tragic collision between him and the humanity he had created, culminating in something that would be at once a crime and an expiation. I think he would be blamed as a hard prophet for dragging down the haughty, and blamed also as a weak sentimentalist for loving the things that cling in corners, children or beggars. I think, in short, that he would give us a sensation that he was turning all our standards upside down, and yet also a sensation that he had undeniably put them the right way up. So, if I had been a Greek sage or an Arab poet before Christ, I should have figured to myself, in a dream, what would actually happen if this earth bore secretly somewhere the father of gods and men. In the abstract, it may be that it is still only a dream. Between those who think it a dream and those who do not, is to be waged the great war of our future in which all these frivolities will be forgotten. But among those who call it a dream I have not met many who call it a small dream; and very few indeed who in reading its tremendous record have been chiefly struck by its limitations.

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II.

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A MOMENTOUS question is being asked with great insistence in the thinking world to-day. In venturing a few general considerations towards an answer I shall take as my text Mr Roberts's paper in the January number of this Journal. It would be a mistake to treat too seriously the points there hazarded against the Jesus of the Gospels. Betraying as they do indifference to facts within the reach of everyone, it will suffice to mention two or three samples, as fairly typical of much that we hear nowadays in sundry quarters. In the whole of my discussion, let me say at the outset I claim to be writing as a Liberal by temperament and conviction, owning no external authority whatever which might dictate to conscience in the quest for truth.

Let us note first two blunders from which Mr Roberts would have been saved by a mere glance at the Revised Version. We read (p. 364), "Provident regard for the future is utterly condemned. 'Take no thought for the morrow' is an absolute injunction." Jesus never said anything of the kind. Even King James's translators never imagined that He was discouraging thrift: it is only the change of meaning in the English phrase during three centuries which suggests any such idea. I am not "worrying about the morrow" when I insure my life; I am only "taking thought for things honourable in the sight of all men." Another example may be seen in the capital Mr Roberts makes out of the assumption that Jesus promised a reward to be bestowed *openly* upon the charitable from the "Father which seeth in secret." Here again the ordinary reader of the Revised Version knows that the crucial word is not in the text; it flagrantly defies the whole context.¹

¹ How early this perverse notion invaded the text is seen by its presence in the Lewis Syriac. But it proves nothing but a well-known tendency of human nature.

These two instances will suffice to show that Mr Roberts seeks to reverse the judgment of the ages without taking the precaution against mistakes of fact. But something more may fairly be demanded of him than that he should read the Gospels in a good text and a modern version. It is not much to ask that he should consult some modern commentaries to see what the labours of biblical scholars have achieved towards the recovery of the original words of Jesus. That he has not thought this worth while may be illustrated from his dicta upon the teaching of Jesus concerning divorce. Mr Roberts expressly cites Mark x. 12, and then says: "Throughout biblical times the right of the wife to sue for divorce was not recognised." Professor Burkitt's brilliant discussion of this passage has shown its genuineness, and its appropriateness to the case of Herodias. The verse is accordingly not inconsistent with Mr Roberts's assertion. But it is another matter to declare that Jesus countenanced any distinction between the sexes in the matter of divorce. It is only "Matthew" who inserts the limitation which penalises the unchaste woman and leaves the unchaste man (v. 32, xix. 9). Our oldest Gospel knows nothing of it, and its absence from Luke shows that it was equally unknown to the lost source "Q" (see Harnack's *Sayings of Jesus*, p. 58). Matthew's insertion of the limitation is a fair theme for discussion. I am only concerned to express the belief, generally held by students of the Synoptic question, that Jesus Himself made no difference between guilty woman and guilty man. His refusal thus to distinguish is well seen in the traditional story interpolated at the beginning of John viii., a story unmistakably based on fact. It was one of the many points in which He was sharply opposed to His people and His time.

There is not a point left in Mr Roberts's belittling of the Sermon on the Mount which a sober critical exegesis will not dispose of. It is, of course, perfectly true that "alms-giving implies a failure of social justice." But the supreme motive power which has enabled the modern world to realise this fact, dimly as yet, but with increasing conviction, is the

teaching of Him who rediscovered the "Imperial Law" (James ii. 8), and made men recognise its unlimited application. Every social advance realised since He came has been forced forward by men of vision who saw the implications of His words and drove them home upon the consciences of men: their hearers confessed the obligation when they saw His authority behind it. It is quite true that in many things "Jesus has been unable to get His own followers to obey His rule." But on the Christian theory that is entirely natural. He came just at the time when the world was ready for Him. That is, there were men ready to grasp His great ideals and preach them; and there were conditions which made possible the speedy working out of many of these ideals in a very considerable measure. But with many others it was not so. Most conspicuously His absolute condemnation of war was a "great thought" that "was too great" for man in that stage of progress. It is too great still, though all the most enlightened followers of Jesus recognise its cogency. The "day of the good Lord Jesus" "has only dawned. It will come by and by."

Mr Roberts exaggerates, for the purpose of his argument, the imperfections of our knowledge of Jesus as a historical teacher. He quotes Schmiedel's "pillars," but seems to share the error of a good many orthodox critics of the Zürich professor. Dr Schmiedel has, with pardonable warmth, protested against those who have taken his famous nine passages as the only real certainties he would allow in the life of Jesus. He meant them, he tells us, as conclusive evidence of His historical reality, as against the fantastic theorists who proclaim in the wilderness their pseudo-critical scepticism. I can hardly believe that Mr Roberts personally believes that these cobwebs of a minute school of universal deniers are really deserving of serious treatment. Let me commend to him the severe rebukes which Professor Harnack metes out to less advanced sceptics in some of his latest work.¹ That the silence of non-

¹ Thus *Sayings of Jesus*, pp. 233 f. (E.T.).

Christian literature can possibly have any significance whatever, the critic would have a hard task to prove. He would have to search for evidence that our extant literature ever did trouble itself appreciably with lower-class movements even in the centres of government. That any Greek or Roman writer would have heard of an artisan from Palestine, who taught for a few months and then perished by the sentence of a petty *chargé d'affaires*, is wildly improbable. Our almost total ignorance of other important religious movements, which did not ultimately force their way into general recognition, will be sufficient demonstration. I may refer here to Professor Franz Cumont's recent lectures, in which he urges this fact with all the authority of an expert admittedly supreme in his subject.¹

Perhaps it is not necessary to say more as to the failure of Mr Roberts's criticism of the historical Jesus. I pass to the stronger and more important part of his essay, on the churches' doctrine of the Divine Christ. The difficulty Mr Roberts feels about the Kenosis I shall not discuss as a philosopher or a theologian—I am neither,—but only from the standpoint of homely common sense. His closing sentences take for granted that the concept "God" is one we can comprehend all round and completely. But that defies the fundamental notions from which all language about "God" must start. If God is omnipotent, how can we deny Him power to limit Himself and become a man? In dealing with the notion of infinity, mathematical science knows how far it can secure sound results, and when the disturbing factor will produce confusion. And, similarly, we can distinguish many fields of thought wherein it is possible for finite minds to contemplate God the Infinite with intelligence, and with a reasonable hope of attaining truth. But there is a point in every such investigation where the factor of infinity comes in and baffles our reasoning; and we have to expect it and understand why it must be so. Now it cannot be denied that the theory of Christianity reveals to us an entirely reasonable motive for

¹ *Les religions orientales dans le paganisme romain*, pp. 13 ff.

an Incarnation. The appearance of a perfect man, perfectly and absolutely human, but free from the faults which blur even the greatest and best of other examples, is an event that we can see to be necessary for the perfecting of the race. We have this attained, on the Christian theory, by the entrance of God into human life in a new form—every human virtue seen in its ideal completeness, and without the weaknesses which in other men detract from the character as a perfect whole. Such a theory may not be at all points comprehensible. As it has to do with God, it would be a contradiction to expect otherwise. But it is obviously reasonable wherever our reason can touch it. Mr Roberts's criticisms seem only to lie against a Kenosis which is imperfectly carried out. To me, at least, no Incarnation is intelligible or capable of fulfilling its purpose which does not involve the production of a humanity which is *real*—as real as my own, but without a single one of the flaws by which I recognise my manhood inferior to the best manhood I know, on the several sides of character and capacity that they affect.

Assume that Jesus possessed a faculty to which man has never shown anything analogous—that He knew the Copernican system, or understood wireless telegraphy, or had other knowledge of the authorship of a psalm than was possible for a man of His time—and His humanity becomes to me an unreal thing: He is no example to me, because He possesses just the one element which makes all the difference in the human struggle to do right. But let Him be genuinely human, differing from me only as an absolutely perfect man differs from an imperfect one, and His humanity becomes an inspiration of unlimited power. Nor can I understand the existence of this perfect man except on the theory—let it mean what it may—that before that human birth at Bethlehem He who brought the first joy of parenthood into Joseph and Mary's home dwelt as Lord in the world of spirit that lies beyond our ken.

Now, of course, if this Christian kenotic theory is true—

and even if the older theories are true, which I find myself unable to follow—the limitations of the historical Jesus are obvious. He spoke Aramaic and sometimes Greek. His intellectual training was what a Galilean peasant's home could supply. The intuitions of genius were coloured by the Jewish conditions and expressed along the lines of Jewish thought. Had He appeared in the land of Socrates, or in the land of Gautama, His humanity would have been very different in its characteristics, though equally perfect in its moral and spiritual equipment. That He appeared among the people which had shown the highest religious and ethical genius, rather than among those who held the primacy of intellect or those who had developed mystical reflexion to its highest degree, is one among many facts that show the Providence behind it all. If God was to speak to men with human voice, every line of thought shows us how the historical record of Jesus satisfies one after another the requirements our knowledge and our instinct realise to be most fitting.

But if the Carpenter of Nazareth had a mission to the world, it is obvious that these limitations must be transcended. He must become no longer a citizen of Nazareth, or a speaker of Aramaic, or a contemporary of the first Cæsars. He must be at home in Manchester, in Bombay, in Peking, in Fiji, with a message that twentieth-century inhabitants of cities and villages of civilisation and barbarism can understand. What is this but to say that Jesus must become Christ, the Universal Man who is now no longer like other men, for He is God and man in one? The germs of this conception must have fallen into the mind of the first missionaries as soon as ever they crossed the borders of their own country. In the fertile intellect of Paul, the Jew, the Greek, the Roman, the idea soon sprang to its full maturity. His relative indifference to the details of the great Teacher's life is fully explained by his realisation of His world-wide significance. A perfect human life, offered to God in obedience that did not stop short of death on the cross, was being made available for every

man on the earth, to be an immanent Divine humanity that could supply power for perfect living. That was Paul's Gospel, drawn from his own experience, and the insight of a unique spiritual genius. And if Paul could understand it from what he saw in missions within the old Roman Empire, cannot we see it more convincingly still, if possible, from missions that cover the world? It is perfectly fair to ask for credentials of the stupendous claim that is made for Jesus as Christ, nor do I object to the demand that they should be "credentials which would never have occurred to a Paul or a Plutarch." But *si quaeris, circumspice*. Read such a survey of the world outlook as is presented in Mr J. R. Mott's remarkable speech in the Albert Hall last November.¹ See how in every part of the world men and women of every race and every state of culture, or absence of culture, are pressing towards Christianity, while the old Christian states slumber oblivious, and only a handful of enthusiasts are awake to the opportunity. What is this that is sweeping over Korea like a prairie fire, drawing Brahmin and Pariah in India, taming the cannibal in the New Hebrides within one missionary's career, and at the same time winning the devotion of the lowest and the highest in our own country, the simple rustic and the choicest brains among the young students of our Universities? Credentials! Is not the Bible House in Queen Victoria Street worth all the apologetics in the world? Take any book ever written, the very flower of literature and the supremest effort of human thought, translate it into 412 languages, from Sanskrit down to the rudest jargon of savages, and scatter it broadcast over the world. When that is done, and the books have sold everywhere and brought civilisation and humanity wherever they have gone, it will be time to discuss whether there is anything unique in Christianity.

And, let it be remembered, what has done all this is the New Testament as it stands, and the Gospels first of all. It is

¹ *Modern World Movements*. Published by the Student Christian Movement, 93 Chancery Lane, W.C.

Jesus, then, whose triumphs are witnessed to-day by missionaries in every quarter of the globe. But if this Jesus is nothing more than a supremely good Jew of the olden time, of whom we know very little, so that a learned man from somewhere or other has even determined Him to be a myth, how are we going to explain the way the world is going after Him? The simple fact is that neither Jesus nor Christ could do it: Jesus Christ alone can work the marvel we see to-day. Those who think it all incredible should go and look for themselves. They would find men and women of races and cultures and languages lying poles asunder all taking hold in their different ways of this unlettered Jew of long ago. By an instinct that men cannot explain, they all find in Him their own countryman and contemporary, the Friend of their own daily life, the Strength of their realised weakness. Who less than the Son of Man, He who is Universal Man because He was God over all, could thus meet the heart's needs of every son of man? The earliest message of Christian preachers was "Jesus Christ is Lord." It is the message still, and we win our way to it through paths of rigid historical and higher criticism, comparative religion, and broad unprejudiced modern outlook on the facts of life to-day. To deny it is to throw away the only key that can unlock the mystery of the world.

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MORAL FORCE IN WAR.

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MILITARY history illustrates the eternal truth of Napoleon's dictum that the moral forces in war are to the physical as three to one, and unless a commander not only admits this but is capable of applying it in practice, he is not a true leader of men, no matter how thorough his knowledge of the material aspect of war, nor how great his intellectual qualifications. That so few men are endowed with the necessary intuition to give its true importance to this factor accounts for the fact that many generations of men produce even more rarely a Hannibal, a Cæsar, or a Napoleon than they do a Kepler, a Herschel, or a Newton, whose marvellous calculations and discoveries are not perhaps so much affected by the moral factors. But there are distinguished generals with quick insight who approach more or less to the ideal leader, in the same way that there are many men of extraordinary intellect who approach more or less nearly to the standard of Newton. But, by the nature of things, there is a smaller proportion of men distinguished on the field of battle than in statesmanship, science, literature, or art. The great leader who can save a nation must be gifted with "qualities rare in their separate excellence, and wonderful in their combination."

Of course a sensible man does not despair because he knows that he cannot be a Napoleon or a Samson; he puts in practice the teaching of the parable of the talents and does his

best to do his duty in that state of life in which it has pleased God to call him, and he is satisfied that his mental attainments, or it may be his bodily strength, should reach a reasonable standard; and we must not overlook that for soldiers to rise to pre-eminence they must be, to a greater extent than most other great men, favoured by a happy conjunction of favourable circumstances, such as favoured all the great commanders who have astonished the world by their achievements.

If it is admitted that the moral forces in war are really to the physical as three to one, it must clearly be right to foster and develop the moral faculties during the plastic state of youth. This wise course distinguished Sparta, and is in vogue in Japan, but that it has practically no place in the educational curriculum of the British Isles is only too well known, and it is to be regretted that in the home life, and in the schools, we do not give more serious attention to the moral training—such as inculcating in the young that duty, justice, honesty, truthfulness, unselfishness, patriotism, and so on, should be the moral equipment of every good citizen, and that a good name should be esteemed more highly than material prosperity.

But, unfortunately, a boy's prospects depend too much upon a mere intellectual capacity, supplemented by a good memory, so that no care is taken to cultivate even his reasoning faculties, because success depends upon examinations that are based on mere knowledge, often so wholly undigested as not to be available for any practical application; and consequently, the boy with great force of character and high moral faculties, if without a good memory, is handicapped, and is accounted the inferior of the so-called clever boy, with his purely scholastic attainments, whom he may absolutely distance later in life.

Prizes and scholarships fall, as a rule, to the lot of only those boys who are gifted with good memories—that is, the boys who can acquire most knowledge and retain it, if only temporarily. And yet, why do so few of these early prodigies ever make their mark in after life? The answer is not far to

seek : it is because brains, knowledge, and a splendid educational equipment are insufficient for success in life if unaccompanied by certain moral qualities. What is the use of the highest ability and knowledge to a general in the field if he is lacking in physical and moral courage, in determination and decision ?

It is admitted that a great general must possess considerable knowledge in addition to a strong character and many high moral qualities, and he must necessarily be intellectual, and indeed, to be successful, he requires more and higher physical and moral qualities than are necessary to be successful in any other calling in life. Consequently, it is unreasonable to expect a general to make no mistakes and never to err in judgment. The chances are that a general in command being, like other men, liable to human error, will of necessity make mistakes ; indeed, the physical and mental strain induced by exceptional circumstances of great complexity produce conditions so abnormal that it has well been said by Turenne that when a man has made no faults in war he has not made war long. And Napoleon said : " In the practice of war, the game is always with him who makes the fewest mistakes." Consequently, we should judge of a commander's capacity not so much by his errors as by the great things he has done—even Napoleon committed deplorable errors ; but to judge his errors by the light of the knowledge now at our disposal is absurd and unfair when it is just this knowledge that was not available at the time he based his decision and action on data sifted from a mass of uncertain, unreliable, misleading, and even false reports. Hence the value of intelligence and reasoning power combined with strength of character in a man who has to draw deductions, and who, in the light of later reports, may have to rectify the consequences of any false moves, and with quick insight take advantage of the errors of his opponent. Further, we have to admit that Fortune plays so important a part in war that a general has to be on the watch to profit by her favours, but well knowing that the fickle goddess is given to deception, and may suddenly

turn and rend her favourite. We know how seldom the highest qualities are combined in one man, therefore we should not be surprised that a nation seldom produces a commander of the first order. All this explains why critics find it so easy to point out why a commander should have acted otherwise than he actually did act. It is difficult for them to realise that while everything is known and fixed for them, the general was dealing with dissolving views and had to see everything through a kaleidoscope and imagine what he could not know. It is far easier to describe a complicated machine when its inanimate parts are at rest ; and in the same way it is quite a different thing to criticise a battle after it is over than to deal with it when it is a living thing and its animate parts are moving, and sometimes very differently from the way anticipated by the generals.

Napoleon said : " It is rare and difficult to find in one man all the qualities necessary for a great general. What is most desirable and immediately brings anyone to the front, is, that the understanding and the attainments should be in equilibrium with the character and the courage. If his courage is much superior to his attainments, a general attempts what is beyond his capacity ; and, on the contrary, if his character and his courage remain below his intelligence, he does not dare carry out his plans."

Supposing a British general goes in command of an army, what moral forces can he awaken ? Can he appeal to glory as Napoleon did, to religion as Cromwell did, or to duty as Wellington and Nelson ? Hardly at first to glory, in these days when militarism is openly condemned by public speakers as if it were an accursed thing, like a vampire sucking the very life-blood of the people. Some will suggest patriotism. But has patriotism such a strong hold on the nation ? Well, it is most probable he will make no formal appeal to any moral forces. It is not now a British custom to do so. But what may happen is this. If the commander is a real leader of men, as soon as he has established confidence, he will be beloved

and idolised by his troops, and great victories will call into being many moral forces, but they will be personal to him. Remove him from his command, and his successor will not, at first at all events, have these forces at his disposal. It was acknowledged by the Duke of Wellington that the presence of Napoleon in the army was equivalent to a reinforcement of 40,000 men, and that was in the days of small armies; in these days it would be far more. Surely a great general is a valuable national asset!

It is instructive to study the moral forces that contributed so largely to the Japanese victories. It is sufficient to say that religion, call it any other name you like, enters into the daily private and public life of the whole nation. Boys and girls alike are brought up to treat their parents with honour, respect, and unselfish devotion, and to revere past generations to whom all living men are so much indebted. The young people are thoroughly disciplined, lofty ideals are set before them, and the moral training at home and at school receives the most careful attention and produces that extraordinary patriotism that is associated with a spirit of self-restraint, patience, unselfishness, and absolute self-sacrifice when occasion demands it.

These virtues are the cause of other virtues, so that there is cohesion and perfect discipline in the nation. The people are frugal, sober, and love honour in war more than life. If the influence of religion has weakened in Christian countries, it is important to know why, because religion is a mighty lever in the hands of a general who commands an army of God-fearing soldiers. Are the people to blame, or the priests, or both?

In Japan, the young men and women of the nobility and wealthy classes would think it dishonourable to devote the best years of their lives to idleness and the pursuit of selfish pleasure, because they are taught that it is wrong not to work.

Too much wealth, luxury and ease, and security from foreign aggression develop not favourably the character of a

nation. It is perhaps as well, if the manly spirit of England is to be retained, that security from aggression will become less and less as the navigation of the sea and air becomes easier. Nothing short of that will persuade us that we should rely upon the manhood of the nation, and not so much upon our wealth and our battleships. Rome was never so great as when she was fighting for her very existence against Hannibal. We know what caused the decline of Rome. It is wrong to say that money is the sinews of war. Money or mercenaries never saved a nation. The sinews of war are the flesh, bone, and blood of the people.

“ But who can gauge the emotions, their strange variation of intensity and expression, the weird fashion in which sometimes they will be left quiescent, or sometimes unexpectedly aroused? Who can say what will of a certainty appeal to them?”

Napoleon understood the art of working upon the emotions, but he said he could not impart the secret to his generals. Such an apparent trifle as a strain of martial music, or even the state of the weather, may have a marked effect upon the animal spirits, and the men may be sullen and gloomy to-day who but yesterday carried victory on the points of their bayonets. Will they now advance, or will they retire? Has the limit of human endurance been reached? There is nothing certain in battle.

It is not conceivable that there are many men in an army who care to fight, and risk death and mutilation, with no more intelligible motive than the mere love of fighting and bloodshed.

The emotions do not depend upon reasoning, nor does inspiration. The emotions are great moral forces that may be the cause of the most startling physical effects. Can we give a better example than the marvellous achievements of Joan of Arc?

It requires great practical knowledge of human nature and reflection to understand how a soldier may be clever, accom-

plished, and a good general in peace, or in a subordinate capacity, and yet fail utterly when in chief command in war.

All we can do is to improve our knowledge of human nature, and, by fostering in ourselves the emotion of sympathy, render ourselves capable of viewing the frailties of our fellow-men with more indulgence, and, by so doing, treat them with more justice; but to expect to entirely transform the unemotional or the essentially unsympathetic temperament would be to expect the Ethiopian to change his skin or the leopard his spots.

Darwin states that "the moral faculties are generally and justly esteemed of higher value than the intellectual." This is so in private life, but if it is not generally observed in the army, we must admit that it is infinitely more difficult to gauge the moral than the intellectual faculties of officers, especially if they have not been through the ordeal of battle.

Darwin considers that man's sympathies have been rendered more tender and widely diffused through the effects of habit, example, instruction, and reflection. "It is not improbable that after long practice virtuous tendencies may be inherited. With the more civilised races the conviction of an all-seeing Deity has had a potent influence on the advance of morality." "The moral qualities are advanced, either directly or indirectly, much more through the effects of habit, the reasoning powers, instruction, religion, etc., than through natural selection." How little is done to advance the moral qualities in the young by attention to the reasoning powers, instruction, and religion has already been stated.

To return to the dictum of Napoleon. We find that all the physical factors—population, financial resources, armed strength—were manifold higher for Russia than for Japan, but the victorious Japanese proved that the moral forces in war are, as they always have been, to the physical as not less than three to one.

A physical cause, shot and shell, will produce but a small physical effect in battle, unless it produces also a moral effect

giving rise to a moral force that may produce a great physical effect. And *it is the physical effect that we strive to bring about in war*, but we should first produce the moral effect which in its turn is the cause of the physical effect. War itself is caused by moral forces that arise from moral or physical causes. It would not be unprofitable to consider what have been the causes of the greatest wars from the siege of Troy to the present era.

In naval warfare, the physical cause may produce the necessary physical effect by sinking the ship, but it is even better if such a moral effect is produced that the ship strikes her flag and becomes a prize. *The whole art of war consists in producing the greatest physical effect at a decisive point.* This is so easy to understand that the uninitiated can see no difficulty in conducting war, and no excuse for errors in judgment. But what seems so simple to understand is often so difficult to do, because in war there is a vast difference between the theory and its practical application, and the gulf that separates the simple theory from the difficult practice can be crossed only by men of rare qualities who must be in close touch and sympathy with human nature, which is so easily affected, so weak and yet so strong, so readily elated and yet so quickly depressed.

We observe a great physical effect in a battle: the troops suddenly lose heart and give way—run away. We say the cause was a panic. Then the cause was a moral force which itself had a cause. What was the cause? It was necessarily of a physical or a moral nature. Then here we have a physical or a moral cause producing a moral force, a panic, which in its turn produces a great physical effect which gives victory to one side, defeat to the other.

A panic is “a sudden unreasonable, overpowering fear, especially where affecting a large number simultaneously.” “A fear that feeds upon itself. Men in a panic are frightened at finding themselves afraid.” Well-known examples are the siege of Samaria, B.C. 868; Marathon, Wagram and

Badajos. The causes of these panics are recorded. The Syrians before Samaria were panic-stricken by hallucinations—moral causes. At Marathon a moral cause—someone saw, or imagined he saw, the god Pan. At Wagram the French during the night after their victory imagined a squadron of horse was a great attack—a physical cause. At the assault of Badajos another physical cause—a lighted match caused the victorious troops to imagine a mine which had no existence.

It is a psychical fact not understood, that a panic is infectious and spreads like wildfire. Perhaps something psychical like telepathy explains it. Further, it is not only men who are liable to panic; animals, especially horses, are subject to panic. "The wicked flee when no man pursueth." "Ye shall flee when none pursueth you."

"I will send a faintness into their hearts in the lands of their enemies: and the sound of a driven leaf shall chase them; and they shall flee, as one fleeth from the sword; and they shall fall when none pursueth. And they shall stumble one upon another, as it were before the sword, when none pursueth."

Consequently, a commander has to be on his guard against any cause that may produce against him such a moral force as a panic with its attendant serious physical effects, and at the same time he should strive to cause this force to act in the ranks of his enemy. It should be the aim of a general to depress the *moral* of the enemy while fostering, raising and maintaining that of his own troops. But this is the gift of few men.

Frederick the Great said: "In a lost battle the greatest evil is not the loss of men, but the discouragement of the troops that is the result." "Victories are determined by deeds and their consequences."

Napoleon was in agreement with Frederick when he insisted that a nation recovers more easily its losses in men than it recovers its honour. This accounts for the effects of a great battle often being so decisive and changing the destinies of

empires and nations. That the Romans maintained their *moral* after Hannibal's crushing victories is evidence of their greatness, and is the best example we can adduce of the importance of the moral as compared with the physical factors in the welfare of nations.

Now, this is all fairly simple, because we have only considered physical and moral cause and effect, but there is a third factor, namely, psychical cause and effect, that introduces complexity so abstruse that it would answer no practical purpose in this essay to do more than refer to its existence. For example, thought is a psychical phenomenon that may be suddenly and unexpectedly received in the brain, and be capable of changing the whole aspect of affairs, but all we can do in anticipation is to bear in mind that in war the sudden and unexpected is sure to happen. Nothing is certain in war, and it cannot be reduced to exact mathematical calculations. It is for this reason that a general should sketch out his plans in mere outline only, because it is beyond the wit of man to foretell what will happen.

Psychical phenomena have only recently been scientifically studied, but it is generally allowed that telepathy, thought transference, reflex action and suggestion, may produce great effects. For example, it is suggested to a man, or he suggests it to himself, that he will be successful or be unsuccessful, that he will live or die, and the suggestion may produce a marked effect.

If the general suggests to himself defeat, it soon injuriously affects his troops. During his reconnaissance of the Roman army before the great battle of Cannæ, Hannibal made a jest that was repeated throughout the army, and it suggested to the Carthaginians that their general must be certain of victory or he could not be so light-hearted. It is not impossible that Hannibal's humour may have just turned the balance of victory in his favour.

Let us now consider courage and its antithesis fear, which are moral forces that are of so much concern in war. The brave man draws others on, the coward holds them back.

The bravery of the Homeric heroes and of those of Ther-mopylæ is kept fresh in our memories. Will the Spaniards ever cease to admire the men and women of Saragossa? But how many schoolboys have ever heard of the bravery of the British troops at Albuera, or of the sublime courage of those on board the *Birkenhead* when she foundered in 1852? Why are not these examples, and many others, impressed upon the rising generations?

What, then, are the causes of the moral forces courage and fear, and can we manipulate these forces?

The cause is sometimes physical, and the state of the stomach or health is the best understood, and yet men in bad health have been extremely brave, because their will-power overcame the weakness of the body. Take Marshal Saxe, who won the battle of Fontenoy in 1745, "nearly dead of dropsy; could not sit on horseback except for a few minutes; was carried about in a wicker bed; and had a lead bullet in his mouth all day to mitigate the intolerable thirst."

But the causes of courage are mostly moral. There is some mysterious working in the minds of ordinary men that gives a force of character that determines them to ignore or control the strong natural instinct of self-preservation and to accept self-sacrifice more or less completely. Sympathy, religious emotion, patriotism, a high sense of honour, and pride, are conducive to courage. If the invaders wantonly provoke animosity, they may give rise to such a feeling of resentment as will inspire a courage that will turn the scale in the war. Those who sow the wind may reap the whirlwind.

Some generals have believed that courage is innate, others that it is acquired. Be this as it may, some men, like certain breeds of dogs, appear to be born unconscious of fear, whereas others are born unduly timid. Most men lie between these two extremes. We must, however, be careful to differentiate between the brave man who by nature is insensible to outside impressions and the equally brave man whose nervous temperament is the opposite of calm. A horse is not a coward

because he is an extremely nervous animal. Then we have blind, unreflecting courage as opposed to deliberate calculating courage, and so on. But there is not much profit in pursuing the subject further, except to remark that the true leader of men has his hand, so to speak, on the pulse, and he instinctively knows the temper of his men.

“In all battles,” said Napoleon, “the time comes when the bravest soldiers, after having made the grandest efforts, feel disposed to run away. This terror is caused by a want of confidence in their courage; it requires only the slightest cause, a mere pretext, to restore to them their courage; the great art is to produce it.” Of this great art Napoleon was master: the mere fact of his presence was sufficient to rally his troops and restore their courage.

In other words, a leader imagines instinctively, or by reasoning process conceives correctly, how his men will act under the existing circumstances. He produces the cause which produces this moral force which will move the masses to produce a wished-for physical effect. If the leader's instinct, or reasoning process, is incorrect, the wished-for results do not materialise. The more often he is correct the greater his leadership. Something may happen to interrupt the supposed course of events. If man's judgment was infallible and he had perfect foresight he would not have erred in what he supposed to be the course of events. We have said that a leader instinctively conceives, but really an unconscious process of reasoning takes place, so rapid as to be like instinct.

Religious feeling is a moral cause that produces an almost irresistible moral force. We need only recall the religious enthusiasm of the followers of Moses, Joshua, Mahommed, Cromwell, and scores of others. Religion is such a mighty factor in war that the general who makes no use of it gratuitously deprives himself of a powerful weapon. Indeed, the greatest things have been done by armies of God-fearing men.

Organisation and administration give rise to discipline, which is a moral force. Napier speaks of "the mechanical courage of discipline," and we have heard of the practice of the parade-ground becoming the instinct of the battlefield.

We now come to leadership, and commence by stating that it may be possible to overestimate the value of experience to a genius for war, but the ordinary man cannot acquire a sound military judgment without laborious study, reflection, and practical experience. Errors in judgment are generally the result of deficient intelligence.

But when all has been said, the great general is only one small physical unit; and yet he may move, according to his will, hundreds of thousands of similar units and masses of physical matter—that is to say, a whole army with its impedimenta; and more still, he may perhaps also move the opposing army. How does he do it? Certainly not by his muscles. Then it must be something psychical. Simply stated, the brain of the general conceives an idea or thought, and finally a wish or intention. The next step is to convey this wish to many other brains and make it their own, because the troops themselves must move their own muscles in response to the idea, thought, or wish. The something psychical that has been referred to is a God-like faculty that in our present ignorance cannot yet be fully analysed, but we must admit its existence, and that the intangible psychical idea or thought does pass over through the medium of the brain into the material world where physical phenomena alone can be seen, heard, or touched. In other words, the idea, thought, or wish becomes materialised.

Sir Oliver Lodge says: "Consider what occurs during speaking and writing. An idea is conceived in the mind; but in order to make itself known or to act as a stimulus, it must move matter." In other words, the muscles of the throat or hand. "The rearrangement of matter is all that we are able to accomplish in the physical world. The only way we can touch the material world is through our muscles. But

a thought belongs to a different order. How can it get itself translated into terms of motion? Physiology partially informs us of the method, and the brain is the organ of translation. But what stimulates the brain? In many cases reflex action; though since that involves no consciousness, it is of small psychical interest. By what means the psychical gets out of its region into the physical no one knows, but it is a process on which discovery is possible. The brain is definitely the link between the two universes or modes of existence. It may not be the only link, but it is the only link we know of."

Now, let us try and apply all this to war. The general has an idea; he wishes to move matter (his troops) from their position to another position, and perhaps one already occupied by the enemy. How does he do it? That is to say, how does he get his idea or thought translated into motion?

Well, he begins by translating his thought through the organ of the brain into the motion of the muscles required for speech or writing, or, in other words, he materialises his thought so that it may be communicated to others by means of their ordinary senses, and in this way his thought or idea is also conceived by each one of his soldiers, and each one at the proper time translates that idea into motion, and so the whole mass of matter—the army—moves in the required direction, overcoming the resistance offered by gravity and by the opposition of the enemy, or refuses to be moved by the enemy if such is the idea. But what is the practical use of all this? Before answering, we must ask another question. How is it that one general can get his troops to move, or stand fast, according to his wishes, whereas another cannot do so, or not nearly so well? It is because of his superior ascendancy over the minds of his men. That is a characteristic of the man and cannot be created by study; but if it exists, it can be developed by increased knowledge of human nature that is acquired by experience and by a greater capacity for sympathy as the years go by. Well, the practical use of all this is that, in selecting leaders, far more weight should be given to personal character-

istics that carry with them ascendancy over the minds and wills of others, and less weight should be attached to mere professional knowledge, capacity to pass good examinations, and do good work in the office. The men follow their officers, and if from want of professional knowledge disaster should result, the officers have much to answer for. Therefore we must not slight the examination test. To be a real leader, a man must inspire confidence, and an officer without sufficient professional knowledge would not inspire confidence.

The great leader gives birth to the great moral forces, and he controls these forces, as did Alexander, Hannibal, Scipio, Cæsar, Cromwell, and Napoleon. He obtains ascendancy over the minds of men. He rides the whirlwind and directs the storm of human passions. He appeals through the imagination, affection, and conscience to love of honour and glory, enthusiasm, *esprit de corps*, patriotism, resentment, self-interest, pride of race, birth, religion, self-sacrifice, loyalty and devotion. He is everybody and everything, the life and soul of his army; his army is as nothing in comparison. Has not history proved it? It has been said, better an army of deer commanded by a lion than an army of lions commanded by a deer.

It was Hannibal and Napoleon who crossed the Alps; their armies only followed. "Of all that befell the Romans and Carthaginians," says Polybius, "good or bad, the cause was one man and one mind—Hannibal." It was Mack who surrendered at Ulm, Bazaine at Metz, and Napoleon III. at Sedan. Of course, a general may be defeated, but the circumstances may cover him with honour and glory, as Leonidas at Thermopylæ.

Under modern peace conditions, preferment perhaps necessarily goes to the intelligent, hard-working officer whose patient spirit frets not under the drudgery of office routine, possibly a man without any force of character or any of the high qualities requisite in a leader. Consequently, the ranks of the army are far more likely to produce a Mack than a Cromwell, and the great leader has in the strife of political life a fairer field and more scope for his commanding character-

istics. Indeed, it may happen that a man may, through force of circumstances, make no headway at all in the military profession for which under different conditions he was a born leader. At all events, it is significant what a small proportion of modern generals have been great men. A man is not great because he is a great general—he is a great general because he is a great man.

Great leaders are abnormal, and no two can resemble each other. Each must command in his own peculiar way. Wellington and Nelson always appealed, and not in vain, to a sense of duty; Napoleon never, but always to glory. Some leaders harangue their troops, others do not; but each one in his own peculiar way may produce the moral force he desires.

Marshal Saxe was right when he said that it is not the big armies that win battles; it is the good. And, notwithstanding the mechanical inventions for the destruction of life, small armies of brave, disciplined, well-equipped, and well-commanded troops will in the future, as in the past, vanquish large armies, however brave, if they are ill-commanded, ill-trained, ill-disciplined, and consequently lack confidence and cohesion.

In modern warfare the moral forces are perhaps mostly produced by moral, less often by physical causes. The moral causes are invisible, inaudible, intangible and mysterious. There is that mysterious action of the mind, and apparently between mind and mind otherwise than through the known organs of the senses. "When one has no fear of death," says Napoleon, "one causes this fear to enter the enemy's ranks." It is not so much the gun as the courage or fear of the man behind the gun.

In war, the moral forces act upon living bodies of men. Sir Oliver Lodge considers that "life is not a form of energy, but is a guiding or directing principle which can utilise and control terrestrial matter and energy to definite ends, producing results that would not otherwise have occurred, such as the nests of birds and the buildings of men." It is clear that Sir Oliver considers a living man to be an incarnation of soul in

matter, a temporary incarnation by a permanent entity or perhaps a part of a permanent entity.

Sir Oliver asserts that life is dependent on matter for its phenomenal appearance and manifestation, and for all its terrestrial activities, but otherwise it is independent of matter. The mind or life incarnated in man is competent to disarrange or interfere with matter—in other words, there is human guidance and spiritual control of matter, of energy, and of other lives and minds. “There was a magnetism about Marlborough,” says Lord Wolseley, “which made itself felt in every society which he frequented, and worked like a spell upon all who came within the circuit of its force.” Napoleon at St Helena said: “I have inspired multitudes to die for me; and then my presence was required; the electricity of my look, my voice: a word from me, then the sacred fire was kindled in all hearts. I certainly possess the secret of that magic power which carries away other people’s minds; yet I could never communicate it to others. Not one of my generals ever received it from me, or guessed at it.” Great leaders appear to receive inspirations, and to have the power to inspire their followers according to their will.

In conclusion, what I have been leading up to is this:—that a good general can produce, and then guide and control, most potent moral forces, so that they will affect the minds and, through the minds, the material bodies of the men who compose not only his own but the opposing army also, and thereby produce the most startling physical effects which may mean victory for one side and defeat for the other; and if Governments are to select the true leaders they must not continue to ignore that in war the moral forces are to the physical as three to one.

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THE CONFUSION OF PRAGMATISM.

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EVERY attempt at that kind of reflective thinking which we call philosophy must have its success or failure largely judged by the way in which it treats its own underlying presuppositions. In order to credit this statement it is not necessary to estimate the relative value of that department of philosophy which sets to itself the task of discovering and criticising these presuppositions, and which is sometimes called Epistemology, Logic, or Theory of Knowledge; nor is it essential to espouse either the Kantian or the Hegelian view of its place and value in systematic philosophy. In his own thinking, however, the writer on philosophical topics, even for the most popular audiences and when employing the liveliest style, should be clearly aware of, and should not muddle, the alleged truths which he takes for granted.

To recognise, set in order, and to criticise in the light of history and of human experience the postulates of all human knowledge and thought is, indeed, a difficult task. It is not an easy thing even to do this valuable service, however candid the spirit and honest the effort with which the attempt is made, for any of the several so-called systems, or schools, of philosophy. But for that particular effort at a satisfying result which has espoused the title of "Pragmatism," the task seems peculiarly, even unnecessarily, baffling. So versatile and changeful is its method of ascertaining what is true, so naïve

and varied its statements of results obtained by the method, and so hard is it to tie down to any one form of expression, that the searcher for the underlying assumptions is repeatedly disappointed, and often just at the point when he most flatters himself that his search is about to be rewarded.

Nevertheless, I shall in this paper attempt to discover, and briefly to criticise, three of the many underlying assumptions of so-called Pragmatism. Those which I have selected are, first, its assumption with regard to the method and aim of philosophy; second, its assumption as to the nature and guaranty of truth; and third, its assumption as to the scope and sanctions of the ideas of value, of what men call good and worth trying for as a reasonable aim in life. Inasmuch as the particular writer on Pragmatism,¹ upon whom I must rely for information as to its opinions, has nowhere definitively or with clear implication discoursed about matters of art and the theory of beauty, from the pragmatist's point of view, I must confine myself, in treating of the third class of assumptions, to his remarks on morals and religion. In regard to all these assumptions, however, we shall find ourselves compelled to face three questions: What *seems* to be taken for granted? What is *said* to be taken for granted? and What is *really* taken for granted?

We inquire first, then: What is assumed by Pragmatism as to the method and aim of philosophy? The preliminary answer to this inquiry is given in the form of an assertion, or rather a statement implicating a truth, in agreement with which all who take philosophy seriously will quickly be found. A man's philosophy, we are told, is really the most important and interesting thing about him; its aim should be to "determine the perspective" in our "several worlds," to satisfy our questionings as to what "life honestly and deeply means." This is not, on its face, so different in significance from the

¹ This criticism is based entirely upon the book which bears the title *Pragmatism, A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking*, by Professor William James; Longmans, Green & Co., 1908.

declaration of Fichte, one of the most abstract, rationalistic, and idealistic of modern philosophers, that a man's philosophy cannot sustain the same relation to him, to his true Self, as that sustained by his furniture, but must be an integral and vital part of that Self, in order to satisfy him at all worthily. Who does not see, however, that these very words of the pragmatist imply that somehow we may, at least approximately, "determine the perspective of our several worlds," may discover what life *deeply* means, and by its aid may see "the total push and pressure of the cosmos." But several questions immediately recur. By what specific method shall we reach after, even if we do not reach, this desirable but extremely difficult point of perspective? What is the scope of the life which demands these deeper satisfactions; and what right have we to assume their superior value, or the possibility of man's reflective thinking to minister with some degree of success to these demands?

Just as we are raising these pressing questions and are hoping that the attempt to throw light upon them will somewhat promptly begin — especially since, as the very name Pragmatism suggests, the test of excellence and truth is found in *practice*—we are led away to hear how the rationalists and idealists have been self-deceived by too much confidence in that which was, with them, merely individualistic and temperamental. Alas, they have also deceived others, and Pragmatism will put an end to this deception. There is undoubted historical truth in this view of temperamental influences. But instead of showing how the diversity of philosophies presents the truth from the various points of view as to that which philosophy seeks—the universal and the true—and following this by a warning to every thinker to know his own temperament, and, as far as possible, to be reasonable and guard himself against being led astray by it, we seem to hear commended, rather than cautioned, the *trust* in temperamental attitudes toward philosophical problems. Only the temperament must be the highly emotional and practical attitude of so-called Pragmatism.

Now every trained student of the physical and natural sciences knows, or ought to know, what is his own so-called "personal equation," and just where he must distrust it; must consider candidly and respectfully the testimony of others, hold judgment in abeyance until he has looked upon the subject as much as possible on all sides, and with other eyes, if he would to some good purpose pursue the scientific method to its successful result. This same thing, as to method, every amateur or trained philosopher knows, or ought to know, equally well. And if he does not know and practise it, no matter how suggestive his theories or seductive his style, he forfeits his claim to the philosophic temper; his method is not the philosophic method for determining "the perspective of worlds," or for satisfying these "deeper needs" of the human mind. For *reason*, in the narrower meaning of that word, has its own life, its important part in determining the philosopher's perspective, and its demands for satisfaction for its own self by its own work. So far forth, rationalism stands for ever secure.

When, then, we are subsequently reminded (p. 168) that, if the lecturer were suddenly to break off serious discourse upon philosophy and "begin to sing 'We won't go home till morning' in a rich baritone voice," it would cause his audience not only to doubt his sanity, but might also alter their opinion of the pragmatic philosophy, the illustration, so far as it is pertinent at all, tends to confute the argument it is somehow intended to support. Such a breach of rational procedure ought, indeed, to discredit the rationality of any philosopher. That the person Nietzsche died in the madhouse can scarcely fail to throw some shadow over the sanity of Nietzsche's thinking; just as the opium-eating of Coleridge obviously clouds his otherwise often profoundly incisive dreams. But every calm and well-poised mind, on reflection, profoundly feels and deliberately judges that such tests ought to have nothing to do by way of determining the truthfulness of the pragmatic or any other system of philosophy. And it is some deeper fault in the conception and execution of the

task of the reflective thinker which has caused Pragmatism to suffer from such misconceptions as the following: "A favourite formula," says Professor James (p. 233), "for describing Mr Schiller's doctrines and mine is that we are persons who think that by saying whatever you find it pleasant to say and calling it truth you fulfil every pragmatistic requirement." This is, indeed, a manifest exaggeration of the valid charge against Pragmatism. But it is only one of innumerable examples of the fact that the *apparent* method of philosophising adopted by it is too often a sort of wilful emotionalism; and that its aim frequently seems to be to satisfy the sensational cravings of the unthinking crowd. But surely such a method can never enable us to determine the "perspective of the several worlds," or to meet the deepest needs of the human mind; much less even can it give us insight into "the push and pull of the cosmos."

When, however, we ask the pragmatist to state his views more clearly, if in less impressive and emotional manner, as to the real method and aim of philosophy, we get answers like the following: "The pragmatic method . . . is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences" (p. 45). The pragmatist "turns towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action and towards power" (p. 51). Pragmatism asks of every philosophical opinion: "What difference would it practically make to anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true?" (p. 45). By this method it expects to reach the end of philosophy and settle "metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable." Thus it is to prove itself "just the mediating way of thinking" which all men require—all, that is, except the great body of would-be philosophers who remain outside the pragmatist fold, and thus are liable to be derided and rejected by that multitude who are to be saved from rationalism and idealism by the pragmatic method (p. 40). For Pragmatism is to act as a universal solvent for all stiff theories of the universe, a reconciler of opposite and

conflicting opinions. "It agrees with nominalism, for instance, in always appealing to particulars; with utilitarianism in emphasising practical aspects; with positivism in its disdain for verbal solutions, useless questions, and metaphysical abstractions" (p. 53). It will do for science and religion what Mr Spencer had it in his heart to do, but miserably failed of accomplishing, because he did not understand the pragmatic method; it will reconcile them to the satisfaction of both materialism and Christian theism (p. 39 f.). For, like Spencerian agnosticism, Pragmatism feels "its heart to be *in the right place* philosophically."

Now this aim at reconciliation is universal with philosophers of every age and school; it is of the very essence of philosophy. In the only place in which, so far as I am aware, I have the honour to be mentioned by pragmatist philosophers, I am said to be "tightly squeezed" between absolutism and agnosticism, because my attempts at the discussion of philosophical problems, however "fair-minded and candid," are not "radical in temper." The resulting philosophy is, therefore, "a thing of compromises." "It lacks the victorious and aggressive note. It lacks *prestige* in consequence" (p. 18). It would be sad, indeed, if my deficiency of temper called "radical," with its "victorious and aggressive note," were the only distinguishing difference in these contrasted methods of attempting reconciliation by a "fair-minded and candid" examination of the truth that is in any and all of the current scientific and philosophical opinions.

No; the superior excellence, the "victorious and aggressive note," of the new pragmatic philosophy must be due to the nature and the success of its method. We turn, then, again to the inquiry: What really *is* the method employed by so-called Pragmatism as itself "a thing of compromises," a hopeful means of "settling metaphysical disputes that might otherwise prove interminable"? Here all hinges upon the meaning given to the word "practical," and to such phrases as "practical consequences," "practical differences," etc. And

here I at once protest that nothing can be vaguer than the popular notions attaching to such terms; and that nothing in the popular speech or in the pragmatist vocabulary is more misty, uncertain, and essentially indefinite than the use made of just these same terms. If, indeed, we cover by the word "practical" all kinds of human activities, everything that man does by way of thinking, feeling, conduct, and by the terms "practical consequences" and "practical differences," everything in the past, present, and future, whether by way of suffering and achieving, or by way of interpreting and explaining the "perspective of the several worlds," the satisfaction of humanity's deepest needs, the "feeling and seeing the push and pull of the cosmos,"—then, of course, not only philosophy, but science, politics, business, work and play, loving and hating, sinning and growing holy, are all to be tested for their value and their truth in the same way. But, understood thus, the formula becomes absolutely worthless, just because of its being absolutely and unquestionably true. Yet, in philosophy, as in every other sphere of man's living and action, and even in philosophy more peremptorily, the same questions perpetually recur: What sort of the practical? *Practical* for whom, and when, and where? *Consequences* of what sort, how measured, how determined, how realised, how known? *Differences* also, of what sort, how estimated, how motivated, by what possible means to be adjusted or arranged? Any satisfactory answer to such questions as these can be attained only by that fair-minded, candid, and clear reflective thinking, on the basis of what is universal in human experience, which is the true method of philosophy—a method that includes, but is not limited by, the method virtually prescribed and actually employed by so-called Pragmatism.

But when this same Pragmatism ceases boastfully to discourse of its superior method, and for the most part forgets to employ method at all, it naïvely and unconsciously strikes a truer though less shrilly triumphant note. Then we detect, amidst the confusion of sounds, an assumption familiar to all

philosophers and of necessity made use of by them all. Then we hear how "the most violent revolutions in an individual's beliefs leave most of his old order standing" (p. 60). Nor is this old order so purely individualistic. For in all cases the influence of these beliefs is "absolutely controlling." The truth of new theological ideas "*will depend entirely on their relations to the other truths that also have to be acknowledged*" (p. 73). And this is as true of science as it is of theology. In the midst of all changes of opinion, there are "certain forms of thought" to which "no one escapes subjection." There are "common-sense *Denkmittel* which, in practice, are uniformly victorious" (p. 180 f.). [It seems, then, that even practical consequences and practical differences are subordinated to these universals.] Nor are these forms of thought, these common-sense *Denkmittel*, without guaranty in the world of reality. For although the pragmatist may propose a rejuvenated form of Mr Spencer's worn-out theory as to how the race arrived at these universals (p. 170 f.), he none the less believes the warrant for them to be bedded in the very structure of the universe itself. Somehow, the microcosmos (human mind) answers to the macrocosmos, the universe on which it is dependent. Pragmatism—to be sure—does away with a "static correspondence" between the two (as though, indeed, any modern thinker conceived of this relation in so ridiculous terms); and for this it substitutes "a rich and active commerce." All and the "*eaches*" must be somehow coherent, although we are far enough at times from seeing just how. There is, indeed, a real world-order; and in some sort "the notion of the absolute world is indispensable." Our astonishment is the less, then, when at the end of the chapter on the "Pragmatist's Notion of Truth" we read: "It is the pragmatists and not the rationalists who are the more genuine defenders of the universe's rationality" (p. 235). This we cannot admit. "Genuine defenders" they are not, in any genuine meaning of such a term. But *rationalists*, in reality, as respects the true and only method of philosophy, they

certainly are ; as, in very truth, every reflective thinker must be. For the method which makes the underlying assumption that between the real universe, meaning by that the complex of things naïvely assumed to be somehow outlying the human mind, and this same human mind, there is a rich and active commerce, is an assumption indispensable to every attempt at the solution of "metaphysical problems."

We conclude, then, with regard to the philosophic method of so-called Pragmatism, that it too often has the seeming to justify its reputation of being a species of wilful emotionalism ; that it defines itself in such a way as to render it either unintelligible or unavailing ; but that when it forgets itself so far as to reveal its underlying assumption, it is quite properly rationalistic to the core. While as to philosophic aim, Pragmatism is only trying to do what all reflective thinking tries to do—namely, discuss the problems implicated in the facts of experience, so as to harmonise and unify as far as possible the truths that are in them. And to accomplish this in some good measure, a fair-minded and candid examination at the court of reason, whether it wins popular applause and acceptance for the moment or not, is safer, and finally more productive of truth and other forms of *practical* good than is the use of the aggressive and victorious tone and the brilliant and captivating style which characterise the pragmatic method.

A criticism of that portion of the pragmatist's doctrine, on which he seems especially to pride himself, and which has been, perhaps, most elaborated to some really good purpose, confirms the truth of what has already been said. For, in its assumptions as to the nature and guaranty of truth, Pragmatism repeats many of the same fallacies, and confirms our estimate of certain of its deficiencies—though not so conspicuously as is the case with its treatment of the method and aim of philosophy. Indeed, in discoursing upon the "Notion of Truth," it is difficult always to maintain the same triumphant and aggressive note, or to make anyone see clearly the value of

your results, unless you are more ostensibly rationalistic. For is not a notion of truth which is not rationalistic impossible and self-contradictory ; since even Pragmatism believes that truths are the "good" things of reason, are reason's satisfactions ? The assumptions of the pragmatist philosophy, which underlie its so-called logic, are no less rationalistic and no more practical than are those of Kant or Hegel when dealing with the same difficult topic. On the contrary, the positions taken and held for the discussion of this difficult branch of philosophy are, in important respects, much inferior to those defended by either one of these great but divergent philosophies.

In order, however, even briefly to criticise or comprehend the pragmatist's notion of what truth is (or rather, if they please, what truths are), and of how truth lays hold upon and claims the allegiance of the human mind, it is first necessary to expose an error in its psychological conception and doctrine. This error may in a measure explain why the pragmatist or Schiller-Dewey view of truth has been so "ferociously attacked by rationalistic philosophers and so abominably misunderstood." Why should it be attacked by rationalists, since it is itself rationalistic to the core ? and why misunderstood, unless it be due to its unfortunate style, since it has already passed into the stage of being "admitted to be true, but obvious and insignificant" ? (p. 198).

The psychological error to which I refer connects itself with the vague and improper use of that much abused word "idea." We are continually told about true and false *ideas*. We are asked to grant an idea to be true and then ask what concrete difference this makes with practice—and all, in order to test conclusively the claims of that same idea to be true (p. 200). We listen to talk about ideas *agreeing* or *disagreeing* with reality ; and we are informed that although truth is a property inherent in ideas, it is not a "stagnant property." For truth just *happens* to an idea. The idea "*becomes* true, is *made* true by events." "Its verity *is* in fact an event," a process ; the process, namely, of its verifying itself, its veri-

fication. Its validity is the process of its valid-*ation*" (p. 201). As for so-called true and false beliefs, they are simply *relations among purely mental ideas*; and our ideas must agree with realities, be such realities concrete or abstract, be they facts or be they principles, under penalty of endless inconsistency and frustration (pp. 201 and 211). As this talk about ideas and the relations of ideas reverberates in our ears, we seem to be thrown backward into the days of Locke and the contemporaneous French School; we rub our eyes and look intently at this new-born child of Pragmatism, to make sure that we are not indeed dreaming. But as for *facts*, they are, essentially considered, neither true nor false; they just simply are, and that is the end of it.

Now, properly speaking, ideas, as ideas, are neither true nor false; and so long as they remain mere ideas they cannot be spoken of as agreeing or disagreeing with so-called "reality." What is this process which, according to Pragmatism, *happens* to an idea, to convert it into a truth or a falsehood? How does the idea *become* true, or get *made* into a truth; and what is the precise nature of that *event* or *process* in which verification or the validating of truth consists? Psychological analysis, quite irrespective of debated epistemological doctrines, pragmatist or otherwise, can give only one answer to such questions as these. Only *judgments*, and not ideas at all, are true or false; and only by processes which link judgments together can man arrive at the verification or discrediting of his beliefs. Nor is there any truth of fact, any fact in reality for the human mind, unless psychological judgment, affirming or denying, is inherent somehow in that which, for the mind, is recognised as fact. For this reason it is that we are made familiar enough with the truth which is maintained in the self-contradictory but illumining jest—that there are more false facts than false theories. Or, as one of the greatest men of science once said to the writer: "If you want an infallible expert testimony as to any (general) fact of science, you must never consult but one expert."

And this is the very essential nature of judgment, the process or event which imparts the quality of truth or falsity to all our mental attitudes, that it affirms or denies relations, in assumed correspondence with facts, not customarily—perhaps never—between abstract conceptions so called, but between concrete things and other things, between actual events and other antecedent or contemporaneous happenings, between all sort of experiences that come—as all experiences must come—under some form of the puzzling and indefinite category called relation. When, then, we hear such astonishing statements as that Pragmatism is the attitude of “looking away from first things,” and of “looking toward last things, fruits, consequences, facts” (p. 55); that “the true is only *the expedient* in the way of our thinking” (p. 58); that we are at liberty “to shuffle our perceptions of intrinsic relation and arrange them freely, inasmuch as the world itself is a kind of muddle or undifferentiated and indifferent plastic mass,”—we do not wonder that those who have respect for the conditions of true and safe judgment misunderstand Pragmatism and even attack it savagely. But this, too, is only its *apparent* notion of truth when stated in lively and picturesque form for popular acceptance and applause.

More seriously considered, how does the pragmatist solve the problems of a theory of cognition, of the nature and guaranty of truth? For an answer, when more precision is demanded, we have the same crude, indefinite, and unsatisfactory use of the terms practical, practical consequences, and practical differences. James tells the inquirer that all truths are only “instrumental”; or—to translate into a phrase which will make the contention more readily correspond to the correct psychological doctrine—that our judgments are true if they are instruments of practical utility. Schiller says the truth is that which “works”; and Dewey, it is that which “gives satisfaction.” But now the questions recur in the same imperative form: *Instrumental* for what purposes, expedient for what ends? that will *work*, when, and how, and to the achievement

of what result? *satisfaction*, to whom, of what sort, and of what value?

Here, again, all this instruction as to the notion and verification of truths turns out to be, when questioned sharply and persistently, either acceptable as a long-ago acknowledged matter of course, or else so vague and indefinite as to be of absolutely no theoretical and—what, for Pragmatism, is worse—of no practical value. For example, the truths of pure mathematics, of the larger part of astronomical science and, indeed, of the most highly prized forms of the physical and natural sciences, have as little instrumental value, as feeble working power, and give as little satisfaction in Wall Street or on the cattle market of Chicago, as do the truths of Hegelism or the Vedantic philosophy. But if we say that all these scientific truths may some day be useful in working man's way to more truths, to a larger and loftier perspective of the several worlds, and that they do now, or if not now, may some time, afford satisfaction to the deeper feelings of man's soul, we are saying something with which no man, philosopher or clown, need have any quarrel. But these pragmatist answers to the problem of knowledge are all as valueless for definition of the notion of truth as they are impracticable for the discovery of any particular concrete truth. Indeed, they are not answers to the question which presses itself upon our attention. They are only vague remarks about tests of certain kinds of truths, and about the feelings with which man's rational nature greets what he believes to have truth.

The answer to the deeper problems is, indeed, assumed by Pragmatism; but it is substantially the same answer which rationalism gives, though disguised under numerous figures of speech, and decorated with much rhetoric that, however, fails quite to conceal its real nature from the critical observer. Nor anywhere, so far as I can discover, is there a consistent and clear-cut distinction made between the two related but not identical inquiries: What is the nature of truth, its "notion,"

so to say? and, How do we test truths in order to assure us of their validity? In reply to the second and much easier of these two questions we are given such commonplaces of logic and philosophy as the following: The only test of any probable truth is, what fits every part of life best, and combines with the collectivity of experiences' demands, nothing being omitted? This is undoubtedly so, although, as furnishing a safe method for any of the particular sciences, theoretical or practical or experimental, it is a declaration as barren as it is indubitable. Again, the two inquiries are mixed up together and viewed in an emotional, rather than logical way, when, in answer to the question, "Whether we ought ever to deny ourselves the *good* we seem to get from holding any particular belief," we are told, No; unless the "vital benefit" got from this belief proves "incompatible" with the "vital benefits yielded by other beliefs" (p. 77 f.). For, "in other words, the greatest enemy of any one of our truths may be the rest of our truths." The net result of which exposition would seem to be that truth is a species of good, and that its test in the concrete instance is a species of internal consistency or compatibility. But what gives the pragmatist, or the rest of us, the right to assume the validity of any such test, and the duty of postponing our individual satisfactions in the intervals of this test? What kind of experience also is to be trusted for *proof* of this disastrous incompatibility between what seem to different minds, and to the same mind at different times, the clash of vital interests?

When Pragmatism digs a little deeper in its effort to discover the nature and foundations of the notion of truth, it finds itself obliged to confess to a certain unity of the universe, or so-called real world. Indeed, the world is one in more than one meaning of the word "One" (p. 132 f.). And to this conclusion there can be no objection. But we must realise *intellectually*—and not merely emotionally, as do the "Christian scientists" and other unscientific mystics, including the philosophical idealists—what is *meant* by the

universal unity. To this also, the rationalist should be, and probably is, the last man in the world to make objections. What, however, shall we assign as the cause of this growing conviction that the "World is One," as it is, in fact, more and more realised intellectually by all the progress of the particular sciences, with their manifold and sometimes seemingly contradictory truths, obtained by the varied methods of discovery and proof which they, severally, deem appropriate?

In answer to this inquiry we have to encounter what is really the most thoroughly and uncompromisingly rationalistic assumption which the history of philosophy has ever known. For one of the authors of the "Schiller-Dewey" theory of truth—its nature and validating—boldly affirms, under the name of "humanism," that, "to an unascertainable extent, our truths are man-made products too" (p. 242). When, then, we speak of an "independent" reality, we have in mind a mere unresisting $\nu\lambda\eta$, which is only to be made over by us. Using the vulgar expression which Pragmatism allows itself, reality, as known by us, "has been already *faked*." No wonder that this doctrine has got for itself the name of a kind of revival of Kantianism; for, in fact, Mr Schiller's theory of the way in which the oneness of the world is to be *intellectualised* differs no more essentially from that of Kant than Professor James's theory of the way man obtained his categories differs from the theory of Mr Herbert Spencer. But what has become of that rich and varied commerce between the human intellect and the concrete existences and relations of things in which the very nature and also the "*verification*" of truths must consist? Judgments, however much they please our feeling or our fancy, cannot be affirmed to be true unless they are somehow compatible, in an order of thought, with that great world-order to which it is the striving of man's intellect to make itself correspond. In the name and words of so-called Pragmatism, then, we affirm: "Woe to him whose beliefs play fast and loose with the order which realities follow in his experience; they will lead him nowhere, or else

make false connections." Now this has been from time immemorial the preaching of rationalism.

But the staying qualities and nobler satisfactions of any attempt at philosophising depend chiefly upon the manner in which it deals with those conceptions that have value—the principles, convictions, and ideals which reflective thinking discloses and criticises, within the spheres of morality and religion. Since Pragmatism claims to test all its doctrines by reference to the practical, and since the sphere of the practical is ethics, while religion, although not throughout identical with morality, is at many points from the roots upward so closely interwoven with it as to make the separation of the two impossible, these doctrines should be especially clear, consistent, and convincing with regard to the philosophy of values. But it is just here that Pragmatism fails most conspicuously. Its unfortunate method, not simply as a matter of linguistic style but also in respect to the more important manner of ascertaining, expounding, and defending truths, when applied to subjects of ethics and the philosophy of religion, as a matter of course causes its real temper and more profound feelings to be misunderstood. And if it frequently is complained of, for treating of duty, and destiny, and God, and the experiences of religion, in a way to suggest flippancy or indifference, it generally has itself to blame.

Fundamentally considered, however, Pragmatism turns out to be, with respect to its ethical and religious contentions and conclusions, either a pretty thorough-going agnosticism or a highly emotional idealism. With its claim that truth is "one species of the good," we have already expressed our hearty accord. In its revolt from the claim of materialism to find "the eternal forces" in "the lower and not in the higher forces," we heartily sympathise. In its contrary contention that "the notion of God, however inferior it may be to those mathematical notions so current in mechanical philosophy, has at least this practical superiority over them, that it guarantees an ideal order that shall be permanently preserved,"

we welcome the avowed pragmatist to our confession of an idealistic faith (p. 106). For indeed, "this need of an eternal moral order is one of the deepest needs of our breast." In respect of the world's salvation our faith, too, is optimistic; but largely because, on the basis of past experiences and present facts, we also hold the "doctrine of meliorism." And then, although we have turned a few pages in the book which instructs us as to the attitude of Pragmatism, *we* have not forgotten what has already been said about the superiority of the faith in an "eternal moral world-order." But because we find nothing thorough, and nothing helpfully new, in so-called Pragmatism, we cling to the rationalistic method of intellectualising our idealism. And we are the more inclined to do this, because we are sadly disappointed and completely dissatisfied with the practical value of this pragmatist attempt at systematic philosophy. It gives us no perspective of the several worlds, nor food for the soul's profoundest needs; neither does it teach us what "life honestly and deeply means," except in so far as, under some disguised form, it borrows and enlivens the assumptions of those rationalistic and idealistic systems it so scornfully derides.

That great artist, Saint Gaudens, in one of his familiar letters, tells us how, when the experiences of life had made him despondent and agnostic, a "deep conviction came over him like a flash that, at the bottom of it all, whatever it is, the mystery must be beneficent." "It does not seem," he goes on to say, "as if the bottom of all were something malevolent; and the thought was a great comfort." This germ of idealism, which perennially springs out of reason, it is the chief business and highest aim of philosophy to comprehend, to cultivate, to expound and justify by comparing it with all the other fundamental facts and abiding growths of human experience. But the method of doing this must be *rationalistic* in the broader and truer meaning of the term. In a word, the aim of philosophy *is* to intellectualise and unify the conclusions derived from the totality of experience, in accordance with reason's abiding

ideals. That this task cannot be fully accomplished by any individual, or within any one age of the world's evolution, nor satisfactorily expressed in terms of any exclusive school of philosophy, it would seem scarcely necessary to affirm.

We gratefully acknowledge, therefore, the attempt of Pragmatism to increase the popular estimate of reflective thinking in its effort to satisfy the deeper needs of humanity for a more profound knowledge of Reality; and as well, to enrich and ennoble in this way man's life of thought, feeling, and conduct. But we cannot grant its boastful claim to superiority in this respect. On the contrary, we are not sure that its unfortunate temper and style, its failure to understand who are the friends and who are the opponents of its own few good and sound positions, and its disregard of some of the most strenuous obligations which are laid upon every scheme of philosophy, will not more than avail—and that speedily—to defeat all its good intentions. And finally, we are “practically” certain that its disregard of a reasonable demand to criticise, first of all, its own underlying assumptions, will leave the confusion of which it so bitterly complains, even worse confounded.

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CHOICE.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

ON almost every question the discussions of philosophers have become a byword. The most diametrically opposed views are advocated with conviction and enthusiasm as the only rational interpretation of the facts. As to the explanation of this extraordinary phenomenon, which radically distinguishes the results of philosophy from those of all the other sciences, opinions differ. But, without exploring all the ramifications of the problem, we may suggest that the psychology of philosophers has a good deal to do with it. As a class, they seem to be constitutionally incapable of seeing both sides of a problem at once. Or rather, having seen one side of it, this perception forms a distorting haze through which they interpret everything else into agreement with it. They are, moreover, invincibly averse from defining all their terms; and all their terms are incurably ambiguous. Each party therefore reaffirms its own convictions in the sense congenial to it, and attributes to its opponents a sense of the terms at issue which makes it into nonsense.

All these characteristics of philosophy are displayed most perfectly in the venerable controversy about Freedom and Responsibility, and exemplified by Mr Bertrand Russell's brilliant but one-sided paper on "Determinism and Morals" in last October's *HIBBERT JOURNAL* (vii. 1, pp. 113-121).

This famous controversy originally grew up on the soil of ethics. It was started by the reply of Greek ingenuity to the Socratic attempt to make a science of morality. Socrates had

contended that virtue was an "art" (which was not yet differentiated from a "science"), and that, therefore, what was virtuous must be a matter of knowledge. The analogy (like all such analogies) was good, but not perfect. If pressed beyond the limits of its applicability, it defeated its own purpose. Strictly interpreted, it implied an extreme intellectualism, which might be made to reduce it to absurdity. If all virtue was knowledge, *i.e.* if knowledge *alone* sufficed to determine virtue, then vice would be nothing but ignorance. Hence it followed both that it was impossible to know an act to be bad and yet do it, and that no one was to blame for doing what was bad, because he clearly did not know it was bad when he did it, and if he had known, would not have done it. Ignorance, however, was no sin; the criminal ought not to be blamed and punished, but to be pitied and instructed.

The logic of this reasoning is beautiful and unanswerable; but it denies two of the great primary facts of moral psychology, *viz.* that men do what they know to be wrong, and that they know themselves to be responsible for such deeds. We see from Aristotle¹ that the Socratic school had no answer to give. They ought either to have questioned the intellectualistic assumption underlying their whole position, *viz.* that human action is always determined by reason alone, and never by deeper-lying instincts, or to have anticipated the audacious consistency of Samuel Butler of "*Erewhon*" fame, and to have developed a conception of *culpable ignorance* which would justify the punishment of disease and stupidity, and the medical treatment of vice. Instead of this, we find Aristotle lamely arguing that though the wilful wrongdoer appears to know what he does, he cannot be really conscious of the nature of his act; while as for the suggestion that the bad man cannot help himself, because he cannot help being ignorant, it is really too extreme, because it would render virtue just as involuntary as vice.

The corollary, then, that the two cases really were alike,

¹ *Nicomachean Ethics*, iii., v. § 18 foll.

that virtue and vice were both involuntary, had not yet been drawn in Aristotle's time. But we can see at once that it was bound to be the next move in the dialectical game, and that with it full-blown Determinism would be sprung upon the moral world, which has been haunted by it ever since. But Determinism has also had another, later and more reputable, parentage in the needs of science and the legitimate desire to forecast events, and it is probably as a methodological principle of scientific calculation that it nowadays inspires affection in most of its adherents.

But they cannot thereby disavow its anti-moral origin, nor lay the spectre of the conflict between ethics and Determinism; and they do their cause no good by the tactics they pursue towards the ethical implications of their doctrine. It would be far more prudent and satisfactory to try to dissociate the scientific postulate from the exculpation of the bad man. The difficulty is a real one and must be faced. It is not met by setting up a counter-bogey to terrify the plain man on either side, and to dilate on the horrors of an indeterminate world in which events have no connexions and nobody can be held responsible for anything he does. For it is not true that these are the legitimate implications of the plain man's working faith in his "freedom" and responsibility, nor is it true that (at any rate for the past thirty years) libertarian philosophers have held a doctrine that could fairly be said to lead to such absurdities. An adroit conspiracy of silence may contrive to prevent the skeleton of Determinism from rattling in its cupboard, and to ignore the real case for libertarianism, while parading a bogus bogey to frighten children and old women; but the very reiteration of old arguments betrays the fact that they continue to be unconvincing to the common sense of men.

All that such tactics can achieve is to render it periodically necessary to re-state the ancient and unsolved difficulty into which Determinism plunges ethics. Mr Russell has not stated it, and has thereby reduced his whole argument to an ingenious piece of special pleading.

Like many great things, the difficulty is extremely simple. If the world is fully determined, there cannot be any alternatives in it. All events are inevitable and necessitated, and could not conceivably be otherwise. This is as true of human actions as of anything else. The crime is inevitable; and so also is the punishment and the illusion that both or either could have been altered by human agency. It is really meaningless, therefore, to speculate whether either could have been different. That we do so is merely a sign of our (inevitable) stupidity. For no man can help doing what he does.

But does he, after all, do what he does? How can *he*, meaning thereby a distinct centre whence actions radiate into the world, *do* anything at all? Has not the very notion of such a centre, of such agency, become a sheer illusion? For consider: every act of every man is unambiguously and unalterably conditioned by its antecedents; and if we trace them back, we can nowhere cut short the causal chains in which all things are caught and fixed. Our thought, therefore, about the antecedents of human action cannot arrest itself at a point where a human being still exists; it passes inevitably on from the human and the moral to the natural and non-moral. Unless each agent is himself eternal—and this hypothesis neither science nor ordinary Determinism would tolerate—he is the helpless product of an inexorable fate, bound to an inevitable past by unbreakable chains, and dangling more impotently on the hook of Time than a worm that is free at least to choose the manner of his wriggle.

This, then, is the real difficulty. Determinism has never answered it. It is vain to protest against the plain proof of the coincidence of Determinism and Fatalism; it is vain to plead that “self-determination” leaves us “free” to do what we will. For it does not give us an alternative; and the “self” which is said to determine our acts must always be traced back on its predestined course to its vanishing point. To imagine, therefore, that Determinism, after annihilating the moral agent, remains compatible with morality, simply

means that the logical implications of the doctrine have not been fully explored.

That so acute a logician as Mr Russell should have failed to see this, and should have been beguiled into attempting futile distinctions between actions right "objectively" and "subjectively," and the kinds of "possibility" attaching to an illusory choice between unreal alternatives (pp. 116-8), is indeed astonishing. Perhaps the explanation lies in the fact that his language is ambiguous. "There certainly is a sense," he tells us, "in which it is possible to choose any one of a number of different actions which we think of"; and again, "when several alternative actions present themselves, it is certain that we can both do which we choose and choose which we will" (p. 118). Does the word "choose" here designate the function of a determined or of an undetermined will? If the former, it leaves the alternatives illusory and does *not* remove the difficulty; if the latter, it is a covert repudiation of Determinism. There is little doubt that the latter is the way in which common sense would naturally understand Mr Russell's phrases; but can Determinism do so? Must it not deny that "choices" mean alternatives; must it not contend that the structure of the universe has from all time determined that we shall be deluded with feelings of free choices, although simultaneously it is impossible not to think that the alternatives are unreal, and that the only possible issue of our "choice" is predestined and inevitable?

Determinists, then, who think their creed compatible with morality, have not realised how far it carries them. The charge against it is not merely that it fails to do full justice to the ethical fact of responsibility, but that it utterly annihilates the moral agent. The notions of agency, power, choice and possibility, and of all the beliefs, words and deeds into which these notions enter, lose all meaning. It is not, indeed, quite true that a consistent Determinism must be speechless, but it is clear that its vocabulary must be very seriously curtailed. Words like "if," "perhaps," "can," "may," "ought," "might

have been," "either . . . or," and their equivalents, would have to be conscientiously expunged from it, and a monotonous "must" would have to take their place. And if, in addition, one reflects that, though all this testimony to the reality of alternatives in life and language would be known to be illusory, we should yet be unable to escape from the illusion, one begins to wonder where the superior "rationality" of the deterministic universe comes in. Rationalistic notions of "reason" are among the curiosities of human psychology; but this deterministic notion of a determined world, suffering from an ineluctable illusion that it was free, would seem to reduce the world to a vast lunatic asylum, in which the patients were not only victims of incurable delusions, but also excruciated by a knowledge of the fact.

Determinism, therefore, cannot be said to make good its claim to rationality and morality. But it does not, of course, follow that Indeterminism is any better. The true lesson of the situation might be that of Scepticism. The alternative views might both be invincible in attack and impotent in defence, and might thus together prove the weakness of human reason. Still this, too, would be a conclusion to be avoided if we can. It would be better to get the human reason out of the pitfall into which it has fallen. Is it not possible to effect a compromise between the conflicting claims?

Determinism, clearly, cannot and ought not to give up its status as a scientific principle. We cannot renounce the right of looking for a determinate connexion between events, for that is the deepest postulate of scientific method. But we need not claim for it absolute and ultimate validity. It is enough if we are entitled always to treat events *as if* they were determined, and if that treatment is true enough to the facts to be useful.

Ethics similarly cannot surrender the belief that alternatives to the evil-doing it condemns were really possible. But it need not contend that habit is no force; that the acts of

moral beings are incalculable, and that every one is eternally free to stultify his past life and present character.¹

Beyond this point our progress will depend on a closer analysis of the conception of *choice*. This conception, we have seen, does not mean the same for the libertarian as for the determinist. For the libertarian, choice is really what it seems to be and what it is experienced as. That is to say, it is real, and really decides between alternatives that are really possible until the decision is taken. For the determinist the alternatives are only apparent. One of them (only we do not know which) is predestined to be taken. The "choice" is only the adoption of that one. Both views, however, give a consistent and intelligible account of "choice," and to decide between them would be to decide the question.

If we decide in favour of the libertarian view, no serious obstacles remain in the path of a philosophy of freedom. For if choice is real, if there really are alternatives, it follows that in choosing between them we are exhibiting our power as real agents, real causes and initiators of new departures in the flow of cosmic change. We thereby prove the existence of free causes. For neither the objection that our doctrine involves a negation of "causes," nor the assumption that "causes" must be fully determined, can any longer be sustained. The conception of cause has entered the world of science from nowhere but from our own direct experience; and if we are free causes that are not incalculable, then free causes may be assumed elsewhere without subverting science.

If, on the other hand, we decide that the alternatives in choice are mere illusion, we cut away the root of the whole belief in freedom; we shall find nothing else in the world that will force upon us so preposterous a notion.

But before we decide, we should at least attempt an unprejudiced consideration of the psychology of choice. Acts

¹ For both these points, cf. Essay xviii. in my *Studies in Humanism*, and an article on "Freedom and Responsibility" in the *Oxford and Cambridge Review*, No. 2.

of choice are surely about the most vivid, real and important experiences of our lives ; and as from their very nature it seems to be impossible that we should fail to attend to them, the verdict of consciousness as to their nature seems particularly worthy of credence. What, then, do we find ? It will hardly be disputed that the alternatives in choice *feel* real ; that we feel "free" in choosing in a way distinct from the feeling which accompanies all our other actions, voluntary and involuntary. Why, then, should not the determinist be called upon to give some good and sufficient reason for his belief that these choices are not really free ? Surely the burden of proof lies on those who allege that what seems to be real is not really so.

The determinist, however, at this point seems singularly lacking in resource. Instead of adducing independent reasons, he simply recoils upon his *a priori* prejudice. To choose freely is to choose without a motive, and therefore irrationally and incalculably. And as this would reinstate chaos, the alternatives cannot be real.

This whole argument is extremely abstract. It takes no account of the psychical experiences, and overlooks an important logical alternative. For it assumes that *indeterminate* choice is the same as *motiveless* choice. But this is neither logically nor psychologically correct. It may be hard to choose, not from lack of motives, but from excess ; the suspense of the will may be due not to apathy and lack of interest, but to the clash of conflicting desires. It is surely a strange confusion which lumps together two such different cases. To have no cogent motive for deciding for either, and to be distracted by strong but contrary impulses, are surely different as conceptions, different as experiences, and different in their results. No real ass would starve, like Buridan's, between two equal bales of hay ; but even an American reporter would hardly induce him to express a preference as between two equal *pictures* of the hay. Psychologically, too, the experiences are different. The mind of the man who has no motive is a blank ;

that of the man who has conflicting motives is a tumult. The act of the former seems capricious and incalculable ; that of the latter seems reasonable and perfectly calculable. *Whichever* way his decision falls, his friends (who think they know him) will say it was just like him ; that it might have been foreseen, and, in short, was thoroughly rational and calculable. And herein they will not be wholly wrong ; for the alternatives between which the choice decides in such a case are plainly rooted in his nature, and consonant therewith.

All of this possibly the determinist will have to admit ; but he will persist in asking—What decides between the alternatives ? Is not the answer “nothing” ? Hence, is not the choice indeterminate, and therefore irrational ? Has not the irrationality been sublimated, and not eliminated ?

The reply again must take the form of beseeching the determinist to look at the facts and to distinguish different cases. Is the kind of indetermination to which the facts point such a very terrible affair ? Does it amount to a total subversion of the cosmic order ? Does it imply an irruption of unbridled and unlimited forces ? Is it effectively the same as the total indetermination which would make a mock of Science ?

Surely it is nothing of the kind. It is an indetermination of a very definite and specific kind ; and to declaim against it because it has formidable congeners is like alleging that it is perilous to keep a domestic cat because a pet tiger would be sure to devastate the household ; and Mr Russell’s argument that one per cent. of indetermination would do one per cent. of the mischief of total indetermination is like arguing that because the tiger would kill ten men in one day, the cat would kill one man in ten days. Surely the determinist should deign to note that the essence of the indetermination is, that it is taken to subsist between alternatives which are separately calculable and individually rational. When they are combined and become relevant to the same situation, it is intelligible that *more* calculation will be needed ; but this is not to say

that *no* calculation will be possible. The calculating instinct of Science, therefore, is not thwarted, but satisfied with an abundance of opportunity. The practical inconvenience to Science, therefore, of this sort of indetermination is *nil*, as Mr Russell himself has finally to admit (p. 121).

Science, of course, always makes the simplest assumptions first. Hence it will always first try to calculate the behaviour of things on the assumption that they have *no* alternatives. But, after all, if that assumption does not work—and in dealing with ourselves it seems to fail—why should not Science contemplate a more complex possibility, and inquire what must be the nature of a reality which contains real alternatives and a modicum of calculable indetermination?

The question is not unanswerable, nor is the answer unintelligible. It is merely needful to introduce a slight modification into the conception of reality. The assumption of a rigid “block” universe, as William James calls it, incapable of the slightest free play of its parts, must be abandoned. In its stead we may conceive a reality that is still plastic and not yet set, with reactions that have not yet grown rigid and unalterable. If this plasticity be real, the future of the world will not be quite determined, but, within the limits of its plasticity, it will be capable of new and alternative developments. At various points there will occur reactions which are variable, because the nature of the real has not yet finally settled down into one of the alternatives; and where such reals are conscious of their nature, they will feel that it leaves them partly indeterminate and free.

That such a conception of reality is not unreasonable may be inferred from the fact that it would seem to be demanded by the fact of individual variation and by any belief in the ultimate reality of evolution. For if the evolution is to be real, and not merely illusory, it must mean a real growth in that in respect to which the world is said to be evolving. And such growth would be impossible if reality were really rigid.

There are, moreover, a good many facts which would bear

this interpretation. The habits of things do not seem to be quite fixed. This is particularly evident in organic nature, and may be directly experienced by us in the formation of human habits. Incompletely formed habits act variably, and their reactions cannot be predicted with exactitude. Now, from their very nature, moral habits must always in general be found among the incompletely formed habits. For in proportion as they grow fixed and automatic, they tend to pass out of the sphere of moral valuation. A being whose nature is so firmly set upon doing the right thing that no temptation to do wrong ever troubles him is no longer, *per se*, a moral being. His virtue has become an irresistible instinct, and he can no longer help doing right. He is supra-moral, that is, moral only as an exemplar of the possibilities of moral progress, to be emulated by those whose moral nature still feels temptation's sting. Conversely, a being for whom the possibility of doing right has been atrophied by the growth of evil habits is really infra-moral. For moral suasion is wasted on him, and no longer strikes a responsive chord. But it is in a being in whom the lower instincts and moral principles are still contending for the mastery that there is real plasticity of habit, real contingency of conduct. In such a being alone are choices real, and not foregone conclusions. For his nature is such that each of the moral alternatives makes a real appeal to him, though to different sides of him. But in such a being the reality of choice and of freedom are one thing and the same, viz. an incident in the development of his moral nature. Hence the existence of moral beings is a standing protest against the assumption of a rigid reality out of which the fallacy of Determinism naturally grows.

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A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN OLD TESTAMENT CRITICISM.

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THOUGH every scholar will admit that many critical questions affecting the Old Testament are not yet settled, it is generally accepted by those who are not bound by dogmatic theories that the main lines of Old Testament criticism may be traced with approximate certainty. I believed so myself for many years, but I no longer hold that opinion.

The time in which the now dominating school of criticism arose was prior to the many discoveries made in Assyria, Babylonia, Egypt, and Syria, and the critics did not understand so clearly as we do, that the Oriental conception of life has always been essentially different from that of the West. The theory of evolution was then prevailing in science and philosophy, and its influence was doubtless felt in critical and historical studies on Old Testament subjects. One looked for the line of evolution in the literary and religious history of Israel, and was indeed happy enough to trace it. The many contradictions, which even the ordinary careful reader of the Bible was often able to discover, gave the ardent scholar the means for constructing a new building out of the scattered pieces of Hebrew literature.

In erecting this building scholars did not always see the great difficulties of their position and the traps that were to be avoided. The Old Testament has been studied for

centuries by scholars who were Christians, and regarded it as a part of the Bible, the holy book of the Christian religion. For centuries, too, the aim of Old Testament studies was not historical knowledge, but edification. Narratives and texts were explained by the scholars in the same way as the painters pictured Bible scenes. The Western ideas of their own time were supposed to have existed in the heads of Bible writers, just as the painters copied Western scenery and Western people in illustrating the Bible. The hymns of ancient Israel were sung by the Protestants of the seventeenth century, and they had not a moment's doubt but that the feelings they combined with those hymns would correspond to the feelings of the Israelitish poet.

The influence of a method that was practised by generations cannot be effaced at one sweep, especially not where religious ideas are concerned—conservatism and religion being usually on the best terms with one another. So we understand that even scholars who possessed a profound knowledge of Oriental history could not always escape the power of the traditional interpretation of Old Testament texts, and yielded to the influence of Western thinking and feeling in explaining Oriental thoughts. In this way the prophets of Israel were represented as not so very different from liberal religious thinkers of our age.

I regard as one of the most striking instances of the power of Western thinking over profound knowledge the interpretation that the late Professor Robertson Smith gave of the first chapters of Hosea. According to him, Hosea married a profligate wife. Three children were born to him, but his wife left him nevertheless. Hosea's affection was not killed. He brought her back to his house and kept her in seclusion. Thinking about the sadness of his experiences, Hosea was struck by the idea that Israel did not behave in a better way towards Jahve. This explanation is accepted by numerous scholars. "It has the great advantage of supplying a psychological key to the conception of Israel as the spouse of Jahve" (*Enc. Bibl.*, 2123).

If we accept this interpretation, we have to assume that the command of Jahve to Hosea (i. 2), "Go, take unto thee a wife of whoredom and children of whoredom," never was a reality for Hosea, but merely the reflex of his psychological impressions of later years. This psychological explanation is of pure Western origin. It encounters the difficulty that the wife Hosea is keeping in seclusion (iii. 3) is different from Gomer, the wife mentioned in i. 3. Nevertheless, scholars are willing to overlook this difficulty, because their Western mind is charmed by the psychological explanation. Now, nearly every page of the Old Testament teaches us that prophecy and revelation of divine commands were realities to the prophets and their people. The prophet was not a man who spoke from his own psychological experience; personally, he had nothing to do with what he spoke, for he did not speak himself, but the Spirit of God spoke through him. The Spirit came and went; and if the Spirit did not touch him, he was not able to speak. And so it is until this very day in Oriental life, where the marabouts and living saints are the representatives of the prophets of the Old Testament. Present Oriental life teaches us still the essentially different appreciation of sexual morals, and the Old Testament itself sufficiently proves that we have to interpret Hosea i. just as it reads.

The criticism of the Pentateuch is of central importance for the literary history of Israel. Here the line of Western thinking has been of great influence upon the critical results. The different sources of the Pentateuch, the Elohist work, the Jahvistic work, Deuteronomy, and the Priestly code were regarded as a kind of books that were published, each of these works being a complete story of a part of the history of the people. Kuenen supposes that the works of the Jahvist and the Elohist appeared in a second edition in Juda. They were originally written in N. Israel. As they did not suit the people of Juda, a new edition was given which agreed with the Judæan ideas. The Priestly code is also supposed to be

an edition of the history of Israel written according to the ideas that prevailed in the Exile.

Lately this theory has been attacked by Gunkel, who pointed out that this pure literary criticism was not able to explain the problems of the Pentateuch. He drew attention to the fact that some of the narratives were doubtless part of old oral traditions, and supposed that these traditions were collected. But the collectors of these traditions became, again, very like the authors of the older criticism; and, after all, Gunkel walks mainly on the same path as Kuenen and Wellhausen.

At the same time, the ethics of the Pentateuch and prophets were interpreted on the basis of Western thought. If we say "thou shalt not steal," we understand by those words that it is forbidden to steal from anybody whomsoever. It was not observed that the Israelites understood by them "it is forbidden to steal from your brother," their ethical feeling being limited to their nation and the friends of their nation. So it seemed impossible to ascribe the ethical contents of the Decalogue to the time of Moses. The Decalogue could only be the reflex of the high ethical standard reached by the prophets of the eighth century. They were regarded as persons of the utmost importance in the line of evolution. Their ethical ideas were embodied in the Thora, and the Book of the Covenant was supposed to be another reflection of the same stage in the evolution.

The ritual and cultus was largely regarded as a product of the priestly hierarchy. The laws dealing with offerings and ritual, therefore, were supposed to be recent. In the pre-exilic period of Israel's religion there was no place for all the details of the laws of the Priestly code. This period was the times of freedom when compared to the post-exilic times.

The religious contents of the Pentateuch were interpreted by the critics under the influence of the old exegesis of the Christian Churches, though they would have denied that they were bound in any way by conservative ideas. Elohim was explained to designate the God of Israel. The Elohist was a

monotheist like the Jahvist. He preferred, for some reason unknown to us, to write Elohim instead of Jahve. He had his own theory about the name Jahve, and held the view that this name was unknown to the patriarchs. The few places where Elohim could not be explained as a designation of the God of Israel were considered to be of little importance, and generally left by themselves.

The idiom of the various sources was carefully studied. Long lists of substantives and verbs, etc. were made, and the idiom was thought a factor of great critical value; and it seemed to be quite forgotten that the few Hebrew texts we possess must be only a small part of the Hebrew literature, that we have not any thorough knowledge about the Hebrew as it was spoken in the pre-exilic time, not even of the way in which the books were written.

In short, the Pentateuchal criticism was in every respect a product of Western thought, Western logic, and Western combinations, which too often forgot that the history of religions and the living Orient were contradictory to the principles of the critical theories.

We have only to look at the results of the recent critical inquiries of the scholars belonging to the school of Graf-Kuenen-Wellhausen in order to see that a thorough application of the critical theories leads to highly improbable results. Words, half-verses, quarters, eighth and sixteenth parts of verses, belonging to different sources, are combined in the most various ways. The number of the Jahvistic and Elohistie writers has lately been steadily increasing; the characters of several alphabets are needed for designating the intricate combinations the numerous redactors have been able to make. A single word very often is sufficient argument for ascribing part of a verse to a different writer, even if it appears only a few times in Old Testament literature. The analysis of the sources is carried out to the bitter end. By the acuteness of scholars, contradictions and parallels are discovered in chapters and verses of the most harmless and harmonious appearance.

Former critics studied the texts with their own eyes, now critics seem to use microscopes.

I wish not to be misunderstood. These remarks do not deny the necessity of a critical inquiry about the origin of the books of the Old Testament. I am fully aware that tradition does not give a sufficient explanation of the literary problems of the Pentateuch and the other books, and I am not a defender of the dogmas of the Churches against the attacks of the "so-called higher criticism." Even the reader of a good translation of the Pentateuch is able to see that the Pentateuch cannot be the product of the pen of one man. What I wish to emphasize is, that present Old Testament criticism has to reform itself.

The history of religions has shown that ritual is inherent to every form of cultus. Even the most simple sanctuaries have their ritual, for where there is a priest there is ritual, and the belief that a mistake in ritual makes the offering null and void.

The code of Hammurabi proved that the high ethical standard of the Book of the Covenant does not represent an ethical and religious life of rare and special character, only arrived at by the great prophets of the eighth century B.C. The same principles of mercy towards widows and orphans, of justice towards the poor, of social feeling, the same love for righteousness, was found in these old laws and in the incantations of the old Babylonians. A complete parallel to the Decalogue is to be found on one of the tablets of the Shurpu-incantations, and the religious hymns of early Babylonian ages have been found to be of the same character as the confessions of sin in the Psalms of Israel.

The study of Oriental folklore has shown that the customs of the present Orient sometimes are a most useful illustration of Old Testament feasts and usages, which have proved to be of an origin quite other than was generally supposed. The old animistic view of life is the background of many things which were once regarded as a highly developed ethical

and religious feeling. The prescript not to seethe a kid in its mother's milk was explained as an instance of the tender feeling of the Israelites, until it became evident that it had nothing to do with such feelings, but was part of customs originating in animism. In the same way, the feast of Mazzoth, the commandment not wholly to reap the corners of the field, Pesach, the day of atonement, and many other customs, are to be placed in a different light from that in which they usually appear.

The *stèle* of Merenptah was discovered; and by its statement that Merenptah devastated the fields of Israel in the fifth year of his reign, the theory of the Exodus in his reign was at once upset.

Travellers studied the population of Palestine and northern Arabia. It became evident that the narratives of Genesis about the patriarchs demanded a careful ethnological interpretation. And the patriarchs, who were always regarded as nomads, without any knowledge of agriculture, proved to be farmers, who possessed herds and flocks. By this simple remark the aspect of the oldest history of Israel was changed at once, and it became evident that agricultural customs and agricultural laws might be of a much earlier date than the monarchical period of Israel's history.

It seems unjust towards Old Testament critics to speak about these things in general terms without proving the soundness of my remarks more in detail. I wish to emphasize that I will not in the least underestimate the great merits of Old Testament scholars who studied in years which had not brought to light the numerous religious Babylonian texts, which had not seen the archæological discoveries of recent expeditions, which did not know the results of ethnological research. In order to prove the soundness of my plea for reform, however, I may be permitted to enter into particulars about one of the main lines of criticism.

It is generally accepted that we find in the Pentateuch a Jahvistic and an Elohist work. Since the days of Astruc,

scholars have learned to acknowledge that the names Jahve and Elohim are guides in the critical inquiry into the sources of the Pentateuch. In both works Jahve and Elohim are the designation of the God of Israel. According to the Elohist, the name Jahve was not revealed until the time of Moses (Exod. iii.).

Now it has been often noticed that the use of Elohim, within the work of the Elohist, is not limited to Genesis and Exod. i.-iii. Elohim is also used Exod. xiii. 17-19, xiv. 19, xviii., xix. 3 and 17, 19, xx. 1, 18-21; Num. xxi. 5, xxii., xxiii. 4, 27, xxiv. 2; Jos. xxii. 33, xxiv. 1, 26. The Elohist work must be of pre-exilic origin, and is reckoned among the prophetic writings; yet, without a single exception, all the pre-exilic prophets call the God of Israel Jahve, and one looks in vain in the Proto-Isaiah, Hosea, Amos, Micah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel for Elohim as a designation of the national God of Israel. Therefore it seems strange that a prophetic writer would avoid Jahve not only in Genesis, but also in Exodus and Numbers, and even in Judges and Samuel.

Elohim appears once in Amos iv. 11, and this place shows the remarkable fact that Elohim meant for Amos "gods," the world of superhuman beings. In this world Jahve was one of the gods. "I have overthrown you, as Elohim overthrew Sodom and Gomorrah," says Jahve. For these words there is but one possible explanation, viz. that Amos does not know that Jahve has destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah. In that case the text would have run, "I have overthrown you, as I overthrew Sodom and Gomorrah." This interpretation is confirmed by Gen. xix. 24: "Then Jahve rained upon Sodom and upon Gomorrah brimstone and fire from Jahve, from heaven." Jahve rained from Jahve is an impossible construction. Originally the verb "rained" must have had another subject, and this can only have been Elohim, Jahve being also (Micah v. 6) a name for heaven, as is explained by the gloss "from heaven" in our text. The narrative of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah did not have its present form in the time of Amos,

but evidently mentioned the Elohim as the destroyers of the cities. Among these Elohim, Jahve represented the clouds.

The same thing occurs in the narrative of Isaac's blessing (Gen. xxvii.), though the right interpretation of this chapter generally is overlooked through the influence of the critical analysis. This chapter is one of those which show us a scene of Oriental life in the most realistic way. The soul of man is a reality, it is the element of life that does not die when the body dies. The soul of a hungry man becomes weak; the soul of a man whose hunger is satiated is vigorous; to eat things one likes to eat is a refreshment for the soul. This conception of life we meet in Gen. xxvii. 3 *seq.* Esau must go out to the field and take venison "and make me savoury meat, such as I love, and bring it to me, that I may eat; that my soul may bless thee before I die." The soul that became refreshed and strong by the savoury dish will be able to give a good and powerful blessing. The blessing is also a reality; once spoken, it will be fulfilled.

Critical analysis has discovered many contradictions in this chapter, and explained the chapter as a composition of a Jahvistic and an Elohist narrative. Elohim is used in verse 28, and verses 7 and 27 write Jahve. In verse 23 it is said, "and he discerned him not . . . so he blessed him"; and verse 27 again, "and he came near and . . . he blessed him." There seemed to be no reasonable doubt about the composite character of the chapter. In looking for further starting-points for the analysis, further parallels and contradictions were easily discovered, and it was believed that the skins of kids, which Jacob put upon his hands, belonged to one version, and the goodly raiment of Esau, by which he disguised himself, to another. In this way it was supposed that verse 23 belonged to another version than verse 27, and it was accepted that the blessing of verse 23 was the parallel of verse 27, and the final blessing which Isaac gave to his son. In that case, however, Isaac would have given blessing before taking the savoury dish. We have seen that it is one of the naïve and

realistic features that Isaac wishes to refresh his soul before giving the blessing. So it is evident that the narrative is spoiled by the analysis, which is quite unnecessary, because the blessing of verse 23 only seems to be a duplicate of the blessing of verse 27 by wrong interpretation of the word. The word "bless" is used in bidding welcome and in taking leave. The Old Testament contains numerous instances of this meaning of the word. In verse 20 Jacob is hesitating on the threshold whether he will approach his father or not. He is not allowed to do so before his father has bidden him welcome. That is the Oriental custom during all ages up to the present day. Isaac is not able to decide whether it is really Esau who is addressing him, and before bidding him welcome he wishes to assure himself that he is not misled. He did not discern that it was really Jacob, and "he bade him welcome." This translation is to be found in commentaries which were not yet engrossed in the chase for contradictions.

Verse 27 writes Jahve, verse 28 Elohim. Notwithstanding this, it is impossible to ascribe the verses 27 and 28 to different sources. "And he came near, and kissed him: and he smelled the smell of his raiment, and blessed him, and said, See, the smell of my son is as the smell of a field which Jahve has blessed. And Elohim give thee of the dew of heaven, and of the fatness of the earth, and plenty of corn and wine." Here the smelling field is the introduction to the blessing, verse 28. The blessing is invoked by the smell of the raiment, that reminded Isaac of the smell of a field moistened by the rain. Evidently Jahve is here the god of rain and clouds. The field he has blessed is smelling as gardens are smelling after a thunderstorm. If verses 27 and 28 cannot be separated, it is obvious that we have in these verses a second instance of a narrative which uses Jahve and Elohim at the same time. Elohim means here the world of the gods, the superhuman beings; Jahve is one of these gods. In ancient Hebrew texts, plural and singular might be written in the same way, so it was easy enough for the later monotheistic priests and Israelitic

scholars to interpret the narrative according to their monotheistic ideas.

These two instances are sufficient to show that the Jahvistic and Elohist theories are not to be applied to Gen. xviii., xix., and Gen. xxvii., for in none of these works is there place for a narrative using Jahve and Elohim at the same time.

A third instance is Gen. xxviii. 11-22, xxxv. 7. The narrative about Jacob's dream at Luz, verse 20, uses Elohim and Jahve at the same time. Jacob saw a number of Elohim. xxviii. 12 says "angels of Elohim," but xxxv. 7 reads Elohim, and proves that the tradition originally alluded to real gods. One of these is Jahve, who stood near the sleeping Jacob and spoke unto him. Afterwards Jacob promised, "if Elohim will be with me . . . and will give me bread to eat . . . then Jahve shall be my God." From this it is apparent that Elohim means the superhuman world of the gods. If he is blessed by this unseen world, he will ascribe it to Jahve and worship him. The primitive character of this verse again is spoiled by the critical analysis, that feels obliged to ascribe the part of the verse containing Elohim to an Elohist source, and the other part to a Jahvistic source, without being able to restore either of the supposed original narratives.

The instances of a promiscuous use of Jahve and Elohim might be multiplied by references to Gen. xvi. (where the name Isma-el proves that the original version of the narrative used also El, otherwise the name would have been Isma-jah), to Gen. iv., ix. 18-27, xxii., xxix., xxx., xxxi., xxxix., to Gen. xi. 1-9 (where the name Bab-el also proves that in the original story El was found). It would, however, demand too much space if I would enter into full details about these chapters. I may be permitted to refer those who are especially interested in critical questions to the *Alttestamentliche Studien*, i.

The oldest tradition of Israel was polytheistic. People believed in the existence of many unseen superhuman powers, and among these gods the national God, Jahve, the god of rain, storm and clouds, thunder and lightning, was only one. But

not all that happened to men was done by Jahve. There is a place in the religion of these Israelites for the protectors of the house, the Elohim, that are mentioned in Exod. xxi. 6. To these Elohim the slave must be brought when he wishes to stay in his master's house after six years' service. The plurality of these divine beings we find also mentioned, Lev. xxiv. 15-16. "Whosoever curseth his Elohim shall bear his sin, whosoever curseth the name Jahve he shall surely be put to death." The critics ascribe this word to P. 1, who is supposed to have written in the sixth century B.C. It is apparent that it must be much older, and belong to the pre-deuteronomic time, as theoretical monotheism was not yet the basis of Israelitic law.

In the post-deuteronomic period the old polytheistic traditions were interpreted in a monotheistic sense. This was very easy, because Elohim was used in these times as the designation of one god, the God of Israel. This is evident from the so-called Elohist psalms. The plural and singular of the verb sometimes were written in the same way. In that case the monotheistic interpretation of a polytheistic narrative not even needed correction of the text. In other instances narratives that were too clearly polytheistic were corrected into Jahvistic ones, as for instance the story of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, and the Tower of Babel.

If we try to penetrate into the religious conceptions of the old Israelites by the aid of the history of religions, archæology, and folklore, we see that many of the old narratives appear under a perfectly different light, and we understand that in many instances the critical analysis has obscured the right explanation of the beautiful stories of Genesis. Then it becomes evident that many laws must be of much older date than is generally accepted. The Book of the Covenant, with its references to the Elohim of the house, cannot be regarded as a reflex of the thoughts of the prophets of the eighth century B.C. There is no reason why the commandments of the Decalogue would not be the oldest document of Israelitic legislation. If we bear in mind that their present form is

longer than the original one, and assume that a shorter form once has existed from which the two different versions in Exodus and Deuteronomy originated, it becomes even necessary to assume that the social and religious commandments which this shorter form contained were given in the desert.

We have already observed that the circle within which ethical commandments were to be obeyed was a narrow one. The ethical feeling originally only regards the members of the same family. As the family became a tribe, the circle became wider. If certain tribes came into close alliance with one another, life would have been impossible if the circle of brotherhood were not at the same time enlarged. Until this day it is a merit amongst the Arabs to steal from a tribe with which they are not allied. The Israelite tribes who gathered round Sinai were united there in one mighty alliance of tribes protected by Jahve, the God who had rescued them from the Egyptians. From this historical fact it follows that the members of the various tribes had to regard the members of other tribes as their brethren. So the commandments, thou shalt do no murder, thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not bear false witness, thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house, became a social necessity. No Israelite ever understood these commandments as we Christians have understood them; and, without any scruples, they have killed the enemies, stolen their possessions, taken their wives, etc., and they have done so in the name of their national God Jahve, who had given these commandments. The critical analysis regards the Decalogue as a product of the religious thought of the seventh or even of the sixth century B.C., because our own ethical feeling has not been sufficiently kept separated from the ethical conceptions of old Israel.

To sum up in conclusion, I believe that an explanation of the text from the standpoint of old Israelitic thought will lead to a reform in Old Testament criticism. We have to

realize that it is a difficult thing to penetrate into the view of life held by a people that existed long ago, and whose descendants are so different from us even at the present day. They had a logic different from ours. Perhaps we may say that they had no logic at all. They did not understand what we call knowledge and science; they drew no line between things possible and impossible; they were not educated by lessons in history, and did not care for future ideals in the same way as we do; they lived just the same kind of life as their descendants in the Orient are living now. Owing to these great differences we shall not always succeed in penetrating into their way of thinking and feeling. But if we try, many critical questions will be seen under a different light.

B. D. EERDMANS.

IS NATURE GOOD? A CONVERSATION.

PROFESSOR JOHN DEWEY.

A GROUP of people are scattered near one another, on the sands of an ocean beach; wraps, baskets, etc., testify to a day's outing. Above the hum of the varied conversations are heard the mock sobs of one of the party.

Various voices. What's the matter, Eaton?

Eaton. Matter enough. I was watching a beautiful wave; its lines were perfect; at its crest, the light glinting through its infinitely varied and delicate curves of foam made a picture more ravishing than any dream. And now it has gone; it will never come back. So I weep.

Grimes. That's right, Eaton; give it to them. Of course well-fed and well-read persons—with their possessions of wealth and of knowledge both gained at the expense of others—finally get bored; then they wax sentimental over their boredom and are worried about "Nature" and its relation to life. Not everybody takes it out that way, of course; some take motor cars and champagne for that tired feeling. But the rest—those who aren't in that class financially, or who consider themselves too refined for that kind of relief—seek a new sensation in speculating why that brute old world out there will not stand for what you call spiritual and ideal values—for short, your egotisms.

The fact is that the whole discussion is only a symptom of the leisure class disease. If you had to work to the limit and beyond to keep soul and body together, and, more than

that, to keep alive the soul of your family in its body, you would know the difference between your artificial problems and the genuine problem of life. Your philosophic problems about the relation of "the universe to moral and spiritual good" exist only in the sentimentalism that generates them. The genuine question is why social arrangements will not permit the amply sufficient body of natural resources to sustain all men and women in security and decent comfort, with a margin for the cultivation of their human instincts of sociability, love of knowledge and of art.

As I read Plato, philosophy began with some sense of its essentially political basis and mission—a recognition that its problems were those of the organisation of a just social order. But it soon got lost in dreams of another world; and even those of you philosophers who pride yourselves on being so advanced that you no longer believe in "another world," are still living and thinking with reference to it. You may not call it supernatural; but when you talk about a realm of spiritual or ideal values in general, and ask about its relation to Nature in general, you have only changed the labels on the bottles, not the contents in them. For what makes anything transcendental—that is, in common language, supernatural—is simply and only aloofness from practical affairs—which affairs in their ultimate analysis are the business of making a living.

Eaton. Yes; Grimes has about hit off the point of my little parable—in one of its aspects at least. In matters of daily life you say a man is "off," more or less insane, when he deliberately goes on looking for a certain kind of result from conditions which he has already found to be such that they cannot possibly yield it. If he keeps on looking, and then goes about mourning because stage money won't buy beef-steaks, or because he cannot keep himself warm by burning the sea-sands here, you dismiss him as a fool or a hysteric. If you would condescend to reason with him at all, you would tell him to look for the conditions that will yield the results;

to occupy himself with some of the countless goods of life for which by intelligently directed search adequate means may be found.

Well, before lunch, Moore was reiterating the old tale. Modern science has completely transformed our conceptions of Nature. It has stripped the universe bare not only of all the moral values which it wore alike to antique pagan and to our medieval ancestors, but also of any regard, any preference, for such values. They are mere incidents, transitory accidents, in her everlasting redistribution of matter in motion; like the rise and fall of the wave I lament, or like a single musical note that a screeching, rumbling railway train might happen to emit. This is a one-sided view; but suppose it were all so, what is the moral? Surely, to change our standpoint, our angle of vision; to stop looking for results among conditions that we know will not yield them; to turn our gaze to the goods, the values that exist actually and indubitably in experience; and consider by what natural conditions these particular values may be strengthened and widened.

Insist if you please that Nature as a whole does not stand for good as a whole. Then, in heaven's name, just because good is both so plural (so "numerous") and so partial, bend your energies of intelligence and of effort to selecting the specific plural and partial natural conditions which will at least render values that we do have more secure and more extensive. Any other course is the way of madness; it is the way of the spoilt child who cries at the seashore because the waves do not stand still, and who cries even more frantically in the mountains because the hills do not melt and flow.

But no. Moore and his school will not have it so: we must "go back of the returns." All this science, after all, is a mode of knowledge. Examine knowledge itself and find it implies a complete all-inclusive intelligence; and then find (by taking another tack) that intelligence involves sentiency, feeling, and also will. Hence your very physical science, if you will only criticise it, examine it, shows that its object,

mechanical nature, is itself an included and superseded element in an all-embracing spiritual and ideal whole. And there you are.

Well, I do not now insist that all this is mere dialectic prestidigitation. No; accept it; let it go at its face value. But what of it? Is any value more concretely and securely in life than it was before? Does this perfect intelligence enable us to correct one single mis-step, one paltry error, here and now? Does this perfect all-inclusive goodness serve to heal one disease? Does it rectify one transgression? Does it even give the slightest inkling of how to go to work at any of these things? No; it just tells you: Never mind, for they are already eternally corrected, eternally healed in the eternal consciousness which alone is really Real. Stop: there is one evil, one pain, which the doctrine mitigates—the hysteric sentimentalism which is troubled because the universe as a whole does not sustain good as a whole. But that is the only thing it alters. The “pathetic fallacy” of Ruskin magnified to the *n*th power is the *motif* of modern idealism.

Moore. Certainly nobody will accuse Eaton of tender-mindedness—except in his logic, which, *as* certainly, is not tough-minded. His excitement, however, convinces me that he has at least an inkling that he is begging the question; and like the true pragmatist that he is, is trying to prevent by action (to wit, his flood of speech) his false logic from becoming articulate to him. The question being whether the values we seem to apprehend, the purposes we entertain, the goods we possess, are anything more than transitory waves, Eaton meets it by saying: “Oh, of course, they are waves; but don’t think about that—just sit down hard on the wave or get another wave to buttress it with!” No wonder he recommends action instead of thinking! Men have tried this method before, as a counsel of desperation or as cynical pessimism. But it remained for contemporary pragmatism to label the drowning of sorrow in the intoxication of thoughtless action, the highest achievement of

philosophic method, and to preach wilful restlessness as a doctrine of hope and illumination. Meantime, I prefer to be tender-minded in my attitude toward Reality, and make that attitude more reasonable by a tough-minded logic.

Eaton. I am willing to be quiet long enough for you to translate your metaphor into logic, and show how I have begged the question.

Moore. It is plain enough. You bid us turn to the cultivation, the nurture, of certain values in human life. But the question is whether these are or are not values. And that is a question of their relation to the Universe—to Reality. If Reality substantiates them, then indeed they are values; if it mocks and flouts them—as it surely does if what mechanical science calls Nature be ultimate and absolute—then they are *not* values. You and your kind are really the sentimentalists, because you are sheer subjectivists. You say: Accept the dream as real; do not question about it; add a little iridescence to its fog and extend it till it obscure even more of Reality than it naturally does, and all is well! I say: Perhaps the dream is no dream but an intimation of the solidest and most ultimate of all realities; and a thorough examination of what the positivist, the materialist, accepts as solid, namely, science, reveals as its own aim, standard, and presupposition that Reality is one all-exhaustive spiritual Being.

Eaton. This is about the way I thought my begging of the question would turn out. You insist upon translating my position into terms of your own; I am not then surprised to hear that it would be a begging of the question for *you* to hold my views. My point is precisely that it is only as long as you take the position that some Reality beyond—some metaphysical or transcendental reality—is necessary to substantiate empirical values that you can even discuss whether the latter are genuine or illusions. Drop the presupposition which you read into everything I say, the idea that the reality of things as they are is dependent upon something beyond and

behind, and the facts of the case just stare you in the eyes: Goods *are*, a multitude of them—but, unfortunately, evils also *are*; and all grades, pretty much, of both. Not the contrast and relation of experience *in toto* to something beyond experience drives men to religion and then to philosophy; but the contrast *within* experience of the better and the worse, and the consequent problem of how to substantiate the former and reduce the latter. Until you set up the notion of a transcendental reality at large, you cannot even raise the question of whether goods and evils are or only seem to be. The trouble and the joy, the good and the evil, is *that* they are; the hope is that they may be regulated, guided, increased in one direction and minimised in another. Instead of neglecting thought, we (I mean the pragmatists) exalt it, because we say that intelligent discrimination of means and ends is the sole final resource in this problem of all problems, the control of the factors of good and ill in life. We say, indeed, not merely that that is what intelligence *does*, but rather what it *is*.

Historically, it is quite possible to show how under certain social conditions this human and practical problem of the relation of good and intelligence generated the notion of the transcendental good and the pure reason. As Grimes reminded us, Plato——

Moore. Yes, and Protagoras — don't forget him; for unfortunately we know both the origin and the consequences of your doctrine that being and seeming are the same. We know quite well that pure empiricism leads to the identification of being and seeming, and that is just why every deeply moral and religious soul from the time of Plato and Aristotle to the present has insisted upon a transcendent reality.

Eaton. Personally I don't need an absolute to enable me to distinguish between, say, the good of kindness and the evil of slander, or the good of health and the evil of valetudinarianism. In experience, things bear their own specific characters. Nor has the absolute idealist as yet answered the question of *how* the absolute reality enables him to distinguish

between being and seeming in one single concrete case. The trouble is that for him *all* Being is on the other side of experience, and *all* experience is seeming.

Grimes. I think I heard you mention history. I wish both of you would drop dialectics and go to history. You would find history to be a struggle for existence—for bread, for a roof, for protected and nourished offspring. You would find history a picture of the masses always going under—just missing—in the struggle, because others have captured the control of natural resources, which in themselves, if not as benign as the eighteenth century imagine, are at least abundantly ample for the needs of all. But because of the monopolisation of Nature by a few persons, most men and women only stick their heads above the welter just enough to catch a glimpse of better things, then to be shoved down and under. The only problem of the relation of Nature to human good which is real is the economic problem of the exploitation of natural resources in the equal interests of all, instead of in the unequal interests of a class. The problem you two men are discussing has no existence—and never had any—outside of the heads of a few metaphysicians. The latter would never have amounted to anything, would never have had any career at all, had not shrewd monopolists or tyrants (with the skill that characterises them) have seen that these speculations about reality and a transcendental world could be distilled into opiates and distributed among the masses to make them less rebellious. That, if you would know, Eaton, is the real historic origin of the ideal world beyond. When you realise that, you will perceive that the pragmatists are only half-way over. You will see that practical questions *are* practical, and are not to be solved merely by having a theory *about* theory, different from the traditional one—which is all your pragmatism comes to.

Moore. If you mean that your own crass Philistinism is all that pragmatism comes to, I fancy you are about right. Forget that the only end of action is to bring about an

approximation to the complete inclusive consciousness ; make, as the pragmatists do, consciousness a means to action, and one form of external activity is just as good as another. Art, religion, all the generous reaches of science which do not show up immediately in the factory—these things become meaningless, and all that remains is that hard and dry satisfaction of economic wants which is Grimes' ideal.

Grimes. An ideal which exists, by the way, only in your imagination. I know of no more convincing proof of the futile irrelevancy of idealism than the damning way in which it narrows the content of actual daily life to the minds of those who uphold it. I sometimes think I am the only true idealist. If the conditions of an equitable and ample physical existence for all were once secured, I, for one, have no fears as to the bloom and harvest of art and science, and all the "higher" things of leisure. Life is interesting enough for me ; give it a show for all.

Arthur. I find myself in a peculiar position in respect to this discussion. An analysis of what is involved in this peculiarity may throw some light on the points at issue, for I have to believe that analysis and definition of what exists is the essential matter both in resolution of doubts and in steps at reform. For brevity, not from conceit, I will put the peculiarity to which I refer in a personal form. I do not believe for a moment in some different Reality beyond and behind Nature. I do not believe that a manipulation of the logical implications of science can give results which are to be put in the place of those which science herself yields in her direct application. I accept Nature as something which is, not seems, and Science as her faithful transcript. Yet because I believe these things, not in spite of them, I believe in the existence of purpose and of good. How Eaton can believe that fulfilment and the increasing realisation of purpose can exist in human consciousness unless they first exist in the world which is revealed in that consciousness is as much beyond me as how Moore can believe that a manipulation of the method

of knowledge can yield considerations of a totally different order from those directly obtained by use of the method. If purpose and fulfilment exist as natural goods, then, and only then, can consciousness itself be a fulfilment of Nature, and be also a natural good. Any other view is inexplicable to sound thinking—save, historically, as a product of modern political individualism and literary romanticism which have combined to produce that idealistic philosophy according to which the mind in knowing the universe creates it.

The view that purpose and realisation are profoundly natural, and that consciousness—or, if you will, experience—is itself a culmination and climax of Nature, is not a new view. Formulated by Aristotle, it has always persisted wherever the traditions of sound thinking have not been obscured by romanticism. The modern scientific doctrine of evolution confirms and specifies the metaphysical insight of Aristotle. This doctrine sets forth in detail, and in verified detail, as a genuine characteristic of existence, the tendency toward cumulative results, the definite trend of things toward culmination and achievement. It describes the universe as possessing, in terms of and by right of its own subject-matter (not as an addition of subsequent reflection), differences of value and importance—differences, moreover, that exercise selective influence upon the course of things, that is to say, genuinely determine the events that occur. It tells us that consciousness itself is such a cumulative and culminating natural event. Hence it is relevant to the world in which it dwells, and its determinations of value are not arbitrary, not *obiter dicta*, but descriptions of Nature herself.

Recall the words of Spencer which Moore quoted this morning: "There is no pleasure in the consciousness of being an infinitesimal bubble on a globe that is infinitesimal compared with the totality of things. Those on whom the un pitying rush of changes inflicts sufferings which are often without remedy, find no consolation in the thought that they are at the mercy of blind forces,—which cause indifferently now the

destruction of a sun and now the death of an animalcule. Contemplation of a universe which is with conceivable beginning or end and without intelligible purpose, yields no satisfaction." I am naïve enough to believe that the only question is whether the object of our "consciousness," of our "thought," of our "contemplation," is or is not as the quotation states it to be. If the statement is correct, pragmatism, like subjectivism (of which I suspect it is only a variation, putting emphasis upon will instead of idea), is an invitation to close our eyes to what is in order to encourage the delusion that things are other than they are. But the case is not so desperate. Speaking dogmatically, the account given of the universe is just—not true. And the doctrine of evolution of which Spencer professedly made so much is the evidence. A universe describable in evolutionary terms is a universe which shows, not indeed design, but tendency and purpose; which exhibits achievement, not indeed of a single end, but of a multiplicity of natural goods at whose apex is consciousness. No account of the universe in terms *merely* of the redistribution of matter in motion is complete, no matter how true as far as it goes, for it ignores the cardinal fact that the character of matter in motion and of its redistribution is such as cumulatively to achieve ends—to have effected the world of values we know. Deny this and you deny evolution; admit it and you admit purpose in the only objective—that is, the only intelligible—sense of that term. I do not say that in addition to the mechanism there are other ideal causes or factors which intervene. I only insist that the whole story be told, that the character of the mechanism be noted—namely, that it is such as to produce and sustain good in a multiplicity of forms. Mechanism *is* the mechanism of achieving results. To ignore this is to refuse to open our eyes to the total aspects of existence.

Among these multiple natural goods, I repeat, is consciousness itself. One of the ends in which Nature genuinely terminates is just awareness of itself—of its processes and ends.

For note the implication as to why consciousness is a natural good: not because it is cut off and exists in isolation, nor yet because we may, pragmatically, cut off and cultivate certain values which have no existence beyond it; but because it is good that things should be known in their own characters. And this view carries with it a precious result: to know things as they are is to know them as culminating in consciousness; it is to know that the universe genuinely achieves and maintains its own self-manifestation.

A final word as to the bearing of this view upon Grimes' position. To conceive of human history as a scene of struggle of classes for domination, a struggle caused by love of power or greed for gain, is the very mythology of the emotions. What we call history is largely non-human, but so far as it is human, it is dominated by intelligence: history is the history of increasing consciousness. Not that intelligence is actually sovereign in life, but that at least it is sovereign over stupidity, error, and ignorance. The acknowledgment of things as they are—that is the causal source of every step in progress. Our present system of industry is not the product of greed or tyrannic lust of power, but of physical science giving the mastery over the mechanism of Nature's energy. If the existing system is ever displaced, it will be displaced not by good intentions and vague sentiments, but by a more extensive insight into Nature's secrets.

Modern sentimentalism is revolted at the frank naturalism of Aristotle in saying that some are slaves by nature and others free by nature. But let socialism come to-morrow and somebody—not anybody, but *somebody*—will be managing its machinery and somebody else will be managed by the machinery. I do not wonder that my socialistic friends always imagine themselves active in the first capacity—perhaps by way of compensation for doing all of the imagining and none of the executive management at present. But those who are managed, who are controlled, deserve at least a moment's attention. Would you not at once agree that if

there is any justice at all in these positions of relative inferiority and superiority, it is because those who are capable by insight deserve to rule, and those who are incapable on account of ignorance, deserve to be ruled? If so, how do you differ, save verbally, from Aristotle?

Or do you think that all that men want in order to *be* men is to have their bellies filled, with assurance of constant plenty and without too much antecedent labour? No; believe me, Grimes, men *are* men, and hence their aspiration is for the divine—even when they know it not; their desire is for the ruling element, for intelligence. Till they achieve that they will still be discontented, rebellious, unruly—and hence ruled—shuffle your social cards as much as you may.

Grimes (after shrugging his shoulders contemptuously, finally says): There is one thing I like about Arthur; he is frank. He comes out with what you all in your hearts really believe—theory, supreme and sublime. All is to the good in this best of all possible worlds, if only some one be defining and classifying and syllogising, according to the lines already laid down. Aristotle's God of pure intelligence (as *he* well knew) was the glorification of leisure; and Arthur's point of view, if Arthur but knew it, is as much the intellectual snobbery of a leisure class economy, as the luxury and display he condemns are its material snobbery. There is really nothing more to be said.

Moore. To get back into the game which Grimes despises. Doesn't Arthur practically say that the universe is good because it culminates in intelligence, and that intelligence is good because it perceives that the universe culminates in—itself? And, on this theory, are ignorance and error, and consequent evil, any less genuine achievements of Nature than intelligence and good? And on what basis does he call by the titles of achievement and end that which at best is an infinitesimally fragmentary and transitory episode? I said Eaton begged the question. Arthur seems to regard it as proof of a superior intelligence (one which realistically takes

things as they are) to beg the question. What is this Nature, this universe in which evil is as stubborn a fact as good, in which good is constantly destroyed by the very power which produces it, in which there resides a temporary bird of passage—consciousness doomed to ultimate extinction—what is such a Nature (all that Arthur offers us) save the problem, the contradiction originally in question? A complacent optimism may gloss over its intrinsic self-contradictions, but a more serious mind is forced to go behind and beyond this scene to a permanent good which includes and transcends goods defeated and hopes suborned. Not because idealists have refused to note the facts as they are, but precisely because Nature is, on its face, such a scene as Arthur describes, idealists have always held that it is but Appearance, and have attempted to mount through it to Reality.

Stair. I had not thought to say anything. My attitude is so different from that of any one of you that it seemed unnecessary to inject another varying opinion where already disagreement reigns. But when Arthur was speaking, I felt that perhaps this disagreement exists precisely because the solvent word had not been uttered. For, at bottom, all of you agree with Arthur, and that is the cause of your disagreement with him and one another. You have agreed to make reason, intellect in some sense, the final umpire. But reason, intellect, is the principle of analysis, of division, of discord. When I appeal to feeling as the ultimate organ of unity, and hence of truth, you smile courteously; say—or think—mysticism; and the case for you is dismissed. Words like feeling, sensation, immediate appreciation, self-communication of Being, I must indeed use when I try to tell the truth I see. But I well know how inadequate the words are. And why? Because language is the chosen tool of intelligence, and hence inevitably bewrayeth the truth it would convey. But remember that words are but symbols, and that intelligence must dwell in the realm of symbols, and you realise a way out. These words, sensation, feeling, etc., as I utter

them are but invitations to woo you to put yourselves into the one attitude that reveals truth—an attitude of direct vision.

The beatific vision? Yes, and No. No, if you mean something rare, extreme, almost abnormal. Yes, if you mean the commonest and most convincing, the *only* convincing self-impartation of the ultimate good in the scale of goods; the vision of blessedness in God. For this doctrine is empirical; mysticism is the heart of all positive empiricism, of all empiricism which is not more interested in denying rationalism than in asserting itself. The mystical experience marks every man's realisation of the supremacy of good, and hence measures the distance that separates him from pure materialism. And as the unmitigated materialist is the rarest of creatures, and the man with faith in an unseen good the commonest, every man is a mystic—and the most so in his best moments.

What an idle contradiction that Moore and Arthur should try to adduce proofs of the supremacy of ideal values in the universe! The sole possible proof is the proof that actually exists—the direct unhindered realisation of those values. For each value brings with it of necessity its own depth of being. Let the pride of intellect and the pride of will cease their clamour, and in the silences Being speaks its own final word, not an argument or external ground of belief, but the self-impartation of itself to the soul. Who are the prophets and teachers of the ages? Those who have been accessible at the greatest depths to these communications.

Grimes. I suppose that poverty—and possibly disease—are specially competent ministers to the spiritual vision? The moral is obvious. Economic changes are purely irrelevant, because purely material and external. Indeed, upon the whole, efforts at reform are undesirable, for they distract attention from the fact that the final thing, the vision of good, is totally disconnected from external circumstance. I do not say, Stair, you personally believe this; but is not such a quietism the logical conclusion of all mysticism?

Stair. This is not so true as to say that in your efforts at

reform you are really inspired by the divine vision of justice; and that this mystic vision and not the mere increase of quantity of eatables and drinkables is your animating motive.

Grimes. Well, to my mind this whole affair of mystical values and experiences comes down to a simple straight-away proposition. The submerged masses do not occupy themselves with such questions as those you are discussing. They haven't the time even to consider whether they want to consider them. Nor does the occasional free citizen who even now exists—a sporadic reminder and prophecy of ultimate democracy—bother himself about the relation of the cosmos to value. Why? Not from mystic insight any more than from metaphysical proof; but because he has so many other interests that are worth while. His friends, his vocation and avocations, his books, his music, his club—these things engage him and they reward him. To multiply such men with such interests—that is the genuine problem, I repeat; and it is a problem to be solved only through an economic and material redistribution.

Eaton. Gladly, Stair, do all of us absolve ourselves from the responsibility of having to create the goods that life—call it God or Nature or Chance—provides. But we cannot, if we would, absolve ourselves from responsibility for maintaining and extending these goods when they have happened. To find it very wonderful—as Arthur does—that intelligence perceives values as they are is trivial, for it is only an elaborate way of saying that they have happened. To invite us, ceasing struggle and effort, to commune with Being through the moments of insight and joy that life provides, is to bid us to self-indulgence—to enjoyment at the expense of those upon whom the burden of conducting life's affairs falls. For even the mystics still need to eat and drink, be clothed and housed, and somebody must do these unmystic things. And to ignore others in the interest of our own perfection is not conducive to genuine unity of Being.

Intelligence is, indeed, as you say, discrimination, dis-

inction. But why? Because we have to *act* in order to keep secure, amid the moving flux of circumstance, some slight but precious good that Nature has bestowed; and because, in order to act successfully, we must act after conscious selection—after discrimination of means and ends. Of course, all goods arrive, as Arthur says, as natural results, but so do all bads, and all grades of good and bad. To label the results that occur culminations, achievements, and then argue to a quasi-moral constitution of Nature because she effects such results, is to employ a logic which applies to the life-cycle of the germ that, in achieving itself, kills man with malaria, as well as to the process of human life that in reaching its fulness cuts short the germ-fulfilment. It is putting the cart before the horse to say that because Nature is so constituted as to produce results of all types of value, therefore Nature is actuated by regard for differences of value. Nature, till it produces a being who strives and who thinks in order that he may strive more effectively, does not know whether it cares more for justice or for cruelty, more for the ravenous wolf-like competition of the struggle for existence, or for the improvements incidentally introduced through that struggle. Literally it has no mind of its own. Nor would the mere introduction of a consciousness that pictured indifferently the scene out of which consciousness developed, add one iota of reason for attributing eulogistically to Nature regard for value. But when the sentient organism, having experienced natural values, good and bad, begins to select, to prefer, and to make battle for its preference; and in order that it may make the most gallant fight possible for its aims, picks out and gathers together in perception and thought what is favourable to its aims and what hostile, then and there Nature has at last achieved significant regard for good. And this is the same thing as the birth of intelligence. For the holding of the end in view and the selecting and organising out of the natural flux, on the basis of this end, conditions that are means, *is* intelligence. Not,

then, when Nature produces health or efficiency or complexity does Nature exhibit regard for value, but only when it produces a living organism that has settled preferences and endeavours. The mere happening of complexity, health, adjustment, is all that Nature effects, as rightly called accident as purpose. But when Nature produces an intelligence—ah, then, indeed Nature has achieved something. Not, however, because this intelligence impartially pictures the nature which has produced it, but because in human consciousness Nature becomes genuinely partial. Because in consciousness an end is preferred, is selected for maintenance, and because intelligence pictures not a world, just as it is *in toto*, but images forth the conditions and obstacles of the continued maintenance of the selected good. For in an experience where values are demonstrably precarious, an intelligence which is not a principle of emphasis and valuation, an intelligence which should define, describe, and classify merely for the sake of knowledge, is a principle of stupidity and catastrophe.

As for Grimes, it is indeed true that problems are solved only where they arise—namely, in action, in the adjustments of behaviour. But, for good or for evil, they can be solved there only with method; and ultimately method is intelligence, and intelligence is method. The larger, the more human, the less technical the problem of practice, the more open-eyed and wide-viewing must be the corresponding method. I do not say that all things that have been called philosophy participate in this method; I do say, however, that a catholic and far-sighted theory of the adjustment of the conflicting factors of life *is*—whatever it be called—philosophy. And unless technical philosophy is to go the way of dogmatic theology, it must loyally identify itself with such a view of its own aim and destiny.

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LE CULTE DES SAINTS DANS L'ISLĀM AU MAGHREB.

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LE culte des saints est l'un des faits le plus caractéristiques de l'Islām dans l'Afrique du nord.

Il est à remarquer que, dans cette partie du continent africain, le culte des saints va en augmentant de l'est à l'ouest, en sorte que c'est au Maroc que nous trouvons le plus riche développement de ce phénomène religieux. Il semble que plus l'on s'éloigne, dans la direction du couchant, de l'Arabie, la patrie primitive du monothéisme arabe, plus le Mahométisme dégénère entre les mains des Berbères, qui forment la majorité de la population du Maghreb.

Dans le présent article, nous présenterons sur cet intéressant sujet quelques observations, puisées en partie dans les travaux publiés sur le culte des saints,¹ en partie aussi dans l'expérience personnelle que nous avons acquise de l'Islām africain.

Origines du culte des saints.—La principale cause à laquelle nous devons faire remonter l'origine du culte des saints au

¹ I. Goldziher, *Muhammedanische Studien*, t. ii. p. 275-378 (*die Heiligenverehrung im Islām*), Halle, 1890.—E. Doutté, *Notes sur l'Islām maghribin : les Marabouts*, Paris, 1900.—C. Trumelet, *Les saints de l'Islām : les saints du Tell*, Paris, 1881.—A. Mouliéras, *Le Maroc inconnu*, 2 vol., Paris, 1895-1899.—C. de Foucauld, *Reconnaissance au Maroc*, Paris, 1888.—E. Doutté, *Merrâkech*, Paris, 1905. A cette liste des ouvrages les plus importants, il y a lieu d'ajouter les relations des principaux voyageurs qui ont parcouru, visité ou étudié l'Afrique du nord.

Maghreb, se trouve dans la persistance des superstitions, héritage du paganisme primitif des Berbères.

A vrai dire, nous sommes mal renseignés sur la religion des Berbères avant l'Islām. Mais, d'une part, les analogies que nous relevons dans le Mahométisme oriental, où certains saints sont incontestablement les successeurs de divinités du paganisme gréco-romain, d'autre part, ce que plusieurs anciens auteurs, Procope en particulier, nous racontent de l'anthropolâtrie des Berbères et de la profonde vénération qu'ils témoignaient à leurs sorciers et aux prophétesses qui dévoilaient l'avenir, nous inclinent à croire que le culte des saints, au Maghreb, est essentiellement d'origine païenne.

La réaction religieuse, provoquée sur le sol africain, au XVI^e siècle, par les victoires des peuples chrétiens en Espagne et dans l'Afrique du nord, a contribué dans une large mesure à l'accroissement du culte des saints. Il semble qu'aux conquêtes chrétiennes ait répondu, au sein de l'Islām, une effervescence religieuse, qui se manifesta, en particulier, par un développement extraordinaire du culte des saints.

Le fanatisme religieux a été ainsi, historiquement parlant, et est encore l'un des facteurs essentiels de la vie maraboutique. Il est près d'être un saint, celui qui manifeste d'une façon violente ses convictions religieuses. La voie de la sainteté se confond souvent avec celle du fanatisme, surtout en face de l'ennemi chrétien. Les événements qui se sont passés au Maroc, dans le cours de l'année 1908, en fournissent plus d'un exemple : l'intervention des troupes françaises, dans l'ouest et dans le sud de ce pays, a déterminé la vocation de plus d'un saint musulman.

L'ascétisme est encore une route qui conduit à la sainteté. Se retirer du monde, vivre dans l'austérité, au vu et au su de tout le monde, se livrer publiquement à des pratiques ascétiques, ce sont là autant de titres à la dignité de marabout. Nombreux sont, en Afrique, les pieux musulmans qui sont parvenus, par cette voie, au rang de saints et qui ont été l'objet, de leur vivant même, de l'adoration des fidèles.

La folie, considérée souvent dans l'Islām comme un signe

de la présence de la divinité dans l'homme, est, plus d'une fois, l'origine de la réputation de sainteté de tel ou tel personnage.

La fondation d'un ordre religieux, d'une confrérie ou d'une *zāwia*, sorte de couvent ou de monastère,¹ est, le plus souvent aussi, le chemin de la sainteté digne d'être l'objet d'un culte.

Faut-il ranger parmi les causes du culte des saints la rigueur même du monothéisme islamique, comme quelques uns l'ont pensé ? Ce dogme fait-il d'Allāh un Dieu si éloigné du fidèle, que cet éloignement nécessite d'une manière absolue l'intercession des saints ? Nous ne le pensons pas.

L'un des traits les plus frappants de l'Islām est, en effet, la persistance de son monothéisme fondamental au milieu des superstitions les plus grossières de ses adorateurs. Il faut avoir entendu, au Maroc en particulier, l'accent de sincérité avec lequel le musulman, qui se rend aux tombeaux des saints pour implorer leur intercession, prononce le fameux " Il n'y a pas d'autre Dieu qu'Allāh," pour se convaincre que cette apparente anomalie, qui consiste à n'adorer qu'un seul Dieu tout en rendant un culte assidu aux saints, n'existe que pour nous, mais qu'en elle-même elle ne constitue aucune contradiction dans l'esprit du fidèle mahométan.

Cela est si vrai que le fondateur de l'ordre des Derqāwa, Sīdī l-'Arbī d-Derqāwī, dont le monothéisme était si absolu qu'il ordonnait à ses adeptes, lorsqu'ils répétaient la *shehāda* (" Il n'y a pas d'autre Dieu qu'Allāh, et Mahomet est l'apôtre d'Allāh "), de ne réciter à haute voix que la première partie de la profession de foi, en se contentant de mentionner mentalement la seconde, est devenu lui-même un saint et par suite l'objet d'un culte. Ses disciples sont demeurés de fidèles adorateurs du Dieu unique, mais ils n'ont garde d'oublier de rendre au fondateur de leur confrérie le culte que tout bon musulman, au Maghreb, voue à la personne des saints.

¹ Une *zāwia* peut être un ensemble, parfois très considérable, de constructions comprenant mosquée, école, habitations pour les étudiants, les pèlerins (s'il y a un tombeau de saint), les voyageurs, les pauvres, etc. Mais la *zāwia* peut être aussi un simple lieu de réunion et d'enseignement.

Le plus souvent, le saint est une célébrité purement locale ; sa réputation de sainteté peut s'étendre au loin, mais l'horizon de son prestige religieux est ordinairement limité. Quelle que soit l'origine de la vénération dont il est l'objet, cette vénération tient, dans un très grand nombre de cas, à des causes locales.

Nous en citerons un exemple, celui de Sīdī Moh'ammed el Bū-Hālī ("l'Idiot"), dans les Djebāla, au Maroc. Ce saint était, il y a peu d'années encore un vieillard de 80 ans, vigoureux et aux formes athlétiques, mais complètement idiot ; il devait sa réputation de sainteté précisément à son infirmité mentale. Entre autres étrangetés, on peut citer la prédilection qu'il avait pour un mets bizarre, qu'il préparait lui-même : il pétrissait ensemble du miel, du son, du beurre, du *kuskus* (plat arabe spécial à la semoule), des cheveux et de la terre, et se nourrissait avec le plus vif plaisir de cet étrange mélange.

Il y a des marabouts de naissance ; parmi eux, il faut mettre en première ligne les sherīfs, descendants vrais ou inauthentiques de Mahomet. Mais ce sont surtout les bonnes œuvres, la science ou ce qu'on désigne de ce nom pompeux, l'ascétisme, la pratique de la retraite religieuse, le mysticisme, le prétendu don des miracles, etc., qui conduisent à la sainteté.

Il y a d'ailleurs des degrés dans la localisation des saints. Tel a sa réputation limitée au bourg qu'il habita ; tel autre a une influence régionale. D'autres étendent leur juridiction spirituelle sur une partie très vaste d'un pays : tels sont, au Maroc, les Sherīfs de Wezzān, qui ont joué à plusieurs reprises un rôle éminent dans la politique marocaine, et dont le renom de sainteté est répandu dans tout le nord du Maroc.

Un marabout des plus curieux à cet égard est Sīdī 'Abdel-qāder el-Djīlānī, saint mondial dans l'Islām, mais qui, au Maroc, bien qu'il soit d'origine asiatique, est invoqué partout comme un saint du Maghreb el-Aqṣā (de l'occident le plus éloigné).

Il ne faudrait pas croire cependant que l'influence d'un saint fût en raison directe de l'étendue territoriale de son prestige religieux. Tel marabout, attaché à un lieu déterminé, y apparaît comme le bras droit de Dieu, à l'exclusion des saints

les plus renommés de l'Islām. Rien de typique, à ce point de vue, comme la déclaration qui fut faite en 1883 à de Foucauld, lorsqu'il se trouvait à Bū-l-Dja'd (Tadla, Maroc): "Ici, ni Sultan, ni Makhzen (gouvernement du Sultan), rien qu'Allāh et Sīdī ben Dāūd." Ce marabout, auquel de Foucauld se présenta, y était seul maître et seigneur. Il est vrai que cette souveraineté ne s'étendait qu'à environ deux journées de marche de Bū-l-Dja'd.

Une cause vraiment étrange de l'élévation de certains personnages à la dignité de saint est le fait d'avoir été renégat ou de descendre d'un renégat. Il s'est produit plus d'une fois, en effet, que des renégats d'origine juive ou chrétienne sont devenus marabouts. Un cas de ce genre d'un très grand intérêt nous est rapporté par l'auteur du Kitāb el-Istiqā, Ah'med ben Khālīd en-Nācīrī es-Slāwī.

L'an 661 de l'Hégire (1263 de J.C.), nous raconte cet écrivain, mourut le Sheikh Abū Nu'aīm Ridhwān ben 'Abd-allāh le Génois, dont le père se fit musulman à la suite de l'incident suivant.

"Ce chrétien avait dans son pays, à Gênes, un cheval qui s'échappa une nuit, entra dans la cathédrale et y fit ses excréments, sans que personne s'en aperçût. Le père de notre saint se hâta de faire sortir son cheval; mais, lorsque vint le matin, les gens de l'église virent le crottin et dirent: 'Certes, le Messie est venu hier dans l'église sur son cheval et celui-ci y a fait ses excréments.' La ville fut mise en émoi par cet événement et les chrétiens se disputèrent l'achat de ce crottin, au point qu'une parcelle se vendait un prix énorme." Le père d'Abū Nu'aīm voulut faire connaître aux chrétiens leur erreur, mais n'ayant pu les en tirer, il s'enfuit à Rabat, au Maroc, où il se convertit à l'Islām.

Un autre cas singulier est celui d'un saint de la côte méridionale du Maroc, si du moins le récit qui nous en a été fait à Mogador en 1901 est digne de foi. Le patron de cette ville, dont le tombeau est érigé au sud des murailles, près de la mer, est Sīdī Mogdul. Ce nom arabe ne serait qu'une altération

du nom propre écossais MacDonald, personnage qui aurait débarqué jadis sur le rivage, où devait être construit Mogador en 1760. MacDonald y serait mort en odeur de sainteté et aurait été transformé après son décès en saint musulman.

Noms donnés aux saints.—Le nom le plus répandu au Maghreb, à l'exception toutefois du Maroc, est celui de *marabout*. En Algérie, il est d'un emploi courant et on le trouve usité de là jusqu'en Egypte.

Le terme de marabout vient du mot arabe *merābet'*, qui désignait, à l'origine, ceux qui servaient comme soldats dans les *ribāt'*, fortins établis sur la frontière des pays musulmans pour se défendre contre les infidèles, et qui devenaient des points d'appui pour l'attaque dirigée contre les chrétiens. Dans ces redoutes, le guerrier musulman se livrait à des exercices de piété. Lorsque le temps de la guerre sainte fut passé, les *ribāt'* se transformèrent en édifices religieux (*zāwia*) et la *merābet'* ne fut plus qu'un personnage religieux, un apôtre d'Allāh, zélé ou même fanatique. C'est ainsi que le mot de marabout en est venu à être le qualificatif, par excellence, des exaltés en religion, de ceux qui, par leur sainteté ou par leur ardeur missionnaire, s'élèvent incontestablement au dessus de la masse des fidèles. Marabout est ainsi devenu le synonyme de saint.¹

Au Maroc, les saints sont habituellement appelés *Sīdī*, "Mon Seigneur," qualificatif usité aussi dans d'autres régions, et souvent ils y reçoivent le titre de *Mūlay*, "Mon Maître."

Le saint est encore qualifié de *walī*, "celui qui est près" de Dieu, l'ami de Dieu. On emploie aussi, en parlant de certains d'entre eux, le terme de *bahlūl*, "simple d'esprit." Quant au mot *medjdhub*, il s'applique à celui qui est habituellement "ravi en extase."

Tous les termes que nous avons énumérés sont usités en parlant des saints vivants aussi bien que de ceux qui sont morts.

Quant aux femmes saintes, elles sont appelées *Settī*,

¹ Dans le langage des Européens habitant les pays musulmans, le mot marabout sert aussi à nommer le tombeau où le saint est enseveli.

“Madame, Ma Maîtresse,” et par les lettrés *Seyyīda*, “Dame, Maîtresse,” abrégé en *Sīda*, féminin de *Seyyīd*, “Seigneur, Maître,” d’où est dérivé *Sidī*. *Settī* n’est d’ailleurs qu’une forme contractée de *Seyyīdatī*, “Madame, Ma Maîtresse.”

Les saintes sont le plus souvent désignées par le mot berbère *Lālla*, “Madame,” et aussi “Maîtresse.” Les Kabyles leur donnent fréquemment le nom de *Imma*, “Mère.”

Multiplicité des saints.—Dans l’Islām de l’Afrique du nord, les saints sont vraiment innombrables et leur multiplicité va croissant, comme nous l’avons dit, plus on s’avance vers l’ouest de ce continent. Cela est si frappant qu’on rencontre dans certaines localités de cette partie de l’Afrique de véritables accumulations de *Qubba*, c’est-à-dire de tombeaux de saints. Tel est, aux portes de Tlemcen, cet admirable paysage où se dressent les mausolées, en ruines pour la plupart, de toute une compagnie de marabouts. Tel est, au Maroc, dans le faubourg d’Azemmūr, le sanctuaire vénéré de Mūlay Bū Chā’ib, entouré de nombreux tombeaux de saints.

La multiplicité des saints est telle que plusieurs marabouts ont deux tombeaux, renfermant chacun, à ce que prétendent les indigènes, le corps entier du même personnage.

Sidī Bū Djeddain, dans le Rīf, est enseveli à Taza et chez les Benī-Tūzīn. Un autre saint marocain, Mūlay Bū-Shtā, fut enterré une première fois à Eḡ-Ḥafīyyīn, et une seconde à Ez-Zghira : le corps se trouve dans les deux tombeaux.

La multiplicité des saints est enfin confirmée par plusieurs proverbes africains, tels que celui-ci, courant en Algérie :

“Dans le Gherīs (plaine des environs de Mascara),
Tout palmier nain a un saint,
Toute branche de palmier a un marabout.”

Saints inconnus.—Le nombre des saints est si considérable qu’il en est beaucoup dont le nom s’est perdu, de sorte qu’une grande quantité de tombeaux, ou de lieux consacrés au souvenir d’un marabout, sont désignés par des qualificatifs équivalents à l’anonymat. On a conclu de ce fait que plusieurs de ces sanctuaires remonteraient à une très haute

antiquité et seraient les vestiges du culte rendu aux divinités païennes.

Souvent les saints inconnus sont simplement qualifiés par le mot *El-Merābet'*, le marabout. Souvent aussi le saint anonyme est appelé *Sidī l-Mokhfī*, "Mon Seigneur le caché."

A Alger, les marabouts anonymes, dont les tombeaux sont placés près d'une route, sont appelés *Sidī Çāh'eb* et '*T'riq*, "Mon Seigneur qui est au bord du chemin."

Enfin, une désignation qui ne manque pas d'originalité, est celle de *Sidī l-Gherīb*, "Mon Seigneur l'étranger." Tel est le saint anonyme dont la dépouille mortelle repose chez les *Benī-Çālah'*, en Algérie.

L'anonymat, il est à peine besoin de l'ajouter, peut couvrir un saint inauthentique. Tel est le cas d'un prétendu marabout *Abū Turāb*, dont le mausolée s'élève au Caire, et dont le nom signifie "Père du sable."

Le célèbre historien arabe *El-Maqrīzī* († 1442) raconte, au sujet de ce tombeau, l'intéressante histoire que voici : "En cet endroit, il y avait autrefois des collines de sable. Quelqu'un voulut y bâtir une maison. Comme il creusait les fondations, il rencontra les ruines d'une mosquée. Les gens nommèrent alors les ruines de cette mosquée (d'après une manière de parler commune en arabe) *Père du Sable* (*Abū Turāb*). Avec le temps, cette appellation fut considérée comme un nom propre : ainsi prirent naissance le *Sheikh Abū Turāb* et son tombeau."

Saintes.—Au nombre très élevé des marabouts, il faut ajouter celui des femmes maraboutes, très important aussi dans le Maghreb.

L'Islām, dès ses origines et de tout temps, a professé et enseigné d'une manière générale le respect de la femme, et plus spécialement la vénération pour celles qui se faisaient remarquer soit par la pureté de leur vie et l'élévation de leur caractère, soit par des dons spirituels exceptionnels. Dans ce fait se trouve la cause essentielle qui nous rend compte de la genèse et du développement du culte des saintes à côté de celui des saints.

A cette cause générale dont les effets se sont fait sentir dans tout l'Islâm, il faut ajouter, pour ce qui concerne l'Afrique du nord, le respect que les Berbères, dans l'antiquité, témoignaient à leurs prophétesses.

Voici, en effet, ce que nous dit Procope, l'historien byzantin du VI^e siècle : "Chez les Maures, il n'est pas permis aux hommes de prophétiser. Ce sont des femmes qui, après avoir accompli certains rites sacrés, touchées par l'esprit, dévoilent l'avenir, aussi bien que les anciens oracles."

Les légendes des marabouts montrent que les descendants des anciens Maures n'ont pas cessé d'être des adorateurs de la sainteté féminine.

Saints communs aux musulmans, aux juifs et aux chrétiens.
—Comme si le nombre des saints et des saintes de l'Islâm était insuffisant, les musulmans ont adopté certains saints d'origine juive ou chrétienne, dont l'intercession leur a paru trop précieuse pour être négligée et laissée aux seuls juifs et chrétiens. Cette observation, qu'on peut faire en Orient comme en Occident, est frappante dans certaines localités du Maghreb.

A Tlemcen, les juives et les musulmanes vont faire des sacrifices au tombeau de Sîdî Ya'qûb et demander au marabout de leur faire avoir des enfants.

Il y a à Fez le tombeau d'une sainte juive, Sol Ashuel, à laquelle les musulmans rendent un culte. Cette juive, dit-on, subit le martyre à Fez plutôt que d'abjurer la foi de ses pères.

Le tombeau de St Louis, près de Tunis, est encore vénéré par les musulmans. A Alger, un vieux marabout, que l'abbé Bargès connaissait particulièrement, avait adressé un curieux ex-voto à la Vierge et l'avait fixé dans une niche où se trouvait la statue de la Madonne, dans la cathédrale d'Alger.

Ces exemples tendent à montrer que, plus la superstition populaire, dans une religion, est grossière et profonde, plus elle cherche à prendre sa part des légendes pieuses des religions

voisines, dans la mesure où ces légendes correspondent à son sentiment religieux.

Hiéarchie des saints.—Le nombre des saints et des saintes est si considérable qu'il s'y est établi de toute nécessité une sorte de hiérarchie, bien que, dans l'Islām, on ne trouve point, comme dans d'autres religions, une série de grades déterminés dans l'échelle des marabouts. Il est vrai de dire que, dans la religion musulmane, c'est la voix populaire qui béatifie et canonise ; aucune autorité religieuse constituée ne prononce sur la qualité et le degré de sainteté.

Il y a des saints de toute catégorie. Il y en a de sordides et de pouilleux ; il en est d'autres riches et vivant en grands seigneurs. Les uns sont de bas étage, les autres sont des princes ; il en est même, au Maroc, qui ont adopté comme insigne le parasol, comme le Sultan.

Certains saints sont mis incontestablement au dessus de la foule des autres, bien que la tendance de chaque région ou de chaque localité soit de proclamer le sien le premier et le plus puissant de tous.

C'est ainsi qu'au Maroc, dans le nord du moins, Mūlay Idrīs, fondateur de Fez, est vénéré au même degré que le Prophète. Mais de tous les saints de l'Islām, aussi bien au Maghreb qu'ailleurs, le plus grand et celui dont l'intercession est considérée comme omnipotente, dans le sens métaphysique du mot, est sans contredit Sīdī 'Abdelqāder el-Djilānī de Bagdad, qui a fondé l'ordre religieux des Qādiriyya.

Don des miracles.—Les saints possèdent la *Karāma*, "faveur divine," et par elle ils reçoivent le don des miracles, le *Taṣarruf*.

La *Baraka* "bénédiction" est une parcelle de la grâce divine qui a été accordée par Dieu au marabout, et que ce dernier peut passer à ses descendants ; cette baraka se transmet par la salive. De là l'usage des marabouts de cracher dans la bouche de leurs disciples, pour leur donner l'initiation, et dans la bouche de ceux qui viennent les implorer, pour leur communiquer à eux aussi la baraka.

Comme dans toutes les religions qui croient pleinement au surnaturel, dans l'Islām le don des miracles n'est pas simplement échu en partage aux saints du passé. Les miracles sont de tous les temps et les marabouts vivants en accomplissent autant que ceux qui sont morts depuis des années ou des siècles.

On retrouve dans les légendes des saints de l'Islām tous les genres possibles et toutes les catégories imaginables de miracles, tels qu'on les constate dans les autres religions. Nous ne signalerons ici que quelques miracles typiques.

Un don par excellence des marabouts est celui de l'ubiquité. Le saint marocain Sīdī l-h'ādjī Qenbūr, par exemple, a été vu le même jour, à la même heure, faisant sa prière dans deux endroits très éloignés l'un de l'autre.

La puissance des saints se manifeste, entre autres faits surnaturels, par le déplacement de choses d'un poids énorme, comme des rochers. C'est ainsi que Sīdī Salem, le saint de Tizza, en Algérie, pour confondre de son imposture un faux marabout, ordonna aux sept rochers, qui se dressaient sur les hauteurs dominant le wady Tizza, de descendre dans la vallée, ce que firent les rochers, dont l'un écrasa l'imposteur.

Les saints ont le pouvoir de se transporter instantanément à des distances fabuleuses. Le fameux 'Abdelqāder, invoqué à El-Abiodh, en Algérie, par une femme qui avait laissé tomber son enfant dans un puits, accourut de Bagdad sous terre et reçut l'enfant dans ses bras avant qu'il eût touché la surface de l'eau.

Les saints marchent sur les eaux ; ils peuvent dessécher la mer, tarir les rivières, etc. Ils ont aussi le pouvoir de faire jaillir des sources, de faire couler les cours d'eau, de les détourner, etc.

Ils ont le pouvoir de se rendre invisibles, de même qu'ils peuvent rester longtemps sans boire ni manger.

Les saints ont le pouvoir de rayonner et de se manifester par des lumières ou des flammes. Tel marabout apparaît sous la forme d'une lueur phosphorescente répandant autour d'elle

des reflets bleuâtres et tremblotants. Tel autre s'avance sous l'apparence d'une colonne lumineuse qui semble pénétrer dans le sol. Le feu a toujours été le symbole de la vie spirituelle.

Les saints opèrent des guérisons et des résurrections. On va prier auprès de leurs tombeaux pour recouvrer la santé. Les femmes stériles s'adressent à certains d'entre eux, dont c'est la spécialité, pour obtenir le privilège de la maternité. Les hommes épuisés et les vieillards vont demander à d'autres, dont c'est la fonction plus particulière, de leur rendre leur virilité. Sidī Mogdul, à Mogador, est un marabout spécialiste de cette catégorie.

Les saints ont le pouvoir d'apparaître après leur mort et de ressusciter pour accomplir un nouveau miracle, et intervenir, comme Dieu lui-même, dans les événements. Les marabouts peuvent aussi s'entretenir avec les saints défunts ou même morts depuis des siècles. Ils peuvent douer de la parole les animaux, les arbres, les pierres, etc. Ils ont le don de transformer les corps, par exemple l'eau en miel, le métal en parfum, etc.

Les saints chassent les mauvais esprits et protègent celui qui les invoque contre l'action pernicieuse des djinns. Près du tombeau de Sidī Ya'qūb, à Tlemcen, se trouve une niche appelée Bit-Djenūn, "la maison des djinns." Le gardien m'a raconté, avec une candeur pleine de gravité, que les démons se rendent dans cette niche et qu'on y vient pour se faire délivrer d'une possession. Le possédé passe la nuit dans cet endroit, en ayant soin de mettre sa tête dans la niche ; le lendemain matin, le djinn a disparu.

Le miracle de la multiplication des pains se reproduit souvent dans la légende des saints musulmans. Tel le plat inépuisable de couscous que le marabout algérien, Sidī Ah'med el-Kbir, offrit à toute une caravane.

Nous citerons encore deux autres catégories de miracles attribués aux saints musulmans, qui présentent un intérêt particulier, à cause des événements militaires qui se sont passés tout récemment encore, en 1908, dans le nord de l'Afrique.

Le premier de ces faits surnaturels est le don d'être ou de rendre invulnérable. Certains marabouts ont la conviction d'être à l'abri des balles et prétendent conférer à leurs disciples cette immunité.

Pendant les insurrections qui ont éclaté en Algérie contre la domination française, de nombreux fanatiques ont prêché la guerre sainte contre les étrangers, s'affublant tous du titre de Mahdî, le Messie musulman, tous étant sherîfs et marabouts. Tous se disaient invulnérables aux balles des fusils français, et malgré que plusieurs aient péri dans les combats, la foi des indigènes dans leur soi-disant invulnérabilité n'a pas été ébranlée.

En avril 1908, le grand marabout Mûlay l-H'asen, chef de la fameuse *h'arqa*, que les troupes françaises eurent à combattre dans le Sud-Marocain, électrisait ses soldats en leur disant : " Ne craignez pas les Roumis, car, lorsqu'ils tireront sur vous, les balles de leurs fusils se changeront en dattes, et les fusils cracheront de l'eau de rose."

Le second fait surnaturel à signaler encore est peut-être plus curieux et se rattache au don de prophétie qu'on accorde aux marabouts.

A plusieurs reprises on a constaté que des saints avaient prédit soit l'occupation française en Algérie, soit les succès des troupes espagnoles au Maroc.

A Alger, avant la prise de la ville par les Français, des prédictions, répandues parmi les musulmans, annonçaient que " des soldats vêtus de rouge (le pantalon rouge des fantassins) et portant une aubergine (*badindjân*) sur la tête (l'ancien gros pompon des shakos) viendraient conquérir le pays."

Adoration des saints. — Vivants ou morts, les saints, quelque illettrés qu'ils soient (et ils le sont souvent), sont adorés. Quiconque a été dans l'Afrique du nord a pu voir le respect superstitieux, véritable adoration, dont les marabouts vivants sont l'objet : baiser le pan de leur robe, baiser l'étrier où repose leur pied, baiser les traces de leurs pas, etc., sont les actes essentiels qui constituent cette anthropolâtrie.

Quant aux marabouts décédés, le culte qui leur est rendu

se manifeste surtout par les pèlerinages à leurs tombeaux. Certains de ces pèlerinages sont accomplis par des foules immenses, lors de la fête du saint. A cette occasion des banquets religieux, en l'honneur du marabout, sont célébrés ; on leur donne le nom de *wa'da* ou de *t'a'am*.

A côté du pèlerinage annuel qui, pour plusieurs saints illustres ou réputés, atteint les proportions d'un événement religieux, il y a le pèlerinage individuel ou *ziāra*. Le fidèle musulman se rend au tombeau de son saint de prédilection pour lui demander une faveur, ou lui adresser son culte d'actions de grâce. Il s'y présente avec des offrandes variées pour le saint lui-même s'il est vivant, et aussi pour le représentant du marabout, descendant du saint ou simple *moqaddem* (préposé) ou *ukīl* (gardien), qui bénéficie lui-même du prestige du marabout, dont il surveille la sépulture. Un sacrifice, en l'honneur du marabout, est accompli par le pèlerin, qui, suivant sa fortune, offrira un bœuf, un mouton, un bouc ou une poule. Cette victime est le plus souvent mangée par celui qui l'a présentée, auprès du tombeau même du marabout ; parfois elle est donnée au moqaddem ou partagée avec lui. Le fidèle fait aussi une offrande au moqaddem, offrande appelée *ziāra* comme le pèlerinage lui-même. Ce cadeau est de valeur très diverse, selon la position du pèlerin ; il consiste en argent et en nature (blé, beurre, sucre, bougies, etc.).

Une autre source de revenus pour le marabout, au Maroc, provient de la *zet'āt'a* ou escorte des voyageurs en pays peu sûr, moyennant un droit perçu par le saint ou par son représentant. C'est là encore, au Maghreb, l'une des formes du prestige maraboutique.

On peut en dire autant de la *bashāra*, c'est-à-dire de l'entremise du marabout entre le voleur de bestiaux et la victime du vol. Moyennant argent, le saint *bashshār* fait rentrer le volé en possession du bétail détourné ; quant à la taxe qu'il perçoit ainsi, le marabout la partage avec le voleur.

Protestation contre l'adoration des saints.—Le culte dont les marabouts sont l'objet a poussé leurs adorateurs à de tels

excès, et les abus de la ziāra ont été si criants que des protestations nombreuses, en actes ou en paroles, ont eu lieu.

Il y a des tribus où les marabouts ne sont pas respectés ; tels, par exemple, les Ida u Blāl du Sud-Marocain, qui ne donnent rien aux marabouts, les traitant de paresseux et les renvoyant avec des moqueries.

Les Benī-Messāra, serviteurs des sherīfs de Wezzān, viennent souvent piller la ville sainte ; souvent aussi ils s'embusquent dans sa banlieue, guettant les jeunes garçons et les femmes, qu'ils emportent dans leurs montagnes pour les vendre ou les faire servir à leurs plaisirs.

Lorsque j'étais sur la côte méridionale du Maroc en janvier 1901, j'ai appris que le fameux marabout Mā el-'Ainīn, qui s'était mis en route pour aller rendre visite à son ami, le Sultan de Marrakesh, venait d'être pillé et rançonné, comme un vulgaire voyageur, par un caïd du Wady Nūn.

Continence et incontinence des saints.—Si le culte des saints est en partie le résultat des vertus qu'ils peuvent avoir, le discrédit, le mépris même dans lequel ils tombent dans l'esprit de quelques uns, est certainement dû, en partie également, aux vices qu'on attribue à plusieurs d'entre eux.

Et cependant qui ne sait que, dans la superstition populaire, tout est permis aux saints qu'on adore ! Les pratiques antinomiennes, suivies par plus d'un, mort en odeur de sainteté, ont été souvent considérées, dans les religions, comme un hors la loi, privilège d'êtres réputés surnaturels et divins.

De nombreux marabouts vivent de la vie habituelle et commune, se mariant et acceptant les conditions de l'existence, telles qu'elles se sont formées dans la société musulmane. Il en est d'autres qui se livrent, les uns à la continence et à l'ascétisme, les autres à l'incontinence et à la débauche. C'est de ces derniers que nous aurons surtout à parler ici.

Les saints continents et ascètes sont l'exception dans l'Islām. Cela vient du fait, commun aux deux grandes religions monothéistes sémitiques, que l'ascétisme n'y est pas

en faveur. Le Coran, tout aussi bien que l'Ancien Testament, est opposé à la mutilation de l'être humain, et, par suite, à toutes les pratiques qui limitent ou arrêtent le libre épanouissement de la vie chez l'homme.

On a observé avec raison que, si le musulman qui aspire à devenir marabout cherche à se faire remarquer par son ascétisme, une fois devenu marabout, il renonce volontiers aux actes de continence, qui n'ont eu qu'un but, lui servir d'échelle à la dignité de saint.

On cite cependant des marabouts ayant pratiqué ou pratiquant l'ascétisme et la continence. On cite aussi des saintes qui ont dû leur renom de maraboutes à leur virginité.

C'est à ce groupe qu'il faut rattacher les saints pouilleux et sales, circulant à moitié nus, vêtus de loques sordides et affectant le plus grand mépris pour les biens de ce monde. Tel était le fondateur de l'ordre religieux des Heddāwa, Sidi Heddi, au XIII^e siècle.

Il y a aussi les marabouts pratiquant l'austérité, mais non la continence. Tel fut l'illustre marabout 'Abdallāh ben Yasīn, le fondateur et le chef des Almoravides, réformateur réputé par ses austérités, et qui mourut sur le champ de bataille en 1059. Ce saint était loin d'être un modèle de continence. Voici ce que l'auteur du "Rudh el-Kartas" nous apprend sur ce pieux personnage: "Son austérité ne l'empêchait point de voir un grand nombre de femmes. Chaque mois, il en épousait plusieurs et s'en séparait successivement; il n'entendait pas parler d'une jolie fille sans la demander aussitôt en mariage."

Le chapitre des saints bons vivants, débauchés ou lubriques est plus long que celui des continents et des ascètes. Et nous venons de voir que l'austérité de certains saints n'est que très relative. Il y a ici plusieurs catégories à distinguer.

Nous citerons tout d'abord les marabouts riches et grands seigneurs, amis des plaisirs et de la vie facile. C'est parmi eux qu'on trouve ces saints personnages qui, en Algérie et ailleurs, boivent en public des liqueurs fortes ou de l'absinthe, s'enivrent

même avec de l'eau de vie, fument l'opium, et dont la moralité est d'ailleurs fort relâchée.

Il y a les marabouts parasites, ne cherchant qu'à duper leurs admirateurs et à faire bonne chère ; plusieurs, parmi eux, ont été réputés par leur embonpoint extraordinaire ou leur obésité.

Il y a les saints obscènes, comme ce marabout dont j'ai vu le tombeau entre Sūq et-Tleta et Gerando, sur la route de Mazagan à Marrakesh, et dont le nom, ou plutôt le surnom, est typique : il s'appelle Sidi l-Hawwāi, c'est-à-dire "le caresseur" (de femmes).

Il y a les marabouts impudiques, qui saisissent une femme qui passe et, en public, s'unissent à elle. On en connaît des exemples authentiques assez nombreux, à Tunis, dans diverses localités de l'Algérie, à Tetuan, etc.

On m'a raconté dans les Shawia, au Maroc, qu'un marabout, ayant pénétré dans la maison d'une jeune mariée, dont il voulait abuser en l'absence du mari, et ayant été mis à la porte par la belle, celle-ci fut vivement blâmée par son époux, lorsqu'à son retour au domicile conjugal, il apprit la vaillante résistance de sa femme aux tentatives de séduction du saint. "La cohabitation avec l'envoyé de Dieu," dit-il à sa compagne, "eût répandu la bénédiction divine sur notre demeure." C'est bien là l'expression du sentiment populaire : tout ce qui vient de l'homme de Dieu est bon, pur et sacré. C'est avec les mêmes principes d'une dévotion aveugle que sont jugées les prostitutions de certaines maraboutes.

Rôle politique et social.—Le prestige extraordinaire dont jouissent les marabouts, et l'influence si grande qu'ils exercent, expliquent le rôle politique qu'ils ont si souvent joué et qu'ils remplissent encore à l'heure actuelle.

Les marabouts, au Maghreb, se sont souvent interposés avec succès entre les tribus se faisant la guerre. On leur doit l'apaisement de nombreux conflits et, en Algérie même, on a fait plus d'une fois appel à leur intervention pour régler des différends entre indigènes et colons français. Ils sont d'une manière générale, dans l'Afrique du nord, les représentants

du droit contre la violence, et du savoir, ou tout au moins du bon sens, contre l'ignorance.

En Algérie, les patriotes et les fanatiques, qui ont soulevé les indigènes contre la France, étaient tous des marabouts.

Dans le but d'expulser les étrangers, du sol de leur pays, ils ont même joué un rôle eschatologique, exploitant la croyance au Mahdī, et se faisant souvent passer eux-mêmes, comme nous l'avons dit, pour ce personnage des derniers temps, qui présidera à la fin du monde.

Bū-'Amāma, qui vient de mourir (octobre 1908) près de Udjda (Maroc), et qui fut un adversaire acharné de la domination française en Algérie, était un marabout de cette sorte.

C'est encore un marabout que ce célèbre Mūlay l-H'asen, dont on a tant parlé lors des événements qui se sont passés d'avril à septembre 1908 dans le Sud-Marocain contigu au Sud-Oranais. C'est lui qui a dirigé et conduit contre les troupes françaises les *h'arka* formidables qui ont attaqué à plusieurs reprises les troupes françaises, et qui ont été mises en déroute, une première fois à Bū-Denīb, les 13 et 14 mai, et une dernière fois à Djorf le 7 septembre 1908. On a raconté qu'au combat du 7 septembre, Mūlay l-H'asen, vieillard octogénaire, s'était enfui vers le Tafilalet. Quelle fin pour ce fanatique marabout qui, depuis des mois, avait prêché la guerre sainte, et par ses discours incendiaires, avait groupé les contingents de la dernière *h'arka*, armée irrégulière composée, assure-t-on, de près de 20,000 musulmans !

Des saintes ont été aussi les inspiratrices et les directrices de soulèvements contre les dominateurs étrangers. Telle fut, en Algérie, la célèbre maraboute Lālla Fāt'ma, qui, en 1857, organisa la résistance contre les soldats français.

Les marabouts ont souvent aussi joué un rôle important dans la politique intérieure de leur pays.

Dans l'Afrique du nord, depuis la fin du XV^e siècle jusqu'en 1830, deux pouvoirs rivaux ont régné, celui des Sherīfs du Maroc, et celui des Turcs d'Alger. Ils étaient nés tous deux, presque en même temps, d'une réaction religieuse contre la

conquête chrétienne de l'Espagne musulmane et contre les entreprises des Portugais et des Espagnols sur le Maroc. Cette double action des chrétiens surexcita le fanatisme des Berbères et des Arabes et détermina une révolution qui fut dirigée par les confréries religieuses et par les marabouts. Dans cette révolution, toutes les dynasties du Maghreb disparurent. Elles furent remplacées par des pouvoirs nouveaux établis sous l'influence des confréries ou des marabouts.

Pour ne citer qu'un seul exemple, tiré de l'histoire contemporaine du Maroc, du rôle politique joué par les marabouts, nous rapporterons ce que raconte A. Mouliéras au sujet d'un saint célèbre d'Esh-Shaūn, Mūlay 'Alī Shaqūr. Ce marabout, qui en 1897 avait environ 90 ans, aurait par son influence fait conférer la dignité suprême à 'Abd el-'Azīz. "J'avais reçu la mission," dit-il au Sultan El-H'asan, après un simulacre d'intronisation de l'enfant qui devait plus tard devenir sultan, "de vous faire monter sur le trône, toi et ton fils." Quel rôle avait-il joué lors de l'avènement de El-H'asan ? Nous l'ignorons.

L'influence des marabouts l'a plus d'une fois emporté sur celle des sultans ; leur intervention souveraine dans l'élévation au trône de certains d'entre eux en est la preuve manifeste. Les Sherīfs de Wezzān, dans la personne de Mūlay T'ayyeb, le second directeur de la confrérie des T'ayyibiyya, contemporain du Sultan Mūlay Ismā'il, au XVII^e siècle, aidèrent puissamment ce Sultan à s'emparer du pouvoir.

Au Maroc, nombre de marabouts se considèrent même, en droit, comme au dessus du Sultan, et en fait ils le sont, ne rendant au monarque aucun hommage, ne lui accordant qu'un respect platonique, sans conséquence pratique. Les Sultans ont été souvent à la merci des marabouts qui ont soulevé contre eux des tribus entières.

Au point de vue social, les marabouts ont souvent joué un rôle bienfaisant comme protecteurs de l'agriculture, creusant des puits, créant des oasis, développant la culture du sol et la rendant florissante, etc.

Nous avons parlé plus haut de leur influence comme *zet'āt'* et comme *bashshār*. Il nous suffira d'ajouter, pour compléter cet article, le patronage qu'ils exercent, vivants ou morts, soit à l'égard des corporations, soit à l'égard des villes.

C'est ainsi que *Mūlay Bū-Shtā* est le patron des musiciens, des chanteurs et des amateurs de sports, dans la région du *Fās*. *Sīdī Moh'ammed el-H'ādjī Bū-'Arrāqia* est le patron de *Tanger*, *Sīdī Belliot* celui de *Casablanca*, etc.

Voici, enfin, pour achever ce tableau du patronage maraboutique, deux brèves légendes de saints, dans leurs fonctions de patrons protecteurs des cités.

Sīdī Yūsof et-Tlīdī, patron d'*Esh-Shaūn*, sortit de son tombeau, lorsque les guerriers de *Lekhmās* assiégeaient la ville ; saisissant l'échelle, sur laquelle ils montaient à l'assaut, il la jeta au loin, écrasant les grimpeurs et les assaillants restés au pied des murailles.

Sīdī s-Sa'īdī, patron de *Tétuan*, anéantit par une formidable explosion les soldats espagnols qui, en 1860, voulurent violer son mausolée.

On voit, par ces légendes, qu'il serait aisé de multiplier, que l'imagination populaire confirme ce que les faits nous apprennent de l'influence extraordinaire exercée par les marabouts, soit au point de vue social, soit au point de vue politique.

Comme on a pu s'en rendre compte par les observations que nous avons présentées sur le culte des saints au Maghreb l'hagiographie musulmane est d'une richesse extraordinaire, et peut rivaliser avec l'hagiographie chrétienne ou indhoue, avec laquelle elle offre d'ailleurs de nombreux points de ressemblance ou de comparaison. Tant il est vrai que partout l'esprit religieux, dans ses développements multiples et ses manifestations innombrables, se révèle suivant des lois inflexibles dans leurs principes et d'une infinie variété dans leurs applications.

E. MONTET.

ATOMIC THEORIES AND MODERN PHYSICS.

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It is becoming evident that the hope of discovering the laws of nature and our relation to them by metaphysical reasoning is impossible. So little, in the long years since Plato and Aristotle, has been done by the philosophers to add to our positive knowledge, that they themselves are abandoning their former methods for the experimental processes of the psychologist. Many will frankly admit that philosophical study is chiefly valuable now as a history of the development of human thought, and agree with Renan that "science, and science alone, can give to humanity what it most craves, a symbol and a law." If this be really the case, if our attainment of knowledge rests with science alone, then it becomes advisable to see whether this hope also must prove fallacious.

Of the various sciences, physics offers probably the best means of attack, for it lies between the concrete classifications of the natural sciences, such as chemistry and biology, and the abstract theories of pure mathematics. Physics, on the one hand, is less disturbed by the multitude of details which often, in the natural sciences, prevent the grasping of a central idea; while, on the other hand, it is more circumscribed by the necessity of constant comparison with concrete phenomena than pure mathematics, and so avoids the danger of confounding speculation and reality. Thus the methods of physics have, to

a degree, become the model which the other sciences seek to follow, a logical mathematical theory based on and corrected by experimental observation. Moreover, this science presents a longer and more consecutive history than most of the others.

It is also noticeable that physics treats of problems similar to those of metaphysics. During the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries philosophy and physics were closely united and diverged only in the nineteenth. With the mass of experimental data now at our disposal, an imperative need is again being felt for theoretical laws which shall classify them, and a philosophical spirit is making itself felt. The reason for this change in method in the last century is understood if we consider the state of scientific knowledge before that time.

Few of the properties of heat, light, sound, and electricity were then known, but, on the other hand, the laws of mechanics were well established, and a solid foundation of experimental fact permitted a broad and comprehensive application of pure mathematics to that branch of physics. It is altogether natural that mechanics should have developed first, for it is the only part of the science which rests directly on the data of experience. It considers only material bodies and their sensible and common properties—such as the occupation of space and the resistance to motion. To measure properties of matter other than spatial and dynamical requires more elaborate apparatus, and it is more difficult to separate extraneous accidents from such attributes as colour, temperature, and tone. We cannot, even in the present state of mathematical knowledge, discuss the complex processes of nature as they are presented to us; for example, a mathematical law which shall define all the changes of colour, of electrical intensity, etc., which occur when a body is heated, is still beyond our powers. But it was possible, with the knowledge then at hand, to abstract from matter all its properties except that of a simple and uniform space and force attribute, and to derive a theory of mechanical action distinct and complete. And so the philosophical scientists of the French revolutionary

period, with whom this mechanical movement culminated, had only mechanical problems to work on, in which their knowledge was practically as accurate as it is to-day.

With the development of the Cartesian geometry and the calculus had come the possibility of discussing the motions of bodies, known as the science of kinematics. By this all problems concerning the paths of moving bodies and their velocities were capable of solution, without the necessity of considering the forces which produced these motions. Newton had published the general laws of motion and of the mutual forces of attraction between bodies, and d'Alembert had supplemented these by a dynamic law which included all the hitherto isolated problems involving force reactions and reduced them to a special case of statics.

On the theoretic side, Kant, Lagrange, and others had discussed the axioms of mechanics and established the three units—length, mass, and time, and it was generally conceded that the solution of any problems of mechanics into the simplest terms of these units was incapable of further reduction.

But one thing remained before an imposing structure could be raised which should withstand criticism, and that was a general law to include and solve problems relating to a system of bodies in equilibrium and at rest. And Lagrange accomplished this.

Such was the state of science when Laplace, in his *Système du Monde*, and Lagrange in the *Mécanique Analytique*, attempted to construct a theory and history of the universe by means only of the general and accepted laws of the two mechanics: celestial, which concerns the heavenly bodies, and terrestrial, those on the earth. Their problem has been stated in many ways, but this may serve:—Given the positions and masses of any system of bodies, to find the configuration of the system at any time previous or afterward.

By the aid of the principle of centres of inertia each heavenly body could be replaced by a mathematical point at which the whole mass was concentrated and endowed with a force of

attraction according to Newton's law of universal gravitation. In the same way each terrestrial body was considered to be composed of a great number of small elastic particles, invariable and indivisible, and to each of these was ascribed the force of attraction, known to be a property of all ponderable matter. This conception of matter was, even at that time, generally accepted, as the original atomic theory of Democritus had been extended and adapted to mathematical analysis by Descartes, Huyghens, and Boscovich. Thus all bodies and systems of bodies became alike in character and subject to the same dynamic laws; and if the state of the universe were given at any time, it became merely a problem in mechanics, whose laws are fully known, to find its history from the beginning to the end. As Laplace proudly and naïvely answered: In this system there was no need of a god. Evidently this statement was a climax of materialism, and probably can never again be uttered with such assurance.

So solidly had this theoretical universe been built, that it defied criticism for a century and established science finally, as it appeared, on a mechanical basis. The other branches of physics, which advanced rapidly during the nineteenth century, fell promptly under the influence of this mechanistic idea. The names employed show this clearly. We have the wave theories of light and sound, the dynamic theory of heat, and the mechanical theories of electricity and magnetism. In all these theories, attributes of matter, such as colour, temperature, musical pitch, electrical charge, etc., are expressed by the mechanical motions and forces of atoms, and are measured solely in terms of the mechanical units of length, mass, and time. The method absolutely eliminates our senses, not only as instruments capable of measuring the quantity of an action, but even denies them the power of deciding qualitatively between phenomena; for the light which affects the eye, the sound heard by the ear, and the heat indicated by temperature are essentially the same thing, merely variations of the universal force of gravitation. These different attributes

of matter are scientifically identical if the forces involved are equal; for as force, however manifested, is merely a mechanical attraction between atoms, all these quantities can be weighed in a chemical balance and have no essential difference. While there may have been great diversity amongst the physicists of the last century as to detail, there was but this one explanation of nature: The universe was merely a complicated machine, whose visible parts were connected together by a system of intangible links called atoms, whose complex motions, while they might defy our analytical skill, were yet completely expressible by general mechanical laws.

To find the weak spot in this mechanistic theory, based on the hypothesis of the atom, is not only a difficult task, but it is one which runs so counter to the accepted teachings of science and to the natural prejudices of the mind, that it is not strange if most scientists now reason as though the atom were a matter of experimental proof rather than metaphysical speculation. Such a mechanistic theory of natural law as Lagrange and Laplace evolved, and as scientific thought of the last century extended, must necessarily depend on some similar atomistic hypothesis. Complex material bodies must be divided up into elementary masses so small that any conceivable variation in them, except mere inertia, must be forever beyond our measurement or even conception. Because, if the atom were divisible or variable, which its name denies, then the actions of its component parts and their variations might be productive of such an attribute as temperature or colour, and thus introduce into the atom properties other than those purely mechanical.

From experience we know of only one way a sensible body may make another move, and that is by a direct push, unless we are willing to endow matter with the spiritualistic powers Sir Oliver Lodge is inclined to assign to it, which supposition at once makes the problem extra-scientific. Either atoms must be granted a mysterious power of attraction through empty space, or else the part of the universe unoccupied by

ponderable matter must be filled with a medium or æther, to act as the mechanical link between atom and atom. Now this æther is either continuous or discontinuous. If continuous, it would serve as a link; but how is matter to move through it or even to exist in it unless two bodies may occupy the same space in the same time, or unless ponderable matter is but an attribute of this ætherial matter? On the other hand, if the æther be discontinuous, it must be porous, and what becomes of our link between atoms? We are driven to the creation of a second more tenuous medium filling the spaces between the grosser one, and so on to the *reductio ad absurdum* pointed out by Clifford.

This discussion may be readily summarised in two metaphysical hypotheses which are frequently accepted as axioms.

First.—Given the masses and the configuration of the centres of inertia of all the atoms, with the law of their mutual attraction, then all the attributes of matter are determined and the problem of the universe is solved.

Second.—As a visible link is required between moving parts of a machine, so invisible links, called æthers, multiplied indefinitely, must exist between atoms.

While most scientists were endeavouring to extend and to perfect this mechanical theory, there were a few inclined to question the validity of the axioms on which it rested. Among the latter, Rankine deserves the first place. In a memoir read before the Philosophical Society of Glasgow in 1855, he discusses scientific methods in general, points out the defects and advantages in the prevailing theories, and outlines a new method which he calls the science of energetics. His criticism is of the highest importance; with subtile irony he exposes the absurdity of a materialistic theory derived from mechanics which inevitably rests on a purely metaphysical basis.

According to Rankine, a true physical theory is the most simple system of principles by which the formal laws of phenomena, experimentally discovered, may be deduced.

Such a theory resembles a science like geometry in that it originates with definitions and axioms for first principles, and derives their consequences logically, by propositions. But, in general, a physical theory differs because these fundamental definitions and axioms discovered first are numerous and complex, since they are deduced from the mass of facts presented to us immediately by nature, whereas the first principles and axioms of geometry are few in number and simple in character, being the results deduced from bodies not necessarily real, such as a mathematical line has length only. In other words, the method pursued in the physical theory is inductive, and is consequently more tentative and laborious than the deductive method of geometry, as the acceptance or rejection of the principles deduced must depend upon their agreement with facts discovered gradually by observations, and not upon general properties agreed upon once for all. The propositions of geometry are final, if the axioms and definitions are granted; a theory of physics is more or less conjectural, as its first principles are always subject to revision because of the discovery of new phenomena.

Two methods of framing a physical theory may be distinguished. They may be termed the abstractive and the hypothetical methods.

According to the abstractive method, a class of objects or phenomena is described and a name or symbol assigned to that assemblage of properties common to all the objects or phenomena composing the class, as perceived by the senses, and without introducing anything hypothetical.

There is only one example of a complete physical theory formed exclusively from the data of experience by the abstractive method—the principles of the science of mechanics. The objects discussed in mechanics are material and real bodies, all of which possess the sensible properties of occupying space and resisting change of motion. The phenomena dealt with are confined to those attributes of matter distinguished by the words force and motion, which we have found to be

common to all bodies of which we have any knowledge. And the laws deduced follow from axioms and definitions which express this universal experience.

According to the hypothetical method, the existence of a class of fictitious objects or phenomena, which cannot be perceived by the senses, is assumed. And properties are assigned, similar to those known to be true of a class of real objects or phenomena, which can be perceived by the senses. If the consequences of such a hypothesis are afterwards found to be in agreement with the results of observation and experiment, then the laws, found to be true for the class of real objects or phenomena, may be applied to the hypothetical class. The objects or phenomena considered by this method are thus merely matters of conjecture, and their nature may be modified at any time so as to make the propositions derived from them conform to an expression of experimental fact. Such, for example, has been the method followed in the wave theory of light. To explain the observed actions of light, the existence of hypothetical bodies, called atoms, and the luminiferous æther, is assumed, and properties are assigned to them similar to those of sensible matter. As new phenomena are discovered the attributes of the atom or æther are modified to fit the requirements. This theory can be considered only as a convenient means of expressing natural laws, and is always subject to change, as it does not depend on the objective realities fundamental to an abstractive method.

Just because the theory of the mechanical motions and motive forces of sensible bodies is the only complete physical theory, and because it does not require the use of a hypothetical method in its development, we have been led to give the hypotheses, advanced for theories of the other branches of physics, a mechanical form. The classes of phenomena considered in all these theories are defined conjecturally as being due to some kind of mechanical motion and motive force, as when heat is defined as consisting in molecular motions, or the rigidity of solids in molecular attractions and repulsions.

The motions and forces involved in these theories can no longer be ascribed to sensible matter, but either hypothetical bodies, such as the luminiferous æther, or hypothetical parts of real bodies, such as molecules, atoms, ætherial vortices, or other imaginary elements of matter, must be created. And to them are assigned properties and laws resembling as closely as may be those of sensible bodies. In explaining new facts as they are discovered, the attributes of the hypothetical matter are modified, or new ones assumed as may best fit the case. Such mechanical hypotheses, not being based on experimental evidence, are held to fulfil their purpose when these conjectural attributes explain in the simplest way the largest body of known phenomena and when they anticipate phenomena afterwards observed. The importance and weight of these hypotheses increase with the number of phenomena whose laws they express.

Certain hypothetical theories, such as the wave theory of light, are undoubtedly useful, since they have reduced complicated actions to a few simple laws. And also they tend to combine all branches of physics into one system in which the axioms of mechanics are the first principles of the whole science. But they must be employed with great caution and judgment. Their free use tends to confuse the essential differences between hypothesis and fact, between metaphysics and physics, and this confusion does now exist in the minds of the public generally and even in those of many scientists. A desire has, consequently, often shown itself to explain away, or set aside, facts inconsistent with a preconceived hypothesis.

Such is briefly Rankine's criticism of the prevailing mechanical and materialistic theories of physics. His conclusions are worthy of thoughtful consideration. It has always been the boast of science that by its methods we may avoid the pitfalls in which metaphysical reasoning inevitably ends. Now, if our most elaborate and complete scientific theory is really metaphysical, we must renounce all our proud claims and consider atomic and mechanical theories solely on the grounds of their utility and simplicity.

A metaphysical hypothesis, valuable solely for its utility, is always dangerous, for by constant use we tend inevitably to give an objective reality to things which in the beginning we knew to exist only in our own minds. And this tendency is especially deplorable in science, which does nothing for education if it does not recognise clearly the limits of our knowledge and distinguish accurately between reality and speculation.

Now the belief in the objective reality of molecules, atoms, æthers, and ætherial vortices has grown so steadily that little objection has been made to the creation of a whole new class of objects, called indifferently ions, corpuscles, electrons, or particles, which are assumed to be the constituent elements of the hypothetical atom. Of the three classes of objects it is, at the present time, the existence of the sensible bodies which is in danger of repudiation. This is the case not only in the minds of the thoughtless but in those of the leading men of science. For example, Professor J. J. Thomson, in the preface to his *Conduction of Electricity through Gases*, says: "The possession of a charge by the ions increases so much the ease with which they can be traced and their properties studied that, as the reader will see, we know far more about the ion than we do about the uncharged molecule." Such a statement is on a parallel with the remark made to the writer by another distinguished physicist, that we know far more about the æther and the atom than we do about sensible matter. This is true, and in the same way as a Frankenstein might say of a mechanical man which he had conceived and constructed,—I know more about him than I do about a real man.

Such confusion of thought is directly traceable to the fact that many scientists have forgotten the distinction between the creations of nature and the creations of their imaginations. We can never say more of molecules, ions, and the æther, than that they may exist; but ponderable matter, as perceived by the senses, has an objective existence, or else there is no place for science. Since Kant's time the existence or the non-existence of those insensible links in the universal machine are known to

be equally demonstrable; we have no criterion of proof. It is curious that scientists still refuse to acknowledge this. If they deny Kant, the metaphysician, they have only to turn to Lagrange, whose scientific claims cannot be ignored, and find he has proved by rigid mathematical analysis that any phenomenon, which obeys the law of conservation of energy, is capable of explanation by a mechanical theory; but, and here is the important point, as there is one adequate theory, so there are also an indefinite number of other mechanical theories which will, so far as our minds are concerned, satisfy all the requirements of the case. We have no criterion in mechanics by which we may determine what is the actual process of nature. There is no *experimentum crucis*, and we choose the explanation which for the moment seems the simplest.

Our inability to decide unequivocally for one mechanical hypothesis instead of another is shown also by the actual history of physical science. Since the time of Huyghens and Newton we have attempted to settle the question whether light is due to a wave motion in an æther or to small particles emitted from luminous bodies. No experiment has been devised which definitely decides between the claims of the two hypotheses, yet the corpuscular theory was abandoned. The reason was not that either was impossible, but that the corpuscle became unmanageable with the accretions added to it as new facts were discovered. Huyghen's wave theory, having outgrown its usefulness, has suffered the same fate. He ascribed light to a series of mechanical waves propagated through an elastic æther, but the attributes necessary to the medium are so contradictory that a new theory, advanced by Maxwell, was accepted as a great relief. In this theory the ætherial waves are not mechanical but electro-magnetic, similar to those we now use in wireless telegraphy. But the difficulties are still pursuing us. We know that such waves can pass through space, but we cannot construct a mechanical model of an atom which will produce or maintain these vibrations, nor have we any evidence they can affect the optic nerve

and produce the sensation of light. The prediction is not extravagant that, before a great while, we shall return to the corpuscular theory with the electrified particle, the constituent of the atom, as an agent. At least this has happened with the theories of electricity.

If a general atomistic theory, which seems to be the only practicable hypothesis, involves these inherent difficulties, and if it presents a real peril to correct scientific thinking, the question arises, whether some general mechanical explanation of all physical phenomena is possible which is not so limited.

Rankine, in the same essay, proposes a method which he calls the science of energetics. As we have been able to frame with some success a theory of physics by using a hypothetical method, we should have even more success in combining all the branches of the science into one general theory if the abstractive method were extended and applied for the purpose. Instead of supposing the various physical phenomena to be constituted, in an occult way, of modifications of motion and force, let us attempt to frame laws which shall embrace the properties common to any one class. He finds energy, or the capacity to effect changes, to be the common characteristic of the various states of matter to which the several branches of physics relate. If then we frame general laws regarding energy, we shall be able to apply them, with appropriate changes, to every branch of physics.

Rankine evidently denies the advisability of trying to find the cause of the attraction of bodies for one another, or the mechanism of the propagation of light and heat through empty space. In all cases we have a certain quantity of energy, acting in a definite manner. Our aim should be to find by experiment the properties of any such manifestation, and to combine all common properties by general mathematical laws. Such was the method of Newton when he established the law of universal gravitation and refrained from conjecturing *how* the forces of attraction acted through space, and no discovery has aided science more. But after he had determined experi-

mentally many of the laws of light, he advanced the hypothesis that these phenomena were caused by motions of intangible corpuscles. It is claimed, on good grounds apparently, that his corpuscular theory retarded the growth of the subject for more than a century, by preventing the adoption of the more convenient wave theory.

Whether or not it is advisable to substitute energy for inertia, or mass, as the general attribute of matter which will best serve for a fundamental unit, may be open to discussion. But it seems certain to me, at least, that the formulation of laws deduced mathematically from experimental data alone, and not conjecture as to the causes of phenomena, is the true province of science and the only method certain not to lead us into vain metaphysical speculation.

Unfortunately, the restraint and clarity of thought shown by Rankine are rare, and few are willing to impose limitations on speculation or to forgo the attempt to create a subjective and metaphysical scheme according to which nature shall work. In the hands of his successors, notably Mach, Duhem, and Ostwald, these barriers have been cleared. They have endeavoured to give an objective reality to the mathematical equation of energy. To make an entity of a symbol, to speak of centres of force as if an intelligible image were conveyed to the mind, to make matter and inertia an attribute of energy, is even more metaphysical than the concepts of atoms and æthers, which could, at least, be likened to sensible objects. With Ostwald, its most militant defender, matter disappears altogether; empty space is known to us only by the quantity of energy necessary to penetrate it, and occupied space is merely a group of various energies. In his enthusiasm he does not hesitate at difficulties. "When a stick strikes you," he exclaims, "which do you feel, the stick or the energy?" One might as well ask the old question, Which comes first, the owl or the egg?—a matter of infinite dispute and no decision. Although Ostwald bristles with mathematical equations and scientific terms, he asks us to return to the meta-

physical methods of the mediæval schoolmen—to thrash over again the endless disputes of nominalists and realists.

As a critical attempt, the school of energetics has done good work by calling attention to the inadequacies of atomic theories, yet as a positive method it has had comparatively little effect. The majority of the men of science still rely absolutely on atomic hypotheses. Indeed, a fresh stimulus has been given them by the efforts to explain the experimental facts, recently discovered, concerning Röntgen rays, the passage of electricity through gases, and the properties of radium; facts which will probably do more, in the end, to discountenance mechanical models of phenomena than the theoretical criticisms of the followers of the school of energetics.

So long as the hypothesis of an invariable and indivisible atom gave a reasonably simple and satisfactory method of attacking the problems of physics, even those men of science who were ready to acknowledge the tentative character of the hypothesis and the contradictory nature of its postulates, were unwilling to try other methods which might retard the progress of science. But the phenomena mentioned above do not fit into the general scheme, and their explanation requires us either to abandon the atomic theory or to modify it radically. The latter has been done, and the atom is now considered to be a complex body composed of an aggregation of invariable and indivisible particles, called corpuscles or ions.

As might be supposed, some real advantages have been obtained. The chemists have long sought in vain for a chemical element whose atom might be considered the primordial substance, and from which the atoms of the other elements were derived. This new idea of the atom offers a solution, for the chemists may now construct the atoms of all the elements out of different combinations of corpuscles. Also the early investigators in electricity, as Benjamin Franklin and Coulomb, were led to hypothecate the existence of subtile electric fluids to explain the fact that electrified matter sometimes showed a force of attraction and sometimes of repulsion. Later, in the

theories of Faraday and Maxwell, the hypothesis of fluids was abandoned, and the ends of the atom of matter were endowed respectively with the properties of electrical attraction and repulsion. Now it is possible to discard this variability in the simple atom by supposing some of the corpuscular elements of a complex atom to exhibit the one kind of electric force, and others the opposite kind.

In spite of these advantages and others which might be cited, the prime fact remains that it is now necessary to abandon the historic and hitherto invincible atomic theory for another which is still more conjectural. For the former element of matter, simple in nature, we have substituted another, complex in character, and have thereby given up the chief and to many the only value of an atomic theory.

The corpuscular theories advanced, almost simultaneously by Lorentz and Larmor, show this clearly. Professor Larmor, in his treatise on *Æther and Matter*, presents a view of the constitution of matter which is sufficient over an extensive range of physical theory, and which he trusts will not be made more complex until it proves inadequate in some definite feature. According to his hypothesis, the molecule of matter is composed of a system, probably large in number, of positively and negatively electrified protions (called frequently by others corpuscles, electrons, or ions) in a state of steady orbital motion around each other. The passage of electricity through a conductor or from one body to another is effected by a transference of electrically charged protions from one molecule to another. The differences in the chemical elements, such as iron or hydrogen, can be accounted for by ascribing them to various aggregations of the protions. As for the protions themselves, they are in whole or part nuclei of intrinsic strain in the æther, places where the continuity of this medium has been broken and cemented together again.

Such a theory is evidently, and in the highest degree, artificial and metaphysical, and Professor Larmor would be the last to assert that he has given a true picture of the

constitution of matter. Its value must rest on the belief that it is the simplest theory available for explaining experimental facts. But the difficulties inherent to the theory seem insuperable. It is almost inconceivable that our simplest idea of the ultimate constituent of the chemical element should be a molecule, so bewilderingly complex in character. Each molecule of an apparently quiescent body is itself an aggregation of particles, each vastly more intricate than the stellar systems, and whirling around each other with a motion approximating a hundred thousand miles per second. And although the molecule itself still possesses the attributes of matter, its constituents become merely nuclei of strain in the æther. What must be the structure of an æther which can maintain such a complex of strains as all the countless atoms in the universe would require? If we can never be sure matter is actually so constituted, it is unfortunate to create a world so counter to our instinctive belief that in a correct definition a complex idea may be explained into simpler parts.

The theory of Professor Lorentz is essentially the same, although he does not attempt any speculations as to the structure of the æther or atom. But he, too, postulates the existence of small, electrically charged particles in all bodies and deduces all electrical laws from the positions and motions of these ions.

It is not necessary to state that both these writers develop their theories with great skill and from a profound knowledge of the science. They have also made a great step in advance by achieving a closer unity in the branches of physics. But to attain this they have introduced postulates which lie outside the domain of science and have, by fixing the attention on a subatom, given an appearance of greater reality to the relatively gross atom.

The influence of these abstruse and metaphysical theories on scientific thought is already apparent in a certain eagerness to advance startling hypotheses and novel ideas. Many men

of science of to-day have temporarily put aside the sobriety and restraint which should characterise scientific reasoning. The most tremendous results are based on insufficient evidence, and the simple statement that the cause of a phenomenon is to be found in ionic action is considered satisfactory. Physicists in Germany are gravely discussing whether ions are spheres or discs in shape. The transmutation of the elements, a problem which has baffled research for centuries, is announced as an assured fact, because radium and a few other substances spontaneously give off energy; because one man found traces of lithium in solutions of copper salts traversed by an electric current,¹ and because another man finds traces of helium gas in vessels containing radium. Surely a matter of such importance should not be decided before the most rigid elimination of more natural causes, at least before it has been proved that the electric current does not liberate lithium, and radium set free helium from the walls of the vessels used in both these experiments. The degradation of the radioactive substances, like uranium and radium, through a whole series of nominal substances, into a well-known element such as lead, cannot surely be anything but guesswork until direct evidence is given of the diminution of the parent body and the production of the new ones. Such confusion of thought and dissolution of the boundaries between fact and fancy is deplorable, and if they create trouble in the minds of scientific men, they have absolutely bewildered the general public. Books of a popular nature are constantly appearing which change the results of speculation into established fact, and their readers naturally credit the most astounding statements. The day may come when a new war will arise between science and

¹ Since writing this essay, word has been received from Mme. Curie confirming my criticism. In repeating the experiment of Sir William Ramsay, she finds that traces of lithium are found when vessels of glass, quartz, or copper are used to contain the solutions of the pure copper salts; but when a platinum vessel is substituted, no lithium appears, thus showing that, in all probability, the lithium was present in the substance of the vessel, and brought out of it by the current.

religion on the issue that the hypotheses of science are too metaphysical to be of value.

It may be necessary, when the laws and phenomena of a science are imperfectly known, to employ a hypothetical method. And a hypothesis may then be of great use in creating a certain unity amongst diverse elements. But the question may well be asked, whether physical science has not outgrown such a state.

The attempt to unite the phenomena of all branches of physics in a few general laws and to explain their cause by the aid of atoms has engaged the attention of the greatest men of science for more than a century. They have spent upon the problem infinite thought and pains, and in the end we have a body of laws firmly established on experimental evidence, but the causes of these laws are as hopelessly obscure as ever. The atom has failed to satisfy the requirements, and now the corpuscle is added to explain new facts, an hypothesis on an hypothesis. As our knowledge increases, who can doubt but that these, in their turn, will give place to others still more complex, if the same method is pursued, until the succession of atoms and subatoms will make the whole atomistic idea an absurdity?

Just as we have, after centuries of incessant controversy, been forced to accept the fact that we cannot by reasoning from our consciousness obtain an objective knowledge of natural causes, so we must come to realise that reasoning from experimental evidence is subject to exactly the same limitations. Science, in other words, like philosophy, has no ontological value. Should not the men of science clearly recognise this fact, and confine their efforts to the legitimate function of science—the discovery of natural phenomena and their classification into general laws derived by logical mathematical processes?

LOUIS TRENCHARD MORE.

CINCINNATI.

THE SCOTTISH ESTABLISHMENT.

FROM AN INSIDE POINT OF VIEW.

THE REV. DAVID FREW, B.D.

RECENT events and movements in the ecclesiastical life of Scotland have so far altered the aspect of the Disestablishment question, and modified the attitude of controversialists on both sides, that practically a new situation is created for the Established Church, which seems to entail upon her a revisal of her present policy. The time may not be opportune for the formulation of an eirenicon, but it demands at least the serious reconsideration of her position, alike in her own interests and those of the country at large. A change, at least in the way of a modification or readjustment of the existing Establishment, if not already urgently called for, is certainly the point towards which the leading lines of ecclesiastical development are converging; and serious consequences may ensue from the ignoring of this fact by the Church, and her failure to take action upon it. A motion was carried some time ago, in one of her leading presbyteries, committing the Church of Scotland to an "open mind" upon the Disestablishment question in her conferences with the United Free Church; and it is a matter of profound regret, as well as of surprise, that, in spite of the possibilities with which it was fraught, nothing further has been heard of it.

Hitherto the policy of the Church of Scotland has been confined to the maintenance of the *status quo*; and there can

be no question of the remarkable success, or good fortune, as some may prefer to have it, which has attended her efforts in that direction, but it would be wrong to conclude that the past results of this policy either guarantee its wisdom in the present or justify its continuance in the future. The present position of the Church is by no means so secure as her more ardent, indiscriminating supporters protest. As a matter of party controversy, it has become so largely dependent upon the vacillations of political opinion that it is unsafe to venture upon confident predictions regarding it. No one knows what a general election may bring forth. Even if it were otherwise, and the Church of Scotland could rely upon an indefinite prolongation of her present peace and freedom from attack, the question would still arise whether she can continue to stand exactly where the centuries have left her, in view of the changed conditions of social and religious life. A position may be tenable which is no longer justifiable, desirable, or even habitable; in which case nothing can be gained, but much, if not all, may be lost, by refusing to give it up.

In discussing the Establishment it is desirable to distinguish between the principle involved—the national recognition of religion—and the system in which it is practically embodied. The principle may be regarded as inviolable, and good for different times and circumstances, while the actual system through which it is applied may be considered open to serious objection. In the nature of the case, the latter must be capable of adaptation to the changing order of things, if it is not to become antiquated and irksome. The existing Establishment, with little or no change, is the heritage of a time so utterly unlike the present that it is only by an effort of the imagination that the modern mind can even partially comprehend it. Scotland had almost realised its ideal of a Presbyterian Theocracy: it had a Parliament of its own, the members of which were mostly staunch adherents of the national religion; Church and State were virtually the same body, acting in different capacities, and viewing itself under

different aspects ; toleration, in matters of religion, was almost unknown ; denominationalism had not arisen ; and the social, industrial, and political developments which have since transformed the life of the people lay hidden in the distant future. It is not surprising that a system conceived and inaugurated under such circumstances should now stand in need of adaptation and amendment ; the wonder rather is that it has been able to withstand material modification so long. In one direction, at least, the practical working of the system is out of touch with the theory on which it is supposed to proceed. Parochial divisions and equipment may be maintained, but it is no longer possible to carry out parochial oversight, organisation, and discipline, as originally intended, in the larger towns and cities, and even in many country districts in which there is a multiplicity of churches. With regard to other points of a subsidiary kind—such as the incidence of ecclesiastical assessments, the allocation of sittings in the parish churches, and the method of payment of stipends—the Church would probably admit the advisability, if not the necessity, of change. It is not so much these things, however, which trouble the modern conscience and press upon the Church the reconsideration of her compact with the State, as a matter of graver, spiritual import, dissatisfaction with which has been accumulating for years, and is no longer voiceless within her own borders. The control of the State over the doctrine of the Church, in the present conditions of national and religious life, is felt to be, not merely an anomaly, but a serious impediment to the spiritual growth and well-being of the Church, and a cause of alienation from the sympathies and confidence of other ecclesiastical bodies with which she has the closest intellectual and traditional affinities. The principal organ of the State is now a heterogeneous House of Commons, only a fraction of the members of which have any real, first-hand acquaintance with Presbyterian beliefs, or any direct interest in them ; it is scarcely tolerable that the regulation of the doctrine of the Church, or any power of interference whatever

with her inner life, should be entrusted to it. Of course, the prerogative of the State is purely negative: a right, not to impose new doctrines upon the Church, but only to confine her to her own traditional lines of belief, and punish her for deviations from them. Still, in an age of religious toleration, freedom of thought, and general progress and enlightenment, it is a grievous encumbrance, to which she can hardly continue to reconcile herself without shirking her spiritual responsibilities and putting herself hopelessly out of touch with the spirit of the time. To be true to her high calling, the Church must have doctrinal autonomy; she must be delivered from external coercion in matters of belief. Whether, as is sometimes contended, her present subjection to the State be an essential implicate of the Establishment principle, or only, as may be argued, a variable, contingent part of the system through which it works, the question of its abolition must be faced.

The realisation of this necessity seems to be the logical consequence, and can scarcely fail to be the actual outcome, of the two leading movements at present proceeding in the Church of Scotland. On the one hand, there is the movement for Creed relaxation and revision which has been gathering force and volume during the last twenty years. At every point of its progress, it has not only been hampered and checked, but baffled and thrown back, by the want of the power of doctrinal initiative in the Church. The discussion of its merits, if not actually precluded by the compact with the State, has been robbed of point and reality by the consciousness of inability to act without the sanction of the secular power, and the fear of untoward consequences resulting, not merely from the defiance of that power, but from anything in the nature of an appeal to it. Spontaneity and candour could hardly be expected, even in the leaders of the Church, when this ghost continually appeared at their banquet, and this Damocles' sword dangled over their heads. Advantage was taken of the abnormal political and ecclesiastical situation

of 1905 to obtain from the State the right of prescribing the Formula of subscription to the Confession of Faith; but, as no alteration was thereby effected in the Act of 1690, on which the Establishment is based, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the relief supposed to be gained is only of a nominal nature. The Church is still bound to the Confession, though in the future she will have the empty satisfaction of forging and fixing the ties that bind her. She is busy at present manufacturing a new Formula; but its completion will leave her position very much as it was before. It is difficult to see what actual result can be attained, other than a futile disturbance of the ecclesiastical air, so long as the doctrinal control of the State is maintained. Something must be done to get rid of that incubus, even at the risk of Disestablishment. The same conclusion follows from the consideration of the movement for union with the United Free Church. It is hopeless to expect that Church to entertain overtures even for co-operation with a Church that still acknowledges the right of the State to interfere in spiritual matters. It is worse than useless to propose an incorporating union: the members of the United Free Church would be foolish indeed if they should return to the fold which has already proved too strait for them, and which is still shepherded by the dog which formerly harassed them and drove them into the wilderness. They and their fathers have sacrificed much for spiritual independence; they have purchased their liberty to think and believe as the spirit moves them at a great price; they cannot belie their traditions, stultify their contentions, and risk their distinctive principle by associating themselves with a Church in which the civil power has still a controlling voice. The evils of disunion may be great and clamant—and the Church of Scotland has a way of dwelling upon them which must be very irritating to the dissenting mind—but greater evils might result from a sacrifice of principle and a betrayal of the spiritual interests of religion. To prove the sincerity of her desire for union, it is not enough

for the Church of Scotland to send annual overtures of peace to the United Free Church, and suggestions for a friendly conference, or even to throw her doors hospitably open: she must bethink herself of the obstacle that blocks the way, and consider seriously the possibility of its removal. It is not want of respect, unfriendly feeling, or love of schism that actuates the United Free Church in her response to the overtures of the Establishment, but a vital principle which she cannot give up; and, until this is recognised in the Church of Scotland, proposals for union must fail of result. Freedom from State control, which is necessitated by her own expanding thought, and consequently desiderated by many of her own members, is at the same time the indispensable condition of her Presbyterian brethren entering into fellowship with her.

The advent of the current year was marked by the issue of an important pamphlet on Scottish Church union, in which the venerable Dr Mair, one of the foremost champions of the subject, and an ex-Moderator of the Established Church, gives a perspicuous review of the present situation, and enters an earnest, eloquent plea for the cessation of Presbyterian divisions. The most significant part of this paper, from the point of view of the present discussion, is that in which the author summarises recent proceedings in the direction of union, and sets down side by side the conditions regarded as indispensable by the Church of Scotland and the United Free Church respectively, and embodied in their latest resolutions. On the one hand, the Church of the Establishment professes herself only able to proceed in the matter "*consistently with the continuance of the national recognition of religion*"; on the other hand, the United Free Church stipulates that the steps to be taken will be "*consistent with the principles of her spiritual freedom*." These are crucial conditions, as Dr Mair observes; but his further remark that "happily they are not incompatible with each other" is not so evident on the face of it, though he seems to have explained it in a previous paper. If these conditions are to be taken in the sense in which they

are generally understood, and so far there has been no official attempt to impart any other signification to them, they certainly are, and it is difficult to see how they ever can be anything else than, incompatible with each other. There is practically no ambiguity about the condition laid down by the United Free Church: "*the principles of her spiritual freedom*" are now tolerably clear to every intelligent Scottish mind (she has been at particular pains to make them so), and amount virtually to the repudiation of any external authority in matters of order and doctrine. But what, it may be asked, does the condition formulated by the Church of Scotland mean? Does it mean the continuance of the existing system of Establishment, and consequently the maintenance of the control of the State, even theoretically, in spiritual affairs? In the absence of any official statement to the contrary, this is certainly the sense in which most people will interpret it; and if that is to be taken as its meaning, then there is no resisting the conclusion that the positions of the two Churches are quite incompatible, and no immediate *rapprochement* is possible between them. The pamphlet of Dr Mair supplies a pressing demand of the situation in focussing attention upon these conditions of union promulgated by the Churches, for their juxtaposition brings out more clearly than anything else could the real point at issue between them. It is to be hoped that it will serve the further purpose of inciting the more thoughtful minds in both communions, but especially in that to which he himself belongs, to an earnest, generous endeavour to bridge over the incompatibility disclosed. The first step towards that desirable result, or indeed towards any general agreement such as Dr Mair desiderates as a basis of practical thought, appears to lie with the Church of the Establishment, in seeking spiritual autonomy for herself. Her indispensable condition of union would be more palatable to the sister Church if it involved no more than the national recognition of religion in such a form as would not carry with it the doctrinal control of the State.

Is it too much to hope that a bold and earnest attempt to secure that freedom in spiritual matters, which is her indefeasible right, would excite the sympathy of the United Free Church, and induce her to make common cause with the Church of Scotland in preserving and maintaining what is good in the Establishment? Along this line seems to lie a solution of the ecclesiastical situation which would be advantageous and honourable to both. On the one hand, the Church of Scotland would be yielding no matter of principle, but ridding herself of an obstacle to her spiritual life and growing desire for wider co-operation and communion; and, on the other hand, the United Free Church would be securing all that she has contended for, and other things besides; while both would be advancing the general religious interests of the country, and helping to realise the dream of a Church at once truly National and Free. Of course there are those in both Churches who will resent the idea of compromise; but it may be sufficient to remind such extremists in the Church of Scotland of the invidious exclusiveness and insecurity of their present position, and to warn those of them in the United Free Church of the probability of results accruing from unconditional Disestablishment such as they do not contemplate. No matter, however, what the opposition or consequences may be, the time seems to have come for the Church of Scotland to take up the question of the external authority involved in the State connection, and consider it with an "open mind."

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KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL ÆSTHETIC IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN MATHEMATICS.

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THE central mass in Kant's philosophic work is the "Critik der reinen Vernunft," and of this the centre is commonly located in the Analytic, more particularly the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. Not a few, however, find in the Æsthetic, in the doctrine of Space and Time as forms of intuition, by far the most enduring and important contribution made by the Königsberger to the fund of human thought and knowledge. Such was the judgement of Schopenhauer, the most luminous intellect that shone on German philosophy during the past century, a judgement repeatedly and emphatically expressed. Such was the impression that was made on the mind of contemporaries, most excellent judges,¹ and found voice in the epithet "all-annihilator" (den alles Zermalmenden), applied to him in *Morgenstunden* (1786). Even to-day, in the general thought of the competent, his name is associated quite as closely and certainly as honourably with the subjectivity of Space and Time as with the Categories, the Antinomies, or the Categorical Imperative. This great idea, clearly announced in the Dissertation of 1770, heralded the birth of the Critical Philosophy, and having watched by the cradle it will perhaps

¹ "The Kantian literature of the preceding (eighteenth) century, which in many respects is superior in quality to that of the present," *Vaihinger*, ii. 142.

follow the hearse, for hardly another Kantian idea is likely to outlive it. For generations it marched triumphantly over Europe, and shaped the whisper of nearly every philosophic throne. But the days that follow, says Pindar, are the wisest witnesses. What, then, is their testimony at the end of five quarters of a century?

In the Supplement II. vi. to Edition B (1787), Kant propounds "the peculiar problem of pure reason" in the words: "How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible?" Whether we accept this, his own deliberate statement, or hold with Adickes that it is a later, or with Paulsen that it is an unfortunate intrusion, certain it is that Kant makes much of this problem and of the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements whereon it rests. Of these, the analytic states in the predicate some partial content of the subject, as *bodies are extended*, extension being part of the concept of body. The synthetic, which might more properly be called *prosthetic*, adds in the predicate what is not present in the subject, and hence not to be discovered therein by any analysis; as *all bodies are heavy*, this heaviness not belonging in any way to the bare concept of body.

This distinction, which reappears in Mill as the division of propositions into Verbal (or essential) and Real (or non-essential or accidental) (*Logic*, i., 6, 4), had not escaped the attention of Locke, who devotes a chapter (viii., Bk. iv.) to *Trifling Propositions*, that bring no increase of knowledge, as opposed to Instructive Propositions. The former include all identities, and "secondly, when a part of any complex Idea is predicated of the Whole." Kant describes his analytic judgements as "those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is thought through Identity." Plainly, then, his agreement with Locke is exact, though Kant is supposed to have derived at this point from Wolff. With the Englishman, to form instructive propositions is "to find out intermediate ideas, and then lay them in such order one by another that the understanding may see the agreement or

disagreement of those in question" (iv. 8, 3), and all such were, of course, experiential. The Continental dogmatism, on the other hand, professed to derive a body of certain truth analytically from concepts. But Kant, mediating between Locke and Leibnitz, held that synthetic judgements may be either *a posteriori* or *a priori*: the former, when the understanding falls back on a complete experience of an object conceived by a concept (embodying only partial experience), to furnish an additional element (as heaviness) that may be then added to the concept by synthetic judgement; the latter, when no such recourse to experience is possible, but when nevertheless such judgements, as mere matters of fact, are actually formed. How is this possible? Such is the "mystery hidden" which Kant, perhaps unconsciously parodying 1 Cor. ii. 6-8, declares none of "the ancients" had known, else they would not have builded systems vainly, and which he set himself to reveal.

With regard to this famous division of judgements (which modern logic disowns, declaring that judgement is at once analytic *and* synthetic), it may be observed that it is touched with genuine Kantian formalism, which builds up the world of thought rigidly, architecturally, fitting one stone precisely on the other, with all the parts symmetrically disposed, the lines hard and fast, and the divisions carefully numbered and registered. The great process of organic growth and metabolism found little recognition in Kant's psychology. It is only the full-formed adult intelligence, panoplied with intuitions, concepts, and ideas, that he deems worthy of his inquisition. In point of fact, to know correctly is to know genetically. The sharply bounded polyhedral blocks of understanding, which Kant calls Concepts, cut small figure in the life of the mind. Concepts there are, certainly, but their outlines are often vague, they shape and reshape themselves almost continuously, they coalesce and fuse into one, or else they dissolve and break up into many ("the concept stands never within safe limits," A 728). Their life is as changeful and eventful

as the life of mind itself. As Mill has clearly seen, the analytic judgements in question simply state some content of the meaning of a word, one of its many connotations. Such analysis always presupposes the synthesis that first yielded the concept in question. This clotting of fluent mental elements into more or less permanent complexes is a fundamental psychologic process rather inadequately treated in the *Critique*.

Elsewhere, as in his lectures, Kant gives another turn to this distinction, declaring that "the relation that results from analysis is logical, that results from synthesis is real," that is, objectively valid. Herewith we are reverted to the Humian distinction (dimly perceived by Locke) between demonstrative or conceptual knowledge of quantity and number, and empirical knowledge of matters of fact and existence (*Enq. H.U.*, Part iii. of section xii.). It is the peculiarity of the former that it is the generation of the thinking spirit, which therein appears as something creative, as endowed with spontaneous energy. This activity constitutes the originality, the productive power, the insight of the mathematician, the man of science, the critic, the philosopher. It shows itself in the formation of Concepts (*Begriffbildung*). Open any work of a creative mind, and you find its first self-appointed task is a sharp determination of certain regulative ideas, perhaps never before defined. Without recognising this originaive function of the intellect, it seems impossible to understand the facts of individual daily life, or the facts of history, especially the discoveries of science. It is no less true in Science than in Religion that the spirit breathes where it will, and you hear its voice but know not whence it comes nor whither it goes. Precisely so is every original idea born of the spirit.

The Concepts of the understanding are thus its own creations ("mathematical definitions *make* the concept itself," A 730), but yet not utterly unoccasioned. The provocation to the generation of these notions comes from without, from

experience. Points, lines, circles, squares, spheres, planes, the whole arsenal of geometry, integers, rationals, irrationals, series, groups, sets, imaginaries, the endless artillery of arithmetic—all these exist nowhere but in their definitions framed by the intellect to suit the intellect itself. Hence, *en passant*, the plausibility in the thesis of M. Le Roy, that science deals not with real facts, but facts of its own formation or deformation. But experience has been full of suggestions of all this elaborate furniture of Reason. Nature has never shown us a point, but has studded the sky with stars; nor a line, but has traversed the ether with rays; nor a circle, but has suspended on high the full disc of the moon. An Alpine traveller asked a native: Do you know where X—— is? The native replied: No, but there's the path to it. Experience does not furnish exact concepts; these she cannot attain, but she does *point the path* that leads to them. These indications are not always equally intelligible to all; often her finger is so wrapt in mist that only the keenest eye can detect its token. Then again it shines out like the day, known and understood not only of all men, but even of the lower animals. The concepts once formed and precisely defined, their implications constitute a body of necessary consistencies, the mathematical content of the relevant doctrine. Whether or not we hold with Moore that “the world is formed of concepts,” and that propositions are independent of any knowing mind, we must, it seems, admit that a proposition is, if not a complete concept, at least a synthesis of concepts. The necessity that characterises mathematical doctrine is a purely logical necessity of the understanding in the synthetic manipulations of its concepts.

But let us not wander too far from Kant and the *Æsthetic*. Of prime importance in his mind is the proposition that all mathematical judgements are synthetic in his sense of the term. His favourite example, appearing twice in the *Critik* and also in the *Prolegomena*, is $7 + 5 = 12$. This judgement, we are told, seems at first sight analytic, following from the concept of a sum by the Law of Contradiction, though in fact this

concept of sum contains naught but the union (as of 7 and 5) into one number without any thought of what that one number is; the concept of 12 is by no means thought in thinking of 7 and 5 as united, and no dissection can find this 12 contained in that sum. Intuition must be called in, as by counting 5 (by the fingers) on to 7, when the number 12 is seen to arise. Paulsen, however, seems to think this judgement really analytic, and that this is clearly seen in the case of "3 and 10 are 13." "The universal axiom that lies at the basis of all arithmetic is that the sum of units is not altered by their transposition in the decimal system." But Paulsen does not seem to meet Kant on the latter's own ground; he merely says, "As a matter of course we could not find in the first instance that the name of the sum of 7 and 5 was 12." Certainly; but Kant says nothing about the name, he appeals to visual intuition as necessary to the predication. These primary additions have been much discussed and much misunderstood. Moore admits that "it is perhaps inconceivable to us now that two and two should not make four; but, when numbers were first discovered, it may well have been thought that two and two made three or five." In the *Essays by a Barrister*, it is contended that "there is a (certain) world," and "in such a world two and two would make five." As even Paulsen does not seem to have come perfectly into the light, and even though "much has lately been said of Kant's celebrated instance" (Bosanquet), perhaps an additional word at this point may not be amiss.

In the first place, it seems plain that both the name and the sign of the sum are indifferent. Whether we say twelve or Zwölf or dozen, whether the sign be 12 or XII or μ , has no significance. The point is, what do we mean by sum and what by twelve? This may be made clear. Let it be assumed that we know what is meant by 1 and what by adding 1. Then we may *define* the sum of any two integers a and b by the equation $a + b = (a + b') + 1$, where $b = b' + 1$. This definition acquires meaning as soon as we know what is $a + b'$; that is, we know what is meant by adding any integer as soon as

we know what is meant by adding the next less integer; or, better, as soon as we know what it is to add any integer, immediately we know what it is to add the next higher integer. We are supposed to know what we mean by the sum $a + 1$, hence we know what we mean by the sum $a + 2$, then by $a + 3$, and so on *in infinitum*. This is the simplest example of *Recurrence*, or the Fermatian Inference, which lies at the heart of all arithmetical reasoning, even at the heart of mathematics itself. As already observed, by what names and symbols we shall denote these numbers, thus successively defined, is purely arbitrary. It seems, then, that there is no other way to generate the concept 12 than by the successive additions of 1, as in Kant's illustration. Twelve is merely the name for the integer sum attained by the successive additions of five units, starting from 7. The summation yields the number arbitrarily named 12, which has no existence outside of this or some equivalent defining summation. There is no *independent* concept of 12 that is compared and identified with the concept of the sum of 7 and 5, as Kant would imply. Though 12 be defined as the sum of 11 and 1, this 11 must then be defined as the sum of 10 and 1, so that we land on the definition of 12 as the sum of 7 and 5, not this sum "defined as 12" (Bosanquet's *Logic*, i., 100). But might not one hesitate for a moment in case of large numbers and ask, Is $798 + 985 = 1783$? Certainly. Does not this then imply that the 1783 is not given as the sum of the other two, but that the two concepts, of the sum and the 1783, are actually compared and identified? Kant refers with special confidence to the case of such large numbers, where, "turn and twist our concepts as we will, we can never, without help from intuition, by mere anatomy of our concepts find the sum." Only apparently is he right. The fact is, we express it in our denary system as a *sum of four numbers*: $1000 + 700 + 80 + 3$. Now this sum is already familiar to us by the definition of sum, and we must, to be sure, verify whether this sum is the same by definition as the sum of 798 and 985. But it is precisely here that intuition would leave us in the lurch; it

is precisely by the analysis (completed of course by synthesis, according to definition of addition) that Kant rejects that we are able to identify the two sums. True, there are many short cuts in the process, but it comes finally to this, that each sum is dissected into its constituent units; at the bottom lies the uniform Fermatian Inference.

However, there is yet a matter of importance in these additions. It is the assumption of the so-called Associative and Commutative Laws. These are expressed respectively by the formulæ $a + (b + c) = (a + b) + c$ and $a + b = b + a$. They are absolutely necessary to our arithmetic, being implicit in all its processes, and are proved rigorously by the same mathematical Johannes Factotum, the Fermatian Inference. The second law declares that the same number is attained in counting two sets continuously whichever set is counted first; the other declares that in counting three sets the same result is attained whether we count the first two sets as one set and then the third set or the first set and then the other two considered as one set; moreover, the two members of each equation may be used equivalently, to suit our convenience. Lipschitz, in his *Analysis*, appeals to *inner intuition* as the basis of these laws, but they are readily deduced from the definition of addition by employment of mathematical induction; nor is it easy to see how inner intuition can here come into play, since in the counting of objects it is not an inner succession that we observe but rather an outer coexistence of which we make abstraction. From all of which we conclude that there is no warrant in Kant's example for his claim that intuition supplies a necessary addendum to the concept of sum in judgements involving addition. It is the Laws of Addition (and Multiplication), proved by *recurrence*, that fill such judgements as $7 + 5 = 12$ with meaning, both justifying and fructifying the equational calculus.

But it must not be supposed that there is nothing *a priori* in this mathematical reasoning, because the alleged Kantian element evaporates. There remains, in fact, the root-assump-

tion of the Fermatian Inference itself, which alone lends it wing for flight to infinity. The general form of this reasoning involves a universal major premiss of this form: If the proposition p holds for any value n of its variable, it holds for the next value $n + 1$. By trial it is then seen to hold (say) for the value 1; hence follows the endless sorites; the impulse communicated by actual experiment to the first term in the series is transmitted thence to the second, thence to the third, and so on without stop, for ever. But how can any universal result be reached hereby? Can the mind actually carry on this process without end? Certainly it does not do it. Schopenhauer says: "The intellect grows weary; the will is never weary." But Poincaré holds that "the mind has a direct intuition of this power of indefinite repetition of the same act, when the act is once possible." "This rule (of reasoning by *recurrence*), inaccessible to analytic proof and to experiment, is the exact type of *a priori* synthetic intuition." Dedekind, on the other hand, has sought to prove this rule in a highly generalised form by an extremely ingenious argument depending upon his concept of a *chain*. Herewith he assumes that integers form the chain of an integer. Peano, on the other hand, assumes mathematical induction as axiomatic. Frege has treated the inference more profoundly, considering it is a special case of the "inheritance" of a property in a series. Keyser has discussed the matter very subtly in a series of memoirs. He analyses the views of Poincaré and Dedekind, discredits all attempts to prove that "infinity is," while admitting by a very fine distinction that "the number of numbers can be proved to be infinite," and maintains that in all pure logical process "infinite is used"; hence he propounds his "Axiom of Infinity"—a weighty contribution to logical theory. It is, he contends, in the very nature of a valid argument-form to transcend any and every finite universe of applicability. Russell, anticipating in a measure vol. ii. of his great work, professes to "prove the principle of mathematical induction," then that no finite number is the number

of finite numbers; thence, since the definition of cardinal numbers implies the existence of the number of cardinal numbers, "the existence of infinite numbers is rigidly demonstrated." He further holds, against Keyser, that Dedekind's postulates indeed imply, but do not presuppose, the actual infinite; and he quite rejects the psychology that finds in mathematical induction any implication of the mind's power endlessly to repeat the same act. Indeed, with him logic and mathematics are quite objective; their implications are what they are quite irrespective of whether there be any mind to know them; truth and the knowledge of truth are two and for ever two. On the contrary, says Poincaré: "All that is not thought is pure nothing; . . . to say there is something else than thought, is therefore an affirmation that can have no meaning"; *nous ne sortons pas de nous-mêmes*, said Condillac.

Amid so great a contrariety of expert testimony, it may be that the last word has not yet been spoken; some other slightly modified view of the matter may not be excluded. One thing, however, seems manifest: the question is one that belongs to the understanding and not to the sensibility; it is one of categories and not of intuitions. Whatever be the nature of the logical necessity under debate, even though it be given in "the inner sense whereby the mind (*Gemüth*) intuits itself or its inner condition," it is certainly not given in "a definite form, under which only the intuition of its (the soul's) inner condition is possible, so that all that pertains to the inner determination is presented in the relations of Time."¹ What the infinite continuum of Time has to do with the discrete aggregate of integers, it is hard to see. The answer, that we can count only in time, seems irrelevant; as well say that the degrees of longitude are possible only by virtue of the equator, on which they may be reckoned. That numbers

¹ In the best translations of the *Critique*, as Watson's and Mueller's, a sense-annulling error has crept in and maintained itself here: "*es ist eine bestimmte Form*" is rendered "It is the (or a) fixed form," where *it* must refer to the *inner sense*, which is impossible in the German. Of course, *es ist* means not "*it is*," but "*there is*," as Meiklejohn translates correctly.

(especially integers) are derived from the intuition of Time seems to be a mere assertion made to complement the more plausible contention that Geometry reposes on the intuition of (Euclidean) space. That the time-form of inner intuition in any way conditions or validates the existence or properties of the class of integers, is a proposition yet to be proved or approved to the understanding.

So far, then, as Arithmetic is concerned, it appears that neither its basis nor its logical procedure is disclosed in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Nor is this strange, since those were the precritical days of mathematics, when indeed its skirts were widened with amazing rapidity, but when the inventive spirit was too busied with its own majestic creations, objectively considered, to give thought to the anatomy of its processes, when the upbuilding went bravely on while the foundations remained unexamined, if indeed not unlaid.

However, it is mainly in connection with geometry, as the doctrine of Space, that Kant's name is associated with mathematics. With the best will in the world he sought to maintain the unimpeachable objective validity of the eldest of the Sciences against every suspicion of scepticism, and this by showing that its subject-matter, Space, was "not an actual existence, not merely a determination (to be sure) or even relation of things, yet such as would belong to them in themselves even unintuited, but such as attaches only to the form of intuition, and hence to the subjective constitution of our mind, but for which (form and constitution) it could not be predicated of anything at all."

In support thereof Kant advances five arguments. Of these the first and second aim to prove that Space-presentation is not empirical but *a priori*: the first, indirectly, from its priority; the second, directly, from its necessity. With these arguments, as being psychological or epistemological, we have at present nothing to do. Arguments (4) and (5) should be given in Kant's own words:—

"(4) Space is not a discursive or so-called general concept

of relations of things in general, but a pure intuition. For first, we can imagine only one single space, and in speaking of many spaces we mean thereby only parts of one and the same unital space. Nor can these parts precede the one single all-including space, as if they were its constituents whence it might be compounded, but they can be thought only as within it. Space is essentially single; the manifold in it, hence too the general concept of spaces in general, rests solely on limitations. Hence it follows that in regard to it an *a priori* intuition (which is non-empirical) must lie at the base of all concepts of the same [spaces A, space B]. Accordingly, all geometrical principles, as that two sides of a triangle are together greater than the third, can never be deduced from general concepts of line and triangle, but from intuition, and in fact *a priori* with apodictic certainty.

“(5 A) Space is presented given as an infinite magnitude. A general concept of space (common alike to a foot and an ell) can determine nothing in regard to magnitude. Were it not for the illimitability in the progress of intuition, no concept of relations would ever imply a principle of infinity in them.

“(5 B) Space is presented as an infinite given magnitude. True it is, we must think every concept as an idea (Vorstellung) contained in an infinite multitude of different possible ideas (as their common mark) and therefore containing them under it; but no concept, as such, can be thought as containing an infinite multitude of ideas in it. However, space is thought thus (for all parts of space coexist *in infinitum*). Hence the original idea of space is intuition *a priori* and not conception.”

Argument (4) seems to consist of two arguments, half-fused together, and one confirmation. The first pivots on the uniqueness of space: “*spatium . . . non est nisi unicum.*” There is only one space even as there is only one God, as the *Critique of Judgement* reminds us; all part-spaces are only space-parts. This notion harks back to Spinoza’s One Infinite Substance and recalls even the Plenum, the One of

Parmenides. The suppressed major would state that every concept contains under it a countless number of possible determinations as examples; space contains no such; therefore, etc.—a valid syllogism in *Camestres*. Amplifying his reply to the possible objection that we yet speak of spaces, as of the various rooms in a building, Kant introduces secondly the notion of the unitality of space: it is an analytic, not a synthetic, whole; the parts are not set together to make it up, they are themselves delimited in it, cut out of it; the whole is first, the parts afterwards. It might be interesting to note that Kant has elsewhere contradicted all this flatly and repeatedly. Thus, under “Axioms of Intuition” (A 162, B 203–4) we find “extensive magnitude,” as space and time, defined as “that in which the presentation of the parts makes possible (and therefore necessarily precedes) the presentation of the whole.” Similarly in the noteworthy notes at B 136 and 160, which seem to loose the bands of these arguments of the *Æsthetic*. At A 505 we meet with a “decomposing synthesis,” and cease thenceforth to wonder.

With the endless strife over these matters we have naught to do, but Kant's major premiss recalls the second paragraph of Riemann's *Habilitationsschrift*, “Ueber die Hypothesen, welche der Geometrie zu Grunde liegen.” The obscurity that has hung over the fundamental presuppositions of Geometry Riemann refers to the fact that the general concept of multiply extended magnitudes has not been worked out. Hence he proposes to himself the problem of constructing this concept out of more general concepts of magnitude, in the course of which construction it turns out that space is only a special case of a triply extended magnitude. Into the details of Riemann's analysis we need not enter here; his epoch-making monograph is easily accessible. The important point is that it meets the fourth Kantian argument directly by showing that space is precisely what Kant held it was not, namely, itself a concept admitting of special determinations, and also a special

determination of a more general concept. We are altogether justified in speaking of several spaces of three dimensions (not all parts of the same space) and also of all of these as species of the broader genus of n -fold extents or spaces. If someone replies that these "vast and desert spaces" are figments of the mathematical fancy, and that Kant is speaking of the solitary ever-unital space of experience, the answer is that Kant has not indeed distinguished in modern wise between perceptual and conceptual space; nevertheless, it is the space of geometry of which he is speaking, as the illustration from the sides of a triangle shows. It is only in this space that the necessity (on which Kant insists) of geometrical relations holds, and it is this space that forms one of many in the Riemannian theory. We must conclude, then, that the march of thought has at this point transcended the Kantian argument.

In (5), in both A and B, the term "given" has been an objective point of attack, both early and recent, from Kästner to Hartmann. It was at once perceived that space was not "given" by intuition as infinite, a criticism that Kant and Kantians have in vain sought to evade. It was confessed that "given" should have been "thought," whereby, however, a change of venue was taken from Sensibility to Understanding. Indeed, Kant himself, in the *Critique of Judgement*, section 26, speaks of the infinite as being "thought given" (*gegeben gedacht*)! But even the emenders have not themselves doubted that space was infinite, at least in thought, so we need pause no longer on the point.

The force or reference of the term "infinite" seems not to be the same in A and B. In the former it is explained in the "boundlessness of the march of intuition." This term "boundlessness" must not mislead us. Since Kant repeatedly speaks of space as infinite, there can be no doubt that he means as much here and means nothing else. The fact that intuition marches forward for ever to remoter and remoter regions, beyond the stars and nebulae and the flaming ramparts of the world, without any suggestion of stop or stay,

meant for him the strict extensive infinity of space. But in B, though space is still infinite, nothing is argued therefrom; instead, we find a neat syllogism in *Cesare*: no concept contains *in* itself an infinite multitude of ideas; but space does; therefore space is no concept. All the weight of this great argument rests upon the word *in* as distinguished from *under*. Such a fulcrum does not inspire perfect confidence, especially on remembering that Kant reiterates elsewhere that space is a concept of the Understanding, and even an idea of Reason, instead of an intuition of the Sensibility; thus "Space without Matter is no object of perception, and nevertheless it is a necessary concept of reason, therefore naught else than a bare Idea." But we must look at the major in this *Cesare*, for which Kant does not offer any proof, neither do his continuators. Is it self-evident? On the contrary, a multiply infinite series is surely a concept, yet it does contain *in* it an infinite multitude of presentations; yes, even of concepts, for it is made up of infinite series, each of which is a concept. Now what is space (at least for the geometer) but such a triply infinite series? What is geometry but the doctrine of such series?

Though commentators prefer this B form of the argument (4), the A form repudiated by Kant himself seems far better, as Adickes perceives. The "boundless progress of intuition" is a new and valuable element of thought, and does seem at first to make the space-form coextensive with the universe. In fact, this very infinitude really underlies the preceding argument, though not mentioned therein. Here, then, we must raise the question whether this admitted boundlessness really implies infinity; we must draw the Riemannian distinction between infinite and unbounded, and therewith the Riemannian conclusion: "The unboundedness of space possesses a greater empirical certitude than any other external experience. From it, however, the infinity by no means follows. On the contrary, if bodies be supposed independent of position, and hence the space's measure of curvature

constant, then the space becomes finite whenever this measure is positive, no matter how small." It is indeed apparent that a circle and a sphere are altogether unbounded, though both are finite. A caterpillar will crawl round all day on the rim of a tub, an ant may scurry about for ever, and "work as hard as adamant," over an eggshell, without let or hindrance. At every instant intuition builds up round the subject an unbounded triple manifold, a three-way spread of possible positions, which he carries about with him always, the vast envelope of perceptual space. Herein lies an important implication as to the internal relations of the extensive elements involved, but none as to the finity or infinity of the extent as a whole. For all we know, "this brave, o'erhanging firmament," this radiant cocoon of the soul, may measure just so many cubic miles. Accordingly, whatsoever support this fifth consideration may ever have lent to the Kantian position, has now disappeared.

The third argument is omitted from the second edition, but its essential idea is emphatically reproduced in the addendum, section 3, "Transcendental Discussion of the Concept of Space"—a surprising expression this (though often recurrent) in a work that devotes so many syllogisms to proving that space is *not* a concept. In this very section 3 Kant insists that space "must be intuition; for from a bare concept no propositions reaching beyond it can be drawn, which, nevertheless, takes place in geometry"; and furthermore he urges the apodicticity of all geometric propositions as proof that they are not experiential, precisely as in argument (3) of the first edition. This latter, then, is genuine Kantian thought, and its omission is a part of that mutilation which most readers must keenly regret. But what is this argument? That the axioms of geometry, as (1) that no two straight lines can meet in more than one point; (2) that the straight line is the shortest distance between two points; (3) that space has three [and only three] dimensions, are not derived from experience, being necessary and universal, and

hence must be *a priori*, given in the form of perception by the external sense. To these he might and should have added (4) the famous parallel-postulate of Euclid, about which longer and more desperate battle has been waged than ever around the walls of windy Troy. Now, as to (2), it may suffice to quote a word from Poincaré, that "it will be possible to deduce it from the other two," (1) and (4), nor is it numbered among Hilbert's *Foundations*. As to (3), we have already seen that Riemann's conception of the manifold legitimises spaces, and therewith their geometries, of any number of dimensions. Nevertheless, Kant might insist that the actual space of perception is for all that still precisely what it is, namely, of three dimensions, and that this is an ultimate, elementary, irresoluble datum of intuition. This we might admit provisionally without prejudging any theory as to the genesis of the space perception or the explanation of its tri-dimensionality. But this perceptual space is not the subject-matter of geometry, but conceptual space, wherein (for special determinations) the axioms hold and apply. But herein, as is now well known, they do not hold, save as assumptions. Rejection of them does not lead (like rejection of the principle of recurrence or the Axiom of Infinity) to any contradiction or absurdity, but to a thoroughly self-consistent, internally coherent body of geometric theorems. Not only have no developments thus far disclosed any disharmony in the Lobachevskian geometry (which rejects the Euclidean postulate of parallels), but it is idle to think that any such disharmony can exist; for if there did, its correlative discord would equally vitiate all Euclidean geometry, since the two geometries are reflections of one another, corresponding term by term, proposition by proposition, as Beltrami has ingeniously taught us. Likewise vain it were to seek for any inner strife in Riemann's geometries (resulting from setting aside axiom 1). Any such strife, did it exist, would bring immediate ruin to the common Euclidean doctrine of the sphere. The coequality of the four geometries is one of the

best assured results of human thinking. They stand on precisely the same logical footing, nor does it seem possible that any experiment should lay bare any ground of preference.

The Euclidean does, indeed, enjoy a certain uniqueness. There may be infinitely many Riemannian and Lobachevskian spaces according to the varying positive or negative value of the space-constant; but there can be only one Euclidean space, for the curvature 0. This Euclidean is then a single critical space between two sets of spaces, a kind of limit or border, exactly as the parabola, with eccentricity 1, is a single critical curve, a border or limit (always of the same shape) between two sets of conics, ellipses and hyperbolas, varying widely in shape with varying eccentricities. But this circumstance gives the Euclidean no degree of logical precedence over the other spaces, even as the parabola enjoys none over its neighbour curves. Nevertheless, all such limits and critical forms have undoubtedly a peculiar interest generally connected with remarkable simplification of properties. An example is the unique parallel in the Euclidean plane, with the resulting unique value of the sum of angles in a plane triangle.

Such uniqueness gives the Euclidean space-form an especial economical value. As a working hypothesis this form is not indeed indispensable, but quite inestimable. Hence its universal adoption by geometers, and the adjustment of all interpretations of experience to its properties. None the less it remains and must remain an extremely important special case, on a dead level in logic with its peers. The axioms that characterise its geometry are no way necessary though every way needful. Kant was right in maintaining that they were not deducible from experience, and in supposing that some intuition of space would be needed to explain their necessity; but no such necessity exists. These assumptions, along with their consequences, are neither *a priori* forms nor empirical data; they are neither true nor false; they are conventions, perfectly consistent and incomparably convenient. Herewith then the modern metageometry gives

the *coup de grace* to the Kantian argument for the purely subjective and intuitional character of space, but only in so far as that argumentation depends on geometric considerations.

Elsewhere (A 712-38) Kant has contrasted the philosopher's with the mathematician's procedure, the latter appealing to intuition (in *constructing* its concepts by figures or by algebraic symbols), as in proving the fifth proposition of Euclid. Unquestionably, such an appeal may be made, and often most successfully. Especially is it useful for the discovery of new relations and the illumination of the whole situation. But it is not therefore necessary. Such construction is an invaluable cane, but not an indispensable crutch. Intuitions would even befog or pervert the sight of Reason in its beatific vision, did they not fall away like scales from the eyes of that *Speculator spiritalis Quasi seraphim sub alis*. The theorems of geometry are the implications of its conceptual apparatus, attending the most high behest of definitions and postulates. Its reasoning differs no whit from other reasoning in the movement of the understanding, and its superior rigour is due to the superior precision with which its concepts are defined. One and the same formal necessity invests every system of valid deductions from a body of premisses exactly definable; it inheres not in the particular matter of the thought, but in its universal manner. Hence it cannot be given by any intuition, by any *form of sense* either external or internal. In so far as this necessity is subjective at all, in so far as it is *felt*, it belongs to the motions of the intellect in the contemplation of its own ideal creations.

Accordingly, it is a fascinating problem for the mathematical logician to determine the minimum of compatible and mutually independent elements and assumptions from which a particular geometry, as the Euclidean, is deducible. In the bud as thus determined lies infolded the whole Ygdrasil-tree of that geometry, from its deepest rootlet to its highest spray. Another question would concern the exact definability of concepts and in what regions it obtains. Still

another would be, why has the mind adopted the peculiar assumptions of the parabolic geometry and organised its experience in accordance therewith? An answer has already been given, that these assumptions are by far the most convenient; but we may still ask, Why choose the most convenient? The answer would seem to be that just as the interchanges of kinetic and potential energy, constituting the cosmic process, while conserving the total energy (or total *something*), take place according to the Law of Least Action, so, too, some certain minimum is momentarily realised in the operations of mind. If the parallel of psychical and physical series be complete, there must be some psychical correspondence to such a universal principle as that of Least Action. When a structure in equilibrium is subjected to external forces it responds by a system of small strains throughout it, which develop a system of the least stresses that will balance the external forces. Hertz, rejecting the notion of force, admitting only Time, Space, Mass as fundamental, supposed invisible bonds connecting (say) n points, having $3n$ co-ordinates; these latter he conceived as co-ordinates of a single point (in a $3n$ -space), which the bonds confined to movement in some space less than $3n$ -fold; then, that this motion would always be on shortest or straightest paths, would be the *one* principle of mechanics. We see that this view also involves a minimum,—and without a minimum-principle, no rational mechanics. We may assume that some analogue obtains in the psychic world, that in the presence and by virtue of any body of experience the mind reacts somewhat as the strained structure or the Hertzian point, adjusting itself with some minimal departure from previous constitution. Some such law of least aberrance would seem to show itself in the organisation of our experience, in the assumptions to which intelligence has been guided, and even in the process of Induction, in eagerly and often hastily passing from particulars to universals. Not only would it seem to be active in this disposition to generalise, in a certain unmistakable impatience

of exceptions, but no less in the impulse to revert to the major premiss, to assume the matter in hand under some wider concept, wherein lies the subtle charm of the syllogism.

In conclusion, if mathematical inquiry has poured abundant water into the wine of Kant's argumentation, it must not be inferred that his doctrine is thereby wholly and irremediably invalidated. It does indeed smack of ingratitude, that the science in whose defence he undertook his deep research should be the first to renounce his guardianship and repudiate his procedures. He might exclaim with Maréchal Villars, "Defend me from my friends." But Kant himself knew as well and proclaimed as clearly as any man that the false must be cleared away to make room for the true, be it knowledge or faith. Throughout the *Æsthetic* he seems to argue like a man upon whom a great dawn had arisen, but whose eyes were not yet quite adjusted to the light. He seems to be seeking for some sure and satisfactory syllogism, which in the end he does not find, but of whose existence he has no doubt. Hence the prevailing unclearness, the endless reiterations, and the contradictions,—the hall-mark of genius. The service that Kant has rendered to philosophy is not depreciated by recognising that here and there his thought has failed of the high mark set before it. Discovery is one thing, rigorous proof is quite another, a fact that even mathematics frequently and brilliantly exemplifies. By some sudden sublation the spirit finds itself transported to airy and inaccessible heights: how—it knows not, nor the way by which it came; it is the long and toilsome task of criticism to explore the mid-lying territory and with engineering skill to construct a firm and infallible highroad that shall conduct thither, step by step, the plodding feet of uninspired intelligence. Kant attained the mountain summit, whence he beheld the world as his idea; we thank him for the message and the call from above, even though he points to no sure path of ascent.

WILLIAM BENJAMIN SMITH.

DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the *Journal*. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

THE INSUFFICIENCY OF SOCIAL RIGHTEOUSNESS AS A MORAL IDEAL.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1909, p. 596.)

ALTHOUGH Principal Forsyth deals with the above subject in the able manner usual to his handling of all topics, yet he seems, to me as a worker, to lack that wider experience of the workaday world of which I may perhaps be allowed to have a more intimate acquaintance. Otherwise, I take it, he would not ask publicly why it is that those who seek for a readjustment of social evils ignore the theologian, as such.

If it were possible for him to step out of his present environment and mix with those who have to encounter the evils in their crudeness, and who, with the overweight of opposing forces, look around for assistance, he would perhaps understand why the mere religionist has been left severely alone.

It is quite true that "humanity cannot explain itself," but humanity is beginning to see that to talk of spiritual forces in an academic manner, while ignoring, or acquiescing in, material evils of the present time, is much the same as a man professing to love God, whom he has not seen, while he hates his brother, who is continually before him.

I quite agree with Dr Forsyth that a deeper working basis for the reformation of society is required than a mere demand for social order; but why have the men professing to hold this deeper basis separated themselves from the movement in its practical issues? I am aware that there have been and are notable exceptions, but these have invariably been subject either to misunderstanding, or regarded as intellectual inferiors, or in some other way sneered at.

The whole righteousness of the universe may not be exhausted in human justice, but surely it is our first duty, if we have any realisation at all of the unity of mankind, to organise the completest scheme of social justice possible. It appears to me that Dr Forsyth inverts the position at

this point: the injustice to God is not brought about by the ignoring of Himself, but by our neglect of the duty which He has laid nearest to our hands. Or does he mean to argue that God thinks more highly of the man who prays, and does nothing more (except perhaps live in comfort himself), than of him who prays not, in the orthodox manner, but whose inner being is stirred by the hardness of the lot of the multitude?

From page 601 onwards Dr Forsyth adopts a more controversial tone, and girds at those who "can sit down under such an arrest of thought" as he appears to think they have accepted; but this seems to imply that he and those other theologians who accept his views have gone *beyond* this experience, and have reached ulterior heights; but if so, where are the tracks of their passage? To what extent are the workers indebted to them? We presume their weight has made some pressure on the social inadequacies of the time. Where is it? You can only test a pudding by eating it, to use a homely phrase; but not many of the plums have come our way. He then confronts us, presumably as a defender of the egotist or capitalist, and asks, if our moral standard is no higher than theirs, how we can dare to request an alteration in the present condition of things; but surely, apart from moral order, about which there seems to be some confusion of thought, on purely economic grounds the worker has a right to demand that the capitalist, etc., shall *not* keep man from his "social paradise."

Granted that a little more inward-looking would be beneficial all round, you can have too much of it, and by becoming absorbed in yourself may forget to look around. This has been the case, unfortunately, with the theologian, as such: hence the reason why he has not been consulted on the question of social righteousness.

H. O. MONTAGUE.

SOUTH NORWOOD.

THE SOCIAL CONSCIENCE OF THE FUTURE.

(*Hibbert Journal*, January and April 1909.)

As one who, actively engaged within the ranks of the Socialist Party, endeavours also to follow the expressions of the movement in literary and religious circles, I read the above article with considerable interest. All that Miss Scudder says of the narrow, selfish character of the social life of to-day, and of the great advance that would be achieved by the realisation of the socialist ideal, is most admirable, and probably no socialist would hesitate to endorse it. But when she deals with the lines on which the advance is to be carried out, with the means by which "the social conscience of the future" is to be prepared and brought to life, the argument seems to rest upon a very inadequate conception of the forces that are moving society towards socialism.

According to Miss Scudder, it would appear that, instead of all changes

in social morality being the result of changes in the economic basis of society, as the economic interpretation of history would have us believe, socialism itself can only be successfully achieved if a certain moral preparation has been undergone; if the majority of mankind has managed by voluntary self-discipline "to endue" itself, as far as in it lies, "with the new Adam, who can thrive in the socialist state to be." I do not mean that Miss Scudder fails to recognise that only *after* socialism has been established can the new social ethics find proper expression. But owing to her inadequate estimate of the economic and political factors which are by themselves sufficient to introduce the new order of society, she feels it necessary to call in the aid of another factor, a spiritual training by which all classes shall learn to relinquish the selfish privileges of present society, and develop "the new social intuitions." On pages 318-319 we read: "The slow but sure growth of the working people in class-consciousness, and their entrance on political power, the consolidation of industry, *the spread of social compunction*" (the italics are mine) "all point the same way." Here we find the real causes of the socialist movement, economic and political in character, coupled with "the spread of social compunction," to which equal importance is apparently attached, and which is, I suppose, considered to be an expression of a moral preparation for socialism. But what is this spread of social compunction? Can any example of it be pointed out which will show it to be the result of a moral or spiritual discipline by which individuals or classes voluntarily surrender any privilege for the good of the whole community? Does not every so-called advance of social compunction result from a hitherto oppressed section securing sufficient power to throw off its bonds? Factory legislation came into operation, not at the suggestion of an enlightened social conscience, but by the demand of the working classes, prompted by their class interests. Similarly, without the need of any aid from a special moral or spiritual discipline, "the consolidation of industry" and the growth of the working classes to power and to a recognition of their own class interests will effect the change to socialism. Not until that change is an accomplished fact can we look for any real progress in social ethics; and then not upon lines properly described as self-sacrifice for the common good, for the interest of the individual will have become identical with the interest of the community.

The erroneous idea that a moral self-disciplinary preparation is necessary seems to have its root in a belief that it is *possible* and *necessary* to convert the privileged classes to socialism. On p. 320 we are told that socialism would bring with it a "penetrating discipline" for "those privileged classes the members of which do so very much like to suit themselves"; and throughout the article there is an assumption that these classes are open to an appeal to voluntarily relinquish their class privileges, and that on their response to this appeal, and active co-operation, the success of the socialist movement depends. The reorganisation is to be achieved "not by the self-assertion of the poor but by the self-knowledge of all" (pre-

sumably all classes) "working together" (p. 324). If this were true I should say with Miss Scudder that socialism indeed requires for its success a change in human nature. Penetrating would need to be the discipline by which the privileged classes, whilst they remain privileged, could be brought to recognise the superiority of a social organisation in which they would be so no longer! But to anyone engaged in the actual battle for socialism, coming in contact with these same privileged classes, and observing their unerring instinct to act and resist as their class interests dictate, such an assumption is absurd. Can one conceive of the feudal lords responding to an appeal to surrender their hereditary rights and privileges and prepare themselves for the rough and strenuous struggle for wealth? Yet Miss Scudder's appeal is for an even greater renunciation. She may reply that no harm can be done by making the appeal; that already socialism numbers many adherents outside the working classes, and that many more may be made. I agree, and fully recognise the value to the socialist movement of the special assistance which converts from the privileged classes are in a position to render, and have rendered. But it should always be made quite clear that the sacrifice of class interests can only be expected from individuals, not from classes as such; and that the only force adequate and necessary to realise socialism is that very "self-assertion of the poor" which Miss Scudder thinks so little of, but which, when defined as the "growth of the working people in class-consciousness and their entrance on political power," she is bound to take account of. Until the working classes, by emancipating themselves and establishing socialism, have given the death-blow to all forms of class rule and class privilege, it is idle to expect a development of the new social intuitions.

In the second portion of her article Miss Scudder anticipates the foregoing criticism, and endeavours to forestall it by making concessions some of which are strangely inconsistent with the expressions and implications of her general argument. The class war, for instance, is admitted to be a stern fact, present in every factory, evident in every act of oppression, strike, and lock-out. But it is apparent that, by the class war, Miss Scudder means something very much more limited than the full bearing of the words as understood by socialists. In the view of Marx and his followers, the class war is much more than a name for strikes and other instances of what Miss Scudder calls guerilla warfare. The part assigned by the doctrine to the working classes is that of bringing the class war itself to an end by the overthrow of capitalism; and if one may judge from history, no moral transformation of the capitalist class will prevent its opposition lasting to the bitter end. Indeed, if Miss Scudder believes in economic determinism, as she appears to do in a half-hearted way, she must see that no such moral transformation is possible *whilst class privilege exists*. Hence the futility of her appeal to the Christian Church to prevent a revolution by bringing about an understanding between the two camps.

THE OVER-EMPHASIS OF SIN.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1909, p. 614.)

IN his lively if somewhat bold article on the above subject, the Rev. Alexander Brown is quite correct in saying that the Church is alarmed at "the decadent sense of sin" that now exists. With a less acute consciousness of sin, the religious exercises of confession and repentance are rendered less necessary, so that it is no matter for surprise if "the Sunday assemblies are visibly diminishing quantities."

To this extent I am with the writer, but I cannot follow him in his sweeping accusations against the pulpit, and his interpretation of sin.

Firstly, his picture of the Evangelical preacher, it seems to me, is overdrawn. This type of preacher is not so common as he supposes. The descendants of Thomas Shepherd and Jonathan Edwards in our day are conspicuous by their fewness. For better or for worse, Evangelicalism of the austere type is among the things of the past. Witness the sermons of our foremost preachers. Savage denunciations and harsh austerities have given way to suave, amiable, compromising oratory. We are more accustomed to the cooings of the dove than the thunders of Sinai.

Mr Brown, in an instructive way, enumerates some of the causes which, as he thinks, have led to the decadent sense of sin; such as the conception of evolution, the influence of heredity and environment, the growth of wealth, and the doctrine of the Fatherhood of God. It is a pity he happens to argue the over-emphasis of sin; otherwise, if he saw things with my eyes, he might have numbered among the causes another, viz., the under-emphasis of sin; for is there not a tendency, in a soft and conciliatory pulpit, to deaden the consciences of the congregation? But, secondly, in order to make good his main thesis, he is not content with merely accounting for the "decadent sense of sin," but proceeds with vigour to justify it. He appears to me, in substance, to maintain that the sense of sin and sin itself move *pari passu*. Can that be so as a matter of fact? If the sense of sin is less acute, does it follow that sin itself is less? One must have courage to answer in the affirmative.

Mr Brown speaks smooth things unto us. Failings which old-fashioned people would regard as sins he calls by soft names. Note the epithets, "amiable shortcomings," "exaggerations," "mistakes," "blunders," "native forces," "faultiness." I envy Mr Brown's optimistic view of sins and sinners, but I have grave doubts as to the correctness of his perspective. Human nature, unfortunately, is not so clean and innocent a thing as he would have us think it is.

Notwithstanding the growth of knowledge and the change in theological thought, sin is still sin, and human nature remains a poor thing. Horace could say, *Vitiis nemo sine nascitur*. Kant, keenest of observers, bewailed the radical taint of human nature, whether in its pagan or cultured state. Sainthood is proverbially characterised by an acute consciousness of sin. Newman felt it more and more as he advanced in life.

The world is obviously advancing, but then the ideal of human perfection is constantly receding into the distance. The gulf between the real and the ideal always staggers us. Says Kant, "When one stands on a higher step of morality he sees farther before him, and his judgment on what men are as compared with what they ought to be is more strict. Our self-blame is, consequently, more severe the more steps of morality we have already ascended in the whole course of the world's history as known to us" (Abbott, *Ethics*, p. 326).

JAMES EVANS.

BRECON.

MATHEMATICS AND THEOLOGY.

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1909, p. 370.)

I HAVE read Professor Keyser's able and thoughtful papers on the bearing of the mathematical theory of infinity on theology with deep interest. With much of what he says I am in entire sympathy; but as his views on mathematical infinity (like the views of mathematicians in general) clash with those I have made known in *Mind* (October 1906), in my *Symbolic Logic* (Longmans), and in my *Man's Origin, Destiny, and Duty* (Williams & Norgate), he will, I hope, bear with me while I point out what appears to me to be a serious flaw in the fundamental principle upon which his argument is founded. He will kindly remember that I am not so much criticising his theory or its theological application as combating an almost universally accepted mathematical axiom.

Reasoning logically from this axiom or definition, Professor Keyser arrives (p. 381) at the conclusion that

"By virtue of this *equality of whole and part*, the whole is said to be *infinite*, and it follows, of course, that the adjective applies to the equal part as well."

On turning over the page we read that

"A collection, class, set, group, aggregate, ensemble, manifold, or multitude of elements . . . is *infinite* if and only if the collection, like the ensemble of points on a sphere, contains a part or sub-collection that is numerically equal to the whole."

Other modern mathematicians, following the same principle, assert that

"If a finite number or ratio be subtracted from an infinite number or ratio, the infinity remains undiminished."

Now, surely a definition, axiom, or linguistic convention that leads to such paradoxes as these should give us pause. The difficulties which admittedly surround our conception of the infinite are in part at least due to the ambiguity of the infinity-symbol ∞ , which mathematicians use sometimes as the inverse or reciprocal of an *infinitesimal*, and sometimes as the formal or symbolic inverse of *zero*. Let H denote a real *infinite* number or ratio, and let h denote a real *infinitesimal* ratio. Then $\frac{H}{1}$ and $\frac{1}{h}$ are real

infinites; their reciprocals $\frac{1}{H}$ and $\frac{h}{1}$ are real *infinitesimals*; while $\frac{0}{1}$ and $\frac{1}{0}$ are *unreal ratios* which have only formal or symbolic existence. If 0 be

considered as equivalent to $\frac{0}{1}$, and ∞ as equivalent to $\frac{1}{0}$, then should be considered as a *pseudo-infinity*, and not as a *real infinity*. The tangent and the secant of a right angle, for example, are not *real* but *pseudo-infinities*. A real infinity must, like all real ratios, have a really existing denominator as well as a really existing numerator.

But, so far, I have defined neither the infinite nor the infinitesimal. My definitions are as follows:—

(1) A number or ratio, positive or negative, is said to be *infinite* when it is too large numerically to be expressed, either exactly or approximately, in any arithmetical system of notation.

(2) A ratio, positive or negative, is said to be *infinitesimal* when it is too small numerically to be expressed, either exactly or approximately, in any arithmetical system of notation.

For example, let M denote a million. The number M^M (the millionth power of a million), though immeasurably large—so large that the ratio of the volume of the earth to the volume of a drop of water would be negligible in comparison—is nevertheless finite and not infinite, because it can be expressed numerically in the decimal notation by simply substituting 1,000,000 for M. Similarly, its reciprocal $1/M^M$, though immeasurably small, is still finite and not infinitesimal.

We may thus have many infinities, H_1, H_2, H_3 , etc., any of which may have any ratio, finite or infinite, to any other; and also many infinitesimals, h_1, h_2, h_3 , etc., any of which may have any ratio, finite or infinite, to any other. Thus, if F denote any *finite* ratio, we may have $H_1 - F = H_2$, in which H_2 is less than H_1 ; but we cannot consistently have $H_1 - F = H_1$, nor $H_2 - F = H_2$. Similarly, we cannot consistently assert $FH_1 = H_1$, or $FH_2 = H_2$, except when $F = 1$.

These definitions of the infinite and of the infinitesimal are self-consistent, and will therefore tend to no needless paradoxes in any system of geometry that adopts them. Any “non-Euclidean” system of geometry that assumes the possible falsity of any of Euclid’s axioms must, in my opinion, be founded on an erroneous principle.

Having thus stated my objection to the commonly accepted view of the infinite, I must abstain from any special criticism of Professor Keyser’s eloquent dissertation further than to remark that I have great difficulty in accepting the conclusion (p. 388) which (logically enough) he draws from modern non-Euclidean premises. This conclusion, which he himself rightly calls an “astounding revelation,” is: that man, by the slow evolutionary development of his intellect, has now at last discovered that “he himself is infinite.” I hope I have not here, by undue compression or otherwise, unintentionally misrepresented Professor Keyser’s meaning. My own

view, founded in part on my definitions of the *infinite* and the *infinitesimal*, is that man is but a link in an infinite ascending and descending chain of psychic beings, culminating at last either in *One* Infinite Being, or else in more than one *Equal* Infinite Beings who always think and act so much in unison that they may be considered as virtually *One*.

The preceding was written before I read Professor Keyser's continuation of his argument in the April issue of the *Hibbert Journal*. A careful perusal of his second paper has in no way changed or modified my views on the true nature of mathematical infinity. I regard the so-called "paradoxy" of the modern non-Euclidean geometry or geometrics as simply so many *reductiones ad absurdum* of the definitions and assumptions on which they are based. On all points but two I consider Euclid right and the modern non-Euclidean wrong; and on those two points I agree with neither. Most non-Euclidean accept Euclid's definition of a mathematical line as "length without breadth," and his definition of a point as "that which has neither parts nor magnitude." Such lines and such points belong, in my opinion, to the class of entities which we commonly call unrealities. Every line has real breadth, though in mathematical investigations it is generally convenient to leave this breadth out of consideration; while every real point is simply an *infinitesimal distance* when we are comparing distances, an *infinitesimal area* (generally square or circular) when we are comparing areas, and an *infinitesimal volume* (generally cubic or spherical) when we are comparing volumes. When I use the word *infinite* or *infinitesimal*, I mean, of course, infinite or infinitesimal (as already defined) in regard to our arbitrary unit of reference. Thus defined, different points may differ in lengths, areas, or volumes. The non-recognition of this fact vitiates (in my opinion) the whole foundation of Professor Keyser's arguments on p. 381 of his first paper. In his second paper (p. 628) he speaks of the "totality" of even numbers and the "totality" of odd numbers. Now, it seems to me that these totalities are either arbitrary, in which case they may be finite or infinite as we choose to consider them; or else, as *totalities*, they are pure unrealities. We may, for example, consider the first million even numbers 2, 4, 6, etc., and the first million odd numbers 1, 3, 5, etc. These are two *finite* totalities. We may, on the other hand, consider the first H_1 even numbers, and the first H odd numbers. These, by my definition here of the symbol H_1 , are two *infinite* totalities, which may or may not be equal. An infinite totality in any other sense is, from my point of view, a self-contradiction. We cannot consistently speak of the whole or totality of anything that is absolutely boundless. Such totalities, like the pseudo-infinities $\frac{1}{0}, \frac{2}{0}$, etc., are self-contradictory, and have only symbolic existence.

HUGH MACCOLL.

REVIEWS

The Development of Greek Philosophy.—By Robert Adamson, sometime Professor of Logic and Rhetoric in the University of Glasgow.—Edited by Professor W. R. Sorley and R. P. Hardie.—Pp. x+326.—Edinburgh and London : Blackwood & Sons, 1908.

EMINENTLY characteristic of Professor Adamson's mode of teaching was the stress laid by him upon the importance of Greek Philosophy as the right means of approaching the problems of speculative thinking. To understand the significance of the ideas which reason brings to bear on experience, one must realise, he insisted, how the demands of reason gradually emerge, and how, in the endeavour to satisfy those demands, the generalities of rational thought take their rise. The early thinkers, he maintained, exhibit "philosophy in the making"; and, distinguished by its "fearless straightforwardness," by what Hegel called *Aufklärung*, Greek speculation afforded the natural mode of introduction to philosophical reflection. This volume, containing the substance of the lectures on Greek Philosophy delivered by Professor Adamson at Glasgow during the years immediately preceding his death, will supply a long-felt want. Singularly able, stimulating and suggestive throughout, the book ought to secure a wide circle of readers. In English there is certainly no other treatise on the subject of like compass at all comparable with it in point of lucidity, thoroughness, and sound scholarship. It forms, moreover, a valuable addition to the two volumes of Lectures published five years ago. The editors are to be congratulated on their very successful accomplishment of a task anything but easy. With no other material at their disposal than the notes of students, they have contrived to turn out a book which reads almost as though it had been written for the press, whilst the numerous references, supplied by them, to the original authorities, contribute considerably to the usefulness of the volume. Mention should also be made of the exceedingly helpful indexes, which have been compiled by the author's daughter, Mrs C. J. Hamilton, with a care and completeness worthy of her father's work.

The book, which covers an extensive ground, is divided into four parts. The first part deals with the pre-Platonic systems, the second with Plato, the third with Aristotle, and the fourth with the Philosophy of the Stoics. By far the larger half of the volume is, however, devoted to a discussion of the Platonic theory of Ideas and of the Aristotelian philosophy.

Of the chapters on the pre-Socratic systems, that on the Eleatics is

perhaps of special importance, in view of the author's interpretation of Platonism. Professor Adamson rejects the view of Zeller—a view possessing, also, the weighty support of Professor Burnet—that Parmenides conceived of Being as a motionless, corporeal, indivisible *plenum*. He maintains that the Eleatic doctrine is more correctly described as metaphysical in character, by which I understand him to mean that the essence of the Eleatic conception consisted in the denial to Being of any other nature than that of simple being. The arguments of Zeno seem, indeed, to lose their point, if we are to suppose that the One is endowed with the characteristics which we assign to extendedness or space. And Melissus very explicitly declares that Being is not corporeal—*δεῖ αὐτὸ σῶμα μὴ ἔχειν* (Simpl. *Phys.* 110. 1). “Parmenides,” writes Professor Burnet, “is not, as some have said, the ‘father of idealism’; on the contrary, all materialism depends on his view of reality.” Parmenides, certainly, is no idealist in the sense of implying that the subjective process of thinking either is, or is creative of, Being, and so to interpret the well-known dictum, *ταῦτόν δ' ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὐνεκεν ἐστὶ νόημα*, would be undoubtedly a woeful anachronism. What, however, these words do express is just the burden of the Eleatic philosophy—namely, that the one content of thought is Being, and that all we can do with respect to the real world is to think of it as existing. The Eleatic doctrine has for us the permanent interest “that it marks one of the perplexities in which human reflection is always involved when it attempts to employ its own notions in working out a completely intelligible scheme” (p. 36).

Daring scepticism had always, I think, a fascination for Professor Adamson—he speaks, for example, of Carneades as “by far the acutest mind in antiquity” (p. 260)—and it is not, perhaps, surprising that the obscure tenets of the Cynics possessed for him a peculiar attractiveness. “There is,” he considers, “good reason for supposing that the opposition of principle between Antisthenes and Plato was much more detailed than is generally suspected; that Antisthenes advocated a theory of knowledge in all respects opposed to the Platonic; that they mutually criticised one another's views; and that in the working out of his own theory of knowledge Plato has repeatedly the counter-doctrine of Antisthenes in view” (p. 79). The counter-doctrine is, in fact, examined in the *Theætetus* (201 D. *sqq.*), and appears to have been a nominalism of an extreme sort. Existence was made up of isolated individual elements, apprehended by correspondingly isolated acts of perception. Of each thing there could be predicated only the expression peculiar to itself (*οἰκείος λόγος*); ultimately, knowledge was confined to identical propositions (*ἐν ἑφ' ἐνός*). From another standpoint the Megarians also reached a similar position with reference to the nature of predication. Combining, so far as was possible, the Eleatic doctrine of Being with the Socratic doctrine of Notions, they drew, apparently, the conclusion that reality consists of a multiplicity of ideal, unchangeable forms, devoid of interconnection, and apprehensible by means of reason alone. And, after the manner of the Eleatics, they assigned no measure

of existence to the particulars of sense perception. The author takes the *εἰδῶν φίλοι* of the *Sophist* to be representatives of the Megarian school, and, indeed, thinks that not only in the *Sophist* but also in the *Parmenides* Plato is to be found struggling with the problem of the One and the Many as it took shape in the hands of the Megarian teachers.

One is conscious that behind the masterly treatment of the Platonic theory of Ideas, in Part II., there lies the full force of Professor Adamson's immense erudition and keen critical faculty. The central problem of the Platonic philosophy was, he contends, to define in what consisted the shadowy, quasi-existential character of the phenomenal world. For, whilst the Eleatics and their successors of the Megarian school had cut the knot of the difficulty by simply denying to sense particulars any claim at all to the title of existence, Plato, who could not fail to have seen that both as a whole and individually the Ideas occupied very much the position of Being in the Eleatic system, never for a moment intended to relegate the things of perception to the indefinable region of Non-Being.

From an early stage of his philosophising, Plato is evidently alive to the consideration that the very manner in which the notion of Ideas had been reached indicated a connection of some sort between them and the multiplicity of sense experience. In the earlier dialogues—*Phædrus*, *Republic*, *Phædo*—the Idea is always regarded as the permanent real essence corresponding to the result of generalisation—a generalisation which starts from the particulars, and which therefore would have had no justification were the distinction between the two realms regarded as one of total exclusion. If, then, Plato at first attempts to explain the connection by calling to his aid such expressions as *μέθεξις*, or *παρουσία*, or *μίμησις*, it can hardly be doubted that even to himself these expressions counted for little more than metaphors, and left the real difficulty unsolved. The expedient to which he has recourse is of a more drastic kind. When reality, by abstracting thought, has been "cut in two with a hatchet," the severed halves can only be brought together again through the instrumentality of a *tertium quid*. Such a *tertium quid* Plato discovers in the peculiar function of what he calls the soul—later, more especially, the world-soul. The soul stands, as it were, on the confines of the two worlds, uniting in itself characteristics of each. On the one hand, although not itself an Idea, it shares, as the principle of knowing, in the nature of the Ideas, for only as timelessly apprehensive of the Ideas does it exist at all. On the other hand, although not itself a sense particular, it shares to some extent, as the principle of self-originating movement or change, in the nature of the changeable. What, then, in speaking of the phenomenal, is metaphorically described as *μέθεξις* or *παρουσία* or *μίμησις*, rests, in the long run, upon the soul's vision of the Ideas, whilst the plurality, the mutability, the transitoriness of phenomena is traced, obscurely enough, to the soul's activity.

No fundamental difference of principle, contends Professor Adamson, distinguishes the later form of the Ideal theory from this earlier form.

The lines of development are mainly in three directions. (i.) Plato concentrates more effort than he had done previously on the conception, already, in some measure, worked out in the *Republic*, of a gradation or scale of existence, extending from the highest or most perfect to that which is on the point of passing into the non-existent. In the *Sophist*, for example, the interconnections among the Ideas are no longer of the external kind supplied by the process of generalising. 'Through introduction of the notions of sameness and otherness (ταὐτοῦ καὶ θατέρου) the way in which the Ideas stand to one another is made to follow in a certain sense from the intrinsic nature of the Ideas themselves. Each Idea, whilst remaining identical with itself, is different from every other, and such difference affords a ground for the predication of non-Being. "A way is thus prepared for excluding from the realm of real existence much that would have been included in it from the earlier point of view" (p. 110), and, at the same time, for modifying the first conception of the relation of the generated particulars to the Idea (p. 111). That trend of thought is pursued further in the *Philebus*, where the elements or kinds of existence are classified under the heads of the fourfold scheme—ἄπειρον, πέρας, μικτόν, and αἰτία. Neither the πέρας, as Brandis held, nor the μικτόν, as Professor Jackson holds, is, in our author's view, the realm of the Ideas. He is of opinion that the αἰτία is the realm of the Ideas, whilst the μικτόν class is restricted solely to particulars. The interpretation adopted is not, it is true, free from difficulty,—no interpretation of this passage is,—but what it implies is this. The Ideal reality is the αἰτία τῆς ξυμμίξεως in the sense of being the informing principle through which quantitative definiteness is imposed on the Indeterminate. Numerical ratios occupy, that is to say, a sort of middle region between Ideas on the one hand and sense particulars on the other, serving thus to bridge the chasm between the singleness of the Idea and the multiplicity of phenomena. (ii.) Plato comes to realise that in the world of generation there is a feature—"just that which is dimly indicated by our term 'materiality'"—which, in his earlier writings, had not received the attention it called for. Accordingly, in the *Timæus*, besides Being and Becoming, there is included within the scheme of the universe a third factor, metaphorically described as "the receptacle (ὑποδοχή), and, as it were, the nurse, of all becoming"—a factor more specifically defined as space (χώρα), which Aristotle expressly tells us was identified by Plato with ὅλη (*Phys.* iv. 2). Here, then, we have another attempt to offer some explanation of the obstinate, irreducible element pervading the realm of phenomena. Space, the mere form of externality, of mutual exclusiveness, is presented as the broad ground of demarcation between the purely intellectual connectedness of the Ideal world and the vague, fluctuating relations of sense particulars. Space, moreover, is conceived by Plato as the very type of Otherness or Difference (θάτερον)—the Otherness necessarily involved, apparently, in the existence of the Ideal world itself, and rendering likewise the phenomenal world a necessary consequence of that existence. As reflected in,

as projected into space, the Ideas *necessarily* come to offer themselves as pluralised into a multiplicity of relative and transitory shapes or images (εἰσιόντα καὶ ἐξιόντα). Material bodies are "just determinations of space, according to a mathematical law" (p. 122). (iii.) Plato departs more and more from his earlier position that to every common name there corresponds an Idea, and is gradually led to see that the theory did not require the assumption of Ideas of artificial objects (σκευαστά), of relations, of qualities, or of things evil as such. Ultimately, in the *Timæus*, two types only of Ideas are recognised: (a) those of classes determined by nature, all informed in various measure by soul,—classes, that is to say, of ξῶα,—and (b) those of a more abstract character, tending to become hardly distinguishable from numerical ratios. Inorganic nature is conceived as built up of elements which are in truth mathematical in character, and the sense qualities which we ascribe to material things are regarded as largely, if not wholly, subjective.

This account of Plato's development differs widely, it need scarcely be said, from that which we owe to Professor Jackson and Mr Archer-Hind. They contend that in the later Platonism the self-existence of the Ideas is entirely abandoned, that Plato attained finally to a conception of the universe as the self-evolution of absolute intelligence of which finite intelligences are differentiations, and that the system of Ideas then became for Plato a system of thoughts within the supreme mind, whilst sensible perceptions were the finite intellect's apprehension, under the conditions of space and time, of the Idea as existing in the intellect of God. For his part, whilst admitting the importance of the position assigned to soul in Plato's explanation of the world of generation, Professor Adamson insists, on the other hand, that Plato always distinguished Soul from the Ideas, and that he steadfastly maintained in respect to the Ideas (as, *e.g.*, in *Timæus*, 52 A) a "transcendental" mode of existence.

The chapters on Aristotle bring out in a striking, incisive manner both the strength and the weakness of a philosophy which, whilst a unique achievement of constructive genius, combines "quite incongruous and incoherent parts." Despite the most strenuous efforts, Aristotle never really succeeds in surmounting the Platonic dualism. At every one of the crucial points in his philosophy—equally in his epistemology, in his psychology, in his ethics, in his metaphysic—there confronts us a *hiatus*, a distinction of kind, creating difficulties precisely similar in character to those which he himself detects in Platonism. (i.) There runs through the theory of knowledge a "mysterious separation" between intuition (νοῦς), the faculty of immediately apprehending first principles (the *πρῶτα καὶ ἄμετα*), on the one hand, and the discursive operation of thought whereby conceptions are compared, contrasted, and rendered precise for the purposes of science on the other, and between both these again and those functions of mind based upon and proceeding from sense perception. Knowledge, Aristotle will have it understood, is in itself the union of the general and the particular, of the universal and the individual; the individual, as it enters

into knowledge, must have an aspect of universality. Yet, when he comes to work out this principle in detail, it is seen to hold a position of unstable equilibrium between two incompatible senses of the term "individual." On the one hand, by "individual" is meant not the numerical unit, but that which is manifested in a plurality of separate units—the natural kind or ultimate species (*ἄτομον εἶδος*). On the other hand, there is the contention that in the order of time our knowledge always starts with the particular (*τὸ καθ' ἑκαστον*), which is not originally apprehended as the manifestation or expression of the form or essence of a natural kind. Nowhere does Aristotle furnish a satisfactory account of the relation between these two senses of the term. Coinciding with the first is the view he throughout accepts, thereby retaining the characteristic tenet of Platonism, that nature is a system of fixed, permanent types of existence, of *εἶδη*, which, save that each one is a specific, and not a generic, universal, are difficult to distinguish from the Platonic Ideas. He does not even remain true to the position that an individual specific form receives realisation only in the potentially manifold matter, and hence in numerical plurality; for the Divine nature, in which there is no feature of numerical plurality, is yet conceived by him as possessing, in the highest degree, individuality.

(ii.) A corresponding perplexity is apparent in the psychology. However anxious Aristotle may be to exhibit *νοῦς* as working into a unity with the other functions of the soul, he debars himself from doing so by the very way in which he has formulated his problem. The truth of things consists in their eternal, permanent, intelligible essences (*νοητά*), and these require for their apprehension an apprehending activity in nature cognate to themselves—eternal and permanent as they are, free as they are from corporeal and temporal conditions. Since, then, the soul is obviously dependent on corporeal and temporal conditions, it follows that *νοῦς* is in its own nature independent of *ψυχή*; it enters the latter *θύραθεν*, and whilst the soul perishes it endures. Just as little, however, can *νοῦς* be conceived as though it were an illumination of the finite soul by the infinite mind, for the latter is absolutely separate from the world of generation.

(iii.) A similar unresolved opposition manifests itself in the Aristotelian ethics. The sharply contrasted ideals of *πρᾶξις* and *θεωρία* are so disjoined as to prevent any real union. Whilst, in accordance with the first, the practical life of temporal effort in the community is viewed as a final end, in the attainment of which moral excellence is realised, in accordance with the second, the supreme welfare of man turns out ultimately to be in a sense at least individual in character—a mode of life, at all events, in which the individual is conceived apart from all relations to the community. The *θεωρῶν*, stationed on his solitary eminence, is pictured as a lonely little god.

(vi.) Resolutely bent, as unquestionably Aristotle is, upon working out, in contra-distinction to the Platonic metaphysic, the thought of the *εἶδη* as immanent in things, as subsisting not *παρὰ τὰ πολλά* but *κατὰ πολλῶν*, yet the elusiveness of that thought proves to be too great even for his skill.

Consistently with his conception of the universe as exhibiting a graduated scale of existence, the Divine Being should have been regarded as the actualisation of what the subordinate stages were potentially—as the soul, so to speak, of the cosmos. But, on the lines of the Aristotelian metaphysic, this consummation—the crowning consummation, doubtless, of any metaphysic—was not to be secured. The Aristotelian deity is a self-contained essence,—pure, unmixed, *ἐνέργεια*,—placed beyond all conceivable relation to the world of the concrete and changeable. With the unity and absoluteness of the Divine nature there is no means of connecting the multiplicity and relativity of even the intelligible essences in the world of generation. “If,” exclaims Aristotle, “the theory of Ideas provides us with no explanation of Change, it cuts us off from any philosophy of nature.” Exactly; yet the demand he makes upon Platonism is a demand which Aristotelianism is even less able to satisfy. The hint, indeed, is thrown out that, since everywhere the tendency towards an end is operative, and perfect actuality is the highest end, movement in nature is ultimately due to a certain striving or desire, a certain unconscious yearning or impulse, of things towards the Divine. But, profound as in some ways the suggestion is, it avails not to bridge over the contradiction between the two Aristotelian doctrines—the one, applied unhesitatingly to the entire sphere of change, that what moves things must itself be moved; the other, restricted to God’s unchangeable being, that the cause of movement remains unmoved. And when we scrutinise the term indicative of the lowest position on the scale of existence, another aspect of the same dilemma comes to the surface. Whilst, on the one hand, *ὕλη* is described as altogether relative in character, as being almost synonymous with negation (*στέρησις*), as in the last resort identical with form, yet, on the other hand, the assignment to *ὕλη* of highly positive functions is no excrescence on the Aristotelian system, but an essential feature thereof. Matter is the unoriginated and indestructible basis of all Becoming: it resists form; it is stubborn and unyielding; it gives rise to deviations from natural law; it is the cause of monstrosities (*τέρατα*). In short, matter is at once necessary for the Aristotelian scheme of development and at the same time refuses to fit into that scheme.

What is the cardinal lesson Professor Adamson would have us derive from such an examination as is here presented of the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy? It is not, I think, difficult to discern. The *πρῶτον ψεῦδος* of Platonism—and of Aristotelianism likewise—is the confusion, underlying the whole system, between the notion of truth and the notion of real existence. Plato identifies—unreservedly and simply—reality and truth: universal validity and objective existence are for him one and the same. The timelessness attaching to truth is forthwith taken to be characteristic of reality; the constituents of real existence are assumed to possess just that constancy, just that immutability, which belong to the notions and principles of intellectual apprehension. The identification

is one to which human reflection is all too readily prone. Whenever, for example, we refer the apparent chaos of successive phenomena to the constancy of natural law, we tend to hypostatise the law, to regard it as a real entity, and to allow only a derivative, secondary kind of being to the phenomena the law is said to explain. If, now, it be further noted that Plato has usually no hesitation in supposing that a distinction in thought must always have corresponding to it an exact counterpart in real existence, the fundamental feature, characteristic of his whole procedure, comes into clear light. Existence of the more special concrete kind must be regarded as dependent upon, as deducible from, existence of the more general kind; relative existence must be derived from, and explained by, absolute, unconditioned existence. We get, then, inevitably the contrast between a world of full, complete existence and a world of fragmentary, incomplete existence, of partial non-existence—the antithesis between the supernatural and the natural, for that, in the end, is what it amounts to—which is the note of Platonism as an influence in the history of human thinking. Platonism furnishes, in fact, the most convincing illustration we possess of the inherent difficulty attending any purely deductive construction of the universe of being. To deduce the relative from the Absolute cannot but evince itself as a futile undertaking, and that because, from the very nature of the initial position assumed, it *must* be impossible to extract from one of these factors, namely, the Absolute, that wherein, specifically, the other, the relative, differs from it. Something over and above what is contained in the universal must be possessed by the particular; and the residuum can never be accounted for by reference to the universal. The universal explains no more than that in the particular which does not differ from it. “It is with Plato as with Spinoza; and Plato’s procedure in interposing intermediaries—the Soul and Space—between the eternal Idea and the variable particular is exactly parallel to Spinoza’s interposition of the attributes and the infinite modes between the universal of Substance and the particular of the finite modes” (p. 131). The appearance of success in any attempt to find an explanation of the particular and the relative in some universal, absolute ground is invariably due to the circumstance that there is illegitimately read into the ultimate ground the additional features required in order to render that ultimate ground equal to the emergencies of the situation. Of this, the Aristotelian philosophy—and Aristotle stands to Plato very much in the relation in which Hegel stands to Spinoza—offers abundant confirmation. Of “that impatience with particular phenomena, and that desire at once to get away from them, which was,” as Caird puts it, “the main weakness of Plato,” there is in Aristotle no trace. Never weary of his polemic against the Platonic error of conferring substantive existence upon the generalities of thought, he insists with ever renewed emphasis that only the concrete is real. Excellent maxim! “*Video meliora proboque,*” we can almost imagine him declaiming, “*deteriora sequor.*” The Ideas, for him, shall no longer be *χωριστά*. Nor, indeed, are they, if by that be meant existing

apart in a celestial region. Interpreted in a new way as the essences of the natural kinds into which the world of generation is divided, they have their habitation here below. But transportation from heaven to earth works, in itself, no miracle; mere proximity to, or remoteness from, a mundane environment is, after all, in respect to the vital issue, a circumstance of comparatively small moment; the problem of the One and the Many is not solved by the simple device of stationing the One *in* the Many. For although *in* the world, universals may still not be *of* the world; and, conceived as both Aristotle and Hegel conceive them, they assuredly are not. "Individuals are born and perish," says Hegel, quite in Aristotelian strain, "the species abides and recurs in them all, and its existence is visible only to reflection." Concrete fact, however, is not a *σύνθετον* made up of fixed, eternal types or thoughts *plus* an indeterminate, formless element—the two constituents being somehow welded together. Nature, so regarded, turns out to be a "bacchantic god," and amply avenges herself upon any attempt thus to represent what is most real in her as "enjoying a timeless mode of being, in contrast with which that which comes into being in time is relatively inferior." She punishes the thinker who hypostatizes essences by forcing him to hypostatize also chance or contingency; and she wrings from Hegel, as she had wrung from Aristotle, the confession that, besides the rational, "sport and external accident" have then a big share in her constitution. There is, perhaps, no term in the philosophical vocabulary that more often proves an obstacle to clear thinking than the term 'immanent,' and it is a delusion to suppose that in the notion of *immanence* is to be found a means of escaping the perplexities of Platonism.

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The Cults of the Greek States.—By L. R. Farnell.—In Five Volumes.—Vols. III. and IV., with Illustrations.—Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907.

DR FARNELL'S great work advances slowly towards completion. The two volumes that form the present instalment show the same qualities as their predecessors—laborious and careful collection of material, wide knowledge of literature and of kindred studies, sobriety of judgment, and clearness of exposition. The same method is followed as in the previous volumes, and although this method has met with some criticism at the hands of the newer school of mythologists, it is difficult to see how any other could be adopted in a systematic account of the established religion as it existed in the various states of Greece. Doubtless this established religion was compounded out of many incongruous elements belonging to various states of religious belief and possibly to various races. But an attempt to disentangle these, however fascinating as a study, could hardly, at least in the

present state of our knowledge, be made a basis for classification. The greater part of the available material would be very difficult to fit into the scheme of such an investigation; and, after all, an account of religious cults in Greece which ignored the Olympian system, or relegated it to a subordinate position, would be as inadequate and one-sided as an account of religion in modern Europe which ignored Christianity.

The fourth volume has a more or less homogeneous character, being devoted mainly to the earth goddess and the deities identified or closely associated with her—Demeter and Persephone, and the Mother of the Gods. A good example of Dr Farnell's methods is to be seen in his criticism of the view that Demeter and Persephone were probably evolved from the primitive corn-fetishes of the field. He says "there is the shadowy personality of an earth-goddess in the background, of larger dimensions than a corn-sheaf, which lends magnitude and grandeur to the Demeter-religion"; and most critics will agree that this judgment is just. Among the many matters treated of in this volume, none excite more general interest than the Eleusinian Mysteries, and about nothing have more divergent views been held, or is there need for more discrimination. Dr Farnell discusses various recent theories, such as M. Foucart's revival of the theory of an Egyptian origin, or the view that there was an early nameless earth-goddess at Eleusis before the intrusion of Demeter, and shows good reasons for rejecting them both. As to the Mysteries themselves, he discusses carefully Dr Jevons's suggestion that their most essential feature was a sacramental sacrifice, but points out the weakness of the evidence for it. The great and indisputable influence of the Mysteries may after all be explained in a simpler and more direct manner. The intense religious excitement, induced by certain sacred rites and performances, which followed days of fast and preparation, may well have been such as to produce a permanent effect on the character of the initiated. It is perhaps more difficult to explain why this effect should also be regarded as ensuring happiness in a future life; but Dr Farnell's suggestion that the various ceremonies could induce "the feeling of intimacy and friendship with the deities," so that "those who had won their friendship by initiation in this life would by the simple logic of faith regard themselves as certain to win blessing at their hands in the next," may be allowed as sufficient. It seems quite certain that no secret doctrine, however imparted, was the essential characteristic of the Eleusinian cult. Dr Farnell rightly refuses to see in the vase-paintings which have been brought into relation with the Mysteries anything more than a reference to some of the external surroundings and an ideal representation of some of the chief characters—certainly they are not likely to be a divulgence of any secret rites.

The fourth volume is devoted to Poseidon and to Apollo, of whom the latter naturally takes up by far the larger share. Indeed, the sections concerned with this god are the longest in the whole work, as was to be expected from the varied nature of his cult, the universality of his worship

in Hellenic lands, and the ethical interest of his character; "being the brightest creation of polytheism, he is also the most complex;" he is also the most essentially Hellenic of the gods, because he stands clear, for the most part, of the philosophical or mystic or orgiastic features which have contaminated the worship of other Olympians. Even the *φαρμακοὶ*, the human victims of the Attic Thargelia, are regarded by Dr Farnell as survivals from a pre-Apolline ritual, and not closely associated with the god; but the victims thrown from the cliff at Leucas and at Curium in Cyprus were so treated in Apollo's service; and though there is no evidence in these cases of identification with the god, it seems that here at least Apollo has inherited a darker and more primitive ritual. In the Hyacinthia also there was the mourning for Hyacinthus, such as fits a god of vegetation; and the connection with Apollo seems more than accidental. It would, after all, be surprising if a god of such wide functions as Apollo did not absorb into his worship some of these less cheerful rites. Even the most ethical of his purely Hellenic conceptions, that of the Purifier from blood and from all other pollution or guilt, is not difficult to bring into relation with the more primitive notions of exorcism. As to the origin of the god, Dr Farnell accepts Ahrens' derivation of the tale of the Hyperboreans from a misinterpretation of the old N. Greek *ὑπερβόροι* = *ὑπερφοροι* (transmitters of the sacred first-fruits), which he calls "by far the most interesting contribution made by philology to the solution of a problem in Greek religion." The route, then, of the sacred procession of the Daphnephoria from Tempe to Delphi "may have corresponded more or less with the line of the earliest southward migration of the worshippers of Apollo."

But the discussion of Apolline ritual is endless. Another problem successfully dealt with in this volume is the early relation of Poseidon and Athena in Athens. Dr Farnell denies a primitive worship of Poseidon, and regards him as the intrusive god of Ionian or Minyan immigrants. Erechtheus, with whom he was identified in the later Athenian official cult, was an old agricultural hero under the protection of Athena. It must be admitted that this view fits the facts far better than that of a primitive god degraded to a hero by his more successful rival Athena. These few examples suffice to show that the book contains many interesting and even illuminating theories, in addition to being a storehouse of well-ordered facts. Dr Farnell's treatment of Dionysus, of which he gave a specimen to the Hellenic Society the other day, will be eagerly awaited. Mythologists and students of religion, whether they accept Dr Farnell's theories or not, will agree that they owe him gratitude for a collection of data which is far more complete, systematic, and judicious than any that was before available, and which goes far to confirm the leading position taken by English scholars in this branch of study.

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An Introduction to Social Psychology.—By William M'Dougall.—London: Methuen & Co.—Pp. xv+355.

Human Nature in Politics.—By Graham Wallas.—London: Archibald Constable & Co.—Pp. xvi+302.

THAT these books should be published at the same time is in itself noteworthy. A progressive psychologist making a path toward an interpretation of group life meets half-way an enlightened politician who is seeking a psychological basis for his empirical knowledge of social activities. Mr M'Dougall, described by Mr Wallas as "keeping alive the study of psychology at Oxford" (p. vi), offers his book as a preparation for the study of collective or group psychology which he proposes to treat in another volume. In the terminology of Continental and American sociologists the present book is not social psychology at all, but deals rather with the social implications of psychology. However, discussion of terminology is a barren pursuit.

In the preface the author frankly summarises what he regards as his own contributions to the subject, namely—an elaboration of the idea of instinct, the assertion that all emotion is the affective aspect of the instinctive process, denial of an imitative instinct and insistence on the sympathetic induction of emotion, a modification of Groos's theory of play, a physiological and novel amplification of Shand's doctrine of the sentiments, and as the principal originality, "what may, perhaps, without abuse of the phrase, be called a theory of volition" (p. 10).

Mr M'Dougall has made good his claims to a fresh and original treatment of his subject. Whether he is presenting new material or elaborating familiar themes, his grasp is sure and his exposition lucid. After insisting that the social sciences are sadly in need of a firm psychological basis, Mr M'Dougall addresses himself to the study of instinct, a word which, as he shows by many quotations, is used in a loose, vague way. An instinct is defined as "an inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or at least to experience an impulse to such action" (p. 29). The temptation to posit an instinct whenever an explanation of conduct is required is notoriously seductive. On the principle of parsimony of hypotheses, it is important to reduce the number of primary instincts to a minimum. Of specific instincts Mr M'Dougall discovers the following, each accompanied by its appropriate emotion: flight and fear, repulsion and disgust, curiosity and wonder, pugnacity and anger, self-abasement and negative self-feeling, self-assertion and positive self-feeling, and the parental instinct and the tender emotion. To these are added certain instincts of which the emotional aspects are less well defined: the instinct of reproduction, the gregarious instinct, the instinct of acquisition, and

the instinct of construction. Besides these specific instincts are certain general innate tendencies: sympathy, suggestion and suggestibility, imitation, play, and the rather elusive concept, temperament. Such are the raw materials of human character. In a way which holds the reader fascinated, if sometimes sceptical, Mr M'Dougall combines these primary instincts into sentiments, as a painter blends shades from the colours of his palette. Fear and curiosity fuse into awe. Add a touch of "tender emotion." Behold reverence as the product. Negative and positive self-feeling neutralise each other and result in shyness: envy is a combination of negative self-feeling and of anger: anger and disgust produce scorn: reproach seems to be a fusion of anger and of tender emotion. Although this general theory of the sentiments is credited to Shand, Mr M'Dougall deserves gratitude—"a binary compound of tender emotion and negative self-feeling" (p. 132)—for the clear, persuasive, and yet cautious way in which he presents ideas which he has made thoroughly his own.

The tracing of the process by which conscious, rational, and moral control is slowly developed out of these instincts and sentiments is another admirable feature of this book. The stages are declared to be: a selective process through pleasure and pain, next punishment and reward, then social approval and disapproval, finally control through loyalty to abstract ideals. The social influence from the very outset is rightly emphasised. It is a question whether the last stage is not too abstract and individualistic. Even there the sanction for conduct is social, either in the sense that the ideals of justice, right, etc., are social or group standards, or inasmuch as the apparently isolated individual, even when he opposes his fellows and ignores their morality, is often supported by the vivid sense of an idealised society, "a heavenly host" who praise and sustain him.

After a brilliant statement of the dilemmas and pitfalls of the venerable determinist-libertarian controversy, Mr M'Dougall attempts to explain what James frankly calls a mystery, namely, how the weaker ideals and sentiments can prevail over the stronger and more primitive desires. The author accepts the view of James that "effort of attention is the essential form of all volition" (p. 242), but insists that the theory that a weaker sentiment gets itself expressed because conflicting desires are inhibited is "a false scent" (p. 244). In Mr M'Dougall's opinion the weaker, more idealistic, sentiment gains dominant power from receiving the support of the emotion of positive self-feeling. Thus volition becomes "the supporting or re-enforcing of a desire or conation by the co-operation of an impulse excited within the system of the self-regarding sentiment" (p. 249). This is so illuminating a point of view that it seems almost churlish to inquire from what source came the multiplicity of minute efforts by which this "sentiment for self-control" (p. 253) was built up, or just how the impulse gets itself excited at the right time to co-operate with the weak desire. In the presence of so cleverly constructed a house of cards, one holds his breath for fear the precarious structure may come

to grief. However, it must be owned that Mr M'Dougall has pushed the mystery back another step, which in itself is a contribution.

The second section—ninety out of three hundred and fifty-five pages—applies in a brief way the doctrine of instincts and sentiments to the family, war, urban crowding, religion, economic phenomena, tradition, custom, etc. The author apparently had little idea of making this part of the volume thorough or systematic. It is distinctly disappointing to any reader who is especially attracted by the word “social” in the title of the book. In his next volume on Collective or Group Psychology it is to be hoped that Mr M'Dougall will apply to social phenomena the original methods of analysis and exposition which make the first part of his *Social Psychology* noteworthy and permanently valuable.

Human Nature in Politics represents the effort of a perplexed politician to find a new basis for faith in representative government. Mr Graham Wallas has been forced by his first-hand experiences in practical politics to choose between cynicism and psychologising. In accepting the latter alternative the expert in County Councils and School Boards rushes in where the Oxford psychologist treads cautiously. Mr Wallas has evidently been impressed with the need of another theory as to voters who prefer feeling to reflection and steadily refuse to intellectualise the means and ends of a nicely calculated and enlightened self-interest. In short, the old individualism with its simple principles is ridiculously futile as an explanation of a clamorous, unstable, at times even hysterical modern constituency. Therefore Mr Wallas eagerly seizes upon Darwinism, instincts and impulses as a basis for human nature as it manifests itself in politics. Mr M'Dougall would probably have his doubts about “a specific instinct of hatred for human beings of a different racial type from ourselves” (p. x), but would be in full accord with the general position. Too much of technical psychology must not be expected of a publicist. It is in the further development of the subject that Mr Wallas's keen insight, enlightened philosophy, and charming humour show to greatest advantage. His treatment of symbols, emblems, party names, and epithets as “political entities” which arouse loyalty and rule by suggestion, his analysis of “non-rational inference” in politics, his warning against undue simplification of political phenomena for purposes of reasoning, and his insistence on *quantitative* rather than merely *qualitative* estimates of social forces are particularly illuminating and sagacious.

Part II. deals with the problem of political morality, an idealism developing out of the gradual individual and collective control of instinct by reason; with representative government, which is being conceived in a new way so that an election is looked upon rather as a process by which right decisions are reached under right conditions than as a mechanical expedient by which decisions already formed are ascertained; with the problem how to keep a civil service independent of partisan politics and at the same time in intelligent sympathy with the common national life; and finally expresses a wistful hope rather than a dogmatic faith that national

rivalries will ultimately yield to "the consciousness of a common purpose"—which, even acknowledged as possible, "would alter the face of world politics at once" (p. 294).

The weakness in Mr Wallas's treatment of "human nature" lies in his failure to appreciate the part which custom and sentiment play in preserving the stability of a society. Instinct and impulse are constantly being organised into a social control which is based on habit and sentiment. The devices of society for producing and maintaining like-mindedness are too much neglected by Mr Wallas. Beneath the suggestible surface of a public lie deep strata of fixed convictions embedded in sentiment. The strength of a representative government consists, not in the rational assent or decisions of the many, but in this great fund of feeling which carries on generation after generation those traditions and customs which are summed up in the term "national character," and are ultimately traceable to the initiative of the few. Mr McDougall's treatment of the sentiments and Professor Sumner's *Folkways*¹ would give Mr Wallas the ideas which he needs to make his psychology more satisfying. But for all that, *Human Nature in Politics* marks a new stage in political philosophising.

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The Moral Ideal: A Historic Study.—By Julia Wedgwood.—New and Revised Edition.—London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd., 1907.

"THE present edition of this book is an enlarged form of that published twenty years ago, with the addition of a chapter on Egypt, and much increase to almost all the rest. No view of mine is changed since I wrote first, but a good deal of what was unhelpful to the meaning is left out; while any fresh material known to me has been carefully considered and mostly embodied, so that the result is practically a new book." Such is the author's own account of the relation of the present edition to its predecessor. I shall probably best meet her wishes if I do not attempt any further distinction between what is old in the book and what is new, and treat it simply as a new book appearing for the first time.

The Moral Ideal is a difficult book to characterise. It is a series of essays on the various phases of ethical thought and feeling which have succeeded one another since the first dawn of civilisation (we are glad to be spared the preliminary excursion into anthropology and primitive religion now usual in such works), beginning with Egypt and ending with the Reformation. It contains much history and much criticism, both of them based on wide and adequate learning; but the element of the author's own reflection is so large that it might be described as almost more a book

¹ *Folkways*, by William G. Sumner (Boston: Gunn & Co., 1907).

of *pensées* than either of culture-history or of criticism. "A History of Human Aspiration" is the description which Miss Wedgwood suggests for her work, with due apologies for applying such a title to "any volume of its size and informal character." More concretely one might perhaps say that its object is to compare Christian ethics with the mode of ethical and religious thought which might most obviously be thought of as entering into competition with Christianity, and to estimate the amount of their correspondence with it, and of their divergence from it. Though the author's own views are nowhere systematically developed, she combines an ardent sympathy with the Christian ideal with a full and frank recognition of the fact that other religions and other ethical systems contain much and important ethical truth—much that may be regarded (though I don't know that she uses the phrase) as true and genuine revelation of God. And on the whole the attempt has been very successful. Few writers have succeeded so well in being just to Paganism and ancient philosophic ethics on the one hand, and to Christianity on the other. The book would be equally valuable and instructive to a narrow-minded Christian disposed to a contemptuous estimate of non-Christian ethics, and to the crude young man who is disposed to adopt the fashionable attitude of posing as "a sort of honorary member of all religions except his own." The book is concerned with ethics rather than with religion or theology; and yet it is one of its strongest points that the author appreciates fully how artificial and unsatisfying is the attempt to deal with ethical questions apart from the systems of the universe (religious and philosophical) with which in real life ethical beliefs are always closely connected.

In so vast a field there will obviously be room for differences of opinion, and the author's fondness for broad generalisation and contrast sometimes involves the ignoring of distinctions between periods and stages of development. The new chapter on Egypt—"the single ancient nation" (as she strikingly calls it)—and the Egyptian Religion is a particularly interesting one, but I should be surprised if a competent critic would not feel the absence of that distinction between the different stages in the development of the religion which has been pointed out by such writers as Mr Flinders Petrie. "Its moral standard (we have surely established) comes nearer to the ideal of modern Christianity than that of any other people whose life we must cross the chasm of millenniums to appreciate" (p. 38). Surely such a verdict could only apply to a very late stage in the development of the religion. So again in the succeeding chapter on "India and the Primal Unity," though distinctions are drawn between Brahminism and Buddhism, Miss Wedgwood is perhaps a little over-eager to identify the modes of thought which they represent. The comparison of Buddhism with Christianity might have gained if it had been examined in less intimate connection with the far lower religion out of which it grew. To Greek and Roman ideals she is generally just, but occasionally we feel that there is a little exaggeration, if it is only the kind

of exaggeration which is almost inevitable if contrasts are to be pointed out in a striking and epigrammatic manner. To identify Aristotle's theory of virtue as the mean (as Miss Wedgwood practically does) with the ideal of "mediocrity" seems to me misleading. That Aristotle's conception of temperance falls short of what is demanded by Christianity is true enough, but that the doctrine of the mean does not necessarily involve a low standard of self-control is sufficiently indicated by the fact that it receives Christian baptism in the pages of St Thomas. The Christian schoolman was surely not wrong in seeing in it merely an assertion of the truth that the true moral ideal is the regulation of desire by reason rather than its suppression; the kind and degree of regulation makes no difference to the doctrine. She seems to me to give too much countenance (p. 186) to the traditional *dictum* that there is no "ought" in Greek morality; and even in the assertion that "the very idea that lies at the root of goodness for a Christian, or for many who have rejected Christianity—the idea of self-sacrifice—was, except with reference to the larger self found in the State, foreign to the Greek ideal" (p. 161), one might have liked a word of qualification, *e.g.* a reference to the doctrine of the friend as the *alter ego*, though, it is true, this self-sacrifice is after all explained as pursuit of a higher good for oneself. And so again, when it is said that "selfishness proper is a defect unrecognised by Greek moral thought" (p. 346), we naturally think of Aristotle's admission that even in his day men did "blame those who love themselves most of all, and call them selfish, as though there were something disgraceful in it" (*ὡς ἐν αἰσχρῇ φιλαύτους ἀποκαλοῦσι*), though he goes on to vindicate a higher kind of self-love. But doubtless to insist at every turn upon qualifications and hesitations would make all generalisation impossible, and such generalisation is of the very essence of such books as the author aims at writing. In the main Miss Wedgwood's contrast is doubtless well founded, but I should have liked a little more recognition of the important principle that in almost every higher religious or ethical system we discern occasional recognition of the truths rightly supposed to be most characteristic of Christianity. The moral rank of the system is determined largely by the presence or absence of elements inconsistent with such occasional recognition. To ignore this aspect of the question is only to play into the hands of those crude people who think they can explain away the moral supremacy of Christianity by quoting isolated sayings from a Jewish rabbi or a Roman Stoic which are almost verbally identical with some of the most characteristic sayings of Christ.

Still more often, when we come to matters of opinion rather than of mere historic fact, we meet with epigrammatic sayings which set one wondering whether they do not involve more exaggeration than epigram necessarily demands. Here are a few of them:—"When patriotism withered, a blight came over the whole moral ideal of that age." (In one direction there was doubtless a "blight," but was not Stoicism on the whole an advance, both in ideal and in practice?) "Cicero is hardly a Roman,

and among Romans he stands alone. He is a Londoner or Parisian born too soon; he is an Athenian born too late; he is a Roman as an English Liberal may be a Roman Catholic" (pp. 235-6). "A group of many cities could hardly accept with a whole heart and conscience the master-and-slave view of humanity as an ideal. The world of *one* city accepted it consistently and logically. . . . Rome is to rule the world, and Romans alone are free" (pp. 239-40). But yet does not Roman law exhibit a growing consciousness of individual rights, and did not even pagan emperors restrict slavery more than it had been restricted in Greece? "Human nature is no worse at one time than at another" (p. 423). Without a good deal of interpretative qualification, does not the acceptance of such a doctrine stultify all human effort and aspiration? Miss Wedgwood's book would be less interesting and suggestive than it is if it did not, side by side with scores of pointed sayings whose truth and insight will appeal to every reader, contain a few which suggest doubts such as these.

Miss Wedgwood's predominant sympathies are, I have suggested, with the Christian ideal, but this ideal is for her, it is evident, an ideal which is only in course of development. She is quite alive to the deficiencies of Christian morality in its actual historical manifestations. In one of the most valuable chapters of the book, entitled "The Fall of Man," she has had the courage to speak the truth about St Augustine. To shower indiscriminating praise upon St Augustine—to treat him as the typical representative of the "religious" or "spiritual" nature—has long been a fashion even with writers who can hardly be said to share a single article of his creed. Miss Wedgwood is bold enough to doubt whether what St Augustine calls his conversion was really that "passage from darkness to light" which he himself supposed. She throws some doubt upon the depth of the early depravity of which St Augustine accuses himself, and she points out in plain language the defects—the unchristian defects, as an ordinary modern Protestant will be inclined to call them—of the creed and the character which resulted from that change. "Augustine had recently repudiated one who in all but name had been a faithful wife to him for half a generation, and was the mother of his only son; her recall and acknowledgment would surely have been recognised by an awakened conscience as the first step in the path of duty. Yet not only did this step never occur to him, but it is plain from all he says that had the advice been given he would have rejected it as a temptation of the Evil One. Such conduct in the fifth century must, of course, not be taken as a proof of the heartless cruelty which it would demonstrate in the twentieth, but is it compatible with a spiritual crisis that turns the soul to God?" (p. 417). She goes on to point out the real meaning of that doctrine of original sin so often professed by those whose creed retains hardly a trace of its original significance, and to illustrate the evil effects in practice of a creed which makes sexual desire the source of all moral evil, and regards its suppression as incomparably more important than the demands of

ordinary honesty and good citizenship or kindly consideration for others. The letter of St Augustine to Boniface, Count of Africa, the traitor who in pursuance of a personal quarrel invited the Vandals into Africa, supplies her with a telling illustration of "the deadening influence on manhood of a morbid worship of purity." The treachery is treated as a venial trifle compared with the enormity of the Count's second marriage after a vow of continence.

Miss Wedgwood's book is mainly, as the title-page suggests, "a historic study." In the last chapter she gives some slight indication of the moral that it is to teach. One point about the ideal of the future, she suggests, is determined: all ancient ideals—including even those of the Church—were "exclusive." The ideal of the present and the future is to be "inclusive." "The nation can never, with a whole heart, set up any permanent distinction between her children and her mere subjects. . . . The true nation is an expansive unity. Even more is the true Church. That conception of a final separation between the lost and the saved, which was for so long woven in with the teaching of Christianity, is in our time discarded for ever. In the future, whatever is a hope for any division of mankind must become a hope for all" (pp. 457-8). Miss Wedgwood goes on to point out how many ideals of life are still compatible with the admission that true good must be promoted for all. There remains the problem, "What is this good? What is this good life that we must promote for all?" But here Miss Wedgwood is content rather to state a problem than to offer a solution—any solution beyond the suggestion that the true human ideal must include all that is best in the various ideals which have been surveyed in the course of her work.

The book concludes with an attempt to mark out the respective spheres of faith and of science, and to claim for the former the whole determination of that content for the idea of "good" of which we are in quest. The spirit of this distinction is very much that of the Kantian philosophy, except that Miss Wedgwood makes Kant's distinction between moral and scientific truth correspond with the distinction between "communicable and incommunicable truth" (which is hardly a Kantian idea); while it seems to be suggested that religious belief as well as ethical is to be determined by the same kind of immediate and incommunicable judgments with which we are presented in our moral judgments, instead of being, with Kant, arrived at merely as the necessary postulate of our purely ethical judgments. To many readers the sharpness of this dualism will seem to require qualification. In a rough way, of course, philosophers of all schools will admit the principle, but further distinction seems to be required. Our author treats historical fact as belonging to the region of demonstrable science; but can we "demonstrate" the guilt or the innocence of Mary, Queen of Scots? And in the probabilities which alone are possible in such matters is there not a large subjective or "incommunicable" element, *i.e.* do not they ultimately repose upon judgments about human character which cannot always be "communicated" from one person to

another person of different experience, temperament, or character? And, on the other side, not all of us will be prepared to hand over to mere "faith" the determination of those questions about the ultimate nature of things which certainly lie beyond the sphere of "demonstrable" scientific fact. In this partition of human thought between "science" and "faith" philosophy seems to be left out.

Further discussion of the problem thus raised would, of course, be out of place. I will only remark that this passage alluded to is the only one in the book which suggests a mode of thinking (though, of course, representatives of it could still be found among philosophers of the highest competence) which was commoner a generation ago than at the present time. To name only one of the causes of this change of attitude, modern thinkers are apt to be more alive than was once the case to the limitations of scientific thought even in its own sphere. "Science cannot enter the realm of ends," says Miss Wedgwood (p. 472). Not all modern biologists and few modern philosophers would be prepared to say that even botany can get on without the conception of an end, though, of course, it remains true that botany can tell us nothing of ends that *ought* to be pursued. If science has become less confident in its profession of "explaining" even the world of "phenomena," if the sphere of science is no longer treated as identical with the sphere of mechanics, philosophy has become more hopeful of treating "scientifically" questions which undoubtedly do not admit of the same degree of certainty, definiteness, and "communicability" that is possible within the sphere of mathematical physics. A closer investigation might show that the sharp contrast which Miss Wedgwood draws between the sphere of "science" and that of "faith" must be resolved into one of degree. There are minds incapable of apprehending even the self-evident axioms of mathematics or of logic, and no instruction can "communicate" such axioms to them: the categorical imperatives of one man's moral consciousness do not indeed command universal assent, but they may represent something more than a sort of wilful, non-rational *ipse dixit*. The moral consciousness claims the same objective validity for its judgments of value that science claims for its laws. It is possible, no doubt, to speak of "verification" in science in a way which is not possible in ethics; but all "verification" implies axioms or postulates which cannot themselves be verified. Still less will modern thinkers be generally disposed to admit that theories of the universe are merely creations of individual choice or individual intuition: those who approach nearest to such a position will not share Miss Wedgwood's confidence in the absolute certainty and truth, within its own sphere, of positive science.

I feel I have been much too critical and controversial in dealing with a book with whose general tone I am in hearty sympathy, and for the merits of which I feel a hearty and respectful admiration. But it is a book whose merits could hardly be exhibited by extract or recapitulation: an attempt to epitomise the contents of a book which consists itself in

very closely packed survey of wide fields of thought could only end in dullness. The book is full of interesting information, of thoughtful criticism and appreciation, of incisive and even brilliant suggestion. It may be cordially recommended to those who do not know it; while many of those who read it in its earlier form will be glad to renew their acquaintance with what has become "practically a new book." It contains no cut-and-dried "system of ethical thought," but it will be eminently helpful and delightful to those who are engaged in the search for one, and it will be read with delight by that larger number of readers who care less for systems than for a working ideal of life.

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Myth, Magic, and Morals: A Study of Christian Origins.—By F. C. Conybeare.—Pp. xviii+376.—London: Watts & Co., 1909.

THE sub-title of this book does not appear on its cover nor even on its first page. For this reason, perhaps, it has found its way into the hands of the present reviewer, a mere student of the lower culture, whose feet have never ventured on the high-soaring but treacherous path of Biblical criticism. Thus he is incompetent to do more than attempt to estimate the general tone and trend of Mr Conybeare's work. Yet after all he may serve in a humble sort of way as a touchstone of its worth, since it is clearly designed for popular consumption. To the specialist the fact that the chapters are for the most part ill-provided with references, and have doubtless been written where books were hard to obtain, may prove at first disturbing. Everyone knows, however, that Mr Conybeare has a quarter of a century of wide and critical research at his back. Hence to challenge his accuracy is only likely to result in catching a Tartar. For the rest, it is always easier and pleasanter to listen to the man who, after elaborate preparation, has the courage to put his notes in his pocket and let himself go. Indeed, the high literary quality of the book consists just in this, its perfect freedom and flow; whilst to the same cause may be assigned its defects, such as they are, namely, a slight tendency to go off on a side-track, and a certain violence of manner that one is wont to associate, say, with the ardent parliamentarian rather than with the philosopher who weighs his words.

The problem that Mr Conybeare puts to himself is broadly this: If we subtract the myth and the magic from early Christianity, is there anything left but the morals? He would seem to conclude that there is nothing. Meanwhile he appears to be decidedly more interested in abetting the work of subtraction than in helping towards an appreciation of the residue. His treatment of Christian morals is, to use a favourite academic phrase, perfunctory. In fact, he might almost as well have left

the word out of his title. A bare dozen of pages is devoted to the moral teaching of Jesus, and that mainly with the object of showing that its universality is not so real as it seems. Yet he allows it to have value for the present age in a conclusion that is at the same time highly characteristic of his own attitude towards the official representatives of Christianity:

"A sublime intransigence breathes through these parables and precepts: a fierce scorn for the rich and selfish, a tender love for the poor and suffering, a contempt for shams and empty conventions, an uncompromising devotion to truth, a true humility. There is about them a ring of real manliness; and that is why the document that records them has proved itself, in every age, a text-book of martyrdom, extorting for itself the homage, however hypocritical, even of clerics and oppressors."

By myth Mr Conybeare means what ethnologists, such, for instance, as M. Hubert, prefer to distinguish as "legend." Everyone is agreed that in later times there was a luxuriant growth of Christian legend; and by the use of scientific method we are coming to understand the conditions, psychological and sociological, under which such a process was fostered or retarded. Mr Conybeare refers the student to a chapter in the scholarly work of Father Hippolyte Delehaye, S.J., *Les Légendes Hagiographiques* (Brussels, 1905), where the gradual accretion of legend round the life of the martyr Procopius is admirably illustrated. The question then arises whether the same falsifying influences have not to a greater or less extent contaminated the very sources of historical Christianity. The decision must be left to the experts, of whom Mr Conybeare is one. The mere anthropologist can but profess allegiance to the methodological postulate that the mythopœic tendencies of the human mind are subject to the same laws all the world over.

Magic is a term that still cries aloud for adequate definition. Mr Conybeare faces this task resolutely. "Magic," he says, "may for our purpose be defined as any rite or religious operation which, in ignorance of true causes, seeks to realise ends, necessary or unnecessary to the well-being of society, by an appeal to occult or supernatural forces, no matter whether the latter be regarded as personal or not." This notion of magic openly conflicts with various conceptions of it that in the anthropological field are at this moment engaged in an internecine struggle for existence. The distinction between the control of impersonal forces and the conciliation of personal beings, with which Dr Frazer virtually correlates the antithesis between magic and religion, is brushed aside. So is the distinction between the anti-social and social types of supernaturalism, whereon MM. Hubert and Mauss would build. Yet Mr Conybeare does not go quite so far as M. Van Gennep, who has recently identified religion with the whole theory, and magic with the whole practice or technique, of sacred cult in all its kinds. Mr Conybeare doubtless perceives that the word magical is bound to retain a dyslogistic flavour. You could never expect to remain on good terms with a bishop if you called him a magician to his face. However, he is evidently prepared to employ the

language of disparagement about all rites usually regarded as religious, if they fail to make appeal to the true causes of things. What are the true causes of things? Mr Conybeare apparently knows. His denunciation of the "charlatanry" of Brigham Young, Mrs Eddy, Eusapia Palladino, Home, Madame Blavatsky, and so on, may perhaps pass muster; though even in connection with some of these cases he might find that men of science were not prepared to endorse his opinion that "the entire vulgar mechanism of trickery" lay exposed to view. But when he condemns the Eucharist, and incidentally humanity's immemorial attempt to effect communion with the divine, as a failure to apprehend the laws of cause and effect, he either is guilty of a most unscientific dogmatism or is drawing on sources of information denied to the rest of the race.

Now there is something to be said for dogmatism on the score of its *ad hominem* pertinency so long as it is used to overthrow a dogmatism that is equally haughty and uncompromising. If, for instance, some Christian theologian, casting his eye contemptuously over the earlier history of religion, were to declare that he can see nothing here but superstition crass and blind, then it is good for him, if not good absolutely, that an adversary should retort: "Why, in that case your own beliefs are riddled through and through with superstition, juju, fetish, and all the rest of it." But surely no enlightened Christian of to-day takes such a view of man's earlier, and doubtless on the whole less successful, experiments in the pursuit of religious truth. Mr Conybeare, however, on his part, makes short work of the hypothesis of a religious evolution. "It is not clear," he says, "that the theory of a progressive revelation as applied by the clergy is anything more than a lame excuse for adhering to old, but false, weights and measures." And he proceeds:—

"The crescent moon is no less bright than the full orb of fourteen nights; but do the fables of the Garden of Eden, of the talking serpent, of the vindictive God punishing his own creatures because they desire knowledge, of Noah and his Ark, give any light at all? Are they more respectable than the myth of Prometheus chained to the rock by Zeus because he revealed the use of fire to mankind? And yet it is on such fables that the doctrine of human redemption, as formulated by Paul and promulgated in catechisms, reposes."

Now of course the development theory of religion can easily degenerate into a piece of insincere cant. But to charge the clergy as a body with insincerity would be sheer rhetoric. Besides, what on earth or in the sky has the crescent moon to do with it? A purely physical analogy cannot prevail against the psychological law that all growth of knowledge and belief and friendly relations must be from vague, confused, and inconsistent towards clear, determinate, and coherent, and this as a direct implication of the only method available in such a case, namely, the method of trial and error.

R. R. MARETT.

The Pauline Epistles: A Critical Study.—By Robert Scott, M.A., D.D., Bombay.—Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1909.

THE attitude of Dr Scott is frank and fearless, but, unlike critics such as Dr Van Manen, he is no iconoclast. His work is a sane and moderate attempt to solve the problem of these Epistles by the application of critical methods. He rejects the Pauline authorship of eight out of the thirteen of them, and regards the remaining five as in part composite. His argument is based entirely upon internal data—"a theory of authorship based on characteristics of thought and style." The clue he uses is, certainly, only a hypothesis, and may, on this ground, be called unscientific; but do not all inquiries need some theory to give them coherence, and to supply a centre around which facts may crystallise? The important point is—Does the author's theory furnish a key that unlocks the problem better than any other? Are the differences, clear to all readers, best explained by assuming that Paul came under Greek influence, and that there was a development in his thought; or by the hypothesis that some of these writings are from other hands? The triumph of either alternative is not yet within sight.

Dr Scott's position is that some of the Epistles are genuinely Pauline, that all are saturated with the Pauline spirit, and that there was in the Early Church a school of writers who interpreted the Gospel from Paul's point of view, at the same time giving to it a bias of their own. These Epistles in substance are Pauline, but are, like "official despatches issued by the head of a department, written by unknown subordinates." They are divided by Dr Scott into four groups, and written respectively by Paul and his younger associates—Silas, Timothy, and Luke. The first and strictly Pauline group consists of 1 and 2 Corinthians, Romans, Galatians, and Philippians, with the exception of certain sections. These five Epistles are supposed to contain "Paul's Gospel," and are said to be self-evidencingly his. But is not such a method eclectic and arbitrary? To select a certain number of Epistles, and to say, *a priori*, that their contents alone are Pauline, rejecting those containing a different but not contradictory teaching, seems illogical; and to assume that Paul ought to have said this, that, and the other in these disputed letters is scarcely scientific criticism.

The second group contains Ephesians i. and ii., Thessalonians (in part), parts of Romans, and sections of Corinthians i. and ii., with other New Testament writings. The writer of these was Silas. The third group consists of 1 Thessalonians i.-iii.; 2 Thessalonians iii.; Colossians, Philemon: of these Timothy was the author. The fourth group contains the Pastoral Epistles, of which the writer was "probably" Luke. Dr Scott makes the first group the standard by which he judges the rest, and concludes, on various grounds (not, however, set out in any order), that the latter cannot be the work of Paul.

1. In most of them, especially in the Pastoral Epistles, there are present Greek terms and ideas quite foreign to Paul. He was brought up a

Pharisee, was "ignorant of secular culture, and antagonistic to the ideas of other lands," while his categories of thought were entirely Rabbinical. But the fact that he was primarily a Jew does not preclude the idea that he came under the influence of Greek culture. His writings may show that his syntax was imperfect; yet, as Deismann and E. L. Hicks argue, his language and style betray the genuine Greek, and this is as observable in Galatians and Ephesians (parts of the genuine group) as in the Pastoral Epistles. The preacher on Mars Hill is no mere Pharisee, but a cosmopolitan, free from Jewish narrowness. Moreover, his general attitude towards the Gentiles points to the broadening influence of Græco-Roman culture. When the vision of Christ broke up his former life and he retired into Arabia to recast his faith under the light of that new revelation, the influence of Tarsus would be considerable; and it seems psychologically probable that his universalism came from these earlier and broader surroundings rather than from the more circumscribed atmosphere of Pharisaism. Traces of Greek thought are present in his great chapter (1 Cor. xv.), where psychological views of Resurrection jostle with the more material conceptions of the Pharisees; and in 2 Cor. v., Socratic rather than Palestinian ideas of a future life are reflected. Also in Paul's striking contrasts (Romans), there are indications of the dualism of Greek philosophy.

2. Style. There are, no doubt, stylistic differences between the first and other groups. The style of the first is direct, abrupt, vigorous, "Cromwellian," and occasionally ambiguous; while that of the latter—of Ephesians especially—is flowing, eloquent, "Miltonic," and occasionally involved; the style of the former is that of a reported address, while that of the latter is literary. Moreover, Paul abounds in antitheses and paradoxes, while his disciples avoid them, or use triplicates instead. But the argument from style is precarious. A writer usually has his own distinct style which distinguishes him from others. But an author, when in different moods, may differ even from himself, of which Carlyle's *John Sterling* and *Sartor Resartus* are examples. In the "genuine" group Paul differs from himself. How different in style is his Hagar allegory from the Corinthian love-lyric. Being a man of moods, nervous, impulsive, sameness would be most unlikely. But the differences most probably arose from the employment of amanuenses. His method presumably was to dictate his ideas to one of those, who, while retaining some of Paul's words and phrases, would clothe the thought in language of his own.

3. Several Epistles and parts of Epistles (Rom. xii., xiii., xv.) are considered non-Pauline because they consist largely of exhortation; indeed the second is called the "Exhortation group," and exhortation is contrary to the genius of Paul, whose basis of morality is "God in man" rather than a detailed set of regulations. To make such a distinction seems far-fetched; for what could be more natural than for the Apostle to enforce his teaching by practical appeal, and crown his argument by an exhortation. Dr Scott tacitly admits this to be sometimes Paul's practice. In the

Philippian letter the ethical element preponderates, and no clear line of distinction is made between the hortatory and the doctrinal parts.

4. Again, in some of the later groups, especially in Ephesians and the Pastoral Epistles, the ideas of Church and Priesthood are more fully developed than in the earlier. With Paul the Church is a local community; with the writer of, say, Ephesians it has become the aggregate body of believers throughout all lands. But, on the other hand, in this Epistle the priesthood, which usually develops *pari passu* with ecclesiasticism, is absent. It is an Epistle "steeped in Paulinism," and in language it is a "mosaic of Pauline phraseology." What more fitting conclusion than that it is from the hand of Paul, and that its views of the Church are the Apostle's later ideas? But it is more difficult to defend the Pastoral Epistles, where the idea of the ministry is considerably advanced. That their author was Luke is not new, and is favoured, amongst others, by Harnack and M'Giffert. It seems probable that Luke possessed fragments of Paul's letters, which he worked up later in this form. This view preserves the Pauline character of the letters, and frees the author from the charge of forgery.

5. Further philosophical considerations lead to questioning. There are traces of Gnosticism (Colossians) and of Alexandrian philosophy. These theosophisings, so it is argued, are foreign to Paul's mind, and later than his day. But there was ample time for their development during his life; and that they should affect some of the Churches is probable, seeing that Colosse and Laodicea were cities where such systems and cults had had their home for centuries. Moreover, incipient Gnosticism is not absent from the authentic group (1 Cor. viii. 6), where the pre-existent Christ, although not an emanation from the Godhead, is regarded as the instrument of creation.

6. The presence of apocalyptic elements in some of the Epistles, especially in Thess. i. and ii., is regarded as evidence against them. On other grounds their authority may be disputed, particularly the fact that Paul's specific doctrines are absent, but certainly not because they contain apocalyptic teaching. Indeed it seems most reasonable, and especially if 1 Thessalonians be his earliest Epistle, that the Apostle should have expected the immediate return of Christ, seeing that such a belief was so universal and persistent in the early Church. Moreover, there are apocalyptic hints in the authentic Epistles, e.g. 1 Cor. xi. 26, xv. 20-35.

7. But theological and doctrinal differences supply the chief evidence. Because of these, it is argued, if Paul be the author of the one group, he cannot be of the other. In the one the teaching is forensic—the law is central; sin is expiated, not forgiven, atoned for, not remitted—but in the other it is ethical. With Paul, Christ is ever the Redeemer; with the others, He is the Great Example. With Paul, righteousness is a new life; with the others, a new moral law, with new precepts. In the first group sonship comes through adoption, in the others it is ethical. With Paul, Christ is not absolutely God; with the others, He is God in His fulness. These are some of the contrasts made, but by no means all. It must be admitted

that different ideas are emphasised in one group as compared with another, and that ideas prominent in one are in the background in another; but may not this arise from the circumstances under which they were written, and on account of their being sent to different people? Besides, the same ideas are present, although not prominent, in all the letters; and also, in the genuine Epistles there is apparently discrepant teaching. In Cor. i. the Resurrection is largely a re-animation of the body, whereas in Cor. ii. it is the clothing of the spirit with the "house that is from heaven." In Philippians the Apostle expects to die before he meets with Christ, but in Corinthians he hopes to be alive at his Lord's return.

The morality of the practice of writing in the name of another is defended on the ground that different ideas of literary etiquette or honesty prevailed then from what prevail to-day, a writer considering that he was honouring the dead by sending out a letter or treatise in their name. But such a defence is little needed when it is remembered that the letters themselves, at least several of them, state that a companion of the Apostle unites with him in the task of writing; and when it is conceded, as it is by Dr Scott, that many of the personal messages and salutations are from the actual pen of Paul.

Our author tells us that this volume is a "preliminary sketch." We look forward with high hopes to further work from the pen of a writer who has already made a valuable contribution to an important and perennially fascinating study.

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The Person of Our Lord and Recent Thought.—By Charles Frederick Nolloth, M.A., Oriel College, Oxford, formerly Rector of All Saints', Lewes.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1908.

This volume is evidence of the uneasiness caused by recent New Testament criticism even in the most conservative school. Some parts of that criticism the author regards as mere "eccentricity," and finds comfort from the thought that "as in physiology abnormal developments are occasionally to be met with and are thought of sufficient interest to be preserved in museums, so in the province of history grotesque and eccentric theories will sometimes deserve mention, if only it be to serve as warnings against the consequences of unhealthy prejudice and warped methods of inquiry." Nevertheless the household of faith is much disturbed by the knowledge that these critics are abroad. And the present guardian plainly tells the inmates that it is useless to resent the application of all the instruments these critics have at command. He even deems it prudent to warn them that "some loss" may easily befall them, and prepares them for the time when "we find we can no longer regard as part of the faith something which is dear from old association." The bulk of our possessions, he

admits, may be diminished, but he consoles the somewhat frightened householder with the reflection that there will be "corresponding gain in security of tenure, in sharpness of outline, and in the clearness with which we can see what we are able to retain."

When the author gets to work we quickly see that he is no half-hearted apologist. In dealing with the "sources" he discriminates between the evidential values to be assigned to the Synoptists and the Fourth Gospel, but in such a manner as to prove plainly that he entertains no doubt as to Johannine authorship or the historical validity of the narrative. Dividing the "sources" into Christian and non-Christian, he discusses the meagre references to Christ in the latter. Of Philo he says "there is no doubt that he was acquainted with Christ and Christianity." There is no warrant whatever for this statement. Philo is altogether silent as to Christ. And this is the more remarkable from the circumstance that he was in Palestine in A.D. 39. He was keenly interested in all the religious movements of his time, and we may accept Renan's view that his silence is due to the fact that he had never heard of Jesus. The author's courage of assertion is yet further evidenced by the fact that he still quotes one of the passages found in Josephus. He omits, however, to mention the silence of another author. The elder Pliny compiled a laborious work in which he gathered together all the unusual natural phenomena he had ever heard of. He chronicles an alleged curious failure of light that followed the murder of Cæsar. Now the crucifixion of Jesus took place in the reign of Tiberius. It was accompanied by stupendous natural phenomena (Matt. xxvii. 45, 51-53). These events took place during the lifetime of Seneca and the elder Pliny, both of whom were curious inquirers into such things. Yet they never mention them. But the whole subject of the silence of non-Christian writers deserves a much more thorough investigation than it obtains in this book.

Students will not be reassured by the undue prominence given in this work to the Petrine element in Mark. When this is regarded along with the fact that there is no reference, or, at most, a doubtful one, to the Pauline influence it becomes significant. For whatever were the "sources" open to the writer of Mark, he carefully selects such as bring into vivid relief the struggle with the authorities, passes lightly by all evidence as to the inner life of the community, and almost entirely suppresses "sayings" which show Jesus' conservative attitude to Jewish law and life. These are Pauline notes, and the failure to recognise them is a curious feature.

When he comes to deal with the question of the historicity of Jesus our author fails to show that he has fully realised the elements of the problem. The question is not to be ruled out of court as an "eccentricity," fit only for a theological museum. Apart from the silences already noted there is the astonishing silence of Paul. Our author does not consider the great probability there is for the statement that Paul must have been in Jerusalem—if his own account of the matter (Acts xxii. 23) is to be accepted—in or about the time of the crucifixion.

Scholars of repute have been driven to account for this silence by the theory that he was then temporarily absent. Then there is the almost total silence of the epistles both as to the life and to the teaching of the Master. Not one of the parables is mentioned, there is no reference to any specific miracles, not a single "saying" from the Sermon on the Mount is quoted, though this is now regarded by such scholars as the Rev. Dr Horton as the eternally binding ethical code of Christianity, and the whole of the life that lies behind the public ministry is left entirely unnoticed. This will seem all the more remarkable when we consider the inner meaning of the Apostle's contention with the Judaising Christians. He contended for the freedom of the spirit as opposed to the tyranny of the letter of the law. But this was also part of the quarrel Jesus is said to have had with the sticklers for the law. Now if Paul had quoted the teaching ascribed to Jesus—say as to meats, or as to the Sabbath—the saying would have been decisive in his favour. Why did he not do this? There are two conceivable answers. We may suppose that Jesus did not then occupy the position of absolutely divine authority which he subsequently came to fill. Certain passages in the epistles, however, make it extremely difficult to hold this theory. Then there is the alternative that Paul did not know of sayings that would have been so entirely in his favour. Our author complains that "there is a disposition on the part of some critics to demand a kind of proof which is never required in other lines of historical investigation." Let us test this. Let us suppose that a recent convert to Irish Home Rule is anxious to make out a case for the theory that this had been for a quarter of a century the accepted policy of the Liberal party. He exhausts the possibilities of ingenious argument, yet omits all reference to the life and teaching of Gladstone. If, in other respects, our convert proved himself an honest, capable, and competent writer, we could account for the omission only by the theory that he did not know of them.

In the chapter on "The Messiah" the author holds the customary view with unfaltering conviction. "Our Lord believed that, in the fullest and truest sense, He was the Messiah of prophecy, the Christ of God, 'He that should come into the world,' the Anointed King of His people, the Son of David." He is glad enough to avail himself of the help of distinguished Continental scholars in fortifying this position, though he drops them quickly later on. For himself he relies on a more than doubtful interpretation of the Greek texts, without reference to the Aramaic. This method is scarcely permissible to-day. It is nearly certain that Jesus did not speak Greek but Aramaic. Important consequences flow from this fact. Professor Schmidt (*The Prophet of Nazareth*) has shown that the only Aramaic word in general use as the original for "Son of Man" simply means "man," "member of the human race." Outside Christian literature it never occurs as a Messianic term. That the disciples subsequently read this meaning into it is true; but as used by Jesus among his hearers the Aramaic term would not convey a Messianic idea, nor would they think

that he was claiming Messiahship. And then, having in view the author's use of the Fourth Gospel, it is worth while asking, is the genius of the Aramaic capable of expressing such philosophical subtleties as this document puts into the mouth of a Galilean artisan? And the Messiahship is closely connected with the view of Jesus as "Son of David." Our author, as has been shown, is a stout defender of this view. The only real attempts at working out this theory in the Gospels are the genealogical tables. Now these trace the descent through Joseph, while, according to the customary view, Joseph had nothing whatever to do with the birth of Jesus. This difficulty has not occurred to our author.

So stout a defender of the faith finds a natural conclusion to his inquiry in the two closing chapters of the book. Interpreting the results at which he has arrived, he finds that (1) Jesus Christ was "man but more than man," and (2) "Jesus Christ is God." It is interesting to note that in order to reach these conclusions he has had to part company with nearly all the distinguished Continental scholars on whose help he relied while dealing with the "historicity" problem. The claims made on behalf of Jesus in these two chapters are stupendous. They rest on forced interpretations of Greek terms, foreign to the Aramaic which Jesus spoke, and involving metaphysical and philosophical difficulties which have bewildered and divided Christendom along the whole line of its history. The "Christ" of Paul is a different being from the Jesus of the Synoptists; he was a super-mundane being existing in heaven before Jesus was born. He belongs to a different order of thought, too, from the "Logos" of the Johannine-Alexandrian circle of ideas. The "Son" who is "a priest for ever after the order of Melchisedec" presents us with a concept of being different in kind from the "second Adam," "the Lord from Heaven" of the Pauline type of thought. And then there is the Apocalyptic type, coming down from Daniel to the Dispersion and introducing us to yet another world of speculation. These are very inadequately interpreted when regarded as "phases" or "aspects" of one commanding Personality. They point to radical differences in quality of being. The idea of the Infinite, Omnipotent, Omnipresent, Omniscient God being pent up within the confines of a limited and fleeting human personality, and in that form being killed and buried, is an idea that refuses to adjust itself to the laws of human thought. Most instructive parallels to several features in this conception of the slain God, and to the Eucharistic institution subsequently based upon it, are to be found in those Oriental cults which pervaded that social order where our Gospels were written. So close are these parallelisms that Christian Fathers, such as Tertullian, accounted for them by the theory that the devil, to discredit Christianity, had suggested them to the heathen. For driving "home" these contradictions it is certain that the present writer will not escape being labelled by our author as "eccentric," or relegated to a theological "museum."

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[An extremely interesting book. There are chapters on the Greek, Roman, Zoroastrian, and Hebrew conceptions of animals, and in a final chapter the growth of modern ideas about animals is discussed.]
- 15 *Compton-Rickett (Joseph)* Origins and Faiths: An Essay of Reconciliation. 282p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1909.
[A contribution towards finding a reasonable basis for belief which shall bring into practical agreement the religious and scientific systems, preserving at the same time the essential truth of great traditions.]
- Granger (Frank)* The Meaning of Experience for Science and Religion. Inter. J. Eth., April 1909.
- An Unknown Man.* "Which is," or The Unknown God. 252p. Alden, Oxford, 1909.
[The same law of gravitation which governs all material phenomena governs likewise all spiritual being, and is involved with evolution in the work of the re-spiritualisation of matter.]
- Anon.* The Mistakes of Darwin and his Would-be Followers. Bibliotheca Sac., April 1909.
- B BIBLE** 1 *Old Test.* 5 *New Test.* 9 *Apocrypha.*
- Picton (J. Allanson)* Man and the Bible: A Review of the Place of the Bible in Human History. 334p. Williams & Norgate, 1909.
[Review will follow.]
- a *Cruveilhier (P.)* Les principaux résultats des fouilles de Suse, et leur rapports avec la Bible. (1st art.) R. du Clergé français, April 15, 1909.
Hogg (H. W.) Orientalia. Interpreter, April 1909.
[Deals with new finds and new texts.]
- Montgomery (J. A.)* A New Aramaic Inscription of Biblical Interest. Bibl. World, Feb. 1909.
[The Inscription of Zakar, King of Hamath, discovered by Pognon.]
- b *Geden (Alfred S.)* Outlines of Introduction to the Hebrew Bible. 382p. T. & T. Clark, 1909.
[The chapters of this book have formed substantially the groundwork or basis of a series of lectures introductory to the study of the Old Testament, which for several years have been delivered at the Wesleyan College, Richmond. The writer holds a conservative position with regard to modern controversies on the authorship of the Pentateuch and the books of the Old Testament in general.]
- i *(Brook, K.)* The Bible and Religion. Interpreter, April 1909.
[1st paper. The Bible is inspiring; is it inspired?] *Rogers (A.)* Prophecy and Poetry. Studies in Isaiah and Browning. (The Bohlen Lectures for 1909.) 279p. Longmans, 1909.
- q *Knight (Wm.)* The Lake of Galilee. Interpreter, April 1909.
Driver (S. R.) Modern Research as illustrating the Bible. (Schweich Lectures of the British Academy, 1908.) 103p. Frowde, 1909.
[First some account is given of the progress made during the past century in the principal branches of research relating to Biblical study, and then an outline of the new knowledge respecting Palestine which has been obtained recently, partly from inscriptions and partly from excavations.]
- Robinson (R. J.)* Damascus: The Pearl of the Desert. Bibl. World, Mar. 1909.
- Conder (Col. C. R.)* The City of Jerusalem. 334p. Murray, 1909.
- r *Smith (J. M. P.) and Burton (E. D.)* The Biblical Doctrine of Atonement. Bibl. World, Jan. 1909.
[Concluding article, distinguishing the fundamental elements from the incidental, and comparing the teachings of the various periods.]
- Wood (I. F.)* The Biblical Doctrine of the Holy Spirit and Present Religious Life. Bibl. World, April 1909.
- y *Fillion (L. Cl.)* Les étapes du rationalisme dans ses attaques contre les Évangiles et la Vie de J.-C. R. du Clergé français, April 1, 1909.
[Begins with the rationalist assaults of Reimarus.]
- 1a *Gray (G. B.)* The Excavations at Gezer and Religion in Ancient Palestine. Expos., May 1909.
- h *Steinmetzer (F.)* Das heilige Salböl des Alten Bundes. Bibl. Ztschr., Heft 1, 1909.
- p *M'Fadyen (J. E.)* Communion with God in the Bible. I. In the Old Testament Prophets. Bibl. World, Feb. 1909.
- r *Badé (W. F.)* The Growth of Ethical Ideals in Old Testament Times. Bibl. World, Mar. 1909.
- Brown (S. L.)* Messianic Interpretation. Interpreter, April 1909.
[Macbride Sermon before the University of Oxford last January.]
- Gordon (A. R.)* The Spirit of Freedom in the Law. Bibl. World, April 1909.
- M'Fadyen (J. E.)* Communion with God in the Bible. II. In the Historical Books of the Old Testament. Bibl. World, April 1909.
- s *Fell (W.)* Der Bibelkanon des Flavius Josephus. a. Das Zeugnis C. Ap. 1. 8 und der Umfang des Kanons. Bibl. Ztschr., Heft 1, 1909.
- 2B *King (E. G.)* Enoch and the Feast of Dedication. Interpreter, April 1909.
[“Enoch’s” walk with God is connected with the Hanukka dedication procession, and both related to solar mythology.]
- Magoun (H. W.)* The Glacial Epoch and the Noachian Deluge. Bibliotheca Sac., April 1909.
[First of a series of papers to show that, “if the Biblical version is a true account, a score of difficult geological problems can be simply solved.”]
- D *Smith (H. P.)* The Red Heifer. Amer. J. Th., April 1909.
[The Levitical rite of the red heifer is a survival from animistic religion naturalised in the law of Israel.]
- E *Wiener (H. M.)* Essays in Pentateuchal Criticism. IV. The Concluding Chapters of Numbers. Bibliotheca Sac., April 1909.
- K *Jordan (W. G.)* Homiletics and Criticism: 2 Samuel xxi. 1-14. Bibl. World, Jan. 1909.
[Attempts to show how, with critical pre-suppositions, such a difficult story can be used homiletically.]

- Caspari (W.)* Literarische Art und historischer Wert von 2 Sam. 15-20. Theolog. Studien, May 1909.
- N *Burkitt (F. C.)* The Lucianic Text of 1 Kings viii. 53b. J. Th. St., April 1909.
- r *Smilh (C. E.)* Ethics of the Mosaic Law. Bibliotheca Sac., April 1909.
- 3B *Vidal (J. M.)* L'idée de résurrection dans Job. R. du Clergé français, Mar. 15, 1909. [The idea does not appear in Job.]
- E *Gordon (A. R.)* Psalm 87. Bibl. World, Feb. 1909.
- [Expository.]
- S *Gilbert (G. H.)* How Men have read The Song of Songs. Bibl. World, Mar. 1909. [Giving some account of the fanciful interpretations that have been held.]
- 5k *Moulton (J. H.) and Milligan (G.)* Lexical Notes from the Papyri. Expos., April, May, and June 1909.
- Kenyon (F. G.)* The Numeration of New Testament Manuscripts. Church Q. R., April 1909.
- r *Labourt (J.)* Le péché originel, dans la tradition juive contemporaine de Notre-Seigneur et dans Saint Paul. R. du Clergé français, April 1, 1909.
- y *Whittaker (Thomas)* The Origins of Christianity. With an Outline of Van Manen's Analysis of the Pauline Literature. 2nd ed., containing an Appendix on Galatians. 260p. Watts & Co., 1909. [In the preface the author states that the study he has recently made of a new work on Judaism, by M. Edouard Dujardin, *La Source du Fleuve Chrétien*, and of the line of criticism by which it has been prepared in France, has led him to modify his view on the O.T.]
- Wrede (William)* The Origin of the New Testament. (Library of Living Thought.) 152p. Harper & Brothers, 1909. [A plain and, considering the limits of space, an exhaustive account of the present condition of criticism of N.T. origins from what is commonly known as the standpoint of the "advanced" school.]
- Turner (C. H.)* Historical Introduction to the Textual Criticism of the New Testament. III. The Contents of the Canon of the New Testament: (B) The (Pauline) Epistles. J. Th. St., April 1909.
- 6 *Davis (T. K.)* The New Birth. Bibliotheca Sac., April 1909.
- Goodspeed (E. J.)* The Freer Gospels and Shenute of Atripe. Bibl. World, Mar. 1909. [Discusses the provenance of the MS.]
- Turton (Lt.-Col. W. H.)* How the Resurrection Narratives explain one another. Expos., May 1909.
- Verrall (A. W.)* Christ before Herod. J. Th. St., April 1909. [Christ is sent to Herod that his Galilean record may be inquired into, for Pilate's guidance in judgment. Herod, with his soldiers (i.e. having strong military forces) "thought nothing" of Christ as a political danger, was favourably impressed, gave Christ a rich garment as a mark of favour, and sent him back to Pilate with a clear record.]
- Girard (Etienne)* Jésus de Nazareth: Notes historiques et critiques. 2nd ed., entièrement remaniée d'après les plus récents travaux exégétiques. (Bibliothèque de Critique religieuse.) 205p. Nourry, 1909.
- r *Knight (W. A.)* Social Outlook in Matthew and Luke. Bibliotheca Sac., April 1909.
- Lebreton (J.)* Les origines de l'Apologétique chrétienne. III. Le message du Christ d'après les Synoptiques. R. prat. d'Apologét., Mar. 1, 1909.
- Abbott (Edwin A.)* The Message of the Son of Man. 188p. Black, 1909. [The title "Son of Man" was adopted by Christ not from apocryphal but solely from Biblical sources, so as to indicate the Man made in the image of God and destined to have dominion over the Beast.]
- y *Moulton (J. H.)* Some Criticisms on Professor Harnack's *Sayings of Jesus*. Expos., May 1909.
- Hall (Charles C.)* Christ and the Eastern Soul: The Witness of the Oriental Consciousness to Jesus Christ. (Burrows Lectures, 1906-1907.) 249p. Univ. of Chicago Press, 1909. [Adopts largely the position of Absolute Idealism, but not in regard to the Will and Moral Freedom.]
- D *Mangenot (E.)* Les éléments secondaires et rédactionnels du "discours des paraboles," Marc iv. 1-34. R. du Clergé français, April 15, 1909. [Furnishes an opportunity of showing how the presence of these elements need not affect the question of Scriptural inspiration and authority.]
- Lake (Kirsopp)* The Date of Q. Expositor, June 1909. [Every year after 50 A.D. increasingly improbable.]
- Soares (T. G.)* The Worth of a Man: An Exposition of Mark v. 1-20. Bibl. World, Feb. 1909.
- E *Landersdorfer (P.)* Bemerkungen zu Lk. i. 26-38. Bibl. Ztschr., Heft 1, 1909.
- Selwyn (Canon E. C.)* The Carefulness of Luke the Prophet. Expositor, June 1909. [Compares Acts ix. 3 sqq., xxii. 6 sqq., xxvi. 12 sqq., with LXX. of Dan. x. to show how closely St Luke has followed his original.]
- F *Scott-Moncrieff (C. E.)* St John: Apostle, Evangelist, and Prophet. 292p. Nisbet, 1909. [A careful treatment of the Johannine question. The aim has been to show that the objections alleged against St John as the author of the works traditionally ascribed to him are far from conclusive.]
- G *Bricout (J.)* La valeur historique du quatrième Evangile. R. du Clergé français, Jan. 1, 1909. [A defence.]
- H *Bacon (B. W.)* Aenon near to Sâlim. Bibl. World, April 1909. [The occurrence in Samaria in reasonable proximity of the names Aenon and Sâlim, and their absence from any other region of Palestine, should lead us provisionally to consider that when the Fourth Evangelist wrote the upper waters of the Wady Beïdan were a resort of members of the Johannine sect, and were then regarded as having served the Baptist as a place for baptising.]
- R *Anon.* Resurrectio Christi: An Apology written from a new Standpoint and supported by Evidence some of which is new. 139p. Kegan Paul, 1909. [Arrives at a theory of the order of the Resurrection appearances and the significance of Pentecost by examining the N.T. accounts in the light of psychical research, and tries to find

corroboration of theory from early Christian documents.]

- W *Tyson (S. L.)* The Sign of Jonah. Bibl. World, Feb. 1909.

[According to St Luke, the "sign" is Jonah's acceptance by the Ninevites; St Matthew's account is an expansion, and the sign is the miraculous deliverance of Jonah.]

- 7h *Kennedy (H. A. A.)* The Scope and Function of the Apostolate in the New Testament. Bibl. World, Mar. 1909.

- Sharman (H. B.)* The Expanding Church. Bibl. World, Feb. 1909.

[Sets forth in narrative form the history in the Acts relating to the growth of the Church.]

- * *Case (S. J.)* The Resurrection Faith of the First Disciples.

Amer. J. Th., April 1909.

[They believed the risen Jesus was heavenly, a visible spirit in an ethereal body.]

- 8 *Hicks (E. L.)* Philip the Evangelist and the Epistle to the Hebrews.

Interpreter, April 1909.

[Attributes the authorship to Philip.]

- Carr (Arthur)* Covenant or Testament? A Note on Hebrews ix. 16, 17.

Expositor, April 1909.

- A *Bailey (J. W.)* Why was Acts written? Bibl. World, Jan. 1909.

[That fellow-Christians might believe that Pauline Christianity was the true conception of the Gospel.]

- Ramsay (Sir W. M.)* Luke's Authorities in Acts i.-xii. Expositor, April 1909.

- Baumgartner (E.)* Zur Siebenzahl der Diakone in der Urkirche zu Jerusalem.

Bibl. Ztschr., Heft 1, 1909.

[Finds, on Josephus' authority, that councils of seven managed affairs in Jewish towns, and the Apostles copied this—supported by the Rabbinic interpretation of Dt. xvi. 18.]

- Case (S. J.)* The First Christian Community. Bibl. World, Jan. 1909.

[Historical narrative.]

- Henke (F. G.)* The Gift of Tongues and Related Phenomena at the Present Day.

Amer. J. Th., April 1909.

[The New Testament phenomena, and those of to-day, are both "a recrudescence of psychic phenomena of a low stage of culture."]

- Lewis (F. G.)* Peter's Place in the Early Church. Bibl. World, March 1909.

[“We not only do injustice to Peter, but obscure strategic events in the life of the early Church, if we minimise Peter's service in the evangelisation of the Gentile world.”]

- Ramsay (W. M.)* Luke's Authorities in the Acts, chapters i.-xii. Expos., May 1909.

- Riggs (J. S.)* Who wrote the Book of the Acts? Bibl. World, Jan. 1909.

[By the familiar arguments, Luke is found to be the author.]

- B *Gilbert (G. H.)* The Greek Element in Paul's Letters. Bibl. World, Feb. 1909.

- Kennett (R. H.)* St Paul's Reference to the Resurrection. I. What the "Third Day" implies. Interpreter, April 1909.

[St Paul's belief in the risen body and the empty tomb.]

- Votaw (C. W.)* The Conversion and Early Ministry of Paul, Acts ix. 1-31, xi. 25-30, xiii. 1-xiv. 28; Gal. i. 15-24.

Bibl. World, April 1909.

- Milligan (George)* Paulinism and the Religion of Jesus. Expositor, June 1909.

[The indwelling Christ was for St Paul no empty abstraction, but a real Person freed from

all bodily limitations and able to make his divine power universally felt.]

- Garvie (Alfred E.)* Studies in the Pauline Theology. V. The Righteousness of God.

Expositor, April 1909.

[God's love has a moral content in the Cross inasmuch as sin is judged as well as forgiven, and therefore it exercises a moral constraint, human love responding to it is humble and contrite, as well as grateful and devoted.]

- Garvie (Alfred E.)* Studies in the Pauline Theology. VI. The Sanctification of Man.

Expositor, June 1909.

[We do justice to Christian experience only as we recognise that God as Spirit Himself becomes progressively immanent in those to whom He reveals Himself and whom He redeems in His Son.]

- J *Robinson (J. Armitage)* St Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians: An Exposition. 1909. Macmillan, 1909.

[A separate issue of the first portion of the Dean of Westminster's *Commentary on the Epistle to the Ephesians*, published in 1903.]

- L *Williams (A. L.)* The Cult of the Angels at Colossæ. J. Th. St., April 1909.

- N *Ramsay (Sir W. M.)* Historical Commentary on the First Epistle to Timothy.

Expositor, June 1909.

[Deals with: i. Purpose of the Letter, ii. Author; iii. Words peculiar to the Pastoral Epistles; iv. Difficulties encountered by Timothy in his charge at Ephesus.]

- 9 *Mangenot (E.)* Histoire et sagesse d'Ahikar l'Assyrien.

R. du Clergé français, Mar. 15, 1909

[Discusses the relation of the work to some of the O.T. writings.]

- Mari (F.)* Le idee escatologiche del libro di Enoch (concluded).

Riv. stor.-crit. d. Scienze Teol., Mar. 1909.

- Pentin (H.)* The Inspiration of the Apocrypha. Interpreter, April 1909.

- Winstedt (E. O.)* Addenda to "Some Coptic Apocryphal Legends."

J. Th. St., April 1909.

[Another fragment of a text, and translation.]

- C CHURCH 14 "Social Problems, 20 " Polity, 42 " Liturgical, 50 " Sacraments, 60 Missions.

- 14 *Figgis (J. N.)* The Gospel and Human Needs. Being the Hulsean Lectures delivered before the University of Cambridge, 1908-9. 209p. Longmans, 1909.

[Review will follow.]

- 15 *Anon.* Evolution and the Church.

Quar. R., April 1909.

- 20 *Pearson (Alfred)* The Ethics of Division. Church Q. R., April 1909.

- 21 *Mott (John R.)* The Future Leadership of the Church. 193p.

Hodder & Stoughton, 1909.

[Deals in a very careful way with the question as to the means of recruiting the ranks of the Christian ministry.]

- 26 *Putnam (James J.)* The Service to Nervous Invalids of the Physician and the Minister. Harvard Theol. R., April 1909.

[Physicians should stand for the skilled employment of special means of preventing disease, with all its causes, and of treating sick persons; clergymen represent the main agency by which the demoralisation of invalidism is counteracted.]

- Powell (Lyman P.)* The Emmanuel Movement in a New England Town. 206p. Putnam, 1909.
- [A systematic account of experiments and reflections designed to determine the proper relationship between the minister and the doctor in the light of modern needs. Gives an account of the aims and methods of the movement initiated by Dr Worcester.]
- 40 *Bishop (E.)* Liturgical Comments and Memoranda. J. Th. St., April 1909.
- 53 *Stone (Darwell)* A History of the Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist, 2 vols. 422 + 674p. Longmans, 1909.
- [Review will follow.]
- Anon.* The Resurrection Body: A Study in the History of Doctrine. Church Q. R., April 1909.
- 60 *Perlmann (S. M.)* The Jews in China. 24p. Narodiczky, 1909.
- [Deals *inter alia* with the question why the Jews have been absorbed in China by the Chinese and not by the Christians.]
- Elvira (Dango)* The Evangelisation of Japan. Harvard Theol. R., Apr. 1909.
- [Christianity has already taken root in the intellectual circles of Japan. If it succeeds also in taking root in the business world, it will triumph, and become the strongest moral power in Japan.]
- Brianquis (J.)* Au retour du Lessonto. Rev. chrét., Mar. 1909.
- [Describes the missionary situation there.]
- Serviere (J. de la)* Le problème des Missions. II. Le clergé indigène. R. prat. d'Apologét., Mar. 1, 1909.
- [Answer to severe criticisms by Canon Joly.]
- D DOCTRINE** 10 "God, 22 "Christ, 60 "Eschatology, 70 "Faith, 90 "Apologetics.
- Horne (C. Silvester), Selbie (W. B.), and others.* Mansfield College Essays. Presented to the Rev. A. M. Fairbairn, D.D., on the occasion of his 70th birthday. 398p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1909.
- [Eighteen essays, almost entirely theological in character. There is a bibliography of Dr Fairbairn's writings.]
- Labache (L.)* La notion théologique de personne. R. prat. d'Apologét., Mar. 1, 1909.
- h *Pfleiderer (Otto)* Primitive Christianity: Its Writings and Teachings in their Historical Connections. Translated by W. Montgomery, B.D. Vol. ii. (Theological Translation Library, vol. xxvi.) 510p. Williams & Norgate, 1909.
- 2 *Jeaffreson (Herbert H.)* Modernism. Church Q. R., Apr. 1909.
- [Counsels modernists to avoid all inclination to form a party, and hopes no difficulties will induce them to separate from that part of the Catholic Church in which God has placed them.]
- Inge (W. R.)* The Meaning of Modernism. Quar. R., Apr. 1909.
- [Objects to the modernists that the crisis of faith cannot be dealt with by establishing a *modus vivendi* between scepticism and superstition. Rather must one believe with Clement of Alexandria that *πιστις ἡ βιωσις, γνῶσις δὲ ἡ πίστις.*]
- 29 *Shearman (Henry Burton)* The Teaching of Jesus about the Future according to the Synoptic Gospels. 396p. University of Chicago Press, 1909.
- [An elaborate work. The word "Future" is used to denote the time subsequent to the final severance of relations between Jesus and his disciples. There is excluded, therefore, the study of the reputed teaching of Jesus about his rejection, sufferings, death, resurrection, and appearance after the resurrection. There is included, however, a chapter discussing the conception of Life after Death.]
- 33 *Tennant (F. R.)* The Positive Elements in the Conception of Sin. Expos., May 1909.
- 60 *Spitta (F.)* Die grosse eschatologische Rede Jesu. Theologische Stud. u. Krit., May 1909.
- 65 *Dole (Charles F.)* Truth and Immortality. Harvard Theol. R., Apr. 1909.
- [We belong to a kingdom of values, an order of good, a universe. The hope of immortality is our sense that the world may be trusted, that the real values abide: this world would not be quite a true world with the hope of immortality left out.]
- Dickinson (G. Lowes)* Is Immortality desirable? New Quar., April 1909.
- E ETHICS.** 6 *Christian Ethics*, 7-9 *Transition to General Ethics*, 10 *Theories*, 20 *Applied Ethics, Sociology*, 23 *Economics*, 27 *Education*.
- 10 *Wundt (Max)* Geschichte der griechischen Ethik. Bd. i. Die Entstehung der griechischen Ethik. 530p. Engelmann, 1908.
- Croce (Benedetto)* Filosofia della pratica. 434p. Guis, Laterza, e Figli, 1909.
- Anon.* The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas. Church Q. R., April 1909.
- [Criticises Westermarck's book. What is important for a scientific understanding of morality is not the development of moral ideas but the manifestation of moral feeling in action.]
- Sorley (W. R.)* Evolutionary Ethics. Quar. R., April 1909.
- [Pleads for a teleological interpretation of the process of evolution, the explanation of its purpose being sought in consciousness. Insists on the distinction between the genesis and the validity of ethical ideas.]
- Wilde (Norman)* The Meaning of Evolution in Ethics. Inter. J. Eth., Apr. 1909.
- [So far from evolution being the explanation of our moral judgments, our moral judgments are an explanation of evolution.]
- Calderoni (M.)* Formes et critères de responsabilité. R. de Mét. et de Morale, March 1909.
- [Attempts to distinguish precisely between moral and legal responsibility, and under the latter between criminal and civil responsibility. Criminal responsibility is independent of the general question of determinism.]
- Weber (L.)* La morale d'Épictète et les besoins présents de l'enseignement moral (fin). R. de Mét. et de Morale, March 1909.
- Piat (C.)* Du fondement de l'obligation morale (concluded). R. prat. d'Apologét., Mar. 1, 1909.
- 20 *Geissler (Kurt)* Der Zusammenhalt der Seeleneinheit mit dem Problem der Fortpflanzung, des Todes, der soziologischen Gemeinschaft und des soziologischen Fortschrittes. Z. f. Phil. u. phil. Krit., cxxxiv. 1, 1909.
- Barth (Paul)* Die Geschichte der Erziehung in soziologischer Beleuchtung: VIII. Vierteljahrssch. f. w. Phil., xxxiii. 1, 1909.
- [The philosophy of the German humanists shown to be both humanistic and religious.]

Their pedagogical theory is discussed, and also its effect upon the universities and secondary schools.]

MacGregor (D. H.) Some Ethical Aspects of Industrialism. Inter. J. Eth., Apr. 1909.

Palante (G.) La sociologie de G. Simmel. Rev. Phil., April 1909.

[Deals with Simmel's work, *Sociologische Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung*.]

Leblond (M. A.) L'idéal du XIX^e siècle. 338p. Alcan, 1909.

Bosanquet (Helen) The Poor Law Report of 1909. 270p. Macmillan, 1909.

[A summary explaining the defects of the present system and the principal recommendations of the Commission, so far as relates to England and Wales.]

Barnett (Canon S. A.) The Poor Law Report. Cont. R., April 1909.

Anon. The Reform of the Poor Law.

Quar. R., April 1909.

Bois (H.) Les œuvres sociales et charitables de Japon. L'orphelinat d'Ishii. Le Christianisme social, Feb. and Mar. 1909.

Calippe (C.) Mouvement social.

R. du Clergé français, Jan. 1, 1909.

[Dealing with the Geneva Conference of the Buyers' Social Leagues; the social work of Belgian Catholics; and the policy of the Confédération Générale du Travail.]

Calippe (C.) Mouvement social.

R. du Clergé français, April 1, 1909.

[With special reference to Roman Catholic social activities.]

Lichtenhan (R.) Le socialisme chrétien dans la Suisse allemande.

Le Christianisme social, Mar. 1909.

Passy (P.) Christianisme et socialisme.

Le Christianisme social, Feb. 1909.

[Thorough-going endorsement of socialism by a Christian.]

23 *Babut (C.)* Consommation et production. A propos d'une maxime de l'apôtre Paul.

Le Christianisme social, Feb. 1909.

[2 Thess. iii. 10.]

Davies (J. Llewelyn) Competition and Co-operation. Expos., May 1909.

[The former is inevitable and desirable, but needs regulation.]

27 *Delvolvé (J.)* Conditions d'une doctrine morale éducative (*suite et fin*).

R. de Mét. et de Morale, Mar. and May 1909.

[Considers, *inter alia*, whether the notion of God, as the basis of the religious organisation of the moral life, has an absolute practical value.]

Armstrong (Edward) A Spanish University: The Oviedo Tercentenary.

Church Q. R., April 1909.

28 *Tolstoy (Leo)* The Law of Force and the Law of Love: II. Fort R., April 1909.

["We in our day have reached a position in which we can no longer stay; whether we like it or no we must enter a new path of life; but we only require for that purpose one thing—to liberate ourselves from the superstitions of pseudo-Christianity and of governmental organisation."]

F PASTORALIA. 2 Sermons.

The Fellowship Hymn-book: 336 Hymns. Headley Brothers, 1909.

[Designed for adult schools, brotherhoods, P.S.A. and other kindred societies.]

Harris (J. Rendel) An Early Christian Hymn-book. Cont. R., April 1909.

[Announces the recovery of a very early Psalter, containing both Jewish and Christian elements in its composition, whose separate hymns reach a total of more than sixty pieces, some of which are marked by a fine imagination and reflect a lofty spiritual experience.]

Guibert (J.) L'apostolat de la miséricorde. R. prat. d'Apologét., April 1, 1909. [Of pastoral interest.]

2 *Lewis (F. Warburton)* The Work of Christ. 203p. Culley, 1909.

[Sermons preached at Holly Park Church, Crouch Hill.]

Adler (Hermann) Anglo-Jewish Memories, and other Sermons. 304p.

Routledge, 1909.

Reid (John) The First Things of Jesus. 262p. Clarke, 1909.

G BIOGRAPHY. 2 English.

Woodworth (R. S.) Hermann Ebbinghaus. J. of Phil., May 13, 1909.

[An obituary notice, containing a nearly complete bibliography of Ebbinghaus's work.]

1 *Dutoit (Marie)* Le Pascal de M. Stroumsky. Rev. chrét., April 1909.

[Review.]

M. B. Eugène Bersier.

Rev. chrét., April 1909.

Mailhet (A.) Quelques notes sur G. Farel. Rev. chrét., April 1909.

Pressensé (Mme. E. de) Lettres inédites. Rev. chrét., Mar. 1909.

[Belonging to the period of M. Edmond de Pressensé's last illness.]

Scholl (T.) Gaston Frommel et ses études de théologie moderne.

Rev. chrét., Mar. 1909.

2 *Herkless (J.) and Hannay (R. K.)* The Archbishops of St Andrews. Vol. ii.

267p. Blackwood, 1909.

[This volume is devoted to Andrew Forman, 1465?-1521.]

The Misses Story. Memoir of Robert Herbert Story, D.D., LL.D., Principal and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Glasgow. 422p.

[Principal Story's daughters have compiled a most interesting account of their father's life and of his strenuous labours as a divine and as Principal of a great University.]

H HISTORY. x Persecutions C Christian M Mediæval R Modern 2 English.

C *Duchesne (Louis)* Early History of the Christian Church from its Foundation to the End of the Third Century. Rendered into English from the 4th ed. 448p.

Murray, 1909.

[A popular account. Author takes an intermediate position between the Tubingen critics and the orthodox apologists.]

Glover (T. R.) The Conflict of Religions in the Early Roman Empire. 366p.

Methuen, 1909.

[A large part of this book formed the course of Dale Lectures delivered in Mansfield College, Oxford, in the spring of 1907. Review will follow.]

Kennedy (H. A. A.) Apostolic Preaching and Emperor-Worship.

Expositor, April 1909.

[Attempts a more or less definite estimate of certain aspects of the bearing of the Imperial cult on Christian teaching and influence in the first age of the Faith.]

Caldar (W. M.) A Fourth-Century Lycaonian Bishop: II.

Expositor, April 1909.

[Further notes on the early career of Eugenius.]

Moore (Clifford H.) Individualism and Religion in the Early Roman Empire.

Harvard Theol. R., April 1909.

Delehaye (H.) Sanctus.

Anal. Bolland., tom. xxviii., fasc. 2.

[Discusses: 1. The word *sanctus* in pagan speech; 2. The word *sanctus* in Christian speech; 3. To whom the title *saint* applies.]

Goodspeed (E. J.) The Nestorian Tablet.

Bibl. World, April 1909.

[An account of this tablet at Stan-Fu, erected by the Nestorian mission in China more than a thousand years ago. A copy has been made for New York.]

Poncelet (A.) Catalogus codicum hagiographicorum latinorum bibliothecarum Romanarum præter quam Vaticanæ.

Anal. Bolland., tom. xxviii., fasc. 2.

M. Dumand (P. H.) La "Jeanne d'Arc" de MM. Thalarnas et A. France, et la Jeanne d'Arc de l'histoire.

R. prat. d'Apologét., April 1, 1909.

Robinson (J. Armitage) Lanfranc's Monastic Constitutions. J. Th. St., April 1909.

R. Lang (A.) The Reformation and Natural Law. Princeton Th. Rev., April 1909.

I INDIVIDUAL CHURCHES AND WRITERS. C *Fathers* 2 *R.C. Church* 3 *Anglican*.

C. Bigg (Charles) The Origins of Christianity. Edited by T. B. Strong, Dean of Christ Church. 526p.

Clarendon Press, 1909.

[The above work was sent to the press on July 13, 1908. On the evening of that day Dr Bigg was seized by the illness of which he died on July 15. The book is a summary account of the history and thought of the Church up to the point at which the persecuting edicts were withdrawn for the last time. Review will follow.]

Stakemeier (B.) La Dottrina di Tertuliano sul Sacramento dell'Eucaristia.

Riv. stor.-crit. d. Scienze Teolog., Mar. 1909.

2 Petschenig (M.) Sancti Aureli Augustini Scripta contra Donatistas. (Vol. lii., Pars. ii., of the Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum.) 616p. Tempsky, 1909.

[Contains the texts of *Contra Litteras Petilianæ*, *Epistula ad Catholicos de secta donatistarum*, and *Contra Cresconium*.]

Barry (W.) Innocent the Great.

Quar. R., April 1909.

McCabe (J.) The Iron Cardinal: The Romance of Richelieu. 401p. Nash, 1909.

Bricout (J.) Notre réponse à un défi.

R. du Clergé français, Mar. 15, 1909.

[A summary of the articles on the truth of Catholicism, written as a reply to Loisy's challenge.]

Decker (M.) Mouvement intellectuel religieux dans les pays de langue allemande.

R. du Clergé français, Mar. 15, 1909.

[Dealing at length with the modernist position in Germany.]

Sortais (G.) Démocratie et Catholicisme.

R. prat. d'Apologét., April 15, 1909.

[Adduces considerations and examples to show there is no incompatibility, "ni de droit ni de fait." The present conflict is due, therefore, to accidental causes which are removable.]

Vacandard (E.) La vérité du Catholicisme. IV. L'institution formelle de l'Eglise par le Christ.

R. du Clergé français, Jan. 1, 1909.

[Categorically affirmed, against Loisy.]

Le Comité pour défendre à l'Etranger la politique religieuse de la France. Les textes de la politique française en matière ecclésiastique 1905-1908. 183p.

Nourry, 1909.

[All the texts are given in their strict entirety and without any commentary.]

Mater (André) La politique religieuse de la République française. 425p.

Nourry, 1909.

[This book is an introduction to a series of publications of texts, intended to make foreigners familiar with French religious politics. It shows how the Pope has interfered since 1905 not only with the French Government, but also with the whole of the French episcopacy.]

Vidal (J. M.) Le mouvement intellectuel religieux en Italie durant l'année 1908.

R. du Clergé français, Jan. 1, 1909.

[Deals (i.) with the modernists of Italy and their writings, (ii.) with the attitude of non-believers towards them, and (iii.) with the anti-modernist polemic.]

Frazer (P.) A Recent Chapter in the Modernist Controversy: The History of the Walmund Incident.

Amer. J. Th., April 1909.

[With excerpts from Walmund's address, "Catholic View of the Universe . . ." which led to the trouble at Innsbruck University.]

3 Plaque (G.) Chez les Anglicans.

R. du Clergé français, April 1, 1909.

[A French Catholic's view of High and Low Church.]

Talbot (Ethelbert) An American Diocese.

Church Q. R., April 1909.

4 Emerton (Ephraim) Calvin and Servetus.

Harvard Theol. R., April 1909.

Warfield (B. B.) Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God.

Princeton Th. Rev., April 1909.

Strathmann (H.) Calvin's Lehre von der Busse in ihrer späteren Gestalt.

5 Theologische Stud. u. Krit., May 1909.

Cooper (James) The Problem of Religion in Scotland.

Church Q. R., April 1909.

9 Jones (Rufus M.) Studies in Mystical Religion. 556p. Macmillan, 1909.

[Review will follow.]

Brathwaite (W. Charles) Spiritual Guidance in the Experience of the Society of Friends. (Swarthmore Lectures, 1909.) 112p. Headley Brothers, 1909.

[Lessons drawn are (a) that the Divine Personality reveals Himself along the common ways of life and with the help of the natural faculties of man, and (b) that we wait for some phenomenal manifestation of the Spirit.]

L LITERATURE. 2 *English*. 3 *German*. 5 *Italian*. 9 *Classical*.

Bayley (Harold) A New Light on the Renaissance displayed in Contemporary Emblems. Illustrated with reproductions of numerous emblems. 278p. Dent, 1909.

[A comprehensive study in medieval symbolism. Light is thrown upon the Legends of the St. Grail, the Romain of the Rose, and other medieval allegories, and it is shown to what a

very deep extent this literature entered into the lives of contemporary craftsmen.]

- Browning (Oscar)* The Old Culture and the New. New Quar., April 1909.
 2 *Austin (Alfred)* The Essentials of Great Poetry. Quar. R., April 1909.
Bradley (A. C.) Oxford Lectures on Poetry. 403p. Macmillan, 1909.
 [Delivered during author's tenure of the Chair of Poetry at Oxford, and not included in *Shakespearean Tragedy*. Review will follow.]
Magnus (Laurie) English Literature in the Nineteenth Century. 426p.

Melrose, 1909.

[The soul of the nineteenth century is revealed through the vision of its writers. Two movements especially stand out pre-eminently in retrospect. The first is the French Revolution, and the second is the Darwinian hypothesis. They are parts of a single whole, which may be called emancipation.]

Toynbee (Paget) Dante in English Literature from Chaucer to Cary (c. 1380-1844). With Introd., Notes, Biographical Notices, Chronological List, and General Index. 2 vols. 724 + 757p.

Methuen, 1909.

[An elaborate work. The number of authors represented is between five and six hundred, and the number of separate works quoted, including letters, diaries, reviews, magazine articles, besides books proper, amounts to considerably over a thousand.]

Forsyth (P. T.) Milton's God and Milton's Satan. Cont. R., April 1909.
 ["The grand flaw of this sublime and immortal book is what is also the most serious defect in a man, a society, or a nation—a false or inadequate idea of the character of God, through the absence of the cross of Christ."]

Macbride (Melchior) The Story of Glastonbury and the Grail, or the Light of Avalon. A Mystery Play concerning the Introduction of Christianity to England by Joseph of Arimathea. 106p.

Hunter & Longhurst, 1909.

Manning (Frederic) Scenes and Portraits. 296p. Murray, 1909.

[The contents are:—i. The King of Uruk; ii. At the House of Euripides; iii. The Friend of Paul; iv. The Jesters of the Lord; v. At San Casciano; vi. The Paradise of the Disillusioned. The author tells us that in these studies, all of them full of suggestive ideas, the principal influence has been that of Renan.]

Bradley (A. C.) English Poetry and German Philosophy in the Age of Wordsworth. (The Adamson Lecture, 1909.) 29p.

Manchester Univ. Press, 1909.
 [Largely a comparison between Hegel and Wordsworth.]

Lee (Sidney) Ovid and Shakespeare's Sonnets. Quar. R., April 1909.

V *Gribble (Francis)* Edward Fitzgerald. Fort. R., April 1909.

Faguet (E.) The Centenary of Tennyson. Quar. R., April 1909.

[A French estimate.]

Clutton-Brock (A.) The Ideas of William Morris. New Quar., April 1909.

Rhys (Ernest) A Tribute to Swinburne. 19th Cent., June 1909.

Gosse (Edmund) Swinburne: Personal Recollections. Fort. R., June 1909.

4 *Anon.* French Literature from the Renaissance to the Classic Age. Edin. R., April 1909.

M RELIGIONS. MYTHOLOGY. 4 *Hinduism*, 7 *Judaism*, 9 *Demonology*, 12 *Occultism*.

Marett (R. R.) The Threshold of Religion. 182p. Methuen, 1909.

[Author holds that many other conditions besides animism were no less primary in the development of religion. He thinks it can be conclusively shown that, in some cases, animistic interpretations have been superimposed on what previously bore a non-animistic sense.]

Clodd (Edward) Pre-Animistic Stages in Religion. Fort. R., June 1909.

Farnell (L. R.) Inaugural Lecture of the Wilde Lecturer in Natural and Comparative Religion. 31p. Blackwell, 1909.

Conybeare (F. C.) Myth, Magic, and Morals: A Study of Christian Origins. 394p. Watts, 1909.

[See p. 939.]

Archambault (M.) Une question nouvelle: Les hiéroglyphes néo-calédoniens. Rev. chrét., Mar. and Apr. 1909.

Brandenburg (E.) Les vestiges des plus anciens cultes en Phrygie.

R. de l'Hist. des Religions, Jan.-Feb. 1909.

Capart (Jean) Bulletin critique des religions de l'Égypte (1906 et 1907). 1^{er} art. R. de l'Hist. des Religions, Jan.-Feb. 1909.
 [Passes a large number of works and articles in review.]

Lefébure (E.) Le bon des Lupercales. R. de l'Hist. des Religions, Jan.-Feb. 1909.

5 *Bardy (G.)* A propos de la morale du Bouddhisme.

R. prat. d'Apologét., April 15, 1909.

Smith (Vincent A.), Ed. The Edicts of Asoka. Edited in English, with an Introd. and Commentary. 77p.

Privately printed, 1909.

7 *Castor (G. D.)* The Kingdom of God in the Light of Jewish Literature.

Bibliotheca Sac., April 1909.

[An inaugural lecture.]

9 *Thompson (R. Campbell)* Semitic Magic: Its Origins and Development. 332p.

Luzak, 1908.

Henry (Victor) La magie dans l'Inde antique. (Bibliothèque de Critique religieuse.) 328p. 2^e ed. Nourry, 1909.

[This volume, by the Professor of Sanscrit in the University of Paris, contains much new and interesting material.]

12 *The Writer of "Confessio Medici."* The Faith and Works of Christian Science. 252p. Macmillan, 1909.

[A strongly adverse criticism.]

Stead (W. T.) The Exploration of the Other World. Fort. R., May 1909.

[Describes how the Bureau for the purpose of attempting to bridge the abyss between the Two Worlds will be worked.]

P PHILOSOPHY. 10 *Metaphysics*, 21 *Epistemology*, 33 *Psychical Research*, 40 *Psychology*, 60 *Logic*, 70 *Systems*, 90 *Philosophers*.

Lindsay (James) Studies in European Philosophy. 391p. Blackwood, 1909.

[The twenty-two papers in this volume have, most of them, previously appeared in periodicals. Their unifying link is said to be "a certain spiritualistic element or idealistic tendency."]

Stress is laid upon the conception of personality both in God and man, in opposition to the Hegelian idealism.]

Creighton (J. E.) The Idea of a Philosophical Platform.

J. of Phil., March 18, 1909.

[When we look to the history of philosophy as a whole, we become conscious of the fundamental basis of agreement, the real process that renders philosophy objective and real.]

Wendel (G.) Systematische Philosophie und Einzelforschung.

Arch. f. system. Phil., xv. 2, May 1909.

- 10 *Urban (Wilbur Marshall)* Valuation: Its Nature and its Laws. Being an Introduction to the General Theory of Value. 451p. Sonnenschein, 1909.

[The theory of "value" is here considered as comprehending in a systematic way all types of human values. The problem is psychological, as dealing with subjective appreciations; but, as values become objectified in normative judgments, there is also the problem here called "axiological"—the "determination of the validity of distinctions between subjective and objective, already developed in worth experiences."]

- 12 *Rousmaniere (Frances H.)* The Bases for Generalisation in Scientific Methods.

J. of Phil., April 15, 1909.

Mangé (Francis) Le Rationalisme comme hypothèse méthodologique. 618p.

Alcan, 1909.

- 13 *Müller (Alois)* Ueber die Möglichkeit einer durch psychische Kräfte bewirkten Aenderung der Energieverteilung in einem geschlossenen System.

Z. f. Phil. u. phil. Krit., cxxxiv. 1, 1909.

[Such a possibility seems precluded because it contradicts either physical facts or the character of physical laws or principles.]

Lodge (Sir Oliver) The Ether of Space. (Library of Living Thought.) 172p.

Harper, 1909.

[The ether of space is a continuous, incompressible, stationary, fundamental substance or perfect fluid. Matter is composed of modified and electrified specks, or minute structures of ether, which are amenable to mechanical as well as to electrical force, and add to the optical or electric density of the medium.]

Campbell (Norman R.) The Physics of Gustave Le Bon. New Quar., April 1909.

Ignotus. Suggestions for a Physical Theory of Evolution: II.

Fort. R., April 1909.

[Deals with various consequences of the "physical theory."]

Snyder (Carl) The Physical Conditions at the Beginnings of Life.

19th Cent., April 1909.

Briot (A.) Les origines de la vie au point de vue scientifique.

Rev. de Phil., April 1909.

Pikler (Julius) Ueber die biologische Funktion des Bewusstseins. 13p.

Zanichelli, 1909.

[A reprint from *Rivista di Scienza* "Scientia."]

Arrhenius (Svante) The Life of the Universe. (Library of Living Thought.) 2 vols. 140 + 277p. Harper, 1909.

[This book, translated by Dr H. Borus, is the work of the Director of the Physico-Chemical Nobel Institute, Stockholm. An attempt is made to trace the development of cosmogonic conceptions from ancient days up to the present time.]

MacColl (Hugh) Man's Origin, Destiny, and Duty. 208p.

Williams & Norgate, 1909.

[Review will follow.]

Bennell (F. Palmer) Weismann's Theory of Heredity. Cont. R., April 1909.

[Explains and criticises Weismann's theory.]

Moore (A. W.) Absolutism and Teleology. Phil. R., May 1909.

[Discusses the question whether absolute perfectionism can be reconciled with the conception of evolution as an essential character of reality.]

Seward (A. C.), Ed. Darwin and Modern Science. Essays in Commemoration of the Centenary of the Birth of Charles Darwin and of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Publication of *The Origin of Species*. 612p. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1909.

[Amongst the twenty-nine essays are contained: "Mental Factors in Evolution," by Principal Lloyd Morgan; "The Influence of the Conception of Evolution on Modern Philosophy," by Professor Höffding; "The Influence of Darwin upon Religious Thought," by Rev. Father Waggett; and "The Influence of Darwinism upon the Study of Religions," by Miss J. Harrison.]

Hubrecht (A. A. W.) Darwinism and Wallaceism. Cont. R., June 1909.

Bateson (N.) Mendel's Principles of Heredity. 410p.

Cambridge Univ. Press, 1909.

- 14 *Jaffé (George)* Ueber die räumliche Anschauungsform: Vierter Dialog zu Berkeleys drei Dialogen zwischen Hylas und Philonous. Vierteljahrssch. f. w. Phil., xxxiii. 1, 1909.

[Primary and secondary qualities are not only like in character, but also separably perceptible. Touch and visual sensations lead to different forms of perception.]

Rawitz (B.) Ueber Raum und Zeit.

Arch. f. system. Phil., xv. 2, May 1909.

Tramer (M.) Ein Versuch die Dreidimensionalität des Raumes auf eine einfache lagegeometrische Erfahrungsannahme zu stützen.

Arch. f. system. Phil., xv. 2, May 1909.

- 16 *Duhem (P.)* Le mouvement absolu et le mouvement relatif (Appendice).

Rev. de Phil., April and May 1909.

- 19 *Brunschwig (L.)* Une phase du développement de la pensée mathématique.

R. de Mét. et de Morale, May 1909.

Reymond (A.) Note sur le théorème d'existence des nombres entiers et sur la définition logistique du zéro.

R. de Mét. et de Morale, March 1909.

[Discusses the definition of zero in the works of Russell and Couturat.]

Rogers (R. A. P.) Mr Haldane on Hegel's Continuity and Cantorian Philosophy. Mind, April 1909.

[Continuity as understood by Hegel and continuity as understood by Dedekind are quite distinct.]

- 21 *Milthaud (G.)* La pensée mathématique: Son rôle dans l'histoire des idées.

Rev. Phil., April 1909.

Schmidt (Karl) Critique of Cognition and its Principles.

J. of Phil., May 27, 1909.

[The distinction between cognition and knowledge is placed in the concept of system. Knowledge that satisfies the group of conditions for which the concept of system stands is cognition.]

Ever (B. C.) The Time Paradox in Perception. *J. of Phil.*, March 18, 1909.

[From any point of view the "sensible appearance," or object-as-perceived, if it is not identical with the psychical state, may be really past.]

M'Gilvary (E. Bradley) Experience and its Inner Duplicity.

J. of Phil., April 29, 1909.

[Experienced things are, when experienced, together in a unique way; this unique way of togetherness is not the result or the by-product of their being experienced, but is what is meant by their being experienced.]

Marvin (Walter T.) The Field of Propositions that have Full Factual Warrant.

J. of Phil., May 13, 1909.

[Answers three questions:—(i.) What fundamental relations do these judgments assert as obtaining between their terms? (ii.) How far is generalisation possible within their field? (iii.) What place do these propositions occupy in the several branches of knowledge?]

Bush (Wendell T.) The Existential Universe of Discourse.

J. of Phil., April 1, 1909.

[Knowledge cannot be defined in terms of perception. I do not know a thing when I perceive it unless I do more than perceive it. Knowledge of existence presumes and depends upon whatever existential universe of discourse we are provided with.]

Perry (R. Barton) The Mind's Familiarity with Itself.

J. of Phil., March 4, 1909.

[The accessibility of mind to itself, evident and important as it is, lends nevertheless no support to the contention that mind is known only in this way.]

Perry (R. Barton) The Mind Within and the Mind Without.

J. of Phil., April 1, 1909.

[The natural mind, or mind as here and now existing, is an organisation possessing as distinguishable but complementary aspects, interest, body, and objects.]

Farges (A.) L'union du sujet et de l'objet dans la perception des sens externes.

Rev. de Phil., April and May 1909.

[Discusses the views of Aristotle and St Thomas Aquinas, and contends that we have an immediate apprehension of material objects.]

Sheffer (Henry M.) Ineffable Philosophies.

[By this term is meant those systems which are based on premises which, for whatsoever reason, lead to no logical deductions, and which thus render the question of coherence, incoherence, consistency, and contradiction altogether meaningless. They are Illusion, Transformation, and Completion Philosophies.]

23 *Kroner (Richard)* Ueber logische und ästhetische Allgemeingültigkeit.

Z. f. Phil. u. phil. Krit., cxxxiv. 1, 1909.

[Maintains with Rickert the logical priority of *Sollen* to *Sein*. A law or principle is true because it is built logically upon judgments, and because these judgments and this logical construction ought to be unconditionally recognised by every thinking mind.]

25 *Seligmann (R.)* Kausalität.

Arch. f. system. Phil., xv. 2, May 1909.

Rohland (P.) Ueber Kausalität und Finalität.

Arch. f. system. Phil., xv. 2, May 1909.

31 *Sainsbury (Harrington)* Drugs and the Drug Habit. With 11 illustrations. 321p.

Methuen, 1909.

[This treatise does not aim at being a text-book. Its purpose rather is to look at the essentials of the task which disease sets and drugs undertake,

and to discuss with what show of reasonableness the medicaments can claim to be equal to their task. Questions of psychological interest are discussed.]

33 *Vaschide (N.)* Essai sur la psychologie de la main. (Bibliothèque de Philosophie expérimentale.) 504p. Rivières, 1909.

[An extensive series of experiments. M. Charles Richet has written a preface, referring regretfully to the early death of the author.]

40 *Duprat (G. L.)* Sur la durée des faits psychiques. *Rev. Phil.*, May 1909.

Loveday (T.) On Certain Objections to Psychology. *Mind*, April 1909.

[A criticism of Prichard's article in *Mind*, N.S., 61.]

Fleischmann (A.) Ueber die objektive Existenz der psychischen Energie.

Arch. f. system. Phil., xv. 2, May 1909.

Coe (George A.) The Mystical as a Psychological Concept.

J. of Phil., April 15, 1909.

Baldwin (J. Mark) Motor Processes and Mental Unity. *J. of Phil.*, April 1, 1909.

[Reply to Judd.]

Thorndike (E. L.) A Note on the Specialisation of Mental Functions with Varying Content. *J. of Phil.*, April 29, 1909.

Offner (Max) Das Gedächtniss: Die Ergebnisse der experimentellen Psychologie und ihrer Anwendung in Unterricht und Erziehung. 281p. Reuter und Reichard, 1909.

Miller (Irving E.) The Psychology of Thinking. 318p. Macmillan, 1909.

[The dominant point of view is biological in the broad sense. The life process is regarded in terms of the satisfaction of needs in the case of man. Special attention is paid to the activity of imagination in thinking.]

Ribot (Th.) La conscience affective.

Rev. Phil., April 1909.

[The affective consciousness is the consciousness of vital energies in the individual and their modalities: it is manifested as a natural force.]

44 *Dreus (Arthur)* Das Unbewusste in der modernen Psychologie.

Z. für Phil. u. phil. Krit., cxxxiv. 1, 1909.

[A defence of Von Hartmann against the criticisms of Herbart in his book, *Bewusstsein und Unbewusstes*.]

45 *Schwarztkopf (Dr)* Ist die Seele eine Substanz?

Z. f. Phil. u. phil. Krit., cxxxiv. 1, 1909.

[Contents, as against Paulsen, that an intelligible notion of substance, in which the notion of life is included, is applicable to the soul. The psychical whole is not only immanent in its parts and functions, but also transcends them, and is in so far substance.]

48 *Claparède (Ed.)* Psychologie de l'enfant et pédagogie expérimentale. Deuxième ed., revue et augmentée. 291p. Kündig, 1909.

[Deals with Problems and Methods, Mental Development, Intellectual Fatigue.]

53 *Marshall (H. Rutgers)* Clearness, Intensity, and Attention.

J. of Phil., May 27, 1909.

[What in one field appears as a change of what we commonly call clearness or vividness, in another field appears as a change of what we commonly call intensity. Intensity and clearness are names for the same characteristic in different settings.]

Warstat (Willi) Vom Individualbegriff. Vierteljahrssch. f. w. Phil., xxxiii. 1, 1909.

[Criticises the Kantian view that there can be no concepts of individuals, and examines the views of Riehl and Sigwart with regard to such

- concepts. Author insists that without concept of individuals, sense perception and thought would be whole disparate functions.]
- 60 *Goblot (E.)* Sur le syllogisme de la première figure.
R. de Mét. et de Morale, May 1909.
Hahn (O.) and Neurath (O.) Zum Dualismus in der Logik.
Arch. f. system. Phil., xv. 2, May 1909.
- 64 *Hocking (W. E.)* Two Extensions of the Use of Graphs in Elementary Logic. (Univ. of California Publications in Philosophy.) 14p. California Univ. Press, 1909.
- 71 *Kronenberg (M.)* Geschichte des deutschen Idealismus. Bd. i. Die idealistische Ideen-Entwicklung von ihren Anfängen bis Kant. 440p. Oscar Beck, 1909.
- Albee (Ernest)* The Present Meaning of Idealism. Phil. R., May 1909.
[Idealism may be said to have lived through its subjective phase, and the opposition between idealism and realism may be done away with in the not too distant future, on the basis of our increasing recognition of experience itself as the real.]
- 72 *Macmillan (R. A. C.)* Reflective Judgment: The High-Water Mark in the Critical Philosophy. Mind, April 1909.
[The usual criticism is that Kant has violated the nature of Feeling, particularly aesthetic, by reducing it to a form of intellectual cognition. In point of fact, he does quite the opposite. While in seeming he brings Feeling back to functions of knowledge, in the process of proof he lifts up knowledge into relationship with the Personal, free activity of Mind.]
- Kelly (M.)* Kant's Philosophy as rectified by Schopenhauer. 128p. Sonnenschein, 1909.
[Schopenhauer's Principle of the Sufficient Ground is the completion of the *Aesthetik* of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.]
- Amrhein (Hans)* Kants Lehre vom Bewusstsein überhaupt und ihre Weiterbildung bis auf die Gegenwart. 220p. Reuther & Richard, 1909.
[A very careful investigation in which the whole of the passages in Kant's writings relating to the conception are taken into account.]
- Witten (K.)* Zur Kritik des Kritizismus. Arch. f. system. Phil., xv. 2, May 1909.
- 74 *James (William)* A Pluralistic Universe: Hibbert Lectures at Manchester College on the Present Situation in Philosophy. 405p. Longmans, 1909.
[Review will follow.]
- Watson (John)* Mr Rashdall's Defence of "Personal Idealism." Mind, April 1909.
[As against Rashdall, author maintains there is no division between knowledge and reality in principle, and therefore no separation between any mode of existence and any other. He denies that there are "objects" which exist only in the individual mind of this or that person, and indeed rejects altogether the conception of "reality" as divided up into separate "things."]
- Talbot (Ellen Bliss)* Humanism and Freedom. J. of Phil., March 18, 1909.
- Riley (L. Woodbridge)* Transcendentalism and Pragmatism. J. of Phil., May 13, 1909.
[Between New England transcendentalism and New England pragmatism there are some striking parallels.]
- Bordeau (J.)* Pragmatisme et modernisme. 243p. Alcan, 1909.
- Montague (W. P.)* The True, the Good, and the Beautiful from a Pragmatic Standpoint. J. of Phil., April 29, 1909.
[Despite their inseparability, the conative and the cognitive types of value are as distinct from one another as north and south, and to seek to identify them or to reduce either to a form of the other is sheer confusion.]
- Berthelot (R.)* Sur le pragmatisme de Nietzsche (*suite*). R. de Mét. et de Morale, May 1909.
[Nietzsche recognises in the Sophists, and especially in Protagoras, an anticipation of his own way of interpreting the nature of truth, and Plato's argument against Protagoras in the *Theaetetus* is equally valid against himself.]
- Moore (A. W.)* "Anti-Pragmatism." J. of Phil., May 27, 1909.
[Reply to Professor Schinz.]
- Knox (H. V.)* Pragmatism: Evolution of Truth. Quar. R., April 1909.
[The distinction between "true" and "false," "real" and "unreal" only becomes applicable, only acquires real meaning, when thought is taken in its dynamic and temporal aspect. To dehumanise truth is to extract and cast aside its very essence.]
- Schiller (F. C. S.)* Solipsism. Mind, April 1909.
[Most of the great systems of philosophy are logically solipsisms. The humanist's refutation of solipsism is simple and sufficient. He is not a solipsist, because he chooses to believe in the existence of others.]
- 76 *Rey (A.)* Vers le positivisme absolu. Rev. Phil., May 1909.
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[Critiques Laurie's tendency to take the factor of negation and evil *per se* as a separate element in our temporal-spatial existence. "God is a spirit, but a spirit in difficulty." Our task as men is to co-operate with Him and "sympathise with Him" in His struggle as He sympathises with us in ours. Such a position, it is contended, makes man's position as well as God's apparently hopeless.]
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G. D. H. and J. H. W.

INDEX.

ARTICLES.

- ATOMIC THEORIES AND MODERN PHYSICS, 864.
 BERGSON, THE PHILOSOPHY OF, 562.
 BOOKLESS RELIGION, 163.
 CHESTERTON, MR G. K., THE MESSAGE OF, 541.
 CHRISTIANITY AMONG THE RELIGIONS, 510.
 CHRISTIANITY AND THE EMPIRE IN ROME AND IN CHINA, 639.
 CHRISTIANITY, IS THERE A COMMON? 493.
 CHRISTIAN MISSIONS AS AFFECTED BY LIBERAL THEOLOGY, 404.
 CHOICE, 802.
 CREDO, 481.
 CRIMINALS, A GREAT REFORM IN THE TREATMENT OF, 391.
 CULTE DES SAINTS DANS L'ISLÂM, LE, 844.
 CULT OF ANCESTORS AND HEROES, RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF
 THE, 415.
 DETERMINISM AND MORALS, 113.
 EARTH-SOUL, THE DOCTRINE OF, AND OF BEINGS INTERMEDIATE BETWEEN
 MAN AND GOD, 278.
 EVANGELICAL BARGAINING, 174.
 GREAT SOCIAL EXPERIMENT, A, 49.
 HEGEL AND HIS METHOD, 63.
 HOW MAY CHRISTIANITY BE DEFENDED TO-DAY? 152.
 INFALLIBILITY AND TOLERATION, 76.
 INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON MORAL EDUCATION, THE CENTRAL PROBLEM
 OF, 346.
 ISLÂM, THE RELIGION OF COMMON SENSE, 522.
 IS NATURE GOOD? A CONVERSATION, 827.

"JERAHMEEL THEORY," THE, 132.

JESUS OR CHRIST? AN APPEAL FOR CONSISTENCY, 352.

JESUS OR CHRIST? A REPLY TO MR ROBERTS, I., 746; II., 759.

JESUS' SECOND VISIT ON EARTH, THE MOSLEM TRADITION OF, 27.

KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL ÆSTHETIC IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN MATHEMATICS, 890.

LIFE IN THE WEST, THE MISCARRIAGE OF, 1.

MATTHEW AND MARK, VARIATIONS BETWEEN, 649.

MESSAGE OF MODERN MATHEMATICS TO THEOLOGY, THE, 370, 623.

MORAL INSTRUCTION, IS THE OLD TESTAMENT A SUITABLE BASIS FOR? 333.

OLD TESTAMENT CRITICISM, A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN, 813.

PAIN, 122.

PRAGMATISM, THE CONFUSION OF, 784.

PSYCHOTHERAPEUTICS AND RELIGION, 295.

REALITY OF GOD, A NEGLECTED ARGUMENT FOR THE, 90.

RELIGION, A CHINESE STATESMAN'S VIEW OF, 19.

RELIGIOUS LIFE AND THOUGHT IN GERMANY TO-DAY, 721.

ST JOHN'S GOSPEL, ON TWO DISLOCATIONS IN, 662.

SCOTTISH ESTABLISHMENT FROM AN INSIDE POINT OF VIEW, THE, 882.

SIN, THE OVER-EMPHASIS OF, 614.

SOCIAL CONSCIENCE OF THE FUTURE, THE, 314, 578.

SOCIAL RIGHTEOUSNESS AS A MORAL IDEAL, THE INSUFFICIENCY OF, 596.

SOCIETY FOR PSYCHICAL RESEARCH, SOME RECENT INVESTIGATIONS BY THE, 241.

SURVIVAL OF DEATH, NEW FACTS ON OUR, 261.

WAR, MORAL FORCE IN, 767.

Anon., Credo, 481.

Alford, B. H., Rev., M.A., Variations between Matthew and Mark, 649.

Balfour, G. W., Rt. Hon., Some Recent Investigations by the Society for Psychical Research, 241.

Bartlett, Lucy C., Miss, A Great Reform in the Treatment of Criminals, 391.

Brown, Alexander, Rev., The Over-Emphasis of Sin, 614.

Buckham, John Wright, D.D., Christianity among the Religions, 510.

Burton, J. W., Rev., Christian Missions as affected by Liberal Theology, 404.

Chesterton, G. K., Jesus or Christ? A Reply to Mr Roberts, 746.

- Cheyne, T. K., Rev., D.Litt., D.D.*, The "Jerahmeel Theory," 132.
- Dewey, John, Prof.*, Is Nature Good? A Conversation, 827.
- Eerdmans, B.D., Prof.*, A New Development in Old Testament Criticism, 813.
- Farnell, Lewis R., Dr.*, Religious and Social Aspects of the Cult of Ancestors and Heroes, 415.
- Forsyth, P. T., Rev., D.D.*, The Insufficiency of Social Righteousness as a Moral Ideal, 596.
- Frew, D., Rev.*, The Scottish Establishment from an Inside Point of View, 882.
- Graham, John, Principal*, New Facts on our Survival of Death, 261.
- Hart, Reginald, Lt.-Gen. Sir, V.C.*, Moral Force in War, 767.
- Herbert, von, F. W.*, The Moslem Tradition of Jesus' Visit on Earth, 27.
- Hopps, John Page*, Evangelical Bargaining, 174.
- Hutton, John A., Rev., M.A.*, The Message of Mr G. K. Chesterton, 541.
- Ishāk, Ibn*, Islām, the Religion of Common Sense, 522.
- James, William, Prof.*, Hegel and his Method, 63.
 The Doctrine of the Earth-Soul and of Beings
 intermediate between Man and God, 278.
 The Philosophy of Bergson, 562.
- Johnston, Charles*, A Chinese Statesman's View of Religion, 19.
- Keyser, C. J., Prof.*, The Message of Modern Mathematics to Theology, 370, 623.
- Ladd, G. T., Prof.*, The Confusion of Pragmatism, 784.
- MacLagan, P. J., Rev., M.A., D.Phil.*, Christianity and the Empire in Rome and in China, 639.
- McGiffert, A. C., Prof.*, How may Christianity be Defended To-Day? 152.
- Marshall, Henry Rutgers, Dr.*, Psychotherapeutics and Religion, 295.
- Moffatt, James, Rev., D.D.*, Bookless Religion, 163.
- Montet, E., Prof., D.D.*, Le Culte des Saints dans l'Islām, 844.
- More, Louis T., Prof.*, Atomic Theories and Modern Physics, 864.
- Moulton, J. H., Prof.*, Jesus or Christ? A Reply to Mr Roberts, 759.
- Muirhead, J. H., Prof.*, Is there a Common Christianity? 493.
 The Central Problem of the International Congress
 on Moral Education, 346.
- Paul, F. J., Rev., M.A., B.D.*, On Two Dislocations in St John's Gospel, 662.
- Peirce, C. S.*, A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God, 90.
- Plater, Charles, Rev., S. J.*, A Great Social Experiment, 49.
- Rāmanāthan, P., C.M.G., K.C.*, The Miscarriage of Life in the West, 1.
- Roberts, R., Rev.*, Jesus or Christ? An Appeal for Consistency, 352.
- Russell, Bertrand, Hon.*, Determinism and Morals, 113.
- Schiller, F. C. S., Dr.*, Choice, 802.
 Infallibility and Toleration, 76.
- Scudder, Vida, Miss*, The Social Conscience of the Future, 314, 578.

- Smith, W. B., Prof.*, Kant's Transcendental Æsthetic in the Light of Modern Mathematics, 890.
Stephen, Caroline, Miss, Pain, 122.
Tasmania, Rt. Rev. Bishop of, Is the Old Testament a Suitable Basis for Moral Instruction? 333.
Weinel, H., Prof., Religious Life and Thought in Germany To-Day, 721.
-

DISCUSSIONS.

- Astley, H. J. Dukinfield, Rev., D.D.*, The "Jerahmeel Theory," 441.
Cheyne, T. K., Rev., D.D., Criticisms of the North Arabian Theory, 673.
Cotter, W. E. P., Science and the Purpose of Life, 191.
Crooker, J. H., Rev., D.D., Professor Flinders Petrie on "Constraint respecting Liquors," 439.
Eshleman, C. H., Professor James on Fechner's Philosophy, 671.
Evans, J., Rev., The Over-Emphasis of Sin, 915.
Horton, Robert F., Rev., D.D., Jesus or Christ? 669.
Houston, D., Rev., The Church of Scotland and its Formula, 195.
Jerome, T. S., Dr Schiller on Infallibility and Toleration, 437.
Inkpin, H. W., The Social Conscience of the Future, 912.
MacColl, Hugh, Mathematics and Theology, 916.
M'Gilvary, E. B., Prof., British Exponents of Pragmatism, 443.
Montague, H. O., The Insufficiency of Social Righteousness, 911.
Schiller, F. C. S., Infallibility and Toleration, 670.
Stewart, W. C., Rev., Is Civilisation in Danger? 188.
Welby, Lady Victoria, How may Christianity be Defended To-Day? 436.
Widdrington, Captain, The Right to Constrain Men for their own Good, 193.
-

REVIEWS.

- Addis, W. E., Rev., M.A.*—Anon., Father and Son, 214.
Barbour, G. F., M.A.—James Adam, The Religious Teachers of Greece, 198.
Boyer, P. J., Rev., M.A.—A. H. M'Neile, The Book of Exodus, 226.
Carpenter, J. Estlin, Rev. Principal, D.D.—Religion in the Further East, 700.

- Corrance, H. C., M.A.*—Marcel Hébert, *Le Pragmatisme*, 218.
- Coulton, G. G., M.A.*—James Gairdner, *Lollardy and the Reformation in England*, 693.
- Fawkes, Alfred, Rev.*—Caroline Stephen and Edward Grubb, *Light Arising, and Authority and the Light Within*, 458.
- Ffrench, G. E., B.D.*—Brooke Foss Westcott, *The Gospel according to St John*, 697.
- Gardner, E. A., Prof., M.A.*—L. R. Farnell, *The Cults of the Greek States*, 927.
- Garrod, H. W., M.A.*—G. K. Chesterton, *Orthodoxy*, 448.
H. G. Wells, *First and Last Things*; and Margaret Benson, *The Venture of Rational Faith*, 680.
- Hicks, G. Dawes, Prof., Litt. D.*—Robert Adamson, *The Development of Greek Philosophy*, 919.
- Jones-Davies, W., Rev. Principal.*—Robert Scott, *The Pauline Epistles: A Critical Study*, 942.
- Jordan, Louis K., Rev.*—Nathan Söderblom, *Studiet av Religionen*, 467.
- Marett, R. R., M.A.*—F. C. Conybeare, *Myth, Magic, and Morals: A Study of Christian Origins*, 939.
- Moffatt, James, Rev. Dr.*—Lewis A. Muirhead, *The Terms of Life and Death in the Old and New Testaments, and other Papers*, 224.
- Petersen, Mrs.*—T. W. Rolleston, *Parallel Paths*, 461.
- Rashdall, Hastings, Rev. Dr.*—Julia Wedgwood, *The Moral Ideal: A Historic Study*, 933.
- Roberts, R., Rev.*—C. Frederick Nolloth, *The Person of our Lord and Recent Thought*, 945.
- Rolleston, T. W., M.A.*—Paul Sabatier, *Modernism: The Jowett Lectures for 1908*, 690.
- Russell, Bertrand, Hon., F.R.S.*—G. Stuart Fullerton and Others, *Essays in honor of William James*, 203.
- Seeger, W. T.*—P. Rāmanāthan, *The Culture of the Soul among Western Nations*, 706.
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- Sorley, W. R., Prof., LL.D.*—Josiah Royce, *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, 207.
- Souter, A., Dr.*—C. H. Turner, ed. *Ecclesiae Occidentalis Monumenta Iuris Antiquissima, Canonum et Conciliorum Graecorum Interpretationes Latinae. Tomi Secundi, Pars Prior*, 227.
- Stock, St George, M.A.*—Sir Oliver Lodge, *Man and the Universe*, 451.
H. Barclay Swete, *The Apocalypse of St John*, 220.
- Thomas, J. M. Lloyd.*—Canon and Mrs S. A. Barnett, *Towards Social Reform*, 684.
- Tyrrell, G., Rev.*—Baron F. von Hügel, *The Mystical Element of Religion*, 687.
- Vincent, G. E., Prof.*—W. M'Dougall, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*; and Graham Wallas, *Human Nature in Politics*, 930.


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Wolf, A., Dr.—Émile Meyerson, Identité et Réalité, 210.

A. C. Pigou, The Problem of Theism, and Other Essays, 454.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

RECENT BOOKS AND ARTICLES, 229, 469, 709, 949.



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